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A CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY INTO THE MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS OF THAT FREEDOM OF WILL, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, PRAISE AND BLAME,
对现代盛行观念的仔细而严谨的探究：论意志的自由，这种自由被认为是道德行动者（MORAL AGENCY）、美德与邪恶（VIRTUE AND VICE）、奖赏与惩罚（REWARD AND PUNISHMENT）、赞扬与指责（PRAISE AND BLAME）所必需的。
IT IS NOT OF HIM THAT WILLETH. – Rom. 9:16.
这不在乎那定意的（WILLETH）人。——罗马书九16
Considered by many to be the greatest book by enormously influential American preacher and theologian JONATHAN EDWARDS (1703 1758), this provocative 1754 work explores the necessity of God s grace for the redeeming of the damaged will of humanity and argues that free will is an extension of and connected to the grace of God.
这部富于挑战性的1754年著作被许多人认为是极具影响力的美国传道人兼神学家乔纳森·爱德华兹（JONATHAN EDWARDS）（1703-1758）最伟大的著作，它探讨了神的恩典（grace）对于救赎人类受损意志的必要性，并论证自由意志是神恩典的延伸，并与之相连。
What is the nature of morality?
道德的本质是什么？
Can God be evil?
神会是邪恶的吗？
What constitutes sin?
什么构成了罪？
How does God s foreknowledge of all events impact concepts of morality?
神对所有事件的预知如何影响道德观念？
How does intent inform our acts of vice and virtue?
意图如何影响我们的邪恶（vice）和美德（virtue）行为？
Still controversial and hotly debated in the 21st century, this demanding evangelistic work some call it the best argument for the sovereignty of God is among the essential reading of the thinker whose philosophies inspired the 18th-century religious of the Great Awakening, which continues to hugely influence American Protestantism to this day.
这部在21世纪仍然存在争议并被热烈讨论、要求很高的福音派著作（有人称之为对神主权（sovereignty of God）最好的论证）属于这位思想家的必读作品之列，祂的哲学激励了18世纪大觉醒（Great Awakening）的信徒，并持续对今天的美国新教（American Protestantism）产生巨大影响。
Freedom of the Will will enthrall and challenge serious readers of the Bible as well as students of theology’s impact on American history.
《论意志的自由》（Freedom of the Will）将吸引并挑战认真的圣经读者以及研究神学对美国历史影响的学生。
If you want to read an accessible summary of Edwards’ argument we recommend “The Will: Fettered but Free,” by Sam Storms.
如果你想阅读爱德华兹论点的易懂摘要，我们推荐萨姆·斯托姆（Sam Storms）的《意志：被束缚却自由》（The Will: Fettered but Free）。
This chapter originally appeared in A God-entranced Vision of All Things: The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards, edited John Piper and Justin Taylor (Crossway, 2004), 201-220, posted with the permission of Crossway.
本章最初出现在《万事沉浸于神的异象：乔纳森·爱德华兹的遗产》（A God-entranced Vision of All Things: The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards）一书中，由约翰·派博（John Piper）和贾斯汀·泰勒（Justin Taylor）编辑（十字路出版社，2004年），第201-220页，经十字路出版社许可发布。
Storms lays out an overview of his essay:
斯托姆（Storms）概述了祂的论文：
First, I will briefly unpack Edwards’ devastating critique of libertarianism, one that I am convinced has yet to be successfully refuted.
首先，我将简要阐释爱德华兹对自由意志论（libertarianism）的毁灭性批判，我相信这种批判迄今尚未被成功驳斥。
Second, I will reconstruct Edwards’ concept of the will.
其次，我将重构爱德华兹关于意志的观念。
Although some have found it to be intolerably complex, it is actually quite simple and forthright once one grasps the meaning of several important terms he employs.
尽管有些人认为它复杂得令人难以忍受，但一旦掌握了祂所使用的几个重要术语的含义，它实际上是相当简单和坦率的。
Third, and finally, I want to address the most problematic element in Edwards’ theology of the will, the fall of Adam and the entrance of evil into the human race.
第三，也是最后，我想谈谈爱德华兹意志神学中最成问题的一个要素：亚当的堕落和邪恶进入人类。
For those who want help in tracing Edwards’ full argument, Daniel P. Fuller has written section-by-section digest of Freedom of the Will.
对于那些希望追溯爱德华兹完整论证的人，丹尼尔·P·富勒（Daniel P. Fuller）为《论意志的自由》撰写了逐节摘要。
Table of Contents
目录
PART I.
第一部分
WHEREIN ARE EXPAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE
论述即将进行之讨论主题所涉及的各种术语和事物，并加以解释和陈述
Concerning the Nature of the Will
论意志的本质
Concerning the determination of the Will
论意志的决定
Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, & and of Contingence
论术语“必然性”（Necessity）、“不可能性”（Impossibility）、“无能”（Inability），以及“偶然性”（Contingence）的含义
Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability
论自然和道德的必然性以及无能的区别
Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency
论自由和道德行动者（moral Agency）的观念
PART II
第二部分
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF
论是否可能存在或能够存在某种意志的自由，即亚米念派（ARMINIANS）将之置于所有道德行动者（MORAL AGENTS）自由本质的那种自由；以及是否曾有过或可以构想出这种事物
Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will’s self-determining Power
显示亚米念派（Arminian）关于意志自由（Liberty of Will）观念的明显不一致，这种自由在于意志的自我决定能力（self-determining Power）
Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered
考量了几种被认为可以规避上述推理的方法
Whether any event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence
论无论何种事件，尤其是意志行为（Volition），是否可以在没有其存在原因的情况下发生
Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul
论意志行为（Volition）是否可以借着灵魂本性的活动（activity of the nature of the soul），在没有原因的情况下产生
Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause ofArminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently
显示：如果假设这些规避中所断言的事情是真实的，它们也完全不相关，并且不能帮助亚米念派的自由（Arminian Liberty）；以及在这种情况下，亚米念派（Arminian）作者是如何被迫进行不一致的言论
Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind
论意志在思想看来完全无所谓（perfectly indifferent）的事情上作出决定
Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference
论意志自由的概念，在于无所谓（Indifference）
Concerning the supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all Necessity
论意志被假定的自由，作为所有必然性（Necessity）的对立面
Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding
论意志行为与悟性（Understanding）指导（Dictates）的关联（Connexion）
Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb’s assertions and reasonings about the Freedomof the Will
意志行为（Volition）必然与动机的影响（influence of Motives）相连：并特别观察了查布先生（Mr. Chubb）关于意志自由的断言和推理中巨大的不一致
The evidence of Gods certain Foreknowledge of the volitions of moral Agents
神对道德行动者（moral Agents）意志行为（volitions）的确定预知（certain Foreknowledge）的证据
God’s certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is without all necessity
神对道德行动者未来意志行为的确定预知，与那些脱离所有必然性（necessity）的意志行为的偶然性（contingence）不一致
Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty
无论我们是否假设道德行动者（moral Agents）的意志行为与任何先前事物相关联，它们都必须在某种意义上是必然的，从而推翻亚米念派（Arminian）的自由
PART III
第三部分
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF
论是否可能存在或能够存在某种意志的自由，即亚米念派（ARMINIANS）将之置于所有道德行动者（MORAL AGENTS）自由本质的那种自由；以及是否曾有过或可以构想出这种事物
God’s moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy
神的道德至美（moral Excellency）是必然的，但仍是美德（virtuous）和值得赞扬的
The Acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praise-worthy, rewardable
耶稣基督的人类灵魂（human soul）的意志行为，必然是圣洁的，但仍是真正的美德（virtuous）、值得赞扬的、可得奖赏的（rewardable）
The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with Blameworthiness
神任凭人犯罪（given up of God to sin），以及堕落之人（fallen man）的一般情况，证明道德的必然性（moral Necessity）和无能（Inability）与可归咎性（Blameworthiness）是一致的
Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey
命令和顺服的义务，与道德上的无能（moral Inability）相一致
That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed to excuse in the non-performance of things in themselves good, particularly considered
对那些被认为可以为未能执行本质上是好的事物提供借口的渴望和努力的真诚（Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours），进行特别考量
Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of Liberty and moral Agency
无所谓（indifference）的自由不仅对美德（Virtue）不是必需的，而且是完全不一致的；并且所有美德的或邪恶的习惯或倾向，都与亚米念派（Arminian）关于自由和道德行动者（moral Agency）的观念不一致
Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions
亚米念派（Arminian）关于道德行动者（moral Agency）的观念与所有动机和诱因（Motive and Inducement）在美德或邪恶行为中的影响不一致
PART IV
第四部分
WHEREIN THE CHIEF GROUNDS OF THE REASONINGS OF ARMINIANS, IN SUPPORT AND DEFENCE OF THE FOREMENTIONED NOTIONS OF LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, &c. AND AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED
考量亚米念派（ARMINIANS）在支持和辩护上述自由、道德行动者等观念，以及反对对立教义时的主要推理基础
The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their nature
内心性情（dispositions of the heart）和意志行为（acts of the will）的美德和邪恶的本质，不在于它们的起因（cause），而在于它们的性质（nature）
The Falseness and Inconsistence of that Metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency Which Seems to be Generally Entertained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, Moral Agency
普遍被亚米念派（Arminian）关于自由和道德行动者教义的辩护者所接受的关于行动和行动者（Action and Agency）的形而上学（Metaphysical）观念的虚假性（Falseness）和不一致性（Inconsistence）
The Reasons Why Some Think It Contrary To Common Sense, To Suppose Those Things Which Are Necessary, To Be Worthy of Either Praise Or Blame
为什么有些人认为，假设那些必然（Necessary）的事物是值得赞扬或指责的，是与常识（Common Sense）相悖的原因
It Is Agreeable To Common sense, And The Natural Notions of Mankind, To Suppose Moral Necessity To Be Consistent With Praise And Blame, Reward And Punishment
假设道德的必然性（Moral Necessity）与赞扬和指责、奖赏和惩罚相一致，是与常识（Common sense）和人类的自然观念相符的
Concerning Those Objections, That This Scheme Of Necessity Renders All Means and Endeavours For The Avoiding Of Sin, Or The Obtaining Virtue And Holiness, Vain And To No Purpose; And That It makes Men No More Than Mere Machines In Affairs Of Morality And Religion
关于那些异议，即这种必然性（Necessity）的体系使所有避免罪恶，或获得美德和圣洁的手段和努力都归于徒然和毫无用处；并且它使人在道德和宗教事务中不过是单纯的机器
Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Agrees With The Stoical Doctrine O Faith, And The Opinions of Mr. Hobbes
关于反对所主张的教义的那个异议，即它与斯多葛（Stoical）的信仰教义（Doctrine O Faith）以及霍布斯先生（Mr. Hobbes）的观点一致
Concerning The Necessity Of The Divine Will
论神圣意志（Divine Will）的必然性