Lex, Rex
列克斯，雷克斯

The Law and the Prince
法律与王子

by Samuel Rutherford
由塞缪尔·拉瑟福德撰写

A DISPUTE FOR
一场争议

THE JUST PREROGATIVE OF KING AND PEOPLE:
国王和人民的公正特权

CONTAINING
包含

THE REASONS AND CAUSES OF THE MOST NECESSARY DEFENSIVE WARS OF THE KINGDOM OF SCOTLAND,
苏格兰王国进行最必要的防御战争的原因和原因

AND OF THEIR
他们的

EXPEDITION FOR THE AID AND HELP OF THEIR DEAR BRETHREN OF ENGLAND;
前往英格兰援助和帮助亲爱的兄弟们的远征行动；

IN WHICH THEIR INNOCENCY IS ASSERTED, AND A FULL ANSWER IS GIVEN TO A SEDITIOUS PAMPHLET, ENTITULED,
在其中肯定了他们的无辜，并对一本煽动性小册子给予了充分回应，该小册子名为《》

"SACRO-SANCTA REGUM MAJESTAS,"
"至高无上的君王权威"

OR

THE SACRED AND ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF CHRISTIAN KINGS;
基督教国王的神圣和皇家特权

UNDER THE NAME OF J. A., BUT PENNED BY
以 J.A.的名义，但是由...写成

JOHN MAXWELL, THE EXCOMMUNICATE POPISH PRELATE;
约翰·麦克斯韦尔，被逐出教会的天主教主教；

WITH A SCRIPTURAL CONFUTATION OF THE RUINOUS GROUNDS OF W. BARCLAY, H. GROTIUS, H. ARNISÆU, ANT. DE DOMI. POPISH BISHOP OF SPALATO, AND OF OTHER LATE ANTI-MAGISTRATICAL ROYALISTS, AS THE AUTHOR OF OSSORIANUM, DR FERNE, E. SYMMONS, THE DOCTORS OF ABERDEEN, ETC.
以圣经为根据，驳斥 W.巴克利、H.格罗提乌斯、H.阿尼斯奥、斯帕拉托的天主教主教安东尼奥·德·多米尼科等人的毁灭性观点，以及其他近期反政府派皇家主义者，如《奥西里亚纳》的作者、费恩博士、E.西蒙斯、阿伯丁大学的医生们等。

IN FORTY-FOUR QUESTIONS
四十四个问题

BY THE
通过

REV. SAMUEL RUTHERFORD
塞缪尔·鲁瑟福牧师

SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.
圣安德鲁斯大学神学教授。

"But if you shall still do wickedly, ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king."—1 SAM. 12:25

EDINBURGH:
爱丁堡

ROBERT OGLE AND OLIVER & BOYD
罗伯特·奥格尔和奥利弗与博伊德

M. OGLE & SON AND WILLIAM COLLINS, GLASGOW
M. OGLE & SON 和威廉·柯林斯，格拉斯哥

D. DEWAR, PERTH. A. BROWN & CO., ABERDEEN. W. M'COMB, BELFAST
D. DEWAR, 珀斯。A. BROWN & CO., 阿伯丁。W. M'COMB, 贝尔法斯特。

HAMILTON, ADAMS & CO., AND JAMES NISBET & CO., LONDON
汉密尔顿，亚当斯公司和詹姆斯尼斯贝特公司，伦敦

MDCCCXLIII
1843

TABLE OF CONTENTS
目录

SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF RUTHERFORD
卢瑟福的生平简述

AUTHOR'S PREFACE
作者的前言

QUESTION I: Whether government be by a divine law
问题一：政府是否应遵循神圣法律？

How government is from God.—Civil power, in the root, immediately from God.
政府如何来自上帝——民权，根源上直接来自上帝。

QUESTION II: Whether or no government be warranted by the law of nature
问题二：政府是否受自然法所授权

Civil society natural in radice, in the root, voluntary in modo, in the manner.—Power of government, and power of government by such and such magistrates, different.—Civil subjection not formally from nature's laws.—Our consent to laws penal, not antecedently natural.—Government by such rulers, a secondary law of nature.—Family government and politic different.—Government by rulers a secondary law of nature; family government and civil different.—Civil government, by consequent, natural.
公民社会在根源上是自然的，在方式上是自愿的。政府的权力和由某些官员组成的政府的权力是不同的。公民的服从并非来自自然法。我们对刑法的同意并非先天自然。由这样的统治者组成的政府是自然法的次要规则。家庭政府和政治不同。由统治者组成的政府是自然法的次要规则；家庭政府和公民政府不同。因此，公民政府是自然的。

QUESTION III: Whether royal power and definite forms of government be from God
问题三：皇权和明确的政府形式是否来自上帝？

That kings are from God, understood in a fourfold sense.—The royal power hath warrant from divine institution.—The three forms of government not different in specie and nature.—How every form is from God.—How government is an ordinance of man, 1 Pet. 2:13.
国王是来自上帝的，以四重意义理解。皇权得到了上帝的设立的保证。三种政府形式在种类和性质上并无不同。每种形式都是来自上帝。政府是人的制度，彼得前书 2:13。

QUESTION IV: Whether or no the king be only and immediately from God, and not from the people
问题四：国王是否仅仅来自上帝，而不是来自人民？

How the king is from God, how from the people.—Royal power three ways in the people.—How royal power is radically in the people.—The people maketh the king.—How any form of government is from God.—How government is a human ordinance, 1 Pet. 2:3.—The people create the king.—Making a king, and choosing a king, not to be distinguished.—David not a king formally, because anointed by God.
国王是如何来自上帝，又如何来自人民。——人民中的皇权有三种方式。——皇权根本上在于人民。——人民造就了国王。——任何形式的政府都来自上帝。——政府是人类的制度，彼得前书 2:3。——人民创造了国王。——成为国王和选择国王没有区别。——大卫不是正式的国王，因为他是被上帝膏选的。

QUESTION V: Whether or no the P. Prelate proveth that sovereignty is immediately from God, not from, the people
问题五：主教是否证明了主权是直接来自上帝，而不是人民？

Kings made by the people, though the office, in abstracto, were immediately from God.—The people have a real action, more than approbation, in making a king.—Kinging of a person ascribed to the people.—Kings in a special manner are from God, but it followeth not; therefore, not from the people.—The place, Prov. 8:15, proveth not but kings are made by the people.—Nebuchadnezzar, and other heathen kings, had no just title before God to the kingdom of Judah, and divers other subdued kingdoms.
人民创造了国王，尽管这个职位本质上是来自上帝。人民在创造国王方面有着实际的行动，而不仅仅是赞同。将一个人封为国王是归功于人民。国王特别是来自上帝，但这并不意味着不来自人民。箴言 8:15 的地方并不能证明国王是由人民创造的。尼布甲尼撒和其他异教国王在上帝面前对犹大王国和其他被征服的王国没有正当的称号。

QUESTION VI: Whether or no the king be so allenarly from both, in regard of sovereignty and designation of his person, as he is noway from the people, but only by mere approbation
问题六：无论国王是否因主权和个人身份的确定而与两者完全分离，他与人民之间并没有任何区别，只是通过纯粹的认可

The forms of government not from God by an act of naked providence, but by his approving will.—Sovereignty not from the people by sole approbation.—Though God have peculiar acts of providence in creating kings, it followeth not hence that the people maketh not kings.—The P. Prelate exponeth prophecies true only of David, Solomon, and Jesus Christ, as true of profane heathen kings.—The P. Prelate maketh all the heathen kings to be princes, anointed with the holy oil of saving grace.
政府形式不是由上帝的裸露意愿而来，而是经过他的批准意愿而来。主权不是由人民的唯一赞同而来。尽管上帝在创造国王方面有特殊的意愿，但这并不意味着人民不能创造国王。主教解释了只适用于大卫、所罗门和耶稣基督的预言，将其解释为适用于亵渎的异教国王。主教将所有异教国王都视为王子，受到拯救恩典的圣油的膏立。

QUESTION VII: Whether the P. Prelate conclude that neither constitution nor designation of kings is from the people
问题七：P. Prelate 是否得出结论，既不是宪法也不是国王的指定来自人民？

The excellency of kings maketh them not of God's only constitution and designation.—How sovereignty is in the people, how not.—A community doth not surrender their right and liberty to their rulers, so much as their power active to do, and passive to suffer, violence.—God's loosing of the bonds of kings, by the mediation of the people's despising him, proveth against the P. Prelate that the Lord taketh away, and giveth royal majesty mediately, not immediately.—The subordination of people to kings and rulers, both natural and voluntary; the subordination of beasts and creatures to man merely natural.—The place, Gen. 9:5, "He that sheddeth man's blood," &c. discussed.
国王的卓越并不意味着他们是上帝唯一的构成和指定。——主权是属于人民的，也不是属于人民的。——一个社区不是将他们的权利和自由完全交给统治者，而是将他们主动行使的权力和被动承受的暴力交给统治者。——上帝通过人民蔑视他来解除国王的束缚，这证明了主以间接而非直接的方式夺走和赋予王权的威严。——人民对国王和统治者的从属关系既是自然的，也是自愿的；而动物和生物对人类的从属关系仅仅是自然的。——创世记 9:5 中的“流人血的”，等等。

QUESTION VIII: Whether or no the P. Prelate proveth, by force of reason, that the people cannot be capable of any power of government
问题八：P. Prelate 是否通过理性的力量证明了人民不能拥有任何政府权力。

In any community there is an active and passive power to government.—Popular government is not that wherein the whole people are governors.—People by nature are equally indifferent to all the three governments, and are not under any one by nature.—The P. Prelate denieth the Pope his father to be the antichrist.—The bad success of kings chosen by people proveth nothing against us, because kings chosen by God had bad success through their own wickedness.—The P. Prelate condemneth king Charles' ratifying (Parl. 2, an. 1641) the whole proceedings of Scotland in this present reformation.—That there be any supreme judges is an eminent act of divine providence, which hindereth not but that the king is made by the people.—The people not patients in making a king, as is water in the sacrament of baptism, in the act of production of grace.
在任何社区中，政府有积极和消极的权力。——民主政府并不是整个人民都是统治者的政府。——人们天性上对这三种政府都一样冷漠，并且天性上不属于任何一种。——P. Prelate 否认教皇是敌基督。——由人民选择的国王的不良结果对我们没有任何证明，因为由上帝选择的国王由于自己的邪恶而遭受了不良结果。——P. Prelate 谴责查尔斯国王在这次现行改革中批准（议会第二次，1641 年）苏格兰的全部行动。——有任何最高法官是神圣的普遍行动，这并不妨碍国王是由人民选出的。——人民在选择国王时不是被动的，就像洗礼的圣事中的水在产生恩宠的行动中一样。

QUESTION IX: Whether or no sovereignty is so in and from the people, that they may resume their power in time of extreme necessity
问题九：主权是否完全来自人民，以至于他们可以在极端紧急情况下恢复他们的权力

How the people is the subject of sovereignty.—No tyrannical power is from God.—People cannot alienate the natural power of self-defence.—The power of parliaments.—The Parliament hath more power than the king.—Judges and kings differ.—People may resume their power, not because they are infallible, but because they cannot so readily destroy themselves as one man may do.—That the sanhedrim punished not David, Bathsheba, Joab, is but a fact, not a law.—There is a subordination of creatures natural, government must be natural; and yet this or that form is voluntary.
人民是主权的主体。没有暴政的权力来自上帝。人民不能剥夺自卫的自然权力。议会的权力比国王更大。法官和国王是不同的。人民可以恢复他们的权力，不是因为他们是无误的，而是因为他们不能像一个人那样轻易地毁灭自己。圣会没有惩罚大卫、拔示巴、约押，这只是一个事实，而不是一条法律。有一种自然的层级关系，政府必须是自然的；然而，这种或那种形式是自愿的。

QUESTION X: Whether or not royal birth be equivalent to divine unction
问题 X：皇室出生是否等同于神圣的膏抹

Impunged by eight arguments.—Royalty not transmitted from father to son.—A family may be chosen to a crown as a single person is chosen, but the tie is conditional in both.—The throne, by special promise, made to David and his seed, by God, (Psal. 89,) no ground to make birth, in foro Dei, a just title to the crown.—A title by conquest to a throne must be unlawful, if birth be God's lawful title.—Royalists who hold conquest to be a just title to the crown, teach manifest treason against king Charles and his royal heirs.—Only, bona fortunæ, not honour or royalty, properly transmitable from father to son.—Violent conquest cannot regulate the consciences of people to submit to a conqueror as their lawful king.—Naked birth is inferior to that very divine unction, that made no man a king without the people's election.—If a kingdom were by birth the king might sell it.—The crown is the patrimony of the kingdom, not of him who is king, or of his father.—Birth a typical designment to the crown in Israel.—The choice of a family to the crown, resolveth upon the free election of the people as on the fountain cause.—Election of a family to the crown lawful.
被八个论点所质疑。——王权不会由父亲传给儿子。——选择一个家族来继承王位，就像选择一个人一样，但这种联系是有条件的。——上帝特别应许给大卫和他的后裔王位（诗篇 89），这并不能成为在上帝的法庭上，出生成为王位的正当理由。——如果出生是上帝的合法称号，那么通过征服获得王位的称号必定是不合法的。——认为征服是合法的王位称号的王党派，明显是在教唆反对查尔斯国王及其皇室继承人的叛国行为。——只有财富，而不是荣誉或王权，才能真正从父亲传给儿子。——暴力征服不能规定人们的良心，使他们服从征服者作为合法国王。——裸露的出生地位低于那种没有人民选举就不能成为国王的神圣膏抹。——如果一个王国是通过出生来决定的，国王可能会出售它。——王冠是王国的家产，而不是国王或他的父亲的家产。——出生是以色列王冠的象征性指定。——选择一个家族来继承王位，是基于人民的自由选举作为根本原因的合法行为。——选择一个家族来继承王位是合法的。

QUESTION XI: Whether or no he be more principally a king who is a king by birth, or he who is a king by the free election of the people
问题十一：无论是出生即为国王的国王，还是由人民自由选举而成为国王的国王，哪一个更主要？

The elective king cometh nearer to the first king. (Deut. 17)—If the people may limit the king, they give him the power.—A community have not power formally to punish themselves.—The hereditary and the elective prince in divers considerations, better or worse, each one than another.
选举国王更接近第一位国王。（申命记 17 章）如果人民可以限制国王，他们就给予了他权力。一个社区没有正式惩罚自己的权力。世袭和选举的王子在各种考虑中，有的比另一个更好或更差。

QUESTION XII: Whether or no a kingdom may lawfully be purchased by the sole title of conquest
第十二个问题：一个王国是否可以通过征服的唯一权利来合法购买？

A Twofold right of conquest.—Conquest turned in an after-consent of the people, becometh a just title.—Conquest not a signification to us of God's approving will.—Mere violent domineering contrary to the acts of governing.—Violence hath nothing in it of a king.—A bloody conqueror not a blessing, per se, as a king is.—Strength as prevailing is not law or reason.—Fathers cannot dispose of the liberty of posterity not born.—A father, as a father, hath not power of life and death. Israel and David's conquests of the Canaanites, Edomites, Ammonites not lawful, because conquest, but upon a divine title of God's promise.
征服的双重权利。征服在人民事后同意的情况下，成为正当的称号。征服对我们来说并不意味着上帝的赞同意愿。纯粹的暴力统治与治理行为相悖。暴力本身并不具备国王的特质。一个血腥的征服者并不像国王一样是一种祝福。力量的胜利并不等同于法律或理性。父亲不能决定尚未出生的后代的自由。作为父亲，他没有生杀予夺的权力。以色列和大卫对迦南人、以东人、亚扪人的征服并不合法，因为这是基于上帝的应许。

QUESTION XIII: Whether or no royal dignity have its spring from nature, and how it is true "Every man is born free," and how servitude is contrary to nature
问题十三：皇家尊严是否源自自然，以及“人人生而自由”是如何成立的，奴役如何违背自然

Seven sorts of superiority and inferiority.—Power of life and death from a positive law.—A dominion antecedent and consequent.—Kings and subjects no natural order.—A man is born, consequenter, in politic relation.—Slavery not natural from four reasons.—Every man born free in regard of civil subjection (not in regard of natural, such as of children and wife, to parents and husband) proved by seven arguments.—Politic government how necessary, how natural.—That parents should enslave their children not natural.
七种优劣之分。正面法律赋予生死权力。先后的统治。国王和臣民没有自然秩序。一个人出生后，与政治关系相关。奴隶制不是自然的，有四个原因。每个人在公民服从方面都是自由的（不是在自然方面，比如儿女和妻子对父母和丈夫的服从），通过七个论点证明。政治统治是多么必要，多么自然。父母奴役他们的孩子是不自然的。

QUESTION XIV: Whether or no the people make a person their king conditionally or absolutely; and whether the king be tyed by any such covenant
问题十四：人民是否有条件或绝对地选择一个人作为他们的国王；国王是否受到任何此类契约的约束

The king under a natural, but no civil obligation to the people, as royalists teach.—The covenant civilly tyeth the king proved by Scriptures and reasons, by eight arguments.—If the condition, without which one of the parties would never have entered into covenant, be not performed, that party is loosed from the covenant.—The people and princes are obliged in their places for justice and religion, no less than the king.—In so far as the king presseth a false religion on the people, eatenus, in so far they are understood not to have a king.—The covenant giveth a mutual co-active power to king and people to compel each other, though there be not one on earth higher than both to compel each of them.—The covenant bindeth the king as king, not as he is a man only.—One or two tyrannous acts deprive not the king of his royal right.—Though there were no positive written covenant (which yet we grant not) yet there is a natural, tacit, implicit covenant tying the king, by the nature of his office.—If the king be made king absolutely, it is contrary to Scripture and the nature of his office.—The people given to the king as a pledge, not as if they became his own to dispose of at his absolute will.—The king could not buy, sell, borrow, if no covenant should tie him to men.—The covenant sworn by Judah (2 Chron. 15) tyed the king.
国王在自然界下，并无对人民的民事义务，正如王党所教。——通过圣经和理由，以八个论点证明契约在民事上约束国王。——如果没有达到一方进入契约的条件，那么该方就可以解除契约。——人民和君主在他们的职位上对正义和宗教有义务，与国王一样。——只要国王向人民强加错误的宗教，人们就理解他们没有国王。——契约赋予国王和人民相互强制的权力，尽管地球上没有比他们更高的人来强制他们中的任何一个。——契约约束国王作为国王，而不仅仅是作为一个人。——一两个暴虐的行为并不剥夺国王的王权。——即使没有明确的书面契约（我们并不否认），根据他的职位的性质，国王也有一种自然的、心照不宣的契约。——如果国王被绝对地成为国王，那就违背了圣经和他的职位的性质。- 作为抵押品交给国王的人民，并不意味着他们成为他完全支配的财产。 - 如果没有契约将国王与人民联系在一起，国王不能买卖、借贷。 - 犹大所宣誓的契约（《历代志下》15 章）将国王束缚住。

QUESTION XV: Whether the king be univocally, or only analogically and by proportion, a father
问题十五：国王是单义的，还是只是类比和比例上的父亲？

Adam not king of the whole earth because a father.—The king a father metaphorically and improperly, proved by eight arguments.
亚当不是全地之王，因为他只是一个父亲。——王者是父亲的比喻和不恰当的说法，通过八个论点得到证明。

QUESTION XVI: Whether or no a despotical or masterly dominion agree to the king, because he is king
问题十六：一个专制或者主宰的统治是否适合国王，因为他是国王

The king hath no masterly dominion over the subjects as if they were his servants, proved by four arguments.—The king not over men as reasonable creatures to domineer.—The king cannot give away his kingdom or his people as if they were his proper goods.—A violent surrender of liberty tyeth not.—A surrender of ignorance is in so far involuntarily as it oblige not.—The goods of the subjects not the king's, proved by eight arguments.—All the goods of the subjects are the king's in a fourfold sense.
国王对臣民没有像对待仆人那样的主宰权，这可以通过四个论点证明。国王不能像对待理性生物那样支配人类。国王不能把他的王国或人民当作他的私人财产来分配。自由的强制放弃是无效的。对无知的放弃在某种程度上是强制性的，因为它并不强制。臣民的财产不属于国王，这可以通过八个论点证明。臣民的所有财产从四个方面来说都属于国王。

QUESTION XVII: Whether or no the prince have properly the fiduciary or ministerial power of a tutor, husband, patron, minister, head, master of a family, not of a lord or dominator
问题十七：无论王子是否适当地拥有受托人或部长的权力，作为导师、丈夫、赞助人、部长、家庭的主人，而不是领主或统治者

The king a tutor rather than a father as these are distinguished.—A free community not properly and in all respects a minor and pupil.—The king's power not properly marital and husbandly.—The king a patron and servant.—The royal power only from God, immediatione simplicis constitutionis, et solum solitudine causæ primæ, but not immediatione applicationis dignitatis ad personam.—The king the servant of the people both objectively and subjectively.—The Lord and the people by one and the same act according to the physical relation maketh the king.—The king head of the people metaphorically only, not essentially, not univocally, by six arguments.—His power fiduciary only.
国王是一位导师，而不是父亲，因为这两者是有区别的。——一个自由社区并不完全是未成年人和学生。——国王的权力并不是婚姻和丈夫的权力。——国王是赞助人和仆人。——国王的权力只来自上帝，通过简单的构成方式，仅仅通过原因的孤立，而不是通过尊贵的应用方式。——国王既客观地又主观地是人民的仆人。——上帝和人民通过同一行为根据物理关系使国王成为国王。——国王只是象征性地成为人民的头，而不是本质上的，也不是一词多义的，通过六个论证。——他的权力只是信托的。

QUESTION XVIII: What is the law or manner of the king (1 Sam. 8:9, 11) discussed fully
问题十八：关于国王的法律或方式（撒母耳记上 8:9, 11）进行了详细讨论。

The power and the office badly differenced by Barclay.—What is משפת חּמלּךָ the manner of the king, by the harmony of interpreters, ancient and modern, protestants and papists.—Crying out (1 Sam. 8) not necessarily a remedy of tyranny, nor a praying with faith and patience.—Resisting of kings that are tyrannous, and patience, not inconsistent.—The law of the king not a permissive law, as was the law of divorcement.—The law of the king (1 Sam. 12:23, 24) not a law of tyranny.
巴克利对权力和职位的区别非常明显。根据古代和现代的解释者，无论是新教徒还是天主教徒，"משפת חּמלּךָ"（国王的方式）是什么样的。在撒母耳记上 8 章中大声疾呼并不一定是对抗暴政的解药，也不是带着信心和耐心祈祷。反抗暴政的国王和忍耐并不矛盾。国王的法律不是一种容许性的法律，就像离婚法一样。国王的法律（撒母耳记上 12:23, 24）不是一种暴政的法律。

QUESTION XIX: Whether or no the king be in dignity and power above the people
问题十九：国王是否在尊严和权力上高于人民

In what consideration the king is above the people, and the people above the king.—A mean, as a mean, inferior to the end, how it is true.—The king inferior to the people.—The church, because the church, is of more excellency than the king, because king.—The people being those to whom the king is given, worthier than the gift.—And the people immortal, the king mortal.—The king a mean only, not both the efficient, or author of the kingdom, and a mean; two necessary distinctions of a mean.—If sin had never been, there should have been no king.—The king is to give his life for his people.—The consistent cause more excellent than the effect.—The people than the king.—Impossible people can limit royal power, but they must give royal power also.—The people have an action in making a king, proved by four arguments.—Though it were granted that God immediately made kings, yet it is no consequent, God only, and not the people, can unmake him.—The people appointing a king over themselves, retain the fountain-power of making a king.—The mean inferior to the end, and the king, as a king, is a mean.—The king, as a mean, and also as a man, inferior to the people.—To swear non-self-preservation, and to swear self-murder, all one.—The people cannot make away their power, 1. Their whole power, nor 2. Irrevocably to the king.—The people may resume the power they give to the commissioners of parliament, when it is abused.—The tables in Scotland lawful, when the ordinary judicatures are corrupt.—Quod efficit tale id ipsum magis tale discussed, the fountain-power in the people derived only in the king.—The king is a fiduciary, a life-renter, not a lord or heritor.—How sovereignty is in the people.—Power of life and death, how in a community.—A community void of rulers, is yet, and may be a politic body.—Judges gods analogically.
国王高于人民的考虑是什么，人民高于国王的考虑是什么。作为一种手段，作为一种手段，低于目标，这是真实的。国王低于人民。教会，因为教会，比国王更优秀，因为国王。人民是国王所赋予的人，比礼物更有价值。人民是不朽的，国王是有限的。国王只是一种手段，不是王国的创造者或者作者，是一种手段；这是一种手段的两个必要区分。如果没有罪恶，就不会有国王。国王要为人民献出生命。一致的原因比效果更优秀。人民比国王更优秀。人民不可能限制皇权，但他们也必须给予皇权。人民在选举国王时有行动，有四个论证证明。即使承认上帝直接立国王，但这并不意味着只有上帝，而不是人民，可以废黜他。人民在选举国王时保留了创造国王的权力。手段低于目标，国王作为国王是一种手段。国王作为一种手段，也作为一个人，低于人民。-发誓不自保，发誓自杀，都一样。-人民不能剥夺他们的权力，1.他们全部的权力，也不能 2.无法收回对国王的权力。-当议会委员会滥用他们获得的权力时，人民可以收回他们给予的权力。-当普通法院腐败时，苏格兰的桌子是合法的。-Quod efficit tale id ipsum magis tale discussed，人民的源头权力只能归于国王。-国王是一个受托人，一个终身租户，不是主人或继承人。-人民如何拥有主权。-生死权力在一个社区中如何存在。-一个没有统治者的社区，仍然可以成为一个政治实体。-法官在类比上是神。

QUESTION XX: Whether inferior judges be essentially the immediate vicegerents of God, as Kings, not differing in essence and nature from kings
问题 XX：次级法官是否本质上是上帝的直接代理人，就像国王一样，本质和性质与国王没有区别？

Inferior judges the immediate vicars of God, no less than the king.—The consciences of inferior judges, immediately subordinate to God, not to the king, either mediately or immediately.—How the inferior judge is the deputy of the king.—He may put to death murderers, as having God's sword committed to him, no less than the king, even though the king command the contrary; for he is not to execute judgment, and to relieve the oppressed conditionally, if a mortal king give him leave; but whether the king will or no, he is to obey the King of kings.—Inferior judges are ministri regni, non ministri regis.—The king doth not make judges as he is a man, by an act of private good-will; but as he is a king by an act of royal justice, and by a power that he hath from the people, who made himself a supreme judge.—The king's making inferior judges hindereth not, but they are as essentially judges as the king who maketh them, not by fountain-power, but power borrowed from the people.—The judges in Israel and the kings differ not essentially. Aristocracy as natural as monarchy, and as warrantable.—Inferior judges depend some way on the king in fieri, but not in facto esse.—The parliament not judges by derivation from the king.—The king cannot make or unmake judges.—No heritable judges.—Inferior judges more necessary than a king.
下级法官是上帝的直接代理人，与国王一样重要。下级法官的良心直接服从上帝，而不是国王，无论是直接还是间接。下级法官如何成为国王的代理人。他可以处死杀人犯，因为他被授予了上帝的剑，与国王一样，即使国王命令相反；因为他不是根据国王的许可来执行审判和救济被压迫者的，而是无论国王是否愿意，他都要服从万王之王。下级法官是王国的仆人，而不是国王的仆人。国王不是以个人意愿的行为来任命法官，而是以王室正义的行为来任命法官，并且是通过他从人民那里获得的权力来任命自己为最高法官。国王任命下级法官并不妨碍他们作为法官的本质，他们与任命他们的国王一样，不是凭借自己的权力，而是凭借从人民那里借来的权力。以色列的法官和国王本质上没有区别。贵族制与君主制一样自然，也同样合法。下级法官在某种程度上依赖国王的未来，但不依赖国王的现实。-议会不由国王的血统来评判。 -国王无权任命或解除法官。 -没有世袭法官。 -次要的法官比国王更为必要。

QUESTION XXI: What power the people and states of parliament hath over the king and in the state
问题二十一：人民和议会的各州对国王和国家有什么权力？

The elders appointed by God to be judges.—Parliaments may convene and judge without the king.—Parliaments are essentially judges, and so their consciences neither dependeth on the king, quoad specificationem, that is, that they should give out this sentence, not that, nec quoad exercitium, that they should not in the morning execute judgment.—Unjust judging, and no judging at all, are sins in the states.—The parliament co-ordinate judges with the king, not advisers only; by eleven arguments.—Inferior judges not the king's messengers or legates, but public governors.—The Jews' monarchy mixed.—A power executive of laws more in the king, a power legislative more in the parliament.
上帝指派的长者作为法官。-议会可以在没有国王的情况下召开和审判。-议会本质上是法官，因此他们的良心不依赖于国王，无论是在具体规定上，即他们应该发出这个判决，而不是那个判决，还是在行使上，即他们不应该在早上执行判决。-不公正的审判和根本不审判都是国家的罪过。-议会与国王是同等的法官，不仅仅是顾问；通过十一个论点。-下级法官不是国王的使者或代表，而是公共管理者。-犹太人的君主制是混合的。-国王在执行法律方面的权力更大，议会在立法方面的权力更大。

QUESTION XXII: Whether the power of the king, as king, be absolute, or dependent and limited by God's
第二十二个问题：国王作为国王的权力是绝对的，还是受上帝的制约和限制的？

first mould and pattern of a king
一个国王的首个模型和图案

The royalists make the king as absolute as the great Turk.—The king not absolute in his power, proved by nine arguments.—Why the king is a living law.—Power to do ill not from God.—Royalists say power to do ill is not from God, but power to do ill, as punishable by man, is from God.—A king, actu primo, is a plague, and the people slaves, if the king, by God's institution, be absolute.—Absoluteness of royalty against justice, peace, reason, and law.—Against the king's relation of a brother.—A damsel forced may resist the king.—The goodness of an absolute prince hindereth not but he is actu primo a tyrant.
君主派使国王成为绝对的大土耳其人。——国王的权力不是绝对的，有九个论据证明。——为什么国王是活法。——做坏事的权力不是来自上帝。——君主派说做坏事的权力不是来自上帝，但是做坏事的权力，作为人所惩罚的，是来自上帝的。——如果国王按照上帝的安排是绝对的，那么国王在实际上是一种灾难，人民是奴隶。——君主制度的绝对性违背了正义、和平、理性和法律。——反对国王作为兄弟的关系。——被强迫的少女可以抵抗国王。——绝对君主的善良并不妨碍他在实际上是一个暴君。

QUESTION XXIII: Whether the king hath a prerogative royal above law
问题 23：国王是否拥有超越法律的皇家特权

Prerogative taken two ways.—Prerogative above laws a garland proper to infinite majesty.—A threefold dispensation, 1. Of power; 2. Of justice; 3. Of grace.—Acts of mere grace may be acts of blood.—An oath to the king of Babylon tyed not the people of Judah to all that absolute power could command.—The absolute prince is as absolute in acts of cruelty, as in acts of grace.—Servants are not (1 Pet. 2:18, 19) interdicted of self-defence.—The parliament materially only, not formally, hath the king for their lord.—Reason not a sufficient restraint to keep a prince from acts of tyranny.—Princes have sufficient power to do good, though they have not absolute to do evil.—A power to shed innocent blood can be no part of any royal power given of God.—The king, because he is a public person, wanteth many privileges that subjects have.
特权有两种方式。超越法律的特权是无限威严的合适花环。三重豁免，1. 权力；2. 正义；3. 恩典。纯粹的恩典行为可能是血腥行为。对巴比伦王的誓言并没有将犹大人民束缚在绝对权力所能命令的一切事情上。绝对的君主在残忍行为和恩典行为上一样绝对。仆人们没有被禁止自卫（彼得前书 2:18, 19）。议会只在实质上，而不是形式上，拥有国王作为他们的主人。理性不能足以约束君主不从事暴政行为。君主有足够的权力去行善，尽管他们没有绝对的权力去作恶。有权力流无辜之血不可能是上帝赋予的任何王权的一部分。国王因为是公众人物，所以缺少许多臣民所拥有的特权。

QUESTION XXIV: What relation the king hath to the law
问题二十四：国王与法律之间的关系是什么？

Human laws considered as reasonable, or as penal.—The king alone hath not a nemothetic power.—Whether the king be above parliaments as their judge.—Subordination of the king to the parliament and co-ordination both consistent.—Each one of the three governments hath somewhat from each other, and they cannot any one of them be in its prevalency conveniently without the mixture of the other two.—The king as a king cannot err, as he erreth in so far, he is not the remedy of oppression intended by God and nature.—In the court of necessity the people may judge the king.—Human laws not so obscure as tyranny is visible and discernible.—It is more requisite that the whole people, church, and religion be secured than one man.—If there be any restraint by law on the king it must be physical, for a moral restraint is upon all men.—To swear to an absolute prince as absolute, is an oath eatenus, in so far unlawful, and not obligatory.
人类法律被视为合理或惩罚性。国王独自拥有非法律性的权力。国王是否高于议会作为他们的法官。国王对议会的从属和协调既一致。三个政府中的每一个都有一些来自其他两个政府，没有其中任何一个政府的主导地位，都不能方便地混合其他两个政府。作为国王，他作为国王不会犯错，因为他在某种程度上犯错，他不是上帝和自然所期望的压迫的解决办法。在紧急情况下，人民可以判断国王。人类法律不像暴政那样隐晦，暴政是明显可见的。保护整个人民、教会和宗教比保护一个人更为重要。如果国王受到法律的限制，那么这种限制必须是物理的，因为道德的限制适用于所有人。对绝对君主发誓，作为绝对君主，这是一种非法的誓言，不具有约束力。

QUESTION XXV: Whether the supreme law, the safety of the people, be above the king
问题二十五：最高法律，人民的安全，是否高于国王

The safety of the people to be preferred to the king, for the king is not to seek himself, but the good of the people.—Royalists make no kings but tyrants.—How the safety of the king is the safety of the people.—A king, for the safety of the people, may break through the letter and paper of the law.—The king's prerogative above law and reason, not comparable to the blood that has been shed in Ireland and England.—The power of dictators prove not a prerogative above law.
人民的安全应优先于国王，因为国王不是为了自己而是为了人民的利益。——皇室主义者只制造暴君而非国王。——国王的安全即是人民的安全。——为了人民的安全，国王可以打破法律的字句和纸面条文。——国王的特权高于法律和理性，但无法与爱尔兰和英格兰流血事件相比。——独裁者的权力并不能超越法律的特权。

QUESTION XXVI: Whether the king be above the law
问题二十六：国王是否高于法律

The law above the king in four things, 1. in constitution; 2. direction; 3. limitation; 4. co-action.—In what sense the king may do all things.—The king under the morality of laws; under fundamental laws, not under punishment to be inflicted by himself, nor because of the eminency of his place, but for the physical incongruity thereof.—If, and how, the king may punish himself.—That the king transgressing in a heinous manner, is under the co-action of law, proved by seven arguments.—The coronation of a king, who is supposed to be a just prince, yet proveth after a tyrant, is conditional and from ignorance, and so involuntary, and in so far not obligatory in law.—Royalists confess a tyrant in exercise may be dethroned.—How the people is the seat of the power of sovereignty.—The place, Psal. 51, "Against thee only have I sinned," &c. discussed.—Israel's not rising in arms against Pharaoh examined.—And Judah's not working their own deliverance under Cyrus.—A covenant without the king's concurrence lawful.
国王之上的法律有四个方面：1. 宪法；2. 指导；3. 限制；4. 共同行动。——国王可以做所有事情的意义。——国王受法律道德约束；受基本法律约束，不受自己施加的惩罚，也不是因为他的地位的卓越性，而是因为其物理上的不协调性。——国王是否可以惩罚自己，以及如何惩罚自己。——国王以极其恶劣的方式违反法律，受到法律的共同行动的约束，通过七个论证得到证明。——被认为是公正的国王加冕后，却被证明是暴君，这种加冕是有条件的，是出于无知的，因此在法律上并不具有约束力。——君主派承认在实践中的暴君可以被废黜。——人民是主权权力的所在地。——诗篇 51 中的地方，“我只得罪了你”等进行了讨论。——以色列人没有起来反抗法老的行为进行了审查。——犹大人在古列统治下没有自救的行为进行了审查。——没有国王的参与的契约是合法的。

QUESTION XXVII: Whether or no the king be the sole, supreme, and final interpreter of the law
问题二十七：国王是否是法律的唯一、至高和最终解释者

He is not the supreme and peremptory interpreter.—Nor is his will the sense of the law.—Nor is he the sole and only judicial interpreter of the law.
他不是至高无上、专横的解释者。——他的意愿也不是法律的意义。——他也不是法律的唯一和独立的司法解释者。

QUESTION XXVIII: Whether or no wars raised by the estates and subjects for their own just defence against the king's bloody emissaries be lawful
第二十八个问题：由于贵族和臣民为了自身正当防卫而发动的战争，是否合法？

The state of the question.—If kings be absolute, a superior judge may punish an inferior judge, not as a judge but an erring man.—By divine institution all covenants to restrain their power must be unlawful.—Resistance in some cases lawful.—Six arguments for the lawfulness of defensive wars.—Many others follow.
问题的状态。如果国王是绝对的，一个上级法官可以惩罚一个下级法官，不是作为一个法官，而是一个错误的人。根据神的安排，所有限制他们权力的契约都是非法的。在某些情况下，抵抗是合法的。六个支持自卫战合法性的论点。还有许多其他的。

QUESTION XXIX: Whether, in the case of defensive wars, the distinction of the person of the king as a man, who may and can commit hostile acts of tyranny against his subjects, and of the office and royal power that he hath from God and the people, can have place
问题二十九：在防御战中，是否可以区分国王作为一个人，他可能会和能够对他的臣民进行敌对的暴行，以及他从上帝和人民那里获得的职位和王权之间的区别？

The king's person in concreto, and his office in abstracto, or, which is all one, the king using his power lawfully to be distinguished (Rom. 13).—To command unjustly maketh not a higher power.—The person may be resisted and yet the office cannot be resisted, proved by fourteen arguments.—Contrary objections of royalists and of the P. Prelate answered.—What we mean by the person and office in abstracto in this dispute; we do not exclude the person in concreto altogether, but only the person as abusing his power; we may kill a person as a man, and love him as a son, father, wife, according to Scripture.—We obey the king for the law, and not the law for the king.—The losing of habitual and actual royalty different.—John 19:10, Pilate's power of crucifying Christ no law-power given to him of God, is proved against royalists, by six arguments.
国王的人物具体而言，他的职位抽象而言，或者说，合法行使权力的国王应该被区分开来（罗马书 13 章）。——不公正的命令并不能成为更高权力。——人可以被抵抗，但职位不能被抵抗，这通过十四个论证得到证明。——对皇室主义者和主教的反对意见进行了回答。——在这场争论中，我们所指的人物和职位的抽象并不完全排除具体的人物，而只是指滥用权力的人物；我们可以按照圣经的教导，将一个人作为一个人杀死，同时又将他作为儿子、父亲、妻子来爱护。——我们服从国王是为了法律，而不是为了国王而服从法律。——习得和实际的王权的丧失是不同的。——约翰福音 19 章 10 节，彼拉多对基督的钉十字架的权力并非上帝赋予他的法律权力，这通过六个论证反驳了皇室主义者的观点。

QUESTION XXX: Whether or no passive obedience be a mean to which we are subjected in conscience by virtue of a divine commandment; and what a mean resistance is. That flying is resistance
问题 XXX：被动顺从是否是我们在良心上受到神命令的一种手段；以及什么是一种手段性的抵抗。逃避是一种抵抗。

The place, 1 Pet. 2:18, discussed.—Patient bearing of injuries and resistance of injuries compatible in one and the same subject.—Christ's non-resistance hath many things rare and extraordinary, and is no leading rule to us.—Suffering is either commanded to us comparatively only, that we rather choose to suffer than deny the truth; or the manner only is commanded, that we suffer with patience.—The physical act of taking away the life, or of offending when commanded by the law of self-defence, is no murder.—We have a greater dominion over goods and members, (except in case of mutilation, which is a little death,) than over our life.—To kill is non of the nature of self-defence, but accidental thereunto.—Defensive war cannot be without offending.—The nature of defensive and offensive wars.—Flying is resistance.
地方，彼得前书 2:18，讨论。忍受伤害和抵抗伤害在同一个主体中是兼容的。基督的不抵抗有许多罕见和非凡的事情，并不是我们的主导规则。受苦只是相对地被命令给我们，我们宁愿选择受苦而不是否认真理；或者只是命令我们以耐心忍受。在法律自卫的命令下，夺取生命或犯罪行为不构成谋杀。我们对财产和肢体有更大的支配权（除了残废的情况，这是一种小死亡），而不是对我们的生命。杀人不是自卫的本质，而是偶然的。防御战不能没有冒犯。防御战和进攻战的性质。逃跑是一种抵抗。

QUESTION XXXI: Whether self-defence, by opposing violence to unjust violence, be lawful, by the law of God and nature
问题 XXXI：根据上帝和自然法，自卫是否合法，即通过对不公正的暴力进行反抗的行为？

Self-defence in man natural, but modus, the way, must be rational and just.—The method of self-defence.—Violent re-offending in self-defence the last remedy.—It is physically impossible for a nation to fly in the case of persecution for religion, and so they may resist in their own self-defence.—Tutela vitæ proxima and remota.—In a remote posture of self-defence, we are not to take us to re-offending, as David was not to kill Saul when he was sleeping, or in the cave, for the same cause.—David would not kill Saul because he was the Lord's anointed.—The king not lord of chastity, name, conscience, and so may be resisted.—By universal and particular nature, self-defence lawful, proved by divers arguments.—And made good by the testimony of jurists.—The love of ourselves, the measure of the love of our neighbours, and enforceth self-defence.—Nature maketh a private man his own judge and magistrate, when the magistrate is absent, and violence is offered to his life, as the law saith.—Self-defence, how lawful it is.—What presumption is from the king's carriage to the two kingdoms, are in law sufficient grounds of defensive wars.—Offensive and defensive wars differ in the event and intentions of men, but not in nature and specie, nor physically.—David's case in not killing Saul nor his men, no rule to us, not in our lawful defence, to kill the king's emissaries, the cases far different.
自卫在人类中是自然的，但方式必须是理性和公正的。自卫的方法。暴力的再犯是自卫的最后手段。在宗教迫害的情况下，一个国家在物理上不可能逃离，所以他们可以为了自卫而抵抗。生命的保护是最近和最远的责任。在远程的自卫姿态中，我们不应该采取再犯的行为，就像大卫不应该在扫罗睡觉或在洞穴里杀死他一样，原因是相同的。大卫不会杀死扫罗，因为他是上帝的受膏者。国王并不是贞操、名誉和良心的主宰，所以可以被抵抗。通过普遍和特殊的自然法，自卫是合法的，通过多种论证得到证明。并且由法学家的证词支持。自爱是对邻居爱的尺度，并强调自卫。当执法官不在场，对他的生命进行暴力威胁时，自然使得一个私人成为自己的法官和执法官，正如法律所说。自卫是多么合法。国王的行为对两个王国的假设是进行防御战的足够依据。进攻战和防御战在人们的事件和意图上有所不同，但在本质和种类上并无差异，也不涉及身体上的差异。大卫不杀扫罗和他的人的情况对我们没有规定，我们在合法防御中杀死国王的使者是不同的情况。

QUESTION XXXII: Whether or no the lawfulness of defensive wars can be proved from the Scripture, from the examples of David, the people's rescuing Jonathan, Elisha, and the eighty valiant priests who resisted Uzziah
问题 32：是否可以从圣经、大卫、人民拯救约拿单、以利沙和抵抗乌西雅的 80 位勇敢的祭司的例子中证明防御战的合法性？

David warrantably raised an army of men to defend himself against the unjust violence of his prince Saul.—David's not invading Saul and his men, who did not aim at arbitrary government, at sub-version of laws, religion, and extirpation of those that worshipped the God of Israel and opposed idolatry, but only pursuing one single person, far unlike to our case in Scotland and England now.—David's example not extraordinary.—Elisha's resistance proveth defensive wars to be warrantable.—Resistance made to king Uzziah by eighty valiant priests proveth the same.—The people's rescuing Jonathan proveth the same.—Libnah's revolt proveth this.—The city of Abel defended themselves against Joab, king David's general, when he came to destroy a city for one wicked conspirator, Sheba's sake.
大卫合法地组建了一支军队来保护自己免受不公正的暴力行为，这是为了对抗他的君王扫罗。大卫并没有入侵扫罗和他的人，他们并不追求专制政府，不破坏法律、宗教，也不消灭那些崇拜以色列上帝并反对偶像崇拜的人，他们只是追捕一个单独的人，与我们现在在苏格兰和英格兰的情况大不相同。大卫的例子并不特别。以利沙的抵抗证明了防御性战争是合法的。八十位勇敢的祭司对乌西雅王的抵抗也证明了这一点。人民解救约拿单也证明了这一点。利巴拿的叛乱也证明了这一点。亚伯城在大卫的将军约押来摧毁城市时保卫了自己，因为他们只是为了一个邪恶的阴谋者希巴而摧毁了一个城市。

QUESTION XXXIII: Whether or no Rom. 13:1 make any thing against the lawfulness of defensive wars
问题 XXXIII：罗马书 13:1 是否对防御性战争的合法性有任何质疑？

The king not only understood, Rom. 13.—And the place, Rom. 13, discussed.
国王不仅理解，罗马书 13 章。而且地方，罗马书 13 章，被讨论。

QUESTION XXXIV: Whether royalists prove, by cogent reasons, the unlawfulness of defensive wars
问题 XXXIV：君主主义者是否能够通过有力的理由证明防御战争的非法性？

Objections of royalists answered.—The place, Exod. 22:28, "Thou shalt not revile the gods," &c. answered.—And Eccles. 10:20.—The place, Eccles. 8:3, 4, "Where the word of a king is," &c. answered.—The place, Job. 34:18, answered.—And Acts 23:3, "God shall smite thee, thou whited wall," &c.—The emperors in Paul's time not absolute by their law.—That objection, that we have no practice for defensive resistance, and that the prophets never complain of the omission of the resistance of princes, answered.—The prophets cry against the sin of non-resistance, when they cry against the judges, because they execute not judgment for the oppressed—Judah's subjection to Nebuchadnezzar, a conquering tyrant, no warrant to us to subject ourselves to tyrannous acts.—Christ's subjection to Cæsar nothing against defensive wars.
王党派的反对意见得到了回答。出埃及记 22:28 中的“不可亵渎神”等地得到了回答。以及传道书 10:20。传道书 8:3,4 中的“王的话在何处”等地得到了回答。约伯记 34:18 得到了回答。使徒行传 23:3 中的“神要击打你这粉饰的墙壁”等地。保罗时代的皇帝并非根据他们的法律拥有绝对权力。那个反对意见，我们没有为自卫抵抗的做法，先知们从未抱怨过君王的抵抗被忽视，得到了回答。先知们对不抵抗的罪行大声疾呼，当他们对法官们大声疾呼时，因为他们没有为受压迫者行公义。犹大对尼布甲尼撒的屈服，一个征服者暴君，对我们没有义务屈服于暴政行为。基督对凯撒的屈服并不意味着不能进行自卫战争。

QUESTION XXXV: Whether the sufferings of the martyrs in the primitive church militant be against the lawfulness of defensive wars
问题 XXXV：原始教会中殉道者的苦难是否违反了自卫战的合法性？

Tertullian neither ours nor theirs in the question of defensive wars.
特尔图利安在防御战问题上既不属于我们，也不属于他们。

QUESTION XXXVI: Whether the king have the power of war only
问题 XXXVI：国王是否只有战争权力

Inferior judges have the power of the sword no less than the king.—The people tyed to acts of charity, and to defend themselves, the church, and their posterity against a foreign enemy, though the king forbid.—Flying unlawful to the states of Scotland and England now, God's law tying them to defend their country.—Parliamentary power a fountain-power above the king.
下级法官与国王一样拥有武力权力。人民被束缚于慈善行为，保护自己、教会和后代免受外敌侵害，即使国王禁止。现在，苏格兰和英格兰的人民被上帝的法律束缚，要保卫自己的国家。议会权力是高于国王的源泉权力。

QUESTION XXXVII: Whether the estates of Scotland are to help their brethren, the protestants of England, against cavaliers, proved by argument 13
第三十七个问题：苏格兰的财产是否要帮助他们的兄弟，即英格兰的新教徒，对抗骑士派，由第 13 个论证证明

Helping of neighbour nations lawful, divers opinions concerning the point.—The law of Egypt against those that helped not the oppressed.
帮助邻国是合法的，关于这一点有不同的观点。埃及法律针对不帮助受压迫者的人。

QUESTION XXXVIII: Whether monarchy be the best of governments
问题三十八：君主制是否是最好的政府形式？

Whether monarchy be the best of governments hath divers considerations, in which each one may be less or more convenient.—Absolute monarchy is the worst of governments. Better want power to do ill as have it.—A mixture sweetest of all governments—Neither king nor parliament have a voice against law and reason.
无论君主制是否是最好的政府，都有各种考虑因素，其中每个因素可能更或更不方便。——绝对君主制是最糟糕的政府。没有权力去做坏事比拥有权力更好。——混合制度是最甜蜜的政府。既没有国王也没有议会可以违背法律和理性。

QUESTION XXXIX: Whether or no any prerogative at all above the law be due to the king. Or if jura majestatis be any such prerogative
问题 XXXIX：国王是否有任何超越法律的特权。或者说，jura majestatis 是否是这样一种特权。

A threefold supreme power.—What be jura regalia.—Kings confer not honours from their plenitude of absolute power, but according to the strait line and rule of law, justice, and good observing.—The law of the king, 1 Sam. 8:9, 11.—Difference of kings and judges.—The law of the king, (1 Sam. 8:9, 11,) no permissive law, such as the law of divorce.—What dominion the king hath over the goods of the subjects.
三重至高权力。——什么是王权特权。——国王不是根据他们绝对权力的充沛，而是根据法律、正义和良好的遵守的严格线条和规则来授予荣誉。——国王的法律，撒母耳记上 8:9, 11。——国王和法官的区别。——国王的法律（撒母耳记上 8:9, 11）不是允许性的法律，比如离婚法。——国王对臣民财产的统治。

QUESTION XL: Whether or no the people have any power over the king, either by his oath, covenant, or any other way
问题 XL：无论是通过他的誓言、契约还是其他任何方式，人民是否对国王有任何权力

The people have power over the king by reason of his covenant and promise.—Covenants and promises violated, infer co-action, de jure, by law, though not de facto.—Mutual punishments may be where there is no relation of superiority and inferiority.—Three covenants made by Arnisæus.—The king not king while he swear the oath and be accepted as king by the people.—The oath of the kings of France.—Hugo Grotius setteth down seven cases in which the people may accuse, punish, or dethrone the king.—The prince a noble vassal of the kingdom upon four grounds.—The covenant had an oath annexed to it.—The prince is but a private man in a contract.—How the royal power is immediately from God, and yet conferred upon the king by the people.
人民因国王的契约和承诺而对其拥有权力。违反契约和承诺会导致法律上的强制，尽管事实上可能没有。在没有上下级关系的情况下，可以进行相互惩罚。阿尼塞乌斯进行了三项契约。国王在宣誓并被人民接受为国王时并不是国王。法国国王的宣誓。雨果·格罗提乌斯列举了七种情况，人民可以指控、惩罚或废黜国王。王子是王国的贵族附属，有四个基础。契约附带了誓言。在合同中，王子只是一个普通人。王权如何直接来自上帝，又是由人民授予国王的。

QUESTION XLI: Whether doth the P. Prelate with reason ascribe to us doctrine of Jesuits in the question of lawful defence
问题 XLI：主教是否有理由将合法防卫问题归因于我们耶稣会士的教义？

The sovereignty is originally and radically in the people, as in the fountain, was taught by fathers, ancient doctors, sound divines, lawyers, before there was a Jesuit or a prelate whelped, in rerum natura.—The P. Prelate holdeth the Pope to be the vicar of Christ.—Jesuits' tenets concerning kings.—The king not the people's deputy by our doctrine, it is only the calumny of the P. Prelate.—The P. Prelate will have power to act the bloodiest tyrannies on earth upon the church of Christ, the essential power of a king.
主权最初和根本上属于人民，就像泉水一样，这是由父辈、古代医生、合理的神职人员和律师们教导的，在耶稣会士或主教出生之前，就在自然界中存在着。——P. Prelate 认为教皇是基督的代理人。——耶稣会士关于国王的信条。——根据我们的教义，国王不是人民的代表，这只是 P. Prelate 的诽谤。——P. Prelate 将拥有在地球上对基督教会进行最血腥的暴政的权力，这是国王的本质权力。

QUESTION XLII: Whether all Christian kings are dependent from Christ, and may be called his vicegerents
问题 42：是否所有基督教国王都依赖于基督，并可以被称为他的代理人？

Why God, as God, hath a man a vicegerent under him, but not as mediator.—The king not head of the church.—The king a sub-mediator, and an under-redeemer, and a sub-priest to offer sacrifices to God for us if he be a vicegerent.—The king no mixed person.—Prelates deny kings to be subject to the gospel.—By no prerogative royal may the king prescribe religious observances and human ceremonies in God's worship.—The P. Prelate giveth to the king a power arbitrary, supreme, and independent, to govern the church.—Reciprocation of subjections of the king to the church, and of the church to the king, in divers kinds, to wit, of ecclesiastical and civil subjection, are no more absurd than for Aaron's priest to teach, instruct and rebuke Moses, if he turn a tyrannous Achab, and Moses to punish Aaron if he turn an obstinate idolator.
为什么上帝作为上帝，给了人类一个副主的地位，但不是作为调解者。国王不是教会的头。国王是一个副调解者，一个下级救赎者，一个为我们向上帝献祭的下级祭司，如果他是副主。国王不是混合人物。教士否认国王受福音的管辖。国王不能凭借王权特权规定上帝崇拜中的宗教仪式和人类仪式。主教给予国王一种任意、至高和独立的权力来管理教会。国王对教会的服从和教会对国王的服从在不同种类中相互交替，即教会和国家的服从，不比亚伦的祭司教导、教育和责备摩西荒唐地教导、教育和责备摩西，如果他变成了暴君亚哈，摩西惩罚亚伦如果他变成了顽固的拜偶像者更荒唐。

QUESTION XLIII: Whether the king of Scotland be an absolute prince, having a prerogative above laws and parliaments
苏格兰国王是否是绝对的君主，拥有超越法律和议会的特权

The king of Scotland subject to parliaments by the fundamental laws, acts, and constant practices of parliaments, ancient and late in Scotland.—The king of Scotland's oath at his coronation.—A pretended absolute power given to James VI. upon respect of personal endowments, no ground of absoluteness to the king of Scotland.—By laws and constant practices the kings of Scotland subject to laws and parliaments, proved by the fundamental law of elective princes, and out of the most partial historians, and our acts of parliament of Scotland.—Coronation oath.—And again at the coronation of James VI. that oath sworn; and again, 1 Parl. James VI. ibid and seq.—How the king is supreme judge in all causes.—The power of the parliaments of Scotland.—The Confession of the faith of the church of Scotland, authorised by divers acts of parliament, doth evidently hold forth to all the reformed churches the lawfulness of defensive wars, when the supreme magistrate is misled by wicked counsel.—The same proved from the confessions of faith in other reformed churches.—The place, Rom. 13, exponed in our Confession of faith.—The confession, not only Saxonic, exhibited to the Council of Trent, but also of Helvetia, France, England, Bohemia, prove the same.—William Laud and other prelates, enemies to parliaments, to states, and to the fundamental laws of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland.—The parliament of Scotland doth regulate, limit, and set bounds to the king's power.—Fergus the first king not a conqueror.—The king of Scotland below parliaments, considerable by them, hath no negative voice.
苏格兰国王受苏格兰古代和近代议会的基本法律、法令和惯例的约束。苏格兰国王在加冕时宣誓。詹姆斯六世被赋予的所谓绝对权力，并不能成为苏格兰国王绝对统治的依据。根据法律和惯例，苏格兰国王受法律和议会的约束，这一点可以从选举君主的基本法和最偏袒的历史学家以及苏格兰议会的法案中得到证明。加冕宣誓。詹姆斯六世加冕时再次宣誓；再次在詹姆斯六世的第一届议会中宣誓。国王在所有案件中拥有最高法官的权力。苏格兰议会的权力。苏格兰教会信仰的告白，经过苏格兰议会的多项法案授权，明确表明当最高统治者被邪恶的建议误导时，进行防御性战争是合法的。其他改革宗教教会的信仰告白也证明了这一点。罗马书 13 章在我们的信仰告白中得到解释。- 坦赛尔会议展示的忏悔，不仅来自撒克逊人，还有来自瑞士、法国、英格兰和波希米亚的忏悔，证明了同样的事实。- 威廉·劳德和其他主教，他们是议会、国家和英格兰、苏格兰和爱尔兰三个王国的基本法律的敌人。- 苏格兰议会对国王的权力进行调整、限制和设定界限。- 第一位国王费尔格斯不是征服者。- 苏格兰国王在议会之下，由议会认可，没有否决权。

QUESTION XLIV: General results of the former doctrine in some few corollaries, in twenty-two questions
第 44 个问题：前述学说的一些普遍结果，以 22 个问题的推论形式呈现

Concerning monarchy, compared with other forms—How royalty is an issue of nature.—And how magistrates, as magistrates, be natural.—How absoluteness is not a ray of God's majesty.—And resistance not unlawful, because Christ and his apostles used it not in some cases.—Coronation is no ceremony.—Men may limit the power that they gave not.—The commonwealth not a pupil or minor properly.—Subjects not more obnoxious to a king than clients, vassals, children, to their superiors.—If subjection passive be natural.—Whether king Uzziah was dethroned.—Idiots and children not complete kings, children are kings in destination only.—Denial of passive subjection in things unlawful, not dishonourable to the king, more than denial of active obedience in the same things.—The king may not make away or sell any part of his dominions.—People may in some cases convene without the king.—How, and in what meaning subjects are to pay the king's debts.—Subsidies the kingdom's due, rather than the king's.—How the seas, ports, forts, castles, militia, magazine, are the king's, and how they are the kingdom's.
关于君主制，与其他形式相比——王权是一种自然问题——以及行政官员作为行政官员是自然的——绝对权力不是上帝威严的一束光——抵抗不是非法的，因为基督和他的使徒在某些情况下没有使用抵抗——加冕不是一种仪式——人们可以限制他们没有给予的权力——共和国不是一个合适的学生或未成年人——臣民对国王的服从并不比客户、封臣、子女对上级更加服从——如果被动服从是自然的——乌西雅王是否被废黜——白痴和儿童不是完全的国王，儿童只是在命运上是国王——在不合法的事情上否认被动服从，对国王来说并不比在同样的事情上否认积极服从更加不光彩——国王不能出售或出让他的领土的任何部分——人民在某些情况下可以在没有国王的情况下召集——臣民应该如何以及在什么意义上支付国王的债务——赋税是王国的应得，而不是国王的——海洋、港口、堡垒、城堡、民兵、军械库是国王的，也是王国的。

SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF SAMUEL RUTHERFORD
塞缪尔·鲁瑟福德生平简述

THE more prominent features of a man's public life are generally characterised by the spirit of the times in which he lived. If the period has been peaceful and undisturbed by party controversy and the disputes of opposing factions, then all flows smoothly and quietly on; the minds of the people repose unharassed and unexcited by public contentions and quarrels; there is opportunity for the cultivation of the useful arts; a taste is displayed in the pursuit of learning and literature, and improvements and discoveries, in every branch of science and art, advance with rapid strides. Such a state of things men of civilized nations in general desire. Yet a period like this, when there has been "peace in the land," looked back upon from a succeeding age, or read as a chapter of history, appears tame and monotonous. There is nothing to arouse the attention or awaken the feelings, when the only record we have of a man is, that he lived, died, and was buried. But it is otherwise when the times have been the scene of anarchy, civil war, or persecution. Then the calmness and repose of the community is broken up; men are excited and roused by the spirit-stirring events that are passing around them; each must take their side;—it is then that their characters are drawn out and shown in a true light; the weak, the timid and undecided, keep the back ground, while men of courage and daring stand forward in bold relief.
一个人公共生活中更显著的特征通常是由他所处的时代精神所决定的。如果这个时期是和平的，没有党派争议和对立派系的纷争，那么一切都会平稳而安静地进行；人们的思想不受公共争论和争吵的困扰和激发；有机会培养实用艺术；在学习和文学追求中展示出品味，科学和艺术的各个领域都取得了快速进步的改进和发现。这样的状态通常是文明国家的人们所渴望的。然而，像这样的时期，当从后来的时代回顾，或者作为历史的一章来阅读时，显得平淡和单调。当我们只知道一个人的记录是他生活、死亡和埋葬时，没有什么能引起注意或唤起感情。但当时代成为无政府状态、内战或迫害的舞台时，情况就不同了。 然后，社区的宁静和安宁被打破；人们被周围激动人心的事件所激发和唤醒；每个人都必须选择立场；在这时，他们的性格被展现出来，真实地显示出来；软弱、胆怯和犹豫不决的人留在幕后，而勇敢和大胆的人则勇敢地站在前方。

There has been in the history of mankind, in all ages, two great contending principles at issue—the contest of error against truth, and the straggle of truth with error. On the one side—error, with the violence of oppression, doing all that persecution can accomplish, in endeavouring to exterminate virtue from the moral universe; and on the other—truth, with noble courage and exalted firmness, maintaining the purity of her principles in opposition to ignorance and persecution. For upwards of four thousand years she has grappled with superstition, idolatry, and bigotry, and, with moral weapons, she has vindicated the justice of her principles, which her enemies have found easier to answer with the sword than by argument. In every age error has had the majority, for truth has had few followers; but, in the end, she has been triumphant even at the stake, or on the scaffold. Yet the faggot will burn with a fiercer flame, and the guillotine will be deeper dyed with the martyr's blood than it has ever yet been, ere the world assent to the truth of her doctrines. On looking back, and reviewing the civil and religious history of our own land, we observe the mighty contest between Popery and the Reformed Doctrine—we see the fearful conflict of right and wrong—and we see truth, with a gigantic effort, burst the fetters which had so long held the people in mental bondage and ignorance. Again, we observe the struggles between Presbytery and Episcopacy, during most of the latter half of the seventeenth century; one party urged on by a spirit of opposition and bigotry, to trample on the religious rights and privileges of the people, and doing all in their power to bring them again under the iron sway of the Church of Rome; the other, with moral courage and firmness, standing boldly forward, in the front of persecution, tyranny, and oppression, for the cause and promotion of true religion; and from the martyrdom of Hamilton, Scotland's first martyr, many a noble spirit has been immolated and set free, for the cause, and at the shrine of Truth;— 重试    错误原因

"Yet few remember them. They lived unknown
然而，很少有人记得他们。他们默默无闻地生活着。

Till persecution dragg'd them into fame,

And chased them up to heaven."

SAMUEL RUTHERFORD was born in the parish of Nisbet, in Roxburghshire, in the year 1600. Of the sphere in life occupied by his parents, we have no means of correctly ascertaining. He is mentioned by Reid "to have been born of respectable parents,"* and Wodrow states that he came of "mean, but honest parents." It is probable, however, that his father was engaged in agricultural pursuits; at all events, he must have held a respectable rank in society, as he otherwise could not have given his son so superior an education. At an early period of his life he discovered a precocious talent, and his parents consequently destined him for the ministry.
塞缪尔·鲁瑟福出生于 1600 年的罗克斯伯郡尼斯贝特教区。关于他的父母从事的职业，我们无法准确确定。里德提到他是“出生在体面的父母家庭”，而沃德罗则称他的父母是“普通但诚实的人”。然而，很可能他的父亲从事农业工作；无论如何，他的父亲在社会中地位应该是体面的，否则他就无法给儿子提供如此优越的教育。在他的早年，他展现出了早熟的才华，因此他的父母决定让他成为一名牧师。

In 1617 he was sent to Edinburgh, and entered the University as a student, where he appears to have excelled in the studies in which he was engaged, for, in four years, he took his degree of Master of Arts; and in 1623, after a severe contest with three competitors, he was elected one of the Regents of the College. The acquirements he displayed at this early period were justly appreciated by his contemporaries. We are told that "the whole Regents, out of their particular knowledge of Mr Samuel Rutherford, demonstrated to them [the Judges] his eminent abilities of mind and virtuous dispositions, wherewith the Judges, being satisfied, declared him successor in the Professor of Humanity."† He, however, only acted in the capacity of Regent about two years, and, on leaving his charge, he devoted himself to the study of Theology, under Mr Andrew Ramsay.
1617 年，他被派往爱丁堡，并以学生身份进入大学，他在所学科目上似乎表现出色，因为在四年内他获得了文学硕士学位；在 1623 年，经过与三名竞争对手的激烈竞争后，他被选为学院的一名教师。他在这个早期展示的才能受到了同代人的高度赞赏。据说“整个教师团队，根据他们对塞缪尔·鲁瑟福的个人了解，向法官们展示了他杰出的智力和高尚的品质，法官们对此表示满意，并宣布他是人文学教授的继任者。”†然而，他只担任教师职务约两年时间，在离开这个职位后，他致力于在安德鲁·拉姆齐先生的指导下学习神学。

The Church of Scotland was at this period almost entirely under the jurisdiction of Episcopal bishops. The establishment of Episcopacy had been gradually going on since the accession of James to the throne of England, who lent all his aid and authority to the furtherance of that end. The Presbyterians who would not conform to the discipline of church government which had been obtruded upon them, were cruelly oppressed. Many were imprisoned, and their goods confiscated; others were banished from their native land; and not a few were dragged to the scaffold or the stake. At the death of King James, in 1625, his son Charles succeeded to the throne, and the people hoped that their grievances would now be listened to, and their wrongs redressed; but they were disappointed. "The father's madness," says Stevenson, "laid the foundation for his successor's woes, and the son exactly followed the father's steps."‡ James held the principles of a royal prerogative, and required absolute and implicit obedience in too strict a manner. These he instilled into the mind of his son, and was, unhappily, too successful; for, on Charles' succession, he carried out the same principles to a most intolerant degree, which was the cause of so much anarchy and confusion in the nation, and entailed upon himself those misfortunes which rendered his reign so unhappy, and his end so miserable.
苏格兰教会在这个时期几乎完全受主教的管辖。自詹姆斯登上英格兰王位以来，主教制度的建立一直在逐渐进行，詹姆斯全力支持并推动这一目标。那些不愿遵守强加给他们的教会管理纪律的长老派遭到了残酷的压迫。许多人被监禁，财产被没收；其他人被流放出自己的祖国；还有不少人被拖上断头台或火刑柱。1625 年，詹姆斯去世，他的儿子查理斯继承了王位，人们希望他们的不满会得到倾听和他们的冤情会得到平反；但他们失望了。史蒂文森说：“父亲的疯狂为继任者的苦难奠定了基础，儿子完全跟随了父亲的脚步。”詹姆斯坚持皇权的原则，并要求过于严格的绝对和绝对服从。 他将这些灌输给他儿子的思想，不幸的是，他非常成功；因此，当查尔斯继位时，他以极端的不容忍程度贯彻了同样的原则，这导致了国家的混乱和混乱，给他自己带来了不幸，使他的统治如此不幸，他的结局如此悲惨。

In 1627, Rutherford was licensed as a preacher of the Gospel, and through the influence of John Gordon of Kenmure, (afterwards Viscount Kenmure,) appointed to a church in the parish of Anwoth, in Kirkcudbright. There is sufficient authority to show that he was not inducted by Episcopal ordination. Being firmly attached to the Presbyterian form of Government from his youth, he manifested great dislike to Prelacy, and could never be induced to stoop to the authority of the bishops, which, at that time, was a very difficult matter to evade. We are told by Stevenson, that "until the beginning of the year 1628, some few preachers, by influence, were suffered to enter the ministry without conformity, and in this number we suppose Mr Rutherford may be reckoned, because he was ordained before the doors came to be more closely shut upon honest preachers." Other authorities might be quoted to the same effect. Here he discharged the duties of his sacred calling with great diligence; and, no doubt, with success. He was accustomed to rise so early as three o'clock in the morning, and devoted his whole time to the spiritual wants of his flock and his own private religious duties. His labours were not confined to his own parishioners, many persons resorted to him from surrounding parishes. "He was," says Livingston, "a great strengthener of all the Christians in that country, who had been the fruits of the ministry of Mr John Welsh, the time he had been at Kirkcudbright."
1627 年，卢瑟福德获得了传道人的许可，并在约翰·戈登（后来的肯穆尔子爵）的影响下被任命为柯克库布莱特郡安沃斯教区的一座教堂的牧师。有足够的证据表明他并没有接受主教的按立。从年轻时起，他坚定地支持长老会的政府形式，对主教制度非常厌恶，从不愿屈服于主教的权威，而那时要逃避这种权威是非常困难的。据史蒂文森说，"直到 1628 年年初，一些少数的传道人凭借影响力被容许进入教职而不需要遵守规定，我们认为卢瑟福德先生可能就是其中之一，因为他是在诚实的传道人受到更严格限制之前被按立的。"其他权威也可以引用类似的说法。在这里，他非常勤奋地履行着他神圣的职责，毫无疑问也取得了成功。他习惯于清晨三点起床，并将自己的全部时间都用于关心他的羊群的属灵需求和自己的私人宗教事务。 他的劳动不仅仅局限于自己的教区居民，许多人从周边教区来找他。利文斯顿说：“他是那个地区所有基督徒的巨大支持者，他们都是约翰·威尔士先生在柯克卡德布赖特任职期间的成果。”"

In 1630, Rutherford experienced a severe affliction by the death of his wife, after a painful and protracted illness of thirteen months, scarcely five years after their marriage. Her death seems to have been the source of much sorrow to him, as he frequently takes notice of it in his letters with much feeling, long after his painful bereavement. To add to his distress, he was himself afflicted with a fever, which lasted upwards of three months, by which he was so much reduced, that it was long ere he was able to perform his sacred duties.
1630 年，拉瑟福德经历了一次严重的打击，他的妻子在他们结婚后不到五年的时间里，经历了长达十三个月的痛苦和拖延的疾病后去世。她的去世似乎给他带来了很多悲伤，他在很长时间后的信件中经常提到这一点，并表达了很多感受。为了增加他的痛苦，他自己也患上了一场持续三个多月的发烧，使他的身体状况大大恶化，很长时间他都无法履行他的神圣职责。

John Gordon, Viscount Kenmure, who had long been the friend and patron of Rutherford, for whom he entertained the greatest respect and esteem, was in August 1634, seized with a disease which caused his death on September following, to the deep sorrow of Rutherford, who was with him at his last moments. Kenmure was a nobleman of an amiable and pious disposition; and, as may be supposed, experienced much pleasure in his intercourse with Rutherford. To Lady Kenmure, Rutherford wrote many of his famous "Letters."
约翰·戈登，肯穆尔子爵，长期以来一直是卢瑟福的朋友和赞助人，他对卢瑟福怀有极大的尊重和敬意。1634 年 8 月，肯穆尔患上了一种导致他在随后的 9 月去世的疾病，这让卢瑟福深感悲痛，他在肯穆尔临终时陪伴在他身边。肯穆尔是一个性情和善、虔诚的贵族，可以想象他与卢瑟福的交往给他带来了很多快乐。卢瑟福给肯穆尔夫人写了许多著名的信件。

About this time, the doctrines of Arminius began to spread to an alarming extent amongst the Episcopalians. His tenets were espoused by Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and also by many of the Scottish prelates, headed by Maxwell, Bishop of Ross, as those only who held the same principles had any chance of preferment in the Church. Rutherford viewed the promulgation of these dangerous tenets with great anxiety, and did all in his power to controvert and oppose them. In 1636, appeared his learned treatise, entitled, "Exercitationes Apologeticæ pro Divina Gratia," which was dedicated to Viscount Kenmure, but was not published till eighteen months after his death. This work gave great offence to the government: he was in consequence summoned to appear before a High Commission Court, which had been constituted by Thomas Sydserff, Bishop of Galloway, a man of Arminian principles, which met at Wigton in June (1636), and there deprived of his office. Sydserff, who had imbibed an inveterate hatred against him, was not satisfied with this, but had him again summoned before the High Commission Court at Edinburgh, which met in July following, and he was there accused "of non-conformity, for preaching against the Perth Articles, and for writing a book, entitled, Exercitationes Apohgiticæ pro Divina Gratia, which they alleged did reflect upon the Church of Scotland; but the truth was, the arguments in that book did cut the sinews of Arminianism, and galled the Episcopal clergy to the quick, and therefore Bishop Lydserff could no longer abide him." Here many other false, frivolous, and extravagant charges were brought against him, but being firm in his innocence, he repelled them all. Lord Lorn (brother to Lady Kenmure), and many others, endeavoured to befriend him; but such was the malevolence of Sydserff, that he swore an oath, if they did not agree to his wishes, he would write to the king. After three days' trial, sentence was passed upon him, that he be deprived of his pastoral office, and discharged from preaching in any part of Scotland, under pain of rebellion, and to be confined before the 20th of August 1636, within the town of Aberdeen during the king's pleasure. This sentence he obeyed, but severe and unjust as it was, it did not discourage him, for in one of his letters, he says, "I go to my king's palace at Aberdeen; tongue, pen, nor wit, cannot express my joy."
大约在这个时候，阿尔米尼乌斯的教义开始在圣公会教徒中广泛传播，这引起了人们的极大担忧。他的信条被坎特伯雷大主教劳德和许多苏格兰主教所支持，其中包括罗斯主教麦克斯韦尔，因为只有持有相同原则的人才有机会在教会中得到提升。鲁瑟福德对这些危险的信条的传播非常担心，并竭尽全力争辩和反对。1636 年，他发表了他的学术著作《为神恩辩护的演习》，这本书是献给肯穆尔子爵的，但直到他去世后的十八个月才出版。这部作品引起了政府的极大不满：他因此被传唤到由加洛韦主教西德塞夫组成的高级委员会法庭，该法庭于 1636 年 6 月在威格顿召开，他在那里被解除了职务。 西德塞夫对他怀有根深蒂固的仇恨，对此并不满意，他再次将他传唤到爱丁堡的高级委员会法庭，该法庭于随后的七月召开，他在那里被指控“不遵守规定，反对珀斯条款进行传道，并写了一本名为《关于神圣恩典的辩护练习》的书，他们声称这本书对苏格兰教会有所影响；但事实上，这本书中的论点削弱了亚米尼派的力量，激怒了主教们，因此利德塞夫主教再也容忍不了他。”在这里，还有许多其他虚假、琐碎和荒谬的指控被提出，但他坚信自己的清白，对此予以驳斥。洛恩勋爵（肯穆尔夫人的兄弟）和许多其他人试图帮助他；但是西德塞夫的恶意如此之深，他发誓如果他们不按照他的意愿行事，他将写信给国王。 经过三天的审判，对他做出了判决，剥夺他的牧师职务，并禁止他在苏格兰的任何地方传道，违者将被视为叛乱，并在 1636 年 8 月 20 日之前被限制在阿伯丁市，直到国王满意为止。他遵守了这个判决，尽管它严厉而不公正，但并没有使他气馁，因为在他的一封信中，他说：“我去了阿伯丁的国王宫殿；言语、笔墨和智慧都无法表达我的喜悦。”"

During his confinement in Aberdeen, he wrote many of his well-known "Letters," which have been so popular. Indeed, there are few cottage libraries in Scotland in which they do not find a place among the scanty but select collection. Episcopacy and Arminianism at this time held the sole sway in Aberdeen, and it was with no gracious feeling that the learned doctors beheld the arrival of Rutherford. They had all imbibed the principles of their great patron, Laud, and manifested great hostility to Presbyterianisra, which was the principal cause of his being sent to that town. He met at first with a cold reception, and his opponents did all in their power to operate on the minds of the people against him. He says himself, that "the people thought him a strange man, and his cause not good." His innocency, however, and the truth of his cause, began at last to be known, and his popularity was spreading daily;—which so much alarmed the doctors, that they wished he might be banished from the kingdom. They entered into several disputations with him, but he appears to have proved himself a match for them. "I am here troubled," says he, "with the disputes of the great doctors, (especially with Dr Barron, on ceremonial and Arminian controversies—for all are corrupt here,) but, I thank God, with no detriment to the truth, or discredit to my profession."
在他在阿伯丁的监禁期间，他写了许多他著名的“信件”，这些信件非常受欢迎。事实上，在苏格兰的小屋图书馆中，几乎没有一家不在稀缺但精选的收藏中找到它们的位置。在那个时候，主教制和阿米纳派在阿伯丁占据了唯一的统治地位，学者们对鲁瑟福的到来并不怀好意。他们都接受了他们的伟大赞助人劳德的原则，并对长老会表示极大的敌意，这也是他被派往那个城市的主要原因。他一开始受到冷遇，他的对手们竭尽全力在人们心中对他进行操作。他自己说，“人们认为他是个奇怪的人，他的事业不好。”然而，他的清白和他的事业的真相最终开始被人们所知，他的声望日益扩散；这让医生们非常担心，他们希望他被驱逐出王国。他们与他进行了几次争论，但他似乎证明自己与他们不相上下。 他说：“我在这里为伟大的医生们的争论所困扰（尤其是与巴伦博士关于礼仪和阿尔明派的争议，因为这里的所有人都是腐败的），但是，感谢上帝，这并没有损害真理，也没有让我的职业受到贬低。”"

About this period, great confusion and commotion reigned in Scotland. It had long been the wish of King Charles to introduce the Church of England Service-book and Canons into the worship of the Presbyterians of Scotland. He accordingly, in April 1636, with ill-judged policy, commenced arrangements for its accomplishment, and gave commands to Archbishop Laud, Bishops Juxon and Wren, to compile a liturgy for the special use of the Church of Scotland. Consequently, one was soon framed, which was nearly similar to that used in the Church of England, excepting a few alterations; and, wherever these occurred, the language was almost synonimous with the Roman Missal. In 1637, a proclamation was issued, commanding the people's strict observance of this new form of worship, and a day was accordingly fixed for its introduction into Edinburgh,—on which it was presumed that compliance would follow throughout all the land. The feelings of the people, as may be supposed, were roused to a high pitch;—they stood boldly forward in opposition to such a tyrannical encroachment on their religious liberty, and manifested such a firm and determined spirit of resistance, that Charles soon began to see, when too late, that he had drawn the reins too tight. They would accept of no measure short of an entirely free and unfettered Presbyterian form of worship, and a chain of events followed which led to a renewal of the National Covenant and the abolition of Episcopacy.
关于这个时期，在苏格兰，混乱和骚动盛行。长期以来，查尔斯国王一直希望将英国教会的礼拜仪式和规则引入苏格兰长老会的崇拜中。因此，他在 1636 年 4 月开始了安排，并命令劳德大主教、朱克森主教和伦主教编写一本专门供苏格兰教会使用的礼拜仪式。于是，很快就制定了一本几乎与英国教会使用的礼拜仪式相似的书，只是有一些改动；而这些改动的地方，语言几乎与罗马弥撒书相似。1637 年，发布了一项公告，命令人们严格遵守这种新的崇拜形式，并相应地确定了在爱丁堡引入这种形式的日期，预计全国各地都会遵守。 人们的情感可以想象得到，已经被激发到了极点；他们勇敢地站出来反对对他们宗教自由的这种暴虐侵犯，并表现出坚定和决绝的抵抗精神，以至于查尔斯很快就开始意识到，为时已晚，他已经过于严厉地控制了局势。他们不会接受任何除了完全自由和无拘束的长老会礼拜形式之外的措施，接着发生了一系列事件，导致了《国家盟约》的重新签署和主教制度的废除。

During these tumults, Rutherford ventured to leave the place of his confinement in Aberdeen, and returned to his parishioners in Anwoth about February 1638, after an absence of more than eighteen months. They did not, however, long enjoy his ministrations, as we find him, in the same year, actively engaged in Glasgow in forwarding the great covenanted work of reformation. Rutherford was deputed one of the commissioners from the Presbytery of Kirkcudbright to the famous General Assembly of 1638, which was convened at Glasgow on the 21st of November. He was called upon to give an account of the accusations which had been preferred against him by the high commission court. After deliberation, a sentence was passed in his favour, and he, along with some others who were in the same circumstances, were recognised as members of the Assembly. Soon after this, an application was made to the Assembly's commission to have him transferred to Glasgow, and another by the University of St. Andrews, that he might be elected professor of divinity in the New College there. The commission appointed him to the professorship in St. Andrews, as his learning and talents fully qualified him for that important situation. He manifested, however, great reluctance to leave Anwoth, and pleaded, in a petition, his "bodily weakness and mental incapacity." There were several other petitions presented from the county of Galloway against his leaving Anwoth, but to no effect; the Court sustained his appointment. In October 1639, he removed to the scene of his future labours, and was appointed colleague to Mr Robert Blair, one of the ministers of St. Andrews.
在这些动荡时期，拉瑟福德冒险离开他在阿伯丁的监禁地，于 1638 年 2 月左右返回他在安沃斯的教区，经过了长达十八个月的离开。然而，他的教民们并没有长时间享受他的教导，因为我们发现他在同一年积极参与格拉斯哥的改革大会议。拉瑟福德被选为柯克库布赫教区的代表之一，参加了 1638 年 11 月 21 日在格拉斯哥召开的著名大会议。他被要求对高级委员会对他提出的指控进行辩护。经过讨论，对他做出了有利的判决，他和其他一些处于同样境地的人被认定为大会议的成员。此后不久，大会的委员会收到了将他调到格拉斯哥的申请，以及圣安德鲁斯大学提出的让他在新学院担任神学教授的申请。委员会任命他担任圣安德鲁斯大学的神学教授。 安德鲁斯，由于他的学识和才能完全使他适合那个重要的职位。然而，他对离开安沃斯表现出极大的不情愿，并在一份请愿书中提到他的“身体虚弱和智力不足”。来自加洛韦郡的几份请愿书反对他离开安沃斯，但没有产生任何效果；法庭支持了他的任命。1639 年 10 月，他搬到了他未来工作的地方，并被任命为圣安德鲁斯教堂的牧师罗伯特·布莱尔先生的助手。

Rutherford was nominated one of the commissioners to the General Assembly of divines held at Westminster in 1643. His colleagues were—Alexander Henderson, Robert Baillie, George Gillespie, and Robert Douglas, ministers;—the Earl of Cassilis, Lord Maitland, (afterwards Duke of Lauderdale,) and Sir Archibald Johnston, of Warriston, elders. He took a prominent part in all the discussions in that famous council, and published several works of a controversial and practical nature. About this time, he wrote his celebrated work entitled Lex Rex, in answer to a treatise by John Maxwell, the excommunicated Bishop of Ross, entitled "Sacro-Sancta Regum Majestas, or the sacred and royal prerogative of Christian kings, wherein soveraigntie is, by Holy Scripture, reverend antiquitie, and sound reason asserted," 4to., Oxford, 1644. This work endeavours to prove, that the royal prerogative of kingly authority is derived alone from God; and it demands an absolute and passive obedience of the subject to the will of the sovereign. The arguments in Lex Rex completely refute all the wild and absurd notions which Maxwell's work contains, although some of the sentiments would be thought rather democratical in modern times. The author displays an intimate knowledge of the classics and the writings of the ancient fathers and schoolmen. The work caused great sensation on its appearance. Bishop Guthrie mentions, that every member of the assembly "had in his hand that book lately published by Mr Samuel Rutherford, which was so idolized, that whereas Buchanan's treatise (de jure Regni apud Scotos) was looked upon as an oracle, this coming forth, it was slighted as not anti-monarchical enough, and Rutherford's Lex Rex only thought authentic."
在 1643 年，拉瑟福德被提名为威斯敏斯特大会的委员之一。他的同事有亚历山大·亨德森、罗伯特·贝利、乔治·吉列斯皮和罗伯特·道格拉斯，都是牧师；卡西利斯伯爵、梅特兰德勋爵（后来的劳德代尔公爵）和沃里斯顿的阿奇博尔德·约翰斯顿爵士，都是长老。他在这个著名的委员会的所有讨论中都发挥了重要作用，并出版了几本有争议性和实践性的作品。大约在这个时候，他写了他著名的作品《法律与君主》，以回应被逐出教会的罗斯主教约翰·麦克斯韦尔的著作《圣洁的君主权，或基督教国王的神圣和王权特权，其中通过圣经、尊敬的古代和合理的理由来维护主权》，4to.，牛津，1644 年。这部作品试图证明，君主权的王权仅来自上帝；并要求臣民对君主的意愿绝对服从和被动顺从。 《法律之王》中的论点完全驳斥了麦克斯韦尔的作品中包含的所有荒谬的观点，尽管其中一些观点在现代被认为是相当民主的。作者展示了对古典文学和古代教父及学者的深入了解。该作品一经问世就引起了极大的轰动。古斯里主教提到，大会的每个成员手中都拿着塞缪尔·拉瑟福德先生最近出版的那本书，这本书被奉为偶像，以至于布坎南的著作（《苏格兰国王权利论》）被视为神谕，而这本书的出现则被轻视为不够反君主制，只有拉瑟福德的《法律之王》被认为是真实可信的。"

Rutherford, who was anxious to return to Scotland, on account of bad health, had made an application to the Assembly for permission to leave; but it was not granted till their business was finished, as his services were very valuable to them; and it was not till 1647 that he was permitted to revisit his native land. On his return to Scotland, he resumed his labours in St. Andrews, and was in December of the same year appointed Principal of the New College, in room of Dr Howie, who had resigned on account of old age. In 1651 he was elected Rector of the University, and was now placed in situations of the highest eminence to which a clergyman of the Church of Scotland can be raised. The fame of Rutherford as a scholar and divine, had now spread both at home and abroad. In the Assembly of 1649, a motion was made, that he would be removed to Edinburgh as Professor of Divinity in the University; and about the same time he received a special invitation to occupy the chair of Divinity and Hebrew in the University of Harderwyck; and also another from the University of Utrecht, both of which he respectfully declined. He had too much regard for the interests of the Church of Scotland to leave the kingdom, considering the critical position in which it was at that time placed.
鲁瑟福德因健康不佳急于返回苏格兰，向议会申请离开的许可，但直到他们的事务完成后才获准，因为他对他们非常有价值；直到 1647 年他才被允许回到故乡。回到苏格兰后，他恢复了在圣安德鲁斯的工作，并在同年 12 月被任命为新学院的校长，接替因年老而辞职的霍伊博士。1651 年，他当选为大学校长，现在他被任命到了苏格兰教会的最高地位。鲁瑟福德作为学者和神学家的声誉现在已经在国内外传播开来。在 1649 年的议会上，有人提议将他调到爱丁堡担任大学神学教授；大约在同一时间，他收到了荷德维克大学邀请他担任神学和希伯来语教授的特别邀请；还有乌得勒支大学的邀请，他都恭敬地婉拒了。 他对苏格兰教会的利益非常重视，因此考虑到当时该教会所处的危急境地，他不愿离开王国。

During the period which followed the death of Charles I. to the restoration, Rutherford took an active part in the struggles of the church in asserting her rights. Cromwell had in the meantime usurped the throne, and independency held the sway in England. On the death of Cromwell in 1658, measures were taken for the restoration of Charles II. to the throne. The Scottish Parliament met in 1651, when the national covenant was recalled—Presbyterianism abolished—and all the decrees of Parliament, since 1638, which sanctioned the Presbyterian system, were rescinded. The rights of the people were thus torn from them—their liberties trampled upon—and the whole period which followed, till the martyrdom of Renwick in 1688, was a scene of intolerant persecution and bloodshed. Rutherford, as may be supposed, did not escape persecution in such a state of things. His work, Lex, Rex, was considered by the government as "inveighing against monarchie and laying ground for rebellion;" and ordered to be burned by the hand of the common hangman at Edinburgh. It met with similar treatment at St Andrews, and also at London; and a proclamation was issued, that every person in possession of a copy, who did not deliver it up to the king's solicitor, should be treated as an enemy to the government. Rutherford himself was deprived of his offices both in the University and the Church, and his stipend confiscated; he was ordered to confine himself within his own house, and was summoned to appear before the Parliament at Edinburgh, to answer a charge of high treason. It may be easily imagined what his fate would have been had he lived to obey the mandate; but ere the time arrived he was summoned to a far higher than an earthly tribunal. Not having a strong constitution, and being possessed of an active mind, he had evidently overworked himself in the share he took in the struggles and controversies of the time. Although not an old man, his health had been gradually declining for several years. His approaching dissolution he viewed with Christian calmness and fortitude. A few weeks before his death, he gave ample evidence of his faith and hope in the Gospel, by the Testimony which he left behind him.* On his death-bed he was cheered by the consolations of several Christian friends, and on the 20th of March 1661, in the sixty-first year of his age, he breathed his last, in the full assurance and hope of eternal life. His last words were, "Glory, glory, dwelleth in Emmanuel's land."
在查理一世去世到复辟时期，拉瑟福德积极参与教会为维护自身权益而进行的斗争。克伦威尔篡夺了王位，独立派在英国占据主导地位。1658 年克伦威尔去世后，开始采取措施恢复查理二世的王位。1651 年，苏格兰议会召开，国家盟约被召回，长老会制度被废除，自 1638 年以来议会通过的所有支持长老会制度的法令被废止。人民的权利被剥夺，他们的自由被践踏，从那时起直到 1688 年伦威克殉道，整个时期都是一场不容忍的迫害和流血的场景。可以想象，拉瑟福德在这种情况下没有逃脱迫害。他的著作《法律，君王》被政府视为“诋毁君主制并为叛乱打下基础”，并被命令在爱丁堡由公共绞刑手焚烧。 它在圣安德鲁斯和伦敦也受到类似的对待；并发布了一项公告，要求每个拥有副本的人，如果不将其交给国王的律师，将被视为政府的敌人。鲁瑟福德本人被剥夺了在大学和教堂的职务，并且他的薪水被没收；他被命令限制在自己的房子里，并被传唤到爱丁堡的议会前，以回答叛国罪的指控。可以想象，如果他活着服从命令，他的命运将会如何；但在时间到来之前，他被传唤到了一个比世俗法庭更高的法庭。由于体质不强，而且思维活跃，他在那个时代的斗争和争议中显然过度劳累。尽管不是一个老人，但他的健康状况已经逐渐恶化了几年。他对即将到来的离世以基督教的平静和坚韧心态看待。在他去世前几周，他通过留下的见证充分证明了他对福音的信仰和希望。在临终时，他得到了几位基督教朋友的安慰，于 1661 年 3 月 20 日，在他 61 岁时，他带着对永恒生命的完全确信和希望离世。他的遗言是：“荣耀，荣耀，居住在以马内利之地。”"

On April 28th, 1842, the foundation-stone of a colossal monument, called the "Rutherford Monument," was laid to his memory; it is erected on the farm of Boreland, in the parish of Anwoth, about half-a-mile from where he used to preach. The monument is of granite; height, from the surface to the apex, sixty feet; square of the pedestal, seven feet, with three rows of steps.
1842 年 4 月 28 日，一座名为“卢瑟福纪念碑”的巨大纪念碑的基石被奠定，它建在安沃斯教区的博兰农场上，距离他曾经讲道的地方大约半英里。这座纪念碑是由花岗岩建造的，高度从表面到顶点为 60 英尺，底座的边长为 7 英尺，有三排台阶。

Of the character of Rutherford—as to his talents and piety, nothing need be here said. All who know his writings, will be at a loss whether most to admire his learning and depth of reasoning, or his Christian graces. We give the following list of his works, which is appended to a memoir* by a talented gentleman of this city; a work compiled with great research and discrimination, and which will amply repay a perusal by all who feel an interest in the remembrance of an individual so distinguished for learning, uprightness, and piety, as was SAMUEL RUTHERFORD.—Exercitationes Apologeticæ pro Divina Gratia: Amst., 12mo., 1636. A Peaceable and Temperate Plea for Paul's Presbyterie in Scotland: Lond., 4to., 1642. A Sermon preached to the Honourable House of Commons, January 31, 1643. Daniel vi. 26. Lond., 4to., 1644. A Sermon preached before the Honourable House of Lords, the 25th day of June 1645. Luke vii. 22–25. Mark iv. 38–40. Matt. viii. 26; Lond., 4to., 1645. Lex, Rex; or the Law and the Prince; a discourse for the just prerogative of king and people: Lond., 4to., 1644. The Due Right of Presbyteries, or a Peaceable Plea for the government of the Church of Scotland: Lond., 4to., 1644. The Tryal and Triumph of Faith: Lond., 4to., 1645. The Divine Right of Church Government and Excommunication: Lond., 4to., 1646. Christ Dying and Drawing to Himself: Lond., 4to., 1647. A Survey of the Spiritual Antichrist, opening the secrets of Familisme and Antinomianisme: Lond., 1648. A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience: Lond., 4to, 1649. The Last and Heavenly Speeches, and Glorious Departure of John Gordoun, Viscount Kenmuir: Edin., 4to., 1649. Disputatio Scholastica de Divina Providentia: Edin., 4to, 1651. The Covenant of Life opened: Edin., 4to., 1655. A Survey of the Survey of that Summe of Church Discipline penned by Mr Thomas Hooker: Lond., 4to., 1658. Influences of the Life of Grace: Lond., 4to., 1659. Joshua Redivivus, or Mr Rutherford's Letters, in three parts: 12mo., 1664. Examen Arminianismi, conscriptum et discipulis dictatum a doctissimo clarissimoque viro, D. Samuele Rhetorforte, SS. Theol. in Academia Scotiae Sanctandreana Doctore et Professore: Ultraj., 12mo., 1668.
关于拉瑟福德的品格，关于他的才能和虔诚，这里不需要多说。所有了解他著作的人，都会为他的学识和深思熟虑感到钦佩，或者为他的基督徒的美德感到钦佩。我们提供以下他的作品清单，这是由本市一位才华横溢的绅士附上的一篇回忆录*，这本书经过了深入的研究和辨别，对所有对一个以学识、正直和虔诚而著名的人感兴趣的人来说，阅读这本书将会有丰厚的回报。这个人就是塞缪尔·拉瑟福德。-《为神的恩典辩护的演习》：阿姆斯特丹，12mo，1636 年。《关于苏格兰保罗长老会的和平和温和的辩护》：伦敦，4to，1642 年。1643 年 1 月 31 日在尊敬的下议院讲道。但以理书 6 章 26 节。伦敦，4to，1644 年。1645 年 6 月 25 日在尊敬的上议院讲道。路加福音 7 章 22-25 节。马可福音 4 章 38-40 节。马太福音 8 章 26 节。伦敦，4to，1645 年。《法律与君主：关于国王和人民公正特权的演讲》：伦敦，4to，1644 年。《长老会的正当权利，或苏格兰教会政府的和平辩护》：伦敦，4to。1644 年，《信仰的试验和胜利》：伦敦，四开本，1645 年，《教会政府和逐出教会的神圣权利》：伦敦，四开本，1646 年，《基督的死亡和吸引自己》：伦敦，四开本，1647 年，《属灵的反基督调查》，揭示家庭主义和反律法主义的秘密：伦敦，1648 年，《反对所谓良心自由的自由辩论》：伦敦，四开本，1649 年，《约翰·戈登子爵肯米尔的最后和天堂演讲，以及荣耀的离去》：爱丁堡，四开本，1649 年，《关于神的预定的学术辩论》：爱丁堡，四开本，1651 年，《生命的盟约揭示》：爱丁堡，四开本，1655 年，《关于托马斯·胡克先生所著教会纪律总结的调查》：伦敦，四开本，1658 年，《恩典生活的影响》：伦敦，四开本，1659 年，《约书亚复活，或拉瑟福德先生的信件》，分为三部分：十二开本，1664 年，《阿尔米尼主义的审查》，由最博学和最杰出的人撰写和教导，D. Samuel Rhetorforte，苏格兰圣安德鲁斯大学神学博士和教授：乌得勒支，十二开本，1668 年。

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE
作者的前言

WHO doubteth (Christian Reader) but innocency must be under the courtesy and mercy of malice, and that it is a real martyrdom to be brought under the lawless inquisition of the bloody tongue. Christ, the prophets, and apostles of our Lord, went to heaven with the note of traitors, seditious men, and such as turned the world upside down: calumnies of treason to Cæsar were an ingredient in Christ's cup, and therefore the author is the more willing to drink of that cup that touched his lip, who is our glorious Forerunner: what, if conscience toward God, and credit with men, cannot both go to heaven with the saints, the author is satisfied with the former companion, and is willing to dismiss the other. Truth to Christ cannot be treason to Cæsar, and for his choice he judgeth truth to have a nearer relation to Christ Jesus, than the transcendent and boundless power of a mortal prince.
谁怀疑（基督徒读者）无辜必须受到恶意的礼遇和怜悯，被带到血腥之舌的无法无天的审讯之下，这是真正的殉道。基督、先知和我们主的使徒，都以叛徒、煽动者和颠覆世界的人的名声上升天堂：对凯撒的背叛的诽谤是基督杯中的成分，因此作者更愿意喝到那杯触及他嘴唇的杯子，他是我们荣耀的先驱：如果对上帝的良心和对人的信任不能与圣徒一同上天堂，作者满足于前者的伴侣，并愿意放弃另一个。对基督的真理不可能对凯撒构成背叛，对于他的选择，他认为真理与基督耶稣有更密切的关系，而不是一个凡人王权的超越和无限。

He considered that popery and defection had made a large step in Britain, and that arbitrary government had over-swelled all banks of law, that it was now at the highest float, and that this sea approaching the farthest border of fancied absoluteness, was at the score of ebbing: and the naked truth is, prelates, a wild and pushing cattle to the lambs and flock of Christ, had made a hideous noise, the wheels of their chariot did run an equal pace with the blood-thirsty mind of the daughter of Babel. Prelacy, the daughter planted in her mother's blood, must verify that word, As is the mother, so is the daughter: why, but do not the prelates now suffer? True, but their sufferings are not of blood, or kindred, to the calamities of these of whom Lactantius saith, (l. 5, c. 19,) O quam honesta voluntate miseri erant. The causes of their suffering are, 1. Hope of gain and glory, steering their helm to a shore they much affect; even to a church of gold, of purple, yet really of clay and earth. 2. The lie is more active upon the spirits of men, not because of its own weakness, but because men are more passive in receiving the impressions of error than truth; and opinions lying in the world's fat womb, or of a conquering nature, whatever notions side with the world, to prelates and men of their make are very efficacious.
他认为天主教和背叛在英国取得了很大的进展，专制政府已经超越了所有法律的限制，现在处于最高浮动状态，这片海洋正接近幻想的绝对性的最远边界，正处于退潮的状态。裸露的事实是，主教们对基督的羊群和群体造成了可怕的噪音，他们的战车轮子与巴比伦女儿的嗜血心理同步。主教制度，这个种植在母亲鲜血中的女儿，必须验证那句话，母亲如何，女儿也如何：为什么主教们现在不受苦？是的，但他们的苦难不是血缘上的，也不是与这些苦难之人的灾难相同，正如拉坦修斯所说，（第 5 卷，第 19 章）哦，他们多么渴望以光荣的意愿而受苦。他们受苦的原因是：1. 对财富和荣耀的希望，驾驶他们的舵朝着他们非常喜欢的岸边，即一个由金子和紫色构成的教堂，但实际上是由泥土和尘土构成的。2. 谎言对人们的精神更具活力，不是因为它自身的脆弱，而是因为人们在接受错误印象时更加被动，而不是真理；而且，存在于世界的肥沃子宫中的观点，或者具有征服性质的观点，无论是与世界站在一边的观点，对于主教和那些与他们相似的人来说都非常有效。

There is another cause of the sickness of our time, God plagued heresy to beget Atheism and security, as atheism and security had begotten heresy, even as clouds through reciprocation of causes engender rain, rain begat vapours, vapours clouds, and clouds rain, so do sins overspread our sad times in a circular generation.
我们这个时代的病症还有另一个原因，上帝降下异端，孕育了无神论和安逸，就像无神论和安逸孕育了异端一样，就像云彼此相互作用产生雨水，雨水孕育水蒸气，水蒸气形成云，云又带来雨水，罪恶也在我们悲伤的时代中循环生成。

And now judgment presseth the kingdoms, and of all the heaviest judgments the sword, and of swords the civil sword, threateneth vastation, yet not, I hope, like the Roman civil sword, of which it was said,
现在审判压迫着各个王国，而最沉重的审判是刀剑，而其中最沉重的刀剑是内战的刀剑，威胁着毁灭，但我希望不会像罗马的内战刀剑那样

Bella geri placuit nullos habitura triumphos.
贝拉决心不再追求任何胜利。

I hope this war shall be Christ's triumph, Babylon's ruin.

That which moved the author, was not (as my excommunicate adversary, like a Thraso, saith) the escapes of some pens, which necessitated him to write, for many before me hath learnedly trodden in this path, but that I might add a new testimony to the times.
作者所感动的，并不是（正如我的被逐出教会的对手所说的那样，像一个狂妄自大的人所说的）一些笔者的逃避，这迫使他写作，因为在我之前，许多人已经在这条道路上学术地踏过，而是我可以为这个时代增添一个新的证词。

I have not time to examine the P. Prelate's preface, only, I give a taste of his gall in this preface, and of a virulent piece, of his agnosco stylum et genium Thrasonis, in which he laboureth to prove how inconsistent presbyterial government is with monarchy, or any other government.
我没有时间审查 P. Prelate 的前言，只是在这个前言中，我给出了他的胆量和他的一篇恶毒的文章的味道，他在其中努力证明长老制政府与君主制或任何其他政府是不一致的。

1. He denieth that the crown and sceptre is under any co-active power of pope or presbytery, or censurable, or dethroneable; to which we say, presbyteries profess that kings are under the co-active power of Christ's keys of discipline, and that prophets and pastors, as ambassadors of Christ, have the keys of the kingdom of God, to open and let in believing princes, and also to shut them out, if they rebel against Christ; the law of Christ excepteth none, (Mat. 16:19; 18:15, 16; 2 Cor. 10:6; Jer. 1:9,) if the king's sins may be remitted in a ministerial way, (as Job 20:23, 24,) as prelates and their priests absolve kings; we think they may be bound by the hand that loosed; presbyteries never dethroned kings, never usurped that power. Your father, P. Prelate, hath dethroned many kings; I mean the Pope, whose power, by your own confession, (c. 5, p. 58,) differeth from yours by divine right only in extent.
他否认皇冠和权杖受到教皇或长老会的任何强制权力的约束，也不可指责或废黜；对此，我们说，长老会宣称国王受到基督纪律的钥匙的强制权力，先知和牧师作为基督的使者拥有神国的钥匙，可以让信仰的君王进入，也可以将他们排除在外，如果他们背叛基督；基督的律法没有例外，（马太福音 16:19；18:15, 16；哥林多后书 10:6；耶利米书 1:9，）如果国王的罪可以以部长的方式得到赦免，（如约伯记 20:23, 24，）就像主教和他们的祭司赦免国王一样；我们认为他们可能会被解放的手所束缚；长老会从未废黜过国王，也从未篡夺过那种权力。你的父亲，P. Prelate，废黜了许多国王；我指的是教皇，根据你自己的承认，（第 5 章，第 58 页，）他的权力只在程度上与你的不同，而在神的权力上是一样的。

2. When sacred hierarchy, the order instituted by Christ, is overthrown, what is the condition of sovereignty?—Ans.—Surer than before, when prelates deposed kings. 2. I fear Christ shall never own this order.
2. 当基督所建立的神圣等级制度被推翻时，主权的状况如何？-答：比主教废黜国王时更加稳固。2. 我担心基督永远不会承认这个秩序。

3. The mitre cannot suffer, and the diadem be secured.—Ans.—Have kings no pillars to their thrones but antichristian prelates. Prelates have trampled diadem and sceptre under their feet, as histories teach us.
3. 主教冠不能受苦，而王冠却能得到保护。-答案-国王的王座上难道没有支柱，除了反基督教的主教吗？历史告诉我们，主教们踩在王冠和权杖之上。

4. Do they not (puritans) magisterially determine that kings are not of God's creation by authoritative commission; but only by permission, extorted by importunity, and way given, that they may be a scourge to a sinful people?—Ans.—Any unclean spirit from hell, could not speak a blacker lie; we hold that the king, by office, is the church's nurse father, a sacred ordinance, the deputed power of God; but by the Prelate's way, all inferior judges, and God's deputies on earth, who are also our fathers in the fifth commandment style, are to be obeyed by no divine law; the king, misled by p. prelates, shall forbid to obey them, who is in downright truth, a mortal civil pope, may loose and liberate subjects from the tie of a divine law.
他们（清教徒）难道不是威严地确定国王不是上帝授权创造的，而只是通过恳求和让步而获得的许可，以便成为对罪恶的人民的惩罚吗？-答：任何来自地狱的不洁灵魂都无法说出更黑暗的谎言；我们认为国王是教会的养父，是神圣的法令，是上帝委派的权力；但按照主教的方式，所有下级法官和上帝在地上的代理人，也是我们在第五诫中称之为父亲的人，不需要遵守神圣的法律；国王被主教误导，会禁止服从他们，实际上是一个致命的世俗教皇，可以解除和解放臣民的神圣法律的束缚。

5. His inveighing against ruling elders, and the rooting out of antichristian prelacy, without any word of Scripture on the contrary, I pass as the extravagancy of a malcontent, because he is deservedly excommunicated for perjury, popery, Socinianism, tyranny over men's conscience, and invading places of civil dignity, and deserting his calling, and the camp of Christ, &c.
他对执政长老的抨击，以及根除反基督教的主教制度，没有任何相反的圣经文字，我认为是一个不满分子的胡言乱语，因为他因为伪证、教皇主义、索契尼主义、对人们良心的暴政、侵犯公职地位以及背弃自己的职责和基督的阵营等罪行而被应当被逐出教会。

6. None were of old anointed but kings, priests, and prophets; who, then, more obliged, to maintain the Lord's anointed, than priests and prophets? The church hath never more beauty and plenty under any government than monarchy, which is most countenanced by God, and magnified by Scripture.—Ans. Pastors are to maintain the rights of people, and a true church, no less than the right of kings; but prelates, the court parasites, and creatures of the king, that are born for the glory of their king, can do no less than profess this in words, yet it is true that Tacitus writeth of such, (Hist. 1. 1,) Libentius cum fortuna principis, quam cum principe loquuntur: and it is true, that the church hath had plenty under kings, not so much, because they were kings, as because they were godly and zealous: except the P. P. say, that the oppressing kings of Israel and Judah, and the bloody horns that made war with the lamb, are not kings. In the rest of the epistle he extols the Marquis of Ormond with base flattery, from his loyalty to the king, and his more than admirable prudence in the treaty of cessation with the rebels; a woe is due to this false prophet, who calleth darkness light, for the former was abominable and perfidious apostacy from the Lord's cause and people of God, whom he once defended, and the cessation was a selling of the blood of many hundred thousand protestants, men, women, and sucking children.
6. 古时只有国王、祭司和先知才能受膏，那么，谁比祭司和先知更有责任维护上帝的受膏者呢？教会在任何政府下都没有比君主制更美丽丰富的，君主制得到上帝的最大支持，并在圣经中被赞美。——答：牧师们要维护人民的权利和真正的教会，不亚于维护国王的权利；但是那些宫廷的谄媚者和国王的爪牙，他们为了国王的荣耀而生，除了口头上表达这一点，他们无能为力。塔西佗在《历史》中写到这样的人：“他们更喜欢与君主的运气交谈，而不是与君主交谈。”而且，教会之所以在君主统治下繁荣，不仅仅是因为他们是国王，更因为他们虔诚而热心。除非教皇们认为，压迫以色列和犹大的国王，以及与羔羊交战的血腥角不是国王。 在这封书信的其余部分中，他用卑鄙的奉承之词赞扬奥蒙德侯爵，称赞他对国王的忠诚以及在与叛乱者的停战协议中表现出的非常出色的谨慎。这个虚伪的先知应该受到谴责，他把黑暗称为光明，因为前者是对主的事业和上帝的子民的可憎和背信弃义的背叛，而停战协议则是对成千上万名新教徒的血液的出卖，其中包括男人、女人和吃奶的婴儿。

This cursed P. hath written of late a treatise against the presbyterial government of Scotland, in which there is a bundle of lies, hellish calumnies, and gross errors.
这个可恶的 P.最近写了一篇反对苏格兰长老会政府的论文，其中充斥着一堆谎言、邪恶的诽谤和严重的错误。

1. The first lie is, that we have lay elders, whereas, they are such as rule, but labour not in the word and doctrine (1 Tim. 5:7, p. 3).
第一个谎言是，我们有长老，然而，他们只是统治，而不在道和教义上劳苦（提摩太前书 5:7，第 3 页）。

2. The second lie, that deacons, who only attend tables, are joint rulers with pastors (p. 3).
第二个谎言是，执事只是负责伺候餐桌，与牧师一样担任共同的统治者（第 3 页）。

3. That we never, or little use the lesser excommunication, that is, debarring from the Lord's Supper (p. 4).
我们从不或很少使用较轻的逐出教会惩罚，即禁止参加主的晚餐（第 4 页）。

4. That any church judicature in Scotland exacteth pecuniary mulcts, and threaten excommunication to the non-payers, and refuseth to accept the repentance of any who are not able to pay: the civil magistrate only fineth for drunkenness, and adultery, blaspheming of God, which are frequent sins in prelates.
任何苏格兰教会的审判机构都要求罚款，并威胁对不支付者进行逐出教会的处罚，并拒绝接受无力支付的人的悔改；而民事法官只对醉酒、通奸和亵渎上帝等常见的主教罪行进行罚款。

5. A calumny it is to say that ruling elders are of equal authority to preach the word as pastors (p. 7).
说执事与牧师在传道方面具有相等的权威是诽谤（第 7 页）。

6. That laymen are members of presbyteries or general assemblies. Buchanan and Mr Melvin were doctors of divinity; and could have taught such an ass as John Maxwell.
6. 俗人是长老会或大会的成员。布坎南和梅尔文先生都是神学博士；他们可以教授像约翰·麦克斯韦尔这样的蠢驴。

7. That expectants are intruders upon the sacred function, because, as sons of the prophets, they exercise their gifts for trial in preaching.
那些期待者是对神圣职能的侵犯，因为作为先知的子孙，他们运用自己的恩赐进行试讲。

8. That the presbytery of Edinburgh hath a superintending power, because they communicate the affairs of the church, and write to the churches, what they hear prelates and bell devise against Christ and his church.
爱丁堡长老会具有监督权力，因为他们传达教会事务，并向教会写信，告知他们所听到的主教和钟声针对基督和他的教会所策划的事情。

9. That the king must submit his sceptre to the presbytery; the king's sceptre is his royal office, which is not subject to any judicature, no more than any lawful ordinance of Christ; but if the king, as a man, blaspheme God, murder the innocent, advance belly-gods, (such as our prelates, for the most part, were,) above the Lord's inheritance, the ministers of Christ are to say, "The king troubleth Israel, and they have the keys to open and shut heaven to, and upon the king, if he can offend."
国王必须向长老会屈服；国王的权杖是他的王权，不受任何司法管辖，就像基督的合法命令一样；但如果国王作为一个人亵渎上帝，谋杀无辜，提拔贪婪之徒（比如我们的大部分教长），超过主的产业，基督的仆人们应该说：“国王扰乱以色列，他们有权利在国王身上打开和关闭天堂，如果他犯罪的话。”

10. That king James said, a Scottish presbytery and a monarchy agreeth as well as God and the devil, is true, but king James meant of a wicked king; else he spake as a man.
詹姆斯国王说，苏格兰长老会和君主制和上帝与魔鬼一样合适，这是真的，但詹姆斯国王指的是邪恶的国王；否则他说的就像一个普通人。

11. That the presbytery, out of pride, refused to answer king James's honourable messengers, is a lie; they could not, in business of high concernment, return a present answer to a prince, seeking still to abolish presbyteries.
长老会因为骄傲而拒绝回答詹姆斯国王的尊贵使者，这是谎言；在重要事务中，他们无法立即回答一个一直试图废除长老会的王子。

12. Its a lie, that all sins, even all civil business, come under the cognizance of the church, for only sins, as publicly scandalous, fall under their power. (Matt. 18:15–17, &c.; 2 Thess. 3:11; 1 Tim. 5:20.) It is a calumny that they search out secret crimes, or that they ever disgraced the innocent, or divided families; where there be flagrant scandals, and pregnant suspicions, of scandalous crimes, they search out these, as the incest of Spotswood, P. Prelate of St Andrews, with his own daughter; the adulteries of Whiteford, P. Prelate of Brichen, whose bastard came weeping to the assembly of Glasgow in the arms of the prostitute: these they searched out, but not with the damnable oath, ex officio, that the high commission put upon innocents, to cause them accuse themselves against the law of nature.
12. 所有的罪恶，甚至所有的民事事务都属于教会的审判范围，这是个谎言，因为只有公开丑闻的罪恶才属于他们的权力范围。（马太福音 18:15-17 等；帖撒罗尼迦后书 3:11；提摩太前书 5:20）他们搜寻秘密罪行或者诽谤无辜是诽谤，或者分裂家庭；只有在有明显的丑闻和可疑的丑闻罪行时，他们才会搜寻，比如斯波茨伍德的乱伦，圣安德鲁斯的主教，与自己的女儿发生乱伦；布里肯的主教怀特福德的通奸，他的私生子哭着被妓女抱到格拉斯哥的大会上：这些他们搜寻出来，但不是像高级委员会那样用可恶的官方宣誓强迫无辜者违背自然法律自证其罪。

13. The presbytery hinder not lawful merchandise; scandalous exhortation, unjust suits of law, they may forbid; and so doth the Scripture, as scandalous to Christians, 2 Cor. 6.
长老会不妨碍合法的商品交易；他们可以禁止令人反感的劝告、不公正的法律诉讼；圣经也这样说，因为这对基督徒来说是令人反感的，哥林多后书 6。

14. They repeal no civil laws; they preach against unjust and grievous laws, as, Isaiah (10:1) doth, and censure the violation of God's holy day, which prelates profaned.
他们不废除任何民法；他们反对不公正和严重的法律，就像以赛亚书（10:1）所做的那样，并谴责教士们亵渎上帝的圣日。

15. We know no parochial popes, we turn out no holy ministers, but only dumb dogs, non-residents, scandalous, wretched, and apostate prelates.
我们没有地方教区的教皇，我们没有神圣的牧师，只有哑巴狗、不住在这里的人、丑闻、可怜和背叛的主教。

16. Our moderator hath no dominion, the P. Prelate absolveth him, while he saith, "All is done in our church by common consent" (p. 7).
我们的调解人没有统治权，P. Prelate 宣告他无罪，同时他说：“我们教会的一切都是经过共同同意完成的”（第 7 页）。

17. It is true, we have no popish consecration, such as P. Prelate contendeth for in the mass, but we have such as Christ and his apostles used, in consecrating the elements.
确实，我们没有像 P. Prelate 在弥撒中争辩的那种天主教的祝圣，但我们有基督和他的使徒在祝圣元素时所使用的方式。

18. If any sell the patrimony of the church, the presbytery censures him; if any take buds of malt, meal, beef, it is no law with us, no more than the bishop's five hundred marks, or a year's stipend that the entrant gave to the Lord Bishop for a church. And whoever took buds in these days, (as king James by the earl of Dunbar, did buy episcopacy at a pretended assembly, by foul budding,) they were either men for the episcopal way, or perfidiously against their oath became bishops, all personal faults of this kind imputed to presbyteries, agree to them under the reduplication of episcopal men.
18. 如果有人出售教堂的产业，长老会会谴责他；如果有人拿了麦芽、面粉、牛肉的芽，这对我们来说不是法律，就像主教的五百英镑，或者新任牧师为教堂给予主教的一年薪水一样。而那些在这些日子里拿了芽的人（比如詹姆斯国王通过邓巴伯爵购买了主教职位，通过不正当的芽来进行了假装的会议），他们要么是支持主教制度的人，要么是背弃了自己的誓言成为了主教，这些个人错误都归咎于长老会，这些错误都是主教派的人的重复。

19. The leading men that covered the sins of the dying man, and so lost his soul, were episcopal men; and though some men were presbyterians, the faults of men cannot prejudice the truth of God; but the prelates always cry out against the rigour of presbyteries in censuring scandals; because they themselves do ill, they hate the light; now here the Prelate condemneth them of remissness in discipline.
那些掩盖垂死者罪恶并使他失去灵魂的主要人物是主教派的人；虽然有些人是长老会的人，但人的过错不能影响上帝的真理；但是主教们总是对长老会在审判丑闻方面的严格态度大声抗议；因为他们自己做错了事，所以他们憎恨光明；现在这里主教谴责他们在纪律上的疏忽。

20. Satan, a liar from the beginning, saith, The presbytery was a seminary and nursery of fiends, contentions, and bloods, because they excommunicated murderers against king James' will; which is all one to say, prophecying is a nurse of bloods, because the prophets cryed out against king Achab, and the murderers of innocent Naboth: the men of God must be either on the one side or the other, or then preach against reciprocation of injuries.
撒旦，一个从一开始就是个骗子的人，说，长老会是恶魔、争斗和流血的温床和育婴院，因为他们违背了詹姆斯国王的意愿而将谋杀犯逐出教会；这就等于说，预言是流血的护士，因为先知们对亚哈王和无辜的拿伯谴责：神的人必须站在一方，要么支持，要么反对伤害的报复。

21. It is false that presbyteries usurp both swords; because they censure sins, which the civil magistrate should censure and punish. Elias might be said then to mix himself with the civil business of the kingdom, because be prophecied against idolators' killing of the Lord's prophets; which crime the civil magistrate was to punish. But the truth is, the assembly of Glasgow, 1637, condemned the prelates, because they, being pastors, would be also lords of parliament, of session, of secret council, of exchequer, judges, barons, and in their lawless high commission, would fine, imprison, and use the sword.
21. 教长会篡夺两把剑的说法是错误的；因为他们审判罪恶，而这是民事法官应该审判和惩罚的。以利亚可以说是与国家的民事事务相混合，因为他预言了偶像崇拜者杀害主先知的罪行；而这个罪行应该由民事法官来惩罚。但事实是，格拉斯哥会议在 1637 年谴责了主教，因为他们作为牧师，还想成为议会、法院、秘密委员会、财政部、法官和男爵的主人，并在他们无法无天的高级委员会中罚款、监禁和使用武力。

22. It is his ignorance that he saith, a provincial synod is an associate body chosen out of all judicial presbyteries; for all pastors and doctors, without delegation, by virtue of their place and office, repair to the provincial synods, and without any choice at all, consult and voice there.
这是他的无知，他说，一个省级教会会议是从所有司法长老会中选择出来的一个合作机构；因为所有的牧师和教师，凭借他们的职位和职责，都会前往省级教会会议，并且没有任何选择，就在那里进行咨询和发表意见。

23. It is a lie that some leading men rule all here; indeed, episcopal men made factions to rent the synods; and though men abuse their power to factions, this cannot prove that presbyteries are inconsistent with monarchy; for then the Prelate, the monarch of his diocesan rout, should be anti-monarchical in a higher manner, for he ruleth all at his will.
这里有一种说法是错误的，即一些领导人统治着这里的一切；事实上，主教们组成派系来分裂教会会议；尽管人们滥用权力形成派系，但这并不能证明长老会与君主制不一致；因为那么主教，他的教区势力的君主，应该以更高的方式反对君主制，因为他按自己的意愿统治一切。

24. The prime men, as Mr R. Bruce, the faithful servant of Christ, was honoured and attended by all, because of his suffering, zeal, holiness, his fruitful ministry in gaining many thousand souls to Christ. So, though king James cast him off, and did swear, by God's name, he intended to be king, (the Prelate maketh blasphemy a virtue in the king,) yet king James swore he could not find an honest minister in Scotland to be a bishop, and therefore he was necessitated to promote false knaves; but he said sometimes, and wrote it under his hand, that Mr R. Bruce was worthy of the half of his kingdom: but will this prove presbyteries inconsistent with monarchies? I should rather think that knave bishops, by king James' judgment, were inconsistent with monarchies.
24. 那些杰出的人，如基督的忠诚仆人布鲁斯先生，因他的受苦、热心、圣洁以及在带领许多千万灵魂归向基督的多产事工而受到所有人的尊敬和关注。所以，尽管詹姆斯国王抛弃了他，并且发誓，以上帝的名义，他打算成为国王（主教将亵渎视为国王的美德），但詹姆斯国王发誓他在苏格兰找不到一个诚实的牧师来担任主教，因此他被迫提拔虚伪的恶棍；但他有时说，并且亲笔写下，布鲁斯先生配得上他王国的一半：但这能证明长老会与君主制不相容吗？我更倾向于认为，根据詹姆斯国王的判断，恶棍主教与君主制不相容。

25. His lies of Mr R. Bruce, excerpted out of the lying manuscripts of apostate Spotswood, in that he would not but preach against the king's recalling from exile some bloody popish lords to undo all, are nothing comparable to the incests, adulteries, blasphemies, perjuries, Sabbath-breaches, drunkenness, profanity, &c., committed by prelates before the sun.

26. Our General Assemby is no other than Christ's court, (Acts 15) made up of pastors, doctors, and brethren, or elders.
我们的大会就是基督的法庭，（使徒行传 15 章），由牧师、教师和弟兄或长老组成。

27. They ought to have no negative vote to impede the conclusions of Christ in his servants.
他们不应该有任何负面的投票来阻碍基督在他的仆人中的结论。

28. It is a lie that the king hath no power to appoint time and place for the General Assembly; but his power is not privative to destroy the free courts of Christ, but accumulative to aid and assist them.
国王无权决定大会的时间和地点是个谎言；但他的权力不是剥夺基督自由法庭的权力，而是增加了对它们的支持和帮助。

29. It is a lie that our General Assembly may repeal laws; command and expect performance of the king, or then excommunicate, subject to them, force and compel king, judges, and all, to submit to them. They may not force the conscience of the poorest beggar, nor is any Assembly infallible, nor can it lay bounds upon the souls of judges, which they are to obey with blind obedience—their power is ministerial, subordinate to Christ's law; and what civil laws parliaments make against God's word, they may authoritatively declare them to be unlawful, as though the emperor (Acts 15) had commanded fornication and eating of blood. Might not the Assembly forbid these in the synod? I conceive the prelates, if they had power, would repeal the act of parliament made, anno 1641, in Scotland, by his majesty personally present, and the three estates concerning the annulling of these acts of parliament and laws which established bishops in Scotland; therefore bishops set themselves as independent monarchs above kings and laws; and what they damn in presbyteries and assemblies, that they practise themselves.
我们的大会可以废除法律，命令并期望国王履行，或者将其逐出教会，迫使和强制国王、法官和所有人服从他们，这是一个谎言。他们不能强迫最贫穷的乞丐的良心，也没有任何大会是不可错误的，也不能限制法官的灵魂，他们必须盲目服从的是基督的法律。他们的权力是辅助的，服从基督的法律；如果议会制定的民事法律违背上帝的话，他们可以宣布这些法律是非法的，就像使徒行传 15 章所描述的皇帝命令通奸和吃血一样。大会难道不能在教会会议中禁止这些吗？我认为，如果主教们有权力的话，他们会废除 1641 年苏格兰议会法案，这个法案是由国王亲自出席和三个贵族制定的，用于废除在苏格兰建立主教的法案和法律；因此，主教们将自己置于国王和法律之上，作为独立的君主；他们谴责在长老会和大会中的事情，却自己去实践。

30. Commissioners from burghs, and two from Edinburgh, because of the largeness of that church, not for cathedral supereminence, sit in assemblies, not as sent from burghs, but as sent and authorised by the church session of the burgh, and so they sit there in a church capacity.
30. 来自市镇的委员以及来自爱丁堡的两名委员，因为教堂的规模较大，而不是因为大教堂的特殊地位，他们在会议中参与，不是作为市镇的代表，而是作为教堂会议授权的代表，因此他们以教堂的身份在那里参与。

31. Doctors both in academies and in parishes, we desire, and our book of discipline holdeth forth such.
31. 医生们无论在学院还是在教区，我们都希望，并且我们的纪律书也如此规定。

32. They hold, (I believe with warrant of God's word,) if the king refuse to reform religion, the inferior judges, and assembly of godly pastors, and other church-officers may reform; if the king will not kiss the Son, and do his duty in purging the House of the Lord, may not Eliah and the people do their duty, and cast out Baal's priests. Reformation of religion is a personal act that belongeth to all, even to any one private person according to his place.
他们认为（我相信是根据上帝的话语），如果国王拒绝改革宗教，那么下级法官、虔诚的牧师会议和其他教会职员可以进行改革；如果国王不愿意亲吻上帝的儿子，并在净化上帝的殿宇方面尽责，难道以利亚和人民不能尽自己的职责，驱逐巴力的祭司吗？宗教改革是一个个人行为，属于每个人，甚至是每个私人根据他的地位。

33. They may swear a covenant without the king, if he refuse; and build the Lord's house (2 Chron. 15:9) themselves; and relieve and defend one another, when they are oppressed. For my acts and duties of defending myself and the oppressed, do not tye my conscience conditionally, so the king consent, but absolutely, as all duties of the law of nature do. (Jer. 22:3; Prov. 24:11; Isa. 58:6; 1:17.)
他们可以在国王拒绝的情况下宣誓立约，并自己建造主的殿（《历代志下》15:9），并在受压迫时互相援助和保护。因为我为自卫和保护受压迫者而采取的行动和责任，并不以国王的同意为条件，而是绝对地遵循自然法的所有责任（《耶利米书》22:3；《箴言》24:11；《以赛亚书》58:6；1:17）。

34. The P. Prelate condemneth our reformation, because it was done against the will of our popish queen. This showeth what estimation he hath of popery, and how he abhorreth protestant religion.
34. P. Prelate 谴责我们的改革，因为它是违背我们天主教女王的意愿而进行的。这显示了他对天主教的评价，以及他对新教宗教的厌恶。

35. They deposed the queen for her tyranny, but crowned her son; all this is vindicated in the following treatise.
他们因为女王的暴政废黜了她，但是加冕了她的儿子；以下论文中对这一切进行了辩护。

36. The killing of the monstrous and prodigious wicked cardinal in the Castle of St Andrews, and the violence done to the prelates, who against all law of God and man, obtruded a mass service upon their own private motion, in Edinburgh anno 1637, can conclude nothing against presbyterial government except our doctrine commend these acts as lawful.

37. What was preached by the servant of Christ, whom (p. 46) he calleth the Scottish Pope, is printed, and the P. Prelate durst not, could not, cite any thing thereof as popish or unsound, he knoweth that the man whom he so slandereth, knocked down the Pope and the prelates.
基督仆人所传讲的，他称之为苏格兰教皇的事情已经印刷出来了，主教大人不敢、也不能引用其中任何一点作为教皇派或错误的证据，他知道那个被他诽谤的人已经击败了教皇和主教们。

38. The making away the fat abbacies and bishoprics is a bloody heresy to the earthly-minded Prelate; the Confession of Faith commended by all the protestant churches, as a strong bar against popery, and the book of discipline, in which the servants of God laboured twenty years with fasting and praying, and frequent advice and counsel from the whole reformed churches, are to the P. Prelate a negative faith and devout imaginations; it is a lie that episcopacy, by both sides, was ever agreed on by law in Scotland.
38. 剥夺肥胖的修道院和主教职位对于世俗化的主教来说是一个血腥的异端邪说；被所有新教教会推崇为抵御天主教的有力屏障的信仰告白，以及在其中，神的仆人们以禁食祷告、频繁征求整个宗教改革教会的建议和指导的二十年中努力创作的纪律书，对于 P.主教来说只是一种否定的信仰和虔诚的幻想；关于主教制度是否在苏格兰通过法律达成共识，双方都曾达成一致的说法是错误的。

39. And it was a heresy that Mr Melvin taught, that presbyter and bishop are one function in Scripture, and that abbots and priors were not in God's books, dic ubi legis; and is this a proof of inconsistency of presbyteries with a monarchy?
39. 梅尔文先生教导的异端说法是，长老和主教在圣经中是同一职能，修道院院长和修道院长不在上帝的书中，说出你在哪里读到的；这是否证明了长老会与君主制不一致？

40. It is a heresy to the P. Prelate that the church appoint a fast, when king James appointed an unseasonable feast, when God's wrath was upon the land, contrary to God's word (Isa. 22:12–14); and what! will this prove presbyteries to be inconsistent with monarchies?
40. 对于 P. Prelate 来说，教会在国王詹姆斯任命一个不合时宜的盛宴时，却指定一个禁食日，这是异端邪说，而上帝的愤怒正降临在这片土地上，这与上帝的话相违背（以赛亚书 22:12-14）；这又能证明长老会与君主制不一致吗？

41. This Assembly is to judge what doctrine is treasonable. What then? Surely the secret council and king, in a constitute church, is not synodically to determine what is true or false doctrine, more than the Roman emperor could make the church canon, Acts 15.
这个议会是为了判断哪些教义是叛国的。那又怎样呢？当然，秘密委员会和国王，在一个建立起来的教会中，不应该像罗马皇帝一样，会议上决定什么是真理或错误的教义，使之成为教会的规范，使徒行传 15 章。

42. Mr Gibson, Mr Black, preached against king James' maintaining the tyranny of bishops, his sympathizing with papists, and other crying sins, and were absolved in a general Assembly; shall this make presbyteries inconsistent with monarchy? Nay, but it proveth only that they are inconsistent with the wickedness of some monarchies; and that prelates have been like the four hundred false prophets that flattered king Achab, and those men that preached against the sins of the king and court, by prelates in both kingdoms, have been imprisoned, banished, their noses ript, their cheeks burnt, their ears cut.
42. 吉布森先生，布莱克先生，反对詹姆斯国王维护主教的暴政，他对天主教徒的同情，以及其他令人震惊的罪行，并在一个大会上被赦免；这难道会使长老会与君主制不一致吗？不，这只能证明他们与某些君主制度的邪恶不一致；主教就像那四百个讨好亚哈王的假先知，那些反对国王和宫廷罪行的人，被两国的主教监禁、流放，他们的鼻子被撕裂，脸颊被烧伤，耳朵被割断。

43. The godly men that kept the Assembly of Aberdeen, anno 1603, did stand for Christ's Prerogative, when king James took away all General Assemblies, as the event proved; and the king may, with as good warrant, inhibit all Assemblies for word and sacrament, as for church discipline.
43. 1603 年，守护阿伯丁会议的虔诚之人为了基督的特权而站出来，正如事件所证明的那样，当詹姆斯国王取消了所有的全体会议。国王可以同样有充分的理由禁止所有的言语和圣礼的会议，就像禁止教会纪律一样。

44. They excommunicate not for light faults and trifles, as the liar saith: our discipline saith the contrary.
他们不会因为轻微的过错和琐事而逐出教会，正如谎言所说的那样：我们的纪律与此相反。

45. This assembly never took on them to choose the king's counsellors; but those who were in authority took king James, when he was a child, out of the company of a corrupt and seducing papist, Esme Duke of Lennox, whom the P. Prelate nameth noble, worthy, of eminent endowments.
这个会议从未试图选择国王的顾问；但是那些有权力的人在詹姆斯国王还是个孩子的时候，将他从一个腐败和诱导人心的天主教徒，列诺克斯公爵埃斯梅的身边带走。预先的主教称他为高贵、有价值和杰出才能的人。

46. It is true Glasgow Assembly, 1637, voted down the high commission, because it was not consented unto by the church, and yet was a church judicature, which took upon them to judge of the doctrine of ministers, and deprive them, and did encroach upon the liberties of the established lawful church judicatures.
格拉斯哥会议确实在 1637 年否决了高级委员会，因为它没有得到教会的同意，而且它是一个教会审判机构，它们自行判断牧师的教义，并剥夺他们的职位，并侵犯了合法建立的教会审判机构的自由。

47. This Assembly might well forbid Mr John Graham, minister, to make use of an unjust decree, it being scandalous in a minister to oppress.
这个大会很可能禁止约翰·格雷厄姆先生，牧师，使用不公正的法令，因为牧师压迫是令人震惊的。

48. Though nobles, barons, and burgesses, that profess the truth, be elders, and so members of the general Assembly, this is not to make the church the house, and the commonwealth the hanging; for the constituent members, we are content to be examined by the pattern of synods, Acts 15:22, 23. Is this inconsistent with monarchy?
尽管信奉真理的贵族、男爵和市民是长老，也是大会的成员，但这并不意味着教会是房子，国家是挂件；对于组成的成员，我们愿意按照会议的模式进行审查，使徒行传 15:22, 23。这与君主制是否矛盾？

46. The commissioners of the General Assembly, are, 1. A mere occasional judicature. 2. Appointed by, and subordinate to the General Assembly. 3. They have the same warrant of God's word, that messengers of the synod (Acts. 15:22–27) hath.
46. 大会的委员会是：1. 仅仅是偶尔的司法机构。2. 由大会任命并隶属于大会。3. 他们拥有与会议使者（使徒行传 15:22-27）相同的上帝之道的授权。

50. The historical calumny of the 17th day of December, is known to all: 1. That the ministers had any purpose to dethrone king James, and that they wrote to John L. Marquis of Hamilton, to be king, because king James had made defection from the true religion: Satan devised, Spotswood and this P. Prelate vented this; I hope the true history of this is known to all. The holiest pastors, and professors in the kingdom, asserted this government, suffered for it, contended with authority only for sin, never for the power and office. These on the contrary side were men of another stamp, who minded earthly things, whose God was the world. 2. All the forged inconsistency betwixt presbyteries and monarchies, is an opposition with absolute monarchy and concluded with a like strength against parliaments, and all synods of either side, against the law and gospel preached, to which kings and kingdoms are subordinate. Lord establish peace and truth.
12 月 17 日的历史诽谤众所周知：1. 那些牧师们有意废黜詹姆斯国王，并写信给约翰·汉密尔顿侯爵，要他成为国王，因为詹姆斯国王背弃了真正的宗教信仰：撒旦设计了这个阴谋，斯波茨伍德和这位主教也传播了这个谣言；我希望这个真实的历史对所有人都是众所周知的。这个国家最圣洁的牧师和教授们坚决支持这个政府，为此受苦，只为了对抗罪恶的权威，而不是为了权力和职位。相反，那些持相反立场的人是另一种类型的人，他们关注世俗的事物，他们的上帝是世界。2. 所有关于长老会和君主制之间的虚构矛盾，都是对绝对君主制的反对，并以同样的力量反对议会和各方的会议，反对传道的法律和福音，君王和王国都是从属于它们的。主啊，使和平与真理得以确立。

QUESTION I
问题一

WHETHER GOVERNMENT BE WARRANTED BY A DIVINE LAW
政府是否受到神圣法律的保证

I REDUCE all that I am to speak of the power of kings, to the author or efficient,—the matter or subject,—the form or power,—the end and fruit of their government,—and to some cases of resistance. Hence,
我将我所要谈论的君王的权力简化为以下几个方面：作者或执行者，物质或主题，形式或力量，政府的目标和成果，以及一些抵抗的情况。

The question is either of government in general, or of particular species of government, such as government by one only, called monarchy, the government by some chief leading men, named aristocracy, the government by the people, going under the name of democracy. We cannot but put difference betwixt the institution of the office, viz, government, and the designation of person or persons to the office. What is warranted by the direction of nature's light is warranted by the law of nature, and consequently by a divine law; for who can deny the law of nature to be a divine law?
问题要么是关于政府的一般性问题，要么是关于特定类型的政府，比如仅由一人统治的君主制，由一些领导人统治的贵族制，或者由人民统治的民主制。我们不能不区分职位的设立，即政府，和人或人们被指定到这个职位上。凡是符合自然之光的指引的事情，都是符合自然法的，因此也是符合神圣法的；因为谁能否认自然法是神圣法呢？

That power of government in general must be from God, I make good, 1st, Because (Rom. 13:1) "there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God." 2d, God commandeth obedience, and so subjection of conscience to powers; Rom. 13:5, "Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, (or civil punishment) but also for conscience sake;" 1 Pet. 2:13, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king as supreme," &c. Now God only by a divine law can lay a band of subjection on the conscience, tying men to guilt and punishment if they transgress.
政府的权力必须来自上帝，我有两个理由：首先，因为《罗马书》13:1 中说：“凡掌权的都是出于神，掌权的都是神所命的。”其次，上帝命令顺从和服从权力，罗马书 13:5 中说：“所以，不是惟因怕刑罚，乃是因良心。”彼得前书 2:13 中也说：“你们要为主的缘故，顺服人的一切制度。”现在，只有上帝通过神圣的法律才能在良心上施加服从的束缚，如果人们违背，就会受到罪和惩罚的约束。

Conclus. All civil power is immediately from God in its root; in that, 1st, God hath made man a social creature, and one who inclineth to be governed by man, then certainly he must have put this power in man's nature: so are we, by good reason, taught by Aristotle. 2d, God and nature intendeth the policy and peace of mankind, then must God and nature have given to mankind a power to compass this end; and this must be a power of government. I see not, then, why John Prelate, Mr Maxwell, the excommunicated prelate of Ross, who speaketh in the name of J. Armagh,2 had reason to say, That he feared that we fancied that the government of superiors was only for the more perfect, but had no authority over or above the perfect, nec rex, nec lex, justo posita. He might have imputed this to the Brazillians, who teach, that every single man hath the power of the sword to revenge his own injuries, as Molina saith.
结论。所有的公民权力都是直接来自上帝的根源；首先，上帝使人成为社会性的生物，并倾向于接受人的统治，那么肯定是上帝将这种权力放在了人的本性中：这是亚里士多德以合理的理由教导我们的。其次，上帝和自然都希望人类的政策和和平，那么上帝和自然必定赋予人类实现这一目标的权力；而这必须是一种统治的权力。我不明白为什么约翰·普雷拉特、麦克斯韦尔先生、被逐出教会的罗斯主教，以及代表阿尔马的约翰·阿马的发言人有理由说，他担心我们认为上级的统治只是为了更完美，而对完美之上没有任何权威，既不是国王，也不是法律所设立的。他可以将这归咎于巴西人，他们教导每个人都有权使用武器来报复自己的伤害，正如莫利纳所说。

QUESTION II
问题二

WHETHER OR NOT GOVERNMENT BE WARRANTED BY THE LAW OF NATURE
政府是否受自然法律所保证

As domestic society is by nature's instinct, so is civil society natural in radice, in the root, and voluntary in modo, in the manner of coalescing. Politic power of government agreeth not to man, singly as one man, except in that root of reasonable nature; but supposing that men be combined in societies, or that one family cannot contain a society, it is natural that they join in a civil society, though the manner of union in a politic body, as Bodine saith, be voluntary, Gen. 10:10; 15:7; and Suarez saith, That a power of making laws is given by God as a property flowing from nature, Qui dat formam, dat consequentia ad formam; not by any special action or grant, different from creation, nor will he have it to result from nature, while men be united into one politic body: which union being made, that power followeth without any new action of the will.
由于本质的本能，国内社会是如此，而公民社会在根本上是自然的，并以合并的方式自愿进行。政治权力并不适用于单个人，除非在合理的本质根源上；但是假设人们结合成社会，或者一个家庭无法容纳一个社会，他们自然而然地加入一个公民社会，尽管合并的方式在政治团体中是自愿的，如博丁所说，创世记 10:10；15:7；苏亚雷斯说，作为一种从自然流出的属性，上帝赋予了制定法律的权力，谁给予形式，就给予形式的结果；不是通过任何与创造不同的特殊行动或授予，也不会让它成为自然的结果，而是当人们联合成一个政治团体时：这种联合一旦形成，这种权力就会在没有任何新的意愿行动的情况下产生。

We are to distinguish betwixt a power of government, and a power of government by magistracy. That we defend ourselves from violence by violence is a consequent of unbroken and sinless nature; but that we defend ourselves by devolving our power over in the hands of one or more rulers seemeth rather positively moral than natural, except that it is natural for the child to expect help against violence from his father: for which cause I judge that learned senator Ferdinandus Vasquius said well, That princedom, empire, kingdom, or jurisdiction hath its rise from a positive and secondary law of nations, and not from the law of pure nature. 1st, The law saith4 there is no law of nature agreeing to all living creatures for superiority; for by no reason in nature hath a boar dominion over a boar, a lion over a lion, a dragon over a dragon, a bull over a bull: and if all men be born equally free, as I hope to prove, there is no reason in nature why one man should be king and lord over another; therefore while I be otherwise taught by the aforesaid Prelate Maxwell, I conceive all jurisdiction of man over man to be as it were artificial and positive, and that it inferreth some servitude whereof nature from the womb hath freed us, if you except that subjection of children to parents, and the wife to the husband; and the law saith, De jure gentium secundarius est omnis principatus. 2d, This also the Scripture proveth, while as the exalting of Saul or David above their brethren to be kings and captains of the Lord's people, is ascribed not to nature (for king and beggar spring of one clay), but to an act of divine bounty and grace above nature, 1 Sam. 13:13; Ps. 78:70, 71.
我们要区分政府的权力和通过执政机构行使政府权力的权力。我们通过暴力来保护自己免受暴力的侵害是一种无缺和无罪的本性的结果；但是，我们通过将我们的权力委托给一个或多个统治者来保护自己，似乎更多是积极的道德而非自然的，除非孩子自然地期望从父亲那里得到对抗暴力的帮助：因此，我认为博学的参议员费迪南德斯·瓦斯奎斯说得很好，即公国、帝国、王国或管辖权的产生是源于国际正面和次要法律，而不是纯粹自然法律的结果。 首先，法律规定，自然法没有适用于所有生物的优越性法则；因为在自然界中，野猪没有统治权，狮子没有统治权，龙没有统治权，公牛没有统治权：如果所有人生来平等自由，正如我希望证明的那样，自然界没有理由让一个人成为另一个人的国王和主人；因此，除非我受到上述主教麦克斯韦尔的其他教导，否则我认为人对人的所有管辖权都是一种人为的和积极的，它暗示了一些我们从出生起就被自然解放出来的奴役，除非你把孩子对父母的服从和妻子对丈夫的服从除外；法律说，根据国际法，次要的是所有统治权。其次，圣经也证明了这一点，扫罗或大卫被高举为上帝子民的国王和领袖，这不是因为自然（因为国王和乞丐都来自同一块泥土），而是因为超越自然的神恩和恩宠的行为，撒母耳记上 13:13；诗篇 78:70, 71。

1. There is no cause why royalists should deny government to be natural, but to be altogether from God, and that the kingly power is immediately and only from God, because it is not natural to us to be subject to government, but against nature for us to resign our liberty to a king, or any ruler or rulers; for this is much for us, and proveth not but government is natural; it concludeth that a power of government tali modo, by magistracy, is not natural; but this is but a sophism, a κατὰ τι ad illud quod est dictum ἀπλῶς, this special of government, by resignation of our liberty, is not natural, therefore, power of government is not natural; it followeth not, a negatione speciei non sequitur negatio generis, non est homo, ergo non est animal. And by the same reason I may, by an antecedent will, agree to a magistrate and a law, that I may be ruled in a politic society, and by a consequent will only, yea, and conditionally only, agree to the penalty and punishment of the law; and it is most true no man, by the instinct of nature, giveth consent to penal laws as penal, for nature doth not teach a man, nor incline his spirit to yield that his life shall be taken away by the sword, and his blood shed, except on this remote ground: a man hath a disposition that a vein be cut by the physician, or a member of his body cut off, rather than the whole body and life perish by some contagious disease; but here reason in cold blood, not a natural disposition, is the nearest prevalent cause and disposer of the business. When, therefore, a community, by the instinct and guidance of nature, incline to government, and to defend themselves from violence, they do not, by that instinct, formally agree to government by magistrates; and when a natural conscience giveth a deliberate consent to good laws, as to this, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," Gen. 9:6, he doth tacitly consent that his own blood shall be shed; but this he consenteth unto consequently, tacitly, and conditionally,—if he shall do violence to the life of his brother: yet so as this consent proceedeth not from a disposition every way purely natural. I grant reason may be necessitated to assent to the conclusion, being, as it were, forced by the prevalent power of the evidence of an insuperable and invincible light in the premises, yet, from natural affections, there resulteth an act of self-love for self-preservation. So David shall condemn another rich man, who hath many lambs, and robbeth his poor brother of his one lamb, and yet not condemn himself, though he be most deep in that fault, 1 Sam. 12:5, 6; yet all this doth not hinder, but government, even by rulers, hath its ground in a secondary law of nature, which lawyers call secundario jus naturale, or jus gentium secundarium; a secondary law of nature, which is granted by Plato, and denied by none of sound judgment in a sound sense, and that is this, Licet vim virepellere, It is lawful to repel violence by violence; and this is a special act of the magistrate.
皇室主义者无法否认政府是自然的原因，只是政府完全来自上帝，国王的权力是直接且唯一来自上帝，因为我们不自然地服从政府，但对我们来说，放弃我们的自由给国王或任何统治者是违背自然的；因此这对我们来说是很大的事情，并且证明了政府是自然的；这并不意味着政府的权力通过管理是不自然的；这只是一个诡辩，一个针对特定情况的诡辩，通过放弃我们的自由来实现政府的特殊情况是不自然的，因此，政府的权力不是自然的；否定种类并不意味着否定类别，不是人类，因此不是动物。 出于同样的原因，我可以通过先前的意愿同意接受统治者和法律，以便在一个政治社会中接受统治，并且只通过后果意愿，甚至有条件地同意法律的惩罚和处罚；而且最真实的是，没有人凭借本能的本性同意惩罚性法律，因为本性并不教导一个人，也不倾向于让他的生命被剑夺去，他的血被流出，除非有这样一个遥远的理由：一个人宁愿让医生切开一条血管，或者切掉他的一部分身体，而不是整个身体和生命被某种传染病毁灭；但在这里，冷静的理性，而不是本能的倾向，是事情的最近的主要原因和决定者。因此，当一个社群凭借本能和自然的引导倾向于统治，并保护自己免受暴力侵害时，他们并没有通过那种本能正式同意由统治者来统治；当一个自然的良心对良好的法律给予深思熟虑的同意时，就像这样，“凡流人血的，他的血也必被人所流”，创世纪。 9:6，他默许自己的血将被流出；但这是他隐含地、条件地默许的——如果他对兄弟的生命施以暴力：然而，这种默许并不完全源于纯粹的自然倾向。我承认，理性可能被迫同意结论，因为在前提中，无法抵挡和无法克服的光明的力量占据主导地位，但从自然情感中，会产生一种为了自我保护而行动的自爱行为。所以，大卫会谴责另一个富人，他有很多小羊，却抢走了他贫穷的兄弟的一只小羊，然而他自己却不会谴责自己，尽管他在这个错误中最为深陷，撒母耳记上 12:5, 6；然而，所有这些并不妨碍，即使是由统治者进行的政府，也有其根源于自然的次要法律，律师们称之为 secundario jus naturale，或者 jus gentium secundarium；这是自然的次要法律，被柏拉图承认，也没有一个明智的人在明智的意义上否认，即这样做是合法的，可以用暴力来抵制暴力；这是执法者的特殊行为。

2. But there is no reason why we may not defend by good reasons that political societies, rulers, cities, and incorporations, have their rise, and spring from the secondary law of nature. 1st, Because by nature's law family-government hath its warrant; and Adam, though there had never been any positive law, had a power of governing his own family, and punishing malefactors; but as Tannerus saith well, and as I shall prove, God willing, this was not properly a royal or monarchical power; and I judge by the reasoning of Sotus,2 Molina, and Victoria.4 By what reason a family hath a power of government, and of punishing malefactors, that same power must be in a society of men, supposing that society were not made up of families, but of single persons; for the power of punishing ill-doers doth not reside in one single man of a family, or in them all, as they are single private persons, but as they are in a family. But this argument holdeth not but by proportion; for paternal government, or a fatherly power of parents over their families, and a politic power of a magistrate over many families, are powers different in nature,—the one being warranted by nature's law even in its species, the other being, in its specie and kind, warranted by a positive law, and, in the general only, warranted by a law of nature. 2d, If we once lay the supposition, that God hath immediately by the law of nature appointed there should be a government, and mediately defined by the dictate of natural light in a community, that there shall be one or many rulers to govern a community, then the Scripture's arguments may well be drawn out of the school of nature: as, (1,) The powers that be, are of God (Rom. 12), therefore nature's light teacheth that we should be subject to these powers. (2.) It is against nature's light to resist the ordinance of God. (3.) Not to fear him to whom God hath committed the sword for the terror of evil-doers. (4.) Not to honour the public rewarder of well-doing. (5.) Not to pay tribute to him for his work. Therefore I see not but Govarruvias, Soto,2 and Suarez, have rightly said, that power of government is immediately from God, and this or that definite power is mediately from God, proceeding from God by the mediation of the consent of a community, which resigneth their power to one or more rulers; and to me, Barclaius saith the same,4 Quamvis populus potentiæ largitor videatur, &c.
但是我们没有理由不能用充分的理由来辩护，即政治社会、统治者、城市和组织的起源，以及它们源于自然的次要法则。首先，因为按照自然法则，家庭政府是合法的；即使没有任何正面法律，亚当也有权力管理自己的家庭并惩罚罪犯；但正如坦纳鲁斯所说，我将证明，这并不是真正的王权或君主权力；我根据索图斯、莫利纳和维多利亚的推理来判断。根据一个家庭拥有政府权力和惩罚罪犯的理由，假设这个社会不是由家庭组成，而是由单个人组成，那么同样的权力必须存在于这个社会中；因为惩罚恶人的权力不是属于家庭中的一个单个人，也不是属于他们所有人作为单个私人个体，而是属于家庭。 但这个论点只能按比例成立；因为父权政府，或者说父母对家庭的父权力量，以及政府对许多家庭的政治权力，是性质不同的权力——前者甚至在其种类上都是由自然法所保证的，而后者在其种类上则是由一项正面法律所保证的，并且仅在一般情况下才由自然法律所保证。第二，如果我们一旦假设上帝立即根据自然法律指定应该有一种政府，并且通过自然光的指示在一个社区中定义应该有一个或多个统治者来管理社区，那么圣经的论证就可以从自然学校中得出：（1）掌权的都是出于上帝（罗马书 12 章），因此自然的光明教导我们应该服从这些权力。（2）抵抗上帝的命令是违背自然的光明的。（3）不敬畏那位上帝委托剑的人来惩罚作恶者。（4）不尊敬公共善行的奖赏者。（5）不为他的工作纳税。 因此，我认为戈瓦鲁维亚斯、索托和苏亚雷斯说得对，政府的权力直接来自上帝，而这种或那种具体的权力则是通过社群的同意来自上帝的中介，社群将他们的权力放弃给一个或多个统治者；对我来说，巴克莱也是这么说的，即使人民似乎是权力的赐予者，等等。

QUESTION III
问题三

WHETHER ROYAL POWER AND DEFINITE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT BE FROM GOD
王权和明确的政府形式是否来自上帝

The king may be said to be from God and his word in these several notions:—
国王可以说是来自上帝，他的话在以下几个方面：

1. By way of permission, Jer. 43:10, "Say to them, Thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, Behold I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant, and will set his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and he shall spread his royal pavilion over them." And thus God made him a catholic king, and gave him all nations to serve him, Jer. 27:6–8, though he was but an unjust tyrant, and his sword the best title to those crowns.
凭借许可，耶利米书 43:10：“你要对他们说，万军之耶和华以色列的神如此说：我要差遣我的仆人巴比伦王尼布甲尼撒来，领他们到这地，将他们击杀，使他们的尸首成为地上的粪土。”上帝这样使他成为普世的国王，并使所有的国家都侍奉他，耶利米书 27:6-8，尽管他只是一个不公正的暴君，他的剑是获得这些王冠的最好理由。

2. The king is said to be from God by way of naked approbation; God giving to a people power to appoint what government they shall think good, but instituting none in special in his word. This way some make kingly power to be from God in the general, but in the particular to be an invention of men, negatively lawful, and not repugnant to the word, as the wretched popish ceremonies are from God. But we teach no such thing: let Maxwell free his master Bellarmine,2 and other Jesuites with whom he sideth in Romish doctrine: we are free of this. Bellarmine saith that politic power in general is warranted by a divine law; but the particular forms of politic power, (he meaneth monarchy, with the first,) is not by divine right, but de jure gentium, by the law of nations, and floweth immediately from human election, as all things, saith he, that appertain to the law of nations. So monarchy to Bellarmine is but an human invention, as Mr Maxwell's surplice is; and Dr Ferne, sect. 3, p. 13, saith with Bellarmine.
据说国王是通过赤裸的赞许来自上帝；上帝赋予人民权力来任命他们认为好的政府，但在他的话语中没有特别的规定。有些人认为国王的权力是总体上来自上帝的，但在具体上是人类的发明，没有违背圣经，就像可悲的天主教仪式一样是来自上帝的。但我们不教导这样的事情：让麦克斯韦尔放过他的主人贝拉尔米尼和其他与他站在罗马教义一边的耶稣会士们：我们不受此束缚。贝拉尔米尼说，总体上政治权力是由神的法律保证的；但具体的政治权力形式（他指的是君主制，以及第一种形式）不是出于神的权利，而是出于各国法律，直接来源于人类的选举，就像他所说的，所有与各国法律有关的事情一样。所以对贝拉尔米尼来说，君主制只是人类的发明，就像麦克斯韦尔的法衣一样；而弗恩博士在第三节第 13 页也和贝拉尔米尼一样说。

3. A king is said to be from God, by particular designation, as he appointed Saul by name for the crown of Israel. Of this hereafter.
据说国王是由上帝指定的，他们被特定地指定，就像上帝亲自指定扫罗为以色列的王冠一样。关于这个，以后再说。

4. The kingly or royal office is from God by divine institution, and not by naked approbation; for, 1st, we may well prove Aaron's priesthood to be of divine institution, because God doth appoint the priest's qualification from his family, bodily perfections, and his charge. 2d, We take the pastor to be by divine law and God's institution, because the Holy Ghost (1 Tim. 3:1–4) describeth his qualifications; so may we say that the royal power is by divine institution, because God mouldeth him: Deut. 17:15, "Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, one from amongst thy brethren," &c.; Rom. 13:1, "There is no power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God." 3d, That power must be ordained of God as his own ordinance, to which we owe subjection for conscience, and not for fear of punishment; but every power is such, Rom. 13. 4th, To resist the kingly power is to resist God. 5th, He is the minister of God for our good. 6th, He beareth the sword of God to take vengeance upon ill-doers. 7th, The Lord expressly saith, 1 Pet. 2:17, "Fear God, honour the king;" ver. 13, 14, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto governors, as those that are sent by him," &c.; Tit. 3:1, "Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers;" and so the fifth commandment layeth obedience to the king on us no less than to our parents; whence, I conceive that power to be of God, to which, by the moral law of God, we owe perpetual subjection and obedience. 8th, Kings and magistrates are God's, and God's deputies and lieutenants upon earth, (Psalm 82:1, 6, 7; Exod. 22:8; 4:16,) and therefore their office must be a lawful ordinance of God. 9th, By their office they are feeders of the Lord's people, Psalm 78:70–72, the shields of the earth, Psal. 47:9, nursing fathers of the church, Psal. 50:23, captains over the Lord's people, 1 Sam. 9:19. 10th, It is a great judgment of God when a land wanteth the benefit of such ordinances of God, Isa. 3:1–3, 6, 7, 11. The execution of their office is an act of the just Lord of heaven and earth, not only by permission, but according to God's revealed will in his word; their judgment is not the judgment of men, but of the Lord, 2 Chron. 19:6, and their throne is the throne of God, 1 Chron. 22:10. Jerome saith, to punish murderers and sacrilegious persons is not bloodshed, but the ministry and service of good laws. So, if the king be a living law by office, and the law put in execution which God hath commanded, then, as the moral law is by divine institution, so must the officer of God be, who is custos et vindex legis divinæ, the keeper, preserver, and avenger of God's law. Basilius saith, this is the prince's office, Ut opem ferat virtuti, malitiam vero impugnet. When Paulinus Treverensis, Lucifer Metropolitane of Sardinia, Dionysius Mediolanensis, and other bishops, were commanded by Constantine to write against Athanasius, they answered, Regnum non ipsius esse, sed dei, a quo acceperit,—the kingdom was God's, not his; as Athanasius saith, Optatus Milevitanus4 helpeth us in the cause, where he saith with Paul, "We are to pray for heathen kings." The genuine end of the magistrate, saith Epiphanius, is ut ad bonum ordinem universitatis mundi omnia ex deo bene disponantur atque administrentur. But some object, If the kingly power be of divine institution, then shall any other government be unlawful, and contrary to a divine institution, and so we condemn aristocracy and democracy as unlawful. Ans. This consequence were good, if aristocracy and democracy were not also of divine institution, as all my arguments prove; for I judge they are not governments different in nature, if we speak morally and theologically, only they differ politically and positively; nor is aristocracy any thing but diffused and enlarged monarchy, and monarchy is nothing but contracted aristocracy, even as it is the same hand when the thumb and the four fingers are folded together and when all the five fingers are dilated and stretched out; and wherever God appointed a king he never appointed him absolute, and a sole independent angel, but joined always with him judges, who were no less to judge according to the law of God (2 Chron. 19:6,) than the king, Deut. 17:15. And in a moral obligation of judging righteously, the conscience of the monarch and the conscience of the inferior judges are equally under immediate subjection to the King of kings; for there is here a co-ordination of consciences, and no subordination, for it is not in the power of the inferior judge to judge, quoad specificationem, as the king commandeth him, because the judgment is neither the king's, nor any mortal man's, but the Lord's, 2 Chron. 19:6, 7.
4. 国王或皇家职位是由上帝通过神圣的制度而来的，而不是仅仅凭借赞同；因为，首先，我们可以很好地证明亚伦的祭司职位是上帝的神圣制度，因为上帝从他的家族、身体完美和职责中指定了祭司的资格。其次，我们认为牧师是根据神的律法和上帝的制度而来的，因为圣灵（提摩太前书 3:1-4）描述了他的资格；同样，我们可以说皇权是由上帝的制度而来的，因为上帝塑造了他：申命记 17:15，“你必要立你们中间的一人为王，就是耶和华你的神所拣选的；必从你弟兄中立一人为王。”罗马书 13:1，“人人当顺服掌权的，因为没有掌权不是出于上帝的；掌权的都是上帝所命的。”第三，那权力必须是上帝自己的制度，我们出于良心而顺从，而不是出于惩罚的恐惧；但每一种权力都是如此，罗马书 13。第四，抵抗国王的权力就是抵挡上帝。第五，他是上帝的仆人，为了我们的利益。第六，他拿着上帝的剑来对付作恶者。第七，主明确说过，彼得前书 2:17，“你们要敬畏上帝，尊敬君王。” 13、14，“为主的缘故，要顺服人的一切制度，或是君王作至高的，或是各地的官长，因为上帝派遣他们。”（彼得前书 2:13,14）；提多书 3:1，“要提醒他们顺服掌权的人。”因此，我认为我们不仅要顺从父母，而且要顺从君王，这是上帝的诫命；因此，我认为我们应该永远顺从和服从上帝的道德法所赋予的权力。第八，国王和官员是上帝的代表和地上的副手（诗篇 82:1,6,7；出埃及记 22:8；4:16），因此他们的职位必须是上帝的合法制度。第九，按照他们的职责，他们是上帝子民的牧养者（诗篇 78:70-72），地上的盾牌（诗篇 47:9），教会的养父（诗篇 50:23），上帝子民的领袖（撒母耳记上 9:19）。第十，当一个国家失去上帝的这些制度的好处时，这是上帝的大审判（以赛亚书 3:1-3,6,7,11）。他们的职责的执行是天地公义的上帝的行动，不仅是准许，而且是根据上帝在他的话语中所启示的旨意；他们的审判不是人的审判，而是主的审判（历代志下 19:6）。 19:6，他们的宝座是上帝的宝座，历代志上 22:10。耶罗姆说，惩罚杀人犯和亵渎神圣之人并不是流血，而是善法律的事奉和服务。因此，如果国王是一位按职责而生的法律，而且执行了上帝所命令的法律，那么，道德法律是按照神的安排，上帝的官员也必须是这样的，他是上帝法律的守护者、保护者和复仇者。巴西略斯说，这是君主的职责，他要支持善行，抵制邪恶。当康斯坦丁命令特里尔的保罗尼乌斯、撒丁岛的大主教卢西弗尔、米兰的狄奥尼修斯等主教写反对亚他那修斯的文章时，他们回答说，王国不是他自己的，而是上帝的，是从上帝那里得来的。正如亚他那修斯所说，米莱维特的奥普塔图斯在这个问题上帮助了我们，他和保罗一起说：“我们应该为异教国王祈祷。”主教埃比法尼乌斯说，官员的真正目标是使整个世界按照上帝的旨意进行良好的秩序和管理。 但是有人反对，如果国王权力是神圣的制度，那么任何其他政府都是非法的，违背神圣的制度，所以我们谴责贵族政治和民主政治是非法的。答案是，如果贵族政治和民主政治不是神圣的制度，那么这个结论是正确的，正如我所有的论点所证明的那样；因为我认为，从道德和神学的角度来看，它们并不是本质上不同的政府，只是在政治和积极方面有所不同；贵族政治只是扩大的君主制，而君主制只是缩小的贵族政治，就像当拇指和四个手指合拢在一起时是同一只手，当五个手指张开时也是同一只手；而上帝在任命国王时，从来没有任命他为绝对的、独立的天使，而是总是与他一起任命法官，他们不仅要按照上帝的律法来判断（《历代志下》19:6），而且国王也要这样（《申命记》17:15）。 在公正判断的道德义务中，君主的良心和下级法官的良心同样直接服从至高的君王；因为这里存在着良心的协调，而不是从属关系，因为下级法官无权按照君王的命令进行判断，因为判断既不属于君王，也不属于任何凡人，而是属于主的（《历代志下》19:6, 7）。

Hence all the three forms are from God; but let no man say, if they be all indifferent, and equally of God, societies and kingdoms are left in the dark, and know not which of the three they shall pitch upon, because God hath given to them no special direction for one rather than for another. But this is easily answered. 1st, That a republic appoint rulers to govern them is not an indifferent, but a moral action, because to set no rulers over themselves I conceive were a breach of the fifth commandment, which commandeth government to be one or other. 2d, It is not in men's free will that they have government or no government, because it is not in their free will to obey or not to obey the acts of the court of nature, which is God's court; and this court enacteth that societies suffer not mankind to perish, which must necessarily follow if they appoint no government; also it is proved elsewhere, that no moral acts, in their exercises and use, are left indifferent to us; so then, the aptitude and temper of every commonwealth to monarchy, rather than to democracy or aristocracy, is God's warrant and nearest call to determine the wills and liberty of people to pitch upon a monarchy, hic et nunc, rather than any other form of government, though all the three be from God, even as single life and marriage are both the lawful ordinances of God, and the constitution and temper of the body is a calling to either of the two; nor are we to think that aristocracy and democracy are either unlawful ordinances, or men's inventions, or that those societies which want monarchy do therefore live in sins.
因此，这三种形式都来自上帝；但是不要让人说，如果它们都是无差别的，同样来自上帝，那么社会和王国将陷入黑暗，不知道他们应该选择哪一种，因为上帝没有给他们任何特殊的指示，让他们选择一种而不是另一种。但这很容易回答。首先，共和国任命统治者来统治他们并不是一种无差别的行为，而是一种道德行为，因为我认为不设立统治者就是违反第五诫命，这诫命要求有一种或另一种形式的政府。 2d，人们是否有政府或无政府并不取决于他们的自由意志，因为他们没有自由意志来服从或不服从自然法庭的行为，而这个法庭是上帝的法庭；而这个法庭规定社会不能让人类灭亡，如果他们不设立政府，必然会导致人类的灭亡；另外，其他地方已经证明，对于我们来说，道德行为的行使和使用都不是任意的；因此，每个共和国倾向于君主制而不是民主制或贵族制，是上帝的许可和最近的呼召，决定人们的意愿和自由选择君主制，即此时此地，而不是其他任何形式的政府，尽管这三种形式都来自上帝，就像独身生活和婚姻都是上帝的合法法令，而身体的构造和性格则是对这两者的召唤；我们也不应认为贵族制和民主制是非法的法令或人类的发明，或者那些没有君主制的社会因此而生活在罪恶中。

But some say that Peter calleth any form of government an human ordinance, 1 Pet. 2:13, ἀνθρωπίνη κτὶσις, therefore monarchy can be no ordinance of God. Ans. Rivetus saith,—"It is called an ordinance of man, not because it is an invention of man, and not an ordinance of God, but respectu subjecti;" Piscator,—"Not because man is the efficient cause of magistracy, but because they are men who are magistrates;" Diodatus,3—"Obey princes and magistrates, or governors made by men, or amongst men;" Oecumenius,—"An human constitution, because it is made by an human disposition, and created by human suffrages;" Dydimus,—Because over it "presides presidents made by men;" Cajetanus,5 Estius,—"Every creature of God (as, preach the gospel to every creature) in authority." But I take the word, "every creature of man," to be put emphatically, to commend the worth of obedience to magistrates, though but men, when we do it for the Lord's sake; therefore Betrandus Cardinalis Ednensis saith,7 "He speaketh so for the more necessity of merit;" and Glossa Ordinaria saith, "Be subject to all powers, etiam ex infidelibus et incredulis, even of infidels and unbelievers," Lyranus,—"For though they be men, the image of God shineth in them;" and the Syriac, as Lorinus saith, leadeth us thereunto, לבלחוז בגי אנשא Lechullechum benai anasa: Obey all the children of men that are in authority. It is an ordinance of men, not effectively, as if it were an invention and a dream of men; but subjectively, because exercised by man. Objectively, and τελικῶς, for the good of men, and for the external man's peace and safety especially; whereas church-officers are for the spiritual good of men's souls. And Durandus saith well, "Civil power according to its institution is of God, and according to its acquisition and way of use is of man." And we may thus far call the forms of magistrates a human ordinance,—that some magistrates are ordained to care for men's lives and matters criminal, of life and death, and some for men's lands and estates; some for commodities by sea, and some by land; and are thus called magistrates according to these determinations or human ordinances.
但有人说彼得称任何形式的政府为人的条例，彼得前书 2:13，ἀνθρωπίνη κτὶσις，因此君主制不能是上帝的条例。回答：里维特斯说，“它被称为人的条例，不是因为它是人的发明，而不是上帝的条例，而是因为它是相对于主体的；”皮斯卡特说，“不是因为人是执政者的有效原因，而是因为执政者是人；”迪奥达图斯说，“顺从由人制定的君主和执政者，或在人中间；”奥库门尼乌斯说，“人的构成，因为它是由人的安排制定的，并由人的选票创造的；”迪迪默斯说，因为在它之上“由人制定的总统主持；”卡耶塔努斯，埃斯蒂乌斯说，“上帝的每一个造物（如，向每一个造物传福音）都有权威。”但我认为，“人类的每一个生物”这个词是强调的，是为了赞扬为了主的缘故而服从政府的价值，即使他们只是普通人；因此，贝特兰多·加尔迪纳尔·埃德纳西斯说：“他这样说是为了更多的功德的必要性。”而《普通注释》说：“要服从所有的权力，甚至是不信教和不信仰的人。”利拉努斯说：“因为虽然他们是人，但上帝的形象在他们身上闪耀。”而叙利亚语，正如洛里纳斯所说，引导我们这样做：“服从所有有权威的人。”这是人的规定，不是实际上的，就像是人的发明和梦想一样；而是主观上的，因为是由人行使的。客观上，最终是为了人的利益，尤其是为了外在人的和平与安全；而教会的职务是为了人的灵魂的属灵好处。杜兰达斯说得好：“根据其制度，公民权力是来自上帝，根据其获取和使用方式，是来自人。”我们可以将官员的形式称为人类的法令，即一些官员被任命负责照顾人们的生活和犯罪事务，包括生死，而另一些官员负责管理人们的土地和财产；一些官员负责海上贸易，而另一些负责陆地贸易；根据这些规定或人类的法令，他们被称为官员。

QUESTION IV
问题四

WHETHER THE KING BE ONLY AND IMMEDIATELY FROM GOD, AND NOT FROM THE PEOPLE
无论国王是否仅仅来自上帝，而不是来自人民

That this question may be the clearer we are to set down these considerations:—
为了使这个问题更加清晰，我们需要列出以下考虑：

1. The question is, Whether the kingly office itself come from God. I conceive it is, and floweth from the people, not by formal institution, as if the people had by an act of reason devised and excogitated such a power: God ordained the power. It is from the people only by a virtual emanation, in respect that a community having no government at all may ordain a king or appoint an aristocracy. But the question is concerning the designation of the person: Whence is it that this man rather than that man is crowned king? and whence is it—from God immediately and only—that this man rather than that man, and this race or family rather than that race and family, is chosen for the crown? Or is it from the people also, and their free choice? For the pastor's and the doctor's office is from Christ only; but that John rather than Thomas be the doctor or the pastor is from the will and choice of men—the presbyters and people.
问题是，国王职位本身是否来自上帝。我认为是的，它来自人民，而不是通过正式的制度，好像人民通过理性的行为设计和构思了这样的权力：上帝安排了这个权力。它只是通过一种虚拟的发出，因为一个没有任何政府的社区可以任命国王或者指定一个贵族政府。但问题是关于人的指定：为什么这个人而不是那个人被加冕为国王？为什么这个人而不是那个人，这个种族或家族而不是那个种族和家族被选择为皇冠？或者是来自人民，他们的自由选择？因为牧师和医生的职位只来自基督；但是约翰而不是托马斯成为医生或牧师是根据人们的意愿和选择——长老和人民。

2. The royal power is three ways in the people: 1st, Radically and virtually, as in the first subject. 2d, Collative vel communicative, by way of free donation, they giving it to this man, not to that man, that he may rule over them. 3d, Limitate,—they giving it so as these three acts remain with the people. (1.) That they may measure out, by ounce weights, so much royal power, and no more and no less. (2.) So as they may limit, moderate, and set banks and marches to the exercise. (3.) That they give it out, conditionate, upon this and that condition, that they may take again to themselves what they gave out upon condition if the condition be violated. The first I conceive is clear, 1st, Because if all living creatures have radically in them a power of self-preservation, to defend themselves from violence,—as we see lions have paws, some beasts have horns, some claws,—men being reasonable creatures, united in society, must have power in a more reasonable and honourable way to put this power of warding off violence in the hands of one or more rulers, to defend themselves by magistrates. 2d, If all men be born, as concerning civil power, alike,—for no man cometh out of the womb with a diadem on his head or a sceptre in his hand, and yet men united in a society may give crown and sceptre to this man and not to that man,—then this power was in this united society, but it was not in them formally, for they should then all have been one king, and so both above and superior, and below and inferior to themselves, which we cannot say; therefore this power must have been virtually in them, because neither man nor community of men can give that which they neither have formally nor virtually in them. 3d, Royalists cannot deny but cities have power to choose and create inferior magistrates; therefore many cities united have power to create a higher ruler; for royal power is but the united and superlative power of inferior judges in one greater judge whom they call a king.
皇权在人民中有三种方式：第一，根本上和实质上，就像在第一个主题中一样。第二，通过自由赠与的方式，他们将其给予这个人，而不是那个人，以便他可以统治他们。第三，有限制性的，他们给予它，以便这三个行为仍然留在人民手中。（1）他们可以用盎司权重来衡量这么多的皇权，不多不少。（2）这样他们可以限制、调节并设立行使的界限和边界。（3）他们以这个和那个条件来给出它，以便如果条件被违反，他们可以再次收回他们根据条件给出的东西。我认为第一个是明确的，首先，因为如果所有的生物都在根本上具有自我保护的能力，以抵御暴力，就像我们看到狮子有爪子，一些动物有角，一些有爪子一样，人作为理性的生物，团结在社会中，必须以一种更理性和更光荣的方式将这种抵御暴力的能力交给一个或多个统治者，通过官员来保护自己。 如果所有人在民事权力方面都是平等的，因为没有人生下来就戴着王冠或手持权杖，然而人们在社会中团结起来可以把王冠和权杖给这个人而不给那个人，那么这个权力就在这个团结的社会中，但它在他们身上并不是形式上的，因为如果是这样的话，他们就都应该是一个国王，既高于自己又低于自己，这是我们不能说的；因此，这个权力必须在他们身上是实质上的，因为既然人和人群体都不能给予他们在形式上和实质上都没有的东西。第三，君主主义者不能否认城市有权力选择和任命下级官员；因此，许多城市联合起来有权力选择一个更高的统治者；因为君主权力只是下级法官的团结和最高权力，他们称之为国王。

Conclus. The power of creating a man a king is from the people.
创造一个人成为国王的权力来自人民。

1. Because those who may create this man a king rather than that man have power to appoint a king; for a comparative action doth positively infer an action. If a man have power to marry this woman and not that woman, we may strongly conclude that he hath power to marry; now, 1 Kings 16 the people made Omri king and not Zimri, and his son Achab rather than Tibni the son o Sinath. Nor can it be replied that this was no lawful power that the people used, for that cannot elude the argument; for (1 Kings 1) the people made Solomon king and not Adonijah, though Adonijah was the elder brother. They say, God did extraordinarily both make the office, and design Solomon to be king,—the people had no hand in it, but approved God's act. Ans. This is what we say, God by the people, by Nathan the prophet, and by the servants of David and the states crying, "God save king Solomon!" made Solomon king; and here is a real action of the people. God is the first agent in all acts of the creature. Where a people maketh choice of a man to be their king, the states do no other thing, under God, but create this man rather than another; and we cannot here find two actions, one of God, another of the people; but in one and the same action, God, by the people's free suffrages and voices, createth such a man king, passing by many thousands; and the people are not passive in the action, because by the authoritative choice of the states the man is made of a private man and no king, a public person and a crowned king: 2 Sam. 16:18, "Hushai said to Absalom, Nay, but whom the Lord and the people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide;" Judg. 8:22, "The men of Israel said to Gideon, Rule thou over us;" Judg. 9:6, "The men of Sechem made Abimelech king;" Judg. 11:8, 11; 2 Kings 14:21, "The people made Azariah king;" 1 Sam. 12:1; 2 Chron. 23:3.
因为那些可能让这个人成为国王而不是那个人的人有权任命国王；因为比较的行动肯定会推断出一个行动。如果一个人有权娶这个女人而不是那个女人，我们可以强烈推断他有权娶；现在，列王纪上 16 章，人民选择了欧米利为王而不是津利，选择了他的儿子亚哈为王而不是辛拿的儿子提比尼。也不能回答说人民使用的权力是非法的，因为这不能逃避这个论点；因为（列王纪上 1 章）人民选择了所罗门为王而不是亚多尼雅，尽管亚多尼雅是哥哥。他们说，上帝非常地创造了这个职位，并指定所罗门为王，人民没有参与其中，只是赞同上帝的行动。回答：这就是我们所说的，上帝通过人民、拿单先知、大卫的仆人和国家的呼喊，“上帝保佑所罗门王！”使所罗门成为国王；这里是人民的真实行动。上帝是所有受造物行动中的第一位行动者。 当一个民族选择一个人作为他们的国王时，国家在上帝的引导下，并没有做其他事情，只是选择了这个人而不是其他人；在这里我们找不到上帝的行动和人民的行动，而是在同一个行动中，上帝通过人民的自由选举和声音创造了这样一个国王，忽视了成千上万的其他人；人民在这个行动中并不被动，因为通过国家的权威选择，这个人从一个普通人变成了一个非国王的公众人物和加冕的国王：撒母耳记下 16:18，“胡沙对押沙龙说，不，乃是耶和华和以色列众人所拣选的，我也与他同住”；士师记 8:22，“以色列人对基甸说，求你治理我们”；士师记 9:6，“示剑人立亚比米勒为王”；士师记 11:8, 11；列王记下 14:21，“百姓立亚撒利雅为王”；撒母耳记上 12:1；历代志下 23:3。

2. If God doth regulate his people in making this man king, not that man, then he thereby insinuateth that the people have a power to make this man king, and not that man. But God doth regulate his people in making a king; therefore the people have a power to make this man king, not that man king. The proposition is clear, because God's law doth not regulate a non-ens, a mere nothing, or an unlawful power; nor can God's holy law regulate an unlawful power, or an unlawful action, but quite abolish and interdict it. The Lord setteth not down rules and ways how men should not commit treason, but the Lord commandeth loyalty, and simply interdicteth treason. If people have then more power to create a lung over themselves than they had to make prophets, then God forbidding them to choose such a man for their king should say as much to his people as if he would say, "I command you to make Isaiah and Jeremiah prophets over you, but not these and those men." This, certainly, should prove that not God only, but the people also, with God, made prophets. I leave this to the consideration of the godly. The prophets were immediately called of God to be prophets, whether the people consented that they should be prophets or not; therefore God immediately and only sent the prophets, not the people; but though God extraordinarily designed some men to be kings, and anointed them by his prophets, yet were they never actually installed kings till the people made them kings. I prove the assumption, Deut. 17:14, 15, "When thou shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are about me, thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee whom the Lord thy God shall choose; one from amongst thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee: thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother." Should not this be an unjust charge to the people, if God only, without any action of the people, should immediately set a king over them? Might not the people reply, We have no power at all to set a king over ourselves, more than we have power to make Isaiah a prophet, who saw the visions of God. To what end then should God mock us, and say, "Make a brother and not a stranger king over you?"
如果上帝在选举国王时指导他的子民选择这个人而不是那个人，那么他暗示了人民有权力选择这个人作为国王，而不是那个人。但是上帝确实在指导他的子民选举国王；因此，人民有权力选择这个人作为国王，而不是那个人。这个命题很清楚，因为上帝的法律不会规范一个不存在的东西、一个纯粹的虚无，或者一个非法的权力；上帝的圣法也不能规范非法的权力或非法的行为，而是完全废除和禁止它。主并没有规定人们不要犯叛国罪的规则和方法，而是主命令忠诚，并且明确禁止叛国。如果人民在选择国王时拥有比选择先知更多的权力，那么上帝禁止他们选择这样一个人作为国王，就等于对他的子民说，"我命令你们选择以赛亚和耶利米作为你们的先知，而不是这些人和那些人。"这无疑证明不仅上帝，而且人民也与上帝一起创造了先知。我把这个问题留给虔诚的人考虑。 先知们立即被上帝召为先知，无论人们是否同意他们成为先知；因此，上帝立即且仅仅派遣先知，而不是人民；尽管上帝特别指定一些人成为国王，并由他的先知膏抹他们，但他们直到人民立他们为国王才真正就任国王。我证明这个假设，申命记 17:14, 15 说：“你若说：‘我要立王治理我，像四围的国一样。’你总要立耶和华你神所拣选的人为王，必从你弟兄中立一人为王，不可立你弟兄以外的人为王。”如果上帝只是立即而没有人民的任何行动就立了一个国王，这难道不是对人民的不公正指控吗？人民难道不能回答说，我们根本没有权力立一个国王，就像我们没有权力使以赛亚成为先知，他看到了上帝的异象。那么上帝为什么要嘲笑我们，说：“立一个弟兄而不是一个陌生人为你们的王？”"

3. Expressly Scripture saith, that the people made the king, though under God: Judg. 9:6, "The men of Sechem made Abimelech king;" 1 Sam. 11:15, "And all the people went to Gilgal, and there they made Saul king before the Lord;" 2 King. 10:5, "We will not make any king." This had been an irrational speech to Jehu if both Jehu and the people held the royalists' tenet, that the people had no power to make a king, nor any active or causative influence therein, but that God immediately made the king: 1 Chron. 12:38, "All these came with a perfect heart to make David king in Hebron;" and all the rest were of one heart to make David king. On these words Lavater saith, The same way are magistrates now to be chosen; now this day God, by an immediate oracle from heaven, appointeth the office of a king, but I am sure he doth not immediately design the man, but doth only mark him out to the people as one who hath the most royal endowments, and the due qualifications required in a lawful magistrate by the word of God: Exod. 18:21, "Men of truth, hating covetousness," &c.; Deut. 1:16, 17, Men who will judge causes betwixt their brethren righteously, without respect of persons; 1 Sam. 10:21, Saul was chosen out of the tribes according to the law of God; Deut. 17., They might not choose a stranger; and Abulensis, Serrarius, Cornelius à Lapide, Sancheiz, and other popish writers, think that Saul was not only anointed with oil first privately by Samuel, (1 Sam. 10:1, 2,) but also at two other times before the people,—once at Mizpeh, and another time at Gilgal, by a parliament and a convention of the states. And Samuel judged the voices of the people so essential to make a king that Samuel doth not acknowledge him as formal king, (1 Sam. 10:7, 8, 17, 18, 19,) though he honoured him because he was to be king, (1 Sam. 9:23, 24,) while the tribes of Israel and parliament were gathered together to make him king according to God's law, (Deut. 17) as is evident. 1st, For Samuel (1 Sam. 3:20,) caused all the tribes of Israel to stand before the Lord, and the tribe of Benjamin was taken. The law provided one of their own, not a stranger to reign over them; and, because some of the states of parliament did not choose him, but, being children of Belial, despised him in their hearts, (v. 27,) therefore after king Saul, by that victory over the Ammonites, had conquered the affections of all the people fully, (v. 10, 11,) Samuel would have his coronation and election by the estates of parliament renewed at Gilgal by all the people, (v. 14, 15,) to establish him king. 2d, The Lord by lots found out the tribe of Benjamin. 3d, The Lord found out the man, by name, Saul the son of Kish, when he did hide himself amongst the stuff, that the people might do their part in the creating of the king, whereas Samuel had anointed him before. But the text saith expressly that the people made Saul king; and Calvin, Martyr, Lavater, and popish writers, as Serrarius, Mendoza, Sancheiz, Cornelius à Lapide, Lyranus, Hugo Cardinalis, Carthusius, Sanctius, do all hence conclude that the people, under God, make the king.
3. 圣经明确地说，人民使国王成为国王，虽然是在上帝的领导下：士师记 9:6，“示剑人立亚比米勒为王”；撒母耳记上 11:15，“众民到了吉甲，在耶和华面前立扫罗为王”；列王记下 10:5，“我们不立王”。如果耶户和人民都持有王权主义者的观点，即人民没有权力立王，也没有在其中起积极或因果作用的影响力，而是上帝直接立王的话，耶户说这番话就是不合理的：历代志上 12:38，“这些人都是心里诚实的，来在希伯仑立大卫作王”；其他人也都一心要立大卫为王。拉瓦特在这些话上说，现在应该选择官员的方式也是如此；如今，上帝通过天上的直接神谕任命了国王的职位，但我确信他并没有直接指定这个人，而只是向人民指出他是一个具有最高贵才能和合乎上帝话语所要求的合法官员资格的人：出埃及记 18:21，“能害羞诚实的人”等等；申命记 1:16,17，“在你们弟兄中间审判公平”等等；撒母耳记上 10:21，根据上帝的律法，扫罗被选中来自各支派；申命记 17 章，他们不能选择一个陌生人；阿布伦西斯、塞拉略、拉皮德、桑切斯和其他天主教作家认为，扫罗不仅在私下由撒母耳先膏油（撒母耳记上 10:1,2），还在米斯巴和吉甲两次在人民面前受膏油，由议会和国家大会进行。撒母耳认为人民的声音对于成为国王至关重要，所以撒母耳没有承认他是正式的国王（撒母耳记上 10:7,8,17,18,19），尽管他因为将要成为国王而受到尊敬（撒母耳记上 9:23,24），当以色列支派和议会按照上帝的律法（申命记 17 章）聚集在一起选他为国王，这是显而易见的。首先，撒母耳（撒母耳记上 3:20）让以色列各支派站在上主面前，选中了便雅悯支派。律法规定他们要选一个自己人而不是陌生人来统治他们；而且，因为一些国家大会的成员没有选择他，而是作为彼利亚的子民，心里藐视他（v. 27，）因此，当扫罗王通过对亚扪人的胜利完全征服了全体人民的感情后，（第 10、11 节），撒母耳就希望在吉甲由全体人民重新加冕和选举他为国会的君主，（第 14、15 节），以确立他为国王。第二，上帝通过抽签找到了便雅悯支派。第三，上帝找到了那个人，名叫基士的扫罗，当他藏在物品中时，人们可以在选举国王的过程中发挥自己的作用，而撒母耳之前已经给他膏抹了。但是，经文明确说人民立扫罗为王；加尔文、殉道者、拉瓦特和天主教作家，如塞拉留斯、门多萨、桑切斯、拉皮德、利拉努斯、雨果红衣主教、卡尔图修士、桑克提乌斯，都从这里得出结论，即人民在上帝的帮助下立国王。

I see no reason why Barclaius should here distinguish a power of choosing a king, which he granteth the people hath, and a power of making a king, which he saith is only proper to God. Ans. Choosing of a king is either—a comparative crowning of this man, not that man; and if the people have this it is a creating of a king under God, who principally disposeth of kings and kingdoms; and this is enough for us. The want of this made Zimri no king, and those whom the rulers of Jezreel at Samaria (2 King. 10) refused to make kings, no kings. This election of the people made Athaliah a princess; the removal of it, and translation of the crown by the people to Joash made her no princess; for, I ask you, what other calling of God hath a race of a family, and a person to the crown, but only the election of the states? There is now no voice from heaven, no immediately inspired prophets such as Samuel and Elisha, to anoint David, not Eliab,—Solomon, not Adonijah. The δίναμις or the heroic spirit of a royal faculty of governing, is, I grant, from God only, not from the people; but I suppose that maketh not a king, for then many sitting on the throne this day should be no kings, and many private persons should be kings. If they mean by the people's choosing nothing but the people's approbative consent, posterior to God's act of creating a king, let them show us an act of God making Kings, and establishing royal power in this family lather than m that family, which is prior to the people's consent,—distinct from the people's consent I believe there is none at all.
我看不出为什么巴克莱应该在这里区分选择国王的权力（他承认人民拥有这个权力）和制定国王的权力（他说只属于上帝）。答：选择国王要么是对这个人加冕，而不是那个人；如果人民有这个权力，那就是在上帝的领导下创造一个国王，因为上帝主要安排国王和王国；这对我们来说已经足够了。缺乏这一点使得洗姆利不成为国王，以及撒玛利亚耶斯列的统治者拒绝让那些人成为国王。人民的选举使得亚他利雅成为公主；而人民将王冠从她身上移走，并转给约阿施，使她不再是公主；因为，我问你，除了国家的选举之外，还有什么其他的神的呼召可以使一个家族的血统和一个人成为国王呢？现在没有来自天堂的声音，也没有像撒母耳和以利沙那样的直接受感启示的先知来膏抹大卫，而不是以利押，所罗门，而不是亚多尼雅。 δίναμις或者说是统治的王室的英勇精神，我承认，只来自上帝，而不是人民；但我认为这并不使一个人成为国王，因为那样的话，今天坐在王位上的许多人就不是国王了，而许多普通人则会成为国王。如果他们所说的人民选择只是指人民事后对上帝创造国王的行为表示赞同，那么让他们向我们展示上帝创造国王并在这个家族中确立王权的行为，而不是那个家族，这是在人民同意之前的行为——我相信与人民同意不同的行为根本就不存在。

Hence I argue: If there be no calling or title on earth to tie the crown to such a family and person but the suffrages of the people, then have the line of such a family, and the persons now, no calling of God, no right to the crown, but only by the suffrages of the people, except we say that there be no lawful kings on earth now when prophetical unction and designation to crowns are ceased, contrary to express scripture; Rom. 13:1–3; 1 Pet. 2:13–17.
因此，我认为：如果在地上没有任何职业或头衔将王冠与这样的家族和个人联系在一起，除了人民的选票，那么这样的家族和现在的人就没有上帝的呼召，没有权利拥有王冠，只能依靠人民的选票，除非我们说现在没有合法的国王，当先知的膏抹和加冕的指定已经停止，这与明确的经文相矛盾；罗马书 13:1-3；彼得前书 2:13-17。

But there is no title on earth now to tie crowns to families, to persons, but only the suffrages of the people: for, 1st, Conquest without the consent of the people is but royal robbery, as we shall see. 2d, There is no prophetical and immediate calling to kingdoms now. 3d, The Lord's giving of regal parts is somewhat; but I hope royalists will not deny but a child, young in years and judgment, may be a lawful king. 4th, Mr Maxwell's appointing of the kingly office doth no more make one man a lawful king than another; for this were a wide consequence. God hath appointed that kings should be; therefore John à Stiles is a king; yea, therefore David is a king. It followeth not. Therefore it remaineth only that the suffrages of the people of God is that just title and divine calling that kings have now to their crowns. I presuppose they have gifts to govern from God.
但现在地球上没有任何头衔可以将王冠与家族、个人联系在一起，只有人民的选票：首先，没有人民的同意，征服只是王室的抢劫，我们将会看到。其次，现在没有先知性和直接的召唤国王的情况。第三，主赐予王权的部分是一些东西；但我希望皇室主义者不会否认，一个年幼无知的孩子也可以成为合法的国王。第四，麦克斯韦尔先生的任命并不能使一个人成为合法的国王，因为这是一个牵强的推论。上帝指定了国王的存在；因此，约翰·斯蒂尔斯是国王；是的，因此大卫也是国王。这并不是因果关系。因此，现在国王们拥有王冠的正当称号和神圣召唤只能是上帝子民的选票。我假设他们有来自上帝的治理才能。

If the Lord's immediate designation of David, and his anointing by the divine authority of Samuel, had been that which alone, without the election of the people, made David formally king of Israel, then there were two kings in Israel at one time; for Samuel anointed David, and so he was formally king upon the ground laid by royalists, that the king hath no royal power from the people; and David, after he himself was anointed by Samuel, divers times calleth Saul the Lord's anointed, and that by the inspiration of God's Spirit, as we and royalists do both agree. Now two lawful supreme monarchs in one kingdom I conceive to be most repugnant to God's truth and sound reason; for they are as repugnant as two most highs or as two infinites. It shall follow that David all the while betwixt his anointing by Samuel and his coronation by the suffrages of all Israel at Hebron, was in-lacking in discharging and acquitting himself or his royal duty, God having made him formally a king, and so laying upon him a charge to execute justice and judgment, and defend religion, which he did not discharge, All David's suffering, upon David's part, must be unjust, for, as king, he should have cut off the murderer Saul, who killed the priests of the Lord; especially, seeing Saul, by this ground, must be a private murderer, and David the only lawful king. David, if he was formally king, deserted his calling in flying to the Philistines; for a king should not forsake his calling upon any hazard, even of his life, no more than a pilot should give over the helm in an extreme storm; but certainly God's dispensation in this warranteth us to say, no man can be formally a lawful king without the suffrages of the people: for Saul, after Samuel from the Lord anointed him, remained a private man, and no king, till the people made him king, and elected him; and David, anointed by that same divine authority, remained formally a subject, and not a king, till all Israel made him king at Hebron; and Solomon, though by God designed and ordained to be king, yet was never king until the people made him so, (1 Kings 1); therefore there floweth something from the power of the people, by which he who is no king now becometh a king formally, and by God's lawful call; whereas before the man was no king, but, as touching all royal power, a mere private man. And I am sure birth must be less than God's designation to a crown, as is clear,—Adonijah was older than Solomon, yet God will have Solomon, the younger by birth, to be king, and not Adonijah. And so Mr Symons, and other court prophets, must prevaricate, who will have birth, without the people's election, to make a king, and the people's voices but a ceremony.
如果上帝直接指定大卫，并由撒母耳的神圣权威膏立他为以色列的国王，而不需要人民的选举，那么在以色列就会同时存在两位国王；因为撒母耳膏立了大卫，所以他在王权的基础上正式成为国王，这是王权派的观点，即国王的权力不来自人民；而大卫在自己被撒母耳膏立之后，多次称扫罗为上帝的受膏者，这是在上帝的灵感下，我们和王权派都同意。现在，我认为在一个国家中有两位合法的最高君主是与上帝的真理和健全理性相矛盾的；因为它们就像两个至高者或两个无限一样相矛盾。 大卫在被撒母耳膏抹和在希伯仑由以色列全体选民加冕之间，一直未能履行和完成他的王职，上帝已正式立他为国王，并赋予他执行公正和审判、捍卫宗教的责任，但他未能履行。从大卫的角度来看，他所遭受的一切苦难都是不公正的，因为作为国王，他应该剪除杀害耶和华祭司的凶手扫罗，尤其是考虑到扫罗在这一点上必然是个私人凶手，而大卫是唯一合法的国王。 大卫，如果他正式成为国王，却背弃了自己的使命，逃到非利士人那里；因为一个国王不应该在任何危险的情况下放弃自己的使命，甚至是生命的危险，就像一个舵手在极端风暴中不应该放弃掌舵一样；但是毫无疑问，上帝在这方面的安排使我们可以说，没有人可以在没有人民选举的情况下正式成为合法的国王：因为扫罗在受到上帝的膏抹之后，仍然是一个普通人，不是国王，直到人民选他为国王；大卫也是同样的，受到同样的神圣权威的膏抹，直到以色列全体人民在希伯仑选他为国王之前，他仍然是一个正式的臣民，而不是国王；所罗门虽然被上帝指定和任命为国王，但直到人民选他为国王（列王纪上 1 章），他从未成为国王；因此，有一种力量来自人民，使那些现在不是国王的人正式成为国王，并且是上帝合法的呼召；而在此之前，这个人不是国王，而是一个纯粹的普通人，就所有王权而言如此。我确信，出生必须低于上帝对王冠的指定，这是显而易见的——亚多尼雅比所罗门年长，然而上帝要求年纪较小的所罗门成为国王，而不是亚多尼雅。 因此，西蒙斯先生和其他宫廷预言家必须支吾其词，他们认为国王的诞生不需要人民的选举，而人民的声音只是一种仪式。

I think royalists cannot deny but a people ruled by aristocratic magistrates may elect a king, and a king so elected is formally made a lawful king by the people's election; for of six willing and gifted to reign, what maketh one a king and not the other five? Certainly by God's disposing the people to choose this man, and not another man. It cannot be said but God giveth the kingly power immediately; and by him kings reign, that is true. The office is immediately from God, but the question now is, What is that which formally applieth the office and royal power to this person rather than to the other five as meet? Nothing can here be dreamed of but God's inclining the hearts of the states to choose this man and not that man.
我认为皇室主义者不能否认，由贵族法官统治的人民可以选举一位国王，而这位被选举的国王通过人民的选举正式成为合法的国王；因为在六个愿意和有才能统治的人中，是什么使其中一个成为国王而不是其他五个呢？当然是上帝引导人民选择这个人，而不是其他人。可以说上帝直接赋予了国王权力；通过他，国王才能统治，这是真实的。这个职位是直接来自上帝的，但现在的问题是，是什么正式将这个职位和王权赋予这个人，而不是其他五个人呢？在这里，除了上帝引导国家的心选择这个人而不是那个人，别无他法。

QUESTION V
问题五

WHETHER OR NO THE POPISH PRELATE, THE AUTHOR OF "SAC. SAN. REGUM MAJESTAS," CALLED THE SACRED AND ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF KINGS, PROVETH THAT GOD IS THE IMMEDIATE AUTHOR OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT THE KING IS NO CREATURE OF THE PEOPLE'S MAKING
无论是否天主教主教，也就是《圣圣王权》的作者，所称的君王的神圣和王权特权，是否证明上帝是主权的直接创造者，以及国王不是人民创造的产物。

Consider, 1. That the excommunicated prelate saith, (c. 2, p. 19,) "Kings are not immediately from God as by any special ordinance sent from heaven by the ministry of angels and prophets; there were but some few such; as Moses, Saul, David, &c.; yet something may immediately proceed from God, and be his special work, without a revelation or manifestation extraordinary from heaven; so the designation to a sacred function is from the church and from man, yet the power of word, sacraments, binding and loosing, is immediately from Jesus Christ. The apostle Matthias was from Christ's immediate constitution, and yet he was designed by men, Acts 1. The soul is by creation and infusion, without any special ordinance from heaven, though nature begetteth the body, and disposeth the matter, and prepareth it as fit to be conjoined with the soul, so as the father is said to beset the son." Ans. 1st, The unchurched Prelate striveth to make us hateful by the title of the chapter,—That God is, by his title, the immediate author of sovereignty; and who denieth that? Not those who teach that the person who is king is created king by the people, no more than those who deny that men are now called to be pastors and deacons immediately, and by a voice from heaven, or by the ministry of angels and prophets, because the office of pastors and deacons is immediately from God. 2d, When he hath proved that God is the immediate author of sovereignty, what then? Shall it follow that the sovereign in concreto may not be resisted, and that he is above all law, and that there is no armour against his violence but prayers and tears? Because God is the immediate author of the pastor and of the apostle's office, does it therefore follow that it is unlawful to resist a pastor though he turn robber? If so, then the pastor is above all the king's laws. This is the Jesuit and all made, and there is no armour against the robbing prelate but prayer and tears.
考虑以下事实：1.被逐出教会的主教说（第 2 章，第 19 页）：“国王并非直接由上帝特别的命令通过天使和先知的事工从天堂派遣而来；只有一些人如摩西、扫罗、大卫等才是如此；然而，某些事情可能直接来自上帝，并且是他的特殊工作，而不需要来自天堂的特殊启示或显现；因此，神圣职能的指定来自教会和人，但是言语、圣礼、束缚和解脱的权力是直接来自耶稣基督。使徒马提亚是由基督直接设立的，但他是由人指定的，见使徒行传 1 章。灵魂是通过创造和注入而来的，没有任何来自天堂的特别命令，尽管自然会产生身体，并使物质适合与灵魂结合，就像父亲被认为是儿子的环绕者。”回答：首先，这位被剥夺教职的主教试图通过章节的标题使我们讨厌——上帝是主权的直接创造者；谁否认这一点呢？ 不是那些教导国王是由人民创造的人，也不是那些否认人们现在被立即称为牧师和执事的人，以及通过天上的声音、天使和先知的事工，因为牧师和执事的职位是直接来自上帝的。第二，当他证明上帝是主权的直接创造者时，那又怎样呢？难道会导致国家元首不可抵抗，他高于一切法律，只有祈祷和眼泪才能对抗他的暴力吗？因为上帝是牧师和使徒职位的直接创造者，难道就意味着抵抗一个转变为强盗的牧师是不合法的吗？如果是这样，那么牧师就高于国王的一切法律。这是耶稣会士和所有人的创造，对抗抢劫的主教只有祈祷和眼泪。

2. He saith in his title, that "the king is no creature of the people's making." If he mean the king in the abstract, that is, the royal dignity, whom speaketh he against? Not against us, but against his own father, Bellarmine, who saith, that "sovereignty hath no warrant by any divine law." If he mean that the man who is king is not created and elected king by the people, he contradicteth himself and all the court doctors.
他在标题中说，“国王不是人民创造的产物。”如果他指的是抽象的国王，也就是皇室尊严，他是在反对谁？不是反对我们，而是反对他自己的父亲贝拉明，他说“主权没有任何神圣法律的保证。”如果他的意思是说担任国王的人不是由人民创造和选举的，他就与自己和所有法庭医生相矛盾。

3. It is false that Saul and David's call to royalty was only from God, "by a special ordinance sent from heaven," for their office is (Deut. 17:14) from the written word of God, as the killing of idolaters, (ver. 3, 7,) and as the office of the priests and Levites, (ver. 8–10,) and this is no extraordinary office from heaven, more than that is from heaven which is warranted by the word of God. If he mean that these men, Saul and David, were created kings only by the extraordinary revelation of God from heaven, it is a lie; for besides the prophetical anointing of them, they were made kings by the people, as the Word saith expressly; except we say that David sinned in not setting himself down on the throne, when Samuel first anointed him king; and so he should have made away with his master, king Saul, out of the world; and there were not a few called to the throne by the people, but many, yea, all the kings of Israel and of Judah.
扫罗和大卫被封为王不仅仅是来自上帝的特别命令，这是错误的，因为他们的职位是根据上帝的书面话语（申命记 17:14）来的，就像杀掉拜偶像者一样（申命记 17:3,7），就像祭司和利未人的职位一样（申命记 17:8-10）。这并不是来自天上的特殊职位，与那些得到上帝话语保证的职位一样。如果他的意思是这些人，扫罗和大卫，只是通过上帝从天上的特殊启示而成为国王，那是谎言；因为除了他们受膏为先知之外，他们还是由人民封为国王的，正如圣经明确所说；除非我们说大卫在撒母耳第一次膏他为王时犯了罪；那样的话，他就应该除掉他的主人，扫罗国王，使他离开这个世界；而且不仅有几个人被人民封为国王，而是许多人，是以色列和犹大的所有国王。

4. The prelate contendeth that a king is designed to his royal dignity "immediately from God, without an extraordinary revelation from heaven," as the man is "designed to be a pastor by men, and yet the power of preaching is immediately from God," &c.; but he proveth nothing, except he prove that all pastors are called to be pastors immediately, and that God calleth and designeth to the office such a person immediately as he hath immediately instituted by the power of preaching and the apostleship, and hath immediately infused the soul in the body by an act of creation; and we cannot conceive how God in our days, when there are no extraordinary revelations, doth immediately create this man a king, and immediately tie the crown to this family rather than to that. This he doth by the people now, without any prophetical unction, and by this medium, viz., the free choice of the people. He need not bring the example of Matthias more than of any ordinary pastor; and yet an ordinary pastor is not immediately called of God, because the office is from God immediately, and also the man is made pastor by the church.
4. 主教争辩说，国王的王位是“直接来自上帝，无需来自天堂的特殊启示”，就像人是“由人指定为牧师，但传道的权力是直接来自上帝”，等等；但他没有证明任何事情，除非他证明所有牧师都是直接被召唤成为牧师的，上帝直接呼召并指定这样一个人担任职位，就像他通过传道和使徒职位的权力直接创造了灵魂注入身体一样；而我们无法想象在我们这个时代，当没有特殊的启示时，上帝如何立即创造这个人成为国王，并立即将王冠与这个家族联系起来，而不是与那个家族联系起来。他现在通过人民来做到这一点，没有任何先知的膏抹，通过这种媒介，即人民的自由选择。他不需要举出马提亚的例子，也不需要举出任何普通牧师的例子；然而，普通牧师并不是直接由上帝呼召的，因为职位是直接来自上帝的，而且人也是由教会成为牧师的。

The P. Prelate saith, (c. 2, p. 20–23,) A thing is immediately from God three ways. 1st, When it is solely from God, and presupposeth nothing ordinary or human antecedent to the obtaining of it. Such was the power of Moses, Saul and David; such were the apostles. 2d, When the collation of the power to such a person is immediately from God, though some act of man be antecedent, as Matthias was an apostle. A baptised man obtaineth remission and regeneration, yet aspersion of water cannot produce these excellent effects. A king giveth power to a favourite to make a lord or a baron, yet who is so stupid as to aver, that the honour of a lord cometh immediately from the favourite and not from the king. 3d, When a man hath, by some ordinary human right, a full and just right, and the approbation and confirmation of this right is immediately from God.
主教说，（第 2 章，第 20-23 页）一件事情有三种方式是直接来自上帝的。第一，当它完全来自上帝，不需要任何普通或人类的前提条件来获得。像摩西、扫罗和大卫的权力就是这样的；使徒们也是如此。第二，当将权力授予某个人的行为是直接来自上帝的，尽管有些人类的行为是在此之前的，就像马提亚成为了使徒。一个受洗的人获得了赦罪和重生，然而洒水并不能产生这些卓越的效果。国王给一个宠臣授予封爵或男爵的权力，然而谁会如此愚蠢地断言，封爵的荣誉是直接来自宠臣而不是国王呢。第三，当一个人通过某种普通的人类权利拥有完全和公正的权利时，对这种权利的认可和确认是直接来自上帝的。

The first way, sovereignty is not from God. The second way, sovereignty is conferred an kings immediately: though some created act of election, succession or conquest intervene, the interposed act containeth not in it power to confer sovereignty; as in baptism, regeneration, if there be nothing repugnant in the recipient, is conferred, not by water, but immediately by God. In sacred orders, designation is from men, power to supernatural acts from God. Election, succession, conquests, remotely and improperly constitute a king. To say in the third sense, that sovereignty is immediately from God by approbation or confirmation only, is against Scripture, Prov. 8:15; Psal. 88:8; John 19; then the people say, You are God's, your power is from below. And Paul's "ordained of God," is "approved and confirmed only of God;" the power of designation, or application of the person to royalty, is from man; the power of conferring royal power, or of applying the person to royal power, is from God. A man's hand may apply a faggot to the fire, the fire only maketh the faggot to burn. 重试    错误原因

Answer. 1st, Apostles, both according to their office and the designation of their person to the office, were immediately and only from God, without any act of the people, and therefore are badly coupled with the royal power of David and king Saul, who were not formally made kings but by the people at Mizpeh and Hebron. 2d, The second way God giveth royal power, by moving the people's hearts to confer royal power, and this is virtually in the people, formally from God. Water hath no influence to produce grace, God's institution and promise doth it; except you dream with your Jesuits, of opus operatum, that water sprinkled, by the doing of the deed, conferreth grace, nisi ponatur obex, what can the child do, or one baptised child more than another, to hinder the flux of remission of sins, if you mean not that baptism worketh as physic on a sick man, except strength of humours hinder? and therefore this comparison is not alike. The people cannot produce so noble an effect as royalty,—a beam from God. True, formally they cannot, but virtually it is in a society of reasonable men, in whom are left beams of authoritative majesty, which by a divine institution they can give (Deut. 17:14) to this man, to David, not to Eliab. And I could well say the favourite made the lord, and placed honour in the man whom he made lord, by a borrowed power from his prince; and yet the honour of a lord is principally from the king. 3. It is true the election of the people containeth not formally royal dignity, but the Word saith, they made Saul, they made David king; so virtually election must contain it. Samuel's oil maketh not David king, he is a subject after he is anointed; the people's election at Hebron maketh him king, differeth him from his brethren, and putteth him in royal state; yet God is the principal agent. What immediate action God hath here, is said and dreamed of, no man can divine, except Prophet P. Prelate. The ἐξουσια, royal authority, is given organically by that act by which he is made king: another act is a night-dream, but by the act of election, David is of no king, a king. The collation of δυναμις, royal gifts, is immediately from God, but that formally maketh not a king, if Solomon saw right, "servants riding on horses, princes going on foot." 4th, Judge of the Prelate's subtilty,—I dare say not his own; he stealeth from Spalato, but telleth it not,—"The applying of the person to royal authority is from the people; but the applying of royal authority to the person of the king, is immediately and only from God; as the hand putteth the faggot to the fire, but the fire maketh it burn." To apply the subject to the accident, is it any thing else but to apply the accident to the subject? Royal authority is an accident, the person of the king the subject. The applying of the faggot to the fire, and the applying of the fire to the faggot, are all one, to any one not forsaken of common sense. When the people applyeth the person to the royal authority, they but put the person in the state of royal authority; this is to make an union betwixt the man and royal authority, and this is to apply royal authority to the person. 5th, The third sense is the Prelate's dream, not a tenet of ours. We never said that sovereignty in the king is immediately from God by approbation or confirmation only, as if the people first made the king, and God did only by a posterior and latter act say Amen to the deed done, and subscribe, as recorder, to what the people doth: so the people should deal crowns and kingdoms at their pleasure, and God behoove to ratify and make good their act. When God doth apply the person to royal power, is this a different action from the people's applying the person to royal dignity? It is not imaginable. But the people, by creating a king, applyeth the person to royal dignity; and God, by the people's act of constituting the man king, doth by the mediation of this act convey royal authority to the man, as the church by sending a man and ordaining him to be a pastor, doth not by that, as God's instruments, infuse supernatural powers of preaching; these supernatural powers may be, and often are in him before he be in orders. And sometimes God infuseth a supernatural power of government in a man when he is not yet a King, as the Lord turned Saul into another man, (1 Sam. 10:5, 6,) neither at that point of time when Samuel anointed him, but afterwards: "After that thou shalt come to the hill of God, the Spirit of the Lord shall come upon thee, and thou shalt prophesy with them, and shalt be turned into another man;" nor yet at that time when he is formally made king by the people; for Saul was not king formally because of Samuel's anointing, nor yet was he king because another spirit was infused into him, (v. 5, 6) for he was yet a private man till the states of Israel chose him king at Mizpeh. And the word of God used words of action to express the people's power: Judg. 9:6, And all the men of Sechem gathered together, and all the men of Millo, וימלּיכוּ regnare fecerunt, they caused him to be king. The same is said 1 Sam. 10:15, They caused Saul to reign; 2 Kings 10:15, לא נמּלךּאישּ We shall not king any man; 1 Chron. 12:38, They came to Hebron לחּמלידּאת-דגּיד to king David over all Israel; Deut. 17. three times the making of a king is given to the people. When thou shalt say, אשימﬣ עלי מלד I shall set a king over me. If it were not in their power to make a king no law could be imposed on them not to make a stranger their king; 1 Kings 12:20, All the congregation kinged Jeroboam, or made him king over all Israel; 2 Kings 11:12, They kinged Joash, or made Joash to reign. 6, The people are to say, You are God's, and your power is below, saith the Prelate: What then? therefore their power is not from God also? It followeth not subordinata non pugnant. The Scripture saith both, the Lord exalted David to be king, and, all power is from God; and so the power of a lord mayor of a city: the people made David king, and the people maketh such a man lord mayor. It is the Anabaptists' argument,—God writeth his law in our heart, and teacheth his own children; therefore books and the ministry of men are needless. So all sciences and lawful arts are from God; therefore sciences applied to men are not from men's free will, industry and studies. The prelate extolleth the king when he will have his royalty from God, the way that John Stiles is the husband of such a woman.
答案。首先，使徒们根据他们的职位和被指定为该职位的人，是直接且仅来自上帝，没有任何人民的行为，因此与大卫和扫罗王的王权不相称，他们不是通过人民在米斯佩和希伯仑正式成为国王的。其次，上帝赋予王权的第二种方式是通过感动人民的心来授予王权，这在实质上是来自人民，正式来自上帝。水没有影响力产生恩典，是上帝的制度和应许产生的；除非你和你们的耶稣会士一样做梦，认为洒水，通过行为本身，赋予恩典，除非有障碍，否则儿童或受洗的儿童能做什么来阻止罪恶的宽恕流动，如果你的意思不是洗礼像药物一样对待病人，除非体液的力量阻碍？因此，这个比较是不一样的。人民不能产生如此崇高的效果，如王权-来自上帝的光芒。确实，从正式上来说，他们不能，但在一个理性人的社会中，他们留下了权威威严的光芒，根据神的制度，他们可以给予（申命记。 17:14) 对这个人，对大卫，而不是以利押。我可以说，宠爱者使主，将荣耀赋予他所立为主的人，借助于他的君主的权力；然而，贵族的荣耀主要来自国王。3. 诚然，人民的选举并不正式包含王权，但圣经说，他们立了扫罗，他们立了大卫为王；因此，虚拟上选举必须包含王权。撒母耳的膏油并没有使大卫成为王，他在受膏之后仍然是一个臣民；人民在希伯仑的选举使他成为王，使他与他的兄弟不同，并使他处于王室的地位；然而，上帝是主要的行动者。上帝在这里有什么直接的行动，是说和梦想的，除了先知 P. Prelate 之外，没有人能够推测。王权是通过使他成为国王的那个行为有机地赋予的：另一个行为是一个夜梦，但通过选举的行为，大卫才是真正的国王。王权的授予，即王室的恩赐，直接来自上帝，但这并不正式地使一个人成为国王，如果所罗门看得对的话，“仆人骑马，王子步行前进”。第四，主教的狡猾法官，我敢说不是他自己；他从斯帕拉托偷来，却不告诉别人：“将个人应用于王权是来自人民；但将王权应用于国王的人，只有上帝；就像手把柴捆放入火中，但火使其燃烧。”将主题应用于事件，难道不就是将事件应用于主题吗？王权是一种事件，国王的人是主题。将柴捆放入火中，将火应用于柴捆，对于任何一个没有失去常识的人来说，都是一样的。当人民将个人应用于王权时，他们只是将个人置于王权的状态中；这就是使人与王权结合，这就是将王权应用于个人。第五，第三种意义是主教的梦想，不是我们的信条。 我们从未说过国王的主权仅仅是通过上帝的认可或确认而立即来自上帝，好像是人民首先造就了国王，上帝只是在事后通过一种较晚的行动对所做的事情说“阿门”，并作为记录者签署人民所做的事情：所以人民应该随心所欲地处理王冠和王国，上帝必须批准并使他们的行为成立。当上帝将某人应用于王权时，这与人民将某人应用于王位尊严是不同的行动吗？这是不可想象的。但是人民通过创造一个国王，将某人应用于王位尊严；而上帝通过人民构成这个人为国王的行为，通过这个行为的中介，将王权授予这个人，就像教会通过派遣一个人并任命他成为牧师一样，并不是通过这样做，作为上帝的工具，注入超自然的传道能力；这些超自然的能力可能在他受到任命之前就已经存在，并且有时上帝在一个人还不是国王的时候就注入了他的超自然的统治能力，就像主将扫罗变成另一个人一样。（撒上 10:6） 10:5, 6，）不是在撒母耳膏抹他的时候，而是在此之后：“你到了神的山，耶和华的灵必大大感动你，你要与他们一同说预言，你要变为新人。”也不是在他被人民正式立为王的时候；因为扫罗不是因为撒母耳的膏抹而正式成为王，也不是因为有另一个灵附在他身上（见第 5、6 节），因为直到以色列的众支派在密比瓦选他为王之前，他仍然是一个普通人。上帝的话用行动的词语来表达人民的权力：士师记 9:6，“示剑的众人和米罗的众人都聚集在一起，他们使亚比米勒作王。”撒母耳记上 10:15 也是这样说的，“他们使扫罗作王。”列王记下 10:15，“我们不会立任何人作王。”历代志上 12:38，“他们来到希伯仑，立大卫作以色列全国的王。”申命记 17 中三次将立王的权力赋予了人民。当你说：“我要立一位王治理我。” 如果他们没有权力让一个陌生人成为国王，就不可能有任何法律强加给他们不让他们让一个陌生人成为国王；列王记上 12:20，全会众立耶罗波安为王，或者说他们让耶罗波安成为以色列的王；列王记下 11:12，他们立约阿施为王，或者说他们让约阿施统治。6，人们应该说，你是上帝的，你的权力是下级的，主教说：那又怎样？因此他们的权力也不是来自上帝吗？这并不意味着下级不会争斗。圣经既说，上帝使大卫成为王，又说，所有的权力都来自上帝；同样，市长的权力也是来自上帝：人民让大卫成为王，人民让这样的人成为市长。这是浸信会的论点，上帝将他的律法写在我们的心中，并教导他自己的儿女；因此，书籍和人的事工是不必要的。所以所有的科学和合法的艺术都来自上帝；因此，应用于人的科学不是来自人的自由意志、努力和学习。主教在他要求国王的王权来自上帝时，赞扬了国王，就像约翰·斯泰尔斯是某个女人的丈夫一样。

P. Prelate.—Kings are of God, they are God's, children of the Most High, his servants, public ministers,—their sword and judgment are God's. This he hath said of their royalty in abstracto and in concreto; their power, person, charge, are all of divine extract, and so their authority and person are both sacred and inviolable.
教长。国王是上帝的，他们是上帝的子民，是至高者的仆人，公共事务官员——他们的权力和判断是上帝的。这是关于他们的王权的抽象和具体的说法；他们的权力、人格和职责都来自神圣的来源，因此他们的权威和人格都是神圣和不可侵犯的。

Ans.—So are all the congregation of the judges; Psal. 82:1, 6, All of them are God's; for he speaketh not there of a congregation of kings. So are apostles, their office and persons of God; and so the prelates (as they think), the successors of the apostles, are God's servants; their ministry, word, rod of discipline, not theirs, but of God. The judgment of judges, inferior to the king, is the Lord's judgment, not men's. Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6, Hence by the Prelate's logic, the persons of prelates, mayors, bailiffs, constables, pastors, are sacred and inviolable above all laws, as are kings. Is this an extolling of kings? But where are kings' persons, as men, said to be of God, as the royalty in abstracto is? The Prelate seeth beside his book, (Psal. 82:7,) "But ye shall die like men."
答案-所有的法官团体也是如此；诗篇 82:1, 6，他们都是上帝的；因为那里所说的不是国王的团体。使徒也是如此，他们的职责和人都是上帝的；主教（他们认为）也是如此，他们是使徒的继承者，是上帝的仆人；他们的事工、话语、管教的权杖，不是他们自己的，而是上帝的。法官的判断，低于国王，是主的判断，不是人的。申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6，因此按照主教的逻辑，主教、市长、法官、警长、牧师的人，高于所有法律，是神圣和不可侵犯的，就像国王一样。这是在赞扬国王吗？但是哪里说国王的人，作为人，是上帝的，就像抽象的王权一样？主教在他的书旁边看到了（诗篇 82:7），"但你们必像人一样死去。"

P. Prelate.—We begin with the law, in which, as God by himself prescribed the essentials, substantials, and ceremonies of his piety and worship, gave order for piety and justice; Deut. 17:14, 15, the king is here originally and immediately from God, and independent from all others. "Set over them"—them, is collective, that is, all and every one. Scripture knoweth not this state principle,—Rex est singulis major, universis minor. The person is expressed in concreto, "Whom the Lord thy God shall choose." This peremptory precept dischargeth the people, all and every one, diffusively, representatively, or in any imaginable capacity to attempt the appointing of a king, but to leave it entirely and totally to God Almighty.
教长。我们从法律开始，上帝亲自规定了他的虔诚和崇拜的要素、实质和仪式，为虔诚和正义提供了秩序；申命记 17:14,15，国王在这里是直接来自上帝，独立于其他人。“立在他们之上”——他们是集体的，即所有人。圣经不知道这个国家原则——国王对每个人都更重要，对整体来说则更次要。这个人以具体的方式表达，“是耶和华你的上帝所拣选的”。这个明确的命令使人民，所有人，以任何可能的方式，都不能试图任命国王，而是完全地把这个任务交给全能的上帝。

Ans.—Begin with the law, but end not with traditions. If God by himself prescribed the essentials of piety and worship, the other part of your distinction is, that God, not by himself, but by his prelates, appointed the whole Romish rites, as accidentals of piety. This is the Jesuits' doctrine. This place is so far from proving the king to be independent, and that it totally is God's to appoint a king, that it expressly giveth the people power to appoint a king; for the setting of a king over themselves, this one and not that one, makes the people to appoint the king, and the king to be less and dependent on the people, seeing God intendeth the king for the people's good, and not the people for the king's good. This text shameth the Prelate, who also confessed, (p. 22,) that remotely and improperly, succession, election, and conquest maketh the king, and so it is lawful for men remotely and improperly to invade God's chair,
答案：从法律开始，但不要以传统结束。如果上帝亲自规定了虔诚和崇拜的基本要素，那么你所区分的另一部分是，上帝不是亲自，而是通过他的主教任命了整个罗马礼仪，作为虔诚的附属物。这是耶稣会的教义。这个地方远远不能证明国王是独立的，也不能完全是上帝任命国王的，它明确赋予了人民任命国王的权力；因为为自己选一个国王，而不是那个国王，使人民任命国王，国王变得更少并且依赖于人民，因为上帝的意图是让国王为人民的利益服务，而不是人民为国王的利益服务。这段经文使主教感到羞愧，他也承认（第 22 页），继承、选举和征服是使国王合法的，所以人们在远离和不适当的情况下侵犯上帝的宝座是合法的。

P. Prelate.—Jesuits and puritans say, it was a privilege of the Jews that God chose their king. So Suarez, Soto, Navarra.
普雷拉特主教。耶稣会士和清教徒说，上帝选择犹太人的国王是他们的特权。苏亚雷斯、索托、纳瓦拉也是这么说的。

Ans.—The Jesuits are the Prelate's brethren, they are under one banner,—we are in contrary camps to Jesuits. The Prelate said himself, (p. 19,) Moses, Saul, and David, were by extraordinary revelation from God. Sure I am kings are not so now. The Jews had this privilege that no nation had. God named some kings to them, as Saul, David,—he doth not so now. God did tie royalty to David's house by a covenant till Christ should come,—he doth not so now; yet we stand to Deut. 17.
答案：耶稣会士是主教的兄弟，他们同属一旗下，而我们与耶稣会士站在对立的阵营。主教自己说过，（第 19 页）摩西、扫罗和大卫是通过神的特殊启示而成为国王的。我确信现在的国王不是这样的。犹太人享有其他国家没有的特权。神为他们指定了一些国王，如扫罗、大卫，但现在不再这样做了。神曾经通过一个约束将王权与大卫的家族联系在一起，直到基督降临，但现在不再如此；然而我们仍然遵守《申命记》17 章。

P. Prelate.—Prov. 8:15, "By me kings reign." If the people had right to constitute a king, it had not been king Solomon, but king Adonijah. Solomon saith not of himself, but indefinitely, "By me," as by the Author, Efficient, and Constituent, kings reign. Per is by Christ, not by the people, not by the high priest, state or presbytery,—not per me iratum, by me in my anger, as some sectaries say. Paul's διαταγὴ του θεοῦ, an ordinance by high authority not revocable. Sinesius so useth the word, Aristotle, Lucilius, Appian, Plutarch, בי· in me and by me, and also Doctor Andrews. Kings indefinitely, all kings: none may distinguish where the law distinguisheth not,—they reign in concreto. That same power that maketh kings must unmake them.
P. Prelate. - 箴言 8:15，“君王藉着我执政。”如果人民有权力选举国王，那就不会是所罗门国王，而是亚多尼雅国王。所罗门并不是指自己，而是泛指“藉着我”，作为君王执政的创造者、推动者和构成者。Per 是指基督，而不是指人民、大祭司、国家或长老会，也不是指“per me iratum”，即我愤怒时的意思，正如一些教派所说的。保罗所说的是神的命令，是不可撤销的高权威。Sinesius 也使用了这个词，亚里士多德、卢西利乌斯、阿皮安、普鲁塔克也是如此，以及安德鲁斯博士。君王是泛指的，所有的君王都是如此：在法律没有区别的地方，没有人可以区分他们，他们是具体统治的。创造君王的权力也必须废除君王。

Ans.—1. The prelate cannot restrict this to kings only; it extendeth to parliaments also. Solomon addeth, וּרזנּיﬦ and consuls, שדיﬦ all the sirs, and princes, ונדיביﬦ and magnificents, and nobles, and more כלּ שבּטי ארצ and all the judges of the earth, they reign, rule, and decree justice by Christ. Here, then, mayors, sheriffs, provosts, constables, are by the Prelate extolled as persons sacred, irresistible. Then, (1.) the judges of England rule not by the king of Britain, as their author, efficient, constituent, but by Jesus Christ immediately; nor doth the commissary rule by the prelate. (2.) All these, and their power, and persons, rule independently, and immediately by Jesus Christ. (3.) All inferior judges are διαταγαὶ του θεοῦ, the ordinances of God not revocable. Therefore the king cannot deprive any judge under him; he cannot declare the parliament no parliament: once a judge, and always and irrevocably a judge. This Prelate's poor pleading for kings deserves no wages. Lavater intelligit superiores et inferiores magistratus, non est potestas nisi a deo, Vatablus consiliarios. 2. If the people had absolute right to choose kings by the law of Israel, they might have chosen another than either Adonijah or Solomon; but the Lord expressly put an express law on them, that they should make no king but him whom the Lord should choose, Deut. 17:4. Now the Lord did either by his immediately inspired prophet anoint the man, as he anointed David, Saul, Jehu, &c., or then he restricted, by a revealed promise, the royal power to a family, and to the eldest by birth; and, therefore, the Lord first chose the man and then the people made him king. Birth was not their rule, as is clear, in that they made Solomon their king, not Adonijah, the elder; and this proveth that God did both ordain kingly government to the kingdom of Israel, and chose the man, either in his person, or tied it to the first-born of the line. Now we have no Scripture nor law of God to tie royal dignity to one man or to one family; produce a warrant for it in the Word, for that must be a privilege of the Jews for which we have no word of God. We have no immediately inspired Samuels to say, "Make David, or this man king;" and no word of God to say, "Let the first-born of this family rather than another family sit upon the throne;" therefore the people must make such a man king, following the rule of God's word, (Deut. 17:14,) and other rules showing what sort of men judges must be, as Deut. 1:16–18; 2 Chron. 19:6, 7. 3. It is true, kings in a special manner reign by Christ; therefore not by the people's free election? The P. Prelate argueth like himself: by this text a mayor of a city by the Lord decreeth justice; therefore he is not made a mayor of a city by the people of the city. It followeth not. None of us teach that kings reign by God's anger. We judge a king a great mercy of God to church or state; but the text saith not, By the Lord kings and judges do not only reign and decree justice, but also murder protestants, by raising against them an army of papists. And the word διαταγαὶ, powers, doth in no Greek author signify irrevocable powers; for Uzziah was a lawful king, and yet (2 Chron. 26.) lawfully put from the throne, and "cut off from the house of the Lord." And interpreters of this passage deny that it is to be understood of tyrants. So the Chaldee paraphrase turns it well, Potentes virga justitiæ: so Lavater and Diodatus saith, this place doth prove, "That all kings, judges and laws, derivari a lege æterna, are derived from the Eternal Law." The prelate, eating his tongue for anger, striveth to prove that all power, and so royal power, is of God; but what can he make of it? We believe it, though he say (p. 30,) sectaries prove, by ἐαν μὴ, "That a man is justified by faith only;" so there is no power but of God only: but feel the smell of a Jesuit. It is the sectaries' doctrine, that we are justified by faith only, but the prelates and the Jesuits go another way,—not by faith only, but by works also. And all power is from God only, as the first Author, and from no man. What then? Therefore men and people interpose no human act in making this man a king and not that man. It followeth not. Let us with the Prelate join Paul and Solomon together, and say, "That sovereignty is from God, of God, by God, as God's appointment irrevocable." Then shall it never follow: it is inseparable from the person unless you make the king a man immortal. As God only can remove the crown, it is true God only can put an unworthy and an excommunicated prelate from office and benefice; but how? Doth that prove that men and the church may not also in their place remove an unworthy churchman, when the church, following God's word, delivereth to Satan? Christ only, as head of the church, excommunicateth scandalous men; therefore the church cannot do it. And yet the argument is as good the one way as the other; for all the churches on earth cannot make a minister properly,—they but design him to the ministry whom God hath gifted and called. But shall we conclude that no church on earth, but God only, by an immediate action from heaven, can deprive a minister? How, then, dare prelates excommunicate, unmake, and imprison so many ministers in the three kingdoms? But the truth is, take this one argument from the Prelate, and all that is in his book falleth to the ground,—to wit, Sovereignty is from God only. A king is a creature of God's making only; and what then? Therefore sovereignty cannot be taken from him: so God only made Aaron's house priests. Solomon had no law to depose Abiathar from the priesthood. Possibly the Prelate will grant all. The passage, Rom. 13., which he saith hath tortured us, I refer to a fitter place—it will be found to torture court parasites.
答案：1. 这位教长不能仅限于国王；它也适用于议会。所罗门还补充说，还有领事、所有的先生、王子、显贵、贵族，以及更多的地方法官，他们都是基督的统治者、统治者和公正的裁决者。因此，市长、警长、警长、警长都被教长吹捧为神圣、不可抗拒的人。然后，（1）英国的法官不是由英国国王作为他们的作者、效能者、组成者来统治的，而是由耶稣基督直接统治；教长也不是由主教统治的。 （2）所有这些人及其权力和人员都是独立的，并且直接由耶稣基督统治。（3）所有下级法官都是神的法令，不可撤销的。因此，国王不能剥夺他下面的任何法官；他不能宣布议会不是议会：一旦成为法官，就永远不可撤销。这位教长对国王的可怜辩护不值得报酬。拉瓦特理解上级和下级官员，没有权力，除非来自上帝，瓦塔布斯的顾问。2. 如果以色列人民有绝对的权利根据以色列的法律选择国王，他们可能会选择除了亚多尼雅或所罗门之外的其他人；但耶和华明确地对他们下了一条法律，即他们不得选择除了耶和华所选择的国王以外的人，申命记 17:4。现在，耶和华要么通过他的先知亲自灵感膏抹这个人，就像他膏抹大卫、扫罗、耶户等人一样，要么他通过启示的应许将王权限制在一个家族和长子身上；因此，耶和华首先选择了这个人，然后人民才立他为国王。出生并不是他们的准则，这一点很明显，因为他们选择的是所罗门为国王，而不是长子亚多尼雅；这证明了上帝既为以色列国设立了国王政府，又选择了这个人，要么是他本人，要么是将其与血统中的长子联系在一起。现在，我们没有圣经或上帝的法律将王位封给一个人或一个家族；在圣经中找出这样的授权吧，因为这必须是犹太人的特权，我们没有上帝的话语来支持这一点。 我们没有立即激发塞缪尔说：“立大卫，或者这个人为王；”也没有神的话说：“让这个家族的长子而不是其他家族的人坐在王位上；”因此，人们必须按照神的话的规定（申命记 17:14）和其他规定来选择这样的人为王，这些规定显示了法官必须是什么样的人，如申命记 1:16-18；历代志下 19:6,7。3.的确，国王以特殊的方式由基督统治；因此，不是由人民的自由选举？主教先生的论证就像他自己一样：根据这段经文，一位市长由主宣布公正；因此，他不是由市民选举成为市长。这并不是必然的。我们中没有人教导国王是由神的愤怒统治的。我们认为国王对教会或国家是神的大恩典；但这段经文并没有说，由于主的缘故，国王和法官不仅统治和宣布公正，而且还通过组织天主教徒的军队来谋杀新教徒。而且，希腊文中的“διαταγαὶ”一词在任何希腊作家的著作中都不表示不可撤销的权力；因为乌西雅是合法的国王，然而（历代志下 26 章）他合法地被废黜，并且“被剪除出主的殿”。这段话的解释者否认它是指暴君。所以迦勒底的解释很好，正义的权杖。Lavater 和 Diodatus 说，这个地方证明了“所有的国王、法官和法律都是从永恒的法律中派生出来的。”主教因愤怒而咬舌头，努力证明所有的权力，包括王权，都是来自上帝；但他能做什么呢？我们相信这一点，尽管他说（第 30 页），分裂派通过“除非”证明“人只因信心而称义”；所以除了上帝以外没有别的权力：但是能感觉到耶稣会士的气味。分裂派的教义是我们只因信心而称义，但是主教和耶稣会士走另一条路——不仅仅是因信心，还要靠行为。所有的权力只来自上帝，作为第一位创造者，不来自任何人。那又怎样呢？因此，人们在选择这个人成为国王而不是那个人时，不会插手人为的行为。这并不是必然的。让我们与主教一起将保罗和所罗门结合起来，说“主权是来自上帝，属于上帝，由上帝任命，不可撤销。”那么它就永远不会发生：它与人的个人身份是不可分割的，除非你让国王成为一个不朽的人。 上帝才能除去王冠，这是真实的，只有上帝才能罢免不称职和被逐出教会的主教。但是，如何罢免呢？这能证明人和教会也可以在适当的时候罢免不称职的教士吗？当教会按照上帝的话语将其交给撒旦时呢？基督作为教会的头，只有他能将丑闻的人逐出教会；因此，教会不能这样做。然而，这个论点从另一个角度来看也是正确的；因为地球上的所有教会都不能使一位牧师合法，他们只是指定那些上帝赋予并呼召的人来担任牧师职务。但是，我们是否应该得出结论，地球上没有任何教会，只有上帝通过直接的天上行动才能剥夺一位牧师的职位呢？那么，主教们如何敢在三个王国中逐出、废黜和监禁如此多的牧师呢？但事实是，如果从主教那里拿走这个论点，他书中的一切都将崩溃——即至高无上的权力只来自上帝。国王只是上帝创造的生物；那又怎样呢？因此，权力不能从他那里夺走：上帝只创造了亚伦家的祭司。所罗门没有法律来废黜亚比亚他从祭司职位上。 可能主教会批准一切。他所说的经文，罗马书 13 章，据他说折磨了我们，我会把它放到一个更合适的地方——它将被发现折磨宫廷的马屁精们。

I go on with the Prelate, (c. 3,) "Sacred sovereignty is to be preserved, and kings are to be prayed for, that we may lead a godly life," 1 Tim. 3. What then? All in authority are to be prayed for,—even parliaments; by that text pastors are to be prayed for, and without them sound religion cannot well subsist. Is this questioned, that kings should be prayed for; or are we wanting in this duty? but it followeth not that all dignities to be prayed for are immediately from God, not from men.
我继续与主教一起前进（第 3 章），"应当保持神圣的统治，为了我们能过上敬神的生活，应当为国王祈祷"（提摩太前书 3 章）。那么，所有有权力的人都应该被祈祷，甚至包括议会；根据这段经文，牧师也应该被祈祷，没有他们，正统的宗教很难存在。有人质疑应该为国王祈祷吗？或者我们在这个责任上有所缺失吗？但这并不意味着所有应该被祈祷的尊位都是直接来自上帝，而不是来自人类。

P. Prelate.—Prov. 8., Solomon speaketh first of the establishment of government before he speaks of the works of creation; therefore better not be at all as be without government. And God fixed government in the person of Adam before Eve, or any one else, came into the world; and how shall government be, and we enjoy the fruits of it, except we preserve the king's sacred authority inviolable?
P. Prelate.——箴言 8 章，所罗门先谈论了政府的建立，然后才谈论创造的工作；因此，最好是有政府，而不是没有政府。上帝在亚当出生之前就在他身上确立了政府，而不是夏娃或其他人；如果我们不保持国王神圣的权威不可侵犯，政府又怎么能存在，我们又怎么能享受其成果呢？

Ans.—1. Moses (Gen. 1) speaketh of creation before he speaketh of kings, and he speaketh (Gen. 3) of Adam's sins before he speaks of redemption through the blessed Seed; therefore better never be redeemed at all as to be without sin. 2. If God made Adam a governor before he made Eve, and any of mankind, he was made a father and a husband before he had either son or wife. Is this the Prelate's logic? He may prove that two eggs on his father's table are three this way. 3. There is no government where sovereignty is not kept inviolable. It is true, where there is a king, sovereignty must be inviolable. What then? Arbitrary government is not sovereignty. 4. He intimateth aristocracy, and democracy, and the power of parliaments, which maketh kings, to be nothing but anarchy, for he speaketh here of no government but monarchy.
答案：1. 摩西（创世记 1 章）在谈到君王之前谈到了创造，他在谈到救赎通过有福的后裔之前谈到了亚当的罪过；因此，与没有罪过相比，最好根本不被救赎。2. 如果上帝在造夏娃之前就让亚当成为了统治者，并且在他没有儿子或妻子之前就成为了父亲和丈夫，那么这是主教的逻辑吗？他可以用这种方式证明他父亲桌子上的两个鸡蛋是三个。3. 在没有保持主权不可侵犯的地方就没有政府。确实，如果有国王，主权必须不可侵犯。那又怎样？专制政府不等于主权。4. 他暗示了贵族制、民主制和议会的权力，这使得国王成为无政府状态，因为他在这里谈论的只是君主制政府。

P. Prelate.—There is need of grace to obey the king, Psal. 18:43; 144:2. It is God who subdueth the people under David. Rebellion against the king is rebellion against God. 1 Pet. 2:17; Prov. 24:12. Therefore kings have a near alliance with God.
主教。顺从国王需要恩典，诗篇 18:43；144:2。是上帝使人民屈服于大卫。反抗国王就是反抗上帝。彼得前书 2:17；箴言 24:12。因此，国王与上帝有着密切的联盟。

Ans.—1. There is much grace in papists and prelates then, who use to write and preach against grace. 2. Lorinus your brother Jesuit will, with good warrant of the texts infer, that the king may make a conquest of his own kingdoms of Scotland and England by the sword, as David subdued the heathen. 3. Arbitrary governing hath no alliance with God; a rebel to God and his country, and an apostate, hath no reason to term lawful defence against cut-throat Irish rebellion. 4. There is need of much grace to obey pastors, inferior judges, masters, (Col. 3:22, 23,) therefore their power is from God immediately, and no more from men than the king is created king by the people, according to the way of royalists.
答案：1. 罗马天主教徒和主教们常常写作和讲道反对恩典，但他们自己却有很多恩典。2. 你的兄弟耶稣会士洛里纳斯将会根据经文的良好授权推断，国王可以用剑征服自己的苏格兰和英格兰王国，就像大卫征服异教徒一样。3. 专断的统治与上帝没有任何关联；对上帝和自己的国家叛逆的人，没有理由称合法的自卫是对付刺客般的爱尔兰叛乱。4. 需要很多恩典来服从牧师、下级法官、主人（歌罗西书 3:22, 23），因此他们的权力来自上帝，与国王通过人民的方式成为国王一样，与人无关。

P. Prelate.—God saith of Pharaoh, (Ex. 9:17,) I have raised thee up. Elisha, directed by God, constituted the king of Syria, 2 Kings 8:13. Pharaoh, Abimelech, Hiram, Hazael, Hadad, are no less honoured with the appellation of kings, than David, Saul, &c., Jer. 29:9. Nebuchadnezzar is honoured to be called, by way of excellency, God's servant, which God giveth to David, a king according to his own heart. And Isa. 45:1, "Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, Cyrus;" and God nameth him near a hundred years before he was born; Isa. 44:28, "He is my shepherd;" Dan. 5:21, God giveth kingdoms to whom he will; Dan. 5:21, empires, kingdoms, royalties, are not disposed of by the composed contracts of men, but by the immediate hand and work of God; Hos. 13:11, "I gave thee a king in my anger, I took him away in my wrath;" Job, He places kings in the throne, &c.
P. Prelate. - 上帝说法老（出埃及记 9:17）：“我让你兴起。”以利沙受上帝指引，任命了叙利亚的国王（列王记下 8:13）。法老、亚比米勒、希兰、哈薛、哈达德与大卫、扫罗等一样被尊称为国王，耶利米书 29:9。尼布甲尼撒也被尊称为上帝的仆人，这个称号也赋予了大卫，他是上帝心中的君王。以赛亚书 45:1，“耶和华对他的受膏者居鲁士如此说。”上帝在他出生前近一百年就给他起了这个名字，以赛亚书 44:28，“他是我的牧者。”但以理书 5:21，上帝将国度赐给他所愿意的人；但以理书 5:21，帝国、王国、王权不是由人的合同安排，而是由上帝的直接手和工作安排；何西阿书 13:11，“我在怒气中给你立了王，又在忿怒中将他废去。”约伯记，他将君王安置在宝座上，等等。

Ans.—Here is a whole chapter of seven pages for one raw argument ten times before repeated. 1. Exod. 9:7, I have raised up Pharaoh; Paul expoundeth it, (Rom. 9) to prove that king Pharaoh was a vessel of wrath fitted for destruction by God's absolute will; and the Prelate following Arminius, with treasonable charity, applieth this to our king. Can this man pray for the king? 2. Elisha anointed, but did not constitute, Hazael king; he foretold he should be king; and if he be a king of God's making, who slew his sick prince and invaded the throne by innocent blood, judge you. I would not take kings of the Prelate's making. 3. If God give to Nebuchadnezzar the same title of the servant of God, which is given to Daniel, (Psal. 18:1, and 116:16;) and to Moses, (Jos. 1:2,) all kings, because kings, are men according to God's heart. Why is not royalty then founded on grace? Nebuchadnezzar was not otherwise his servant, than he was the hammer of the earth, and a tyrannous conqueror of the Lord's people. All the heathen kings are called kings. But how came they to their thrones for the most part? As David and Hezekiah? But God anointed them not by his prophets; they came to their kingdoms by the people's election, or by blood and rapine; the latter way is no ground to you to deny Athaliah to be a lawful princess—she and Abimelech were lawful princes, and their sovereignty, as immediately and independently from God, as the sovereignty of many heathen kings. See then how justly Athaliah was killed as a bloody usurper of the throne; and this would licence your brethren, the Jesuits, to stab heathen Kings, whom you will have as well kings, as the Lord's anointed, though Nebuchadnezzar and many of them made their way to the throne, against all law of God and man, through a bloody patent. 4. Cyrus is God's anointed and his shepherd too, therefore his arbitrary government is a sovereignty immediately depending on God, and above all law; it is a wicked consequence. 5. God named Cyrus near a hundred years ere he was born; God named and designed Judas very individually, and named the ass that Christ should ride on to Jerusalem, (Zach. 9:9,) some more hundred years than one. What, will the Prelate make them independent kings for that? 6. God giveth kingdoms to whom he will. What then? This will prove kingdoms to be as independent and immediately from God as kings are; for as God giveth kings to kingdoms, so he giveth kingdoms to Kings, and no doubt he giveth kingdoms to whom he will. So he giveth prophets, apostles, pastors, to whom he will; and he giveth tyrannous conquests to whom he will: and it is Nebuchadnezzar to whom Daniel speaketh that from the Lord, and he had no just title to many kingdoms, especially to the kingdom of Judah, which yet God, the King of kings, gave to him because it was his good pleasure; and if God had not commanded them by the mouth of his prophet Jeremiah, might they not have risen, and, with the sword, have vindicated themselves and their own liberty, no less than they lawfully, by the sword, vindicated themselves from under Moab, (Judges 3,) and from under Jabin, king of Canaan, who, twenty years, mightily oppressed the children of Israel, Judges 4. Now this P. Prelate, by all these instances, making heathen kings to be kings by as good a title as David and Hezekiah, condemneth the people of God as rebels, if, being subdued and conquered by the Turk and Spanish king, they should, by the sword, recover their own liberty; and that Israel, and the saviours which God raised to them, had not warrant from the law of nature to vindicate themselves to liberty, which was taken from them violently and unjustly by the sword. From all this it shall well follow that the tyranny of bloody conquerors is immediately and only dependent from God, no less than lawful sovereignty; for Nebuchadnezzar's sovereignty over the people of God, and many other kingdoms also, was revenged of God as tyranny, Jer. 50:6, 7; and therefore the vengeance of the Lord, and the vengeance of his temple, came upon him and his land, Jer. 50:16, &c. It is true the people of God were commanded of God to submit to the king of Babylon, to serve him, and to pray for him, and to do the contrary was rebellion; but this was not because the king of Babylon was their king, and because the King of Babylon had a command of God so to bring under his yoke the people of God. So Christ had a commandment to suffer the death of the cross, (John 10:18,) but had Herod and Pilate any warrant to crucify him? None at all. 7. He saith, Royalties, even of heathen kings, are not disposed of by the composed contracts of men, but by the immediate hand and work of God. But the contracts of men to give a kingdom to a person, which a heathen community may lawfully do, and so by contract dispose of a kingdom, is not opposite to the immediate hand of God, appointing royalty and monarchy at his own blessed liberty. Lastly he saith, God took away Saul in his wrath; but I pray you, did God only do it? Then had Saul, because a king, a patent royal from God to kill himself, for so God took him away; and we are rebels by this, if we suffer not the king to kill himself. Well pleaded.
答案——这是一个完整的章节，有七页纸，其中一个原始的争论被重复了十次。1.出埃及记 9:7，我已经兴起法老；保罗解释了这一点，（罗马书 9 章）以证明法老王是上帝绝对意愿下被定为毁灭的愤怒器皿；而主教追随亚米尼乌斯，用叛逆的仁慈将这一点应用到我们的国王身上。这个人能为国王祈祷吗？2.以利沙膏抹，但没有任命哈薩耳为王；他预言他将成为国王；如果他是上帝所造的国王，他通过无辜的鲜血杀死了他生病的王子并侵占了王位，你们来判断吧。我不会接受主教所造的国王。3.如果上帝给尼布甲尼撒同样的称号，就像给但以理（诗篇 18:1 和 116:16）和摩西（约书亚记 1:2）一样，那么所有的国王，因为他们是国王，都是上帝心中的人。为什么王权不是建立在恩典之上呢？尼布甲尼撒不是他的仆人，而是他是地上的锤子，是主的子民的暴君征服者。所有的异教国王都被称为国王。但他们大部分是如何登上王位的呢？像大卫和希西家一样吗？ 但是上帝没有通过他的先知膏选他们，他们通过人民的选举或者通过血腥和掠夺来获得王国；后一种方式对你来说不能否认阿塔利亚是合法的公主——她和亚比米勒是合法的王子，他们的统治权与许多异教国王一样，是直接且独立于上帝的。看看阿塔利亚作为一个血腥的篡位者被杀害是多么公正；这将使你们的兄弟，耶稣会士，有权刺杀异教国王，你们既然认为他们既是国王，也是上主的受膏者，尽管尼布甲尼撒和他们中的许多人通过血腥的专利途径登上了王位，违背了上帝和人的法律。4.居鲁士是上帝的受膏者，也是他的牧人，因此他的专制政府是直接依赖上帝的统治，高于一切法律；这是一个邪恶的推论。5.上帝在居鲁士出生前近一百年就已经提到了他的名字；上帝也非常具体地指定了犹大，并指定了基督骑驴进耶路撒冷的驴子（撒迦利亚书 9:9），比一百年还要多。主教会会让他们成为独立的国王吗？6.上帝将国家赐给他所愿意的人。那又怎样？ 这将证明王国与君王一样独立且直接来自上帝；因为上帝赐予君王王国，同样也赐予君王王国，毫无疑问，他将王国赐予他所愿意的人。他也将先知、使徒、牧师赐予他所愿意的人；他也将暴虐的征服赐予他所愿意的人。就像但以理对尼布甲尼撒所说的那样，这是从主那里来的，尼布甲尼撒对许多王国没有正当的权利，尤其是对犹大王国，然而上帝，万王之王，却因为他乐意如此而将其赐予他；如果上帝没有通过他的先知耶利米的口吩咐他们，他们难道不能起来，用剑为自己和自己的自由辩护，就像他们合法地用剑为自己从摩押（士师记 3）和迦南王雅宾（士师记 4）的统治下解放出来一样。现在这位 P. 大主教，通过这些例子，使异教国王成为与大卫和希西家一样合法的国王，谴责了上帝的子民，如果他们被土耳其和西班牙国王征服和征服，他们应该通过剑来恢复自己的自由，那么他们就是叛乱者；以色列和上帝为他们兴起的拯救者没有从自然法中获得权利，来为他们被剑夺走的自由辩护。从所有这些可以得出结论，血腥征服者的暴政与合法的主权一样，直接且仅仅依赖于上帝；因为尼布甲尼撒对上帝的子民和许多其他王国的统治被上帝报复为暴政，耶利米书 50:6, 7；因此，主的报复和他的殿的报复降临在他和他的土地上，耶利米书 50:16 等。诚然，上帝的子民被上帝命令顺服巴比伦王，侍奉他，并为他祈祷，违背这些就是叛乱；但这不是因为巴比伦王是他们的国王，也不是因为巴比伦王有上帝的命令来使上帝的子民屈服于他的轭下。 所以基督有一个命令要忍受十字架的死亡（约翰福音 10:18），但希律和彼拉多有权利钉他在十字架上吗？完全没有。他说，即使是异教国王的权力也不是由人的合同决定的，而是由上帝的直接手和工作决定的。但人们通过合同将王国授予某个人，这是一个异教社区可以合法做的事情，因此通过合同来决定王国并不与上帝的直接手相对立，上帝按照他自己的祝福自由任命君主制和王权。最后他说，上帝在他的愤怒中夺走了扫罗；但我请问，只有上帝这样做吗？那么扫罗，因为是国王，就有上帝的专利权可以自杀，因为上帝这样带走了他；如果我们不允许国王自杀，那么我们就是叛逆者。这是一个很好的辩解。

QUESTION VI
问题六

WHETHER THE KING BE SO FROM GOD ONLY, BOTH IN REGARD OF HIS SOVEREIGNTY AND OF THE DESIGNATION OF HIS PERSON TO THE CROWN, AS THAT HE IS NO WAY FROM THE PEOPLE, BUT BY MERE APPROBATION
无论国王是否仅仅是由上帝所任命，无论是在他的统治权上还是在他的人选上，他都不是从人民那里得来的，而是仅仅通过赞同

Dr Ferne, a man much for monarchy, saith, Though monarchy hath its excellency, being first set up of God, in Moses, yet neither monarchy, aristocracy, nor any other form, is jure divino, but "we say (saith he) the power itself, or that sufficiency of authority to govern that is in a monarchy or aristocracy, abstractly considered from the qualification of other forms, is a flux and constitution subordinate to that providence; an ordinance of that dixi or silent word by which the world was made, and shall be governed under God." This is a great debasing of the Lord's anointed, for so sovereignty hath no warrant in God's word, formally as it is such a government, but is in the world by providence, as sin is, and as the falling of a sparrow to the ground: whereas God's word hath not only commanded that government should be, but that fathers and mothers should be; and not only that politic rulers should be, but also kings by name, and other judges aristocratical should be, Rom. 13:3; Deut. 17:4; 1 Pet. 2:17.; Prov. 24:21; Prov. 15:16, If the power of monarchy and aristocracy, abstracted from the forms, be from God, then it is no more lawful to resist aristocratical government and our lords of parliament or judges, than it is lawful to resist kings.
费尔恩博士，一个非常支持君主制的人，说道，尽管君主制有其优点，因为它是上帝在摩西时期首次建立的，但君主制、贵族制或任何其他形式都不是神授的，而是“我们说（他说）君主制或贵族制中的权力本身，或者说从其他形式的资格中抽象出来的治理能力，是一个从属于上帝的普遍规定；是上帝默示的命令，通过这个默示的话语，世界被创造，并在上帝的统治下运行。”这是对上帝所膏选的君主的极大贬低，因为君权在上帝的话语中没有正式的授权，而是通过上帝的安排存在于世界上，就像罪恶和麻雀落地一样。然而，上帝的话语不仅命令了政府的存在，还命令了父母的存在；不仅命令了政治统治者的存在，还明确提到了国王和其他贵族法官的存在，罗马书 13:3；申命记 17:4；彼得前书 2:17；箴言 24:21；箴言 15:16，如果从形式上抽象出来的君主制和贵族制的权力来自上帝，那么抵抗贵族政府、议会贵族或法官就和抵抗国王一样是不合法的。

But hear the Prelate's reasons to prove that the king is from the people by approbation only. "The people (Deut. 17) are said to set a king over them only as (1 Cor. 6) the saints are said to judge the world, that is, by consenting to Christ's judgment: so the people do not make a king by transferring on him sovereignty, but by accepting, acknowledging, and reverencing him as king, whom God hath both constituted and designed king."
但请听大主教的理由，证明国王只是通过人民的认可才来自于人民。“人民（申命记 17 章）只是像圣徒（哥林多前书 6 章）被称为审判世界一样，即通过同意基督的审判：所以人民并不是通过将主权转移给他来制造一个国王，而是通过接受、承认和尊敬他作为国王，他是上帝所立并指定的国王。”

Ans.—1. This is said, but not a word proved, for the Queen of Sheba and Hiram acknowledged, reverenced and obeyed Solomon as king, and yet they made him not king, as the princes of Israel did. 2. Reverence and obedience of the people is relative to the king's laws, but the people's making of a king is not relative to the laws of a king; for then he should be a king giving laws and commanding the people as king, before the people make him king. 3, If the people's approving and consenting that an elected king be their king, presupposeth that he is a king, designed and constituted by God, before the people approve him as king, let the P. Prelate give us an act of God now designing a man king, for there is no immediate voice from heaven saying to a people, This is your king, before the people elect one of six to be their king. And this infallibly proveth that God designeth one of six to be a king, to a people who had no king before, by no other act but by determining the hearts of the states to elect and design this man king, and pass any of the other five. 4. When God (Deut. 17.) forbiddeth them to choose a stranger, he presupposeth they may choose a stranger; for God's law now given to man in the state of sin, presupposeth he hath corruption of nature to do contrary to God's law. Now if God did hold forth that their setting a king over them was but the people's approving the man whom God shall both constitute and design to be king, then he should presuppose that God was to design a stranger to be the lawful king of Israel, and the people should be interdicted to approve and consent that the man should be king whom God should choose; for it was impossible that the people should make a stranger king (God is the only immediate king-creator), the people should only approve and consent that a stranger should be king; yet, upon supposition that God first constituted and designed the stranger king, it was not in the people's power that the king should be a brother rather than a stranger, for if the people have no power to make a king, but do only approve him or consent to him, when he is both made and designed of God to be king, it is not in their power that he be either brother or stranger, and so God commandeth what is simply impossible. Consider the sense of the command by the Prelate's vain logic: I Jehovah, as I only create the world of nothing, so I only constitute and design a man, whether a Jew or Nebuchadnezzar, a stranger, to be your king; yet I inhibit you, under the pain of my curse, that you set any king over yourselves, but only a brother. What is this, but I inhibit you to be creators by omnipotent power? 5. To these add the reasons I produced before, that the people, by no shadow of reason, can be commanded to make this man king, not that man, if they only consent to the man made king, but have no action in the making of the king.
答案：1. 据说，但没有证据证明，示巴女王和希兰承认、尊敬和服从所罗门作为国王，但他们并没有让他成为国王，就像以色列的王子们那样。2. 人民的尊敬和服从是相对于国王的法律的，但人民的选举国王与国王的法律无关；因为在人民选举他成为国王之前，他应该是一个给予法律并命令人民的国王。3. 如果人民批准和同意一个选举出来的国王成为他们的国王，就预设他是由上帝指定和设立的国王，那么让主教给我们一个上帝现在指定一个人为国王的行动，因为没有来自天上的直接声音对人民说，这是你们的国王，之前人民选举其中之一成为他们的国王。这无疑证明了上帝决定了其中之一成为国王，对于一个以前没有国王的人民，上帝只通过决定各州的心来选举和指定这个人为国王，并通过其他五个人中的任何一个。4. 当上帝（申命记 17 章）禁止他们选择陌生人，他假设他们可以选择陌生人；因为上帝在人类陷入罪恶状态时给予人类的律法，假设人类具有与上帝的律法相违背的本性腐败。现在，如果上帝确实表明他们设立国王只是人民批准上帝所指定和设计的人成为国王，那么他就应该假设上帝将指定一个陌生人成为以色列的合法国王，而人民则被禁止批准和同意上帝所选择的人成为国王；因为人民不可能让陌生人成为国王（上帝是唯一的直接创造国王者），人民只能批准和同意陌生人成为国王；然而，假设上帝首先指定和设计陌生人成为国王，那么人民就无法决定国王是兄弟还是陌生人，因为如果人民没有权力制定国王，而只是在上帝已经制定和指定他成为国王后批准和同意他，那么他是兄弟还是陌生人就不在他们的权力范围之内，所以上帝命令的是根本不可能的事情。 考虑到大主教的虚无逻辑，思考这个命令的意义：我耶和华，既然只创造了虚无的世界，所以我也只能构建和设计一个人，无论是犹太人还是尼布甲尼撒，一个陌生人，成为你们的国王；然而，我禁止你们，在我诅咒的威胁下，任命任何国王，只能是一个兄弟。这不就是我用全能的力量禁止你们成为创造者吗？此外，还有我之前提出的理由，即人民无法以任何理由被命令选举这个人作为国王，而不是那个人，如果他们只是同意被选为国王的人，而对选举国王没有任何行动。

P. Prelate.—All the acts, real and imaginable, which are necessary for the making of kings, are ascribed to God. Take the first king as a ruling case, 1 Sam. 12:13, "Behold the king whom ye have chosen, and whom ye have desired; and, behold, the Lord hath set a king over you!" This election of the people can be no other but their admittance or acceptance of the king whom God hath chosen and constituted, as the words, "whom ye have chosen," imply. 1 Sam. 9:17; 1 Sam. 10:1, You have Saul's election and constitution, where Samuel, as priest and prophet, anointeth him, doing reverence and obeisance to him, and ascribing to God, that he did appoint him supreme and sovereign over his inheritance. And the same expression is, (1 Sam. 12:13,) "The Lord hath set a king over you;" which is, Psal. 2:6, "I have set my king upon my holy hill of Zion." Neither man nor angel hath any share in any act of constituting Christ king. Deut. 17 the Lord vindicateth, as proper and peculiar to himself, the designation of the person. It was not arbitrary to the people to admit or reject Saul so designed. It pleased God to consummate the work by the acceptation, consent and approbation of the people, ut suaviore modo, that by a smoother way he might encourage Saul to undergo the hard charge, and make his people the more heartily, without grumbling and scruple, reverence and obey him. The people's admittance possibly added something to the solemnity and to the pomp, but nothing to the essential and real constitution or necessity; it only puts the subjects in mala fide, if they should contravene, as the intimation of a law, the coronation of an hereditary king, the enthronement of a bishop. And 1 Kings, 3:7, "Thou hast made thy servant king;" 1 Sam. 16:1, "I have provided me a king;" Psal. 18:50, He is God's king; Ps. 89:19, "I have exalted one chosen out of the people;" (ver. 20,) He anointeth them; (ver. 27,) adopteth them: "I will make him my first-born." The first-born is above every brother severally, and above all, though a thousand jointly.
P. Prelate. - 所有与制定国王有关的行为，无论是实际的还是想象的，都归功于上帝。以第一位国王为例，撒母耳记上 12:13 说：“看哪，你们所选择、所求的王，看哪，耶和华已经立在你们以上一位王了！”人民的选举只能是他们接受上帝所选择和任命的国王，正如“你们所选择”的话所暗示的那样。撒母耳记上 9:17；撒母耳记上 10:1，你们有扫罗的选举和任命，在那里，作为祭司和先知的撒母耳给他膏抹，并向他表示尊敬和顺从，并归功于上帝，他任命他为至高无上的统治者。同样的表达方式也出现在撒母耳记上 12:13 中，“耶和华已经立一位王在你们以上”；这与诗篇 2:6 中的“我已经立我的君在锡安我的圣山上”是一样的。人和天使在任命基督为王的任何行为中都没有任何份额。申命记 17 章中，上帝辩护说，指定人选是属于他自己的，是特有的。人民对所指定的扫罗是否接受并不是任意的。 上帝喜欢通过人民的接受、同意和认可来完成这项工作，以更顺利的方式鼓励扫罗承担艰巨的责任，并使人民更真诚地、不抱怨和疑虑地尊敬和服从他。人民的接纳可能增加了庄严和盛大的氛围，但对于实质性和真实的构成或必要性没有任何影响；它只是让臣民们在违反法律、加冕成为世袭国王、或者祝圣主教的情况下处于不诚实的状态。在《列王纪上》3:7 中，“你立我为王”；在《撒母耳记上》16:1 中，“我为自己选了一位王”；在诗篇 18:50 中，他是上帝的王；在诗篇 89:19 中，“我从百姓中拣选了一位升高的人”（第 20 节），他们被膏抹（第 27 节），被收养：“我要立他为长子。”长子在每个兄弟中都是最高的，也高于所有人，即使是一千人一起。

Ans.—1. By this reason, inferior judges are no less immediate deputies of God, and so irresistible, than the king, because God took off the spirit that was on Moses, and immediately poured it on the seventy elders, who were judges inferior to Moses, Num. 2:14–16. 2. This P. Prelate cannot make a syllogism. If all the acts necessary to make a king be ascribed to God, none to the people, then God both constituteth and designeth the king—but the former the Scripture saith; therefore, if all the acts be ascribed to God, as to the prime king-maker and disposer of kings and kingdoms, and none to the people, in that notion, then God both constituteth and designeth a king. Both major and minor are false. The major is as false as the very P. Prelate himself. All the acts necessary for war-making are, in an eminent manner, ascribed to God, as (1.) The Lord fighteth for his own people. (2.) The Lord scattered the enemies. (3.) The Lord slew Og, king of Bashan. (4.) The battle is the Lord's. (5.) The victory the Lord's; therefore Israel never fought a battle. So Deut. 32, The Lord alone led his people—the Lord led them in the wilderness—their bow and their sword gave them not the land. God wrought all their works for them, (Isa. 26:12;) therefore Moses led them not; therefore the people went not on their own legs through the wilderness; therefore the people never shot an arrow, never drew a sword. It followeth not. God did all these as the first, eminent, principal, and efficacious pre-determinator of the creature (though this Arminian and popish prelate mind not so to honour God). The assumption is also false, for the people made Saul and David kings; and it were ridiculous that God should command them to make a brother, not a stranger, king, if it was not in their power whether he should be a Jew, a Scythian, an Ethiopian, who was their king, if God did only, without them, both choose, constitute, design the person, and perform all acts essential to make a king; and the people had no more in them but only to admit and consent, and that for the solemnity and pomp, not for the essential constitution of the king. 1 Sam. 9:17; 1 Sam. 10:1, we have not Saul elected and constituted king. Samuel did obeisance to him and kissed him, for the honour royal which God was to put upon him; for, before this prophetical unction, (1 Sam. 9:22,) he made him sit in the chief place, and honoured him as king, when as yet Samuel was materially king and the Lord's vicegerent in Israel. If, then, the Prelate conclude any thing from Samuel's doing reverence and obeisance to him as king, it shall follow that Saul was formally king, before Samuel (1 Sam. 10:1) anointed him and kissed him, and that must be before he was formally king, otherwise he was in God's appointment king, before ever he saw Samuel's face; and it is true he ascribeth honour to him, as to one appointed by God to be supreme sovereign, for that which he should be, not for that which he was, as (1 Sam. 9:22) he set him in the chief place; and, therefore, it is false that we have Saul's election and constitution to be king, (1 Sam. 10,) for after that time the people are rebuked for seeking a king, and that with a purpose to dissuade them from it as a sinful desire: and he is chosen by lots after that and made king, and after Samuel's anointing of him he was a private man, and did hide himself amongst the stuff, ver. 22. 3. The Prelate, from ignorance or wilfully, I know not, saith, The expression and phrase is the same, 1 Sam. 12:13, and Psal. 2:6, which is false; for 1 Sam. 12:13, it is והוּח נּתז יהוּה עלּיבמ מלךְ Behold the Lord hath given you a king, such is the expression; Hos. 13:11, I gave them a king in my wrath, but that is not the expression in Psalm 2:6, but this, ﬦלכי וּאניּ נסכתי "But I have established him my king;" and though it were the same expression, it followeth not that the people have no hand any other way in appointing Christ their head, (though that phrase also be in the Word, Hos. 1:11,) than by consenting and believing in him as king; but this proveth not that the people, in appointing a king, hath no hand but naked approbation, for the same phrase doth not express the same action; nay, the judges are to kiss Christ, (Psal. 2:12,) the same way, and by the same action, that Samuel kissed Saul, (1 Sam. 10:1,) and the idolaters kissed the calves, (Hos. 13:2;) for the same Hebrew word is used in all the three places, and yet it it certain the first kissing is spiritual, the second a kiss of honour, and the third an idolatrous kissing. 4. The anointing of Saul cannot be a leading rule to the making of all kings to the world's end; for the P. Prelate, forgetting himself, said, that only some few, as Moses, Saul, and David, &c., by extraordinary manifestation from heaven, were made kings, (p. 19.) 5. He saith it was not arbitrary for the people to admit or reject Saul so designed. What meaneth he. It was not morally arbitrary, because they were under a law (Deut. 17:14, 15) to make him king whom the Lord should choose. That is true. But was it not arbitrary to them to break a law physically? I think he, who is a professed Arminian, will not so side with Manicheans and fatalists. But the P. Prelate must prove it was not arbitrary, either morally or physically, to them not to accept Saul as their king, because they had no action at all in the making of a King, God did it all, both by constituting and designing the king. Why then did God (Deut. 17) give a law to them to make this man king, not that man, if it was not in their free will to have any action or hand in the making of a king at all? But that some sons of Belial would not accept him as their king, is expressly said, (1 Sam. 10:27;) and how did Israel conspire with Absalom to unking and dethrone David, whom the Lord had made king? If the Prelate mean it was not arbitrary to them physically to reject Saul, he speaketh wonders; the sons of Belial did reject him, therefore they had physical power to do it. If he mean it was not arbitrary, that is, it was not lawful to them to reject him, that is true; but doth it follow they had no hand nor action in making Saul king, because it was not lawful for them to make a king in a sinful way, and to refuse him whom God choose to be king? Then see what I infer. (1.) That they had no hand in obeying him as king, because they sinned in obeying unlawful commandments against God's law, and so they had no hand in approving and consenting he should be king; the contrary whereof the P. Prelate saith. (2.) So might the P. Prelate prove men are passive, and have no action in violating all the commandments of God, because it is not lawful to them to violate any one commandment. 6. The Lord (Deut. 17) vindicates this, as proper and peculiar to himself, to choose the person, and to choose Saul. What then? Therefore now the people, choosing a king, have no power to choose or name a man, because God anointed Saul and David by immediate manifestation of his will to Samuel; this consequence is nothing, and also it followeth in nowise, that therefore the people made not Saul king. 7. That the people's approbation of a king is not necessary, is the saying of Bellarmine and the papists, and that the people choose their ministers in the apostolic church, not by a necessity of a divine commandment, but to conciliate love betwixt pastor and people. Papists hold that if the Pope make a popish king the head and king of Britain, against the people's will, yet is he their king. 8. David was then king all the time Saul persecuted him. He sinned, truly, in not discharging the duty of a king, only because he wanted a ceremony, the people's approbation, which the Prelate saith is required to the solemnity and pomp, not to the necessity, and truth, and essence, of a formal king. So the king's coronation oath, and the people's oath, must be ceremonies; and because the Prelate is perjured himself, therefore perjury is but a ceremony also. 9. The enthronement of bishops is like the kinging of the Pope. The apostles must spare thrones when they come to heaven, (Luke 22:29, 30;) the popish prelates, with their head the Pope, must be enthroned. 10. The hereditary king he maketh a king before his coronation, and his acts are as valid before as after his coronation. It might cost him his head to say that the Prince of Wales is now king of Britain, and his acts acts of kingly royalty, no less than our sovereign is king of Britain, if laws and parliaments had their own vigour from royal authority. 11. I allow that kings be as high as God hath placed them, but that God said of all kings, "I will make him my first-born," &c., Psal. 89:26, 27,—which is true of Solomon as the type, 2 Sam. 7; 1 Chron. 17:22; 2 Sam. 7:12; and fulfilled of Christ, and by the Holy Ghost spoken of him, (Heb. 1:5, 6,)—is blasphemous; for God said not to Nero, Julian, Dioclesian, Belshazzar, Evil-merodach, who were lawful kings, "I will make him my first-born;" and that any of these blasphemous idolatrous princes should cry to God, "He is my father, my God," &c., is divinity well beseeming an excommunicated prelate. Of the king's dignity above the kingdom I speak not now; the Prelate pulled it in by the hair, but hereafter we shall hear of it.
答案：1. 凭此理由，次级法官与国王一样，都是上帝的直接代表，不可抗拒，因为上帝将摩西身上的灵气取下，立即倾注给七十位比摩西次级的长老，他们是法官，见民数记 2:14-16。2. 这位主教无法进行演绎推理。如果所有使一个国王产生所必需的行为都归因于上帝，而没有归因于人民，那么上帝既构成又指定了国王——但圣经说的是前者；因此，如果所有行为都归因于上帝，作为最高的国王制造者和国王国家的安排者，而没有归因于人民，在这个概念中，上帝既构成又指定了国王。主次命题都是错误的。主命题和这位主教本人一样错误。所有使战争发生所必需的行为，都以显著的方式归因于上帝，如：（1）主为自己的百姓而战斗。（2）主驱散了敌人。（3）主杀死了巴珊王俄格。（4）战斗是主的。（5）胜利是主的；因此以色列从未进行过战斗。因此，申命记 32 章说，只有主引导他的百姓——主引导他们在旷野中——他们的弓和剑没有给他们这片土地。 上帝为他们完成了一切工作，（以赛亚书 26:12）；因此，摩西没有带领他们；因此，人民没有自己走过旷野；因此，人民从未射箭，从未挥剑。这并不是正确的。上帝是作为第一位、卓越的、主要的和有效的预定者来完成所有这些事情的（尽管这位阿米纳和天主教的主教并不这样尊重上帝）。这个假设也是错误的，因为人民选举了扫罗和大卫作为国王；如果上帝只是在他们的权力范围内选择、任命、指定人选，并执行使一个国王所必需的所有行为，那么上帝命令他们选举一个兄弟而不是一个陌生人作为国王就是荒谬的；人民对此只需要接受和同意，而这只是为了庄重和盛大，而不是为了国王的实质性构成。撒母耳记上 9:17；撒母耳记上 10:1，我们没有看到扫罗被选举和任命为国王。撒母耳向他行礼并亲吻他，是为了上帝将要赐予他的王位的荣耀；因为在这次先知的膏抹之前，（撒母耳记上 1:10） 9:22，当时撒母耳还是以色列的国王和上帝的代理人，他让扫罗坐在首位，并尊重他如同国王。因此，如果主教从撒母耳向扫罗行礼和顺从中得出任何结论，那么就会得出这样的结论：在撒母耳膏抹和亲吻扫罗之前，扫罗已经是正式的国王，而且在他正式成为国王之前，他已经被上帝任命为国王，否则他就不会在撒母耳面前见到。事实上，撒母耳将尊荣归于他，是因为他被上帝任命为至高无上的统治者，而不是因为他已经成为了国王，正如（撒母耳记上 9:22）他让扫罗坐在首位。因此，我们有关扫罗的选举和国王的构成是错误的（撒母耳记上 10），因为在那之后，人民因寻求国王而受到责备，并且目的是劝阻他们不要有这样的罪恶欲望。在此之后，扫罗通过抽签被选为国王，并在撒母耳膏抹他之后，他成为了一个普通人，并藏身于物品之中（撒母耳记上 10:22）。主教要么出于无知，要么故意，我不知道，他说，撒母耳记上 12:13 和诗篇中的表达和措辞是相同的。 2:6，这是错误的；因为撒母耳记上 12:13，它是“耶和华已经给你们一位王”，这是表达方式；何西阿书 13:11，我在愤怒中给他们一位王，但这不是诗篇 2:6 的表达方式，而是“但我已经立他为我的王”；即使是相同的表达方式，也不能证明人民在任命基督为他们的头领时没有其他的参与方式（尽管这个短语也在圣经中出现，何西阿书 1:11），除了同意并相信他是王；但这并不证明人民在任命国王时只有赞同的权力，因为相同的短语并不表示相同的行动；不仅如此，法官们也要亲吻基督（诗篇 2:12），用同样的方式、同样的行动，撒母耳亲吻扫罗（撒母耳记上 10:1），拜偶像者亲吻小牛犊（何西阿书 13:2）；因为这三个地方都使用了相同的希伯来语词汇，然而第一个亲吻是属灵的，第二个是尊敬的亲吻，第三个是拜偶像的亲吻。4. 扫罗的膏抹不能成为制定世界末日所有国王的主导规则；因为 主教，忘记了自己，说只有一些人，如摩西、扫罗和大卫等，通过来自天堂的特殊显现才成为国王（第 19 页）。5. 他说人民接受或拒绝所指定的扫罗并不是任意的。他的意思是什么？从道义上讲，这并不是任意的，因为他们受到一条法律的约束（申命记 17:14, 15），要让上帝所选择的人成为国王。这是正确的。但是，对他们来说，违反一条法律在物理上不是任意的吗？我认为，作为一个公开宣称自由意志论者的他，不会站在摩尼教徒和宿命论者的一边。但是，大主教必须证明，对他们来说，不接受扫罗作为国王既不是道义上任意的，也不是物理上任意的，因为他们在国王的产生过程中没有任何行动，上帝完成了一切，包括国王的设立和指定。那么，上帝为什么要给他们一条法律（申命记 17），让他们选择这个人作为国王，而不是那个人，如果他们在国王的产生过程中根本没有自由意志的行动或参与？但是，正如《撒母耳记上》10:27 所明确说的，有些匪徒之子不愿接受他作为国王；以色列人如何与押沙龙共谋废黜上帝所立的国王大卫呢？ 如果大主教的意思是他们在身体上拒绝扫罗并不是任意的，那他说得很奇妙；比利亚的儿子们确实拒绝了他，因此他们有身体上的能力这样做。如果他的意思是这不是任意的，也就是说，他们拒绝他是不合法的，那是正确的；但是，这是否意味着他们在扫罗成为国王的过程中没有参与和行动，因为按照上帝的选择，以罪恶的方式拒绝了他？那么看看我得出的结论。（1）他们在遵守他作为国王的时候没有参与，因为他们违背了上帝的法律，违背了不合法的命令，所以他们没有参与和同意他成为国王；而大主教则相反。（2）大主教可以这样证明人们是被动的，在违反上帝的所有诫命时没有行动，因为对他们来说违反任何一个诫命都是不合法的。6. 主（申命记 17 章）为此辩护，说这是他自己的特权，选择人选，并选择了扫罗。那又怎样呢？ 因此，现在人民选择国王时，没有权力选择或任命一个人，因为上帝通过向撒母耳直接显现的方式膏立了扫罗和大卫；这个结论无关紧要，也绝不意味着人民没有选择扫罗为国王。7. 人民对国王的认可并非必要，这是贝拉尔米和天主教徒的说法，他们认为使徒教会中人民选择他们的牧师，并非出于神命令的必要性，而是为了调和牧师和人民之间的爱。天主教徒认为，即使教皇使一个天主教国王成为不受人民欢迎的英国国王，他仍然是他们的国王。8. 扫罗迫害大卫的整个时间里，大卫都是国王。他确实犯了罪，因为他没有履行国王的职责，只是因为他缺少了一个仪式，即人民的认可，而预备主教说这只是对庄严和盛大的要求，而不是对正式国王的必要性、真实性和本质的要求。因此，国王的加冕誓言和人民的誓言都必须是仪式；而且由于预备主教自己就是个伪誓者，所以伪誓也只是一种仪式而已。9. 主教的登基就像教皇的加冕。 使徒们来到天堂时必须保留宝座，（路加福音 22:29, 30;）天主教的主教们，以及他们的头领教皇，必须加冕登基。10. 世袭的国王在加冕之前就被封为国王，他的行为在加冕之前和之后一样有效。如果说威尔士亲王现在是英国国王，并且他的行为具有国王的权威，那可能会让他丧命，就像我们的君主是英国国王一样，如果法律和议会从皇家权威中获得自己的力量。11. 我承认国王的地位是由上帝安排的，但上帝并没有对所有国王说：“我要使他成为我的长子”，诗篇 89:26, 27，这对所罗门作为预表是正确的，撒母耳记下 7 章；历代志上 17 章 22 节；撒母耳记下 7 章 12 节；并且这也应验在基督身上，并且是由圣灵借着他说出来的，（希伯来书 1:5, 6），这是亵渎的；因为上帝没有对尼禄、朱利安、戴克里先、伯沙撒、伊娃美罗达这些合法的国王说：“我要使他成为我的长子”；而这些亵渎的偶像崇拜的君王中的任何一个都会向上帝呼喊：“他是我的父，我的上帝”，等等，这是不适合一个被逐出教会的主教的神学观点。 关于国王的尊严高于王国，我现在不说；主教用头发把它拉了进来，但以后我们会听到更多关于它的事情。

P. Prelate (p. 43, 44).—God only anointed David, (1 Sam. 16:4,) the men of Bethlehem, yea, Samuel knew it not before. God saith, "With mine holy oil have I anointed him," Psal. 89:20. 1. He is the Lord's anointed. 2. The oil is God's, not from the apothecary's shop, nor the priest's vial—this oil descended from the Holy Ghost, who is no less the true olive than Christ is the true vine; yet not the oil of saving grace, as some fantastics say, but holy. (1.) From the author, God. (2.) From influence in the person, it maketh the person of the king sacred. (3.) From influence on his charge, his function and power is sacred.
P. Prelate（第 43 页，44 页）。只有上帝膏选了大卫（撒母耳记上 16:4），伯利恒的人们，甚至撒母耳之前都不知道。上帝说：“我用我的圣膏膏抹了他”（诗篇 89:20）。1.他是主的受膏者。2.这膏油是上帝的，不是来自药店，也不是祭司的瓶子——这膏油来自圣灵，他与基督一样是真正的橄榄树；然而并不是拯救的恩典的膏油，正如一些幻想者所说，而是圣洁的。（1.）来自创造者，上帝。（2.）对人的影响，使国王的人格神圣。（3.）对他的职责的影响，使他的职能和权力神圣。

Ans.—1. The Prelate said before, David's anointing was extraordinary; here he draweth this anointing to all kings. 2. Let David be formally both constituted and designed king divers years before the states made him king at Hebron, and then (1.) Saul was not king,—the Prelate will term that treason. (2.) This was a dry oil. David's person was not made sacred, nor his authority sacred by it, for he remained a private man, and called Saul his king, his master, and himself a subject. (3.) This oil was, no doubt, God's oil, and the Prelate will have it the Holy Ghost's, yet he denieth that saving grace, yea, (p. 2. c. i.) he denieth that any supernatural gift should be the foundation of royal dignity, and that it is a pernicious tenet. So to me he would have the oil from heaven, and yet not from heaven. (4.) This holy oil, wherewith David was anointed, (Psal. 89:20,) is the oil of saving grace; his own dear brethren, the papists, say so, and especially Lyranus,2 Glossa ordinaria, Hugo Cardinalis, his beloved Bellarmine, and Lorinus, Calvin, Musculus, Marloratus. If these be fanatics, (as I think they are to the Prelate,) yet the text is evident that this oil of God was the oil of saving grace, bestowed on David as on a special type of Christ, who received the Spirit above measure, and was the anointed of God, (Psal. 45:7,) whereby all his "garments smell of myrrh, aloes and cassia," (ver. 8,) and "his name Messiah is as ointment poured out, (Song, 1) This anointed shall be head of his enemies. "His dominion shall be from the sea to the rivers," ver. 25. He is in the covenant of grace, ver. 26. He is "higher than the kings of the earth." The grace of perseverance is promised to his seed, ver. 28–30. His kingdom is eternal "as the days of heaven," ver. 35, 36. If the Prelate will look under himself to Diodatus and Ainsworth, this holy oil was poured on David by Samuel, and on Christ was poured the Holy Ghost, and that by warrant of Scripture, (1 Sam. 16:1; 13:14; Luke 4:18, 21; John 3:34,) and Junius and Mollerus6 saith with them. Now the Prelate taketh the court way, to pour this oil of grace on many dry princes, who, without all doubt, are kings essentially no less than David. He must see better than the man who, finding Pontius Pilate in the Creed, said, he behooved to be a good man; so, because he hath found Nero the tyrant, Julian the apostate, Nebuchadnezzar, Evil-merodach, Hazael, Hagag, all the kings of Spain, and, I doubt not, the Great Turk, in Psal. 89:19, 20, so all these kings are anointed with the oil of grace, and all these must make their enemies' necks their footstool. All these be higher than the kings of the earth, and are hard and fast in the covenant of grace, &c.
答案：1.主教之前说，大卫的膏抹是非同寻常的；在这里，他将这个膏抹扩展到所有的国王。2.让大卫在成为希伯仑的国王之前正式被任命和指定为国王，而不是几年前，那时（1）扫罗不是国王，主教将其称为叛国罪。（2）这是一种干油。大卫的人并没有因此成为神圣的，他的权威也没有因此成为神圣，因为他仍然是一个普通人，称扫罗为他的国王，他的主人，自己是一个臣民。（3）这种油无疑是上帝的油，主教认为它是圣灵的油，然而他否认救恩的恩典，甚至否认任何超自然的恩赐应该成为王权的基础，认为这是一个有害的观点。所以对我来说，他希望这种油来自天堂，但又不希望来自天堂。（4）大卫受膏的这种圣洁的油（诗 89:20）是救恩的恩典的油；他亲爱的兄弟天主教徒们这样说，尤其是 Lyranus，2 Glossa ordinaria，Hugo Cardinalis，他心爱的贝拉尔米诺，和 Lorinus，加尔文，穆斯库卢斯，马洛拉图斯。 如果这些人是狂热者（我认为他们对主教是这样），然而，经文明确表明，这神的油是拯救的恩典之油，赐给大卫，作为基督的特殊预表，他接受了超乎寻常的圣灵，并被神膏抹（诗篇 45:7），以致他的“衣服都有没药、沉香和肉桂的香气”（诗篇 45:8），并且“他的名是倒出来的香膏”（雅歌 1），这位受膏者将成为他的敌人的头目。“他的统治权将从海洋延伸到河流”（诗篇 45:25）。他在恩约中（诗篇 45:26）。他“高过地上的君王”。恒久忍耐的恩典应许给他的后裔（诗篇 45:28-30）。他的国度是永恒的，“如同天的日子”（诗篇 45:35, 36）。如果主教看看 Diodatus 和 Ainsworth 的解释，这圣洁的油是撒母耳倒在大卫身上的，而圣灵是膏抹在基督身上的，这是经文的授权（撒母耳记上 16:1; 13:14; 路加福音 4:18, 21; 约翰福音 3:34），Junius 和 Mollerus 也这样说。现在主教采取了一种宫廷的方式，将这恩典之油倒在许多干燥的王子身上，毫无疑问，他们本质上与大卫一样是君王。 他一定比那个在信经中找到彼拉多的人看得更清楚，他说彼拉多必定是个好人；所以，因为他在诗篇 89:19、20 中找到了暴君尼禄、背道者朱利安、尼布甲尼撒、恶美罗达、哈薛、哈盖，还有所有西班牙国王，我不怀疑还包括大土耳其国王，所以所有这些国王都被恩膏的油所膏，所有这些国王都必须让他们的敌人的颈项成为他们的脚凳。所有这些人都比地上的国王更高，都在恩约中坚定不移，等等。

P. Prelate.—All the royal ensigns and acts of kings are ascribed to God. The crown is of God, Isa. 62:3; Psal. 21:3. In the emperors' coin was a hand putting a crown on their head. The heathen said they were θεοστεφεῖς, as holding their crowns from God. Psal. 18:39, Thou hast girt me with strength (the sword is the emblem of strength) unto battle. See Judg. 7:17, Their sceptre God's sceptre. Exod. 4:20; 17:9, We read of two rods, Moses' and Aaron's; Aaron's rod budded: God made both the rods. Their judgment is the Lord's, 2 Chron. 19:6; their throne is God's, 1 Chron. 19:9. The fathers called them, sacra vestigia, sacra majestas,—their commandment, divalis jussio. The law saith, all their goods are res sacræ. Therefore our new statists disgrace kings, if they blaspheme not God, in making them the derivatives of the people,—the basest extract of the basest of irrational creatures, the multitude, the commonalty.
P. Prelate.——所有皇家的旗帜和国王的行为都归功于上帝。冠冕是来自上帝，以赛亚书 62:3；诗篇 21:3。在皇帝的硬币上有一只手把冠冕戴在他们的头上。异教徒说他们是θεοστεφεῖς，因为他们的冠冕是来自上帝。诗篇 18:39，你以力量束腰（剑是力量的象征）准备战斗。见士师记 7:17，他们的权杖是上帝的权杖。出埃及记 4:20；17:9，我们读到有两根杖，摩西的和亚伦的；亚伦的杖发芽了：上帝造了这两根杖。他们的审判是主的，历代志下 19:6；他们的宝座是上帝的，历代志上 19:9。祖先称他们为 sacra vestigia，sacra majestas——他们的命令是 divalis jussio。法律说，他们的所有财产都是 res sacræ。因此，我们的新政治家如果不亵渎上帝，就是贬低国王，因为他们把国王看作是人民的衍生物——最低贱的动物中最低贱的提取物，即群众，平民。

Ans.—This is all one argument from the Prelate's beginning of his book to the end: In a most special and eminent act of God's providence kings are from God; but, therefore, they are not from men and men's consent. It followeth not. From a most special and eminent act of God's providence Christ came into the world, and took on him our nature, therefore he came not of David's loins. It is a vain consequence. There could not be a more eminent act than this, (Psal. 40) "A body thou hast given me;" therefore he came not of David's house, and from Adam by natural generation, and was not a man like us in all things except sin. It is tyrannical and domineering logic. Many things are ascribed to God only, by reason of a special and admirable act of providence,—as the saving of the world by Christ, the giving of Canaan to Israel, the bringing his people out from Egypt and from Chaldee, the sending of the gospel to both Jew and Gentile, &c.; but, shall we say that God did none of these things by the ministry of men, and weak and frail men? 1. How proveth the Prelate that all royal ensigns are ascribed to God, because (Isa. 62) the church universal shall be as a crown of glory and a royal diadem in the hand of the Lord; therefore, bæculus in angulo, the church shall be as a seal on the heart of Christ. What then? Jerome, Procopius, Cyrillus, with good reason, render the meaning thus; Thou, O Zion and church, shalt be to me a royal priesthood, and a holy people. For that he speaketh of his own kingdom and church is most evident, (ver. 1, 2,) "For Zion's sake I will not hold my peace," &c. 2. God put a crown of pure gold on David's head, (Psal. 21:3,) therefore Julian, Nero, and no elective kings, are made and designed to be kings by the people. He shall never prove this consequence. The Chaldee paraphrase applieth it to the reign of King Messiah; Diodatus speaketh of the kingdom of Christ; Ainsworth maketh this crown a sign of Christ's victory; Athanasius, Eusebius, Origen, Augustine, Dydimus, expound it of Christ and his kingdom. The Prelate extendeth it to all kings, as the blasphemous rabbins, especially Rabbin Salomon, deny that he speaketh of Christ here. But what more reason is there to expound this of the crowns of all kings given by God, (which I deny not,) to Nero, Julian, &c., than to expound the foregoing and following verses as applied to all kings? Did Julian rejoice in God's salvation? did God grant Nero his heart's desire? did God grant (as it is, ver. 4,) life eternal to heathen kings as kings? which words all interpreters expound of the eternity of David's throne, till Christ come, and of victory and life eternal purchased by Christ, as Ainsworth, with good reason, expounds it. And what though God gave David a crown, was it not by second causes, and by bowing all Israel's heart to come in sincerity to Hebron to make David king? 1 Kings 12:33. God gave corn and wine to Israel, (Hos. 2) and shall the prelate and the anabaptist infer, therefore, he giveth it not by ploughing, sowing, and the art of the husbandman? 3. The heathen acknowledgeth a divinity in kings, but he is blind who readeth them and seeth not in their writings that they teach that the people maketh kings. 4. God girt David with strength, while he was a private man, and persecuted by Saul, and fought with Goliah, as the title of the same beareth; and he made him a valiant man of war, to break bows of steel; therefore he giveth the sword to kings as kings, and they receive no sword from the people. This is poor logic. 5. The P. Prelate sendeth us (Judg. 7:17,) to the singular and extraordinary power of God with Gideon; and, I say, that same power behooved to be in Oreb and Zeeb, (ver. 25,) for they were שרי princes, and such as the Prelate, from Prov. 7:15, saith have no power from the people. 6. Moses' and Aaron's rods were miraculous. This will prove that priests are also God's, and their persons sacred. I see not (except the Prelate would be at worshipping of relies) what more royal divinity is in Moses' rod, because he wrought miracles by his rod, than there is in Elijah's staff, in Peter's napkin, in Paul's shadow. This is like the strong symbolical theology of his fathers the Jesuits, which is not argumentative, except he say that Moses, as king of Jeshurun, wrought miracles; and why should not Nero's, Caligula's, Pharaoh's, and all kings' rods then dry up the Red Sea, and work miracles? 7. We give all the styles to kings that the fathers gave, and yet we think not when David commandeth to kill Uriah, and a king commandeth to murder his innocent subjects in England and Scotland, that that is divalis jussio, the command of a god; and that this is a good consequence—Whatever the king commandeth, though it were to kill his most loyal subjects, is the commandment of God; therefore the king is not made king by the people. 8. Therefore, saith he, these new statists disgrace the king. If a new statist, sprung out of a poor pursuivant of Crail—from the dunghill to the court—could have made himself an old statist, and more expert in state affairs than all the nobles and soundest lawyers in Scotland and England, this might have more weight. 9. Therefore the king (saith P. P.) is not "the extract of the basest of rational creatures." He meaneth, fex populi, his own house and lineage; but God calleth them his own people, "a royal priesthood, a chosen generation;" and Psal. 78:71, will warrant us to say, the people is much worthier before God than one man, seeing God chose David for "Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance," that he might feed them. John P. P.'s father's suffrage in making a king will never be sought. We make not the multitude, but the three estates, including the nobles and gentry, to be as rational creatures as any apostate prelate in the three kingdoms.
答案：这是主教在他的书中从头到尾的一个论点：在上帝最特殊和卓越的保佑行动中，国王是来自上帝的；但是，因此，他们不是来自人和人的同意。这并不成立。从上帝最特殊和卓越的保佑行动中，基督来到世界，并承担了我们的本性，因此他不是出自大卫的后裔。这是一个虚无的推论。没有比这更卓越的行动了（诗篇 40：“你赐给我一个身体”）；因此他不是出自大卫的家族，也不是通过自然的生育从亚当而来，并且不像我们一样是一个除了罪之外的人。这是专横和霸道的逻辑。许多事情只归于上帝，因为他特殊而令人钦佩的保佑行动，比如基督拯救世界，将迦南地赐给以色列，将他的子民从埃及和迦勒底带出来，将福音传给犹太人和外邦人等等；但是，我们难道要说上帝没有通过人的事奉、脆弱和软弱的人来完成这些事情吗？主教如何证明所有皇家的象征都归于上帝，因为（以赛亚书 教会普世将成为主手中的荣耀之冠和皇家王冠；因此，教会将成为基督心中的印记。那又如何呢？耶罗姆、普罗科比乌斯、西里尔等人有充分的理由这样解释；锡安和教会啊，你将成为我一个祭司的王国，一个圣洁的子民。因为他所说的是他自己的国度和教会，这是最明显的（第 1、2 节）：“因为锡安的缘故，我必不静默……”等等。2. 神将纯金的冠冕戴在大卫的头上（诗篇 21:3），因此朱利安、尼禄和非选举的国王都是由人民制定和指定的国王。他永远无法证明这个推论。迦勒底的译解将其应用于弥赛亚王的统治；迪奥达图斯谈到了基督的国度；艾因斯沃斯将这顶冠冕解释为基督胜利的象征；阿他那修斯、尤西比乌斯、奥利根、奥古斯丁、迪迪默斯将其解释为基督和他的国度。主教将其扩展到所有国王，而亵渎的拉比们，尤其是拉比萨洛蒙，否认他在这里说的是基督。但是，将这个解释为上帝赐给所有国王的冠冕（我不否认），赐给尼禄、朱利安等人的冠冕，有更多的理由吗？比起将前文和后文解释为适用于所有国王，更好的是将其解释为适用于所有国王吗？朱利安为上帝的救恩而欢喜吗？上帝是否满足了尼禄的心愿？上帝是否给予异教国王作为国王的永生（正如经文所说）？所有的解释者都将这些话解释为直到基督来临的大卫王位的永恒，以及基督所赢得的胜利和永生，正如艾恩斯沃思以充分的理由解释的那样。即使上帝给了大卫一个王冠，那不也是通过第二因素，并通过使以色列全心全意地前往希伯仑，使大卫成为王吗？列王纪上 12:33。上帝给以色列人粮食和酒（何西阿书 2 章），难道主教和重洗派就可以推断出，上帝不是通过耕种、播种和农夫的技艺来给予这些吗？3.异教徒承认国王中有神性，但那些阅读他们的著作却看不到他们教导人民制造国王的人是瞎眼的。4. 上帝赋予大卫力量，当他还是一个普通人时，被扫罗迫害，与歌利亚战斗，正如标题所述；他使他成为勇敢的战士，能够打破钢弓；因此，他将剑赐给国王作为国王，他们不从人民那里接受剑。这是错误的逻辑。5.主教将我们（士师记 7:17）指向基甸与上帝的独特力量；我说，奥勒布和齐布（25 节）必须具备同样的力量，因为他们是שרי王子，正如主教从箴言 7:15 所说，他们没有来自人民的权力。6.摩西和亚伦的杖是奇迹的。这将证明祭司也是上帝的，他们的人是神圣的。我看不出（除非主教想要崇拜遗物），为什么摩西的杖中有更多的王室神性，因为他通过他的杖行了奇迹，而以利亚的杖、彼得的手巾、保罗的影子中没有。 这就像他的父辈耶稣会士的强烈象征神学一样，它不具有争论性，除非他说摩西作为耶书仑的国王行了奇迹；那么为什么尼禄、加里古拉、法老和所有国王的手杖不能使红海干涸并行奇迹呢？我们给予国王所有父辈给予的尊号，但我们并不认为当大卫命令杀害乌利亚时，或者当国王命令在英格兰和苏格兰谋杀他的无辜臣民时，那是神的命令；并且这是一个好的推论——无论国王命令什么，即使是杀害他最忠诚的臣民，都是上帝的命令；因此国王不是由人民选出来的。因此，他说，这些新的政治家贬低了国王。如果一个新的政治家，从克雷尔的一个贫穷的传令官中崛起——从粪堆到宫廷——能够使自己成为一个老练的政治家，并且比苏格兰和英格兰所有的贵族和最有经验的律师更懂政治事务，那可能会更有说服力。因此，国王（P. P.说）不是“最低级的理性生物的精华”。他的意思是，他的家族和血统是人民的代表；但上帝称他们为自己的子民，“一个皇家的祭司，一个被选中的一代人”；而诗篇 78:71，将使我们有理由说，在上帝面前，人民比一个人更有价值，因为上帝选择了大卫作为“雅各的子民，以色列的产业”，以便他可以喂养他们。约翰 P.P.的父亲在选举国王方面的投票将永远不会被寻求。我们认为，不是人民，而是包括贵族和绅士在内的三个阶级，与任何一个背叛的主教一样理性。

QUESTION VII
问题七

WHETHER OR NO THE POPISH PRELATE, THE AFORESAID AUTHOR, DOTH BY FORCE OF REASON EVINCE THAT NEITHER CONSTITUTION NOR DESIGNATION OF THE KING IS FROM THE PEOPLE
无论这位天主教主教是否通过理由的力量证明国王的宪法和任命都不是来自人民

The P. Prelate aimeth (but it is an empty aim) to prove that the people are wholly excluded. I answer only arguments not pitched on before, as the Prelate saith.
普雷拉特主教的目标是证明人民完全被排除在外（但这是一个空洞的目标）。我只回答之前没有提到的论点，正如主教所说。

P. Prelate.—1. To whom can it be more proper to give the rule over men than to Him who is the only king truly and properly of the whole world? 2. God is the immediate author of all rule and power that is amongst all his creatures, above or below 3. Man before the fall received dominion and empire over all the creatures below immediately, as Gen. 1:28; Gen. 9:2; therefore we cannot deny that the most noble government (to wit monarchy) must be immediately from God, without any contract or compact of men.
主教。给予统治人类的权力，有谁比那位真正且适当地统治整个世界的唯一国王更合适呢？上帝是所有统治和权力的直接创造者，无论是在他的创造物中的上方还是下方。人在堕落之前立即获得了对所有下方创造物的统治和帝国，正如创世记 1:28 和创世记 9:2 所述。因此，我们不能否认最崇高的政府（即君主制）必须直接来自上帝，没有任何人的契约或协议。

Ans.—1. The first reason concludeth not what is in question; for God only giveth rule and power to one man over another; therefore he giveth it immediately. It followeth not. 2. It shall as well prove that God doth immediately constitute all judges, and therefore it shall be unlawful for a city to appoint a mayor, or a shire a justice of peace. 3. The second argument is inconsequent also, because God in creation is the immediate author of all things, and, therefore, without consent of the creatures, or any act of the creature, created an angel a nobler creature than man, and a man than a woman, and men above beasts; because those that are not can exercise no act at all. But it followeth not that all the works of providence, such as is the government of kingdoms, are done immediately by God; for in the works of providence, for the most part in ordinary, God worketh by means. It is then as good a consequence as this: God immediately created man, therefore he keepeth his life immediately also without food and sleep; God immediately created the sun, therefore God immediately, without the mediation of the sun, giveth light to the world. The making of a king is an act of reason, and God hath given a man reason to rule himself; and therefore hath given to a society an instinct of reason to appoint a governor over themselves; but no act of reason goeth before man be created, therefore it is not in his power whether he be created a creature of greater power than a beast or no. 4. God by creation gave power to a man over the creatures, and so immediately; but I hope men cannot say, God by creation hath made a man king over men. 5. The excellency of monarchy (if it be more excels lent than any other government, of which hereafter) is no ground why it should be immediately from God as well as man's dominion over the creature; for then the work of man's redemption, being more excellent than the raising of Lazarus, should have been done immediately without the incarnation, death and satisfaction of Christ, (for no act of God without himself is comparable to the work of redemption, 1 Pet. 1:11, 12; Col. 1:18–22,) and God's less excellent works, as his creating of beasts and worms, should have been done mediately, and his creating of man immediately.
答案：1. 第一个理由并不能得出问题的结论；因为上帝只赋予一个人对另一个人的统治和权力；因此，他是直接赋予的。这并不成立。2. 这同样证明上帝直接任命所有的法官，因此城市任命市长或郡任命治安官是不合法的。3. 第二个论点也是不成立的，因为上帝在创造中是所有事物的直接创造者，因此，在没有生物的同意或任何生物的行为的情况下，上帝创造了比人类更高贵的天使，比女人更高贵的男人，以及比兽类更高贵的人类；因为那些不存在的东西无法进行任何行动。但这并不意味着上帝所有的作为，比如国家的治理，都是直接由上帝完成的；因为在大多数情况下，上帝在普通的事务中是通过手段来工作的。这就好比这样的推论：上帝直接创造了人类，因此他也直接保持他的生命，不需要食物和睡眠；上帝直接创造了太阳，因此上帝直接、不经过太阳的中介，给世界带来光明。 制造一个国王是出于理性的行为，上帝赋予人类理性来统治自己；因此，社会也被赋予了理性的本能来任命一个统治者；但在人类被创造之前，并没有任何理性的行为，所以他无法决定自己是否成为比兽类更强大的生物。4. 上帝通过创造赋予了人类对其他生物的统治权，而且是直接的；但我希望人们不能说，上帝通过创造使一个人成为人类之王。5. 君主制的卓越性（如果它比其他任何政府更卓越，以后会讨论）并不是它应该像人类对其他生物的统治权一样直接来自上帝的理由；因为那样的话，人类的救赎工作，比复活拉撒路更为卓越，就应该在没有基督的道成肉身、死亡和救赎的情况下立即完成（因为上帝的任何行为都无法与救赎的工作相比，彼得前书 1:11, 12; 歌罗西书 1:18-22），而上帝较不卓越的工作，如创造兽类和虫子，应该是通过中介完成的，而他创造人类则是直接完成的。

P. Prelate.—They who execute the judgment of God must needs have the power to judge from God; but kings are deputies in the exercise of the judgments of God, therefore the proposition is proved. How is it imaginable that God reconcileth the world by ministers, and saveth man by them, (1 Cor. 5; 1 Tim. 4:16,) except they receive a power so to do from God? The assumption is, (Deut. 1:17; 1 Chron, 19:6,) Let none say Moses and Jehosaphat spake of inferior judges; for that which the king doth to others he doth by himself, Also, the execution of the kingly power is from God; for the king is the servant, angel, legate, minister of God, Rom. 13:6, 7. God properly and primarily is King, and King of kings, and Lord of lords (1 Tim. 6:15; Rev. 1:5); all kings, related to him, are kings equivocally, and in resemblance, and he the only King,
P. Prelate.——执行上帝的审判的人必须具备上帝的审判权力；但国王在执行上帝的审判时是代理人，因此命题得到证明。上帝如何通过仆人和拯救人类（哥林多前书 5 章；提摩太前书 4 章 16 节），除非他们从上帝那里获得这样的权力？假设是这样的（申命记 1 章 17 节；历代志上 19 章 6 节），不要说摩西和约沙法是指下级法官；因为国王对他人所做的事情，他是亲自做的。此外，国王的权力的执行来自上帝；因为国王是上帝的仆人、天使、使者、部长（罗马书 13 章 6、7 节）。上帝是真正和首要的国王，是众王之王、众主之主（提摩太前书 6 章 15 节；启示录 1 章 5 节）；所有与他有关的国王都是类似的国王，只有他是唯一的国王。

Ans.—1. That which is in question is never concluded, to wit, that "the king is both immediately constituted and designed king by God only, and not by the mediation of the people;" for when God reconcileth and saveth men by pastors, he saveth them by the intervening action of men; so he scourgeth his people by men as by his sword, (Psal. 17:14,) hand, staff, rod, (Isa. 10:5,) and his hammer. Doth it follow that God only doth immediately scourge his people, and that wicked men have no more hand and action in scourging his people than the Prelate saith the people hath a hand in making a king? and that is no hand at all by the Prelate's way. 2. We may borrow the Prelate's argument:—Inferior judges execute the judgment of the Lord, and not the judgment of the king; therefore, by the Prelate's argument, God doth only by immediate power execute judgment in them, and the inferior judges are not God's ministers, executing the judgment of the Lord. But the conclusion is against all truth, and so must the Prelate's argument be; and that inferior judges are the immediate substitutes and deputies of God, is hence proved, and shall be hereafter made good, if God will. 3. God is properly King of kings, so is God properly causa causarum, the Cause of causes, the Life of lifes, the Joy of joys. What! shall it then follow that he worketh nothing in the creatures by their mediation as causes? Because God is Light of lights, doth he not enlighten the earth and air by the mediation of the sun? Then God communicateth not life mediately by generation, he causeth not his saints to rejoice, with joy unspeakable and glorious, by the intervening mediation of the Word. These are vain consequences. Sovereignty, and all power and virtue is in God infinitely; and what virtue and power of action is in the creatures, as they are compared with God, are in the creatures equivocally and in resemblance, and κατὰ δοξὴν in opinion rather than really, Hence it must follow that second causes work none at all,—no more than the people hath a hand or action in making the king, and that is no hand at all, as the Prelate saith. And God only and immediately worketh all works in the creatures, because both the power of working and actual working cometh from God, and the creatures, in all their working, are God's instruments. And if the Prelate argue so frequently from power given of God, to prove that actual reigning is from God immediately,—Deut. 8:18, The Lord "giveth the power to get wealth,"—will it follow that Israel getteth no riches at all, or that God doth not mediately by them and their industry get them? I think not.
答案：1. 有争议的是，即“国王是由上帝直接任命和指定的，而不是通过人民的介入。”因为当上帝通过牧师调和和拯救人类时，他是通过人的中介行动来拯救他们的；同样，他用人作为他的剑（诗篇 17:14），手、杖（以赛亚书 10:5）和锤子来惩罚他的子民。难道这意味着只有上帝才能直接惩罚他的子民，邪恶的人没有比主教所说的人民在选举国王时更多的参与和行动吗？按照主教的观点，那根本就不算参与。2. 我们可以借用主教的论点：下级法官执行的是上帝的审判，而不是国王的审判；因此，按照主教的论点，上帝只通过直接的权力在他们身上执行审判，下级法官不是上帝的仆人，执行上帝的审判。但结论与事实相悖，主教的论点也是如此；而下级法官是上帝的直接代理人和代表，这是可以证明的，如果上帝愿意的话，将来会证明。3. 上帝是万王之王，上帝是万因之因，生命之生命，喜悦之喜悦。难道因此就意味着他不通过他们作为媒介而在创造物中起作用吗？因为上帝是万光之光，他不通过太阳的媒介照亮地球和空气吗？那么上帝不通过世代传承媒介传递生命，他不通过道的介入使他的圣徒欢喜，欢喜无法言喻而荣耀吗？这些都是徒劳的推论。主权、权力和能力都是无限的在上帝手中；而与上帝相比，创造物所具有的能力和行动力在本质上是模糊的、类似的，更多是在观念上而非实际上。因此，必须得出结论，第二因素根本不起作用——就像人民在制造国王时没有手或行动一样，正如主教所说的那样。只有上帝才能直接并独立地在创造物中进行一切工作，因为工作的能力和实际工作都来自上帝，而创造物在他们的一切工作中都是上帝的工具。 如果主教经常从上帝赋予的权力来证明实际统治是直接来自上帝的，比如《申命记》8:18 中说：“耶和华使你得着财富的能力”，那么这是否意味着以色列根本不会获得任何财富，或者上帝不通过他们和他们的努力来间接获得财富？我认为不是。

P. Prelate.—To whom can it be due to give the kingly office but to Him only who is able to give the endowment and ability for the office? Now God only and immediately giveth ability to be a king, as the sacramental anointing proveth, Josh. 3:10. Othniel is the first judge after Joshua; and it is said, "And the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel:" the like is said of Saul and David.
P. Prelate.——除了那位能够赋予王职的人，还能归谁呢？现在只有上帝能够直接赋予成为国王的能力和才干，正如圣礼的膏抹所证明的那样，约书亚记 3:10。阿他尼勒是约书亚之后的第一位士师；据说，“耶和华的灵降在他身上，他就作了以色列的士师。”关于扫罗和大卫也有类似的记载。

Ans.—1. God gave royal endowments immediately, therefore he immediately now maketh the king. It followeth not, for the species of government is not that which formally constituteth a king, for then Nero, Caligula, Julian, should not have been kings; and those who come to the crown by conquest and blood, are essentially kings, as the Prelate saith. But be all these Othniels upon whom the Spirit of the Lord cometh? Then they are not essentially kings who are babes and children, and foolish and destitute of the royal endowments; but it is one thing to have a royal gift, and another thing to be formally called to the kingdom, David had royal gifts after Samuel anointed him, but if you make him king, before Saul's death, Saul was both a traitor all the time that he persecuted David, and so no king, and also king and God's anointed, as David acknowledgeth him; and, therefore, that spirit that came on David and Saul, maketh nothing against the people's election of a king, as the Spirit of God is given to pastors under the New Testament, as Christ promised; but it will not follow that the designation of the man who is to be pastor should not be from the church and from men, as the Prelate denieth that either the constitution or designation of the king is from the people, but from God only. 2. I believe the infusion of the Spirit of God upon the judges will not prove that kings are now both constituted and designed of God solely, only, and immediately; for the judges were indeed immediately, and for the most part extraordinarily, raised up of God; and God indeed, in the time of the Jews, was the king of Israel in another manner than he was the king of all the nations, and is the king of Christian realms now, and, therefore, the people's despising of Samuel was a refusing that God should reign over them, because God, in the judges, revealed himself even in matters of policy, as what should be done to the man that gathered sticks on the Sabbath-day, and the like, as he doth not now to kings.
答案：1. 上帝立即赋予了王权，因此他立即成为国王。这并不意味着政府的形式是正式构成国王的因素，否则尼禄、卡利古拉和朱利安就不会成为国王；那些通过征服和流血而登上王位的人，本质上是国王，正如主教所说的那样。但是，这些人都像俄特尼尔一样，都是上主的灵降临在他们身上吗？ 然后，那些婴儿和孩子、愚蠢和缺乏王者才能的人本质上并不是国王；拥有王者才能是一回事，被正式称为国王是另一回事。大卫在撒母耳膏抹他之后拥有王者才能，但如果你在扫罗死之前就立他为王，那么扫罗在迫害大卫的同时一直是叛徒，因此既不是国王，也是国王和上帝的受膏者，正如大卫所承认的。因此，降临在大卫和扫罗身上的那灵并不影响人民选举国王，正如上帝的灵在新约下赐给牧师一样，正如基督所应许的；但这并不意味着牧师的指定不应该来自教会和人，正如主教否认国王的组织或指定是来自人民，而只来自上帝一样。 我相信上帝的灵降临在法官身上，并不意味着现在国王的成立和设计完全只来自上帝，因为法官确实是由上帝直接和大部分时候是非常特殊地兴起的；在犹太人的时代，上帝确实以一种不同于他对所有国家的王的方式成为以色列的王，而现在他是基督教国家的王；因此，人民对撒母耳的蔑视是拒绝上帝统治他们，因为上帝在法官身上甚至在政策问题上都显现出自己，比如对那个在安息日采集柴火的人应该怎么处理等等，而现在对国王则没有这样的显现。

P. Prelate.—Sovereignty is a ray of divine glory and majesty, but this cannot be found in people, whether you consider them jointly or singly; if you consider them singly, it cannot be in every individual man, for sectaries say, That all are born equal, with a like freedom; and if it be not in the people singly, it cannot be in them jointly, for all the contribution in this compact and contract, which they fancy to be human composition and voluntary constitution, is only by a surrender of the native right that every one had in himself. From whence, then, can this majesty and authority be derived? Again, where the obligation amongst equals is by contract and compact, violation of the faith plighted in the contract, cannot in proper terms be called disobedience or contempt of authority. It is no more but a receding from, and a violation of, that which was promised, as it may be in states or countries confederate. Nature, reason, conscience, Scripture, teach, that disobedience to sovereign power is not only a violation of truth and breach of covenant, but also high disobedience and contempt, as is clear, 1 Sam. 10:26. So when Saul (chap, 11) sent a yoke of oxen, hewed in pieces, to all the tribes, the fear of the Lord fell on the people, and they came out with one consent, 1 Sam. 11:7; also, (Job 11:18,) He looseth the bonds of kings, that is, he looseth their authority, and bringeth them into contempt; and he girdeth their loins with a girdle, that is, he strengtheneth their authority, and maketh the people to reverence them. Heathens observe that there is θεῖον τὶ, some divine thing in kings. Profane histories say, that this was so eminent in Alexander the Great, that it was a terror to his enemies, and a powerful loadstone to draw men to compose the most seditious councils, and cause his most experienced commanders embrace and obey his counsel and command. Some stories write that, upon some great exigency, there was some resplendent majesty in the eyes of Scipio. This kept Pharaoh from lifting his hand against Moses, who charged him so boldly with his sins. When Moses did speak with God, face to face, in the mount, this resplendent glory of majesty so awed the people, that they durst not behold his glory, Exod. 34; this repressed the fury of the people, enraged against Gideon from destroying their idol, Judg. 6; and the fear of man is naturally upon all living creatures below, Gen. 9, So what can this reverence, which is innate in the hearts of all subjects toward their sovereigns, be, but the ordinance unrepeatable of God, and the natural effect of that majesty of princes with which they are endowed from above?
教长先生——主权是神圣荣耀和威严的一道光芒，但这在人们身上无法找到，无论你是将他们集体考虑还是单独考虑；如果你单独考虑他们，那么每个人身上都不可能有这种权力，因为分派主义者说，每个人生来平等，享有同样的自由；如果它不在人们身上单独存在，那么它也不可能在他们集体身上存在，因为他们所想象的这个契约和合同中的所有贡献，只是每个人对自己原有权利的放弃。那么，这种威严和权威从何而来？再者，当平等者之间的义务是通过契约和合同来约束时，违背在契约中许下的信誉，不能用正确的术语称之为不服从或蔑视权威。它只不过是违背和破坏了所承诺的事情，就像在联邦的国家或地区一样。自然、理性、良心、圣经都教导我们，对最高权力的不服从不仅是对真理的违背和契约的破坏，而且是极度的不服从和蔑视，正如撒母耳记上 10:26 所清楚表明的。 所以当扫罗（第 11 章）将一对牛犁成碎片送给各支派时，耶和华的恐惧降临在人民身上，他们一致同意出来，撒母耳记上 11:7；同样，（约伯记 11:18）他解开君王的束缚，即解开他们的权威，并使他们受到轻视；他用腰带束缚他们的腰，即加强他们的权威，并使人民尊敬他们。异教徒观察到君王身上有某种神圣的东西。亵渎的历史记载说，亚历山大大帝身上的这种特质非常突出，它使他的敌人感到恐惧，也是吸引人们组织最具煽动性的会议和使他最有经验的指挥官接受和遵守他的建议和命令的强大磁石。一些故事写道，在某些紧急情况下，斯基比奥的眼睛中有一种辉煌的威严。这使法老不敢对摩西动手，尽管摩西大胆地指责他的罪恶。当摩西在山上与上帝面对面交谈时，这种辉煌的威严使人民敬畏，他们不敢看他的荣耀，出埃及记。 这压制了人们对基甸的愤怒，他们因为摧毁了他们的偶像而愤怒，士师记 6 章；而人类的恐惧天生就存在于下层的所有生物中，创世记 9 章。那么，这种对君主的敬畏，不就是所有臣民内心中与生俱来的、不可重复的上帝的命令，以及君主们从上天赋予的威严的自然效果吗？

Ans.—1. I never heard any shadow of reason till now, and yet (because the lie hath a latitude) here is but a shadow, which the Prelate stole from M. Anton, de Dom. Archiepisc, Spalatensis; and I may say, confidently, this Plagiarius hath not one line in his book which is not stolen; and, for the present, Spalato's argument is but spilt, and the nerves cut from it, while it is both bleeding and lamed. Let the reader compare them, and I pawn my credit he hath ignorantly clipped Spalato. But I answer, "Sovereignty is a beam and ray (as Spalato saith) of divine majesty, and is not either formally or virtually in the people." It is false that it is not virtually in the people; for there be two things in the judge, either inferior or supreme, for the argument holdeth in the majesty of a parliament, as we shall hear. (1.) The gift or grace of governing (the Arminian Prelate will be offended at this). (2.) The authority of governing. The gift is supernatural, and is not in man naturally, and so not in the king; for he is physically but a mortal man, and this is a gift received, for Solomon asked it by prayer from God. There is a capacity passive in all individual men for it. As for the official authority itself, it is virtually in all in whom any of God's image is remaining since the fall, as is clear, as may be gathered from Gen. 1:28; yea, the father, the master, the judge, have it by God's institution, in some measure, over son, servant, and subject, though it be more in the supreme ruler; and, for our purpose, it is not requisite that authoritative majesty should be in all, (what is in the father and husband I hope to clear,) I mean, it needeth not to be formally in all, and so all are born alike and equal. But he who is a Papist, a Socinian, an Arminian, and therefore delivered to Satan by his mother church, must be the sectary, for we are where this Prelate left us, maintainors of the Protestant religion, contained in the Confession of Faith and National Covenant of Scotland, when this Demas forsook us and embraced the world. 2. Though not one single man in Israel be a judge or king by nature, nor have in them formally any ray of royalty or magistratical authority, yet it followeth not that Israel, parliamentarily convened, hath no such authority as to name Saul king in Mizpeh, and David king in Hebron, 1 Sam. 10:24, 25; 1 Chron. 11:12; 12:38, 39. One man alone hath not the keys of the kingdom of heaven; (as the Prelate dreameth) but it followeth not that many, convened in a church way, hath not this power, Matt. 18:17; 1 Cor. 5:1–4, One man hath not strength to fight against an army of ten thousand; doth it follow, therefore, that an army of twenty thousand hath not strength to fight against these ten thousand? Though one Paul cannot synodically determine the question, (Acts 15) it followeth not that the apostles, and elders, and brethren, convened from divers churches, hath not power to determine it in a lawful synod; and, therefore, from a disjoined and scattered power, no man can argue to a united power. So not any one man is an inferior ruler, or hath the rays and beams of a number of aristocratical rulers; but it followeth not that all these men, combined in a city or society, have not power, in a joint political body, to choose inferior or aristocratical rulers. 3. The P.Prelate's reason is nothing. All the contribution (saith he) in the compact body to make a king, is only by a surrender of the native right of every single man (the whole being only a voluntary contribution). How, then, can there be any majesty derived from them? I answer, Very well; for the surrender is so voluntary, that it is also natural, and founded on the law of nature, that men must have governors, either many, or one supreme ruler. And it is voluntary, and dependeth on a positive institution of God, whether the government be by one supreme ruler, as in a monarchy, or in many, as in an aristocracy, according as the necessity and temper of the commonwealth do most require. This constitution is so voluntary, as it hath below it the law of nature for its general foundation, and above it, the supervenient institution of God, ordaining that there should be such magistrates, both kings and other judges, because without such, all human societies should be dissolved. 4. Individual persons, in creating a magistrate, doth not properly surrender their right, which can be called a right; for they do but surrender their power of doing violence to those of their fellows in that same community, so as they shall not now have moral power to do injuries without punishment; and this is not right or liberty properly, but servitude, for a power to do violence and injuries is not liberty, but servitude and bondage. But the Prelate talketh of royalty as of mere tyranny, as if it were a proper dominion and servile empire that the prince hath over his people, and not more paternal and fatherly, than lordly or masterly. 5. He saith, "Violation of faith, plighted in a contract amongst equals, cannot be called disobedience; but disobedience to the authority of the sovereign is not only breach of covenant, but high disobedience and, contempt." But violation of faith amongst; equals, as equals, is not properly disobedience; for disobedience is betwixt a superior and an inferior: but violation of faith amongst equals, when they make one of their equals their judge and ruler, is not only violation of truth, but also disobedience. All Israel, and Saul, while he is a private man seeking his father's asses, are equals by covenant, obliged one to another; and so any injury done by Israel to Saul, in that case, is not disobedience, but only violation of faith. But when all Israel maketh Saul their king, and sweareth to him obedience, he is not now their equal; and an injury done to him now, is both a violation of their faith, and high disobedience also. Suppose a city of aldermen, all equal amongst themselves in dignity and place, take one of their number and make him their mayor and provost—a wrong done to him now, is not only against the rules of fraternity, but disobedience to one placed by God over them. 6. 1 Sam. 11:7, "The fear of the Lord fell on the people, and they came out with one consent to obey Saul;" therefore God hath placed authority in kings, which is not in people. It is true; because God hath transferred the scattered authorities that are in all the people, in one mass; and, by virtue of his own ordinance, hath placed them in one man, who is king. What followeth? That God conferreth this authority immediately upon the king, without the mediation of any action of the people? Yea, the contrary rather followeth. 7. God looseth the bond of kings; that is, when God is to cast off kings, he causeth them to loose all authority, and maketh them come into contempt with the people. But what doth this prove? That God taketh away the majesty and authority of kings immediately; and therefore God gave to kings this authority immediately, without the people's conveyance? Yea, I take the Prelate's weapon from him. God doth not take the authority of the king from him immediately, but mediately, by the people's hating and despising him, when they see his wickedness, as the people see Nero a monster—a prodigious blood-sucker. Upon this, all the people contemn him and despise him, and so the majesty is taken from Nero and all his mandates and laws, when they see him trample upon all laws, divine and human, and that mediately by the people's heart despising of his majesty; and so they repeat, and take again, that awesome authority that they once gave him. And this proveth that God gave him the authority mediately, by the consent of man. 8. Nor speaketh he of kings only, but (ver. 15) he poureth contempt עלּ־ברינים super munificos. Pineda. Aria. Mont, super Principes upon nobles and great men; and this place may prove that no judges of the earth are made by men. 9. The heathen say, That there is some divinity in princes, as in Alexander the Great and Scipio, toward their enemies; but this will prove that princes and kings have a superiority over those who are not their native subjects, for something of God is in them, in relation to all men that are not their subjects. If this be a ground strong and good, because God only, and independently from men, taketh away this majesty, as God only and independently giveth it, then a king is sacred to all men, subjects or not subjects. Then it is unlawful to make war against any foreign king and prince, for in invading him or resisting him, you resist that divine majesty of God that is in him; then you may not lawfully flee from a tyrant, no more than you may lawfully flee from God. 10. Scipio was not a king, therefore this divine majesty is in all judges of the earth, in a more or less measure;—therefore God, only and immediately, may take this spark of divine majesty from inferior judges. It followeth not. And kings, certainly, cannot infuse any spark of a divine majesty on any inferior judges, for God only immediately infuseth it in men; therefore it is unlawful for kings to take this divinity from judges, for they resist God who resist parliaments, no less than those who resist kings. Scipio hath divinity in him as well as Cæsar, and that immediately from God, and not from any king. 11. Moses was not a king when he went to Pharaoh, for he had not, as yet, a people, Pharaoh was the king, and because Pharaoh was a king, the divines of Oxford must say, His majesty must not, in words of rebuke, be resisted more than by deeds. 12. Moses' face did shine as a prophet receiving the law from God—not as a king. And is this sunshine from heaven upon the face of Nero and Julian? It must be, if it be a beam of royal majesty, if this pratler say right, but (2 Cor. 3:7) this was a majesty typical, which did adumbrate the glory of the law of God, and is far from being a royalty due to all heathen kings. 13. I would our king would evidence such a majesty in breaking the images and idols of his queen, and of papists about him. 14. The fear of Noah, and the regenerated who are in covenant with the beasts of the field, (Job 5:23,) is upon the beasts of the earth, not by approbation only, as the people maketh kings by the Prelate's way; nor yet by free consent, as the people freely transfer their power to him who is king. The creatures inferior to man, have, by no act of free will, chosen man to be their ruler, and transferred their power to him, because they are, by nature, inferior to man; and God, by nature, hath subjected the creatures to man, (Gen. 1:28,) and so this proveth not that the king, by nature, is above the people—I mean the man who is king; and, therefore, though God had planted in the hearts of all subjects a fear and reverence toward the king, upon supposition that they have made him king, it followeth not that this authority and majesty is immediately given by God to the man who is king, without the intervening consent of the people, for there is a native fear in the scholar to stand in awe of his teacher, and yet the scholar may willingly give himself to be a disciple to his teacher, and so give his teacher power over him. Citizens naturally fear their supreme governor of the city, yet they give to the man who is their supreme governor, that power and authority which is the ground of awe and reverence. A servant naturally feareth his master, yet often he giveth his liberty, and resigneth it up voluntarily to his master; and this was not extraordinary amongst the Jews, where the servant did entirely love the master, and is now most ordinary when servants do, for hire, tie themselves to such a master. Soldiers naturally fear their commanders, yet they may, and often do, by voluntary consent, make such men their commanders; and, therefore, from this, it followeth in no way that the governor of a city, the teacher, the master, the commander in war, have not their power and authority only and immediately from God, but from their inferiors, who, by their free consent, appointed them for such places.
答案：1. 直到现在我从未听到任何合理的理由，然而（因为谎言有宽容度），这里只是一个影子，是主教从斯帕拉蒂的安东尼奥·多姆·阿奇比斯科普拉特（M. Anton, de Dom. Archiepisc, Spalatensis）那里偷来的；我可以自信地说，这个剽窃者的书中没有一行是没有偷来的；而且，就现在而言，斯帕拉蒂的论点只是被浪费了，而且被割断了神经，因为它既在流血又瘫痪。让读者比较一下，我抵押我的信誉，他无意中剪辑了斯帕拉蒂。但是我回答说，“主权是神圣威严的一束光芒（正如斯帕拉蒂所说），既不是形式上也不是实质上在人民中。” 它不在人民中实质上是错误的；因为在法官中有两件事，无论是低级的还是最高的，因为这个论点适用于议会的威严，我们将会听到。（1）统治的恩赐或恩典（亚米尼亚主教对此会感到不满）。 （2）统治的权威。这个恩赐是超自然的，不是人类天生具有的，所以国王也没有；因为他在物理上只是一个凡人，这是一个接受的恩赐，因为所罗门曾经通过祈祷向上帝请求过。每个个体男人都有被动的能力去担任这个职位。 至于官方权威本身，几乎所有仍保留上帝形象的人都拥有，这是显而易见的，可以从创世记 1:28 中得出；是的，父亲、主人、法官都是上帝所设立的，对儿子、仆人和臣民有一定程度的权威，尽管在最高统治者身上更为明显；对于我们的目的来说，并不需要所有人都具有权威的威严（我希望能够澄清父亲和丈夫身上的权威），我的意思是，并不需要所有人都正式地具备权威，因此所有人生来都是平等的。但是，一个天主教徒、一个索西尼派、一个阿米纳派，因此被他的母教会交给撒旦，必须成为异端分子，因为我们是这位主教离开我们时的位置，维护苏格兰信仰告白和国家盟约中包含的新教宗教。2. 虽然以色列没有一个人天生就是法官或国王，也没有正式拥有王权或执法权的光芒，但这并不意味着以色列在议会上没有权力，在米斯巴尼命名扫罗为王，在希伯仑命名大卫为王，撒母耳记上 10:24,25；历代记 11:12; 12:38, 39. 一个人独自没有天国的钥匙；（正如主教所梦见的）但这并不意味着许多人在教会中聚集时没有这个权力，马太福音 18:17；哥林多前书 5:1-4，一个人没有力量对抗一万人的军队；因此，二万人的军队没有力量对抗这一万人吗？虽然保罗一个人不能在公会上决定问题（使徒行传 15），但这并不意味着使徒、长老和从不同教会聚集的弟兄们没有权力在合法的公会上决定；因此，从分散和散布的权力，无法推断出统一的权力。因此，没有任何一个人是下级统治者，或者拥有一群贵族统治者的权力和光芒；但这并不意味着所有这些人在一个城市或社会中结合起来，没有权力在一个联合的政治机构中选择下级或贵族统治者。3. 主教的理由毫无意义。所有的贡献（他说）在组成国王的团体中，只是每个单个人放弃本能权利的结果（整体只是自愿贡献）。 那么，这些统治者如何能够获得任何威严呢？我的回答是，非常好；因为这种投降是如此自愿，以至于也是自然的，并且建立在自然法则上，即人们必须有统治者，无论是许多统治者还是一个至高无上的统治者。这是自愿的，并且依赖于上帝的正式制度，无论是一个至高无上的统治者，如君主制，还是许多统治者，如贵族制，都取决于国家的需要和气质。这种体制是如此自愿的，以至于它在下面有自然法则作为其总体基础，在上面有上帝的附加制度，规定应该有这样的统治者，既有国王又有其他法官，因为如果没有这样的统治者，所有人类社会都将解体。 个人在创建一个治理者时，并没有真正放弃他们的权利，这可以被称为权利；因为他们只是放弃了对同一社区中其他人的暴力行为的权力，以至于他们现在没有道义上的权力可以无罪伤害他人；这不是真正的权利或自由，而是奴役，因为有权力进行暴力和伤害并不是自由，而是奴役和束缚。但是主教将王权视为纯粹的暴政，好像君主对他的人民拥有的是一种真正的统治和奴役帝国，而不是更像父亲般的关怀，而不是像主人般的统治。他说：“违背在平等合同中许下的信仰不能被称为不服从；但是对主权的不服从不仅是违约，而且是严重的不服从和蔑视。”但是在平等的情况下，违背信仰并不是真正的不服从；因为不服从是在上级和下级之间发生的：但是在平等的情况下，当他们选择一个平等的人作为他们的法官和统治者时，违背信仰不仅是违背真理，而且是不服从。 所有以色列人，包括扫罗，当他还是一个寻找父亲驴子的普通人时，都是契约上的平等者，彼此有义务；因此，以色列对扫罗的任何伤害，在这种情况下，并不是不服从，而只是违背信仰。但当所有以色列人选择扫罗为他们的国王，并向他宣誓服从时，他们不再是平等的；对他的伤害，既违背了他们的信仰，也是严重的不服从。假设一个市议会，所有成员在尊严和地位上都是平等的，他们选出其中一人作为市长和警长——对他的伤害，不仅违反了兄弟会的规则，也是对上帝所安排的人的不服从。撒母耳记上 11:7 说：“耶和华的灵降在民身上，他们就一同出来，像一个人一样。”因此，上帝将权柄赋予了国王，而不是人民。这是真实的；因为上帝将散布在人民中的各种权力，集中在一起；并且根据他自己的命令，将它们赋予了一个人，他就是国王。那么，接下来呢？上帝是否直接将这种权威赋予国王，而不需要人民的任何行动来介入？ 是的，相反的情况更为普遍。7. 上帝解除了国王的束缚；也就是说，当上帝要废黜国王时，他会让他们失去所有的权威，并使他们在人民中受到蔑视。但这证明了什么呢？证明上帝立即夺走了国王的威严和权威；因此，上帝立即赋予国王这种权威，而不需要人民的转让？是的，我从主教那里夺走了他的武器。上帝并不是立即夺走国王的权威，而是通过人民对他的憎恨和蔑视来间接夺走。当人们看到尼禄这样的怪物，一个吸血鬼般的怪物时，他们都蔑视他和鄙视他。因此，当人们看到他践踏所有的神圣和人类法律时，尼禄和他的命令和法律的威严就被夺走了，这是通过人民心中对他威严的蔑视来间接实现的；因此，他们再次重复并夺回了他们曾经给予他的那种可怕的权威。这证明了上帝通过人类的同意间接赋予了他权威。8. 他不仅谈到了国王，而且（第 15 节）他倾注了蔑视在慷慨的人身上。 蒙特，超级原则适用于贵族和伟大的人们；而这个地方可能证明，地球上没有法官是由人造成的。异教徒说，王子中有一些神性，就像亚历山大大帝和斯基比奥对待他们的敌人一样；但这将证明，王子和国王对那些不是他们本国子民的人有优越性，因为他们身上有上帝的一些东西，与所有不是他们子民的人有关。如果这是一个坚固和好的基础，因为只有上帝独自并独立地夺走这个威严，正如只有上帝独自并独立地赋予它一样，那么国王对所有人来说都是神圣的，无论是子民还是非子民。那么对任何外国国王和王子发动战争是不合法的，因为在入侵他或抵抗他时，你抵抗的是他身上的上帝的神圣威严；那么你不可以合法地逃离一个暴君，就像你不可以合法地逃离上帝一样。斯基比奥不是国王，因此这种神圣威严在地球上的所有法官身上都有，程度或多或少；因此，只有上帝，只有立即，才能从下级法官身上夺走这一神圣威严的火花。这并不意味着。 国王当然不能赋予任何下级法官神圣威严的火花，因为只有上帝才能直接赋予人们这种威严；因此，国王从法官身上夺取这种神性是不合法的，因为他们抵抗议会的人和抵抗国王的人一样，也是在抵抗上帝。斯基比奥和凯撒一样，都有来自上帝的神性，而不是来自任何国王。11.当摩西去见法老时，他还不是国王，因为他还没有一个民族，法老才是国王，因为法老是国王，牛津的神学家们必须说，他的陛下在责备的言辞上不能比行动更受到抵抗。12.摩西的脸发光，像一个从上帝那里接受律法的先知，而不是像一个国王。那么尼禄和朱利安的脸上是否也有来自天堂的阳光呢？如果这是皇家威严的一束光芒，如果这个喋喋不休的人说得对的话，那么它必须是，但是（哥林多后书 3:7）这是一种象征性的威严，它预示了上帝的律法的荣耀，远非所有异教国王都应享有的皇权。13.我希望我们的国王能够在打破他的王后和他周围的天主教徒的偶像和雕像上展现出这样的威严。14. 对于挪亚的恐惧，以及与田野的野兽立约的重生者（约伯记 5:23），这种恐惧存在于地上的野兽中，不仅仅是通过认可，就像人们通过主教的方式选举国王一样；也不是通过自由同意，就像人们自愿将权力转让给国王一样。低于人类的生物，并没有通过自由意志的行动选择人类作为他们的统治者，并将他们的权力转让给他，因为它们在本质上低于人类；上帝本性上使生物服从人类（创世记 1:28），所以这并不能证明国王，也就是那个人，本性上高于人民；因此，尽管上帝在所有臣民的心中根植了对国王的敬畏和尊重，假设他们已经选举了他，但这并不意味着这种权威和威严是上帝直接赋予国王的，而不需要人民的介入同意，因为学生天生就会对老师敬畏，然而学生可能愿意成为老师的学生，并将自己的权力交给老师。 市民自然而然地害怕他们的最高统治者，然而他们将权力和权威赋予了他们的最高统治者，这是敬畏和尊敬的基础。仆人自然而然地害怕他的主人，然而他经常自愿放弃自由，将其自愿地交给他的主人；在犹太人中，这并不是什么特别的事情，因为仆人完全爱他的主人，现在当仆人为了雇佣而将自己绑在这样的主人身上时，这是最普遍的情况。士兵自然而然地害怕他们的指挥官，然而他们可以，而且经常会，通过自愿同意，选择这样的人作为他们的指挥官；因此，从这一点来看，城市的统治者、教师、主人、战争指挥官并不仅仅是直接从上帝那里获得他们的权力和权威，而是从他们的下级那里，通过他们的自由同意，被任命到这些职位上。

P. Prelate (Arg. 7, p. 51, 52)—This seemeth, or rather is, an unanswerable argument,—No man hath power of life and death but the Sovereign Power of life and death, to wit, God, Gen. 9:5. God saith thrice he will require the blood of man at the hands of man, and this power God hath committed to God's deputy: whoso sheddeth man's blood כאדﬦ by man shall die,—by the king, for the world knew not any kind of government at this time but monarchical, and this monarch was Noah; and if this power be from God, why not all sovereign power? seeing it is homogeneous, and, as jurists say, in indivisibili posita, a thing in its nature indivisible, and that cannot be distracted or impaired, and if every man had the power of life and death, God should not be the God of order.
P. Prelate（阿根廷 7，第 51 页，52 页）- 这似乎是一个无法反驳的论点，或者更确切地说，是一个无法反驳的论证。没有人有生死的权力，除了生死的最高权力，即上帝（创世纪 9:5）。上帝三次说他要向人要求人的血，而这个权力上帝已经委托给了上帝的代理人：凡流人血的，必被人所杀，即国王，因为在那个时候世界上只有君主制的政府形式，而这位君主就是挪亚；如果这个权力是来自上帝，为什么不是所有的最高权力呢？因为它是同质的，正如法学家所说的，它是不可分割的，不能被分散或削弱的东西，如果每个人都有生死的权力，上帝就不会是秩序之神。

The P. Prelate taketh the pains to prove out of the text that a magistracy is established in the text. Ans. 1. Let us consider this unanswerable argument. (1.) It is grounded upon a lie, and a conjecture never taught by any but himself, to wit, that כאדﬦ by, or in, or through man, must signify a magistrate, and a king only. This king was Noah. Never interpreter, nay, not common sense can say, that no magistrate is here understood but a king. The consequence is vain: His blood shall be shed by man; therefore by a magistrate? it followeth not; therefore by a king? it followeth not. There was not a king in the world as yet. Some make Belus, the father of Ninus, the first king, and the builder of Babylon. This Ninus is thought the first builder of the city after called Nineveh, and the first king of the Assyrians. So saith Quintus Curtius and others; but grave authors believe that Nimrod was no other than Belus the father of Ninus. So saith Augustine,2 Eusebius, Hieronym.; and Eusebius4 maketh him the first founder of Babylon: so saith Clemens, Pirerius,6 and Josephus saith the same. Their times, their cruel natures are the same. Calvin saith, Noah yet lived while Nimrod lived; and the Scripture saith, "Nimrod began to reign, and be powerful on the earth." And Babel was דאשיח ממלּכתוּ the beginning of his kingdom. No writer, Moses nor any other, can show us a king before Nimrod. So Eusebius, Paul Orosius,2 Hieronym., Josephus,4 say that he was the first king; and Tostatus Abulens., and our own Calvin, Luther,6 Musculus on the place, and Ainsworth, make him the first king and the founder of Babylon. How Noah was a king, or there was any monarchical government in the world then, the Prelate hath alone dreamed it. There was but family-government before this. 2. And if there be magistracy here established by God, there is no warrant to say it is only a monarchy; for if the Holy Ghost intendeth a policy, it is a policy to be established to the world's end, and not to be limited (as the Prelate doth) to Noah's days. All interpreters, upon good ground, establish the same policy that our Saviour speaketh of, when he saith, "He shall perish by the sword who taketh the sword," Matt. 26:52. So the Netherlands have no lawful magistrate who hath power of life and death, because their government is aristocratical, and they have no king. So all acts of taking away the lives of ill-doers shall be acts of homicide in Holland. How absurd! 3. Nor do I see how the place, in the native scope, doth establish a magistracy. Calvin saith not so; and interpreters deduce, by consequence, the power of the magistrate from this place. But the text is general,—He who killeth man shall be killed by man: either he shall fall into the magistrate's hand, or into the hand of some murderer; so Calvin,8 Marlorat, &c. He speaketh, saith Pirerius, not of the fact and event itself, but of the deserving of murderers; and it is certain all murderers fall not into the magistrate's hands; but he saith, by God and man's laws they ought to die, though sometime one murderer killeth another. 4. The sovereign power is given to the king, therefore, it is given to him immediately without the consent of the people. It followeth not. 5. Power of life and death is not given to the king only, but also to other magistrates, yea, and to a single private man in the just defence of his own life. Other arguments are but what the Prelate hath said already.
普雷拉特主教费心证明在这段文字中确立了一个治理机构。答案 1. 让我们考虑这个无法反驳的论点。(1.) 它建立在一个谎言和一个只有他自己提出的猜测之上，即“通过人”必须意味着一个治理者，只能是一个国王。这个国王是挪亚。没有解释者，甚至没有常识可以说，这里理解的治理者只是一个国王。结论是徒劳的：他的血将被人流出；因此是通过一个治理者吗？这并不是必然的；因此是通过一个国王吗？这也不是必然的。当时世界上还没有国王。有人认为尼努斯的父亲贝鲁斯是第一位国王，也是巴比伦的建造者。这个尼努斯被认为是后来被称为尼尼微的城市的第一位建造者，也是亚述人的第一位国王。这是昆图斯·库尔修斯和其他人所说的；但是重要的作者们相信尼姆罗德不过是尼尼斯的父亲贝鲁斯。奥古斯丁、尤西比乌斯、耶罗尼姆也是这么说的；尤西比乌斯还把他称为巴比伦的第一位创始人：克莱门斯、皮雷里乌斯也是这么说的；约瑟夫斯也是这么说的。他们的时代，他们的残忍本质是一样的。 加尔文说，挪亚在尼米罗德活着的时候还活着；圣经说，“尼米罗德开始统治，并在地上有权势。”巴别是他王国的起源。没有任何作家，无论是摩西还是其他人，能够向我们展示尼米罗德之前的国王。因此，尤西比乌斯、保罗·奥罗修斯、耶罗尼姆、约瑟夫斯都说他是第一位国王；托斯塔图斯·阿布伦斯和我们自己的加尔文、路德、穆斯库卢斯在这个地方上也认为他是第一位国王和巴比伦的创始人。关于挪亚如何成为国王，或者当时世界上是否存在君主制政府，只有主教一个人做了这个梦。在此之前只有家庭政府。2. 如果这里确实有上帝建立的政权，就没有理由说它只是君主制；因为如果圣灵打算建立一种政策，那就是一种要建立到世界末日的政策，而不是像主教所说的仅限于挪亚的时代。所有的解释者都在很好的基础上建立了我们的救主所说的同样的政策，当他说：“拿刀的必死于刀下。”（马太福音 26:52） 因此，荷兰没有合法的拥有生死权力的法官，因为他们的政府是贵族制，没有国王。因此，在荷兰，夺取罪犯生命的行为都将是谋杀行为。多么荒谬！3.我也看不出这个地方如何建立起一个司法机构。加尔文并没有这样说；解释者们从这个地方推导出了法官的权力。但这个文本是普遍的——杀人者必被人杀：他要么会落入法官的手中，要么会落入某个谋杀者的手中；所以加尔文、马洛拉特等人都这样说。皮雷里乌斯说，他所说的不是事实和事件本身，而是谋杀者的应得之罪；而且可以肯定，并非所有的谋杀者都会落入法官的手中；但他说，根据上帝和人的法律，他们应该死，尽管有时一个谋杀者会杀死另一个谋杀者。4.最高权力是给予国王的，因此，它是直接给予他的，不需要人民的同意。这并不是必然的。5.生死权力不仅仅给予国王，还给予其他法官，甚至给予单个私人在正当防卫自己生命时。 其他的论点只是主教已经说过的。

QUESTION VIII
问题八

WHETHER THE PRELATE PROVETH BY FORCE OF REASON THAT THE PEOPLE CANNOT BE CAPABLE OF ANY POWER OF GOVERNMENT
无论主教是否能通过理性的力量证明人民不能拥有任何政府权力

P. Prelate.—God and nature giveth no power in vain, and which may not be reduced into action; but an active power, or a power of actual governing, was never acted by the community; therefore this power cannot be seated in the community as in the prime and proper subject, and it cannot be in every individual person of a community, because government intrinsically and essentially includeth a special distinction of governors, and some to be governed; and, to speak properly, there can no other power be conceived in the community, naturally and properly, but only potestas passiva regiminis, a capacity or susceptibility to be governed, by one or by more, just as the first matter desireth a form. This obligeth all, by the dictate of nature's law, to submit to actual government; and as it is in every individual person, it is not merely and properly voluntary, because, howsoever nature dictates that government is necessary for the safety of the society, yet every singular person, by corruption and self-love, hath a natural aversion and repugnance to submit to any: every man would be a king himself. This universal desire, appetitus universalis aut naturalis, or universal propension to government, is like the act of the understanding assenting to the first principles of truth, and to the will's general propension to happiness in general, which propension is not a free act, except our new statists, as they have changed their faith, so they overturn true reason. It will puzzle them infinitely to make anything, in its kind passive, really active and collative of positive acts and effects. All know no man can give what he hath not. An old philosopher would laugh at him who would say, that a matter perfected and actuated by union with a form, could at pleasure shake off its form, and marry itself to another. They may as well say, every wife hath power to resume her freedom and marry another, as that any such power active is in the community, or any power to cast off monarchy.
教长：上帝和自然不会白白赋予权力，也不会让权力无法实施；但是，实际统治的权力从未由社群行使过；因此，这种权力不能像在社群中那样归属于社群作为主体，也不能归属于社群中的每个个体，因为政府本质上包含了统治者和被统治者的特殊区分；准确地说，社群中除了被动统治的权力（即被统治的能力或易受统治的能力），自然和适当地不可能存在其他权力，就像原始物质渴望形式一样。这使得每个人都必须按照自然法的规定服从实际的政府；而对于每个个体而言，这并不完全是自愿的，因为尽管自然规定政府对社会的安全是必要的，但每个人都因为腐败和自私而天生地不愿意接受任何统治：每个人都想成为自己的国王。 这种普遍的欲望，即 appetitus universalis aut naturalis，或者对政府的普遍倾向，就像理解行为同意真理的第一原则，以及意愿对整体幸福的普遍倾向一样，这种倾向并不是一个自由的行为，除非我们的新统治者，因为他们改变了信仰，所以他们颠覆了真正的理性。让他们无法理解的是，如何使一种被动的事物在其种类中真正地变得主动，并产生积极的行为和效果。众所周知，没有人能够给予他所没有的东西。一个古老的哲学家会嘲笑那个说一个通过与形式的结合而完善和激活的物质可以随意摆脱其形式，并与另一个结合的人。他们可能会说，每个妻子都有权利恢复自由并与另一个人结婚，就像任何积极的力量存在于社区中，或者有权推翻君主制一样荒谬。

Ans.—1. The P. Prelate might have thanked Spalato for this argument, but he doth not so much as cite him, for fear his theft be apprehended; but Spalato hath it set down with stronger nerves than the Prelate's head was able to copy out of him. But Jac. de Almain, and Navarrus,2 with the Parisian doctors, said in the Council of Paris, "that politic power is immediately from God, but first from the community;" but so that the community apply their power to this or that government—not of liberty, but by natural necessity—but Spalato and the plagiary Prelate do both look beside the book. The question is not now concerning the vis rectivta the power of governing in the people, but concerning the power of government; for these two differ much. The former is a power of ruling and monarchical commanding of themselves. This power is not formally in the people, but only virtually; and no reason can say that a virtual power is idle because it cannot be actuated by that same subject that it is in; for then it should not be a virtual, but a formal power. Do not philosophers say such an herb virtually maketh hot? and can the sottish Prelate say this virtual power is idle, and in vain given of God, because it doth not formally heat your hand when you touch it. 2. The P. Prelate, who is excommunicated for Popery, Socinianism, Arminianism, and is now turned apostate to Christ and his church, must have changed his faith, not we, and be unreasonably ignorant, to press that axiom, "That the power is idle that cannot be reduced to acts;" for a generative power is given to living and sensitive creatures,—this power is not idle though it be not reduced in act by all and every individual sensitive creature. A power of seeing is given to all who naturally do, or ought to see, yet it is not an idle power because divers are blind, seeing it is put forth in action in divers of the kind; so this power in the community is not idle because it is not put forth in acts in the people in which it is virtually, but is put forth in action in some of them whom they choose to be their governors; nor is it reasonable to say that it should be put forth in action by all the people, as if all should be kings and governors. But the question is not of the power of governing in the people, but of the power of government, that is, of the power of making governors and kings; and the community doth put forth in act this power, as a free, voluntary, and active power; for (1.) a community transplanted to India, or any place of the world not before inhabited, have a perfect liberty to choose either a monarchy, or a democracy, or an aristocracy; for though nature incline them to government in general, yet are they not naturally determinated to any one of those three more than another. (2.) Israel did of their own free will choose the change of government, and would have a king as the nations had; therefore they had free will, and so an active power so to do, and not a passive inclination only to be governed, such as Spalato saith agreeth to the first matter. (3.) Royalists teach that a people under democracy or aristocracy have liberty to choose a king; and the Romans did this, therefore they had an active power to do it,—therefore the Prelate's simile crooks: the matter at its pleasure cannot shake off its form, nor the wife cast off her husband being once married; but Barclaius, Grotius, Arnisæns, Blackwood, and all the royalists, teach that the people under any of these two forms of democracy or aristocracy may resume their power, and cast off these forms and choose a monarch; and if monarchy be the best government, as royalists say, they may choose the best. And is this but a passive capacity to be governed? (4.) Of ten men fit for a kingdom they may design one, and put the crown on his head, and refuse the other nine, as Israel crowned Solomon and refused Adonijah. Is this not a voluntary action, proceeding from a free, active, elective power? It will puzzle the pretended Prelate to deny this,—that which the community doth freely, they do not from such a passive capacity as is in the first matter in regard of the form. 3. It is true that people, through corruption of nature, are averse to submit to governors "for conscience sake, as unto the Lord," because the natural man, remaining in the state of nature, can do nothing that is truly good, but it is false that men have no active moral power to submit to superiors, but only a passive capacity to be governed. He quite contradicteth himself; for he said before, (c. 4, p. 49,) that there is an "innate fear and reverence in the hearts of all men naturally, even in heathens, toward their sovereign;" yea, as we have a natural moral active power to love our parents and superiors, (though it be not evangelically, or legally in God's court, good) and so to obey their commandments, only we are averse to penal laws of superiors. But this proveth no way that we have only by nature a passive capacity to government; for heathens have, by instinct of nature, both made laws morally good, submitted to them, and set kings and judges over them, which clearly proveth that men have an active power of government by nature. Yea, what difference maketh the Prelate betwixt men and beasts? for beasts have a capacity to be governed, even lions and tigers; but here is the matter, if men have any natural power of government, the P. Prelate would have it, with his brethren the Jesuits and Arminians, to be not natural, but done by the help of universal grace; for so do they confound nature and grace. But it is certain our power to submit to rulers and kings, as to rectors, and guides, and fathers, is natural; to submit to tyrants in doing ills of sin is natural, but in suffering ills of punishment is not natural. "No man can give that which he hath not," is true, but that people have no power to make their governors is that which is in question, and denied by us. This argument doth prove that people hath no power to appoint aristocratical rulers more than kings, and so the aristocratical and democratical rulers are all inviolable and sacred as the king. By this the people may not resume their freedem if they turn tyrants and oppressors. This the Prelate shall deny, for he averreth, (p. 96,) out of Augustine, that the people may, without sin, change a corrupt democracy into a monarchy.
答案：1.主教可能应该感谢斯帕拉托提出的这个论点，但他没有引用他，因为他担心自己的盗窃行为会被发现；但斯帕拉托比主教的头脑更加坚定地写下了这个论点。但是雅克·德·阿尔曼和纳瓦鲁斯以及巴黎的医生在巴黎会议上说，“政治权力直接来自上帝，但首先来自社区”；但是社区必须将他们的权力应用于这个或那个政府，而不是自由的，而是出于自然的必要性；但是斯帕拉托和这位剽窃的主教都没有看清问题的本质。现在的问题不是关于人民统治的权力，而是关于政府的权力；因为这两者有很大的区别。前者是统治和单一命令自己的权力。这种权力在人民中并不是形式上的，而只是虚拟的；没有理由说虚拟的权力是无用的，因为它不能由与之相同的主体激活；否则它就不是虚拟的，而是形式上的权力。难道哲学家不是说这样一种草本植物虚拟地使人发热吗？ 苏格兰的主教能否说这种虚拟的权力是无用的，是上帝白白赋予的，因为当你触摸它时它并没有正式地加热你的手。2. 这位被开除教籍的主教因为信奉天主教、索契尼主义和阿米纳主义，现在背叛了基督和他的教会，他必须改变他的信仰，而不是我们，而且他非常无知，要坚持那个公理，“不能转化为行动的权力是无用的”；因为生物和有感知能力的生物被赋予了生殖能力，即使不是每个个体有感知能力的生物都将这种能力转化为行动，这种能力也不是无用的。所有自然上能够或应该看见的人都被赋予了看见的能力，然而这并不是一种无用的能力，因为有些人是盲人，因为这种能力在同类中的一些人身上得到了实践；所以这种权力在社区中并不是无用的，因为它在人们中间虚拟地存在，但在一些人身上得到了实践，他们被选为他们的统治者；而且说它应该由所有人实践，好像所有人都应该成为国王和统治者，这是不合理的。 但问题不在于人民的统治权力，而在于政府的权力，即制定统治者和国王的权力；社区以自由、自愿和积极的力量行使这种权力；因为（1）一个移居印度或世界上任何一个以前没有人居住的地方的社区，完全有权选择君主制、民主制或贵族制；因为尽管自然倾向于一般性的统治，但他们并没有天生地倾向于这三种中的任何一种。 （2）以色列人出于自愿选择了政府的变革，并希望像其他国家一样有一个国王；因此，他们有自由意志，因此有积极的权力这样做，而不仅仅是被统治的被动倾向，正如斯帕拉托所说的与第一事物相符。 （3.) 保皇派教导，民主或贵族制度下的人民有权选择国王；罗马人就是这样做的，因此他们有能力这样做，因此主教的比喻是错误的：事物不能随意改变其形式，妻子一旦结婚就不能抛弃丈夫；但巴克莱、格罗提乌斯、阿尼塞恩斯、布莱克伍德和所有保皇派都教导，人民在民主或贵族制度下可以恢复他们的权力，摒弃这些形式并选择君主；如果君主制是最好的政府，正如保皇派所说，他们可以选择最好的。这难道不仅仅是一种被动的被统治能力吗？（4）在十个适合担任国王的人中，他们可以选出一个人，给他戴上王冠，拒绝其他九个人，就像以色列加冕所罗门并拒绝亚多尼雅一样。这不是一种自愿的行动，来自自由、积极、选择的权力吗？这将使这个自称的主教难以否认：社区自由地做的事情，并不是出于对形式的第一物质的被动能力。 人们确实因为本性的腐败而不愿意出于良心的缘故服从统治者，因为自然人仍处于自然状态，不能做出真正善良的行为，但是人们没有积极的道德力量来服从上级，只有被动的被统治的能力是错误的。他自相矛盾；因为他之前说过（第 4 章，第 49 页），在所有人的心中，甚至是异教徒的心中，都有一种“与君主的内在恐惧和尊敬”；是的，正如我们有一种自然的道德积极力量来爱我们的父母和上级（虽然在上帝的法庭中不是福音或合法的善行），并遵守他们的命令，只是我们对上级的惩罚法律不愿意。但这并不能证明我们只有通过本性才有被动的统治能力；异教徒通过本性的本能，制定了道德上的善良法律，服从这些法律，并设立了国王和法官，这清楚地证明了人们通过本性具有积极的统治能力。是的，主教在人类和动物之间有什么区别呢？ 野兽有被统治的能力，甚至狮子和老虎也是如此；但问题在于，如果人类有任何天然的统治能力，P. Prelate 会认为，他和他的耶稣会和阿米纳会的兄弟们认为，这不是天然的，而是通过普遍的恩典来完成的；因此，他们混淆了自然和恩典。但可以肯定的是，我们顺从统治者和国王，就像顺从校长、导师和父亲一样，是天然的；顺从暴君在犯罪行为上是天然的，但在受罚的痛苦上是不天然的。"人不能给予他所没有的"是正确的，但人民没有权力选择他们的统治者，这是有争议的，我们否认这一点。这个论点证明了人民没有权力任命贵族统治者，就像国王一样，所以贵族和民主统治者都是不可侵犯和神圣的。根据这一点，人民不能夺回他们的自由，如果他们变成暴君和压迫者。Prelate 会否认这一点，因为他引用奥古斯丁的话（第 96 页），说人民可以在没有罪恶的情况下，将腐败的民主制转变为君主制。

P. Prelate (pp. 95, 96).—If sovereignty be originally inherent in the people, then democracy, or government by the people, were the best government, because it cometh nearest to the fountain and stream of the first and radical power in the people, yea, and all other forms of government were unlawful; and if sovereignty be natively inherent in the multitude it must be proper to every individual of the community, which is against that false maxim of theirs, Quisque nascitur liber. Every one by nature is born a free man, and the posterity of those who first contracted with their elected king are not bound to that covenant, but, upon their native right and liberty, may appoint another king without breach of covenant. The posterity of Joshua, and the elders in their time, who contracted with the Gibeonites to incorporate them, though in a serving condition, might have made their fathers' government nothing.
P. Prelate（第 95 页，第 96 页）。——如果主权最初存在于人民之中，那么民主或人民治理将是最好的政府，因为它最接近人民的第一和根本权力的源泉和流动，而其他形式的政府都是非法的；如果主权天然存在于众多人中，那么每个社区成员都应该拥有这种权力，这与他们的错误观念“每个人天生自由”相违背。每个人天生都是自由的，最初与他们选举的国王订立契约的后代并不受该契约的约束，而是可以根据他们的天赋权利和自由选择另一位国王，而不违反契约。约书亚的后代和他们那个时代的长老与基遍人订立契约，尽管处于一种服从的状态，但他们可以使他们祖先的政府变得无足轻重。

Ans.—1. The P. Prelate might thank Spalato for this argument also, for it is stolen; but he never once named him, lest his theft should be apprehended. So are his other arguments stolen from Spalato; but the Prelate weakeneth them, and it is seen stolen goods are not blessed. Spalato saith, then, by the law of nature every commonwealth should be governed by the people, and by the law of nature the people should be under the worst government; but this consequence is nothing; for a community of many families is formally and of themselves under no government, but may choose any of the three; for popular government is not that wherein all the people are rulers, for this is confusion and not government, because all are rulers, and none are governed and ruled. But in popular government many are chosen out of the people to rule; and that this is the worst government is said gratis, without warrant; and if monarchy be the best of itself, yet, when men are in the state of sin, in some other respects it hath many inconveniences. 2. I see not how democracy is best because nearest to the multitude's power of making a king; for if all the three depend upon the free will of the people, all are alike afar off, and alike near hand, to the people's free choice, according as they see most conducive to the safety and protection of the commonwealth, seeing the forms of government are not more natural than politic incorporations of cities, yea, than of shires; but from a positive institution of God, who erecteth this rather than that, not immediately now, but mediately, by the free will of men; no one cometh formally, and ex natur a rei, nearer to the fountain than another, except that materially democracy may come nearer to the people's power than monarchy, but the excellency of it above monarchy is not hence concluded; for by this reason the number of four should be more excellent than the number of five, of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand, or of millions, because four cometh near to the number of three, which Aristotle calleth the first perfect number, cui additur τὸ πᾶν of which yet formally all do alike share in the nature and essence of number. 2. It is denied that it followeth from this antecedent, that the people have power to choose their own governors; therefore all governments except democracy, or government by the people, must be sinful and unlawful, (1.) Because government by kings is of divine institution, and of other judges also, as is evident from God's word, Rom. 13:1–3; Deut. 17:14; Prov. 8:15, 16; 1 Pet. 2:13, 14; Psal. 2:10, 11, &c. (2.) Power of choosing any form of government is in the people; therefore there is no government lawful but popular government. It followeth no ways; but presupposeth that power to choose any form of government must be formally actual government; which is most false, yea, they be contrary, as the prevalency or power and the act are contrary; so these two are contrary, or opposite. Neither is sovereignty, nor any government, formally inherent in either the community by nature, nor in any one particular man by nature; and that every man is born free, so as no man, rather than his brother, is born a king and a ruler, I hope, God willing, to make good, so as the Prelate shall never answer on the contrary. 3. It followeth not that the posterity living, when their fathers made a covenant with their first elected king, may without any breach of covenant on the king's part, make void and null their fathers' election of a king, and choose another king, because the lawful covenant of the fathers, in point of government, if it be not broken, tyeth the children, but it cannot deprive them of their lawful liberty naturally inherent in them to choose the fittest man to be king; but of this hereafter more fully. 4. Spalato addeth, (the Prelate is not a faithful thief,) "If the community by the law of nature have power of all forms of government, and so should be, by nature, under popular government, and yet should refuse a monarchy and an aristocracy," yet, Augustine addeth,2 "If the people should prefer their own private gain to the public good, and sell the commonwealth, then some good man might take their liberty from them, and, against their will, erect a monarchy or an aristocracy." But the Prelate (p. 97) and Augustine supposeth the people to be under popular government. This is not our case; for Spalato and the Prelate presupposeth by our grounds that the people by nature must be under popular government, Augustine dreameth no such thing, and we deny that by nature they are under any form of government. Augustine, in a case most considerable thinketh one good and potent man may take the corrupt people's power of giving honours, and making rulers from them, and give it to some good men, few or many, or to one; then Augustine layeth down as a ground that which Spalato and the Prelate denieth,—that the people hath power to appoint their own rulers; otherwise, how could one man take that power from them? The Prelate's fifth argument is but a branch of the fourth argument, and is answered already.
答案：1.教长可能也要感谢斯帕拉托提供的这个论点，因为它是偷来的；但他从未提到过他，以免他的盗窃行为被发现。他的其他论点也是从斯帕拉托那里偷来的；但教长削弱了它们，而且人们看到了偷来的货物没有被祝福。斯帕拉托说，按照自然法则，每个共和国都应该由人民来治理，而按照自然法则，人民应该处于最糟糕的政府之下；但这个结论并不成立；因为许多家庭组成的社区本质上并不受任何政府的统治，而可以选择其中的任何一种；因为民主政府并不是所有人都是统治者的政府，因为这是混乱而不是政府，因为所有人都是统治者，没有人被统治和管理。但在民主政府中，从人民中选出许多人来统治；而且这是最糟糕的政府是毫无根据地说的，没有依据；而且即使君主制本身是最好的，但当人们处于罪恶状态时，在其他方面它也有许多不便之处。2. 我不明白为什么民主制度最好，因为它最接近于大众制定国王的权力；因为如果这三种制度都依赖于人民的自由意志，那么它们对人民的自由选择来说都是一样远的，一样近的，根据人民认为对共和国的安全和保护最有利的方式，因为政府形式不比城市的政治组织更自然，也不比郡更自然；但是这是出于上帝的正式设立，他建立这个而不是那个，不是直接地，而是通过人们的自由意志；除了在实质上民主制度可能比君主制度更接近人民的权力之外，它的卓越性并不由此得出；因为按照这个理由，四的数量应该比五、十、一百、一千或一百万的数量更优秀，因为四接近亚里士多德所称的第一个完美数，其中还加上了τὸ πᾶν，然而在形式上，所有人都同样分享了数字的本质和实质。 否认从这个前提中可以得出结论，即人民有权选择自己的统治者；因此，除了民主或人民统治之外的所有政府都必须是罪恶和非法的，(1.) 因为君主制是神的安排，其他法官也是如此，这从上帝的话语中是明显的，罗马书 13:1-3；申命记 17:14；箴言 8:15, 16；彼得前书 2:13, 14；诗篇 2:10, 11 等。(2.) 选择任何形式的政府的权力在人民手中；因此，只有民主政府是合法的。它绝不是这样；但是假设选择任何形式的政府的权力必须是实际的政府；这是最错误的，是的，它们是相反的，就像优势或权力与行动是相反的一样；所以这两者是相反的，或者相反的。主权，或者任何政府，既不是本质上属于社区，也不是本质上属于任何一个人；每个人都是自由出生的，所以没有人，而不是他的兄弟，是生来就是国王和统治者，我希望，上帝愿意，能够证明这一点，以至于主教永远无法反驳。3. 并不意味着，当父辈与他们首位选定的国王缔结契约时，后代生活中的人们可以在国王没有违反契约的情况下，废除和取消他们父辈选举的国王，并选择另一位国王，因为父辈在政府方面的合法契约，如果没有被打破，就束缚了子女，但它不能剥夺他们天生具有的合法自由，即选择最合适的人担任国王的自由；但这一点以后会更详细地讨论。斯帕拉托补充道（主教不是一个忠诚的贼）：“如果社群根据自然法则拥有各种政府形式的权力，因此应该是自然地处于民主政府之下，但却拒绝君主制和贵族制”，然而，奥古斯丁补充道：“如果人民应该将自己的私利置于公共利益之上，并出卖共和国，那么一些善良的人可以从他们那里夺取他们的自由，并违背他们的意愿建立君主制或贵族制。”但主教（第 97 页）和奥古斯丁假设人民处于民主政府之下。 这不是我们的情况；对于斯帕拉托和主教来说，根据我们的观点，人民本质上必须处于民主政府之下，奥古斯丁并没有做出这样的假设，我们否认他们本质上属于任何形式的政府。在一个非常重要的案例中，奥古斯丁认为一个善良而有权势的人可以夺取腐败的人民赋予荣誉和制定统治者的权力，并将其赋予一些善良的人，无论是少数还是多数，或者只有一个人；然后奥古斯丁提出了一个前提，即斯帕拉托和主教否认的——人民有权力任命自己的统治者；否则，一个人怎么能夺取他们的权力呢？主教的第五个论点只是第四个论点的一个分支，已经得到了回答。

P. Prelate (chap. 11).—He would prove that kings of the people's making are not blessed of God. The first creature of the people's making was Abimelech (Judg. 9:22), who reigned only three years, well near Antichrist's time of endurance. He came to it by blood, and an evil spirit rose betwixt him and the men of Sechem, and he made a miserable end. The next was Jeroboam, who had this motto, He made Israel to sin. The people made him king, and he made the same pretence of a glorious reformation that our reformers now make: new calves, new altars, new feasts are erected; they banish the Levites and take in the scum and dross of the vulgar, &c. Every action of Christ is our instruction. Christ was truly born a king, notwithstanding, when the people would make him a king, he disclaimed it—he would not be an arbiter betwixt two brethren differing.
P. Prelate（第 11 章）。他要证明由人民选出的国王并不是上帝祝福的。人民选出的第一个国王是亚比米勒（士师记 9:22），他只统治了三年，接近于敌基督的统治时间。他通过流血而上位，邪恶的灵在他和示剑人之间兴起，他最终悲惨地结束了。下一个是耶罗波安，他的座右铭是他使以色列犯罪。人民选他为国王，他提出了与我们的改革者现在提出的相同的光荣改革的借口：建立新的牛犊、新的祭坛、新的节日；他们驱逐利未人，接纳庸俗的渣滓等等。基督的每一个行动都是我们的教导。基督确实是作为一个国王降生的，然而，当人民要封他为王时，他否认了这一点——他不愿意成为两个争执的兄弟之间的仲裁者。

Ans.—I am not to follow the Prelate's order every way, though, God willing, I shall reach him in the forthcoming chapters. Nor purpose I to answer his treasonable railing against his own nation, and the judges of the land, whom God hath set over this seditious excommunicated apostate. He layeth to us frequently the Jesuit's tenets, when as he is known himself to be a papist. In this argument he saith, Abimelech did reign only three years, well near Antichrist's reign. Is not this the basis and the mother principle of popery, That the Pope is not the Antichrist, for the Pope hath continued many ages? He is not an individual man, but a race of men; but the Antichrist, saith Belarmine, Stapleton, Becanus, and the nation of Jesuits and poplings, shall be one individual man—a born Jew, and shall reign only three years and a half. But, 1. The argument from success proveth nothing, except the Prelate prove their bad success to be from this, because they were chosen of the people. When as Saul chosen of God, and most of the kings of Israel and Judah, who, undeniably, had God's calling to the crown, were not blessed of God; and their government was a ruin to both people and religion, as the people were removed to all the kingdoms of the earth, for the sins of Manasseh, Jer. 15:4. Was therefore Manasseh not lawfully called to the crown? 2. For his instance of kings unlawfully called to the throne, he bringeth us whole two, and telleth us that he doubteth, as many learned men do, whether Jeroboam was a king by permission only, or by a commission from God. 3. Abimelech was cursed, because he wanted God's calling to the throne; for then Israel had no king, but judges, extraordinarily raised up by God; and God did not raise him at all, only he came to the throne by blood, and carnal reasons moving the men of Sechem to advance him. The argument presupposeth that the whole lawful calling of a king is the voices of the people. This we never taught, though the Prelate make conquest a just title to a crown, and it is but a title of blood and rapine. 4. Abimelech was not the first king, but only a judge. All our divines, with the word of God, maketh Saul the first king. 5. For Jeroboam had God's word and promise to be king, 1 Kings 11:34–38. But, in my weak judgment, he waited not God's time and way of coming to the crown; but that his coming to the throne was unlawful, because he came by the people's election, is in question. 6. That the people's reformation, and their making a new king, was like the kingdom of Scotland's reformation, and the parliament of England's way now, is a traitorous calumny. For, 1. It condemneth the king, who hath, in parliament, declared all their proceedings to be legal. Rehoboam never declared Jeroboam's coronation to be lawful, but, contrary to God's word, made war against Israel. 2. It is false that Israel pretended religion in that change. The cause was the rough answer given to the supplication of the estates, complaining of the oppression they were under in Solomon's reign. 3. Religion is still subjected to policy by prelates and cavaliers, not by us in Scotland, who sought nothing but reformation of religion, and of laws so far as they serve religion, as our supplications, declarations, and the event proveth. 4. We have no new calves, new altars, new feasts, but profess, and really do hazard, life and estate, to put away the Prelate's calves, images, tree-worship, altar-worship, saints, feast-days, idolatry, masses; and nothing is said here but Jesuits, and Canaanites, and Baalites, might say, (though falsely) against the reformation of Josiah. Truth and purity of worship this year is new in relation to idolatry last year, but it is simpliciter older. 5. We have not put away the Lord's priests and Levites, and taken in the scum of the vulgar, but have put away Baal's priests, such as excommunicated Prelate Maxwell and other apostates, and resumed the faithful servants of God, who were deprived and banished for standing to the Protestant faith, sworn to by the prelates themselves. 6. Every action of Christ, such as his walking on the sea, is not our instruction in that sense, that Christ's refusing a kingdom is directly our instruction. And did Christ refuse to be a king, because the people would have made him a king? That is, non causa pro causa, he refused it, because his kingdom was not in this world, and he came to suffer for men, not to reign over man. 7. The Prelate, and others who were lords of session, and would be judges of men's inheritances, and would usurp the sword by being lords of council and parliament, have refused to be instructed by every action of Christ, who would not judge betwixt brother and brother.
答案：我不会完全遵循主教的命令，但上帝愿意的话，我将在接下来的章节中与他见面。我也不打算回应他对自己的国家和法官的背叛性谩骂，上帝已经派他们来管理这个叛逆的被逐出教会的背教者。他经常把耶稣会士的信条归咎于我们，而他自己却被认为是天主教徒。在这个论点中，他说亚比米勒只统治了三年，几乎接近于敌基督的统治。这不就是天主教的基础和母体原则吗？即教皇不是敌基督，因为教皇已经持续了很多年了？他不是一个个体，而是一群人；但是，贝拉米尼、斯特普尔顿、贝卡努斯以及耶稣会和教皇的国家都说，敌基督将是一个个体，一个出生的犹太人，只统治三年半。但是，1.从成功的论点中无法证明任何事情，除非主教能证明他们的不良结果是因为他们是人民选择的。 当扫罗被上帝选中，并且以色列和犹大的大多数国王，无可否认地，他们都是上帝呼召的，但他们并没有得到上帝的祝福；他们的统治对人民和宗教都是一种毁灭，因为人民因玛拿西的罪孽而被驱逐到地球上的所有王国，耶利米书 15:4。所以，玛拿西是否合法地被呼召为国王？2.关于那些非法登基的国王，他给我们举了两个例子，并告诉我们，像许多有学问的人一样，他怀疑耶罗波安是否只是凭许可成为国王，还是得到了上帝的委任。3.亚比米勒被诅咒，因为他没有得到上帝的呼召成为国王；因为那时以色列没有国王，只有上帝特别兴起的法官；上帝根本没有提拔他，只是他凭血缘和肉体原因使示剑的人们推举他上位。这个论点假设合法的国王呼召是人民的声音。我们从未教导过这一点，尽管主教将征服视为合法登基的正当理由，但这只是血腥和掠夺的理由。4.亚比米勒不是第一位国王，只是一位法官。我们所有的神学家，都以上帝的话语为准，认为扫罗是第一位国王。 耶罗波安有上帝的话和应许成为国王，列王记 11:34-38。但是，在我脆弱的判断中，他没有等待上帝的时机和方式来登基；而他登上王位的方式是否合法，因为他是通过人民的选举而来，还有待商榷。人民的改革和他们选举新国王，与苏格兰王国的改革和英格兰议会的方式完全不同，这是一种背叛性的诽谤。因为，1. 这谴责了国王，在议会中，他宣布了所有他们的行动都是合法的。罗波安从未宣布耶罗波安的加冕是合法的，反而违背上帝的话，对以色列发动了战争。2. 以色列在那次变革中假装是出于宗教的原因是错误的。原因是对国家的请愿书给予的粗鲁回答，抱怨他们在所罗门统治下所受的压迫。3. 宗教仍然受到主教和骑士的政策支配，而不是我们在苏格兰，我们只追求宗教的改革，以及法律在服务宗教方面的改革，正如我们的请愿书、声明和事件所证明的那样。4. 我们没有新的小牛犊、新的祭坛、新的节日，但我们真正冒着生命和财产的危险，去除主教的小牛犊、偶像、树木崇拜、祭坛崇拜、圣人、节日、偶像崇拜和弥撒；这里只说了耶稣会士和迦南人、巴力人可能会说（虽然是虚假的），反对约西亚的改革。今年的真理和敬拜的纯洁与去年的偶像崇拜相比是新的，但它在本质上更古老。5.我们没有去除主的祭司和利未人，接纳了庸俗之辈，而是去除了巴力的祭司，如被逐出教会的主教麦克斯韦尔和其他背教者，并恢复了那些因坚守由主教们自己宣誓的新教信仰而被剥夺和流放的忠诚的神仆。6.基督的每一个行动，如他在海上行走，不是我们的教导，以至于基督拒绝国王直接成为我们的教导。基督拒绝成为国王，是因为人们想要他成为国王吗？也就是说，他拒绝了，因为他的国不在这个世界上，他来是为了为人类受苦，而不是为了统治人类。7. 大主教和其他担任会议贵族的人，他们想成为人们继承权的裁判者，通过成为议会和国会的贵族来篡夺权力，他们拒绝接受基督的每一个行动所传达的教诲，基督不愿在兄弟之间做出判断。

P. Prelate.—Jephthah came to be judge by covenant betwixt him and the Gileadites. Here you have an interposed act of man, yet the Lord himself, in authorising him as judge, vindicateth it no less to himself, than when extraordinarily he authorised Gideon and Samuel, 1 Sam. 12:11; therefore, whatsoever act of man interveneth, it contributeth nothing to royal authorit—it cannot weaken or repeal it.
P. Prelate.——耶弗他成为吉列亚底人之间的约定的裁判。在这里，你有一个人的干预行为，然而主自己在授权他作为裁判时，对此的辩护与他特别授权基甸和撒母耳时一样，撒母耳记上 12:11；因此，无论人的行为如何干预，它对王权的授权没有任何贡献——它不能削弱或废除它。

Ans.—It was as extraordinary that Jephthah, a bastard and the son of an harlot, I should be judge, as that Gideon should be judge. God vindicateth to himself, that he giveth his people favour in the eyes of their enemies. But doth it follow that the enemies are not agents, and to be commended for their humanity in favouring the people of God? So Psal. 65:9, 10, God maketh corn to grow, therefore clouds, and earth, and sun, and summer, and husbandry, contributeth nothing to the growing of corn. But this is but that which he said before. We grant that this is an eminent and singular act of God's special providence, that he moveth and boweth the wills of a great multitude to promote such a man, who, by nature, cometh no more out of the womb a crowned king, than the poorest shepherd in the land; and it is an act of grace to endue him with heroic and royal parts for the government. But what is all this? Doth it exclude the people's consent? In no ways. So the works of supernatural grace, as to love Christ above all things, to believe in Christ in a singular manner, are ascribed to the rich grace of God, But can the Prelate say that the understanding and will, in these acts, are merely passive, and contributeth no more than the people contributeth to royal authority in the king? and that is just nothing by the Prelate's way. And we utterly deny, that as water in baptism hath no action at all in the working of remission of sins, so the people hath no influence in making a king; for the people are worthier and more excellent than the king, and they have an active power of ruling and directing themselves toward the intrinsical end of human policy, which is the external safety and peace of a society, in so far as there are moral principles of the second table, for this effect, written in their heart; and, therefore, that royal authority which, by God's special providence, is united in one king, and, as it were, over-gilded and lustred with princely grace and royal endowments, is diffused in the people, for the people hath an after-approbative consent in making a king, as royalists confess water hath no such action in producing grace.
答案——耶弗他是一个私生子，是妓女的儿子，他能成为法官，就像基甸能成为法官一样，这是非同寻常的。上帝为自己辩护，他使他的子民在敌人眼中获得恩宠。但这是否意味着敌人不是行动者，不应该因为他们支持上帝的子民而受到赞扬？就像诗篇 65:9,10 所说，上帝使庄稼生长，因此云彩、大地、太阳、夏天和农业对庄稼的生长没有贡献。但这只是他之前所说的。我们承认这是上帝特殊的显著和独特的行动，他使众多人的意愿倾向于支持这样一个人，这个人从本质上来说，与这个国家最贫穷的牧羊人一样，并不是天生的加冕国王；将他赋予英雄和王者的才能来治理是一种恩典。但这一切又如何？难道这排除了人民的同意吗？绝对不是。 因此，超自然的恩典的作用，如将基督置于万物之上的爱，以及以独特的方式相信基督，都归功于上帝丰富的恩典。但是，主教能否说，在这些行为中，理解和意愿仅仅是被动的，对国王的权威没有任何贡献？按照主教的观点，这几乎等于没有。我们完全否认，就像洗礼中的水在赦免罪孽的工作中没有任何作用一样，人民在立国王的过程中没有任何影响；因为人民比国王更有价值，更卓越，他们有主动的权力来统治和引导自己朝着人类政策的内在目标，即社会的外部安全和和平，因为他们心中有第二诫的道德原则，为此目的而写入；因此，那种由上帝特别的安排，在一个国王身上统一起来的王权，就像镀金和镀亮了王者的恩典和王室的才能一样，是在人民中传播的，因为人民在立国王的过程中有事后的赞同同意，正如王党派承认水没有在产生恩典方面的作用一样。

QUESTION IX
问题九

WHETHER OR NO SOVEREIGNTY IS SO FROM THE PEOPLE, THAT IT REMAINETH IN THEM IN SOME PART, SO AS THEY MAY, IN CASE OF NECESSITY, RESUME IT
无论主权是否来自人民，它在某种程度上仍然属于他们，以便在必要时可以重新夺回

The Prelate will have it Babylonish confusion, that we are divided in opinion. Jesuits (saith he) place all sovereignty in the community. Of the sectaries, some warrant any one subject to make away his king, and such a work is no less to be rewarded than when one killeth a wolf. Some say this power is in the whole community; some will have it in the collective body, not convened by warrant or writ of sovereignty; but when necessity (which is often fancied) of reforming state and church, calleth them together; some in the nobles and peers; some in the three estates assembled by the king's writ; some in the inferior judges.
主教认为我们意见不一，像巴比伦一样混乱。耶稣会士（他说）将主权全部归于社群。在教派中，有些人认为任何一个臣民都有权杀死国王，这样的行为应该得到奖励，就像杀死一只狼一样。有些人说这种权力在整个社群中，有些人认为它在没有主权授权或命令的情况下集体机构中，但当需要（通常是幻想的）改革国家和教会时，他们才会被召集在一起；有些人认为它在贵族和贵族中，有些人认为它在国王的命令下召集的三个阶级中，有些人认为它在下级法官中。

I answer, If the Prelate were not a Jesuit himself, he would not bid his brethren take the mote out of their eye; but there is nothing here said but what Barclaius said better before this plagiarius. To which I answer, We teach that any private man may kill a tyrant, void of all title; and that great Royalist saith so also. And if he have not the consent of the people, he is an usurper, for we know no external lawful calling that kings have now, or their family, to the crown, but only the call of the people. All other calls to us are now invisible and unknown; and God would not command us to obey kings, and leave us in the dark, that we shall not know who is the king. The Prelate placeth his lawful calling to the crown, in such an immediate, invisible, and subtle act of omnipotency, as that whereby God conferreth remission of sins, by spinkling with water in baptism, and that whereby God directed Samuel to anoint Saul and David, not Eliab, nor any other brother. It is the devil in the P. P., not any of us, who teach that any private man may kill a lawful king, though tyrannous in his government. For the subject of royal power, we affirm, the first, and ultimate, and native subject of all power, is the community, as reasonable men naturally inclining to a society; but the ethical and political subject, or the legal and positive receptacle of this power, is various, according to the various constitutions of the policy. In Scotland and England, it is the three estates of parliament; in other nations, some other judges or peers of the land. The Prelate had no more common sense for him to object a confusion of opinion to us, for this, than to all the commonwealths on earth, because all have not parliaments, as Scotland hath. All have not constables, and officials, and churchmen, and barons, lords of council, parliaments, &c., as England had: but the truth is, the community, orderly convened, as it includeth all the estates civil, have hand, and are to act in choosing their rulers. I see not what privilege nobles have, above commons, in a court of parliament, by God's law; but as they are judges, all are equally judges, and all make up one congregation of God's. But the question now is, If all power of governing (the Prelate, to make all the people kings, saith, if all sovereignty) be so in the people that they retain power to guard themselves against tyranny; and if they retain some of it, habitu, in habit, and in their power. I am not now unseasonably, according to the Prelate's order, to dispute of the power of lawful defence against tyranny; but, I lay down this maxim of divinity: Tyranny being a work of Satan, is not from God, because sin, either habitual or actual, is not from God; the power that is, must be from God; the magistrate, as magistrate, is good in nature of office, and the intrinsic end of his office, (Rom. 13:4) for he is the minister of God for thy good; and, therefore, a power ethical, politic, or moral, to oppress, is not from God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power; and is no more from God, but from sinful nature and the old serpent, than a license to sin. God in Christ giveth pardons of sin, but the Pope, not God, giveth dispensations to sin. To this add, if for nature to defend itself be lawful, no community, without sin, hath power to alienate and give away this power; for as no power given to man to murder his brother is of God, so no power to suffer his brother to be murdered is of God; and no power to suffer himself, a fortiori, far less can be from God. Here I speak not of physical power, for if free will be the creature of God, a physical power to acts which, in relation to God's law, are sinful, must be from God.
我回答说，如果主教本身不是耶稣会士，他就不会要求他的兄弟们从自己的眼中取出木屑；但这里说的都是巴克莱在这个剽窃者之前更好地说过的话。对此我回答说，我们教导任何私人都可以杀死一个毫无合法地位的暴君；那位伟大的王党派也这样说。如果他没有人民的同意，他就是篡位者，因为我们现在不承认国王或他们的家族对王位的任何外部合法召唤，只承认人民的召唤。对我们来说，其他的召唤现在是看不见和未知的；上帝不会命令我们顺从国王，却让我们处于黑暗中，不知道谁是国王。主教将他对王位的合法召唤放在了一种直接、看不见和微妙的全能行为中，就像上帝通过洗礼用水洒来赦免罪过的行为，以及上帝指示撒母耳膏抹扫罗和大卫的行为，而不是以利押或其他任何兄弟。教皇派里的恶魔，而不是我们中的任何人，教导任何私人都可以杀死一个合法的国王，即使他在统治中是暴虐的。 对于皇权的主题，我们肯定，第一，最终和本土的权力主体是社区，因为理性的人天然倾向于社会；但是伦理和政治主体，或者说是这种权力的法律和正式的容器，根据政策的不同构成也不同。在苏格兰和英格兰，它是议会的三个阶级；在其他国家，是其他一些法官或者土地上的贵族。主教对于他对我们提出的意见混乱一事，没有比对地球上所有的共和国更有常识，因为并非所有国家都有像苏格兰那样的议会。并非所有国家都有警察、官员、教士、男爵、国务院、议会等，就像英格兰那样：但事实是，有秩序地召集的社区，因为它包括所有的公民阶级，有权利并且应该在选择他们的统治者时行动。我不明白贵族在上帝的法律中在议会中有什么特权；但是作为法官，所有人都是平等的法官，所有人都组成了上帝的一个集会。 但现在的问题是，如果所有的统治权力（主教说，如果所有的主权）都在人民手中，他们保留了保护自己免受暴政的权力；而且他们保留了一部分权力，习惯上，在他们的权力范围内。根据主教的命令，我现在不是不合时宜地争论合法抵抗暴政的权力；但是，我提出了这个神学原则：暴政是撒旦的作品，不是来自上帝，因为罪，无论是习惯性的还是实际的，都不是来自上帝；存在的权力必须来自上帝；作为统治者，作为统治者，他的本质是善良的，他的职责的内在目标是善良的（罗马书 13:4），因为他是上帝的仆人，为了你的利益；因此，压迫的伦理、政治或道德权力不是来自上帝，也不是一种权力，而是权力的放肆偏离；它不是来自上帝，而是来自罪恶的本性和老蛇，就像犯罪的许可证一样。上帝在基督里赦免罪过，但教皇，不是上帝，给予犯罪的特许。 如果自然保护自身是合法的，那么没有一个社群可以无罪地剥夺和放弃这种权力；因为上帝不会给予人杀害自己兄弟的权力，同样上帝也不会给予人容忍他的兄弟被杀害的权力；更不用说容忍自己被杀害的权力了。这里我不是指物理力量，因为如果自由意志是上帝的创造物，那么在与上帝的法律相关的行为中，一种物理力量必须来自上帝，即使这些行为是有罪的。

But I now follow the P. Prelate (c. ix., p. 101, 102).—Some of the adversaries, as Buchanan, say that the parliament hath no power to make a law, but only προξουλευμα without the approbation of the community. Others, as the Observator, say, that the right of the gentry and commonalty is entirely in the knights and burgesses of the House of Commons, and will have their orders irrevocable. If, then, the common people cannot resume their power and oppose the parliament, how can tables and parliaments resume their power and resist the king?
但我现在追随 P. Prelate（第九章，第 101 页，102 页）。一些对手，如布坎南，说议会无权制定法律，只能在社区的批准下进行προξουλευμα。另一些人，如观察家，说绅士和平民的权利完全掌握在下议院的骑士和市民手中，并且他们的命令是不可撤销的。如果普通民众不能恢复他们的权力并反对议会，那么桌子和议会如何恢复他们的权力并抵抗国王呢？

Ans.—The ignorant man should have thanked Barclaius for this argument, and yet Barclaius need not thank him, for it hath not the nerves that Barclaius gave it. But I answer, 1. If the parliament should have been corrupted by fair hopes (as in our age we have seen the like) the people did well to resist the Prelate's obtruding the Mass Book, when the lords of the council pressed it, against all law of God and man, upon the kingdom of Scotland; and, therefore, it is denied that the acts of parliament are irrevocable. The observator said they were irrevocable by the king, he being but one man; the P. Prelate wrongeth him, for he said only, they have the power of a law, and the king is obliged to consent, by his royal office, to all good laws, and neither king nor people may oppose them. Buchanan said, Acts of parliament are not laws, obliging the people, till they be promulgated; and the people's silence, when they are promulgated, is their approbation, and maketh them obligatory laws to them; but if the people speak against unjust laws, they are not laws at all: and Buchanan knew the power of the Scottish parliament better than this ignorant statist. 2. There is not like reason to grant so much to the king, as to parliaments, because, certainly, parliaments who make kings under God, or above any one man, and they must have more authority and wisdom than any one king, except Solomon (as base flatterers say) should return to the thrones of the earth. And as the power to make just laws is all in the parliament, only the people have power to resist tyrannical laws. The power of all the parliament was never given to the king by God. The parliament are as essentially judges as the king, and, therefore, the king's deed may well be revoked, because he acteth nothing as king, but united with his great or lesser council, no more than the eye can see, being separated from the body. The peers and members of parliament have more than the king, because they have both their own power, being parts and special members of the people, and, also, they have their high places in parliament, either from the people's express or tacit consent. 3. We allow no arbitrary power to the parliament, because their just laws are irrevocable; for the irrevocable power of making just laws doth argue a legal, not an irrevocable, arbitrary power; nor is there any arbitrary power in the people, or in any mortal man. But of the covenant betwixt king and people hereafter.
答案——无知之人应该感谢巴克莱斯提出的这个论点，然而巴克莱斯不需要感谢他，因为这个论点并没有巴克莱斯赋予它的力量。但我回答，1. 如果议会被美好的希望腐化（正如我们这个时代所见），当议会贵族强迫教士在苏格兰王国上推行弥撒书时，人民很好地抵制了教士的强迫，这违背了上帝和人的法律；因此，否认议会的法令是不可撤销的。观察家说它们是国王无法撤销的，因为国王只是一个人；教士冤枉了他，因为他只是说，它们有法律的力量，国王作为国王有义务通过他的王室职责同意所有好的法律，国王和人民都不能反对它们。布坎南说，议会的法令在宣布之前不是对人民有约束力的法律；当它们被宣布时，人民的沉默就是他们的赞同，并使它们对他们具有约束力的法律；但如果人民反对不公正的法律，那么它们根本不是法律：布坎南比这个无知的统计学家更了解苏格兰议会的权力。2. 给予国王如此多的权力，没有比给予议会更合理的理由，因为议会确实是在上帝之下，或者高于任何一个人的地位，他们必须拥有比任何一个国王更多的权威和智慧，除了所罗门（如谄媚者所说）之外，他们应该重新回到地球的王位上。正义法律的制定权完全掌握在议会手中，只有人民有权力抵制暴政法律。上帝从未将全部议会权力赋予国王。议会和国王一样是法官的本质，因此国王的行为可以被撤销，因为他并不是作为国王行事，而是与他的大或小委员会合作，就像眼睛离开身体一样。贵族和议会成员比国王更有权力，因为他们既拥有自己的权力，又是人民的一部分和特殊成员，而且他们在议会中拥有高位，无论是出于人民的明示还是默示同意。 我们不允许议会拥有任意权力，因为他们的公正法律是不可撤销的；因为制定公正法律的不可撤销权力表明的是合法的，而不是任意的不可撤销权力；人民或任何凡人都没有任意权力。但是，关于国王和人民之间的契约，我们将在后面讨论。

P. Prelate (c. 10, p. 105).—If sovereign power be habitually in the community, so as they may resume it at their pleasure, then nothing is given to the king but an empty title; for, at the same instant, he receiveth empire and sovereignty, and layeth down the power to rule or determine in matters which concern either private or public good, and so he is both a king and a subject.
如果主权权力在社群中习以为常，以至于他们可以随意夺回权力，那么国王只是一个空洞的头衔；因为在同一瞬间，他既接受了帝国和主权，又放弃了在涉及私人或公共利益的事务中统治或决定的权力，所以他既是国王又是臣民。

Ans.—This naked consequence the Prelate saith and proveth not, and we deny it, and give this reason, The king receiveth royal power with the states to make good laws, and power by his royalty to execute those laws, and this power the community hath devolved in the hands of the king and states of parliament; but the community keepeth to themselves a power to resist tyranny, and to coerce it, and eatenus in so far is Saul subject, that David is not to compear before him, nor to lay down Goliah's sword, nor disband his army of defence, though the king should command him so to do.
答案：这位主教所说的裸露的结果没有证明，我们否认这一点，并给出这个理由，国王与国家一起接受皇权以制定良好的法律，并通过他的皇权来执行这些法律，而这种权力社区已经转交给国王和议会国家；但是社区保留了自己抵抗暴政并加以制约的权力，因此才有了扫罗受制约的情况，即大卫不需要出现在他面前，也不需要放下歌利亚的剑，也不需要解散他的防御军队，即使国王命令他这样做。

P. Prelate (c. xvi. pp. 105–107).—By all politicians, kings and inferior magistrates are differenced by their different specific entity, but by this they are not differenced; nay, a magistrate is in a better condition than a king, for the magistrate is to judge by a known statute and law, and cannot be censured and punished but by law. But the king is censurable, yea, disabled by the multitude; yea, the basest of subjects may cite and convent the king, before the underived majesty of the community, and he may be judged by the arbitrary law that is in the closet of their hearts, not only for real misdemeanour, but for fancied jealousies. It will be said, good kings are in danger; the contrary appeareth this day, and ordinarily the best are in greatest danger. No government, except Plato's republic, wanteth incommodities: subtle spirits may make them apprehend them. The poor people, bewitched, follow Absalom in his treason; they strike not at royalty at first, but labour to make the prince naked of the good council of great statesmen, &c.
P. Prelate（第 16 页 105-107 页）。所有政治家都认为国王和下级官员是因其不同的特定实体而有所区别，但他们并不因此而有所区别；相反，官员的状况比国王更好，因为官员必须根据已知的法规和法律来判断，并且只能受到法律的指责和惩罚。但国王是可指责的，甚至被众多人所剥夺权力；是的，最卑微的臣民也可以在社群的至高无上权威面前传唤和传讯国王，并且可以根据他们内心深处的专横法律来判决国王，不仅仅是因为真实的过失，还包括虚构的嫉妒。有人会说，好国王也会有危险；然而事实却相反，通常最好的国王面临最大的危险。除了柏拉图的共和国之外，没有任何政府是没有不便之处的：敏锐的人可能会让他们意识到这些不便之处。贫穷的人民被迷惑，跟随阿布沙隆参与叛乱；他们一开始并没有针对皇权，而是努力让王子失去伟大政治家的良好建议等。

Ans.—Whether the king and the under magistrate differ essentially, we shall see. 1. The P. Prelate saith all politicians grant it, but he saith untruth. He bringeth the power of Moses and the judges to prove the power of kings; and so either the judges of Israel and the kings differ not essentially, or then the Prelate must correct the spirit of God, terming one book of Scripture מלכים Kings, and another שוּבּטיﬦ Judges, and make the book of Kings the book of Judges. 2. The magistrate's condition is not better than the king's, because the magistrate is to judge by a known statute and law, and the king not so. God moulded the first king, (Deut. 17:18,) when he sitteth judging on his throne, to look to a written copy of the law of God, as his rule. Now, a power to follow God's law is better than a power to follow man's sinful will; so the Prelate putteth the king in a worse condition than the magistrate, not we, who will have the king to judge according to just statutes and laws. 3. Whether the king be censurable and deposable by the multitude, he cannot determine out of our writings. 4. The community's law is the law of nature—not their arbitrary lust. 5. The Prelate's treasonable railings I cannot follow. He saith that we agree not ten of us to a positive faith, and that our faith is negative; but his faith is Privative, Popish, Socinian, Arminian, Pelagian, and worse, for he was one of that same faith that we are of. Our Confession of Faith is positive, as the confession of all the reformed churches; but I judge he thinketh the Protestant faith of all the reformed churches but negative. The incommodities of government, before our reformation, were not fancied, but printed by authority. All the body of popery was printed and avowed as the doctrine of the Church of Scotland and England, as the learned author, and my much respected brother, evidenceth in his Ludensium, ἀυτο κατακρισες, the Canterburian Self-conviction. The parliament of England was never yet found guilty of treason. The good counsellors of great statesmen, that parliaments of both kingdoms would take from the king's majesty, are a faction of perjured Papists, Prelates, Jesuits, Irish cut-throats, Strafords, and Apostates; subverters of all laws, divine, human, of God, of church, of state.
答案：关于国王和下级官员是否本质上不同，我们将会看到。1. P. Prelate 说所有政治家都承认这一点，但他说的不对。他引用了摩西和法官的权力来证明国王的权力；所以要么以色列的法官和国王本质上没有区别，要么 Prelate 必须更正上帝的灵感，将一本经书称为"国王"，将另一本经书称为"法官"，并将国王的书变成法官的书。2. 官员的地位并不比国王好，因为官员是根据已知的法规和法律来判断，而国王不是。上帝塑造了第一位国王（申命记 17:18），当他坐在宝座上审判时，要看上帝的律法的书写副本作为他的准则。现在，遵循上帝的律法的权力比遵循人的罪恶意愿的权力更好；所以 Prelate 把国王置于比官员更糟糕的境地，而不是我们，我们要求国王根据公正的法规和法律来判断。3. 关于国王是否可以受到群众的批评和废黜，我们的著作中无法确定。4. 社区的法律是自然法，而不是他们的任意欲望。5. 主教的背叛言辞我无法追随。他说我们十个人中没有一个能达成一种肯定的信仰，我们的信仰是否定的；但他的信仰是剥夺的、教皇的、索西尼派的、阿米纳派的、佩拉格派的，甚至更糟，因为他曾经是我们所信仰的那种信仰的一员。我们的信仰告白是肯定的，就像所有改革派教会的告白一样；但我判断他认为所有改革派教会的新教信仰只是否定的。我们改革之前的政府的不便之处并非臆想，而是经过授权印刷的。整个天主教的体系被印刷并公开宣称为苏格兰和英格兰教会的教义，正如那位博学的作者和我非常尊敬的兄弟在他的《Ludensium, ἀυτο κατακρισες》中所证明的那样，坎特伯雷自我定罪。英格兰议会从未被判有罪。两国议会从国王陛下那里夺走的伟大政治家的好建议，是一群背信弃义的天主教徒、主教、耶稣会士、爱尔兰刺客、斯特拉福德和叛教者的帮派；他们颠覆了所有的神的法律、人的法律、上帝的法律、教会的法律和国家的法律。

P. Prelate (c. 15, pp. 147, 148).—In whomsoever this power of government be it is the only remedy to supply all defects, and to set right whatever is disjointed in church and state, and the subject of this superintending power must be free from all error in judgment and practice, and so we have a pope in temporalibus; and if the parliament err the people must take order with them, else God hath left church and state remediless.
在任何人身上，这种政府权力都是唯一的补救措施，可以弥补教会和国家中的所有缺陷，并纠正一切不协调之处。这种监督权力的对象必须在判断和实践上没有任何错误，因此我们在世俗事务中有一个教皇；如果议会犯错，人民必须对他们采取措施，否则上帝将使教会和国家无法得到救治。

Ans.—1. This is stolen from Barclaius also, who saith, Si Rex regnum suum alienæ ditioni manciparit, regno cadit: "If the king shall sell his kingdom, or enslave it to a foreign power, he falleth from all right to his kingdom." But who shall execute any such law against him?—not the people, not the peers, not the parliament; for this mancipium ventris et aulæ, this slave saith, (p. 149,) "I know no power in any to punish or curb sovereignty but in Almighty God." 2. We see no superintending power on earth, in king or people, which is infallible, nor is the last power of taking order with a prince who enslaveth his kingdom to a foreign power, placed by us in the people because they cannot err. Court flatterers, who teach that the will of the prince is the measure of all right and wrong, of law and no law, and above all law, must hold that the king is a temporal pope, both in ecclesiastical and civil matters; but because they cannot so readily destroy themselves (the law of nature having given to them a contrary internal principle of self-preservation) as a tyrant who doth care for himself, and not for the people. 3. And because Extremis morbis extrema remedia, in an extraordinary exigent, when Ahab and Jezebel did undo the church of God, and tyrannise over both the bodies and consciences of priest, prophet and people, Elijah procured the convention of the states, and Elijah, with the people's help, killed all Baal's priests, the king looking on, without question, against his heart. In this case I think it is more than evident that the people resumed their power. 4. We teach not that people should supply all defects in government, nor that they should use their power when anything is done amiss by the king, no more than the king is to cut off the whole people of God when they refuse an idolatrous service, obtruded upon them against all law. The people are to suffer much before they resume their power; but this court slave will have the people to do what he did not himself; for when king and parliament summoned him, was he not obliged to appear? Non-compearance when lawful, royal, and parliamentary power summoneth, is no less resistance than taking of ports and castles.
答案：1. 这也是从巴克莱斯那里偷来的，他说：“如果国王出售他的王国，或将其奴役于外国势力，他将失去对王国的所有权利。”但是谁会对他执行这样的法律呢？不是人民，不是贵族，也不是议会；因为这个奴隶说，（第 149 页）“我知道没有人有权力惩罚或限制主权，除了全能的上帝。”2. 我们在地球上看不到任何超越性的权力，无论是国王还是人民，都是不可错误的，也没有最后的权力来处理那些将他的王国奴役于外国势力的君主，因为我们将这种权力放在人民身上，因为他们不能犯错。那些教导国王的意愿是一切权利和错误、法律和非法律的尺度，并且高于一切法律的宫廷谄媚者，必须认为国王是一个世俗的教皇，既在教会事务上，也在民事事务上；但是因为他们不能像只关心自己而不关心人民的暴君那样轻易毁灭自己（自然法则给予他们相反的自我保护内在原则）。3. 因为疾病的极端需要极端的治疗，当亚哈和耶洗别毁灭上帝的教会，并且对牧师、先知和信徒的身体和良心进行暴政时，以利亚召集了各州的代表大会，并在人民的帮助下杀死了巴力的所有祭司，国王毫不犹豫地看着，不顾他的内心。在这种情况下，我认为很明显，人民恢复了他们的权力。我们并不教导人民应该弥补政府的所有缺陷，也不教导人民在国王做错事情时应该使用他们的权力，就像国王不应该在人民拒绝一种违法的崇拜时割断上帝的整个子民一样。人民在恢复他们的权力之前必须承受很多苦难；但是这个宫廷奴才希望人民做他自己没有做的事情；因为当国王和议会召唤他时，他不是被迫出庭吗？当合法的、王室的和议会的权力召唤时，不出庭就是抵抗，不亚于攻占港口和城堡。

P. Prelate.—Then this superintending power in people may call a king to account, and punish him for any misdemeanour or act of injustice. Why might not the people of Israel's peers, or sanhedrim, have convented David before them, judged and punished him for his adultery with Bethsheba, and his murder of Uriah. But it is held by all that tyranny should be an intended universal, total, manifest destruction of the whole commonwealth, which cannot fall in the thoughts of any but a madman. What is recorded in the story of Nero's wish in this kind, may be rather judged the expression of transported passion than a fixed resolution.
主教：那么，人民手中的这种监督权力可以追究国王的责任，并因其任何不端行为或不公正行为对其进行惩罚。为什么以色列人民的同辈或圣会不能召集大卫，审判并惩罚他与拔示巴的通奸和他杀乌利亚的行为呢？但众人都认为，暴政应该是有意的、普遍的、彻底的、明显的对整个共和国的摧毁，这种想法只会出现在疯子的脑海中。尼禄在这方面的愿望在故事中所记载的，可能更应该被视为情感的表达，而不是一个确定的决议。

Ans.—The P. Prelate, contrary to the scope of his book, which is all for the subject and seat of sovereign power, against all order, hath plunged himself in the deep of defensive arms, and yet hath no new thing. 1, Our law of Scotland will warrant any subject, if the king take from him his heritage, or invade his possession against law, to resist the invaders, and to summon the king's intruders before the lords of session for that act of injustice. Is this against God's word, or conscience? 2. The Sanhedrim did not punish David, therefore, it is not lawful to challenge a king for any one act of injustice: from the practice of the Sanhedrim to conclude a thing lawful or unlawful, is logic we may resist. 3. By the P. Prelate's doctrine, the law might not put Bathsheba to death, nor yet Joab, the nearest agent of the murdering of innocent Uriah, because Bathsheba's adultery was the king's adultery—she did it in obedience to king David; Joab's murder was royal murder, as the murder of all the cavaliers, for he had the king's handwriting for it. Murder is murder, and the murderer is to die, though the king by a secret let-alone, a private and illegal warrant, command it; therefore the Sanhedrim might have taken Bathsheba's life and Joab's head also; and, consequently, the parliament of England, if they be judges, (as I conceive God and the law of that ancient and renowned kingdom maketh them,) may take the head of many Joabs and Jermines for murder; for the command of a king cannot legitimate murder. 4. David himself, as king, speaketh more for us than for the Prelate,—2 Sam. 12:7, "And David's anger was greatly kindled against the man, (the man was himself, ver. 7, 'Thou art the man,') and he said to Nathan, as the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die." 5. Every act of injustice doth not unking a prince before God, as every act of uncleanness doth not make a wife no wife before God. 6. The Prelate excuseth Nero, and would not have him resisted, if "all Rome were one neck that he might cut it off with one stroke (I read it of Caligula; if the Prelate see more in history than I do, I yield). 7. He saith, the thoughts of total eversion of a kingdom must only fall on a madman. The king of Britain was not mad when he declared the Scots traitors (because they resisted the service of the mass) and raised an army of prelatical cut-throats to destroy them, if all the kingdom should resist idolatry (as all are obliged). The king slept upon this prelatical resolution many months: passions in fervour have not a day's reign upon a man; and this was not so clear as the sun, but it was as clear as written, printed proclamations, and the pressing of soldiers, and the visible marching of cut-throats, and the blocking up of Scotland by sea and land, could be visible to men having five senses.
答案——P. Prelate，与他的书的目的相反，他全力支持主权力的主题和地位，违背了所有秩序，陷入了防御武器的深渊，但却没有新的东西。1、我们苏格兰的法律将保护任何公民，如果国王夺走了他的遗产，或违法侵犯了他的财产，他可以抵抗侵犯者，并将国王的侵犯者传唤到会议贵族面前以对其不公行为进行审判。这是否违背了上帝的话语或良心？2、圣会没有惩罚大卫，因此，对国王提出任何不公正行为的质疑是不合法的：从圣会的实践中得出合法或非法的结论是我们可以反对的逻辑。3、根据 P. Prelate 的教义，法律不能处死拔示巴，也不能处死乔押，他是无辜乌利亚被谋杀的最近的参与者，因为拔示巴的通奸是国王的通奸-她是在顺从大卫王的命令下犯下的；乔押的谋杀是王室谋杀，就像所有骑士的谋杀一样，因为他有国王的亲笔信件作为凭证。 谋杀就是谋杀，凶手应该死，即使国王通过秘密的、私人的和非法的授权下令，因此圣会也可以夺去巴实巴的生命和约押的头颅；因此，如果英国议会是法官（我认为上帝和那个古老而著名的王国的法律使他们成为法官），他们可以为谋杀夺去许多约押和杰尔曼的头颅；因为国王的命令不能使谋杀合法。4. 作为国王，大卫为我们说得比主教还多——撒母耳记下 12:7，“大卫对那人（那人就是他自己，第 7 节说‘你就是那人’）大发烈怒，对拿单说，我指着永生的耶和华起誓，行这事的人该死。”5. 不公正的行为并不会在上帝面前使君王失去王位，就像不洁的行为并不会在上帝面前使妻子失去妻子的身份一样。6. 主教为尼禄开脱，如果“整个罗马都是一个脖子，他可以一刀砍掉”（我读到的是卡利古拉；如果主教在历史上看到的比我多，我就认输）。7. 他说，对一个王国的彻底颠覆的想法只能出现在一个疯子的脑海中。 英国国王在宣布苏格兰人为叛徒时并不疯狂（因为他们抵制弥撒仪式），并组建了一支由主教派刺客组成的军队来消灭他们，即使整个王国都抵制偶像崇拜（因为所有人都有义务如此）。国王对这个主教派的决议思考了很多个月：激情的热度不会在一个人身上持续一天；虽然这并不像太阳那样明确，但它像书面、印刷的宣言、士兵的征召、刺客的行军以及对苏格兰的海陆封锁一样清晰，对于有五感的人来说是可见的。

Covarruvias, a great lawyer, saith, that all civil power is penes remp. in the hands of the commonwealth; because nature hath given to man to be a social creature, and impossible he can preserve himself in a society except he, being in community, transform his power to an head. He saith: Hujus vero civilis societatis et resp. rector ab alio quam ab ipsamet repub. constitui non potest juste et absq. tyrannide. Siquidem ab ipso Deo constitatus non est, nec electus cuilibet civili societati immediate Rex aut Princeps. Arist. (polit. 3, c. 10) saith, "It is better that kings be got by election than by birth; because kingdoms by succession are vere regia, truly kingly: these by birth are more tyrannical, masterly, and proper to barbarous nations. And Covarruv. (tom. 2, pract. quest, de jurisd. Castellan. Reip. c. 1, n. 4,) saith, "Hereditary kings are also made hereditary by the tacit consent of the people, and so by law and consuetude."
科瓦鲁维亚斯，一位伟大的律师，说道，所有的公权力都掌握在共和国手中；因为大自然赋予人类成为社会性生物的能力，除非他在社群中将自己的权力转化为一个首领，否则他无法在社会中保护自己。他说：然而，这种公民社会和公共权力的领导者只能由共和国本身而非其他人来确定，否则就是不公正和暴政。因为他不是由上帝本人任命的，也不是由任何一个公民社会直接选出的国王或君主。亚里士多德（政治学第三卷第十章）说：“通过选举产生的国王比通过血统继承产生的国王更好，因为通过继承产生的国王真正具有国王的特质，而通过血统继承产生的国王更加暴虐、专制，更适合野蛮的民族。”科瓦鲁维亚斯（第二卷实践问题，关于卡斯蒂利亚共和国司法问题第一章第四条）说：“世袭国王也是通过人民的默许以及法律和习俗而成为世袭的。”

Spalato saith, "Let us grant that a society shall refuse to have a governor over them, shall they be for that free? In no sort, But there be many ways by which a people may be compelled to admit a governor; for then no man might rule over a community against their will. But nature hath otherwise disposed, ut quod singuli nollent, universi vellent, that which every one will not have, a community naturally desireth." And the Prelate saith, "God is no less the author of order than he is the author of being; for the Lord who createth all conserveth all; and without government all human societies should be dissolved and go to ruin: then government must be natural, and not depend upon a voluntary and arbitrary constitution of men. In nature the creatures inferior give a tacit consent and silent obedience to their superior, and the superior hath a powerful influence on the inferior. In the subordination of creatures we ascend from one superior to another, till at last we come to one supreme, which, by the way, pleadeth for the excellency of monarchy. Amongst angels there is an order; how can it then be supposed that God hath left it to the simple consent, of man to establish a heraldry of sub et supra, of one above another, which neither nature nor the gospel doth warrant? To leave it thus arbitrary, that upon this supposed principle mankind may be without government at all, is vain; which paradox cannot be maintained. In nature God hath established a superiority inherent in superior creatures, which is no ways derived from the inferior by communication in what proportion it will, and resumeable upon such exigents as the inferior listeth; therefore neither hath God left to the multitude, the community, the collective, the representative or virtual body, to derive from itself and communicate sovereignty, whether in one or few, or more, in what measure and proportion pleaseth them, which they resume at pleasure."
斯帕拉托说：“让我们假设一个社会拒绝有一个统治者，他们因此而自由吗？根本不是。但是有很多方法可以迫使人们接受一个统治者；因为没有人可以违背一个社区的意愿来统治。但是自然的安排是这样的，即使个别人不愿意，整个社区自然而然地渴望着。”主教说：“上帝不仅是存在的创造者，也是秩序的创造者；因为创造万物的主保护万物；没有政府，所有人类社会都会解体和毁灭：所以政府必须是自然的，而不是依赖于人们自愿和任意的构建。在自然界中，较低级的生物默默地同意和服从较高级的生物，而较高级的生物对较低级的生物有强大的影响力。在生物的层级中，我们从一个上级升到另一个上级，最后到达一个至高无上的存在，这也为君主制的卓越性辩护。” 在天使中存在一种秩序；那么，难道可以认为上帝将其留给了人的简单同意来建立一个超越和超越的传世纹章，而这既不是自然也不是福音所保证的吗？将其任意地留给这个假设的原则上，人类可能完全没有政府，这是徒劳的；这个悖论是无法维持的。在自然界中，上帝已经建立了一种优越性，这种优越性是优越生物固有的，绝不是通过与较低生物的沟通而获得的，也不是可以按照他们的意愿在某些紧急情况下恢复的；因此，上帝也没有将主权留给了众多的、共同的、集体的、代表性的或虚拟的机构，让它们从自身中派生和传达主权，无论是在一个人、少数人还是更多人中，以什么样的程度和比例取悦于他们，他们可以随意恢复这种主权。"

Ans.—To answer Spalato: No society hath liberty to be without all government, for "God hath given to every society," saith Covarruvias, "a faculty of preserving themselves, and warding off violence and injuries; and this they could not do except they gave their power to one or many rulers." But all that the Prelate buildeth on this false supposition, which is his fiction and calumny, not our doctrine, to wit, "that it is voluntary to man to be without all government, because it is voluntary to them to give away their power to one or more rulers," is a mere non-consequence. 1. We teach that government is natural, not voluntary; but the way and manner of government is voluntary. All societies should be quickly ruined if there were no government; but it followeth not, therefore, God hath made some kings, and that immediately, without the intervening consent of the people, and, therefore, it is not arbitrary to the people to choose one supreme ruler, and to erect a monarchy, or to choose more rulers, and to erect an aristocracy. It followeth no way. It is natural to men to express their mind by human voices. Is not speaking of this or that language, Greek rather than Latin, (as Aristotle saith,) κατὰ συνθηκὴν by human institution? It is natural for men to eat, therefore election of this or that meat is not in their choice. What reason is in this consequence? And so it is a poor consequence also, Power of sovereignty is in the people naturally, therefore it is not in their power to give it out in that measure that pleaseth them, and to resume it at pleasure. It followeth no way. Because the inherency of sovereignty is natural and not arbitrary, therefore, the alienation and giving out of the power to one, not to three, thus much, not thus much, conditionally, not absolutely and irrevocably, must be also arbitrary. It is as if you should say, a father having six children, naturally loveth them all, therefore he hath not freedom of will in expressing his affection, to give so much of his goods to this son, and that conditionally, if he use these goods well; and not more or less of his goods at his pleasure. 2. There is a natural subordination in nature in creatures superior and inferior, without any freedom of election. The earth made not the heavens more excellent than the earth, and the earth by no freedom of will made the heavens superior in excellency to itself. Man gave no superiority of excellency to angels above himself. The Creator of all beings did both immediately, without freedom of election in the creature, create the being of all the creatures, and their essential degrees of superiority and inferiority, but God created not Saul by nature king over Israel; nor is David by the act of creation by which he is made a man, created also king over Israel; for then David should from the womb and by nature be a king, and not by God's free gift. Here both the free gift of God, and the free consent of the people intervene. Indeed God made the office and royalty of a king above the dignity of the people, but he, by the intervening consent of the people, maketh David a king, not Eliab; and the people maketh a covenant at David's inauguration, that David shall have so much power, to wit, power to be a father, not power to be a tyrant,—power to fight for the people, not power to waste and destroy them. The inferior creatures in nature give no power to the superior, and therefore they cannot give in such a proportion power. The denial of the positive degree is a denial of the comparative and superlative, and so they cannot resume any power; but the designing of these men or those men to be kings or rulers is a rational, voluntary action, not an action of nature,—such as is God's act of creating an angel a nobler creature than man, and the creating of man a more excellent creature than a beast; and, for this cause, the argument is vain and foolish; for inferior creatures are inferior to the more noble and superior by nature, not by voluntary designation, or, as royalists say, by naked approbation, which yet must be an arbitrary and voluntary action. 3. The P. Prelate commendeth order while we come to the most supreme; hence he commendeth monarchy above all governments because it is God's government. I am not against it, that monarchy well-tempered is the best government, though the question to me is most problematic; but because God is a monarch who cannot err or deny himself, therefore that sinful man be a monarch is miserable logic; and he must argue solidly, forsooth, by this, because there is order, as he saith, amongst angels, will he make a monarch and a King-angel? His argument, if it have any weight at all in it, driveth at that, even that there be crowned kings amongst the angels. 重试    错误原因

QUESTION X
问题 X

WHETHER OR NOT ROYAL BIRTH BE EQUIVALENT TO DIVINE UNCTION
无论皇室出生是否等同于神圣的膏抹

Symmons holdeth that birth is as good a title to the crown, as any given of God. How this question can be cleared, I see not, except we dispute that, Whether or not kingdoms be proper patrimonies derived from the father to the son. I take there is a large difference betwixt a thing transmitable by birth from the father to the son, and a thing not transmitable. I conceive, as a person is chosen to be a king over a people, so a family or house may be chosen; and a kingdom at first choosing a person to be their king, may also tie themselves to choose the first-born of his body, but as they transfer their power to the father, for their own safety and peace, (not if he use the power they give him to their destruction,) the same way they tie themselves to his first-born, as to their king. As they choose the father not as a man, but a man gifted with royal grace and a princely faculty for government, so they can but tie themselves to his first-born, as to one graced with a faculty of governing; and if his first-born shall be born an idiot and a fool, they are not obliged to make him king; for the obligation to the son can be no greater than the obligation to the father, which first obligation is the ground, measure, and cause, of all posterior obligations. If tutors be appointed to govern such an one, the tutors have the royal power, not the idiot; nor can he govern others who cannot govern himself. That kings go not as heritage from the father to the son, I prove.
Symmons 认为，出生就像上帝赋予的任何权利一样，是继承王位的好理由。我不知道如何解决这个问题，除非我们争论这个问题，即王国是否是从父亲传给儿子的合法继承权。我认为，从父亲传给儿子的东西和不能传承的东西之间有很大的区别。我认为，就像一个人被选为人民的国王一样，一个家族或家庭也可以被选中；一个国家在最初选择一个人作为他们的国王时，也可以约束自己选择他的长子，但是当他们将权力转移给父亲时，是为了他们自己的安全和和平（如果他利用他们给予他的权力来摧毁他们，就不是这样了），他们也同样约束自己选择他的长子作为国王。 由于他们选择的是一个具有皇家恩典和王者才能的男人作为国王，所以他们只能将自己与他的长子联系在一起，因为长子被赋予了统治的才能；如果他的长子是个白痴和傻瓜，他们没有义务让他成为国王；因为对儿子的义务不能比对父亲的义务更大，而第一个义务是所有后续义务的基础、尺度和原因。如果为这样的人指定了导师来管理，那么导师拥有皇家权力，而白痴则没有；不能自己管理自己的人也不能管理他人。我证明了国王不是从父亲传给儿子的。

1. God (Deut. 17) could pot command them to choose such an one for the king, and such an one who, sitting on his throne, shall follow the direction of God, speaking in his word, if birth were that which gave him God's title and right to the crown; for that were as much as such a man should be heir to his father's inheritance, and the son not heir to his father's crown, except he were such a man. But God, in all the law moral or judicial, never required the heir should be thus and thus qualified, else he should not be heir; but he requireth that a man, and so that a family, should be thus and thus qualified, else they should not be kings. And I confirm it thus:—The first king of divine institution must be the rule, pattern, and measure, of all the rest of the kings, as Christ maketh the first marriage (Matt. 19:8,) a pattern to all others; and Paul reduceth the right administration of the Supper to Christ's first institution, 1 Cor. 11:23. Now, the first king (Deut. 17:14, 15) is not a man qualified by naked birth, for then the Lord, in describing the manner of the king and his due qualifications, should seek no other but this, You shall choose only the first-born, or the lawful son of the former king. But seeing the king of God's first moulding is a king by election, and what God did after, by promises and free grace, give to David and his seed, even a throne till the Messiah should come, and did promise to some kings, if they would walk in his commandments, that their sons, and sons' sons, should sit upon the throne, in my judgment, is not an obliging law that sole birth should be as just a title, in foro Dei, (for now I dispute the question in point of conscience,) as royal unction.
1. 如果出生是给予他上帝的称号和王位权利的原因，上帝（申命记 17 章）可能命令他们选择这样一个人作为国王，这个人在王位上坐着时，要遵循上帝的指示，按照他的话语说话；因为这就等于这样一个人应该继承他父亲的财产，而儿子却不能继承他父亲的王位，除非他也是这样一个人。但是，上帝在所有的道德或司法法律中，从未要求继承人必须具备这样和那样的资格，否则他就不会成为继承人；但他要求一个人，以及一个家庭，必须具备这样和那样的资格，否则他们就不能成为国王。我这样证实它：神所立的第一位国王必须成为所有其他国王的规则、模范和标准，正如基督将第一次婚姻（马太福音 19:8）作为其他所有婚姻的模范一样；保罗将圣餐的正确行使归结为基督的第一次设立（哥林多前书 11:23）。现在，第一位国王（申命记 17:14, 15) 不是一个凭裸体出生就有资格的人，因为如果是这样，主在描述国王及其应有的资格的方式时，不会寻求其他，只会选择长子，或者前任国王的合法儿子。但是，既然上帝首次塑造的国王是通过选举产生的，而上帝在此之后通过应许和自由恩典赐予大卫及其后裔国王的地位，直到弥赛亚降临，并且上帝曾向一些国王应许，如果他们遵行他的诫命，他们的儿子和孙子将坐在王位上，我认为，独生子出生并不是一个在上帝的法庭上（因为现在我在道德问题上争论这个问题）与王权油膏一样公正的称号。

2. If, by divine institution, God hath impawned in the people's hand a subordinate power to the Most High, who giveth kingdoms to whom he will, to make and create kings, then is not sole birth a just title to the crown. But the former is true. By precept (Deut. 17:15) God expressly saith, "Thou shalt choose him king, whom the Lord shall choose." And if it had not been the people's power to create their own kings, how doth God, after he had designed Saul their king, yet expressly (1 Sam. 10) inspire Samuel to call the people before the Lord at Mizpeh to make Saul king? And how doth the Lord (ver. 22) expressly shew to Samuel and the people, the man that they might make him king? And because all consented not that Saul should be king, God will have his coronation renewed. Ver. 14, "Then said Samuel to the people, come and let us go to Gilgal, and renew the kingdom there;" ver. 15, "And all the people went to Gilgal, and there they made Saul king before the Lord in Gilgal." And how is it that David, anointed by God, is yet no king, but a private subject, while all Israel make him king at Hebron?
如果上帝以神圣的方式将次要权力交给人民手中，上帝按自己的意愿赐予国王的权力，使其成为国王，那么仅仅出生就是合理的王位称号。但前者是正确的。上帝明确地说（申命记 17:15）：“你要立你们中间为王的，是耶和华你的神所拣选的。”如果人民没有权力创造自己的国王，上帝在指定扫罗为国王之后，为何明确地（撒母耳记上 10 章）激励撒母耳在米斯巴召集人民在耶和华面前立扫罗为王？上帝如何明确地向撒母耳和人民展示他们可以立为王的人（经文 22 节）？因为不是所有人都同意扫罗成为国王，上帝要求重新加冕。经文 14 节：“撒母耳对众民说：‘你们来，我们往吉甲去，在那里立国王。’”经文 15 节：“于是众民到了吉甲，在耶和华面前立扫罗为王。”大卫受上帝膏抹，却不是国王，而是一个普通的臣民，直到以色列全体人民在希伯仑立他为王。

3. If royal birth be equivalent to royal unction and the best title; if birth speak and declare to us the Lord's will and appointment, that the first-born of a king should be king, as M. Symmons and others say, then is all title by conquest, where the former king standeth in title to the crown and hath an heir, unlawful. But the latter is against all the nation of the royalists, for Arnisæus, Barclay, Grotius, Jo. Rossensis Episco., the Bishop of Spalato, Dr Ferne, M. Symmons, the excommunicate Prelate, if his poor learning may bring him in the roll, teach that conquest is a lawful title to a crown. I prove the proposition. (1.) because if birth speak God's revealed will, that the heir of a king is the lawful king, then conquest cannot speak contrary to the will of God, that he is no lawful king, but the conqueror is the lawful king. God's revealed will should be contradictory to himself, and birth should speak, it is God's will that the heir of the former king be king, and the conquest being also God's revealed will, should also speak that that heir should not be king. (2) If birth speak and reveal God's will that the heir be king, it is unlawful for a conquered people to give their consent that a conqueror be their king; for their consent being contrary to God's revealed will, (which is, that birth is the just title,) must be an unlawful consept. If royalists say, God, the King of kings, who immediately maketh kings, may and doth transfer kingdoms to whom he will; and when he putteth the sword in Nebuchadnezzar's hand to conquer the king and kingdom of Judah, then Zedekiah or his son is not king of Judah, but Nebuchadnezzar is king, and God, being above his law, speaketh in that case his will by conquests, as before he spake his will by birth. This is all can be said. Ans. They answer black treason in saying so, for if Jeremiah, from the Lord, had not commanded expressly, that both the king and kingdom of Judah should submit to the king of Babylon, and serve him, and pray for him, as their lawful king, it had been as lawful for them to rebel against that tyrant, as it was for them to fight against the Philistines and the king of Ammon; but if birth be the just and lawful title, in foro Dei, in God's court, and the only thing that evidenceth God's will, without any election of the people, that the first-born of such a king is their lawful king, then conquests cannot not now speak a contradictory will of God; for the question is not, whether or not God giveth power to tyrants to conquer kingdoms from the just heirs of kings, which did reign lawfully before their sword made an empty throne, but whether conquest now, when Jeremiahs are not sent immediately from God to command, for example, Britain to submit to a violent intruder, who hath expelled the lawful heirs of the royal line of the king of Britain, whether, I say, doth conquest, in a such a violent way, speak that it is God's revealed will, called Voluntas signi, the will that is to rule us in all our moral duties, to cast off the just heirs of the blood royal, and to swear homage to a conqueror, and so as that conqueror now hath as just right as the king of Britain had by birth. This cannot be taken off by the wit of any who maintain that conquest is a lawful title to a crown, and that royal birth, without the people's election, speaketh God's regulating will in his word, that the first-born of a king is a lawful king by birth, for God now-a-days doth not say the contrary of what he revealed in his word. If birth be God's regulating will, that the heir of the king is in God's court a king, no act of the conqueror can annul that word of God to us, and the people may not lawfully, though they were ten times subdued, swear homage and allegiance to a conqueror against the due right of birth, which by royalists' doctrine revealeth to us the plain contradictory will of God. It is, I grant, often God's decree revealed by the event, that a conqueror be on the throne, but this will is not our rule, and the people are to swear no oath of allegiance contrary to God's Voluntas signi, which is his revealed will in his word regulating us.
如果皇室出生等同于皇家加冕和最好的头衔；如果出生向我们宣示上帝的旨意和指派，即国王的长子应该成为国王，正如西蒙斯先生和其他人所说，那么所有通过征服获得的头衔都是非法的，因为前任国王在头衔上仍然有权利，并且有继承人。但后者与所有皇室主义者的观点相悖，因为阿尼塞乌斯、巴克利、格罗蒂乌斯、罗森斯主教、斯帕拉托主教、费恩博士、西蒙斯先生（即被逐出教会的主教，如果他可算作学识贫乏的话）都认为征服是合法的夺冠方式。我证明这个命题。（1）因为如果出生能够表达上帝的启示意愿，即国王的继承人是合法的国王，那么征服就不能与上帝的意愿相悖，即他不是合法的国王，而征服者才是合法的国王。上帝的启示意愿将会自相矛盾，出生将会表达上帝的意愿，即前任国王的继承人应该成为国王，而征服也是上帝的启示意愿，也应该表达那个继承人不应该成为国王。 （2）如果出生的言论揭示了上帝的意愿，即继承人成为国王，那么征服的人民同意征服者成为他们的国王是不合法的；因为他们的同意与上帝的启示意愿相反（即出生是公正的称号），必然是一个非法的概念。如果王党派说，作为万王之王的上帝可以并且确实将王国转让给他所愿意的人；当他将剑交给尼布甲尼撒征服犹大王和王国时，那么西底家或他的儿子就不是犹大王，而是尼布甲尼撒是国王，上帝超越他的法律，在这种情况下，通过征服来表达他的意愿，就像他以前通过出生来表达他的意愿一样。这就是所有可以说的。回答。他们这样说是对黑色叛国行为的回应，因为如果耶利米没有明确命令犹大的国王和王国都应该顺服巴比伦的国王，侍奉他，并为他祈祷，作为他们合法的国王，那么他们反抗那个暴君就和他们对抗非利士人和亚扪人一样合法；但是如果出生是公正和合法的头衔，在上帝的法庭上，在上帝的意愿没有人民选举的情况下，第一个出生的国王的子嗣就是他们合法的国王，那么征服现在就不能说出上帝的相反意愿；因为问题不是上帝是否给予暴君从合法的国王手中征服王国的权力，而是征服现在，在没有耶利米直接从上帝那里命令的情况下，例如，要求英国顺从一个驱逐了英国合法国王血统的暴力入侵者，我要说的是，征服在如此暴力的方式下，是否表明这是上帝的启示意愿，即所谓的 Voluntas signi，这是我们应该遵循的意愿我们的道德责任是摒弃合法的王位继承人，向征服者宣誓效忠，以至于现在这个征服者拥有与英国国王出生时一样正当的权利。这不能被任何主张征服是合法王位的标题，以及没有人民选举的皇室出生，是上帝在他的话语中规定的旨意，即国王的长子是合法的国王。因为上帝现在不会说与他在他的话语中所揭示的相反的话。如果出生是上帝的旨意，即国王的继承人在上帝的法庭上是国王，那么征服者的任何行为都不能废除上帝对我们的那个话语，人民即使被征服了十次，也不可以合法地向征服者宣誓效忠，违背出生的正当权利，这正是王室主义者的教义向我们揭示的上帝的明显相反的旨意。我承认，往往上帝的旨意通过事件揭示出征服者坐上王位，但这个旨意不是我们的准则，人民不应该宣誓效忠违背上帝在他的话语中所揭示的旨意，这是上帝在他的话语中规定我们的旨意。

4. Things transferable and communicable by birth from father to son, are only, in law, those which heathens call bona fortunæ riches, as lands, houses, monies and heritages; and so saith the law also. These things which essentially include gifts of the mind, and honour properly so called—I mean honour founded on virtue—as Aristotle, with good reason, maketh honour præminum virtutis, cannot be communicated by birth from the father to the son; for royal dignity includeth these three constituent parts essentially, of which none can be communicable by birth. (1.) The royal faculty of governing, which is a special gift of God above nature, is from God. Solomon asked it from God, and had it not by generation from his father David. (2.) The royal honour to be set above the people because of this royal virtue is not from the womb, for then God's Spirit would not have said, "Blessed art thou, O land, when thy king is the son of nobles," Eccl. 10:17; this honour, springing from virtue, is not born with any man, nor is any man born with either the gift or honour to be a judge. God maketh high and low, not birth. Nobles are born to great estates. If judging be heritage to any, it is a municipal positive law. I now speak in point of conscience. (3.) The external lawful title, before men come to a crown, must be God's will, revealed by such an external sign as, by God's appointment and warrant, is to regulate our will; but according to Scripture, nothing regulateth our will, and leadeth the people now that they cannot err following God's rule in making a king, but the free suffrages of the states choosing a man whom they conceive God hath endued with these royal gifts required in the king whom God holdeth forth to them in his word. (Deut. 17) Now there be but these to regulate the people, or to be a rule to any man to ascend lawfully, in foro Dei, in God's court to the throne. (1.) God's immediate designation of a man by prophetical and divinely-inspired unction, as Samuel anointed Saul and David; this we are not to expect now, nor can royalists say it. (2.) Conquest, seeing it is an act of violence, and God's revenging justice for the sins of a people, cannot give in God's court such a just title to the throne as the people are to submit their consciences unto, except God reveal his regulating will by some immediate voice from heaven, as he commanded Judah to submit to Nebuchadnezzar as to their king by the mouth of Jeremiah. Now this is not a rule to us; for then, if the Spanish king should invade this land, and, as Nebuchadnezzar did, deface the temple, and instruments and means of God's worship, and abolish the true worship of God, it should be unlawful to resist him, after he had once conquered the land: neither God's word, nor the law of nature could permit this. I suppose, even by grant of adversaries, now no act of violence done to a people, though in God's court they have deserved it, can be a testimony to us of God's regulating will; except it have some warrant from the law and testimony, it is no rule to our conscience to acknowledge him a lawful magistrate, whose sole law to the throne is an act of the bloody instrument of divine wrath, I mean the sword. That, therefore, Judah was to submit, according to God's word, to Nebuchadnezzar, whose conscience and best warranted calling to the kingdom of Judah was his bloody sword, even if we suppose Jeremiah had not commanded them to submit to the king of Babylon, I think cannot be said. (3) Naked birth cannot be this external signification of God's regulating will to warrant the conscience of any to ascend to the throne, for the authors of this opinion make royal birth equivalent to divine unction; for David anointed by Samuel, and so anointed by God, is not king,—Saul remained the Lord's anointed many years, not David, although anointed by God; the people's making him king at Hebron, founded upon divine unction, was not the only external lawful calling that we read of that David had to the throne; then royal birth, because it is but equivalent only to divine unction, not superior to divine unction, it cannot have more force to make a king than divine unction. And if birth was equivalent to divine unction, what needed Joash, who had royal birth, be made king by the people? and what needed Saul and David, who had more than royal birth, even divine unction, be made kings by the people? and Saul, having the vocal and infallible testimony of a prophet, needed not the people's election—the one at Mizpeh and Gilgal, and the other at Hebron.
4. 从父亲传给儿子的可转让和可传达的东西，只有在法律上被异教徒称为 bona fortunæ财富的东西，如土地、房屋、货币和遗产；法律也是这样说的。这些本质上包括心灵的礼物和适当称之为荣誉的东西，我指的是建立在美德上的荣誉，正如亚里士多德所说，荣誉是美德的奖赏，这些东西不能通过出生从父亲传给儿子；因为皇家尊严本质上包括这三个组成部分，其中没有一个可以通过出生传达。（1）统治的皇家能力，这是上帝在自然之上的特殊恩赐，是来自上帝的。所罗门向上帝祈求，而不是通过他父亲大卫的血统得到的。（2）因为这种皇家美德而被置于人民之上的皇家荣誉并非来自子宫，因为那样的话，上帝的灵就不会说：“你的王是贵族之子，那地就有福了。”（传道书 10:17）这种荣誉源于美德，不是与任何人一同出生的，也没有任何人天生具有成为法官的恩赐或荣誉。上帝使人卑贵，不是出生使人卑贵。贵族出生于伟大的财产。 如果判断是任何人的遗产，那就是市政正法。我现在说的是良心问题。（3.）在人们得到王冠之前，必须是上帝的意愿，通过上帝指定和授权的外部标志来调节我们的意愿；但根据圣经，没有什么能够调节我们的意愿，引导人们遵循上帝在选举国王时的规则，除了国家自由选举一个他们认为上帝赋予了这位国王所需的王者才能的人，这是上帝在他的话语中向他们展示的。（申命记 17 章）现在只有这些可以调节人民，或者对任何人来说是一个合法的规则，进入上帝的法庭，登上王位。（1.）上帝通过先知和神启示的膏抹直接指定一个人，就像撒母耳膏抹扫罗和大卫一样；我们现在不应该期望这种情况，君主主义者也不能这样说。（2.）征服，因为它是一种暴力行为，是上帝对人民罪孽的复仇正义，在上帝的法庭上不能给予王位如此公正的称号，以至于人民要顺从他们的良心，除非上帝通过某种直接的天命向人们显明他的调节意愿，就像他通过耶利米的口吩咐犹大要顺从尼布甲尼撒王一样。现在这对我们来说不是一个准则；因为如果西班牙国王入侵这片土地，并像尼布甲尼撒王那样破坏神的敬拜的殿宇、器具和手段，并废除真正的敬拜，那么在他一旦征服这片土地之后，抵抗他将是不合法的：无论是上帝的话语还是自然法都不允许这样做。我认为，即使是在对手的让步下，对一个人民进行的暴力行为，即使在上帝的法庭上他们应得这样的待遇，对我们来说也不能成为上帝调节意愿的证明；除非它有一些来自法律和证言的保证，否则对我们的良心来说，承认他是合法的统治者，他唯一的法律就是神的愤怒的血腥工具，我指的是剑。 因此，根据上帝的话，犹大应该向尼布甲尼撒屈服，尼布甲尼撒的良心和合法的召唤是他血腥的剑，即使我们假设耶利米没有命令他们向巴比伦王屈服，我认为也不能这样说。（3）裸露的出生不能成为上帝调节意愿的外在表示，以保证任何人的良心上升到王位，因为这种观点的提出者认为王室出生等同于神圣的膏抹；因为大卫受撒母耳膏抹，也就是上帝的膏抹，不是国王，扫罗多年来仍然是上主的受膏者，而不是大卫，尽管大卫受到上帝的膏抹；人民在希伯仑立他为王，是基于神圣的膏抹，这并不是我们所读到的大卫登上王位的唯一合法外在召唤；因此，王室出生只是等同于神圣的膏抹，而不是超越神圣的膏抹，它不能比神圣的膏抹更有力地成为国王的依据。如果出生等同于神圣的膏抹，那么拥有王室出生的约阿施为什么还需要人民立他为王呢？扫罗和大卫为什么还需要人民立他们为王，他们不仅拥有王室出生，甚至还有神圣的膏抹呢？ 扫罗拥有先知的明确和不可辜负的证词，不需要人民的选举-一次在密斯巴和吉甲，另一次在希伯仑。

5. If royal birth be as just a title to the crown as divine unction, and so as the people's election is no title at all, then is it unlawful that there should be a king by election in the world now; but the latter is absurd,—so is the former. I prove the proposition, because where conquerors are wanting, and there is no king for the present, but the people governing, and so much confusion aboundeth, they cannot lawfully appoint a king, for his lawful title before God must either be conquest—which to me is no title—(and here, and in this case, there is no conquest) or the title must be a prophetical word immediately inspired of God, but this is now ceased; or the title must be royal birth, but here there is no royal birth, because the government is popular; except you imagine that the society is obliged in conscience to go and seek the son of a foreign king to be their king. But I hope that such a royal birth should not be a just title before God to make him king of that society to which he had no relation at all, but is a mere stranger. Hence in this case no title could be given to any man to make him king, but only the people's election, which is that which we say. And it is most unreasonable that a people under popular government cannot lawfully choose a king to themselves, seeing a king is a lawful magistrate, and warranted by God's word, because they have not a king of royal birth to sit upon the throne.
如果皇室出身与神圣的膏抹一样是王位的正当称号，而人民的选举则根本不是任何称号，那么现在世界上通过选举产生国王是非法的；但后者是荒谬的，前者也是如此。我证明这个命题，因为在没有征服者的情况下，现在没有国王，而是人民在统治，导致混乱丛生，他们不能合法地任命国王，因为他在上帝面前的合法称号必须是征服（对我来说这不是称号）（在这种情况下没有征服），或者称号必须是上帝直接启示的预言之言，但这已经停止了；或者称号必须是皇室出身，但这里没有皇室出身，因为政府是民主的；除非你想象社会在道义上有责任去寻找一个外国国王的儿子来做他们的国王。但我希望这样的皇室出身不应该是在上帝面前使他成为那个社会的合法国王的正当称号，因为他与那个社会没有任何关系，只是一个陌生人。因此，在这种情况下，任何人都不能被给予称号使他成为国王，只有人民的选举，这就是我们所说的。 在民主政府下，人民无法合法地选择一位国王作为自己的统治者是非常不合理的，因为国王是合法的官员，并且得到了上帝的话语的支持，只是因为他们没有一位出身皇室的国王坐在王位上。

Mr Symmons saith that birth is the best title to title crown, because after the first of the family had been anointed unction was no more used in that family, (unless there arose a strife about the kingdom, as betwixt Solomon and Adonijah, Joash and Athaliah) the eldest son of the predecessor was afterward the chosen of the Lord, his birthright spake the Lord's appointment as plainly as his father's unction.—Ans. 1. It is a conjecture that unction was not used in the family, after the first unction, except the contest was betwixt two brethren: that is said, not proved; for 2 Kings 23:30, when good Josiah was killed, and there was no contest concerning the throne of that beloved prince, the people of the land took Jehoahaz his son, and anointed him, and made him king in his father's stead; and the priests were anointed, (Lev. 6:22,) yea, all the priests were anointed, (Numb. 3:3,) yet read we not in the history, where this or that man was anointed. 2. In that Adonijah, Solomon's elder brother, was not king, it is clear that God's anointing and the people's electing made the right to the crown, and not birth. 3. Birth de facto did design the man, because of God's special promises to David's house; but how doth a typical descent made to David, and some others by God's promise, prove, that birth is the birthright and lawful call of God to a crown in all after ages? For as gifts to reign goeth not by birth, so neither doth God's title to a crown go.
辛蒙斯先生说，出生是获得王位的最好资格，因为在家族的第一个人受膏之后，该家族就不再使用膏油了（除非发生了关于王国的争斗，如所罗门和亚多尼雅、约阿施和亚他利雅之间的争斗）。前任的长子随后成为上帝所选择的人，他的长子继承权就像他父亲的受膏一样明确地表明了上帝的任命。-答案 1.有人猜测在第一次受膏之后，除非是两个兄弟之间的争斗，否则家族中就不再使用膏油：这只是说了，并没有证明；因为在列王记下 23:30 中，当好王约西亚被杀害时，并没有关于这位深受人民喜爱的王位的争斗，国内的人民选取了他的儿子约哈斯，膏油了他，并立他为王，继承他父亲的位置；祭司们也受膏了（利未记 6:22），是的，所有的祭司都受膏了（民数记 3:3），然而我们在历史中并没有读到这个人或那个人受膏的记载。2.由于所罗门的哥哥亚多尼雅不是国王，清楚地表明上帝的膏油和人民的选举才是获得王位的权利，而不是出生。3. 出生实际上确实决定了一个人的身份，因为上帝对大卫家族有特殊的应许；但是，大卫的典型血统以及其他一些人通过上帝的应许得到的血统，如何证明出生是后世所有王位的合法呼召和上帝的权利？因为统治的恩赐不是通过出生来获得，上帝对王位的权利也不是如此。

M. Symmons.—A prince once possessed of a kingdom coming to him by inheritance, can never, by any, upon any occasion be dispossessed thereof, without horrible impiety and injustice. Royal unction was an indelible character of old: Saul remained the Lord's anointed till the last gasp. David durst not take the right of government actually unto him, although he had it in reversion, being already anointed thereunto, and had received the spirit thereof.
M. Symmons. - 一位王子一旦继承了一个王国，无论在任何情况下，都不能被剥夺，否则将是可怕的不虔诚和不公正。古代的王权傅油是不可磨灭的标志：扫罗一直是上帝的受膏者，直到最后一口气。大卫不敢实际掌握政权，尽管他已经被膏立为王，并接受了王权的灵感。

Ans.—1. This is the question, If a prince, once a prince by inheritance, cannot be dispossessed thereof without injustice; for if a kingdom be his by birth, as an inheritance transmitted from the father to the son, I see not but any man upon necessary occasions may sell his inheritance; but if a prince sell his kingdom, a very Barclay and a Grotius with reason will say, he may be dispossessed and dethroned, and take up his indelible character then. (2.) A kingdom is not the prince's own, so as it is injustice to take it from him, as to take a man's purse from him; the Lord's church, in a Christian kingdom, is God's heritage, and the king only a shepherd, and the sheep, in the court of conscience, are not his. (3.) Royal unction is not an indelible character; for neither Saul nor David were all their days kings thereby, but lived many days private men after divine unction, while the people anointed them kings, except you say that there were two kings at once in Israel; and that Saul, killing David, should have killed his own lord, and his anointed. (4.) If David durst not take the right of government actually on him, then divine unction made him not king, but only designed him to be king: the people's election must make the king.
答案：1. 这是一个问题，如果一个王子，一旦通过继承成为王子，就不能被剥夺，否则就是不公正的；因为如果一个王国是他的出生权，就像是从父亲传给儿子的遗产，我看不出任何人在必要的情况下不能卖掉他的遗产；但如果一个王子卖掉他的王国，一个巴克利和一个格罗修斯会合理地说，他可以被剥夺和废黜，并且接受他的不可磨灭的特征。(2.) 一个王国不是王子的私有财产，所以从他那里夺走它就是不公正的，就像从一个人那里夺走他的钱包一样；在一个基督教王国中，主的教会是上帝的产业，国王只是一个牧羊人，在良心的法庭上，羊不是他的。(3.) 王权的膏抹不是不可磨灭的特征；因为扫罗和大卫都不是因为神的膏抹而一生都是国王，而是在神膏抹他们为国王之后，还有很多天他们是普通人，除非你说在以色列同时有两个国王；并且扫罗杀死大卫，应该杀死他自己的主和他的受膏者。(4.如果大卫不敢真正承担起政府的权力，那么神的膏抹并没有使他成为国王，只是预定他成为国王：国民的选举才能使他成为国王。

M. Symmons addeth, "He that is born a king and a prince can never be unborn, Semel Augustus semper Augustus; yea, I believe the eldest son of such a king is, in respect of birth, the Lord's anointed in his father's life-time,—even as David was before Saul's death, and to deprive him of his right of reversion is as true injustice as to dispossess him of it."
M. Symmons 补充道：“一旦成为国王和王子，就永远不可能变回普通人，一次是皇帝，永远是皇帝；是的，我相信这样一个国王的长子，在出生时就是上帝所膏选的，就像大卫在扫罗去世之前一样，剥夺他继承权利是真正的不公正，就像剥夺他的权利一样。”

Ans.—It is proper only to Jesus Christ to be born a king. Sure I am no man bringeth out of the womb with him a sceptre, and a crown on his head. Divine unction giveth a right infallibly to a crown, but birth doth not so; for one may be born heir to a crown, as was hopeful prince Henry, and yet never live to be king. The eldest son of a king, if he attempt to kill his father, as Absalom did, and raise forces against the lawful prince, I conceive he may be killed in battle without any injustice. If in his father's time he be the Lord's anointed, there be two kings; and the heir may have a son, and so there shall be three kings, possibly four,—all kings by divine right.
答案：只有耶稣基督才能合适地作为一个国王出生。我确信没有人在出生时带着权杖和头戴皇冠。神圣的膏抹确实无疑地赋予了王位的权利，但出生并不具备这样的权利；因为一个人可能出生时是王位的继承人，就像有希望的亨利王子一样，但可能永远不会成为国王。如果一个国王的长子试图像押沙龙那样杀害他的父亲，并且对合法的王子发动武装叛乱，我认为他在战斗中被杀并没有不公正。如果在他父亲在位期间他是上帝的受膏者，那么就会有两个国王；而继承人可能会有一个儿子，这样就可能会有三个国王，甚至可能有四个——所有这些都是按照神圣的权利成为国王。

The Prelate of Rochester saith, "The people and nobles give no right to him who is born a king, they only declare his right."
罗切斯特的主教说：“人民和贵族并不赋予出生为国王的人权利，他们只是宣告他的权利。”

Ans.—This is said, not proved. A man born for an inheritance is by birth an heir, because he is not born for these lands as a mean for the end, but by the contrary, these lands are for the heir as the mean for the end; but the king is for his kingdom as a mean for the end, as the watchman for the city, the living law for peace and safety to God's people; and, therefore, is not heres hominum, an heir of men, but men are rather heredes regis, heirs of the king.
答案：这是说的，而不是证明的。一个为继承而生的人，因为他不是为这些土地而生，作为目的的手段，而是相反，这些土地是为继承人作为目的的手段；但国王对于他的王国来说是作为目的的手段，就像守城者对于城市，活法对于上帝的子民的和平与安全一样；因此，他不是人类的继承人，而是人类更像是国王的继承人。

Arnisæus saith, "Many kingdoms are purchased by just war, and transmitted by the law of heritage from the father to the son, beside the consent of the people, because the son receiveth right to the crown not from the people, but from his parents; nor doth he possess the kingdom as the patrimony of the people, keeping only to himself the burden of protecting and governing the people, but as a propriety given to him lege regni, by his parents, which he is obliged to defend and rule, as a father looketh to the good and welfare of the family, yet so also as he may look to his own good.
阿尼西乌斯说：“许多王国是通过正义战争购买的，并且根据继承法从父亲传给儿子，而不需要人民的同意，因为儿子获得王位的权利不是来自人民，而是来自他的父母；他并不把王国视为人民的家产，只是自己承担保护和治理人民的负担，而是作为父母给予他的财产，他有义务保卫和统治，就像父亲关心家庭的利益和福祉一样，但同时也要关心自己的利益。”

Ans.—We read in the word of God that the people made Solomon king, not that David, or any king, can leave in his testament a kingdom to his son. He saith, the son hath not the right of reigning as the patrimony of the people, but as a propriety, given by the law of the kingdom by his parents. Now this is all one as if he said the son hath not the right of the kingdom as the patrimony of the people, but as the patrimony of the people—which is good nonsense; for the propriety of reigning given from father to son by the law of the kingdom, is nothing but a right to reign given by the law of the people, and the very gift and patrimony of the people; for lex regni, this law of the kingdom is the law of the people, tying the crown to such a royal family; and this law of the people is prior and more ancient than the king, or the right of reigning in the king, or which the king is supposed to have from his royal father, because it made the first father the first king of the royal line. For I demand, how doth the son succeed to his father's crown and throne? Not by any promise of a divine covenant that the Lord maketh to the father, as he promised that David's seed should sit on his throne till the Messiah should come. This, as I conceive, is vanished with the commonwealth of the Jews; nor can we now find any immediate divine constitution, tying the crown now to such a race,—nor can we say this cometh from the will of the father-king making his son king. For, 1. There is no Scripture can warrant us to say the king maketh a king, but the Scripture holdeth forth that the people made Saul and David kings. 2. This may prove that the father is some way a cause why this son succeedeth king; but he is not the cause of the royalty conferred upon the whole line, because the question is, Who made the first father a king? Not himself; nor doth God now immediately by prophets anoint men to be kings,—then must the people choose the first man, then must the people's election of a king be prior and more ancient than the birth-law to a crown; and election must be a better right than birth. The question is, Whence cometh it that not only the first father should be chosen king; but also whence is it, that whereas it is in the people's free will to make the succession of kings go by free election, as it is in Denmark and Poland, yet the people doth freely choose, not only the first man to be king, but also the whole race of the first-born of this man's family to be kings. All here must be resolved in the free will of the community. Now, since we have no immediate and prophetical enthroning of men, it is evident that the lineal deduction of the crown from father to son, through the whole line, is from the people, not from the parent.
答案：我们在上帝的话语中读到，人民立所罗门为王，并不是大卫或任何国王可以在遗嘱中将王国留给他的儿子。他说，儿子没有作为人民的祖业而统治的权利，而是作为父母国家法律赋予的所有权。现在这就好像他说儿子没有作为人民的祖业而统治的权利，而是作为人民的祖业，这是毫无意义的；因为由王国法律从父亲传给儿子的统治权，只不过是人民法律赋予的统治权，也是人民的赠与和祖业；因为王国法律，即王国的法律，将王冠与这样一个王室捆绑在一起；而这个人民的法律比国王更早、更古老，或者说国王从他的皇家父亲那里被认为拥有的统治权，因为它使第一个父亲成为皇室血统的第一位国王。因此，我要问，儿子是如何继承父亲的王冠和王位的？ 并非因为上帝与父亲所立的神圣约定，正如他曾承诺大卫的后裔将坐在他的宝座上，直到弥赛亚降临。我认为，这个约定已经随着犹太人的共和国消失了；我们现在找不到任何直接的神圣宪法，将王位与某个种族联系起来，也不能说这是父王的意愿，使他的儿子成为国王。因为，1. 没有经文可以证明国王能够立国王，而经文表明是人民立了扫罗和大卫为王。2. 这可能证明父亲在某种程度上是儿子成为国王的原因，但他不是整个王室所授予的王权的原因，因为问题是，谁使第一个父亲成为国王？不是他自己；上帝现在也不再通过先知直接膏抹人们成为国王，那么人民必须选择第一个人，人民对国王的选举必须比对王位的出生法更为重要和古老；选举必须是比出生更好的权利。 问题是，为什么不仅第一位父亲被选为国王，而且为什么在人民有权利通过自由选举来确定国王继任者的情况下，人民自由选择的不仅是第一位国王，而且是这个人家族的长子一系列国王。所有这些都必须解决在社区的自由意志中。现在，由于我们没有直接和先知般的加冕仪式，很明显，王位的直系传承是从人民而不是从父母那里来的。

6. Hence, I add this as my sixth argument, That which taketh away that natural aptitude and nature's birthright in a community, given to them by God and nature, to provide the most efficacious and prevalent mean for their own preservation and peace in the fittest government, that is not to be holden; but to make birth the best title to the crown, and better than free election, taketh away and impedeth that natural aptitude and nature's birthright of choosing, not simply a governor, but the best, the justest, the more righteous, and tyeth and fettereth their choice to one of a house, whether he be a wise man, and just, or a fool and an unjust man; therefore to make birth the best title to the crown, is not to be holden.
因此，我将这作为我的第六个论点，夺走了上帝和自然赋予社区的自然才能和天赋，为了他们自己的保护和和平，在最适合的政府中提供最有效和普遍的手段，这是不可持有的；而是将出生作为最好的继承王位的条件，比自由选举更好，夺走并阻碍了选择的自然才能和天赋，不仅仅是选择一个统治者，而是最好的、最公正的、更正义的，将他们的选择束缚在一个家族中，无论他是聪明和公正的人，还是愚蠢和不公正的人；因此，将出生作为最好的继承王位的条件是不可持有的。

It is objected, That parents may bind their after generations to choose one of such a line, but by this argument, their natural birthright of a free choice to elect the best and fittest, is abridged and clipped, and so the posterity shall not be tyed to a king of the royal line to which the ancestors did swear. See for this the learned author of "Scripture and Reasons pleaded for Defensive Arms."
有人反对，父母可能限制他们的后代选择这样一条血统，但是通过这个论点，他们天生的自由选择权利被剥夺和剪裁，因此后代将不会被束缚在祖先宣誓效忠的皇室血统之下。请参阅《为防御武器辩护的圣经和理由》一书中的博学作者。

Ans.—Frequent elections of a king, at the death of every prince, may have, by accident, and through the corruption of our nature, bloody and tragical sequels; and to eschew these, people may tie and oblige their children to choose one of the first-born, male or female, as in Scotland and England, of such a line; but I have spoken of the excellency of the title by election above that of birth, as comparing things according to their own nature together, but give me leave to say, that the posterity are tied to that line,—1. Conditionally: so the first-born, ceteris paribus, be qualified, and have an head to sit at the helm. 2. Elections of governors would be performed as in the sight of God, and, in my weak apprehension, the person coming nearest to God's judge, fearing God, hating covetousness; and to Moses' king, (Deut. 17) one who shall read in the book of the law; and it would seem now that gracious morals are to us instead of God's immediate designation. 3. The genuine and intrinsical end of making kings is not simply governing, but governing the best way, in peace, honesty, and godliness, (1 Tim. 2) therefore, these are to be made kings who may most expeditely procure this end. Neither is it my purpose to make him no king who is not a gracious man, only here I compare title with title.
答案：频繁选举国王，在每位王子去世时，可能会因为偶然事件和人性的腐败而导致血腥和悲剧性的后果；为了避免这些问题，人们可以约束并强迫他们的子女选择第一胎男女之一作为继承人，就像苏格兰和英格兰那样；但是我已经谈到了选举产生的头衔优于出生的头衔，因为它们是根据它们自身的本质进行比较的，但请允许我说，后代是被束缚在那条血统上的——1.有条件地：所以第一胎，其他条件相同的情况下，有资格并有一个领导者来掌舵。2.统治者的选举将在上帝的眼前进行，并且在我脆弱的理解中，最接近上帝的审判者，敬畏上帝，憎恶贪婪；并且对于摩西的国王（申命记 17 章），应该是那个能够在律法书中阅读的人；现在看来，仁慈的道德对我们来说代替了上帝的直接指定。3.制定国王的真正和内在目的不仅仅是统治，而是以和平、诚实和敬虔的方式统治（提摩太前书 2 章）；因此，应该制定那些最能迅速实现这一目标的人为国王。 并非我的目的是让那些不仁慈的人失去国王的地位，我只是在这里将称号与称号进行比较。

Arg. 7. Where God hath not bound the conscience, men may not bind themselves, or the consciences of the posterity. But God hath not bound any nation irrevocably and unalterably to a royal line, or to one kind of government; therefore, no nation can bind their conscience, and the conscience of the posterity, either to one royal line, or irrevocably and unalterably to monarchy. The proposition is clear. 1. No nation is tyed, jure divino, by the tie of a divine law, to a monarchy, rather than to another government. The Parisian doctors prove, that the precept of having a pope is affirmative, and so tyeth not the church, ad semper, for ever; and so the church is the body of Christ, without the Pope: and all oaths to things of their nature indifferent, and to things the contrary whereof is lawful and may be expedient and necessary, lay on a tie only conditionally, in so far as they conduce to the end. If the Gibeonites had risen in Joshua's days to cut off the people of God, I think no wise man can think that Joshua and the people were tyed, by the oath of God, not to cut off the Gibeonites in that case; for to preserve them alive, as enemies, was against the intent of the oath, which was to preserve them alive, as friends demanding and supplicating peace, and submitting. The assumption is clear. If a nation seeth that aristocratical government is better than monarchy, hic et nunc, that the sequels of such a monarchy is bloody, destructive, tyrannous; that the monarchy compelleth the free subjects to Mahomedanism, to gross idolatry, they cannot, by the divine bond of any oath, captive their natural freedom, which is to choose a government and governors for their safety, and for a peaceable and godly life; or fetter and chain the wisdom of the posterity unalterably to a government or a royal line, which, hic et nunc, contrary to the intention of their oath, proveth destructive and bloody. And in this case, even the king, though tyed by an oath to govern, is obliged to the practices of the Emperor Otho; and as Speed saith of Richard the second, to resign the crown for the eschewing of the effusion of blood. And who doubteth but the second wits of the experienced posterity may correct the first wits of their fathers; nor shall I ever believe that the fathers can leave in legacy by oath, any chains of the best gold to fetter the after wits of posterity, to a choice destructive to peace and true godliness.
7. 在上帝没有约束良心的地方，人们不能约束自己，也不能约束后代的良心。但是上帝没有将任何国家永久不变地约束在一个王室或一种政府上；因此，任何国家都不能将他们的良心和后代的良心，无论是对一个王室还是对君主制永久不变地约束起来。这个命题很清楚。1. 没有一个国家是按照神圣法律的约束，必须选择君主制而不是其他政府形式。巴黎的医生们证明，拥有教皇的命令是肯定的，所以并没有永久地约束教会；因此，教会是基督的身体，没有教皇也可以存在。对于本质上无关紧要的事物和相反的事物，它们的宣誓只有在特定条件下才有约束力，只要它们有助于达到目标。 如果在约书亚时代，基遍人起来剪除上帝的子民，我认为没有一个明智的人会认为约书亚和百姓受到上帝的誓约的约束，不能在那种情况下剪除基遍人；因为保留他们作为敌人的生命，违背了誓约的意图，即保留他们作为寻求和平、恳求和顺从的朋友的生命。这个假设是明确的。如果一个国家看到贵族政府比君主制更好，此时此地，这种君主制的后果是血腥、破坏性、暴虐的；这种君主制迫使自由公民信仰伊斯兰教，信仰低俗的偶像崇拜，他们不能通过任何神圣的誓约束缚他们的自然自由，即选择一种政府和统治者来保障他们的安全和和平、虔诚的生活；或者将后代的智慧不可改变地束缚在一种政府或王室血统上，这种政府或王室血统，此时此地，与他们誓约的意图相反，证明是破坏性和血腥的。 在这种情况下，即使国王受誓约束以统治，也被迫效仿奥托皇帝的做法；正如斯皮德所说的理查德二世，为了避免流血，放弃王位。谁能怀疑经验丰富的后代的第二个智慧可以纠正他们父辈的第一个智慧；我永远不会相信父辈可以通过誓约将任何最好的黄金锁链留给后代的智慧，以选择破坏和平和真正的虔诚。

Arg. 8. An heritor may defraud his first-born of his heritage, because of his dominion he hath over his heritage: a king cannot defraud his first-born of the crown. An heritor may divide his heritage equally amongst his twelve sons: a king cannot divide his royal dominions in twelve parts, and give a part to every son; for so he might turn a monarchy into an aristocracy, and put twelve men in the place of one king. Any heritor taken captive may lawfully oppignerate, yea, and give all his inheritance as a ransom for his liberty; for a man is better than his inheritance: but no king may give his subjects as a price or ransom.
第 8 条。一个继承人可以欺骗他的长子，夺取他的遗产，因为他对遗产拥有统治权：国王不能夺取他的长子的王位。一个继承人可以平均分配他的遗产给他的十二个儿子：国王不能将他的王权分成十二份，给每个儿子一份；因为这样他可能会把君主制变成贵族制，让十二个人取代一个国王的位置。任何被俘的继承人可以合法地抵押，甚至把他的全部遗产作为赎金换取自由；因为人比他的遗产更重要：但国王不能把他的臣民作为代价或赎金。

Yet I shall not be against the succession of kings by birth with good limitations; and shall agree, that through the corruption of man's nature, it may be in so far profitable, as it is peaceable, and preventeth bloody tumults, which are the bane of human societies. Consider further for this, Ægid. Romanus, lib. 3. de reg. princi. cap. 5, Turrecremat. and Joan. de terræ Reubeæ, 1 tract, contr. Rebelles, ar. 1, con. 4. Yet Aristotle, the flower of nature's wit, (lib. 3. polit. c. 10,) preferreth election to succession. He preferreth Carthage to Sparta, though their kings came of Hercules. Plutarch in Scylla, saith, he would have kings as dogs, that is, best hunters, not those who are born of best dogs. Tacitus, lib. 1, Naci et generari a Principibus, fortuitum, nec ultra æstimantur.
然而，我不反对通过出生来继承国王的方式，但要有良好的限制；我同意，由于人性的腐败，这种方式可能在某种程度上是有益的，因为它能够维持和平，防止血腥的动乱，这是人类社会的祸根。进一步考虑这一点，参考Ægid. Romanus 的《关于统治者的书》第 3 卷第 5 章，Turrecremat.和 Joan. de terræ Reubeæ的《反叛者论文》第 1 篇第 4 条。然而，亚里士多德，这位天才之花（《政治学》第 3 卷第 10 章），更倾向于选举而不是继承。他更喜欢迦太基而不是斯巴达，尽管他们的国王都是海格力斯的后裔。普鲁塔克在《斯库拉》中说，他希望国王像狗一样，也就是说，是最好的猎人，而不是出生在最好的狗身上。塔西佗在《年表》第 1 卷中说，出生在王子家庭并不是偶然的，也不被过高评价。

QUESTION XI
问题十一

WHETHER OR NO HE BE MORE PRINCIPALLY A KING WHO IS A KING BY BIRTH, OR HE WHO IS A KING BY THE FREE ELECTION AND SUFFRAGES OF THE PEOPLE
无论他是出生就是国王的国王，还是通过人民的自由选举和投票成为国王的国王

Assert. 1.—Without detaining the reader, I desire liberty to assert that, where God establisheth a kingdom by birth, that government, hic et nunc, is best; and because God principally distributeth crowns, when God establisheth the royal line of David to reign, he is not principally a king who cometh nearest and most immediately to the fountain of royalty, which is God's immediate will; but God established, hic et nunc, for typical reasons (with reverence of the learned) a king by birth.
断言。1. - 不耽搁读者，我要自由地断言，上帝通过出生来建立一个王国时，这个政府在此时此地是最好的；因为上帝主要是在分配王冠，当上帝建立大卫王室来统治时，最主要的不是那个最接近和最直接与王权源泉——上帝的直接意愿相联系的国王；而是上帝为了象征性的原因（对学者表示敬意），通过出生来建立了一个国王。

Assert. 2.—But to speak of them, ex natur a rei, and according to the first mould and pattern of a king by law, a king by election is more principally king (magis univoce et per se) than an hereditary prince. (1.) Because in hereditary crowns, the first family being chosen by the free suffrages of the people, for that cause ultimate, the hereditary prince cometh to the throne, because his first father, and in him the whole line of the family, was chosen to the crown, and propter quod unumquodque tale, id ipsum magis tale. (2.) The first king ordained by God's positive law, must be the measure of all kings, and more principally the king than he who is such by derivation. But the first king is a king by election, not by birth, Deut. 17:15, Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose; one from amongst thy brethren shalt thou set over thee. (3.) The law saith, Surrogatum fruitur privilegiis ejus, in cujus locum surrogatur, he who is substituted in the place of another, enjoyeth the privileges of him in whose place he succeedeth. But the hereditary king hath royal privileges from him who is chosen king. Solomon hath the royal privileges of David his father, and is therefore king by birth, because his father David was king by election; and this I say, not because I think sole birth is a just title to the crown, but because it designeth him who indeed virtually was chosen, when the first king of the race was chosen. (4.) Because there is no dominion of either royalty, or any other way by nature, no more than an eagle is born king of eagles, a lion king of lions; neither is a man by nature born king of men; and, therefore, he who is made king by suffrages of the people, must be more principally king than he who hath no title but the womb of his mother.
断言 2. - 但是从事物的本质出发，根据法律规定的国王的第一模型和模式来说，选举产生的国王比世袭王子更主要地成为国王（更明确和本质）。 （1）因为在世袭王位中，第一个家族是由人民的自由选举选择的，因此世袭王子继承王位，因为他的第一个父亲，以及整个家族的血脉，被选为国王，而每个这样的事物都更加如此。 （2）上帝的正面法律规定的第一位国王必须成为所有国王的尺度，而且比通过衍生成为国王的人更为重要。但是第一位国王是通过选举而不是出生成为国王的，申命记 17:15 说：“你必要立耶和华你神所拣选的人作王，必从你弟兄中立一个人作王。” （3）法律说，代替他人的人享有他所继任者的特权。但是世袭国王从被选为国王的人那里获得王室特权。 所罗门拥有他父亲大卫的王室特权，因此他是出生即为国王，因为他的父亲大卫是通过选举成为国王的；我之所以这样说，并不是因为我认为单独的出生是合理的王位称号，而是因为它指明了那个实际上被选择的人，当这个种族的第一位国王被选择时。（4）因为没有任何一种统治方式，无论是王权还是其他方式，是天生的，就像一只鹰不是天生的鹰王，一只狮子不是天生的狮王；同样，一个人并不是天生的人王；因此，通过人民的选举成为国王的人，比那些只有母亲的子宫作为称号的人更主要地成为国王。

Dr Ferne is so far with us, to father royalty upon the people's free election as on the formal cause, that he saith, If to design the person and to procure limitation of the power, in the exercise of it, be to give the power, we grant the power is from the people; but (saith he) you will have the power originally from themselves, in another sense, for you say, they reserve power to depose and displace the magistrate; sometimes they make the monarchy supreme, and then they divest themselves of all power, and keep none to themselves; but, before established government, they have no politic power whereby they may lay a command on others, but only a natural power of private resistance, which they cannot use against the magistrate.
弗恩博士迄今为止与我们一起，将王权赋予人民的自由选举视为正式原因，他说，如果设计人选并在行使权力时限制权力是给予权力，那么我们承认权力来自人民；但是（他说）你们将从另一个意义上说，他们最初从自己那里保留了权力，因为你们说，他们保留了废黜和罢免官员的权力；有时他们使君主制至高无上，然后他们剥夺了自己所有的权力，不再保留任何权力；但是，在建立政府之前，他们没有政治权力可以对他人下命令，只有一种私人抵抗的自然权力，他们不能对抗官员。

Ans.—But to take off those by the way. 1. If the king may choose A. B. an ambassador, and limit him in his power, and say, Do this, and say this to the foreign state you go to, but no more, half a wit will say the king createth the ambassador, and the ambassador's power is originally from the king; and we prove the power of the lion is originally from God, and of the sea and the fire is originally from God, because God limiteth the lion in the exercises of its power, that it shall not devour Daniel, and limiteth the sea, as Jeremiah saith, when as he will have its proud waves to come thither and no farther, and will have the fire to burn those who threw the three children into the fiery furnace, and yet not to burn the three children; for this is as if Dr Ferne said, The Power of the king of six degrees, rather than this power of five, is from the people, therefore the power of the king is not from the people; yea, the contrary is true. 2. That the people can make a king supreme, that is, absolute, and so resign nature's birthright, that is, a power to defend themselves, is not lawful, for if the people have not absolute power to destroy themselves, they cannot resign such a power to their prince. 3. It is false that a community, before they be established with formal rulers, have no politic power; for consider them as men only, and not as associated, they have indeed no politic power: but before magistrates be established, they may convene and associate themselves in a body, and appoint magistrates; and this they cannot do if they had no politic power at all. 4. They have virtually a power to lay on commandments, in that they have power to appoint to themselves rulers, who may lay commandments on others. 5. A community hath not formally power to punish themselves, for to punish, is to inflict malum disconveniens naturæ, an evil contrary to nature; but, in appointing rulers and in agreeing to laws, they consent they shall be punished by another, upon supposition of transgression, as the child willingly going to school submitteth himself in that to school discipline, if he shall fail against any school law; and by all this it is clear, a king by election is principally a king. Barclay then faileth, who saith, No man denieth but succession to a crown by birth is agreeable to nature. It is not against nature, but it is no more natural than for a lion to be born a king of lions.
答案：但是顺便说一下。1. 如果国王可以选择一位大使，并限制他的权力，并说，你去的外国国家要做这个，说这个，但不能超过这个范围，聪明人会说国王创造了大使，大使的权力最初来自国王；我们证明狮子的力量最初来自上帝，海洋和火焰的力量也是如此，因为上帝限制了狮子在力量的运用上，使其不能吞噬但以理，上帝限制了海洋，正如耶利米所说，当他希望它的波浪傲慢地到达那里，但不能再往前走，他希望火焰烧毁那些把三个孩子扔进火炉的人，但不烧伤这三个孩子；因为这就像弗恩博士说的，国王的权力是从人民那里获得的六个层次的权力，而不是这五个层次的权力，因此国王的权力不是来自人民；是的，相反是真的。2. 人民可以使国王成为至高无上的、绝对的，并放弃自然的权利，即保护自己的权力，这是不合法的，因为如果人民没有绝对的权力毁灭自己，他们就不能将这样的权力放弃给他们的君主。3. 一个社区在正式建立统治者之前没有政治权力是错误的；因为将他们视为仅仅是人，而不是联合起来的人，他们确实没有政治权力；但在建立统治者之前，他们可以聚集并组成一个团体，并任命统治者；如果他们根本没有政治权力，他们就无法做到这一点。4. 他们实际上有权力制定命令，因为他们有权力为自己任命统治者，这些统治者可以对其他人下达命令。5. 一个社区没有正式的权力来惩罚自己，因为惩罚是对自然的不利之处进行施加，是违背自然的恶行；但是，在指定统治者和同意法律方面，他们同意他们将被另一个人惩罚，假设他们违反了规定，就像孩子自愿去学校接受学校纪律一样，如果他违反了学校的任何法律；通过这一切，很明显，通过选举产生的国王首先是国王。巴克利就此失败，他说，没有人否认通过出生继承王位符合自然。这不是违背自然，但它并不比狮子生来就是狮子王更自然。

Obj.—Most of the best divines approve an hereditary monarch, rather than a monarch by election.
大多数最优秀的神职人员赞同世袭君主，而不是选举君主。

Ans.—So do I in some cases. In respect of empire simply, it is not better; in respect of empire now, under man's fall in sin, I grant it to be better in some respects. So Salust in Jugurth. Natura mortalium imperij avida. Tacitus, Hist. 2. Minore discrimine princeps sumitur, quam queritu, there is less danger to accept of a prince at hand, than to seek one afar off. In a kingdom to be constituted, election is better; in a constituted kingdom, birth seemeth less evil. In respect of liberty, election is more convenient; in respect of safety and peace, birth is safer and the nearest way to the well. See Bodin. de Rep. lib. 6, c. iv.; Thol. de Rep. lib. 7, c iv.
答案：在某些情况下，我也是这样认为。就帝国而言，简单地说，并不更好；就现在的帝国而言，在人类堕入罪恶之后，我承认在某些方面更好。就像萨卢斯特在《尤格尔斯》中所说的那样。人类的本性渴望统治。塔西佗在《历史》第二卷中说，接受一个近在手边的君主比远离寻找一个君主更安全。在一个尚未建立的王国中，选举更好；在一个已经建立的王国中，出生似乎不那么糟糕。就自由而言，选举更方便；就安全和和平而言，出生更安全，也是通往幸福之道的最近途径。参见博丁的《国家论》第六卷第四章；托尔的《国家论》第七卷第四章。

QUESTION XII
问题十二

WHETHER OR NOT A KINGDOM MAY LAWFULLY BE PURCHASED BY THE SOLE TITLE OF CONQUEST
无论一个王国是否可以通过征服的唯一方式合法购买

The Prelate averreth confidently (c. 17, p. 58) that a title to a kingdom by conquest, without the consent of a people, is so just and evident by Scripture, that it cannot be denied; but the man bringeth no Scripture to prove it. Mr Marshall saith, (Let. p. 7,) a conquered kingdom is but continuata injuria, a continued robbery. A right of conquest is twofold. 1. When there is no just cause. 2. When there is just reason and ground of the war. In this latter case, if a prince subdue a whole land which justly deserveth to die, yet, by his grace, who is so mild a conqueror, they may be all preserved alive; now, amongst those who have thus injured the conqueror, as they deserve death, we are to difference the persons offending, and the wives, children—especially those not born—and such as have not offended. The former sort may resign their personal liberty to the conqueror, that the sweet life may be saved. He cannot be their king properly; but I conceive that they are obliged to consent that he be their king, upon this condition, that the conqueror put not upon them violent and tyrannical conditions that are harder than death. Now, in reason, we cannot think that a tyrannous and unjust domineering can be God's lawful mean of translating kingdoms; and, for the other part, the conqueror cannot domineer as king over the innocent, and especially the children not yet horn.
大主教自信地宣称（第 17 章，第 58 页），征服而未经人民同意的王国所有权在圣经中是如此公正和明显，无法否认；但这个人没有引用圣经来证明。马歇尔先生说（信函，第 7 页），征服的王国只是持续的不公，持续的抢劫。征服的权利有两种情况。1. 没有正当理由时。2. 当战争有正当理由和根据时。在后一种情况下，如果一个王子征服了整个土地，而这个土地理应死亡，然而，由于他是如此温和的征服者，他们都可以被保存下来；现在，在那些冒犯征服者的人中，他们理应死亡，我们应该区分冒犯者和妻子、孩子-尤其是那些尚未出生的孩子-以及那些没有冒犯的人。前一种情况下，他们可以将个人自由让渡给征服者，以保全宝贵的生命。他不能成为他们真正的国王；但我认为，他们有义务同意他成为他们的国王，前提是征服者不对他们施加比死亡更加暴虐和残酷的条件。 现在，在理性上，我们不能认为暴虐和不公正的统治可以成为上帝合法转移王国的手段；而且，征服者不能作为国王对待无辜者，尤其是尚未出生的儿童。

Assert. 1.—A people may be, by God's special commandment, subject to a conquering Nebuchadnezzar and a Cæsar, as to their king, as was Judah commanded by the prophet Jeremiah to submit unto the yoke of the king of Babylon, and to pray for him, and the people of the Jews were to give to Cæsar the things of Cæsar; and yet both those were unjust conquerors; for those tyrants had no command of God to oppress and reign over the Lord's people, yet were they to obey those kings, so the passive subjection was just and commanded of God, and the active, unjust and tyrannous, and forbidden of God.
断言。1. ——一个民族可能会根据上帝的特殊命令，成为征服者尼布甲尼撒和凯撒的统治对象，就像犹大被先知耶利米命令要顺服巴比伦王的轭，并为他祈祷一样，犹太人也要将凯撒的东西归给凯撒；然而这两个征服者都是不公正的征服者；因为这些暴君没有上帝的命令来压迫和统治上帝的子民，然而他们仍然要顺从这些国王，所以被动的顺从是公正的，并且是上帝所命令的，而主动的顺从是不公正和暴虐的，并且是上帝所禁止的。

Assert. 2.—This title by conquest, through the people's after consent, may be turned into a just title, as in the case of the Jews in Cæsar's time, for which cause our Saviour commanded to obey Cæsar, and to pay tribute unto him, as Dr Ferne confesseth, (sec. vii. p. 30). But two things are to be condemned in the Doctor. 1. That God manifesteth his will to us in this work of providence, whereby he translateth kingdoms. 2. That this is an over-awed consent. Now to the former I reply,—1. If the act of conquering be violent and unjust, it is no manifestation of God's regulating and approving will, and can no more prove a just title to a crown, because it is an act of divine providence, than Pilate and Herod's crucifying of the Lord of glory, which was an act of divine providence, flowing from the will and decree of divine providence, (Acts 2:23; 4:28,) is a manifestation that it was God's approving will, that they should kill Jesus Christ. 2. Though the consent be some way over-awed, yet is it a sort of contract and covenant of loyal subjection made to the conqueror, and therefore sufficient to make the title just; otherwise, if the people never give their consent, the conqueror, domineering over them by violence, hath no just title to the crown.
断言 2. ——这个通过人民的同意而获得的征服的头衔，可以转变为一个正当的头衔，就像在凯撒时代的犹太人的情况一样，因此我们的救主命令顺服凯撒，并向他纳税，正如弗恩博士所承认的那样（第七节，第 30 页）。但是，医生有两点应受谴责。第一，上帝在这个国家转移的工作中向我们显明他的意愿。第二，这是一种被威胁的同意。现在对于前者，我回答说，1. 如果征服的行为是暴力和不公正的，那么它不是上帝调整和赞成的意愿的表现，它不能像彼拉多和希律钉死荣耀之主一样，这是上帝的意愿的行为，流动从上帝的意愿和旨意中（使徒行传 2:23; 4:28），这表明他们应该杀死耶稣基督是上帝的赞成意愿。2. 虽然同意可能在某种程度上被压制，但它是一种向征服者许下忠诚服从的契约和盟约，因此足以使统治合法；否则，如果人民从未给予他们的同意，征服者通过暴力统治他们，就没有对王位的正当权利。

Assert. 3.—Mere conquest by the sword, without the consent of the people, is no just title to the crown.
仅凭剑术征服，没有人民的同意，不能成为合法的王位。

Arg. 1.—Because the lawful title that God's word holdeth forth to us, beside the Lord's choosing and calling of a man to the crown, is the peope's election, Deut. 17:15, all that had any lawful calling to the crown in God's word, as Saul, David, Solomon, &c., were called by the people; and the first lawful calling is to us a rule and pattern to all lawful callings.
因为上帝的话语向我们展示的合法权利，除了上主选择和呼召一个人担任王位之外，还有人民的选举，申命记 17:15，所有在上帝的话语中有合法呼召担任王位的人，如扫罗、大卫、所罗门等，都是由人民呼召的；而第一个合法的呼召对我们来说是所有合法呼召的规范和范例。

Arg. 2.—A king, as a king, and by virtue of his royal office, is the father of the kingdom, a tutor, a defender, protector, a shield, a leader, a shepherd, a husband, a patron, a watchman, a keeper of the people over which he is king, and so the office essentially includeth acts of fatherly affection, care, love and kindness, to those over whom he is set, so as he who is clothed with all these relations of love to the people, cannot exercise those official acts on a people against their will, and by mere violence. Can he be a father, a guide and a patron to us against our will, and by the sole power of the bloody sword? A benefit conferred on any against their will is no benefit. Will he by the awesome dominion of the sword be our father, and we unwilling to be his sons—an head over such as will not be members? Will he guide me as a father, a husband, against my will? He cannot come by mere violence to be a patron, a shield, and a defender of me through violence.
第二点——作为国王，凭借其皇家职位，他是王国的父亲、导师、捍卫者、保护者、盾牌、领导者、牧羊人、丈夫、赞助人、守望者和人民的守护者。因此，这个职位本质上包括对那些他所统治的人民的父爱、关怀、爱和善意的行为。因此，那些身负这些与人民的爱有关的关系的人，不能通过人民的意愿和纯粹的暴力来行使这些官方行为。他能够在我们不愿意的情况下成为我们的父亲、导师和赞助人吗？他能够凭借血腥的剑的唯一权力成为我们的父亲，而我们不愿意成为他的子女吗？他能够违背我的意愿来引导我，作为一个丈夫吗？他不能通过纯粹的暴力成为我的赞助人、盾牌和捍卫者。

Arg. 3.—It is not to be thought that that is God's just title to a crown which hath nothing in it of the essence of a king, but a violent and bloody purchase, which is in its prevalency in an oppressing Nimrod, and the cruelest tyrant that is hath nothing essential to that which constituteth a king; for it hath nothing of heroic and royal wisdom and gifts to govern, and nothing of God's approving and regulating will, which must be manifested to any who would be a king, but by the contrary, cruelty hath rather baseness and witless fury, and a plain reluctancy with God's revealed will, which forbiddeth murder. God's law should say, "Murder thou, and prosper and reign;" and by the act of violating the sixth commandment, God should declare his approving will, to wit, his lawful call to a throne.
第三点。不要认为那是上帝正当的王位，其中没有国王的本质，只有暴力和血腥的获取，这在一个压迫人的尼姆罗德和最残忍的暴君中占主导地位，没有国王所必需的英雄和皇家的智慧和才能来治理，也没有上帝的认可和调节的意愿，这必须向任何想成为国王的人显现出来，相反，残忍更多地表现出卑劣和愚蠢的狂怒，与上帝的启示意愿明显相抵触，禁止谋杀。上帝的法律应该说，“你谋杀，然后繁荣和统治”，通过违反第六诫命的行为，上帝应该宣布他的认可意愿，即他对王位的合法召唤。

Arg. 4.—There be none under a law of God who may resist a lawful call to a lawful office, but men may resist any impulsion of God stirring them up to murder the most numerous and strongest, and chief men of a kingdom, that they may reign over the fewest, the weakest, and the young, and lowest of the people, against their will; therefore this call by the sword is not lawful. If it be said that the divine impulsion, stirring up a man to make a bloody conquest, that the ire and just indignation of God in justice may be declared on a wicked nation, is an extraordinary impulsion of God, who is above a law, and therefore no man may resist it; then all bloody conquerors must have some extraordinary revelation from heaven to warrant their yielding of obedience to such an extraordinary impulsion. And if it be so, they must show a lawful and immediate extraordinary impulsion now, but, it is certain, the sins of the people conquered, and their most equal and just demerit before God, cannot be a just plea to legitimate the conquest; for though the people of God deserved devastation and captivity by the heathen, in regard of their sins, before the throne of divine justice, yet the heathen grievously sinned in conquering them, Zech. 1:15, "And I am very sore displeased with the heathen that are at ease; for I was but a little displeased, and they helped forward the affliction." So though Judah deserved to be made captives, and a conquered people, because of their idolatry and other sins, as Jeremiah had prophecied, yet God was highly displeased at Babylon for their unjust and bloody conquest, Jer. 50:17, 18, 33, 34; 51:35, "The violence done to me and to my flesh be upon Babylon, shall the inhabitants of Zion say; and my blood upon the inhabitants of Chaldea, shall Jerusalem say." And that any other extraordinary impulsion to be as lawful a call to the throne as the people's free election, we know not from God's word; and we have but the naked word of our adversaries, that William the Conqueror, without the people's consent, made himself, by blood, the lawful king of England, and also of all their posterity; and that king Fergus conquered Scotland.
阿尔格蒂 4. ——在上帝的法律下，没有人可以抵抗对合法职位的合法召唤，但人们可以抵抗上帝激励他们去谋杀最多、最强大、最高位的国家领导人，以便统治最少、最弱小、最年轻和最低层次的人民，这是违背他们意愿的；因此，用剑来召唤是不合法的。如果有人说，上帝的激励使一个人进行血腥征服，以便以公正的方式宣告上帝对邪恶的国家的愤怒和公正的愤怒，这是上帝的非凡激励，他高于法律，因此没有人可以抵抗它；那么所有血腥征服者都必须从天上得到一些非凡的启示，以保证他们服从这种非凡的激励。 如果是这样的话，他们必须立即展示一个合法和特殊的推动力，但是可以肯定的是，人民的罪恶被征服，他们在上帝面前的最公平和公正的罪过，不能成为合法征服的正当理由；因为虽然上帝的子民因为他们的罪恶在神的审判座前应受毁灭和被异教徒俘虏的惩罚，但异教徒征服他们也犯了严重的罪过，撒迦利亚书 1:15 说：“我甚恼怒那安逸的列国，因为我从前稍微恼怒我的百姓，他们就加增灾祸。”所以尽管犹大因为他们的偶像崇拜和其他罪恶而应该成为俘虏和被征服的民族，正如耶利米预言的那样，但上帝对巴比伦的不公正和血腥征服非常不满，耶利米书 50:17、18、33、34；51:35 说：“我被虐待的事归给巴比伦，我被杀的人归给迦勒底人，锡安的居民要说；耶路撒冷的居民要说，愿流我的血归给巴比伦的居民。”任何其他非凡的推动力，与人民的自由选举一样合法地呼唤王位，我们不从上帝的话语中得知；我们只有对手的空洞言辞，即威廉征服者在没有人民同意的情况下，通过流血成为英格兰合法的国王，以及费尔格斯国王征服苏格兰的说法。

Arg. 5.—A king is a special gift from God, given to feed and defend the people of God, that they may lead a godly and peaceable life under him, (Psal. 78:71, 72; 1 Tim. 2:2;) as it is a judgment of God that Israel is without a king many days, (Hos. 3:4,) and that there is no judge, no king, to put evil-doers to shame. (Judg. 19:1.) But if a king be given of God as a king, by the acts of a bloody conquest, to be avenged on the sinful land over which he is made a king, he cannot be given, actu primo, as a special gift and blessing of God to feed, but to murder and to destroy; for the genuine end of a conqueror, as a conqueror, is not peace, but fire and sword. If God change his heart, to be of a bloody devastator, a father, prince, and feeder of the people, ex officio, now he is not a violent conqueror, and he came to that meekness by contraries, which is the proper work of the omnipotent God, and not proper to man, who, as he cannot work miracles, so neither can he lawfully work by contraries. And so if conquest be a lawful title to a crown, and an ordinary calling, as the opponents presume, every bloody conqueror must be changed into a loving father, prince and feeder; and if God call him, none should oppose him, but the whole land should dethrone their own native sovereign (whom they are obliged before the Lord to defend) and submit to the bloody invasion of a strange lord, presumed to be a just conqueror, as if he were lawfully called to the throne both by birth and the voices of the people. And truly they deserve no wages who thus defend the king's prerogative royal; for if the sword be a lawful title to the crown, suppose the two generals of both kingdoms should conquer the most and the chiefest of the kingdom now, when they have so many forces in the field, by this wicked reason the one should have a lawful call of God to be king of England and the other to be king of Scotland; which is absurd.
国王是上帝的特殊恩赐，被赋予以供养和保护上帝的子民，使他们在他的统治下过上敬虔和平静的生活，（诗篇 78:71, 72; 提摩太前书 2:2;）正如以色列没有国王的日子是上帝的审判一样，（何西阿书 3:4，）没有审判官，没有国王来羞辱作恶者。（士师记 19:1。）但是，如果一个国王是上帝通过血腥征服的行为赐予的，为了对他所统治的罪恶之地进行复仇，他不能作为上帝的特殊恩赐和祝福来供养，而是为了谋杀和毁灭；因为一个征服者的真正目的，作为征服者，不是和平，而是火与剑。如果上帝改变他的心，使他成为一个血腥的破坏者、人民的父亲、王子和供养者，那么他就不再是一个暴力的征服者，他通过相反的方式变得温和，这是全能的上帝的工作，而不是人类的工作，因为人既不能行神迹，也不能合法地通过相反的方式工作。 如果征服是合法的夺冠方式和一种普通的职业，正如对手所假设的那样，那么每个血腥的征服者都必须变成一个慈爱的父亲、王子和供养者；如果上帝召唤他，没有人应该反对他，而整个国家应该废黜他们自己的本土君主（他们在上帝面前有义务保护），并屈服于一个被认为是正义的征服者的血腥入侵，就好像他是合法地通过出生和人民的声音被召唤到王位上的。实际上，那些这样捍卫国王的王权的人不应该得到任何报酬；因为如果剑是夺冠的合法方式，假设两个王国的将军在他们拥有如此多的军队的情况下征服了现在的王国中最多和最重要的部分，根据这种邪恶的理由，一个人应该合法地被上帝召唤成为英格兰国王，另一个人应该合法地被上帝召唤成为苏格兰国王；这是荒谬的。

Arg. 6.—Either conquest, as conquest, is a just title to the crown, or as a just conquest. If as a conquest, then all conquests are just titles to a crown; then the Ammonites, Zidonians, Canaanites, Edomites, &c., subduing God's people for a time, have just title to reign over them; and if Absalom had been stronger than David, he had then had the just title to be the Lord's anointed and king of Israel, not David; and so strength actually prevailing should be God's lawful call to a crown. But strength, as strength victorious, is not law nor reason: it were then reason that Herod behead John Baptist, and the Roman Emperors kill the witnesses of Christ Jesus. If conquest, as just, be the title and lawful claim before God's court to a crown, then, certainly, a stronger king, for pregnant national injuries, may lawfully subdue and reign over an innocent posterity not yet born. But what word of God can warrant a posterity not born, and so accessory to no offence against the conqueror, (but only sin original,) to be under a conqueror against their will, and who hath no right to reign over them but the bloody sword? For so conquest, as conquest, not as just, maketh him king over the posterity. If it be said, The fathers may engage the posterity by an oath to surrender themselves as loyal subjects to the man who justly and deservedly made the fathers vassals by the title of the sword of justice; I answer, The fathers may indeed dispose of the inheritance of their children, because that inheritance belongeth to the father as well as to the son; but because the liberty of the son being born with the son, (all men being born free from all civil subjection,) the father hath no more power to resign the liberty of his children than their lives; and the father, as a father, hath not power of the life of his child; as a magistrate he may have power, and, as something more than a father, he may have power of life and death. I hear not what Grotius saith, "Those who are not born have no accidents, and so no rights, Non entis nulla sunt accidentia; then children not born have neither right nor liberty." And so no injury (may some say) can be done to children not born, though the fathers should give away their liberty to the conquerors,—those who are not capable of law are not capable of injury contrary to law.—Ans. There is a virtual alienation of rights and lives of children not born unlawful, because the children are not born. To say that children not born are not capable of law and injuries virtual, which become real in time, might say, Adam did not any injury to his posterity by his first sin, which is contrary to God's word: so those who vowed yearly to give seven innocent children to the Minotaur to be devoured, and to kill their children not born to bloody Molech, did no acts of bloody injury to their children; nor can any say, then, that fathers cannot tie themselves and their posterity to a king by succession. But I say, to be tyed to a lawful king is no making away of liberty, but a resigning of a power to be justly governed, protected and awed from active and passive violence.
阿格六：征服，无论是作为征服本身，还是作为正义的征服，都是夺取王位的正当理由。如果是作为征服，那么所有的征服都是夺取王位的正当理由；那么亚扪人、西顿人、迦南人、以东人等在一段时间内征服上帝的子民，就有正当的理由统治他们；如果押沙龙比大卫更强大，那么他就有正当的理由成为上帝的受膏者和以色列的国王，而不是大卫；因此，实际上占上风的力量应该是上帝合法的召唤王位。但是，力量作为胜利的力量并不是法律或理性：如果是的话，希律就有理由斩首施洗约翰，罗马皇帝就有理由杀害基督耶稣的见证人。如果征服作为正当的理由是在上帝的法庭上夺取王位的合法主张，那么，毫无疑问，一个更强大的国王，出于国家的严重伤害，可以合法地征服和统治一个尚未出生的无辜后代。但是，上帝的话语能够保证一个尚未出生的后代，并且对征服者没有任何冒犯（只有原罪），被迫接受一个他们不愿意的征服者，并且这个征服者没有权利统治他们，除了血腥的剑之外？ 对于征服，作为征服，而不是公正的征服，使他成为后代的国王。如果有人说，父辈可以通过誓言使后代自愿成为那个以正义和应得之剑的称号使父辈成为臣民的人的忠诚臣民，我回答说，父辈确实可以处置他们子女的继承权，因为继承权既属于父亲也属于儿子；但是因为儿子的自由与生俱来（所有人都生来自由，不受任何公民隶属），父亲没有权力放弃子女的自由，就像他们的生命一样；作为父亲，他没有孩子的生命权力；作为一个执法者，他可能有权力，作为比父亲更多的东西，他可能有生死权力。我不在乎格罗蒂乌斯说什么，“那些没有出生的人没有意外，因此没有权利，非存在者没有任何意外；那么未出生的孩子既没有权利也没有自由。”所以，有人可能会说，即使父亲们将自己的自由让给了征服者，也不会对尚未出生的孩子造成伤害——那些无法遵守法律的人也无法对法律进行违反的伤害。答案是，对尚未出生的孩子的权利和生命的虚拟剥夺是非法的，因为这些孩子尚未出生。说尚未出生的孩子无法遵守法律和虚拟的伤害，这些伤害在时间上变得真实，就好像说亚当的第一次犯罪没有对他的后代造成伤害一样，这是违背上帝的话语的。因此，那些每年发誓将七个无辜的孩子献给米诺陶罗斯，让其吞食，并杀死他们尚未出生的孩子献给血腥的摩洛克的人，对他们的孩子没有进行血腥的伤害；因此，没有人可以说父亲们不能通过继承将自己和他们的后代与国王联系起来。但我要说的是，与合法的国王联系在一起并不是剥夺自由，而是放弃权力以便得到公正的治理、保护和免受主动和被动的暴力。

Arg. 7.—No lawful king may be dethroned, nor lawful kingdom dissolved; but law and reason both saith, Quod vi partum est imperium, vi dissolvi potest. Every conquest made by violence may be dissolved by violence: Censetur enim ipsa natura jus dare ad id omne, sine quo obtineri non potest quod ipsa imperat.
任何合法的国王都不得被废黜，合法的王国也不得解散；但法律和理性都说，权力通过暴力获得，也可以通过暴力解散。每一个通过暴力征服的国家都可以通过暴力解体：因为自然本身被认为赋予了一切必要的权力，否则无法实现自身的命令。

Obj.—It is objected, that the people of God, by their sword, conquered seven nations of the Canaanites; David conquered the Ammonites for the disgrace done to his ambassadors; so God gave Egypt to Nebuchadnezzar for his hire in his service done against Judah. Had David no right over the Ammonites and Moabites but by expecting their consent? Ye will say, A right to their lands, goods and lives, but not to challenge their moral subjection. Well, we doubt not but such conquerors will challenge and obtain their moral consent. But if the people refuse their consent, is there no way, for providence giveth no right? So Dr Ferne, so Arnisæus.2
它被反对，说上帝的子民通过他们的剑征服了迦南的七个国家；大卫为了对他的使者的侮辱而征服了亚扪人；所以上帝把埃及交给尼布甲尼撒作为他对犹大所做的服务的报酬。大卫对亚扪人和摩押人没有其他权利，除了期待他们的同意吗？你们会说，对他们的土地、财产和生命有权，但不能要求他们的道义服从。好吧，我们不怀疑这样的征服者会要求并获得他们的道义同意。但如果人民拒绝同意，难道没有办法，因为上帝的安排并没有给予权利吗？费恩博士和阿尼塞乌斯也是这样认为的。

Ans.—A facto ad jus non vales consequentia, God, to whom belongeth the world and the fulness thereof, disponed to Abraham and his seed the land of Canaan for their inheritance, and ordained that they should use their bow and their sword, for the actual possession thereof; and the like divine right had David to the Edomites and Ammonites, though the occasion of David's taking possession of these kingdoms by his sword, did arise from particular and occasional exigencies and injuries; but it followeth in no sort that, therefore, kings now wanting any word of promise, and so of divine right to any lands, may ascend to the thrones of other kingdoms than their own, by no other title than the bloody sword. That God's will was the chief patent here is clear, in that God forbade his people to conquer Edom, or Esau's possession, when as he gave them command to conquer the Amorites. I doubt not to say, if Joshua and David had no better title than their bloody sword, though provoked by injuries, they could have had no right to any kingly power over these kingdoms; and if only success by the sword be a right of providence, it is no right of precept. God's providence, as providence without precept or promise, can conclude a thing is done, or may be done, but cannot conclude a thing is lawfully and warrantably done, else you might say the selling of Joseph, the crucifying of Christ, the spoiling of Job, were lawfully done. Though conquerors extort consent and oath of loyalty, yet that maketh not over a royal right to the conqueror to be king over their posterity without their consent. Though the children of Ammon did a high injury to David, yet no injury can be recompensed in justice with the pressure of the constrained subjection of loyalty to a violent lord. If David had not had an higher warrant from God than an injury done to his messengers, he could not have conquered them. But the Ammonites were the declared enemies of the church of God, and raised forces against David when they themselves were the injurers and offenders. And if David's conquest will prove a lawful title by the sword to all conquerors, then may all conquerors lawfully do to the conquered people as David did; that is, they may "put them under saws, and under harrows of iron, and under axes of iron, and cause them pass through the brick-kilne." But, I beseech you, will royalists say, that conquerors, who make themselves kings by their sword, and so make themselves fathers, heads, defenders, and feeders of the people, may use the most extreme tyranny in the world, such as David used against the children of Ammon, which he could not have done by the naked title of sword-conquest, if God had not laid a commandment of an higher nature on him to serve God's enemies so? I shall then say, if a conquering king be a lawful king, because a conqueror, then hath God made such a lawful king both a father, because a king, and a tyrant, and cruel and lion-hearted oppressor of those whom he hath conquered; for God hath given him royal power by this example, (2 Sam. 12:30, 31,) to put these, to whom he is a father and defender by office, to torment, and also to be a torturer of them by office, by bringing their backs under such instruments of cruelty as "saws, and harrows of iron, and axes of iron."
答案：上帝拥有世界和其中的一切，祂将迦南之地赐给亚伯拉罕和他的后裔作为他们的产业，并命令他们使用弓和剑来实际占有这片土地；大卫对以东人和亚扪人也有同样的神圣权利，尽管大卫通过剑夺取这些王国的原因是特殊的和偶然的紧急情况和伤害；但这并不意味着，现在的国王如果没有任何应许的话语，也就是没有任何神圣权利去占领其他王国的王位，除了通过血腥的剑。这里明显是上帝的意愿起了主要作用，因为上帝禁止祂的子民征服以东或以扫的领土，而却命令他们征服亚摩利人。我毫不怀疑地说，如果约书亚和大卫只有血腥的剑作为他们的权利，尽管是受到伤害的激发，他们就没有权利统治这些王国；如果只有通过剑的成功是上帝的权利，那就不是上帝的命令权利。 上帝的恩典，作为没有规定或承诺的恩典，可以得出一件事已经完成或可能完成的结论，但不能得出一件事是合法和有权利完成的结论，否则你可能会说出卖约瑟夫、钉死耶稣、掠夺约伯都是合法的。虽然征服者可以强迫人们同意和效忠的誓言，但这并不能使征服者在没有他们的同意的情况下成为他们后代的国王。尽管亚扪人对大卫造成了严重的伤害，但没有任何伤害可以通过迫使人们忠诚于一个暴力的领主来得到公正的补偿。如果大卫没有比对他使者的伤害更高的上帝授权，他就不能征服他们。但亚扪人是上帝教会的公开敌人，并且在他们自己是伤害者和罪犯的情况下对大卫发动了战争。如果大卫的征服证明了剑的合法所有权，那么所有征服者都可以合法地对待被征服的人民，就像大卫所做的那样；也就是说，他们可以“用锯子、铁耙和铁斧将他们压制，使他们经过砖窑”。但是，我恳求你们，皇室主义者会说，征服者们通过他们的剑成为国王，从而成为人民的父亲、领袖、捍卫者和养育者，他们可以使用世界上最极端的暴政，就像大卫对亚扪子民所使用的那样，如果上帝没有给他下达更高层次的命令，要他这样为上帝的敌人服务，他就不能仅凭剑征服的头衔来这样做。那么我要说的是，如果一个征服的国王是合法的国王，因为他是征服者，那么上帝通过这个例子（撒母耳记下 12:30, 31）给了他这样一个合法的国王既是父亲，因为他是国王，又是暴君，残忍和狮心般的压迫者，对待他所征服的人。因为上帝让他用这些工具来折磨那些他作为父亲和捍卫者的人，并且也让他作为一名官员来折磨他们，通过使用"锯子、铁耙和铁斧"这样的残酷工具。"

QUESTION XIII
问题十三

WHETHER OR NO ROYAL DIGPITY HAVE ITS SPRING FROM NATURE, AND HOW THAT IS TRUE, "EVERY MAN IS BORN FREE," AND HOW SERVITUDE IS CONTRARY TO NATURE
无论皇家的尊严是否源自自然，以及这是如何真实的，"每个人都是自由出生的"，以及奴役如何违背自然

I conceive it to be evident that royal dignity is not immediately, and without the intervention of the people's consent, given by God to any one person, and that conquest and violence is no just title to a crown. Now the question is, If royalty flow from nature, if royalty be not a thing merely natural, neither can subjection to royal power be merely natural; but the former is rather civil than natural: and the question of the same nature is, Whether subjection or servitude be natural.
我认为明显的是，皇室的尊严并非直接由上帝赋予某个人，而是需要人民的同意介入，征服和暴力并不能成为加冕的正当理由。现在的问题是，如果皇权源自自然，如果皇权不仅仅是自然的事物，那么对皇权的服从也不仅仅是自然的；相同性质的问题是，服从或奴役是否是自然的。

I conceive that there be divers subjections to these that are above us some way natural, and therefore I rank them in order, thus:—1. There is a subjection in respect of natural being, as the effect to the cause; so, though Adam had never sinned, this morality of the fifth command should have stood in vigour, that the son by nature, without any positive law, should have been subject to the father, because from him he hath his being, as from a second cause. But I doubt if the relation of a father, as a father, doth necessarily infer a royal or kingly authority of the father over the son; or by nature's law, that the father hath a power of life and death over, or above, his children, and the reasons I give are, (1.) Because power of life and death is by a positive law, presupposing sin and the fell of man; and if Adam, standing in innocency, could lawfully kill his son, though the son should be a malefactor, without any positive law of God, I much doubt. (2.) I judge that the power royal, and the fatherly power of a father over his children, shall be found to be different; and the one is founded on the law of nature, the other, to wit, royal power, on a mere positive law. 2. The degree or order of subjection natural is a subjection in respect of gifts or age. So Aristotle (1 polit. cap. 3) saith, "that some are by nature servants." His meaning is good,—that some gifts of nature, as wisdom natural, or aptitude to govern, hath made some men of gold, fitter to command, and some of iron and clay, fitter to be servants and slaves. But I judge this title to make a king by birth, seeing Saul, whom God by supervenient gifts made a king, seemeth to owe small thanks to the womb, or nature, that he was a king, for his cruelty to the Lord's priests speaketh nothing but natural baseness. It is possible Plato had a good meaning, (dialog. 3, de legib.) who made six orders here. "1. That lathers command their sons; 2. The noble the ignoble; 3. The elder the younger; 4. The masters the servants; 5. The stronger the weaker; 6. The wise the ignorant." Aquinas (II-II, q. 57, art. 3), Driedo (de libert. Christ. lib. 1, p. 8), following Aristotle, (polit. lib. 7, c. 14,) hold, though man had never sinned there should have been a sort of dominion of the more gifted and wiser above the less wise and weaker; not antecedent from nature properly, but consequent, for the utility and good of the weaker, in so far as it is good for the weaker to be guided by the stronger, which cannot be denied to have some ground in nature. But there is no ground for kings by nature here. 1. Because even those who plead that the mother's womb must be the best title for a crown, and make it equivalent to royal unction, are to be corrected in memory thus,—That it is merely accidental, and not natural, for such a son to be born a king, because the free consent of the people making choice of the first father of that line to be their king, and in him making choice of the first-born of the family, is merely accidental to father and son, and so cannot be natural. 2. Because royal gifts to reign are not held by either us or our adversaries to be the specific essence of a king; for if the people crown a person their king, say we,—if the womb bring him forth to be a king, say the opponents,—he is essentially a king, and to be obeyed as the Lord's anointed, though nature be very parce, sparing, and a niggard in bestowing royal gifts; yea, though he be an idiot, say some, if he be the first-born of a king, he is by just title a king, but must have curators and tutors to guide him in the exercise of that royal right that he hath from the womb. But Buchanan saith well, "He who cannot govern himself shall never govern others."
我认为我们对那些在我们之上的事物有各种不同的从属关系，某种程度上是自然的，因此我将它们按顺序排列如下：1. 在自然存在方面存在一种从属关系，就像效果对原因一样；因此，即使亚当从未犯罪，第五诫的道德规范仍然有效，即儿子在自然状态下，无需任何正面法律，应该服从父亲，因为他的存在来自于父亲，就像来自第二原因一样。但我怀疑作为父亲的关系是否必然意味着父亲对儿子有王权或君主权力；或者根据自然法则，父亲是否对子女拥有生死权力，以及我提出的理由是，（1）因为生死权力是通过正面法律来确定的，前提是有罪和人类的堕落；如果亚当在无辜中可以合法地杀死他的儿子，即使儿子是罪犯，没有上帝的正面法律，我非常怀疑。（2）我认为王权和父亲对子女的权力是不同的；其中一个是基于自然法则，而另一个，即王权，是基于纯粹的正面法律。2. 自然的服从程度或顺序是在天赋或年龄方面的服从。亚里士多德（《政治学》第一章第三节）说过，“有些人天生就是仆人。”他的意思是，自然的智慧或统治能力等一些天赋使得一些人像黄金一样适合指挥，而一些人像铁和泥土一样适合做仆人和奴隶。但我认为这个称号使一个人成为国王，因为上帝通过额外的恩赐使扫罗成为国王，似乎对他成为国王的胎儿或天性没有多少感激之情，因为他对上帝的祭司的残忍行为只表明了他的天性卑劣。可能柏拉图有一个好意思（《法律篇》第三篇），他在这里列出了六个等级。“1. 父亲指挥儿子；2. 高贵者指挥卑贱者；3. 年长者指挥年幼者；4. 主人指挥仆人；5. 强者指挥弱者；6. 智者指挥无知者。”阿奎那（《神学大全》第二部分第二部分第 57 题第 3 条），德里多（《基督教自由论》第一卷第 8 页），追随亚里士多德（《政治学》第七卷第 14，）尽管人类从未犯罪，但更有才华和智慧的人应该在较不聪明和较弱的人之上拥有一种统治权；这种统治权不是从本质上先于自然而来的，而是随之而来的，是为了较弱者的效用和利益，因为较弱者被较强者指导对较弱者有益，这在一定程度上是有自然依据的。但是在这里，君王没有自然的依据。1.因为即使那些主张母亲的子宫应该是王冠的最佳称号，并将其等同于王权的人，也应该纠正他们的记忆，即这仅仅是偶然的，而不是自然的，因为人民自由地同意选择那条血统的第一位父亲作为他们的国王，并在他身上选择家族的长子，这对父亲和儿子来说仅仅是偶然的，因此不能是自然的。2. 因为王权的赐予并不被我们或我们的对手视为国王的特定本质；因为如果人民加冕某人为国王，我们说——如果母亲生下他成为国王，对手说——他本质上是国王，应当作为上帝的受膏者而被服从，尽管自然界在赐予王权方面非常吝啬；是的，即使他是个白痴，有人说，如果他是国王的长子，他就是合法的国王，但必须有监护人和导师来指导他行使从出生起就拥有的王权。但布坎南说得好，“不能自律的人永远不能统治他人。”"

Assert. 1.—As a man cometh into the world a member of a politic society, he is, by consequence, born subject to the laws of that society; but this maketh him not, from the womb and by nature, subject to a king, as by nature he is subject to his father who begat him, no more than by nature a lion is born subject to another king-lion; for it is by accident that he is born of parents under subjection to a monarch, or to either democratical or aristocratical governors, for Cain and Abel were born under none of these forms of government properly; and if he had been born in a new planted colony in a wilderness, where no government were yet established, he should be under no such government.
断言。1.——当一个人作为一个政治社会的成员来到这个世界时，他因此而生来就受制于该社会的法律；但这并不意味着他从出生起就天生受制于一个国王，就像他天生受制于生他的父亲一样，就像一只狮子天生受制于另一只狮子国王一样；因为他出生在父母受制于君主或民主或贵族统治者的偶然情况下，而该形式的政府并不适用于该形式的政府，因为该恺恩和亚伯并不适用于这些政府形式；如果他在一个尚未建立政府的荒野中的新殖民地出生，他将不受任何这样的政府的约束。

Assert. 2.—Slavery of servants to lords or masters, such as were of old amongst the Jews, is not natural, but against nature. 1. Because slavery is malum naturæ, a penal evil and contrary to nature, and a punishment of sin. 2. Slavery should not have been in the world, if man had never sinned, no more than there could have been buying and selling of men, which is a miserable consequent of sin and a sort of death, when men are put to the toiling pains of the hireling, who longeth for the shadow, and under iron harrows and saws, and to hew wood, and draw water continually. 3. The original of servitude was, when men were taken in war, to eschew a greater evil, even death, the captives were willing to undergo a less evil, slavery, (S. Servitus, 1 de jure. Pers.) 4. A man being created according to God's image, he is res sacra, a sacred thing, and can no more, by nature's law, be sold and bought, than a religious and sacred thing dedicated to God. S. l. Instit. de inutil. scrupl. l. inter Stipulantem. S. Sacram. F. de verber. Obligat.
断言 2.仆人对主人的奴役，如古代犹太人之间的奴役，不是自然的，而是违背自然的。1.因为奴役是 malum naturæ，一种刑罚性的邪恶，违背自然，是对罪恶的惩罚。2.如果人类从未犯罪，世界上就不应该有奴役，就像人们不应该买卖人一样，这是罪恶的可悲后果，是一种类似死亡的痛苦，当人们被迫像雇工一样辛勤劳作，渴望阴影，被铁耙和锯子压迫，不断劈柴和挑水。3.奴役的起源是，当人们在战争中被俘，为了避免更大的祸害，即死亡，俘虏们愿意忍受较小的祸害，即奴役。(S. Servitus, 1 de jure. Pers.) 4.人类按照上帝的形象被创造，他是 res sacra，一种神圣的东西，按照自然法则，他不能被买卖，就像一件献给上帝的宗教和神圣的东西一样。S. l. Instit. de inutil. scrupl. l. inter Stipulantem. S. Sacram. F. de verber. Obligat.

Assert. 3.—Every man by nature is a freeman born, that is, by nature no man cometh out of the womb under any civil subjection to king, prince, or judge, to master, captain, conqueror, teacher, &c.
断言。第三条——每个人天生都是自由人，也就是说，没有人天生就在出生时受制于国王、王子、法官、主人、队长、征服者、教师等任何民事约束。

Arg. 1.—Because freedom is natural to all, except freedom from subjection to parents; and subjection politic is merely accidental, coming from some positive laws of men, as they are in a politic society; whereas they might have been born with all concomitants of nature, though born in a single family, the only natural and first society in the world.
因为自由是所有人的天性，除了对父母的服从之外；而政治上的服从只是偶然的，来自于人们在一个政治社会中的某些正面法律；尽管他们可能在一个单一的家庭中出生，但他们可能带有与自然相伴的一切特征，这是世界上唯一的自然和最初的社会。

Arg. 2.—Man is born by nature free from all subjection, except of that which is most kindly and natural, and that is fatherly or filial subjection, or matrimonial subjection of the wife to the husband; and especially he is free of subjection to a prince by nature; because to be under jurisdiction to a judge or king, hath a sort of jurisdiction, (argument, L. Si quis sit fugitivus. F. de edil. edict. in S. penult, vel fin.) especially to be under penal laws now in the state of sin. The learned senator Ferdinandus Vasquez saith, (lib. 2. c. 82. n. 15,) Every subject is to lay down his life for the prince. Now no man is born under subjection to penal laws or dying for his prince.
第二条论点——人类天生自由，除了最亲切和自然的父子、夫妻之间的从属关系，以及妻子对丈夫的从属关系，他特别不受自然状态下对君主的从属关系的约束；因为受到法官或国王的管辖，具有某种形式的管辖权（论据，L. Si quis sit fugitivus. F. de edil. edict. in S. penult, vel fin.），尤其是在罪恶状态下受到刑法的约束。博学的参议员费尔南多·瓦斯克斯说（lib. 2. c. 82. n. 15），每个臣民都应为君主舍生。现在没有人天生受到刑法的约束或为君主而死。

Arg. 3.—Man by nature is born free, and as free as beasts; but by nature no beast, no lion is born king of lions; no horse, no bullock, no eagle, king of horses, bullocks, or eagles. Nor is there any subjection here, except that the young lion is subject to the old, every foal to its dam; and by that same law of nature, no man is born king of men, nor any man subject to man in a civil subjection by nature, (I speak not of natural subjection of children to parents,) and therefore Ferdi. Vasquez (illustr. quest. lib. 2, c. 82, n. 6,) said, that kingdoms and empires were brought in, not by nature's law, but by the law of nations. He expoundeth himself elsewhere to speak of the law of nature secondary, otherwise the primary law of nations is indeed the law of nature, as appropriated to man. If any reply, That the freedom natural of beasts and birds, who never sinned, cannot be one with the natural freedom of man who is now under sin, and so under bondage for sin, my answer is, That the subjection of the misery of man by nature, because of sin, is more than the subjection of beasts, comparing species and kinds of beasts and birds with mankind, but comparing individuals of the same kind amongst themselves; as lion with lion, eagle with eagle, and so man with man; in which respect, because he who is supposed to be the man born free from subjection politic, even the king born a king, is under the same state of sin, and so by reason of sin, of which he hath a share equally with all other men by nature, he must be, by nature, born under as great subjection penal for sin (except the king be born void of sin) as other men; therefore he is not born freer by nature than other men, except he come out of the womb with a king's crown on his head.
人类天生自由，和野兽一样自由；但是没有野兽，没有狮子天生就是狮子之王；没有马，没有牛，没有鹰天生就是马之王，牛之王，或者鹰之王。这里没有任何服从，除了幼狮服从老狮，每只小马服从母马；根据自然法则，没有人天生就是人之王，也没有人在自然状态下服从其他人（我不是指儿童对父母的自然服从），因此费尔迪南德·瓦斯奎兹（《解释问题书》第 2 卷第 82 章第 6 条）说，王国和帝国的出现不是由自然法则，而是由国际法所带来的。他在其他地方解释自己所说的是次要的自然法则，否则，原始的国际法则实际上就是适用于人类的自然法则。 如果有任何回应，那就是野兽和鸟类的自然自由，它们从未犯罪，不能与现在身陷罪恶、因此受罪恶束缚的人的自然自由相同。因此，我的回答是，人类因为罪恶而天生的苦难受制于自然界中的野兽更多，这是在将不同物种和种类的野兽和鸟类与人类进行比较时得出的结论，但是在将同一种类的个体相互比较时，如狮子与狮子、老鹰与老鹰，以及人与人；在这方面，因为被认为是从政治上免于受制的人，即天生的国王，也处于同样的罪恶状态，因此由于罪恶的缘故，他与其他人一样，在天性上出生时就承受同样严厉的罪恶惩罚（除非国王天生无罪）。因此，除非他出生时头戴国王的王冠，否则他并不比其他人在天性上更自由。

Arg. 4.—To be a king is a free gift of God, which God bestoweth on some men above others, as is evident, (2 Sam. 12:7, 8; Psal. 75:6; Dan. 4:32;) and therefore all must be born kings, if any one man be by nature a king born, and another a born subject. But if some be by God's grace made kings above others, they are not so by nature; for things which agree to man by nature, agree to all men equally: but all men equally are not born kings, as is evident; and all men are not equally born by nature under politic subjection to kings, as the adversaries grant, because those who are by nature kings, cannot be also by nature subjects.
争论 4：成为国王是上帝的自由赐予，上帝将其赐予某些人，超过其他人，正如明显所示（撒母耳记下 12:7, 8; 诗篇 75:6;但以理书 4:32）；因此，如果有人天生是国王，而另一个人是天生的臣民，那么所有人都必须天生为国王。但如果有些人因上帝的恩典而成为超过其他人的国王，那么他们并非天生如此；因为属于人类天性的事情，应当平等适用于所有人：但众所周知，并非所有人都是天生的国王；而且并非所有人在天性上平等地天生为国王的臣民，正如对手们承认的那样，因为那些天生为国王的人，不能天生也是臣民。

Arg. 5.—If men be not by nature free from politic subjection, then must some, by the law of relation, by nature be kings. But none are by nature kings, because none have by nature these things which essentially constitute kings, for they have neither by nature the calling of God, nor gifts for the throne, nor the free election of the people, nor conquest; and if there be none a king by nature, there can be none a subject by nature. And the law saith, Omnes sumus natura liberi, nullius ditioni subjecti. lib. Manumiss. F. de just. et jur. S. jus antem gentium, Jus. de jur. nat. We are by nature free, and D. L. ex hoc jure cum simil.
如果人们不是天生就摆脱了政治的统治，那么根据关系法则，就必然有些人天生就是国王。但是没有人天生就是国王，因为没有人天生就具备构成国王的本质要素，因为他们既没有天生的神召，也没有王位的天赋，也没有人民的自由选举，也没有征服；如果没有人天生就是国王，那就没有人天生就是臣民。法律说，我们都是天生自由的，没有受任何人统治的。我们是天生自由的，根据这个法律和类似的法律。

Arg. 6.—Politicians agree to this as an undeniable truth, that as domestic society is natural, being grounded upon nature's instinct, so politic society is voluntary, being grounded on the consent of men; and so politic society is natural, in radice, in the root, and voluntary and free, in modo, in the manner of their union; and the Scripture cleareth to us, that a king is made by the free consent of the people, (Deut 17:15,) and so not by nature.
政治家们一致认为这是一个不可否认的真理，即家庭社会是自然的，基于自然的本能，而政治社会是自愿的，基于人们的同意；因此，政治社会在根本上是自然的，在联合方式上是自愿和自由的；圣经向我们阐明，国王是由人民的自由同意产生的（申命记 17:15），因此不是由于自然的原因。

Arg. 7.—What is from the womb, and so natural, is eternal, and agreeth to all societies of men; but a monarchy agreeth not to all societies of men; for many hundred years, de facto, there was not a king till Nimrod's time, the world being governed by families, and till Moses' time we find no institution for kings, (Gen. 7) and the numerous multiplication of mankind did occasion monarchies, otherwise, fatherly government being the first and measure of the rest, must be the best; for it is better that my father govern me, than that a stranger govern me, and, therefore, the Lord forbade his people to set a stranger over themselves to be their king. The P. Prelate contendeth for the contrary, (c. 12, p. 125,) "Every man (saith he) is born subject to his father, of whom immediately he hath his existence in nature; and if his father be the subject of another, he is born the subject of his father's superior."—Ans. But the consequence is weak. Every man is born under natural subjection to his father, therefore he is born naturally under civil subjection to his father's superior or king. It followeth not. Yea, because his father was born only by nature subject to his own father, therefore he was subject to a prince or king only by accident, and by the free constitution of men, who freely choose politic government, whereas there is no government natural, but fatherly or marital, and therefore the contradictory consequence is true.
第七论：从子宫中产生的东西是自然的，因此是永恒的，并适用于所有人类社会；但君主制并不适用于所有人类社会；因为在很多百年间，实际上并没有国王，直到尼摩德时代，世界是由家族统治的，直到摩西时代我们才发现有关国王的制度（创世记 7 章），人类的大量繁殖导致了君主制的出现，否则，父权政府作为第一个和其他政府的衡量标准，必须是最好的；因为我父亲统治我比一个陌生人统治我更好，因此，上帝禁止他的子民任命一个陌生人作为他们的国王。主教辩称相反（第 12 章，第 125 页），"每个人（他说）都是作为他父亲的臣民而出生的，他的存在是直接来自他父亲的，如果他的父亲是另一个人的臣民，那么他就是他父亲的上级的臣民。"——答：但这个推论是薄弱的。每个人在自然上都是出生在对他父亲的自然服从之下，因此他在自然上出生在对他父亲的上级或国王的公民服从之下。这并不成立。 是的，因为他的父亲只是出于自然而受制于自己的父亲，所以他只是偶然地受制于王子或国王，以及人们自由选择政治政府的自由构成，而没有自然的政府，只有父权或婚姻权，因此相反的结论是正确的。

P. Prelate.—Every man by nature hath immunity and liberty from despotical and hierarchial empire, and so may dispose of his own at will, and cannot enslave himself without his own free will; but God hath laid a necessity on all men to be under government, and nature also laid this necessity on him, therefore this sovereignty cannot protect us in righteousness and honesty, except it be entirely endowed with sovereign power to preserve itself, and protect us.
每个人天生都有免受专制和教权帝国统治的豁免权和自由，因此可以随意处理自己的事务，不能在没有自由意志的情况下奴役自己；但上帝使所有人必须接受政府的统治，自然界也赋予了他这种必要性，因此这种主权只有在完全具备保护自身和保护我们的主权力量时，才能在正义和诚实中保护我们。

Ans.—1. The Prelate here deserteth his own consequence, which is strong against himself, for if a man be naturally subject to his father's superior, as he said before, why is not the son of a slave naturally subject to his father's superior and master? 2. As a man may not make away his liberty without his own consent, so can he not, without his own consent, give his liberty to be subject to penal laws under a prince, without his own consent, either in his father's or in the representative society in which he liveth. 3. God and nature hath laid a necessity on all men to be under government, a natural necessity from the womb to be under some government, to wit, a paternal government, that is true; but under this government politic, and namely under sovereignty, it is false; and that is but said: for why is he naturally under sovereignty rather than aristocracy? I believe any of the three forms are freely chosen by any society. 4. It is false that one cannot defend the people, except he have entire power, that is to say, he cannot do good except he have a vast power to do both good and ill.
答案：1. 这位教长背离了他自己的观点，这个观点对他自己来说是有力的，因为如果一个人天生就要服从他父亲的上级，正如他之前所说的，那么为什么一个奴隶的儿子天生就要服从他父亲的上级和主人呢？2. 正如一个人不能在没有自己的同意的情况下放弃他的自由一样，他也不能在没有自己的同意的情况下将他的自由交给一个君主统治下的刑法，无论是在他父亲的还是在他所居住的代表性社会中。3. 上帝和自然使所有人都必须受制于政府，从出生起就有一种自然的必要性，即父权政府，这是真实的；但是在这个政治上的政府，尤其是在主权下，这是错误的；这只是说说而已：为什么他天生就要受制于主权而不是贵族政府呢？我相信这三种形式中的任何一种都可以由任何社会自由选择。4. 说一个人除非拥有完全的权力，否则不能保护人民，这是错误的，也就是说，除非他拥有广泛的权力来做好事和坏事，否则他不能做好事。

P. Prelate.—It is accidental to any to render himself a slave, being occasioned by force or extreme indigence, but to submit to government congruous to the condition of man, and is necessary for his happy being, and natural, and necessary, by the inviolable ordinance of God and nature.
普雷拉特。成为奴隶是偶然的，是由于强力或极度贫困所引起的，但顺从适合人类状况的政府是必要的，对于人的幸福存在是自然而然的，也是上帝和自然的不可违背的法令。

Ans. 1.—If the father be a slave, it is natural and not accidental, by the Prelate's logic, to be a slave. 2. It is also accidental to be under sovereignty, and sure not natural; for then aristocracy and democracy must be unnatural, and so unlawful governments. 3. If to be congruous to the condition of man be all one with natural man, (which he must say if he speak sense) to believe in God, to be an excellent mathematician, to swim in deep waters, being congruous to the nature of man, must be natural. 4. Man by nature is under government paternal, not politic properly, but by the free consent of his will.
答案 1：如果父亲是奴隶，根据主教的逻辑，成为奴隶是自然而非偶然的。2. 处于统治之下也是偶然的，而非自然的；因此，贵族制和民主制必然是不自然的，也就是非法的政府。3. 如果与人的状况相符等同于自然人（如果他说的有道理的话），那么相信上帝、成为一名出色的数学家、在深水中游泳，都是符合人的本性的，也就是自然的。4. 人类天生是在父权制下，而非真正的政治制度下，但是通过自由意志的自愿。

P. Prelate (p. 126).—Luke 11:5, Christ himself was ὑποτασσομὲνος subject to his parents, (the word which is used, Rom. 13) therefore none are exempted from subjection to lawful government.
P. Prelate（第 126 页）。—路加福音 11:5，基督自己也顺从他的父母（这个词在罗马书 13 中使用），因此没有人可以免除对合法政府的顺从。

Ans.—We never said that any were exempted from lawful government. The Prelate and his fellow Jesuits teach that the clergy are exempted from the laws of the civil magistrate, not we; but because Christ was subject to his parents, and the same word is used, Luke 11, which is in Rom. 13, it will not follow, therefore, men are by nature subject to kings, because they are by nature subject to parents.
我们从未说过任何人可以免除合法政府的法律。主教和他的耶稣会同僚教导说，神职人员可以免除民事法官的法律，而不是我们；但是因为基督顺从他的父母，而且在路加福音 11 章使用了与罗马书 13 章相同的词语，因此并不能得出结论，人类天生就要顺从君王，因为他们天生就要顺从父母。

P. Prelate.—The father had power over the children, by the law of God and nature, to redeem himself from debt, or any distressed condition, by enslaving his children begotten of his own body; if this power was not by the right of nature and by the warrant of God, I can see no other, for it could not be by mutual and voluntary contract of children and fathers.
普利拉特（Prelate）——根据上帝和自然法的规定，父亲有权通过奴役自己所生的子女来解除债务或任何困境；如果这种权力不是基于自然法和上帝的授权，我就看不出其他的解释，因为它不能是子女和父亲之间的互惠和自愿合同。

Ans.—1. Show a law of nature, that the father might enslave his children; by a divine positive law, presupposing sin, the father might do that; and yet I think that may be questioned, whether it was not a permission rather than a law, as was the bill of divorce; but a law of nature it was not. 2. The P. Prelate can see no law but the law of nature here; but it is because he is blind or will not see. His reason is, It was not by mutual and voluntary contract of children and fathers, therefore it was by the law of nature; so he that cursed his father was to die by God's law. This law was not made by mutual consent betwixt the father and the son, therefore it was a law of nature: the Prelate will see no better. Nature will teach a man to enslave himself to redeem himself from death, but that it is a dictate of nature that a man should enslave his son, I conceive not. 3. What can this prove, but that if the son may, by the law of nature, be enslaved for the father, but that the son of a slave is by nature under subjection to slavery, and that by nature's law; the contrary whereof he spake in the page preceding, and in this same page.
答案：1.展示一个自然法则，父亲可以奴役他的孩子；通过神圣的正面法律，假设有罪，父亲可以这样做；然而我认为这可能是一个许可而不是法律，就像离婚法案一样；但这不是自然法则。2.主教只能看到自然法则，但这是因为他是盲目的或不愿看到。他的理由是，这不是孩子和父亲之间的相互和自愿的契约，所以这是自然法则；所以诅咒父亲的人应该按照上帝的法律而死。这个法律不是由父亲和儿子之间的相互同意制定的，所以这是自然法则：主教看不到更好的。自然会教导一个人奴役自己以从死亡中赎回自己，但我不认为这是自然的规定一个人应该奴役他的儿子。3.这能证明什么呢，除了如果儿子可以根据自然法则被奴役，那么奴隶的儿子就是天生属于奴隶的，这是自然法则；而他在前一页和这一页中说的正好相反。

As for the argument of the Prelate to answer Suarez, who laboureth to prove monarchy not to be natural, but of free consent, because it is various in sundry nations, it is the Jesuits' argument, not ours. I own it not. Let Jesuits plead for Jesuits.
至于主教对苏亚雷斯的论点的回应，他试图证明君主制不是自然的，而是出于自由意愿，因为在不同的国家中君主制是多样的，这是耶稣会士的论点，不是我们的。我不认同它。让耶稣会士为耶稣会士辩护。

QUESTION XIV
问题十四

WHETHER OR NO THE PEOPLE MAKE A PERSON THEIR KING CONDITIONALLY, OR ABSOLUTELY; AND WHETHER THERE BE SUCH A THING AS A COVENANT TYING THE KING NO LESS THAN HIS SUBJECTS
无论人们是否有条件地或绝对地选择一个人作为他们的国王；无论是否存在一种将国王与他的臣民联系在一起的契约

There is a covenant natural, and a covenant politic and civil. There is no politic or civil covenant betwixt the king and his subjects, because there be no such equality (say royalists) betwixt the king and his people, as that the king can be brought under any civil or legal obligation in man's court, to either necessitate the king civilly to keep an oath to his people, or to tie him to any punishment, if he fail, yet (say they) he is under natural obligation in God's court to keep his oath, but he is accountable only to God if he violate his oath.
有一种自然契约，还有一种政治和公民契约。国王与他的臣民之间没有政治或公民契约，因为（皇室主义者说）国王与他的人民之间没有这种平等，使得国王可以在人的法庭上受到任何民事或法律义务的约束，迫使国王在民事上遵守对人民的誓言，或者将他与任何惩罚联系起来，如果他违背誓言，然而（他们说）他在上帝的法庭上有自然义务遵守他的誓言，但只有对上帝负责，如果他违背誓言。

Assert. 1—There is an oath betwixt the king and his people, laying on, by reciprocation of bands, mutual civil obligation upon the king to the people, and the people to the king; 2 Sam. 5:3, "So all the elders of Israel came to the king to Hebron, and king David made a covenant with them in Hebron before the Lord, and they anointed David king over Israel." 1 Chron. 11:3, "And David made a covenant with them before the Lord, and they anointed David king over Israel, according to the word of the Lord by Samuel." 2 Chron. 23:2, 3, "And they went about in Judah, and gathered the Levites out of all the cities of Judah, and the chief of the fathers of Israel, and they came to Jerusalem. And all the congregation made a covenant with the king [Joash] in the house of God." 2 Kings 11:17, "Jehoiada made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people, that they should be the Lord's people; between the king also and the people." Eccl. 8:2, "I counsel thee to keep the king's commandment, and that in regard of the oath of God." Then it is evident there was a covenant betwixt the king and the people. That was not a covenant that did tie the king to God only, and not to the people,—1. Because the covenant betwixt the king and the people is clearly differenced from the king's covenant with the Lord, 2 Kings 11:17. 2. There was no necessity that this covenant should be made publicly before the people, if the king did not in the covenant tie and oblige himself to the people; nor needed it be made solemnly before the Lord in the house of God. 3. It is expressly a covenant that was between Joash the king and his people; and David made a covenant at his coronation with the princes and elders of Israel, therefore the people gave the crown to David covenant-wise, and upon condition that he should perform such and such duties to them. And this is clear by all covenants in the word of God: even the covenant between God and man is in like manner mutual,—"I will be your God, and ye shall be my people." The covenant is so mutual, that if the people break the covenant, God is loosed from his part of the covenant, Zech. 11:10. The covenant giveth to the believer a sort of action of law, and jus quoddam, to plead with God in respect of his fidelity to stand to that covenant that bindeth him by reason of his fidelity, Isa. 43:26; 63:16; Dan. 9:4, 5; and far more a covenant giveth ground of a civil action and claim to a people and the free estates against a king, seduced by wicked counsel to make war against the land, whereas he did swear by the most high God, that he should be a father and protector of the church of God.
断言。1-国王与他的人民之间有一种誓约，通过相互约束的方式，国王对人民有着相互的民事义务，人民对国王也有相互的义务；撒母耳记下 5:3，“以色列的众长老都来到希伯仑见大卫王，大卫在希伯仑耶和华面前与他们立约，他们就膏大卫作以色列的王。”历代志上 11:3，“大卫与众人在耶和华面前立约，他们就膏大卫作以色列的王，是照耶和华藉撒母耳所说的话。”历代志下 23:2,3，“他们走遍犹大，从犹大各城里招聚利未人和以色列的众族长到耶路撒冷来。全会众在神的殿里与王立约。约阿施就与众民立约，在耶和华殿里向他们起誓。”列王记下 11:17，“约雅大使耶和华与王和民立约，作耶和华的民，又使王和民立约。”传道书 8:2，“我劝你遵守王的命令，既指着神的誓起的。”因此，显然国王与人民之间有一个盟约。这不仅仅是将国王与上帝联系在一起，而不与人民联系在一起的盟约，1. 因为国王与人民之间的契约与国王与上帝之间的契约明显不同，如《列王记下》11:17 所示。2. 如果国王在契约中没有将自己与人民联系在一起，那么这个契约就没有必要在人民面前公开进行，也不需要在上帝的殿堂庄严地进行。3. 这明确是国王约阿施与他的人民之间的契约；大卫在加冕时与以色列的王子和长老立了约，因此人民按照契约的方式将王冠给了大卫，并要求他履行对他们的某些责任。这在上帝的话语中的所有契约中都是清楚的：即使是上帝与人之间的契约也是相互的，“我要作你们的神，你们要作我的子民。”契约是如此相互的，以至于如果人民违反了契约，上帝就可以解除自己在契约中的责任，撒迦利亚书 11:10。契约赋予信徒某种法律行动和权利，使他们能够在上帝面前以他们对契约的忠诚为由与上帝辩护，以赖以约束自己的契约，以赛亚书 43:26；63:16；但以理书。 9:4, 5; 并且更多地，一个契约为人民和自由的地产提供了对国王的民事诉讼和索赔的依据，因为国王被邪恶的建议引诱去对抗这片土地，而他曾经发誓要成为上帝教会的父亲和保护者。

Assert. 2. All covenants and contracts between man and man, yea, all solemn promises, bring the covenanters under a law and a claim before men, if the oath of God be broken, as the covenant betwixt Abraham and Abimelech, (Gen. 21:27,) Jonathan and David. (1 Sam. 18:3.) The spies profess to Rahab in the covenant that they made with her, (Josh. 2:20,) "And if thou utter this our business, we will be quit of thine oath which thou hast made us to swear." There be no mutual contract made upon certain conditions, but if the conditions be not fulfilled, the party injured is loosed from the contract. Barclay saith, "That this covenant obligeth the long to God, but not the king to the people."—Ans. It is a vain thing to say that the people and the king make a covenant, and that David made a covenant with the elders and princes of Israel; for if he be obliged to God only, and not to the people, by a covenant made with the people, it is not made with the people at all, nay, it is no more made with the people of Israel than with the Chaldeans, for it bindeth David no more to Israel than to Chaldea, as a covenant made with men. Arnisæus saith, "When two parties contract, if one perform the duty, the other is acquitted." Sect. Oex hujus mod ubi vult just. de duob. rets, lib. 3. Dr Ferne saith, "Because every one of them are obliged fully (Sect. 1) Just. eod. to God, to whom the oath is made (for that is his meaning), and if either the people perform what is sworn to the Lord or the king, yet one of the parties remaineth still under obligation; and neither doth the people's obedience exempt the king from punishment, if he fail, nor the king's obedience exempt the people, if they fail, but every one beareth the punishment of his own sin; and there is no mutual power in the parties to compel one another to perform the promised duty, because that belongeth to the pretor or magistrate, before whom the contract is made. The king hath jurisdiction over the people, if they violate their oath; but the people hath no power over the prince; and the ground that Arnisæus layeth down is this,—1. The king is not a party contracting with the people, as if there were mutual obligations betwixt the king and the people, and a mutual co-active power on either side. 2. That the care of religion belongeth not to the people, for that hath no warrant in the Word (saith he). 3. We read not that the people was to command and compel the priests and the king to reform religion and abolish idolatry, as it must follow, if the covenant be mutual. 4. Jehoiada (2 Kings 11) obligeth himself, and the king, and the people, by a like law, to serve God; and here be not two parties but three—the high priest, the king, and the people, if this example prove any thing. 5. Both king and people shall find the revenging hand of God against them, if they fail in the breach of their oath; every one, king and people, by the oath stand obliged to God, the king for himself, and the people for themselves, but with this difference, the king oweth to God proper and due obedience as any of the subjects, and also to govern the people according to God's true religion, (Deut. 17; 2 Chron. 29;) and in this the king's obligation differeth from the people's obligation; the people, as they would be saved, must serve God and the king, for the same cause. (1 Sam. 12) But, besides this, the king is obliged to rule and govern the people, and keep them in obedience to God; but the people is not obliged to govern the king, and keep him in obedience to God, for then the people should have as great power and jurisdiction over the king, as the king hath over the people, which is against the word of God, and the examples of the kings of Judah; but this cometh not from any promise or covenant that the king hath made with the people, but from a peculiar obligation whereby he is obliged to God as a man, not as a king:—
断言。2. 人与人之间的所有契约和合同，甚至所有庄严的承诺，如果违背了上帝的誓约，都会使契约人在人前受到法律和索赔的约束，就像亚伯拉罕与亚比米勒之间的约定（创世记 21:27），约拿单与大卫之间的约定（撒母耳记上 18:3）。间谍们在与喇合的约定中向她表明：“如果你泄露我们的事情，我们将不再受你所发的誓约的约束”（约书亚记 2:20）。只有在某些条件下才会达成相互合同，但如果条件没有得到满足，受伤的一方就可以解除合同。巴克利说：“这个约束只对上帝有约束力，而不对国王有约束力。”-答：说人民和国王达成了一个契约，以及大卫与以色列的长老和首领达成了一个契约，是徒劳的；因为如果他只对上帝有约束力，而不对人民有约束力，那么与人民达成的契约根本就不存在，不仅如此，它对以色列人民的约束力也不比对迦勒底人更大，因为它只是与人达成的契约。 阿尼斯斯说：“当两个当事方签订合同时，如果一方履行了责任，另一方就被免除责任。”Oex hujus mod ubi vult just. de duob. rets, lib. 3. 弗恩博士说：“因为他们每个人都完全地（第 1 节）向上帝负有义务，而誓言是向上帝发出的（这是他的意思），即使人民履行了对上帝或国王所宣誓的事情，但其中一方仍然有义务；人民的服从也不能使国王免于惩罚，如果他失败的话，国王的服从也不能使人民免于惩罚，而是每个人都要承担自己罪孽的惩罚；而且当事方之间没有相互强制对方履行承诺的权力，因为这属于合同签订之前的普雷托尔或官员的职权。国王对人民有管辖权，如果他们违反誓言；但人民对王子没有权力；阿尼斯斯所提出的理由是：1. 国王与人民并不是相互签订合同的当事方，就像国王和人民之间有相互义务和相互强制权力一样。2. 宗教的关怀不属于人民，因为圣经中没有这样的授权（他说）。我们没有读到人民要命令和强迫祭司和国王改革宗教和废除偶像崇拜，如果契约是相互的话，这是必然的。约阿施（列王记下 11 章）通过一项类似的法律使自己、国王和人民都要事奉上帝；这里不是两个派别，而是三个——大祭司、国王和人民，如果这个例子证明了什么的话。如果国王和人民违背了誓约，他们都会遭到上帝的报应；每个人，国王和人民，都因誓约而对上帝负有义务，国王为自己，人民为自己，但有一个区别，国王对上帝有适当和应有的顺从义务，就像任何一个臣民一样，还要根据上帝的真正宗教来治理人民（申命记 17 章；历代志下 29 章）；在这一点上，国王的义务与人民的义务不同；人民为了自己的救赎，必须事奉上帝和国王，出于同样的原因。（撒母耳记上）但是，除此之外，国王有责任统治和管理人民，并使他们顺服于上帝；但是人民没有责任统治国王，并使他顺服于上帝，因为如果人民对国王有与国王对人民一样的权力和管辖权，那就违背了上帝的话语和犹大王的榜样；但这并不是国王与人民所订立的任何承诺或契约所带来的，而是由于他作为一个人对上帝有特殊的责任所带来的，而不是作为一个国王

Arg. 1.—This is the mystery of the business which I oppose in these assertions.
这是我在这些论述中反对的商业之谜。

Assert. 1.—As the king is obliged to God for the maintenance of true religion, so are the people and princes no less in their place obliged to maintain true religion; for the people are rebuked, because they burn incense in all high places, 2 Kings 17:11; 2 Chron. 33:17; Hos. 4:13. And the reason why the high places are not taken away, is given in 2 Chron. 20:33, for as yet the people "had not prepared their heart unto the God of their fathers;" but you will reply, elicit acts of maintenance of true religion are commanded to the people, and that the places prove; but the question is de actibus imperatis, of commanded acts of religion, sure none but the magistrate is to command others to worship God according to his word. I answer, in ordinary only, magistrates (not the king only but all the princes of the land) and judges are to maintain religion by their commandments, (Deut. 1:16; 2 Chron. 1:2; Deut. 16:19; Eccles. 5:8; Hab. 1:4; Mic. 3:9; Zech. 7:9; Hos. 5:10, 11,) and to take care of religion; but when the judges decline from God's way and corrupt the law, we find the people punished and rebuked for it: Jer. 15:4, "And I will cause them to be removed to all kingdoms of the earth, because of Manasseh, the son of Hezekiah king of Judah, for that which he did in Jerusalem;" 1 Sam. 12:24, 25, "Only fear the Lord; but if ye shall still do wickedly, ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king." And this case, I grant, is extraordinary; yet so, as Junius Brutus proveth well and strongly, that religion is not given only to the King, that he only should keep it, but to all the inferior judges and people also in their kind; but because the estates never gave the king power to corrupt religion, and press a false and idolatrous worship upon them, therefore when the king defendeth not true religion, but presseth upon the people a false and idolatrous religion, in that they are not under the king, but are presumed to have no king, catenus, so far, and are presumed to have the power in themselves, as if they had not appointed any king at all; as if we presume the body had given to the right hand a power to ward off strokes and to defend the body; if the right hand should by a palsy, or some other disease, become impotent, and be withered up, when ill is coming on the body, it is presumed that the power of defence is recurred to the left hand, and to the rest of the body to defend itself in this case as if the body had no right hand, and had never communicated any power to the right hand. So if an incorporation accused of treason, and in danger of the sentence of death, shall appoint a lawyer to advocate their cause, and to give in their just defences to the judge, if their advocate be stricken with dumbness, because they have lost their legal and representative tongue, none can say that this incorporation hath lost the tongues that nature hath given them, so as by nature's law they may not plead in their own just and lawful defence, as if they had never appointed the foresaid lawyer to plead for them. The king, as a man, is not more obliged to the public and regal defence of the true religion than any other man of the land; but he is made by God and the people king, for the church and people of God's sake, that he may defend true religion for the behalf and salvation of all. If therefore he defend not religion for the salvation of the souls of all in his public and royal way, it is presumed as undeniable that the people of God, who by the law of nature are to care for their own souls, are to defend in their way true religion, which so nearly concerneth them and their eternal happiness.
断言。1. ——正如国王因维护真正的宗教而感谢上帝一样，人民和君主在各自的位置上同样有责任维护真正的宗教；因为人民受到了责备，因为他们在所有的高处焚香，列王记下 17:11；历代志下 33:17；何西阿书 4:13。而高处为什么没有被拆除，在历代志下 20:33 中给出了原因，因为人民“还没有预备好他们祖宗的神。”但你会回答说，人民被命令维护真正的宗教，并且这些地方证明了这一点；但问题是关于被命令的宗教行为，只有执政官才能命令他人按照上帝的话来敬拜。我回答说，通常情况下，执政官（不仅仅是国王，而是全国的所有君主和法官）都应该通过他们的命令来维护宗教（申命记 1:16；历代志下 1:2；申命记 16:19；传道书 5:8；哈巴谷书 1:4；弥迦书 3:9；撒迦利亚书 7:9；何西阿书 5:10, 11），并且要关心宗教；但当法官们偏离上帝的道路并败坏法律时，我们发现人民因此受到惩罚和责备：耶利米书 15:4, "And I will cause them to be removed to all kingdoms of the earth, because of Manasseh, the son of Hezekiah king of Judah, for that which he did in Jerusalem;" 1 Sam. 12:24, 25, "Only fear the Lord; but if ye shall still do wickedly, ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king.而且，我承认这个案例是非同寻常的；然而，正如朱尼乌斯·布鲁图斯所证明的那样，宗教不仅仅是给予国王的，他们应该保持宗教，而且也是给予所有下级法官和人民的；但是因为各个阶层从未给予国王腐蚀宗教、强迫他们接受错误和偶像崇拜的权力，所以当国王不捍卫真正的宗教，而是强迫人民接受错误和偶像崇拜的宗教时，人民并不受国王的统治，而被认为没有国王，因此他们被认为拥有自己的权力，就好像他们根本没有任命国王一样；就好像我们假设身体给予右手防御和保护身体的权力；如果右手因为瘫痪或其他疾病而无法行动，当身体受到伤害时，我们假设防御的权力转移到左手和身体的其他部分，以自卫，就好像身体没有右手，从未将任何权力交给右手一样。 所以，如果一个被指控叛国罪并面临死刑的法人组织，他们任命一名律师来为他们辩护，并向法官提交他们的正当辩护，如果他们的律师因为失去了他们的合法代表之舌而失声，那么没有人能说这个法人组织失去了大自然赋予他们的语言，以至于按照自然法则他们不能为自己的正当合法辩护而辩护，就好像他们从未任命上述律师为他们辩护一样。国王作为一个人，对真正宗教的公共和王室辩护并没有比土地上的其他人更多的义务；但他是由上帝和人民成为国王，是为了教会和上帝的子民的缘故，他可以为了所有人的利益和救赎而捍卫真正的宗教。因此，如果他不以公共和王室的方式为了所有人的灵魂的救赎而捍卫宗教，那么可以毫不否认地认为上帝的子民，根据自然法则，应该关心自己的灵魂，并以他们的方式捍卫与他们和他们的永恒幸福息息相关的真正宗教。

Assert. 2.—When the covenant is betwixt God, on the one part, and the king, priests and people, on the other; it is true, if the one perform for his part to God the whole duty, the other is acquitted: as if two men be indebted to one man ten thousand pounds, if the one pay the whole sum the other is acquitted. But the king and people are not so contracting parties in covenant with God as that they are both indebted to God for one and the same sum of complete obedience, so as if the king pay the whole sum of obedience to God, the people are acquitted; and if the people pay the whole sum, the king is acquitted: for every one standeth obliged to God for himself; for the people must do all that is their part in acquitting the king from his royal duty, that they may free him and themselves both from punishment, if he disobey the King of kings; nor doth the king's obedience acquit the people from their duty. Arnisæus dreamed if he believed that we make king and people this way party-contractors in covenant with God. Nor can two copartners in covenant with God so mutually compel one another to do their duty; for we hold that the covenant is made betwixt the king and the people, betwixt mortal men; but they both bind themselves before God to each other. But saith Arnisæus, "It belongeth to a pretor or ruler, who is above both king and people, to compel each of them,—the king to perform his part of the covenant to the people, and the people to perform their part of the covenant to the king. Now there is no ruler but God, above both king and people." But let me answer. The consequence is not needful, no more than when the king of Judah and the king of Israel make a covenant to perform mutual duties one to another,—no more than it is necessary that there should be a king and superior ruler above the king of Israel and the king of Judah, who should compel each one to do a duty to his fellow-king; for the king and people are each of them above and below others in divers respects: the people, because they create the man king, they are so above the king, and have a virtual power to compel him to do his duty; and the king, as king, hath an authoritative power above the people, because royalty is formally in him, and originally and virtually only in the people, therefore may he compel them to their duty, as we shall hear anon; and therefore there is no need of an earthly ruler higher than both, to compel both.
断言 2：当契约是上帝与国王、祭司和人民之间的时候，如果一方对上帝履行了全部责任，另一方就被免除责任，就像如果两个人欠一人一万英镑，如果其中一个支付了全部金额，另一个就被免除责任。但是国王和人民与上帝并不是以这样的方式作为契约的缔约方，以至于他们都对上帝负有同样数量的完全顺从的债务，所以如果国王向上帝支付了全部顺从的金额，人民就被免除责任；如果人民支付了全部金额，国王就被免除责任。因为每个人都对上帝负有自己的责任；人民必须尽他们的一切责任来免除国王的王室职责，以便如果他违抗万王之王，他们可以使他和自己都免于惩罚；国王的顺从也不能免除人民的责任。阿尼塞乌斯梦想如果他相信我们以这种方式使国王和人民成为与上帝缔约的缔约方。 在上帝的约定中，两个合作伙伴也不能相互强迫对方履行自己的职责；因为我们认为，这个约定是在国王和人民之间达成的，是在凡人之间达成的；但他们在上帝面前互相约束。但阿尼塞乌斯说：“强迫他们中的每一个人履行他们在约定中的部分，是属于一个高于国王和人民的执政官或统治者的责任。”但让我来回答。 后果是不必要的，就像犹大王和以色列王互相约定履行彼此的义务一样，就像没有必要有一个高于犹大王和以色列王的国王和上级统治者，强迫每个人对他的同伴国王履行义务；因为国王和人民在各个方面都是上下有别的：人民之所以能够创造出国王这个人，是因为他们在国王之上，有一种虚拟的权力来迫使他履行职责；而国王作为国王，因为王权正式归于他，而原始和虚拟的王权只归于人民，所以他可以迫使他们履行职责，我们马上就会听到；因此，没有必要有一个高于两者的地上统治者来强迫两者。

Assert. 3.—We shall hereafter prove the power of the people above the king, God willing; and so it is false that there is not mutual coactive power on each side.
断言。3.——我们将在未来证明人民的权力高于国王，若上帝愿意；因此，双方都存在相互协同的权力，所以说没有这种权力是错误的。

Assert. 4.—The obligation of the king in this covenant floweth from the peculiar national obligation betwixt the king and the estates, and it bindeth the king as king, and not simply as he is a man. 1. Because it is a covenant betwixt the people and David, not as he is the son of Jesse, for then it should oblige Eliab, or any other of David's brethren; yea, it should oblige any man if it oblige David as a man; but it obligeth David as a king, or as he is to be their king, because it is the specific act of a king that he is obliged unto, to wit, to govern the people in righteousness and religion with his royal power. And so it is false that Arnisæus sasus saith, that "the king, as a, man, is obliged to God by this covenant, not as a king." 2, He saith, by covenant the king is bound I to God as a map, not as a king, But so the man will have the king, as king, under no law of God; and go he must either be above God, as king, or co-equal with God; which are manifest blasphemies. For I thought ever the royalists had not denied that the king, as king, had been obliged to keep his oath to his subjects, in relation to God, and in regard of natural obligation,—so as, he sinneth before God if he break his covenant with his people,—though they deny that he is obliged to keep his covenant in relation to his subjects, and in regard of politic or civil obligation to men. Sure I am this the royalists constantly teach, 3, He would have this covenant so made with men as it obligeth not the king to men, but to God, But the contrary is true, Besides the king and the people's covenant with the Lord, king Joash made another covenant; with the people, and Jehoiada the priest was only a witness, or one who, in God's name, performed the rite of anointing; otherwise he was a subject on the people's side, obliged to keep allegiance to Joash, as to his sovereign and master. But, certainly, whoever maketh a covenant with the people, promising to govern them according to God's word, and upon that condition and these terms received a throne and crown from the people, he is obliged to what he promiseth to the people, Omnis promittens, facit alteri, cui promissio facta est, jus in promittentem. Whoever maketh a promise to another, giveth to that other a sort of right or jurisdiction to challenge the promise. The covenant betwixt David and Israel were a shadow, if it tie the people to allegiance to David as their king, and if it tie not David as king to govern them in righteousness; but leave David loose to the people, and only tie him to God, then it is a covenant betwixt David and God only: but the text saith, it is a covenant betwixt the king and the people, 2 Kings 11:17; 2 Sam. 5:3.
断言。第四条——国王在这个契约中的义务源于国王与国家之间特殊的国家义务，它将国王作为国王而约束，而不仅仅是作为一个人。1. 因为这是人民与大卫之间的契约，不是因为他是耶西的儿子，否则它应该约束以利押或大卫的其他兄弟；是的，如果它约束大卫作为一个人，它应该约束任何人；但它约束大卫作为国王，或者说作为他们的国王，因为国王有特定的行为，他被迫去行使，即以他的王权来公正地治理人民和宗教。所以阿尼塞乌斯说的“国王作为一个人，是通过这个契约对上帝有义务，而不是作为一个国王”是错误的。2. 他说，通过契约，国王作为一个人被上帝约束，而不是作为一个国王。但是这样的话，这个人将使国王作为国王不受上帝的任何法律约束；他要么必须把自己看作是上帝之上的国王，要么与上帝平等；这是明显的亵渎。 因为我一直认为，君主派从未否认国王作为国王，有义务对他的臣民守誓，与上帝有关，以及基于自然义务的考虑，所以，如果他违背与人民的契约，他就在上帝面前犯罪。尽管他们否认他有义务在与臣民的契约中，以及与政治或民事义务对人的关系中守约。我确信君主派一直在教导这一点，即他希望这个契约是与人们达成的，而不是将国王对人民有义务，而是对上帝有义务。但事实正好相反。除了国王和人民与上帝的契约外，约阿施国王还与人民达成了另一个契约，耶何耶大祭司只是一个见证人，或者是以上帝的名义执行膏抹仪式的人；否则，他是人民一方的臣民，有义务对约阿施保持效忠，就像对他的君主和主人一样。 但是，无论如何，凡是与人民订立契约，承诺按照上帝的话语来治理他们，并且在这个条件和这些条款下从人民那里获得了王位和王冠的人，他有责任履行对人民的承诺。凡是对他人作出承诺的人，都给予了对方一种权利或管辖权来要求履行承诺。大卫与以色列之间的契约如果将人民与大卫作为他们的国王联系在一起，并且不将大卫作为国王与公正地治理他们联系在一起，而只将大卫与上帝联系在一起，那么这只是大卫与上帝之间的契约。但是经文说，这是国王与人民之间的契约，列王记下 11:17；撒母耳记下 5:3。

Arg. 2.—Hence our second argument. He who is made a minister of God, not simply, but for the good of the subject, and so he take heed to God's law as a king, and govern according to God's will, he is in so far only made king by God as he fulfilleth the condition; and in so far as he is a minister for evil to the subject, and ruleth not according to that which the book of the law commandeth him as king, in so far he is not by God appointed king and ruler, and so must be made a king by God conditionally: but so hath God made kings and rulers, Rom. 13:4; 2 Chron. 6:16; Psal. 89:30, 31; 2 Sam. 7:12; 1 Chron. 28:7–9. This argument is not brought to prove that Jeroboam or Saul leave off to be kings when they fail in some part of the condition; or as if they were not God's vicegerents, to be obeyed in things lawful, after they have gone on in wicked courses; for the people consenting to make Saul king, they give him the crown, pro hac vice, at his entry absolutely. There is no condition required in him before they make him king, but only that he covenant with them to rule according to God's law. The conditions to be performed are consequent, and posterior to his actual coronation and his sitting on the throne. But the argument presupposeth that which the Lord's word teacheth, to wit, that the Lord and the people giveth a crown by one and the same action; for God formally maketh David a king by the princes and elders of Israel choosing of him to be their king at Hebron; and, therefore, seeing the people maketh him a king covenantwise and conditionally, so he rule according to God's law, and the people resigning their power to him for their safety, and for a peaceable and godly life under him, and not to destroy them, and tyrannise over them. It is certain God giveth a king that same way by that very same act of the people; and if the king tyrannise, I cannot say it is beside the intention of God making a king, nor yet beside his intention as a just punisher of their transgressions; for to me, as I conceive, nothing either good or evil falleth out beside the intention of Him who "doeth all things according to the pleasure of his will," If, then, the people make a king, as a king, conditionally, for their safety, and not for their destruction, (for as a king he saveth, as a man he destroyeth, and not as a king and father,) and if God, by the people's free election, make a king, God maketh him a king conditionally, and so by covenant; and, therefore, when God promiseth (2 Sam. 7:12; 1 Chron. 28:7–9) to David's seed, and to Solomon, a throne, he promiseth not a throne to them immediately, as he raised up prophets and apostles without any mediate action and consent of the people, but he promiseth a throne to them by the mediate consent, election, and covenant of the people; which condition and covenant he expresseth in the very words of the people's covenant with the king, "So they walk as kings in the law of the Lord, and take heed to God's commandment and statutes to do them."
因此，我们的第二个论点是这样的。那些被任命为上帝的仆人，不仅仅是为了主体的利益，而且要遵守上帝的法律，像国王一样统治，并按照上帝的旨意来治理，他只有在满足条件的情况下才被上帝任命为国王；而如果他成为对主体有害的仆人，并且不按照律法书所命令的方式来统治，那么他就不是上帝所任命的国王和统治者，因此必须通过上帝的条件来成为国王。但是上帝确实是这样任命国王和统治者的，罗马书 13:4；历代志下 6:16；诗篇 89:30, 31；撒母耳记下 7:12；历代志上 28:7–9。这个论点并不是为了证明耶罗波安或扫罗在某些条件上失败时就不再是国王，或者他们不是上帝的代理人，在他们走上邪恶的道路后，仍然应该在合法的事情上服从他们；因为人民同意让扫罗成为国王，他们在他入主时完全给予他王冠。在他们任命他为国王之前，对他没有任何条件要求，只要他与他们立约，按照上帝的律法来统治。 履行的条件是在他实际加冕和登基之后。但这个论点假设了主的话所教导的，即主和人民通过同一行动赐予王冠；因为上帝通过以色列的王子和长老在希伯仑选择他为他们的国王，正式使大卫成为国王；因此，既然人民按照契约和条件使他成为国王，他就要按照上帝的律法统治，人民将他们的权力让渡给他是为了他们的安全，为了在他的统治下过上和平和虔诚的生活，而不是为了毁灭他们和对他们施行暴政。 上帝确实是通过人民的行为来赋予国王的；如果国王暴虐，我不能说这是上帝赋予国王时的意图之外，也不能说这是上帝作为公正的惩罚者的意图之外；因为在我看来，无论是好是坏的事情都不会发生在那位“按照他的旨意行事”的上帝的意图之外。因此，如果人民选择国王，作为国王，是为了他们的安全，而不是为了他们的毁灭（因为作为国王他拯救，作为人他毁灭，而不是作为国王和父亲），如果上帝通过人民的自由选举来成为国王，上帝是有条件地使他成为国王，因此是通过契约；因此，当上帝应许（撒母耳记下 7:12；历代志上） 28:7-9）对大卫的后裔和所罗门，他并没有立即给予他们王位，就像他在没有人民的中介行动和同意的情况下兴起了先知和使徒一样，但他通过人民的中介同意、选举和契约向他们承诺了王位；他用人民与国王的契约的确切措辞来表达这个条件和契约，“他们要遵行耶和华的律法，谨守他的诫命和法度，像他们作王一样。”"

Obj. 1.—But then Solomon, falling in love with many outlandish women, and so not walking according to God's law, loseth all royal dignity and Kingly power, and the people is not to acknowledge him as king, since the kingly power was conferred upon him rather than Adonijah, upon such a condition, which condition not being performed by him, it is presumed that neither God, nor the people under God, as God's instruments in making king, conferred any royal power on him.
然而，所罗门爱上了许多外国女人，不按照上帝的律法行事，因此失去了所有的王室尊严和王权，人民不应承认他为国王，因为王权是授予他而不是亚多尼雅的，而这种条件并未被他履行，可以推断出上帝和作为上帝工具的人民在立王时并未赋予他任何王权。

Ans.—It doth not follow that Solomon, falling in love with strange women, doth lose royal dignity, either in the court of heaven or before men; because the conditions of the covenant upon which God, by the people, made him king must be exponed by the law, Deut. 17. Now that cannot bear that any one act, contrary to the royal office; yea, that any one or two acts of tyranny doth denude a man of the royal dignity that God and the people gave him; for so David, committing two acts of tyranny: one of taking his own faithful subject's wife from, and another in killing himself, should denude himself of all the kingly power that he had; and that, therefore, the people, after his adultery and murder, were not to acknowledge David as their king,—which is most absurd; for as one single act of unchastity is indeed against the matrimonial covenant, and yet doth not make the woman no wife at all, so it must be such a breach of the royal covenant as maketh the king no king, that annulleth the royal covenant, and denudeth the prince of his royal authority and power, that must be interpreted a breach of the oath of God, because it must be such a breach upon supposition whereof the people would not have given the crown, but upon supposition of his destructiveness to the commonwealth, they would never have given to him the crown.
答案：所罗门爱上外国女人，并不意味着他在天堂的法庭或人们面前失去了王位的尊严；因为上帝通过人民使他成为国王的契约条件必须根据律法进行解释，申命记 17 章。 既然不能容忍任何违背皇室职责的行为；是的，任何一两次的暴政行为都会剥夺一个人上帝和人民赋予他的皇家尊严；因此，大卫犯下两次暴政行为：一次是夺取自己忠诚臣民的妻子，另一次是自杀，这使他失去了所有的王权；因此，在他犯下通奸和谋杀之后，人民不应该承认大卫为他们的国王——这是非常荒谬的；因为一次通奸确实违背了婚姻契约，但并不意味着这个女人就不再是妻子，同样，必须是违背了皇家契约的行为才能使国王不再是国王，废除皇家契约，剥夺王子的皇家权威和权力，这必须被解释为违背了上帝的誓约，因为人民只有在假设他对国家有破坏性的情况下才会给予他王冠，否则他们永远不会给他王冠。

Obj. 2.—Yet at least it will follow that Saul, after he is rejected of God for disobedience in not destroying the Amalekites, as Samuel speaketh to him, (1 Sam. 15) is no longer to be acknowledged kina by the people, at least after he committeth such acts of tyranny, as are 1 Sam. 18:12–15, &c.; and after he had killed the priests of the Lord and persecuted innocent David, without cause, he was no longer, either in the court of heaven or the court of men, to be acknowledged as king, seeing he had manifestly violated the royal covenant made with the people; (1 Sam. 11:14, 15,) and yet, after those breaches, David acknowledged him to be his prince and the Lord's anointed.
然而，至少可以得出结论，扫罗在神因他不听从撒母耳的命令，没有消灭亚玛力人之后，不再被人民承认为国王，至少在他犯下了撒母耳记上 18:12-15 等暴行之后。在他杀害了耶和华的祭司并无缘无故迫害无辜的大卫之后，无论在天堂的法庭还是人间的法庭，他都不再被承认为国王，因为他明显违反了与人民所立的王权盟约（撒母耳记上 11:14, 15）。然而，在这些违约之后，大卫仍然承认他是自己的君王和上主所膏立的。

Ans. 1.—The prophet Samuel's threatening, (1 Sam. 17) is not exponed of actual unkinging and rejecting of Saul at the present; for after that, Samuel both honoured him as king before the people and prayed for him, and mourned to God on his behalf as king, (1 Sam. 16:1, 2,) but the threatening was to have effect in God's time, when he should bring David to the throne, as was prophesied, upon occasion of less sin, even his sacrificing and not waiting the time appointed, as God had commanded, 1 Sam. 13:13, 14. 2. The people and David's acknowledgment of Saul to be the Lord's anointed and a king, after he had committed such acts of tyranny as seem destructive of the royal covenant, and inconsistent therewith, cannot prove that Saul was not made king by the Lord and the people conditionally, and that for the people's good and safety, and not for their destruction; and it doth well prove,—(1.) That those acts of blood and tyranny committed by Saul, were not done by him as king, or from the principle of royal power given to him by God and the people. (2.) That in these acts they were not to acknowledge him as king. (3.) That these acts of blood were contrary to the covenant that Saul did swear at his inaugeration, and contrary to the conditions that Saul, in the covenant, took on him to perform at the making of the royal covenant. (4.) They prove not but the states who made Saul king might lawfully dethrone him, and anoint David their king. But David had reason to hold him for his prince and the Lord's anointed, so long as the people recalled not their grant of royal dignity, as David, or any man, is obliged to honour him as king whom the people maketh king, though he were a bloodier and more tyrannous man than Saul. Any tyrant standeth in titulo, so long as the people and estates who made him king have not recalled their grant; so as neither David, nor any single man, though six hundred with him, may unking him or detragt obedience from him as king; so many acts of disloyalty and breaches of laws in the subjects, though they be contrary to this covenant that the states make with their prince, doth not make them to be no subjects—and the covenant mutual standeth thus,
答案 1. - 先知撒母耳的威胁（撒母耳记上 17 章）并不意味着目前实际上废黜和拒绝扫罗；因为在那之后，撒母耳既在人民面前尊重他为王，为他祈祷，也为他向上帝哀求，（撒母耳记上 16:1, 2，）但这个威胁将在上帝的时机中生效，当他将大卫带到王位上，正如预言所说，这是因为更小的罪过，即他的献祭和不等待上帝所指定的时间，正如上帝所吩咐的，撒母耳记上 13:13, 14。 2. 人民和大卫承认扫罗是上主的受膏者和国王，尽管他犯下了似乎破坏了王权盟约并与之不一致的暴行，但这并不能证明扫罗不是在上主和人民的条件下成为国王的，而是为了人民的利益和安全，而不是为了他们的毁灭；这确实证明了：（1）扫罗犯下的这些血腥和暴行并不是他作为国王所做的，也不是出于上帝和人民赋予他的王权的原则。（2）在这些行为中，他们不应承认他为国王。（3）) 这些血腥行为违背了扫罗在就职时所宣誓的盟约，也违背了扫罗在盟约中承诺的条件。 (4.) 这些行为证明了扫罗的国家可以合法废黜他，并膏立大卫为他们的国王。但是，只要人民没有撤销他们对王权的授予，大卫有理由将他视为自己的君主和上帝的受膏者，就像大卫或其他人一样，都有义务尊重人民所选的国王，即使他比扫罗更血腥和暴虐。只要人民和封地将其封为国王的权力没有被收回，任何暴君都可以保持统治地位；因此，即使有六百人与大卫站在一起，也不能废黜他的王位或削弱对他的服从；因此，尽管臣民的不忠行为和违反法律的行为与他们与君主所订立的契约相悖，但这并不意味着他们不再是臣民——而这个契约是相互的

Arg. 3.—1. If the people, as God's instruments, bestow the benefit of a crown on their king, upon condition that he will rule them according to God's word, then is the king made king by the people conditionally; but the former is true, therefore so is the latter. The assumption is proved thus:—Because to be a king, is to be an adopted father, tutor, a politic servant and royal watchman of the state; and the royal honour and royal maintenance given to him, is a reward of his labours and a kingly hire. And this is the apostle's argument, Rom. 13:6, "For this cause pay you tribute also, [there is the wages] for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing." There is the work. Qui non implet conditionem a se promissam, cadit beneficio. It is confirmed thus:—The people either maketh the man their prince conditionally;—(1.) that he rule according to law or absolutely;—(2.) so that he rule according to will or lust;—or, (3.) without any vocal transactions at all, but only brevi manu, say, "Reign thou over us, and, God save the king;" and so there be no conditions spoken on either side;—or, (4.) the king is obliged to God for the condition which he promiseth by oath to perform toward the people; but he is to make no reckoning to the people, whether he perform his promise or no; for the people being inferior to him, and he, solo Deo minor, only next and immediate to God, the people can have no jus, no law over him by virtue of any covenant. But the first standing, we have what we seek; the second is contrary to Scripture. He is not (Deut. 17:15, 16) made absolutely a a king to rule according to his will and lust; for "reign thou over us," should have this meaning—"Come thou and play the tyrant over us, and let thy lust and will be a law to us,"—which is against natural sense; nor can the sense and meaning be according to the third, That the people, without any express, vocal, and positive covenant, give a throne to their king to rule as he pleaseth; because it is a vain thing for the Prelate and other Mancipia Aulæ, court-bellies, to say Scotland and England must produce a written authentic covenant betwixt the first king and their people, because, say they, it is the law's word, Do non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem lex, that covenant which appeareth not, it is not; for in positive covenants that is true, and in such contracts as are made according to the civil or municipal laws, or the secondary law of nature. But the general covenant of nature is presupposed in making a king, where there is no vocal or written covenant. If there be no conditions betwixt a Christian king and his people, then those things which are just and right according to the law of God, and the rule of God in moulding the first king, are understood to rule both king and people, as if they had been written; and here we produce our written covenant, Deut. 17:15; Josh. 1:8, 9; 2 Chron. 32:32. Because this is as much against the king as the people, and more; for if the first king cannot bring forth his written and authentic tables to prove that the crown was given to him and his heirs, and his successors, absolutely and without any conditions, so as his will shall be a law, cadit causa, he loseth his cause (say they). The king is in possession of the royal power absolutely, without any condition, and you must put him from his possession by a law. I answer, This is most false. (1.) Though he were in mala fide, and in unjust possession, the law of nature will warrant the people to repeal their right and plead for it, in a matter which concerneth their heads, lives, and souls. (2.) The parliaments of both kingdoms standing in possession of a nomothetic power to make laws, proveth clearly that the king is in no possession of any royal dignity conferred absolutely, and without any condition, upon him; and, therefore, it is the king's part by law to put the estates out of possession; and though there were no written covenant, the standing law and practice of many hundred acts of parliament, is equivalent to a written covenant.
如果人民作为上帝的工具，将王冠的好处赐予他们的国王，并要求他按照上帝的话语来统治他们，那么国王就是在人民的条件下成为国王；前者是真实的，因此后者也是如此。这个假设可以这样证明：因为成为国王意味着成为一个被收养的父亲、导师、国家的政治仆人和皇家守卫；给予他的皇家荣誉和皇家维持是对他劳动的回报和国王的报酬。这是使徒的论证，罗马书 13:6 说：“你们也为这个缘故纳税，因为他们是上帝的执事，常常专心办理这事。”这就是工作。不履行自己承诺的条件的人将失去这个好处。这一点可以这样证实：人民要么有条件地选择他作为他们的王；（1）要求他按照法律统治，要么绝对地统治；（2）要求他按照意愿或欲望统治；或者（3）根本没有任何口头交易，只是简单地说：“统治我们吧，上帝保佑国王。”，因此双方没有提出任何条件；或者（4）。国王对上帝有义务履行他发誓向人民承诺的条件；但他对人民是否履行承诺不需考虑；因为人民在他之下，而他只次于上帝，人民无权通过任何契约对他施加法律约束。但第一种立场符合圣经；第二种立场则相反。（申命记） 17:15, 16) 绝对地使一个国王按照他的意愿和欲望统治；因为“统治我们”，应该有这个意思——“来吧，你来暴虐地统治我们，让你的欲望和意愿成为我们的法律”——这是违背自然常识的；也不能按照第三种意思和含义，即人民在没有明确、口头和积极的契约的情况下，给予国王一个王位，让他按照自己的意愿统治；因为对于主教和其他宫廷的奴才来说，他们说苏格兰和英格兰必须出示第一位国王与人民之间的书面正式契约是徒劳的，因为他们说，这是法律的原则，即不明显和不存在的契约不算数，因为在积极的契约中，这是真实的，在根据民事法或市政法或自然法的次要法律所做的合同中也是如此。但是，在没有口头或书面契约的情况下，制定国王的时候，是基于自然的普遍契约的假设。 如果基督教国王与他的人民之间没有条件，那么根据上帝的法律和上帝在塑造第一位国王时的规则，那些公正和正确的事情被理解为统治国王和人民，就好像它们已经被写下来了；在这里，我们引用了我们的书面契约，申命记 17:15；约书亚记 1:8, 9；历代志下 32:32。因为这对国王和人民来说都是一样的，甚至更加严重；因为如果第一位国王不能拿出他的书面和真实的文件来证明王冠是绝对无条件地赋予他及其后裔和继任者的，以至于他的意愿成为法律，那么他将失去他的理由（他们说）。国王绝对地拥有王权，没有任何条件，你必须通过法律将他从他的地位上罢免。我回答说，这是最错误的。（1.）即使他在恶意和不公正的占有中，自然法律也将授权人民撤销他们的权利，并为此辩护，这关系到他们的头脑、生命和灵魂。（2.）两个王国的议会都拥有制定法律的立法权，这清楚地证明国王并没有绝对、无条件地被授予任何皇家尊严；因此，根据法律，国王有责任将财产交还给各个领地。即使没有书面契约，许多百年来的议会法律和实践的持续，与书面契约具有同等效力。

2. When the people appointed any to be their king, the voice of nature exponeth their deed, though there be no vocal or written covenant; for that fact—of making a king—is a moral lawful act warranted by the word of God (Deut. 17:15, 16; Rom. 13:1, 2) and the law of nature; and, therefore, they having made such a man their king, they have given him power to be their father, feeder, healer, and protector; and so must only have made him king conditionally, so he be a father, a feeder, and tutor. Now, if this deed of making a king must be exponed to be an investing with an absolute, and not a Conditional power, this fact shall be contrary to Scripture and to the law of nature; for if they have given him royal power absolutely, and Without any condition, they must have given to him power to be a father, protector, tutor, and to be a tyrant, a murderer, a bloody lion, to waste and destroy the people of God.
当人们任命某人为他们的国王时，自然的声音揭示了他们的行为，即使没有口头或书面契约；因为这个行为——任命国王——是一个道德上合法的行为，是上帝的话语（申命记 17:15, 16；罗马书 13:1, 2）和自然法律所保证的；因此，他们任命这样一个人为国王，他们就给了他成为他们的父亲、养育者、医治者和保护者的权力；所以他们只能有条件地任命他为国王，只要他是一个父亲、养育者和导师。现在，如果将这个任命国王的行为解释为授予绝对权力而不是有条件的权力，这个事实将与圣经和自然法律相矛盾；因为如果他们绝对地给了他王权，没有任何条件，他们必须给予他成为一个父亲、保护者、导师以及成为一个暴君、杀人犯、血腥的狮子，来浪费和摧毁上帝的子民的权力。

3. The law permitteth the bestower of a benefit to interpret his own mind in the bestowing of a benefit, even as a king and state must expone their own commission given to their ambassador, so must the estates expone whether they bestowed the crown upon the first king conditionally or absolutely.
法律允许施予者在施予利益时解释自己的意图，就像国王和国家必须解释给予大使的委任一样，各个阶层也必须解释他们是否有条件或无条件地授予第一位国王王冠。

4. If it stand, then must the people give to their first elected king a power to waste and destroy themselves, so as they may never control it, but only leave it to God and the king to reckon together, but so the condition is a chimera. "We give you a throne, upon condition you swear by Him who made heaven and earth, that you will govern us according to God's law; and you shall be answerable to God only, hot to us, whether you keep the covenant you make with us, or violate it." But how a covenant can be made with the people, and the king obliged to God, not to the people, I conceive not. This presupposeth that the king, as king, cannot do any sin, or Commit any act of tyranny against the people, but against God only; because if he be obliged to God only as a king, by virtue of his covenant, how can he fail against an obligation where there is no obligation? But, as a king, he oweth no obligation of duty to the people; and indeed so do our good men expound Psal. 51., "Against thee, thee only have I sinned," not against Uriah; for if he sinned not as king against Uriah, whose life he was obliged to preserve as a king, he was not obliged as a king by any royal duty to preserve his life. Where there is no sin, there is no obligation not to sin; and where there is no obligation not to sin, there is no sin. By this the king, as king, is loosed from all duties of the second table, being once made a king, he is above all obligation to love his neighbour as himself; for he is above all his neighbours, and above all mankind, and only less than God.
如果它存在，那么人民必须给予他们首位选举的国王权力来浪费和摧毁自己，以至于他们永远无法控制它，只能将其留给上帝和国王一起计算，但这种条件是虚构的。“我们给你一个王位，条件是你要发誓以创造天地的上帝来统治我们，你只对上帝负责，而不是对我们负责，无论你是否遵守与我们所订立的契约，或者违背它。”但是，我不明白如何与人民订立契约，而国王只对上帝负责，而不是对人民负责。这假设了国王作为国王不能犯任何罪，或者对人民施加任何暴政行为，只能对上帝犯罪；因为如果他作为国王只对上帝负有义务，根据他的契约，他如何能违背没有义务的义务？但是，作为国王，他对人民没有义务；事实上，我们的善良之人解释了诗篇 51。"只有得罪了你，我才犯了罪"，并非得罪了乌利亚；因为如果他作为国王没有得罪乌利亚，他作为国王有义务保护他的生命，那么他作为国王就没有义务保护他的生命。没有罪的地方就没有不犯罪的义务；没有不犯罪的义务的地方就没有罪。因此，作为国王，他被解除了第二诫命的所有责任，一旦成为国王，他就超越了对邻居如己的爱的义务；因为他高于所有邻居，高于全人类，只比上帝低一等。

Arg. 4.—If the people be so given to the king, that they are committed to him as a pledge, oppignerated in his hand as a pupil to a tutor, as a distressed man to a patron, as a flock to a shepherd; and so they remain the Lord's church, his people, his flock, his portion, his inheritance, his vineyard, his redeemed ones, then they cannot be given to the king as oxen and sheep, that are freely gifted to a man; or as a gift or sum of gold or silver that the man to whom they are given may use, so that he cannot commit a fault against the oxen, sheep, gold, or money that is given to him, however he shall dispose of them. But the people are given to the king to be tutoted and protected of him, so as they remain the people of God, and in covenant with him; and if the people Were the goods of fortune (as heathens say), he could no more sin against the people than a man can sin against his gold; now, though a man by adoring gold, or by lavish profusion And wasting of gold, may sin against God, yet not against gold; nor can he be in any covenant with gold, or under any obligation of either duty or sin to gold, or to lifeless and reasonless creatures properly, therefore he may sin in the use of them, and yet not sin against them, but against God. Hence, of necessity, the king must be under obligation to the Lord's people in another manner than that he should only answer to God for the loss of men, as if men were worldly goods under his hand, and as if being a king he were now by this royal authority privileged from the best half of the law of nature, to wit, from acts of mercy and truth, and covenant-keeping with his brethren.
如果人民如此向国王臣服，以至于他们被托付给他，像一个学生被托付给导师，像一个困扰的人被托付给保护者，像一群羊被托付给牧羊人；并且他们仍然是主的教会，他的子民，他的羊群，他的份额，他的产业，他的葡萄园，他的救赎者，那么他们就不能像牛和羊一样被赠送给一个人；或者像一笔黄金或白银的礼物或款项，被赠予的人可以使用，以至于他不能对赠予给他的牛、羊、黄金或钱币犯错，无论他如何处理它们。 但是人民是交给国王来教育和保护的，只要他们仍然是上帝的子民，并与他立约；如果人民是财富（正如异教徒所说），他就不能对人民犯罪，就像一个人不能对他的金子犯罪一样；尽管一个人崇拜金子，或者挥霍浪费金子，可能会得罪上帝，但不会得罪金子；他也不能与金子立约，也没有义务对金子或无生命和无理性的生物负责，因此他可能在使用它们时犯罪，但不是得罪它们，而是得罪上帝。因此，国王必须以一种与上帝的子民有不同的方式对上帝的子民负责，他不仅仅要对上帝负责，因为他失去了人民，好像人民是他手中的世俗财产，好像作为国王，他现在凭借这种王权豁免了自然法的最好一半，即仁慈、真理和与兄弟姐妹立约的行为。

Arg. 5.—If a king, because a king, were privileged from all covenant obligation to his subjects, then could no law of men lawfully reach him for any contract violated by him; then he could not be a debtor to his subjects if he borrowed money from them; and it were utterly unlawful either to crave him money, or to sue him at law for debts; yet our civil laws of Scotland tyeth the king to pay his debts, as any other man: yea, and king Solomon trafficing, and buying, and selling betwixt him and his own subjects, would seem unlawful; for how can a king buy and sell with his subjects, if he be under no covenant obligation to men, but to God only. Yea, then, a king could not marry a wife, for he could not come under a covenant to keep his body to her only, nor if he committed adultery, could he sin against his wife, because being immediate unto God, and above all obligation to men, he could sin against no covenant made with men, but only against God.
如果一个国王，因为是国王，免除了对臣民的所有契约义务，那么任何违反他所签订的合同的法律都不能合法地适用于他；如果他向臣民借钱，他就不会欠债给他们；而且向他借钱或者为债务而在法庭上起诉他都是完全非法的；然而我们苏格兰的民法规定国王必须偿还债务，就像其他人一样：是的，所罗门王与自己的臣民进行贸易、买卖似乎是不合法的；因为如果国王对人没有任何契约义务，只对上帝有义务，那么国王如何与臣民进行买卖呢？是的，那么国王就不能娶妻，因为他不能与妻子签订保持身体忠诚的契约，而且如果他犯奸淫罪，他也不能违背对妻子的契约，因为他与上帝直接接触，并且高于对人的任何义务，他只能违背与上帝所立的契约。

Arg. 6.—It that Was a lawful covenant made by Asa, and the states of Judah, 2 Chron. 15:13, "That whosoever would not seek the Lord God of their fathers, should be put to death, whether small or great, whether man or woman," this obligeth the king, for ought I see, and the princes, and the people, but it was a lawful covenant; therefore the king is under a covenant to the princes and judges, as they are to him; it is replied by Barclaius: "If a master of a school should make a law, Whosoever shall go out at the school doors without liberty obtained of the master, shall be whipped, it will not oblige the schoolmaster that he shall be whipped if he go out at the school doors without liberty; so neither doth this law oblige the king, the supreme lawgiver."
阿撒和犹大的人民所达成的合法契约是：凡不寻求他们祖先的主耶和华的人，无论大小、男女，都应被处死。我认为，这使得国王、王子和人民都有义务遵守这个契约，但这是一个合法的契约；因此，国王对王子和法官有契约责任，就像他们对他有责任一样。巴克莱回答说：“如果一位学校校长制定了一条规定，凡是未经校长允许就走出学校门的人都会被鞭打，这并不意味着校长如果未经允许走出学校门就会被鞭打；同样，这条法律也不会对国王这位最高立法者产生约束力。”

Ans. 1.—Suppose that the scholars have no less hand and authority magisterial in making the law than the schoolmaster, as the princes of Judah had a collateral power with king Asa about that law, it would follow, that the schoolmaster is under the same law, 2. Suppose going out at school doors, were that way a moral neglect of studying in the master, as it is in the scholars, as the not seeking of God is as heinous a sin in king Asa, and no less deserving death, than it is in the people, then should the law oblige schoolmaster and scholar both without exception. 3. The schoolmaster is clearly above all laws of discipline which he imposeth on his scholars; but none can say that king Asa was clearly above that law of seeking of the Lord God of his fathers. Diodorus Siculus (i. 17), saith, the kings of Persia were under an oath, and that they might not change the laws; and so were the kings of Egypt and Ethiopia. The kings of Sparta, which Aristotle calleth just kings, renew their oath every month. Romulus so covenanted with the senate and people. Carolus V. Austriacus sweareth he shall not change the laws without the consent of the electors, nor make new laws, not dispose or pledge any thing that belongeth to the empire. So read we Spec. Saxon, lib. 3, act. 54, and Xenophon (Cyroped. lib. 8,) saith there was a covenant between Cyrus and the Persians. The nobles are crowned when they crown their king, and exact a special oath of the king. So doth England, Poland, Spain, Arragonia, &c. Alber. Gentilis, and Grotius,2 prove that kings are really bound to perform oaths and contracts to their people; but "notwithstanding there be such a covenant, it followeth not from this, (saith Arnisæus) that if the prince break his covenant and rule tyranhically, the people shall be free, and the contract or covenant nothing,"—Ans. The covenant may be materially broken, while the king remaineth king, and the subjects remain subjects; but when it is both materially and formally declared by the states to be broken, the people must be tree from their allegiance; but of this more hereafter.
答案 1.——假设学者在制定法律方面与校长一样有着同样的权力和权威，就像犹大的王子们在法律方面与亚撒王有着相同的权力一样，那么可以得出结论，学校校长也受到同样的法律约束。2. 假设离开学校门口是校长在道德上对学习的忽视，就像学者们一样，就像亚撒王不寻求上帝一样是一种极其严重的罪恶，不亚于人民，那么法律应该对校长和学者都适用，没有例外。3. 学校校长显然高于他对学生施加的所有纪律法规，但没有人能说亚撒王明显高于寻求他祖先的主上帝的法律。西库罗斯（i. 17）说，波斯的国王受到誓言的约束，他们不能改变法律；埃及和埃塞俄比亚的国王也是如此。亚里士多德称之为公正国王的斯巴达国王每个月都要重新宣誓。罗穆卢斯与参议院和人民达成了协议。卡洛斯五世。 奥地利人发誓，他不会在选民同意之前改变法律，也不会制定新法律，不会处置或抵押帝国的任何东西。我们在《Spec. Saxon, lib. 3, act. 54》和《Xenophon (Cyroped. lib. 8)》中读到了这样的内容。贵族们在加冕国王时也会加冕自己，要求国王发誓。英格兰、波兰、西班牙、阿拉贡等国也是如此。亚尔伯特·真提利斯和格罗蒂乌斯证明，国王确实有责任履行对人民的誓言和合同；但是，“尽管有这样的契约，但这并不意味着（阿尔尼塞斯说）如果君主违背了契约并以暴政统治，人民就会自由，契约也就无效了。”答案是，当国王仍然是国王，臣民仍然是臣民时，契约可能在实质上被破坏；但当国家明确宣布契约在实质和形式上被破坏时，人民必须从忠诚中解脱出来；但这个问题以后再讨论。

Arg. 7.—If a master bind himself by an oath to his servant, he shall not receive such a benefit of such a point of service; if he violate the oath, his oath must give his servant law and right both to challenge his master, and to be free from that point of service; an army appointeth such a one their leader and captain, but they refuse to do it except he swear he shall not betray them to the enemy. If he doth betray them, then must the soldiers be loosed from that contract. If one be appointed pilate of a ship, and not but by an oath, if he sell the passengers to the Turks, they may challenge the pilate of his oath; and it is clear that (1.) the estates should refuse the crown to him who would refuse to govern them according to God's law, but should profess that he would make his own will a law, therefore the intention of the oath is clearly conditional. (2.) When the king sweareth the oath, he is but king in fieri, and so not as king above the states of kingdoms. Now his being king doth not put him in a case above all civil obligation of a king to his subjects, because the matter of the oath is, that he shall be under them so far in regard of the oath of God.
如果主人以誓言约束自己的仆人，他将不会从这种服务中获得任何好处；如果他违背誓言，他的誓言必须给予仆人法律和权利，即挑战主人，并从这种服务中解脱出来；军队任命某人为他们的领袖和队长，但他们拒绝这样做，除非他发誓不会背叛他们给敌人。如果他背叛了他们，士兵们就必须解除那份合同。如果有人被任命为船长，而且只能通过宣誓，如果他把乘客卖给土耳其人，他们可以挑战船长的誓言；而且很明显，（1）贵族应该拒绝把王冠给那些拒绝按照上帝的法律来统治他们的人，而应该宣称他们将把自己的意愿作为法律，因此誓言的意图显然是有条件的。（2）当国王发誓时，他只是未来的国王，所以并不是作为国王高于王国的地位。现在，他作为国王并不使他摆脱作为国王对臣民的所有民事义务，因为誓言的内容是，他将在上帝的誓言下屈服于他们。

Arg. 8.—If the oath of God made to the people do not bind him to the people to govern according to law, and not according to his will and lust, it should be unlawful for any to swear such an oath, for if a power above law agree essentially to a king as a king, as royalists hold, he who sweareth such an oath should both swear to be a king to such a people, and should swear to be no king, in repect by his oath he should renounce that which is essential to a king.
如果上帝对人民所作的誓言不能约束他按照法律而不是他的意愿和欲望来统治人民，那么对于任何人来说，宣誓这样的誓言都是不合法的，因为如果超越法律的权力与国王作为国王的本质是一致的，正如保皇派所认为的那样，那么宣誓这样的誓言的人既要宣誓成为这样一个国王的人民，又要宣誓不再是国王，从他的誓言来看，他应该放弃国王的本质。

Arnisæus objecteth: Ex particularibus non potest colligi conclusio universalis, some few of the kings, as David and Joash, made a covenant with the people; it followeth not that this was an universal law.—Ans. Yea, the covenant is (Deut. 17.) and must be a rule to all; if so just a man as David was limited by a covenant, then all the rest also.
Arnisæus 反驳道：不能从个别情况得出普遍结论，一些国王，如大卫和约阿施，与人民立约；这并不意味着这是一项普遍法律。——答：是的，这个约定（申命记 17 章）必须成为所有人的规则；如果像大卫这样正直的人都受到约束，那么其他人也是如此。

QUESTION XV
问题十五

WHETHER OR NO THE KING BE UNIVOCALLY, OR ONLY ANALOGICALLY, AND BY PROPORTION, A FATHER
无论国王是单一的，还是只是类比的，并且通过比例，都是一个父亲

It is true Aristotle (Polit. l. 3, c. 11) saith, that the kingly power is a fatherly power; and Justin, (Novell 12, c. 2,) Pater quamvis legum contemptor, quamvis impius sit, tamen pater est. But I do not believe that, as royalists say, the kingly power is essentially and univocally that same with a paternal or fatherly power; or that Adam, as a father, was as a father and king; and that suppose Adam should live in Noah's days, that by divine institution and without consent of the kingdoms and communities on earth, Adam hoc ipso, and for no other reason but because he was a father, should also be the universal king, and monarch of the whole world; or suppose Adam was living to this day, that all kings that hath been since, and now are, held their crowns of him, and had no more kingly power than inferior judges in Scotland have, under our sovereign king Charles, for so all that hath been, and now are, lawful kings, should be unjust usurpers; for if fatherly power be the first and native power of commanding, it is against nature that a monarch who is not my father by generation, should take that power from me, and be a king over me and my children.
亚里士多德（政治学第 3 卷第 11 章）说得没错，君王权力是一种父权力；而贾斯汀（新法典第 12 章第 2 节）说，即使是蔑视法律、邪恶的父亲，仍然是父亲。但我不相信，正如君主主义者所说，君王权力本质上和父权力完全相同；或者亚当作为一个父亲，就像一个父亲和国王一样；假设亚当活在挪亚的时代，那么在上帝的安排下，不经过地球上的王国和社区的同意，仅仅因为他是一个父亲，亚当本身就应该成为全世界的普遍国王和君主；或者假设亚当活到今天，那么所有自从亚当以来的君王，包括现在的君王，都是从他那里继承了王冠，他们的君王权力不比苏格兰的下级法官在我们的君主查尔斯统治下的权力更大，因此所有合法的君王都将成为不公正的篡夺者；因为如果父权力是最初和本源的命令权力，那么一个不是我亲生父亲的君主夺走这个权力，并统治我和我的子女，是违背自然的。

1. But I assert, first, that though the Word warrant us to esteem kings fathers, Isa 49:23; Jud. 5:7; Gen. 20:2, yet are not they essentially and formally fathers by generation; Num. 11:12, "Have I conceived all this people? have I begotten them?" and yet are they but fathers metaphorically—by office, because they should care for them as fathers do for children, and so come under the name of fathers in the fifth commandment, and therefore rigorous and cruel rulers are leopards, and lions, and wolves, Ezek. 22:27; Zeph. 3:3. If, then, tyrannous judges be not essentially and formally leopards and lions, but only metaphorically, neither can kings be formally fathers. 2. Not only kings but all judges are fathers, in defending their subjects from violence and the sword, and fighting the Lord's battles for them, and counselling them. If, therefore, royalists argue rightly, a king is essentially a father, and fatherly power and royal power are of the same essence and nature. As, therefore, he who is once a father is ever a father, and his children cannot take up arms against him to resist him, for that is unnatural and repugnant to the fifth commandment; so he who is once a king is evermore a king, and it is repugnant to the fifth commandment to resist him with arms. It is answered,—that the argument presupposeth that royal power and fatherly power is one and the same in nature, whereas they differ in nature, and are only one by analogy and proportion; for so pastors of the Word are called fathers, 1 Cor. 4:15, it will not follow, that once a pastor, evermore a pastor; and that if therefore pastors turn wolves, and by heretical doctrine corrupt the flock, they cannot be cast out of the church. 3. A father, as a father, hath not power of life and death over his sons, because, Rom. 13, by divine institution the sword is given by God to kings and judges; and if Adam had had any such power to kill his son Cain for the killing of his brother Abel, it had been given to him by God as a power politic, different from a fatherly power; for a fatherly power is such as formally to preserve the life of the children, and not to take away the life; yea, and Adam, though he had never sinned, nor any of his posterity, Adam should have been a perfect father, as he is now indued with all fatherly power that any father now hath; yea God should not have given the sword or power of punishing ill-doers, since that power should have been in vain, if there had been no violence, nor bloodshed, or sin on the earth; for the power of the sword and of lawful war, is given to men now in the state of sin. 4. Fatherly government and power is from the bosom and marrow of that fountain law of nature; but royal power is not from the law of nature, more than is aristocratical or democratical power. Dr. Ferne saith, (part 1, sec. 3, p. 8,) Monarchy is not jure divino, (I am not of his mind,) nor yet from the law of nature, but ductu naturæ, by the guidance of nature. Sure it is from a supervenient commandment of God, added to the first law of nature, establishing fatherly power. 5. Children having their life and first breathings of nature from their parents, must be in a more entire relation from their father than from their prince. Subjects have not their being natural, but their civil, politic and peaceable well-being from their prince. 6. A father is a father by generation, and giving the being of nature to children, and is a natural head and root, without the free consent and suffrages of his children, and is essentially a father to one child, as Adam was to one Cain; but a prince is a prince by the free suffrages of a community, and cannot be a king to one only, and he is the politic head of a civil corporation. 7. A father, so long as his children liveth, can never leave off to be a father, though he were mad and furious—though he be the most wicked man on earth. Qui genuit filium non potest non genuisse filium, what is once past cannot, by any power, be not past; a father is a father for ever. But by confession of royalists, as Barclaius, Hugo Grotius, and Arnisæus, and others, grant, If a king sell his subjects by sea or land to other nations,—if he turn a furious Nero, he may be dethroned; and the power that created the king under such express conditions, as if the king violate them by his own consent he shall be put from the throne—may cease to hold him king; and if a stronger king conquer a king and his subjects, royalists say the conqueror is a lawful king; and so the conquered king must also lawfully come down from his throne, and turn a lawful captive sitting in the dust. 8. Learned politicians, as Bartholomeus Romulus, (Defens. part 1, n. 153,) and Joannes de Anania (in c. fin. de his qui fil. occid.) teach that "the father is not obliged to reveal the conspiracy of his son against his prince; nor is he more to accuse his son, than to accuse himself, because the father loveth the son better than himself," (D. Listi quidem. Sect. Fin. quod. met. caus. et D. L. fin. c. de cura furiosi,) and certainly a father had rather die in his own person, as choose to die in his son's, in whom he affecteth a sort of immortality, in specie, quando non potest in individuo; but a king doth not love his subjects with a natural or fatherly love thus; and if the affections differ, the power which secondeth the affection, for the conservation either of being, or well-being, must also differ proportionally.
但我断言，首先，虽然圣经告诉我们要尊重国王如同尊重父亲（以赛亚书 49:23；士师记 5:7；创世纪 20:2），但他们并非本质上和形式上通过生育成为父亲（民数记 11:12，“我怀了这整个百姓吗？我生了他们吗？”），他们只是以隐喻的方式成为父亲——通过职责，因为他们应该像父亲对待孩子一样关心他们，所以在第五诫中被称为父亲，因此严厉和残忍的统治者被比喻为豹、狮子和狼（以西结书 22:27；西番雅书 3:3）。因此，如果暴虐的法官本质上和形式上并非豹和狮子，而只是隐喻性的，那么国王也不能本质上和形式上成为父亲。其次，不仅国王，所有的法官都是父亲，他们保护他们的臣民免受暴力和刀剑的伤害，为他们争战，给予他们指导。因此，如果君主主义者的论点正确，国王本质上是父亲，父权和王权具有相同的本质和性质。 因此，一旦成为父亲，就永远是父亲，他的子女不能拿起武器反抗他，因为这是不自然的，违背了第五诫；同样，一旦成为国王，就永远是国王，用武力反抗他也违背了第五诫。有人回答说，这个论点假设王权和父权在本质上是相同的，然而它们在本质上是不同的，只是通过类比和比例成为一体；例如，神职人员被称为父亲，但这并不意味着一旦成为神职人员，就永远是神职人员；如果牧师变成狼，通过异端教义败坏羊群，他们也可以被驱逐出教会。一个父亲作为父亲，并没有对他的儿子有生死权力，因为罗马书中这样说。 13，根据神的安排，剑是上帝赐予国王和法官的；如果亚当有权力杀死他的儿子该隐，因为他杀了他的兄弟亚伯，那么这种权力是上帝赋予他的一种政治权力，不同于父亲的权力；因为父亲的权力是正式地保护孩子的生命，而不是夺走生命；是的，即使亚当从未犯罪，他的后代也没有，亚当应该是一个完美的父亲，就像他现在具有的所有父亲的权力一样；是的，上帝本不应该赐予剑或惩罚作恶者的权力，因为如果地球上没有暴力、流血或罪恶，那么这种权力将是徒劳的；因为剑和合法战争的权力是赋予现在处于罪恶状态的人的。4. 父权政府和权力源自自然法的本质；但是君主权力不是来自自然法，也不比贵族或民主权力更多。费恩博士说（第一部分，第 3 节，第 8 页），君主制不是神授的（我不同意他的观点），也不是来自自然法，而是在自然的引导下。 当然，这是来自上帝的附加命令，添加到自然法的第一条，确立了父权。5. 孩子们从父母那里获得生命和自然的第一次呼吸，他们与父亲的关系比与君主的关系更加紧密。臣民的存在不是自然的，而是从君主那里获得的他们的公民、政治和和平的福祉。6. 父亲是通过生育而成为父亲的，他给予孩子们自然的存在，他是一个天然的头和根源，不需要孩子们的自由同意和选票，他对一个孩子来说是本质上的父亲，就像亚当对于该隐一样；但是君主是通过社区的自由选票成为君主的，他不能只是一个国王，他是一个公民团体的政治头。7. 父亲只要孩子还活着，就永远不会停止做父亲，即使他疯狂和狂暴，即使他是地球上最邪恶的人。Qui genuit filium non potest non genuisse filium，一旦过去的事情无法通过任何力量变成未过去的事情；父亲永远是父亲。 但是根据皇室支持者的承认，如巴克莱、雨果·格罗提乌斯和阿尼塞乌斯等人，如果国王将他的臣民出售给其他国家，无论是通过海上还是陆地，如果他变成了狂暴的尼禄，他可能会被废黜；而创造国王的权力在明确的条件下，如果国王违反了这些条件，他自己同意的话，他将被废黜，不再被视为国王；如果一个更强大的国王征服了一个国王和他的臣民，皇室支持者说征服者是合法的国王；因此，被征服的国王也必须合法地下台，成为一个合法的俘虏坐在尘土中。8. 学者政治家，如巴托洛梅乌斯·罗穆卢斯（Defens. part 1, n. 153）和约翰内斯·德·阿纳尼亚（in c. fin. de his qui fil. occid.）教导说，“父亲没有义务揭露儿子对君主的阴谋；他不应该指责儿子，就像他指责自己一样，因为父亲比自己更爱儿子”（D. Listi quidem. Sect. Fin. quod. met. caus. et D. L. fin. c.）。 对于疯狂的治疗，父亲宁愿亲自死去，也不愿选择在儿子身上死去，因为他在儿子身上追求一种特殊的不朽，尤其是当他无法在个体中实现时；但是国王并不以这种自然或父爱的方式爱他的臣民；如果感情不同，支持感情的权力，无论是为了存在还是为了幸福，也必须相应地不同。

The P. Prelate (c. 7, p. 87,) objecteth against us thus, stealing word by word from Arnisæus. 1. When a king is elected sovereign to a multitude, he is surrogated in the place of a common father, Exod. 20:12, "Honour thy father." Then, as a natural father receiveth not paternal right, power, or authority, from his sons, but hath this from God and the ordinance of nature, nor can the king have his right from the community. 2. The maxim of the law is, Surrogatus gaudet privilegus ejus cui surrogatur, et qui succedit in locum, succedit in jus. The person surrogated hath all the privileges that he hath in whose place he succeedeth; he who succeedeth to the place succeedeth to the rights; the adopted son, or the bastard who is legitimated and cometh in the place of the lawful born son, cometh also in the privileges of the lawful born son. A prince elected cometh to the full possession of the majesty of a natural prince and father, for Modus acquirendi non tollit naturale jus possidendi (saith Arnisæus, more fully than the poor Plagiarius), the manner of acquiring any thing, taketh not away the natural possession, for however things be acquired, if the title be just, possession is the law of nations. Then when the king is chosen in place of the father, as the father hath a divine right by nature, (so must the king have that same;) and seeing the right proprietor (saith the pamphleting Prelate) had his right by God, by nature, how can it be but howsoever the designation of the person is from the disordered community, yet the collation of the power is from God immediately, and from his sacred and inviolable ordinance? And what can be said against the way by which any one elected obtained his right, for seeing God doth not now send Samuels or Elisnas to anoint or declare kings, we are, in his ordinary providence, to conceive the designation of the person is the manifestation of God's will, called voluntas signi, as the schools speak, just so as when the church designeth one to sacred orders.
普雷拉特（约 7，第 87 页）以阿尼塞乌斯的话反对我们，逐字抄袭。1. 当一个国王被选为众多人的统治者时，他被代理为一个普通父亲的位置，出埃及记 20:12，“要尊重你的父亲。”然后，正如一个自然父亲不是从他的儿子那里获得父权、权力或权威，而是从上帝和自然的规定中获得的，国王也不能从社区获得他的权利。2. 法律的原则是，被代理人享有被他所代理的人的特权，接替他的位置就接替了他的权利；被收养的儿子，或者合法化的私生子，代替了合法出生的儿子的位置，也享有合法出生的儿子的特权。 一个被选举的王子完全拥有一个自然王子和父亲的威严，因为 Modus acquirendi non tollit naturale jus possidendi（如 Arnisæus 所说，比可怜的 Plagiarius 更详细），任何事物的获取方式并不剥夺自然拥有权，因为无论如何获得，如果标题是正当的，拥有是国际法的规定。然后，当国王被选为父亲的位置时，正如父亲拥有神圣的权利一样（国王也必须拥有同样的权利）；并且由于合法的所有者（如传单中的主教所说）通过上帝和自然获得了他的权利，那么无论人的指定是来自无序的社区，权力的授予都是直接来自上帝和他神圣不可侵犯的法令。对于任何一个被选举者获得权利的方式，还能说什么呢？因为既然上帝现在不再派遣撒母耳或以利撒拿膏抹或宣布国王，我们在他的普通供应中，要认为人的指定是上帝旨意的显现，被称为 voluntas signi，就像教会指定某人接受神圣职位一样。

Ans. 1.—He that is surrogated in the place of another, due to him by a positive law of man, he hath law to all the privileges that he hath in whose place he is surrrogated, that is true. He who is made assignee to an obligation for a sum of money, hath all the rights that the principal party to whom the bond or obligation was made. He who cometh in the place of a mayor of a city, of a captain in an army, of a pilot in a ship, or of a pope, hath all the privileges and rights that his predecessors had by law. Jus succedit juri, persona jure predita personæ jure preditæ. So the law, so far as my reading can reach,—who profess myself a divine;—but that he who succeedeth to the place of a father by nature, should enjoy all the natural rights and privileges of the person to whom he succeedeth, I believe the law never dreamed it; for then the adopted son, coming in place of the natural son, hath right to the natural affection of the father. If any should adopt Maxwell the prelate, should he love him as the pursuivant of Crail (Maxwell's father) loved him, I conceive not. Hath the adopted son his life, his being, the figure bodily, the manners of the son in whose place he is adopted; or doth he naturally resemble the father as the natural son doth? The Prelate did not read this law in any approved jurist, though he did steal the argument from Arnisæus, and stole the citations of Homer and Aristotle out of him, with a little metathesis. A natural son is not made a son by the consent of parente, but he is a son by generation: so must the adopted son be adopted without the free consent and grace of the father adopting: so here the king cometh in the place of a natural father. But I conceive the law saith not that the elected king is a king without consent of the subjects, as a natural father is a father without the consent of his sons. Nor is it a law true, as "once a father always a father," so once an elected king always a king, though he sell his subjects, being induced thereunto by wicked counsellors, If the king have no privileges but what the natural father hath, in whose place he cometh, then, as the natural father, in a free kingdom, hath not power of life and death over his sons, neither hath the king power of life and death over his subjects. This is no law. This maxim should prove good if the king were essentially a father by generation and natural propagation; but he is only a father metaphorically, and by a borrowed speech. A father non generando, sed politice alendo, tuendo, regendo, therefore an elected prince cometh not in the full possession of all the natural power and rights of a natural father. 2. The P. Prelate speaketh disgracefully of the church of God, calling it a disorderly community, as if he himself were born of kings, whereas God calleth the king their shepherd, and the people, "God's flock, inheritance and people;" and they are not a disorderly body by nature, but by sin; in which sense the Prelate may call king, priest and people, a company of heirs of God's wrath, except he be an Arminian still, as once he was. If we are in ordinary providence now, because we have not Samuels and prophets to anoint kings, to hold the designation of a person to be king to be the manifestation of God's will, called voluntas signi, is treason, for if Scotland and England should design Maxwell in the place of king Charles our native sovereign, (an odious comparison,) Maxwell should be lawful king; for what is done by God's will, called by our divines (they have it not from schoolmen, as the Prelate ignorantly saith) his signified will, which is our rule, is done lawfully. There can be no greater treason put in print than this
答案 1. - 他是因为人的正面法律而被代替在另一个人的位置上，他拥有他所代替的人所拥有的所有特权，这是正确的。被指定为一笔款项的债权人，拥有与债权人所拥有的所有权利。代替市长、军队中的队长、船上的舵手或教皇的人，拥有他的前任根据法律所享有的所有特权和权利。法律继承法律，人以法律赋予人以法律赋予。根据我的阅读范围，法律如此-我自称为神学家-但是继承自然父亲的位置的人，是否应该享有他所继承的人的所有自然权利和特权，我相信法律从未想过；因为那样的话，被收养的儿子代替了亲生儿子，就有权享受父亲的自然情感。如果有人收养了主教麦克斯韦尔，他会像克雷尔的传令官（麦克斯韦尔的父亲）那样爱他，我不认为会这样。 养子是否具有他的生命、存在、身体形象和被养父所采纳的儿子的举止方式；或者他是否自然地像亲生儿子一样像父亲？主教没有在任何经过认可的法学家那里读到这个法律，尽管他从阿尼塞乌斯那里偷了这个论点，并从他那里偷了荷马和亚里士多德的引文，稍作改动。一个亲生儿子不是通过父母的同意而成为儿子，而是通过生育而成为儿子：所以被收养的儿子必须在没有收养父亲的自由同意和恩典的情况下被收养：所以在这里，国王代替了亲生父亲的位置。但我认为法律并没有说选举出来的国王是没有子民同意的国王，就像亲生父亲是没有儿子同意的父亲一样。也不是一个真实的法律，就像“一旦是父亲就永远是父亲”一样，一旦是选举出来的国王就永远是国王，尽管他出于邪恶的顾问的引导而出卖了他的子民。如果国王没有除了亲生父亲所拥有的特权，那么在一个自由王国中，就像亲生父亲一样，国王对他的子民没有生杀予夺的权力。 这不是法律。如果国王本质上是通过生育和自然繁殖成为父亲，这个格言应该是正确的；但实际上，他只是借用一种比喻的方式成为父亲。他是通过养育、保护和统治而成为父亲，而不是通过生育。因此，一个选举产生的君主并没有完全拥有一个自然父亲的所有权力和权益。2. 这位高级教士对上帝的教会说了一些令人不悦的话，称其为一个无序的群体，仿佛他自己是出身于国王家族一样，然而上帝称国王为他们的牧羊人，称人民为“上帝的羊群、产业和子民”；他们并不是天生的无序团体，而是因为罪恶而如此；在这个意义上，除非他仍然是一个阿敏派，否则这位高级教士可以称国王、牧师和人民为上帝愤怒的继承者。 如果我们现在处于普通的神意中，因为我们没有撒母耳和先知来膏立君王，来确定一个人成为国王是上帝旨意的体现，被称为 voluntas signi，那么这是叛国行为，因为如果苏格兰和英格兰要选举麦克斯韦尔代替我们的本土君主查尔斯国王（一个可憎的比较），那么麦克斯韦尔就是合法的国王；因为按照我们的神学家所说（他们并不是从学院派那里得来的，正如主教无知地说），上帝的旨意，也就是我们的准则，是合法的。这是印刷品中最大的背叛

QUESTION XVI
问题十六

WHETHER OR NO A DESPOTICAL AND MASTERLY DOMINION OF MEN AND THINGS AGREE TO THE KING BECAUSE HE IS KING
无论一个专制和掌控一切的统治是否适合国王，因为他是国王

I may here dispute whether the king be lord, having a masterly dominion both over men and things. But I first discuss shortly his dominion over his subjects.
我可能在这里争论国王是否是主人，对人和事物都有主宰的统治。但我首先简要讨论他对臣民的统治。

It is agreed on by divines, that servitude is a penal fruit of sin, and against nature. Institutt. de jure personarum, Sect. 1, and F. de statu hominum. I. libertas; because all men are born by nature of equal condition.
神学家们一致认为，奴役是罪恶的惩罚果实，违背自然法。《人身法学》第一章和《人类状态法学》第一章都有所提及。自然法规定，所有人生来平等。

Assert. 1.—The king hath no proper, masterly, or lordly dominion over his subjects; his dominion is rather fiduciary and ministerial, than masterly,
断言。1. 国王对他的臣民没有真正的、主宰的或统治的权力；他的统治更像是信托和行政的，而不是主宰的。

1. Because royal empire is essentially to feed, rule, defend, and to govern in peace and godliness, (1 Tim. 2:2,) as the father doth his children; Psal. 78:71, "He brought him to feed Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance;" Isa. 55:4, "I gave him for a leader and commander to the people;" 2 Sam. 5:2, "Thou shalt feed my people Israel;" 2 Sam. 5:2; 1 Chron. 11:2; 1 Chron. 17:6,) And so it is for the good of the people, and to bring those over whom he is a feeder and ruler, to such a happy end; and, as saith Althusius, (polit. c.1, n, 13,) and Marius Salomonius, (de princ, c.2,) it is to take care of the good of those over whom the ruler is set, and, conservare est, rem illæsam servare, to keep a thing safe. But to be a master, and to have a masterly and lordly power over slaves and servants, is to make use of servants for the owner's benefit, not for the good of the slave, (l. 2, de leg. l. Servus de servit. expert. Danæ polit. l. 1, Tolossan. de Rep. l. 1, c. 1, n. 15, 16,) therefore are servants bought and sold as goods, (jure belli. F. de statu hominum l. et servorum.)
因为皇家帝国本质上是为了养育、统治、保卫和以和平和敬虔的方式治理，（提摩太前书 2:2）就像父亲对待他的孩子一样；诗篇 78:71，“他使他们牧养他的百姓雅各，领他的百姓以色列；”以赛亚书 55:4，“我立他作众民的见证，作众民的君王；”撒母耳记下 5:2，“你必牧养我的百姓以色列；”撒母耳记下 5:2；历代志上 11:2；历代志上 17:6，）所以这是为了人民的利益，以及将那些他所养育和统治的人带到这样一个幸福的结局；正如阿尔图修斯所说，（政治学第 1 章，第 13 节），以及马里乌斯·萨洛蒙尼乌斯所说，（关于君主第 2 章），这是为了关心那些统治者所管理的人的利益，并且保护是保持事物安全的意思。但是成为主人，拥有对奴隶和仆人的主宰和统治权力，是为了将仆人用于主人的利益，而不是为了奴隶的利益，（法律第 2 卷，关于奴隶法律。达尼埃尔政治学第 1 卷，图卢兹共和国第 1 卷，第 1 章，第 15、16 节），因此仆人被买卖如同商品，（战争法律。人类状态法律和奴隶法律。）

2. Not to be under governors and magistrates is a judgment of God, (Isa. 3:6, 7; 3:1; Hos. 3:4; Judg. 19:1, 2,) but not to be under a master as slaves are, is a blessing, seeing freedom is a blessing of God, (John 8:33; Exod. 21:2, 26, 27; Deut. 15:12;) so he that killeth Goliath, (1 Sam. 17:25,) his father's house shall be free in Israel. (Jer. 34:9; Acts 22:28; 1 Cor. 9:19; Gal. 4:26, 31.) Therefore the power of a king cannot be a lordly and masterly power; tor then to be under a kingly power should both be a blessing and a curse, and just punishment of sin.
不受统治者和官员的统治是上帝的判断（以赛亚书 3:6, 7; 3:1; 何西阿书 3:4; 士师记 19:1, 2），但不像奴隶那样受主人的统治是一种祝福，因为自由是上帝的祝福（约翰福音 8:33; 出埃及记 21:2, 26, 27; 申命记 15:12）；所以杀死歌利亚的人（撒母耳记上 17:25），他的父家在以色列中将自由（耶利米书 34:9; 使徒行传 22:28; 哥林多前书 9:19; 加拉太书 4:26, 31）。因此，国王的权力不能是一种主宰和统治的权力；因为受国王权力统治既应该是一种祝福，也是一种诅咒，是对罪的公正惩罚。

3. Subjects are called the servants of the king, (1 Sam. 15:2; 2 Chron. 13:7; 1 Kings 12:7; Exod. 10:1, 2; Exod. 9:20,) but they are not slaves, because (Deut. 17:20) they are his brethren: "That the king's heart be not lifted up against his brethren;" and his sons; (Isa. 49:23;) and the Lord gave his people a king as a blessing, (1 Kings 10:9; Hos. 1:11; Isa. 1:26; Jer. 17:25,) "and brought them out of the house of bondage," (Exod. 20:2,) as out of a place of misery. And therefore to be the king's servants in the place cited, is some other thing than to be the king's slaves.
主题被称为国王的仆人，（撒母耳记上 15:2；历代志下 13:7；列王纪上 12:7；出埃及记 10:1, 2；出埃及记 9:20，）但他们不是奴隶，因为（申命记 17:20）他们是他的兄弟：“免得王心高傲，离弃他的弟兄。”和他的儿子们；（以赛亚书 49:23；）耶和华给他的子民一个国王作为祝福，（列王纪上 10:9；何西阿书 1:11；以赛亚书 1:26；耶利米书 17:25，）“将他们从奴隶之家带出来，”（出埃及记 20:2，）就像从一个痛苦的地方带出来一样。因此，在引用的地方成为国王的仆人，与成为国王的奴隶是不同的事情。

4. The master might in some cases sell the servant for money, yea for his own gain he might do it, (Nehem. 5:8; Eccles, 2:7; 1 Kings 2:32; Gen. 9:25; Gen. 26:14; 2 Kings 4:1; Gen. 20:14, and might give away his servants; and the servants were the proper goods and riches of the master; (Eccles. 2:7; Gen. 30:43; Gen. 20:14; Job 1:3, 15); but the king may not sell his kingdom or subjects, or give them away for money, or any other way; for royalists grant that king to be a tyrant, and worthy to be dethroned, who shall sell his people; for the king may not dilapidate the rents of the crown and give them away to the hurt and prejudice of his successors, (l. ult. Sect. sed nostr. c. Comment. de lege, I. peto, 69, Sect. frartrem de lege, 2, I. 32, ultimo, D.T.) and far less can he lawfully sell men, and give away a whole kingdom to the hurt of his successors, for that were to make merchandise of the living temples of the Holy Ghost; and Arnisæus, (de authorit. princip. c. 3, n. 7,) saith, servitude is præter naturam, beside nature; he might have said, contrary to nature (l. 5, de stat. homin. Sect. 2, Inst, de jur. perso. c. 3, et Novel. 89); but the subjection of subjects is so consonant to nature, that it is seen in bees and cranes. Therefore a dominion is defined, a faculty of using of things to what uses you will. Now a man hath not this way an absolute dominion over his beasts, to dispose of them at his will; for a good man hath mercy on the life of his beast, (Prov. 12:10,) nor hath he dominion over his goods to use them as he will, because he may not use them to the damage of the commonwealth, he may not use them to the dishonour of God; and so God and the magistrate hath laid some bound on his dominion. And because the king being made a king leaveth not off to be a reasonable creature, he must be under a law, and so his will and lust cannot be the rule of his power and dominion, but law and reason must regulate him. Now if God had given to the king a dominion over men as reasonable creatures, his power and dominion which by royalists is conceived to be above law, should be a rule to men as reasonable men, which would make men under kings no better than brute beasts, for then should subjects exercise acts of reason, not because good and honest, but because their prince commandeth them so to do; and if this cannot be said, none can be at the disposing of kings in politic acts liable to royal government, that way that the slave is in his actions under the dominion of his master.
4. 主人在某些情况下可以出售仆人以换取金钱，甚至为了自己的利益也可以这样做（尼希米记 5:8；传道书 2:7；列王纪上 2:32；创世记 9:25；创世记 26:14；列王纪下 4:1；创世记 20:14），并且主人的仆人是主人的财产和财富（传道书 2:7；创世记 30:43；创世记 20:14；约伯记 1:3, 15）；但国王不能出售他的王国或臣民，也不能以金钱或其他方式将他们赠予他人；因为君主主义者承认，出售自己的人民的国王是暴君，应该被废黜；因为国王不能挥霍皇冠的收入并将其赠予他人，以损害和损害他的继任者（l. ult. Sect. sed nostr. c. Comment. de lege, I. peto, 69, Sect. frartrem de lege, 2, I. 32, ultimo, D.T.）；更不用说他合法地出售人民，并将整个王国赠予他的继任者，因为那将是对圣灵的活体殿堂进行买卖；而阿尼塞乌斯（de authorit. princip. c. 3, n. 7）说，奴役是违背自然的，他本可以说是违背自然的（l. 5, de stat. homin. Sect. 2, Inst, de jur. perso. c. 3, et Novel. 但是，对于主体的征服是与自然相一致的，这在蜜蜂和鹤中都可以看到。因此，统治被定义为使用事物的能力，以达到你想要的目的。现在，一个人对他的牲畜没有绝对的统治权，不能随意处置它们；因为善良的人怜悯他的牲畜的生命（箴言 12:10），他也不能随意使用他的财产，因为他不能将它们用于损害公共利益，也不能用于亵渎上帝；因此，上帝和政府对他的统治权进行了一定的限制。而且，因为国王成为国王后并没有停止成为一个理性的生物，他必须受到法律的约束，所以他的意愿和欲望不能成为他权力和统治的准则，而是法律和理性必须对他进行调节。 现在，如果上帝赋予国王对人类作为理性生物的统治权，那么国王的权力和统治，被皇室主义者认为是超越法律的，应该成为理性人的准则，这将使国王统治下的人们不比野兽更好，因为他们行使理性行为不是因为善良和正直，而是因为他们的君主命令他们这样做；如果不能这样说，那么在政治行为中，没有人可以处于国王的支配之下，就像奴隶在行动中处于主人的统治之下一样。

Obj. 1.—The Prelate objecteth out of Spalato, Arnisæus, and Hugo Grotius, (for in his book there is not one line which is his own, except his railings;) "All government and superiority in rulers is not primely and only for the subjects' good; for some are by God and nature appointed for the mutual and inseparable good of the superior and inferior, as in the government of husband and wife, or father and son; and in herili dominio, in the government of a lord and his servant, the good and benefit of the servant is but secondary and consecutively intended, it is not the principal end, but the external and adventitious, as the gain that cometh to a physician is not the proper and internal end of his art, but followeth only from his practice of medicine.
目标 1.——主教从斯帕拉托、阿尼塞乌斯和雨果·格罗提乌斯（因为在他的书中没有一行是他自己的，除了他的辱骂）中提出异议：“所有统治者的政府和优越性并不是仅仅为了被统治者的利益；因为有些人是由上帝和自然指定的，为了上下级的共同和不可分割的利益，比如在丈夫和妻子、父亲和儿子的治理中；在主仆关系的治理中，仆人的利益只是次要和连带的，它不是主要目的，而是外在和附带的，就像医生的收益并不是他的艺术的真正和内在的目的，而只是从他的医学实践中产生的。

Ans. 1.—The Prelate's logic tendeth to this; some government tendeth to the mutual good of the superior and inferior, but royal government is some government, therefore, nothing followeth from a major proposition, Ex particulari affirmante, in prima figura; or of two particular propositions. 2. If it be thus formed, every marital government, and every government of the lord and servant is for the mutual good of the superior and inferior; but royal government is such, therefore the assumption is false, and cannot be proved, as I shall anon clear.
答案 1：大主教的逻辑趋向于这一点；某些政府趋向于上下级的共同利益，但皇家政府是某些政府，因此，从一个主要命题中无法得出任何结论，即在第一形式中，或者从两个特定命题中。2. 如果是这样构建的，每个婚姻政府和每个主仆政府都是为了上下级的共同利益；但皇家政府是这样的，因此假设是错误的，无法证明，我将很快澄清。

Obj. 2.—Solomon disposed of Cabul and gave it to Hiram, therefore a conquered kingdom is for the good of the conqueror especially.
所以，所罗门处理了迦步勒，并将其交给希兰，因此征服的王国对征服者尤为有利。

Ans.—Solomon's special giving away some titles to the king of Tyre, being a special act of a prophet as well as a king, cannot warrant the king of England to sell England to a foreign prince, because William made England his own by conquest, which also is a most false supposition; and this he stole from Hugo Grotius, who condemneth selling of kingdoms.
答案：所罗门特别赠予推罗国王一些头衔，作为一位先知和国王的特殊行为，不能使英国国王将英国卖给外国王子，因为威廉通过征服使英国成为他自己的，这也是一个最错误的假设；而这个观点是从雨果·格罗提乌斯那里偷来的，他谴责出售王国。

Obj. 3.—A man may render himself totally under the power of a master without any conditions; and why may not the body of a people do the like? even to have peace and safety, surrender themselves fully to the power of a king? A lord of great manors may admit no man to live in his lands but upon a condition of a full surrender of him and his posterity to that lord. Tacitus sheweth us it was so anciently amongst the Germans: those engaged in the campaigns surrendered themselves fully to the Romans.
一个人可以毫无条件地使自己完全处于一个主人的控制之下，为什么一个民族的身体不能做同样的事情呢？为了获得和平与安全，他们可以完全将自己投降给一个国王的权力之下。一个拥有大片土地的领主可能不会允许任何人在他的土地上居住，除非他和他的后代完全向那个领主投降。塔西佗在《日耳曼人志》中告诉我们，这在德国人中古已有之：那些参加战役的人完全向罗马人投降。

Ans.—What compelled people may do to redeem their lives, with loss of liberty, is nothing to the point; such a violent conqueror who will be a father and a husband to a people, against their will, is not their lawful king; and that they may sell the liberty of their posterity, not yet born, is utterly denied as unlawful; yea, a violentated father to me is a father, and not a father, and the posterity may vindicate their own liberty given away unjustly, before they were born, Qua omne regnum vi partum potest vi dissolvi.
答案：人们为了赎回自己的生命而做出的牺牲自由的行为，并不重要；一个强制性的征服者，他将成为一个人民的父亲和丈夫，违背他们的意愿，不是他们合法的国王；而且他们可能出卖尚未出生的后代的自由，这是完全被否定为非法的；是的，对我来说，一个被迫的父亲是父亲，但也不是父亲，后代可以在他们出生之前为他们不公正地放弃的自由辩护，因为任何王国都可以通过暴力而建立，也可以通过暴力而解散。

Obj. 4.—But (saith Dr Ferne) these which are ours, and given away to another, in which there redoundeth to God by donation a special interest, as in things devoted to holy uses, though after they be abused, yet we cannot recal them; therefore, if the people be once forced to give away their liberty, they cannot recal it, far less if they willingly resign it to their prince.
目标 4. - 但是（费恩博士说），这些属于我们的东西，如果被赠予他人，其中包含了上帝通过捐赠获得的特殊利益，就像被奉献给圣事的东西一样，即使它们被滥用了，我们也无法收回它们；因此，如果人民一旦被迫放弃他们的自由，他们就无法收回它，更不用说如果他们自愿将它们放弃给他们的君主了。

Ans.—1. This is not true, when the power is given for the conservation of the kingdom, and is abused for the destruction thereof; for a power to destruction was never given, nor can it, by rational nature, be given. Mortifications given to religious uses by a positive law, may be recalled by a more divine and stronger law of nature, such as this,—"I will have mercy and not sacrifice." Suppose David, of his own proper heritage, had given the shew-bread to the priests; yet, when David and his men are famishing, he may take it back from them against their will. Suppose Christ had bought the ears of corn, and dedicated them to the altar, yet might he and his disciples eat them in their hunger. The vessels of silver, dedicated to the church, may be taken and bestowed on wounded soldiers. 2. A people free may not, and ought not, totally surrender their liberty to a prince, confiding on his goodness. (1.) Because liberty is a condition of nature that all men are born with, and they are not to give it away—no, not to a king, except in part and for the better, that they may have peace and justice for it, which is better for them, hic et nunc. (2.) If a people, trusting in the goodness of their prince, enslave themselves to him, and he shall after turn tyrant, a rash and temerarious surrender obligeth not, Et ignorantia facit factum quasi involuntarium. Ignorance maketh the fact some way involuntary; for if the people had believed that a meek king would have turned a roaring lion, they should not have resigned their liberty into his hand; and, therefore, the surrender was tacitly conditional to the king as meek, or whom they believed to be meek, and not to a tyrannous lord; and, therefore, when the contract is made for the utility of the one party, the law saith, their place is for after wits, that men may change their mind and resume their liberty, though, if they had given away their liberty for money, they cannot recal it; and if violence made the surrender of liberty, here is slavery; and slaves taken in war, so soon as they can escape and return to their own, they are free. (D. Sect. item. ea justit. de rerum divin. I. nihil. F. de capt. l. 3.) So the learned Ferdin. Vasquez (illust. l. 2. c. 82. n. 15.) saith, "The bird that was taken, and hath escaped, is free." Nature in a forced people, so soon as they can escape from a violent conqueror, maketh them a free people; and si solo tempore (saith Ferd. Vasquez, l. 2. c. 82, n. 6,) justificatur subjectio, solo tempore facilius justificabitur liberatio.
答案：1. 当权力被赋予以保护王国，并被滥用以摧毁王国时，这是不真实的；因为摧毁的权力从未被赋予，也不能通过理性的本性被赋予。通过正面法律给予宗教用途的苦修可以被更神圣和更强大的自然法律所撤销，比如这样的法律：“我要怜悯，不要祭祀。”假设大卫凭自己的产业将陈设饼给了祭司们；然而，当大卫和他的人们挨饿时，他可以违背他们的意愿从他们那里拿回来。假设基督买了谷物，并将其奉献给祭坛，然而他和他的门徒可以在饥饿时吃掉它们。奉献给教堂的银器可以被拿走并赠给受伤的士兵。2. 一个自由的人民不可以，也不应该完全将他们的自由交给一个依赖他的善良的王子。（1.）因为自由是人类与生俱来的自然条件，他们不应该放弃它，即使是给国王，除非在某种程度上并且为了更好的目的，以便他们可以为此获得和平和正义，这对他们来说更好，此时此地。（2.如果一个人民相信他们的君主的善良，自愿将自己奴役于他，而他后来变成了暴君，轻率和鲁莽的投降并不具有约束力，因为无知使行为变得有些无意识；因为如果人民相信温和的国王会变成咆哮的狮子，他们就不会把自由交给他；因此，这种投降是暗含条件的，条件是国王要温和，或者他们认为他是温和的，而不是暴君；因此，当合同是为了一方的利益而订立时，法律说，他们的位置是为了事后的智慧，人们可以改变主意并恢复自由，尽管如果他们出售自由以换取金钱，他们不能收回；如果暴力导致了自由的投降，那就是奴隶制；而在战争中被俘的奴隶，只要他们能逃脱并返回自己的国家，他们就是自由的。（D. Sect. item. ea justit. de rerum divin. I. nihil. F. de capt. l. 3.）因此，博学的费尔迪南德·瓦斯克斯（illust. l. 2. c. 82. n. 15.）说：“被捕获并逃脱的鸟是自由的。自然使被迫的人民，一旦能够逃脱暴力征服者的控制，成为自由的人民；正如费尔南多·瓦斯克斯所说（《法律学》第 2 卷第 82 章第 6 条），只有时间可以证明服从的正当性，同样只有时间可以更容易地证明解放的正当性。

Assert. 2.—All the goods of the subjects belongeth not to the king. I presuppose that the division of goods doth not necessarily flow from the law of nature, for God made man, before the fall, lord of the creatures indefinitely; but what goods be Peter's, and not Paul's, we know not. But supposing man's sin, though the light of the sun and air be common to all, and religious places be proper to none, yet it is morally impossible that there should not be a distinction of meum et tuum, mine and thine; and the decalogue forbidding theft, and coveting the wife of another man, (yet is she the wife of Peter, not of Thomas, by free election, not by an act of nature's law,) doth evidence to us, that the division of things is so far forth (men now being in the state of sin) of the law of nature, that it hath evident ground in the law of nations; and thus far natural, that the heat that I have from my own coat and cloak, and the nourishment from my own meat, are physically incommunicable to any. But I hasten to prove the proposition:—If, 1. I have leave to permit that, in time of necessity, all things are common by God's law—a man travelling might eat grapes in his neighbour's vineyard, though he was not licensed to carry any way. I doubt if David, wanting money, was necessitated to pay money for the shew-bread, or for Goliath's sword, supposing these to be the very goods of private men, and ordinarily to be bought and sold. Nature's law in extremity, for self-preservation, hath rather a prerogative royal above all laws of nations and all civil laws, than any mortal king; and, therefore, by the civil law, all are the king's, in case of extreme necessity. In this meaning, any one man is obliged to give all he hath for the good of the commonwealth, and so far the good of the king, in as far as he is head and father of the commonwealth.1 2. All things are the king's, in regard of his public power to defend all men and their goods from unjust violence. 3. All are the king's, in regard of his act of conservation of goods, for the use of the just owner. 4. All are the king's in regard of a legal limitation, in case of a damage offered to the commonwealth. Justice requireth confiscation of goods for a fault; but confiscated goods are to help the interested commonwealth, and the king, not as a man (to bestow them on his children) but as a King. To this we may refer these called bona caduca et inventa, things lost by shipwreck or any other providence, Ulpian, tit. 19, t. c. de bonis vacantibus. C. de Thesauro.
断言 2：所有主体的财产并不属于国王。我假设财产的分配并不必然源于自然法，因为上帝在人类堕落之前，使人类成为无限制的创造物的主人；但我们不知道哪些财产属于彼得，哪些属于保罗。但是，假设人类的罪恶，尽管太阳和空气的光明是共同的，宗教场所是无人所有的，但在道义上不可能没有我与你的区别，我的和你的区别；十诫禁止偷窃和贪恋他人的妻子（然而她是彼得的妻子，不是托马斯的，是自由选择的，而不是自然法的行为），这向我们证明，物质的分配在一定程度上（现在人类处于罪恶状态）是属于自然法的，它在国际法中有明显的依据；在这个意义上是自然的，我从自己的外套和披风中得到的热量，以及从自己的食物中得到的营养，是无法与他人分享的。但我急于证明这个命题：如果，1. 在必要的时候，我有权力允许一切事物根据上帝的法律成为共有物品 - 一个旅行的人可以在邻居的葡萄园里吃葡萄，即使他没有被许可携带。我怀疑如果大卫缺钱，他是否被迫为陈设的面包或歌利亚的剑付钱，假设这些是私人的财物，通常可以买卖。在极端情况下，为了自我保护，自然法比所有国家法律和民事法律都有更高的王权特权，超过任何凡人国王；因此，根据民事法，所有人在极端情况下都属于国王。在这个意义上，任何一个人都有义务为了国家的利益而奉献他所拥有的一切，因此也是为了国王的利益，因为他是国家的头和父亲。2. 所有事物都属于国王，因为他有公共权力来保护所有人及其财产免受不公正的暴力侵害。3. 所有事物都属于国王，因为他有保护财产的行为，为了正当所有者的使用。4. 在对国家造成损害的情况下，所有事物都属于国王，根据法律的限制。 正义要求对过错进行财产没收；但是被没收的财产是为了帮助有利益的共和国和国王，而不是作为一个人（将它们赠予他的子女），而是作为一个国王。对于这一点，我们可以参考所谓的"bona caduca et inventa"，即因船只失事或其他神意而丢失的财物，乌尔皮安，第 19 章，关于无主财产。C. de Thesauro.

Arg. 1.—And the reasons why private men are just lords and proprietors of their own goods, are,—1. Because, by order of nature, division of goods cometh nearer to nature's law and necessity than any king or magistrate in the world; and because it is agreeable to nature that every man be warmed by his own fleece—nourished by his own meat, therefore, to conserve every man's goods to the Just owner, and to preserve a community from the violence of rapine and theft, a magistrate and king was devised. So it is clear, men are just owners of their own goods, by all good order, both of nature and time, before there be any such thing as a king or magistrate. Now, if it be good that every man enjoy his own goods, as just proprietor thereof, for his own use, before there be a king, who can be proprietor of his goods? And a king being given of God for a blessing, not for any man's hurt and loss, the king cometh in to preserve a man's goods, but not to be lord and owner thereof himself, nor to take from any man God's right to his own goods.
第一点——私人拥有者是他们自己财产的正当主人的原因是：1.因为按照自然的秩序，财产的分配比世界上任何国王或官员更接近自然的法则和必要性；并且因为每个人靠自己的羊毛取暖，靠自己的食物养活，所以为了保护每个人的财产归正当所有者所有，并防止社会遭受掠夺和盗窃的暴力，才有了官员和国王的设立。因此，很明显，在有国王或官员之前，按照自然和时间的良好秩序，人们就是自己财产的正当所有者。现在，如果每个人在国王出现之前享有自己的财产作为正当所有者的权利是好的，那么国王又如何成为他的财产的所有者呢？而且，国王是上帝赐予的祝福，不是为了伤害和损失任何人，国王的职责是保护人们的财产，而不是成为财产的主人和所有者，也不是剥夺任何人对自己财产的上帝赋予的权利。

Arg. 2.—When God created man at the beginning, he made all the creatures for man, and made them by the law of nature the proper possession of man, but then there was not any king formally as king; for certainly Adam was a father before he was a king, and no man being either born or created a king over another man, no more than the first lion and the first eagle that God created, were, by the birthright and first start of creation, by nature the king of all lions and all eagles to be after created,—no man can, by nature's law, be the owner of all goods of particular men. And because the law of nations, founded upon the law of nature, hath brought in meum et tuum, mine and thine, as proper to every particular man, and the introduction of kings cannot overturn nature's foundation; neither civility nor grace destroyeth but perfecteth nature; and if a man be not born a king, because he is a man, he cannot be born the possessor of my goods.
当上帝在最初创造人类时，他为人类创造了所有生物，并按照自然法则使它们成为人类的合法财产，但那时还没有正式的国王；因为亚当在成为国王之前就已经是一个父亲，就像第一只狮子和第一只老鹰一样，上帝创造它们时，并没有因为出生权和创造的首次开始，而使它们成为所有狮子和老鹰的自然之王，根据自然法则，没有人可以成为所有个人财产的所有者。因为国际法是建立在自然法之上的，引入了“我的”和“你的”作为每个个人的财产，国王的引入不能推翻自然的基础；文明和优雅并没有破坏自然，而是完善了自然；如果一个人不是因为他是一个人而成为国王，那么他也不能成为我的财产的所有者。

Arg. 3.—What is a character and note of a tyrant, and an oppressing king as a tyrant, is not the just due of a king as a king; but to take the proper goods of subjects, and use them as his own, is a proper character and note of a tyrant and oppressor; therefore the proposition is evident: A king and a tyrant are, by way of contradiction, contrary one to another. The assumption is proved thus:—Ezek. 45:9, 10, "Thus saith the Lord, Let it suffice you, O princes of Israel: remove violence and spoil, and execute judgment and justice; take away your exactions from my people, saith the Lord. Ye shall have just balances, and a just ephah, and a just bath." If all be the king's, he is not capable of extortion and rapine. God complaineth of the violence of kings, Micah 3:1, 3, "Is it not for you to know judgment? who also eat the flesh of my people, and flay their skins from off them; and they break their bones and chop them in pieces, as for the pot, and as flesh within the chaldron." (Isa. 3:14; Zeph. 3:3) Was it not an act of tyranny in king Achab to take the vineyard of Naboth? and in king Saul (1 Sam. 8:14) to take the people of God's "fields and vineyards, and oliveyards, and give them to his servants?" Was it a just fault that Hybreas objected to Antonius, exacting two tributes in one year, that he said, "If thou must have two tributes in one year, then make for us two summers and two harvests in one year?" This cannot be just. If all be the king's, the king taketh but his own.
阿格. 3. 暴君和压迫国王的特征和特点，并不是国王作为国王的正当权利；但是将臣民的财产当作自己的财产并使用，是暴君和压迫者的特征和特点；因此，命题是明显的：国王和暴君在对立的情况下是相反的。假设可以这样证明：以西结书 45:9, 10：“主耶和华如此说：以色列的首领啊，你们已经够了强暴和抢夺，你们施行审判和公义，从我民中夺去勒索，这是主耶和华说的。你们要用公道的天平、公道的伊法、公道的罢特。”如果一切都是国王的，他就不能进行敲诈和掠夺。神抱怨国王的暴力，弥迦书 3:1, 3：“你们这些施行恶事、以权势行强暴的，岂不当知道公平吗？他们吞吃我民的肉，剥皮折骨，打碎骨头，分成块子，如同要下锅，又如釜中的肉。”（以赛亚书 3:14；西番雅书 3:3）亚哈王夺取拿伯的葡萄园，难道不是暴政的行为吗？扫罗王也是如此（撒上）。 8:14）将上帝的“田地、葡萄园和橄榄园”夺给他的仆人，这是一个公正的过错吗？海布雷亚斯反对安东尼乌斯一年内征收两次贡税，他说：“如果你一年内必须征收两次贡税，那就让我们一年内有两个夏天和两个收获季节吧。”这是不公正的。如果一切都是国王的，国王只是拿回自己的东西而已。

Arg. 4.—Subjects under a monarch could not give alms, nor exercise works of charity; for charity must be my own, Isa. 58:7, "Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry," &c.; Eccles. 11:1, "Cast thy bread upon the waters;" and the law saith, "It is theft to give of another man's to the poor;" yea, the distinction of poor and rich should have no place under a monarchy, he only should be rich.
争论 4：君主统治下的臣民不能施舍，也不能从事慈善事业；因为慈善必须是我自己的，以赛亚书 58:7 说：“岂不是要将你的饼分给饥饿的人”等等；传道书 11:1 说：“把你的饼丢在水面上”；而法律说：“拿别人的给穷人是盗窃”；是的，在君主制下，贫富的区别不应存在，只有君主才应该富有。

Arg. 5.—When Paul commandeth us to pay tribute to princes (Rom. 13:6) because they are the ministers of God, he layeth this ground, that the king hath not all, but that the subjects are to give to him of their goods.
阿尔格。5. - 当保罗命令我们向君王纳税（罗马书 13:6），因为他们是上帝的仆人时，他提出了这个理由，即国王并不拥有一切，而是臣民应该将他们的财物给予他。

Arg. 6.—It is the king's place, by justice, to preserve every man in his own right, and under his own fig-tree; therefore, it is not the king's house.
阿尔格六：根据正义，国王的职责是保护每个人的权利，让他们各自拥有自己的权力，因此，这不是国王的房子。

Arg. 7.—Even Pharaoh could not make all the victual of the land his own, while he had bought it with money; and every thing is presumed to be free (allodialis, free land,) except the king prove that it is bought or purchased. L. actius, C. de servit. et aqua. et Joan. And. m. C. F. de ind. et hosti. in C. minus de jur.
阿尔格。7. - 即使法老用钱买下了土地，他也不能将土地上的所有食物都变成自己的；除非国王能证明它是购买的，否则一切都被假定为自由土地（所有权土地）。L. actius, C. de servit. et aqua. et Joan. And. m. C. F. de ind. et hosti. in C. minus de jur.

Arg. 8.—If the subjects had no propriety in their own goods, but all were the prince's due, then the subject should not be able to make any contract of buying and selling without the king, and every subject were in the case of a slave. Now the law saith, (L. 2. F. de Noxali. act. l. 2. F. ad legem aquil.) When he maketh any covenant, he is not obliged civilly to keep it, because the condition of a servant, he not being sui juris, is compared to the state of a beast, though he be obliged by a natural obligation, being a rational creature, in regard of the law of nature, L. naturaliter, L. si id quod, L. interdum, F. de cond. indebit. cum aliis. The subject could not, by Solomon, be forbidden to be surety for his friend, as king Solomon doth counsel, (Prov. 6:1–3;) he could not be condemned to bring on himself poverty by sluggishness, (as Prov. 6:6–10;) nor were he to honour the Lord with his riches, (as Prov. 3:9;) nor to keep his covenant though to his loss, (Psal. 25:14;) nor could he be merciful and lend, (Psal. 37:26;) nor had he power to borrow; nor could he be guilty in not paying all again. (Psal. 37:21.) For subjects, under a monarchy, can neither perform a duty, nor fail in a duty, in the matter of goods. If all be the king's, what power or dominion hath the subject in disposing of his prince's goods? See more in Petr. Rebuffus, tract. congruæ portionis, n. 225, p. 109, 110. Sed quoad dominium rerum, &c.
如果主权者拥有所有财产，而公民没有自己的财产所有权，那么公民将无法在没有国王的情况下进行任何买卖合同，每个公民都处于奴隶的境地。现在法律规定，当他订立任何契约时，他没有民事义务去遵守它，因为作为一个仆人，他不是自己的主人，他的状态被比作一个兽类，尽管他有一种自然义务，作为一个理性的生物，根据自然法律，他不能被所罗门禁止为他的朋友担保，正如所罗门王所建议的那样（箴言 6:1-3）；他不能因懒惰而使自己陷入贫困（如箴言 6:6-10）；他不能以自己的财富来尊敬上帝（如箴言 3:9）；他不能遵守他的契约，即使是为了自己的损失（诗篇 25:14）；他不能慈悲地借贷（诗篇 37:26）；他没有借贷的权力；他不能因未偿还而有罪（诗篇 37:21）。对于主题来说，在君主制下，无论是履行职责还是失职，都与财产有关。如果一切都属于国王，主题在处理国王的财产时有什么权力或统治力？详见彼得·雷布福斯的《合适份额论文》，第 225 号，第 109、110 页。但就财产所有权而言，等等。

QUESTION XVII
问题十七

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCE HAVE PROPERLY A FIDUCIARY AND MINISTERIAL POWER OF A TUTOR, HUSBAND, PATRON, MINISTER, HEAD, FATHER OF A FAMILY, NOT OF A LORD OR DOMINATOR
无论王子是否拥有作为导师、丈夫、赞助人、部长、领导、家长的适当信托和部长权力，而不是作为主人或统治者

That the power of the king is fiduciary, that is, given to him immediately by God in trust, royalists deny not; but we hold that the trust is put upon the king by the people. We deny that the People give themselves to the king as a gift, for what is freely given cannot be taken again; but they gave themselves to the king as a pawn, and if the pawn be abused, or not used in that manner as it was conditioned to be used, the party in whose hand the pawn is intrusted, faileth in his trust.
国王的权力是信托的，即由上帝直接赋予他的，这一点君主主义者不否认；但我们认为，这种信托是人民赋予国王的。我们否认人民将自己作为礼物送给国王，因为自由给予的东西不能再被夺走；但他们将自己作为抵押品交给了国王，如果这个抵押品被滥用或未按照约定的方式使用，托付抵押品的一方就失去了信任。

Assert. 1.—The king is more properly a tutor than a father. 1. Indigency is the original of tutors—the parents die; what then shall become of the orphan and his inheritance? He cannot guide it himself, therefore nature devised a tutor to supply the place of a father, and to govern the tutor; but, with this consideration, the father is lord of the inheritance, and if he be distressed, may sell it, that it shall never come to the son, and the father, for the bad deserving of his son, may disinherit him; but the tutor, being but a borrowed father, cannot sell the inheritance of the pupil, nor can he, for the pupil's bad deserving, by any dominion of justice over the pupil, take away the inheritance from him, and give it to his own son. So a community of itself, because of sin, is a naked society that can but destroy itself, and every one eat the flesh of his brother; therefore God hath appointed a king or governor, who shall take care of that community, rule them in peace, and save all from reciprocation of mutual acts of violence, yet so as, because a trust is put on the ruler of a community which is not his heritage, he cannot dispose of it as he pleaseth, because he is not the proper owner of the inheritance. 2. The pupil, when he cometh to age, may call his tutor to an account for his administration. I do not acknowledge that as a truth, which Arnisæus saith, (de authoritate prin. c. 3, n. 5,) "The commonwealth is always minor and under tutory, because it alway hath need of a curator and governor, and can never put away its governor; but the pupil may grow to age and wisdom, so as he may be without all tutors and can guide himself, and so may call in question on his tutor; and the pupil cannot be his judge, but must stand to the sentence of a superior judge, and so the people cannot judge or punish their prince—God must be judge betwixt them both."
断言。1.国王更适合作为导师而不是父亲。1.贫困是导师的起源——父母去世了，那么孤儿和他的遗产将会怎样？他自己无法管理，因此自然界设计了一个导师来代替父亲的角色，并管理导师；但是，父亲是遗产的主人，如果他陷入困境，可以出售遗产，使其永远不会传给儿子，而且父亲可以因为儿子的不良行为而剥夺他的继承权；但是，导师只是一个借来的父亲，不能出售学生的继承权，也不能因为学生的不良行为而通过对学生的正当统治剥夺他的继承权，并将其给予自己的儿子。 因为罪恶的缘故，一个社区本身就是一个裸露的社会，只能自我毁灭，每个人都吃自己兄弟的肉；因此，上帝指派了一个国王或统治者，他将照顾这个社区，以和平统治他们，并拯救所有人免受相互暴力的报复，但是因为统治者对一个社区的信任并不是他的继承权，所以他不能随心所欲地处理它，因为他不是这个继承权的真正所有者。2.当学生长大成人时，可以追究导师的管理责任。我不承认阿尼塞乌斯所说的那个真理（de authoritate prin. c. 3, n. 5），即“共和国始终是未成年人且受监护的，因为它始终需要监护人和统治者，并且永远不能摆脱统治者；但是学生可以长大成人和智慧，以至于他可以没有任何导师并自己引导自己，因此可以对他的导师提出质疑；学生不能成为他的法官，而必须接受上级法官的判决，因此人民不能判断或惩罚他们的君主-上帝必须在他们之间做出判断。”"

But this is begging the question; every comparison halteth. There is no community but is major in this, that it can appoint its own tutors; and though it cannot be without all rulers, yet it may well be without this or that prince and ruler, and, therefore, may resume its power, which it gave conditionally to the ruler for its own safety and good; and in so far as this condition is violated, and power turned to the destruction of the commonwealth, it is to be esteemed as not given; and though the people be not a politic judge in their own cause, yet in case of manifest oppression, nature can teach them to oppose defensive violence against offensive. A community in its politic body is also above any ruler, and may judge what is manifestly destructive to itself.
但这是在回避问题；每个比较都停滞不前。没有一个社群不重要的，它可以任命自己的导师；虽然它不能没有所有的统治者，但它很可能没有这个或那个王子和统治者，因此，它可以恢复它给予统治者的权力，条件是为了自己的安全和利益；只要这个条件被违反，权力被转化为对公共利益的破坏，它就应该被视为没有给予；虽然人民在自己的事务中不是一个政治上的裁判，但在明显的压迫情况下，自然可以教导他们对抗攻击性的防御暴力。一个社群在其政治实体中也高于任何统治者，可以判断什么是明显对自身有害的。

Obj.—The pupil hath not power to appoint his own tutor, nor doth he give power to him; so neither doth the people give it to the king.
目前，学生没有权力选择自己的导师，也没有授权给他；同样，人民也没有将权力授予国王。

Ans.—The pupil hath not indeed a formal power to make a tutor, but he hath virtually a legal power in his father, who appointeth a tutor for his son; and the people hath virtually all royal power in them, as in a sort of immortal and eternal fountain, and may create to themselves many kings.
答：学生确实没有正式权力选择导师，但他在父亲身上具有实质上的法定权力，父亲为儿子指定导师；人民在自己身上具有所有皇权的实质性权力，就像一种不朽和永恒的源泉，可以创造出许多国王。

Assert. 2.—The king's power is not properly and univocally a marital and husbandly power, but only analogically. 1. The wife by nature is the weaker vessel, and inferior to the man, but the kingdom, as shall be demonstrated, is superior to the king. 2. The wife is given as an help to the man, but by the contrary, the father here is given as an help and father to the commonwealth, which is presumed to be the wife. 3. Marital and husbandly power is natural, though it be not natural but from free election that Peter is Ana's husband, and should have been, though man had never sinned; but royal power is a politic constitution, and the world might have subsisted though aristocracy or democracy had been the only and perpetual governments. So let the Prelate glory in his borrowed logic; he had it from Barclay. "It is not in the power of the wife to repudiate her husband, though never so wicked. She is tyed to him for ever, and may not give to him a bill of divorcement, as by law the husband might give to her. If therefore the people swear loyalty to him, they keep it, though to their hurt." Psal. 15—Ans. There is nothing here said, except Barclay and the Plagiary prove that the king's power is properly a husband's power, which they cannot prove but from a simile that crooketh. But a king, elected upon conditions, that if he sell his people he shall lose his crown, is as essentially a king as Adam was Eve's husband, and yet, by grant of parties, the people may never divorce from such a king, and dethrone him, if he sell his people; but a wife may divorce from her husband, as the argument saith. And this poor argument the Prelate stole from Dr Ferne (part 2, sect. 3, p. 10, 11). The keeping of covenant, though to our hurt, is a penal hurt, and loss of goods, not a moral hurt, and loss of religion.
断言 2：国王的权力并非婚姻和丈夫的权力，而只是类比的。1. 妻子天生是弱者，低于男人，但王国，如将被证明，却高于国王。2. 妻子被赋予作为男人的帮助，但相反，这里的父亲被赋予作为国家的帮助和父亲的角色，而国家被假定为妻子。3. 婚姻和丈夫的权力是自然的，尽管彼得成为安娜的丈夫是出于自由选择，即使人类从未犯罪；但王权是一种政治体制，世界可以继续存在，即使贵族制或民主制是唯一和永久的政府形式。因此，让主教以他借来的逻辑而自豪吧；他从巴克莱那里得到了它。"妻子没有权力抛弃她的丈夫，即使他再邪恶。她永远与他绑定，不能给他离婚状，就像根据法律，丈夫可以给她一样。因此，如果人民对他宣誓效忠，即使对他们有害，他们也会遵守。"诗篇 15—答： 除了巴克利和抄袭者证明国王的权力实际上是丈夫的权力之外，这里没有说什么。他们只能通过一个弯曲的比喻来证明这一点。但是，一个在条件下当选的国王，如果他出卖自己的人民，就会失去王位，与亚当是夏娃的丈夫一样，本质上仍然是国王。然而，根据当事人的授权，人民可能永远不能与这样的国王离婚并废黜他，但是妻子可以离开丈夫，正如这个论点所说。这个可怜的论点是主教从费恩博士那里偷来的（第二部分，第 3 节，第 10、11 页）。遵守契约，即使对我们有害，也是一种惩罚性的伤害和财产损失，而不是道德上的伤害和宗教上的损失。

Assert. 3.—The king is more properly a sort of patron, to defend the people, (and therefore hath no power given either by God or man to hurt the people,) and a minister, or public and honourable servant, (Rom. 13:4,) for he is the minister of God to thee for good. 1. He is the commonwealth's servant objectively, because all the king's service, as he is king, is for the good, safety, peace and salvation of the people, and in this he is a servant. 2. He is the servant of the people representatively, in that the people hath impawned in his hand all their power to do royal service.
断言。第三条——国王更恰当地说是一种保护人民的赞助人（因此，他既没有上帝也没有人给予他伤害人民的权力），以及一位公共和尊贵的仆人（罗马书 13:4），因为他是上帝的仆人，为了你的利益。1.他客观上是国家的仆人，因为作为国王，他所有的服务都是为了人民的利益、安全、和平和救赎，他在这方面是一位仆人。2.他是人民的代表性仆人，因为人民已经将他们所有的权力抵押在他手中，以便进行皇家服务。

Obj. 1.—He is the servant of God, therefore he is not the people's servant, but their sovereign lord.
他是上帝的仆人，因此他不是人民的仆人，而是他们的主宰。

Ans.—It followeth not; because all the services the king, as king, performeth to God, are acts of royalty, and acts of royal service, as terminated on the people, or acts of their sovereign lord; and this proveth, that to be their sovereign is to be their servant and watchman.
答：这并不是因为国王作为国王向上帝献上的所有服务都是王权的行为，是王权服务的行为，作为对人民的终结，或者是他们的君主的行为；这证明了，成为他们的君主就是成为他们的仆人和守望者。

Obj. 2.—God maketh a king only, and the kingly power is in him only, not in the people.
只有上帝才能创造一个国王，国王的权力只存在于他自己，而不在人民手中。

Ans. 1.—The royal power is only from God immediately,—immediatione simplicis constitutionis, et solum a Deo solitudine primæ causæ,—by the immediation of simple constitution, none but God appointed there should be kings. But, 2. Royal power is not in God, nor only from God, immediatione applicationis regiæ dignitatis ad personam, nec a Deo solum, solitudine causæ applicantis dignitatem, huic, non illi, in respect of the applying of royal dignity to this Person, not to that.
答案 1.——皇权仅来自上帝，通过简单的构成方式，只有上帝指定应该有国王。但是，2. 皇权不在上帝，也不仅仅来自上帝，而是通过将皇位尊严应用于这个人，而不是那个人。

Obj. 3.—Though royal power were given to the people, it is not given to the people as if it were the royal power of the people, and not the royal power of God, neither is it any otherwise bestowed on the people but as on a beam, a channel, an instrument by which it is derived to others, and so the king is not the minister or servant of the people.
虽然皇权可能被赋予人民，但它并不是赋予人民的人民皇权，也不是以其他方式赋予人民，而是作为一种光束、渠道、工具传递给其他人的方式，因此国王不是人民的部长或仆人。

Ans.—It is not in the people as in the principal cause; sure all royal power that way is only in God; but it is in the people as in the instrument, and when the people maketh David their king at Hebron, in that same very act, God, by the people using their free suffrages and consent, maketh David king at Hebron; so God only giveth rain, and none of the vanities and supposed gods of the Gentiles can give rain, (Jer. 14:22,) and yet the clouds also give rain, as nature, as an organ and vessel out of which God poureth down rain upon the dry earth; (Amos 9:6;) and every instrument under God that is properly an instrument, is a sort of vicarious cause in God's room, and so the people as in God's room applieth royal power to David, not to any of Saul's sons, and appointeth David to be their royal servant to govern, and in that to serve God, and to do that which a community now in the state of sin cannot formally do themselves; and so I see not how it is a service to the people, not only objectively, because the king's royal service tendeth to the good, and peace, and safety of the people, but also subjectively, in regard he hath his power and royal authority which he exerciseth as king from the people under God, as God's instruments; and, therefore, the king and parliament give out laws and statutes in the name of the whole people of the land; and they are but flatterers, and belie the Holy Ghost, who teach that the people do not make the king; for Israel made soul king at Mizpeh, and Israel made David king at Hebron.
答案：这不是因为人民是主要原因；当然，所有的王权只属于上帝；但是人民作为工具，他们在希伯伦选择大卫为国王的时候，上帝通过人民的自由选举和同意，使大卫成为希伯伦的国王；同样，只有上帝能给予雨水，其他外邦人所崇拜的虚无和假神都不能给予雨水。（耶利米书） 14:22，然而云朵也会带来雨水，就像大自然一样，它是上帝将雨水倾泻到干燥的地球上的器官和容器；（阿摩司书 9:6）而在上帝的位置上，每一个合适的工具都是一种代理原因，所以人民将皇权授予大卫，而不是扫罗的儿子，并任命大卫作为他们的皇家仆人来统治，并在此过程中侍奉上帝，并做那些在罪恶状态下的社群无法正式完成的事情；因此，我不明白这是如何对人民有所服务的，不仅客观上，因为国王的皇家服务有益于人民的福祉、和平和安全，而且主观上，因为他拥有自己的权力和皇家权威，他作为国王在上帝的工具下行使；因此，国王和议会以整个国家人民的名义颁布法律和法规；那些教导人民不是选择国王的人只是在奉承，背离了圣灵的真理；因为以色列在米斯巴立扫罗为王，以色列在希伯仑立大卫为王。

Obj. 4.—Israel made David king, that is, Israel designed David's person to be king, and Israel consented to God's act of making David king, but they did not make David king.
以色列立大卫为王，即以色列设计大卫成为王的人选，并同意上帝立大卫为王的行为，但他们并没有亲自立大卫为王。

Ans.—I say not that Israel made the royal dignity of kings: God (Deut. 17) instituted that himself; but the royalist must give us an act of God going before an act of the people's making David king at Hebron, by which David of no king is made formally a king; and then another act of the people, approving only and consenting to that act of God, whereby David is made formally of no king to be a king. This royalists shall never instruct, for there be only two acts of God here; 1. God's act of anointing David by the hand of Samuel; and 2. God's act of making David king at Hebron; and a third they shall never give. But the former is not that by which David was essentially and formally changed from the state of a private subject and no king, into the state of a public judge and supreme lord and king; for (as I have proved) after this act of anointing of David king, he was designed only and set apart to be in the Lord's fit time; and after this anointing, he was no more formally a king than Doeg or Nabal were kings, but a subject who called Saul the Lord's anointed and king, and obeyed him as another subject doth his king; but it is certain God by no other act made David king at Hebron, than by Israel's act of free electing him to be king and leader of the Lord's people, as God by no other act sendeth down rain on the earth, but by his melting the clouds, and causing rain to fall on the earth; and therefore to say Israel made David king at Hebron, that is, Israel approved only and consented to a prior act of God's making David king, is just to say Saul prophecied, that is, Saul consented to a prior act of the Spirit of God who prophecied; and Peter preached, (Acts 2) that is, Peter approved and consented to the Holy Ghost's act of preaching, which to say, is childish.
答案：我不是说以色列使国王的尊严成为了国王：上帝（申命记 17 章）是自己设立的；但是国王派必须给我们一个在人民在希伯伦立大卫为王之前，上帝的行动之前的上帝的行动，通过这个行动，大卫并没有正式成为国王；然后是人民的另一个行动，只批准和同意上帝的这个行动，通过这个行动，大卫正式成为了国王。国王派永远无法证明这一点，因为这里只有两个上帝的行动；1. 上帝通过撒母耳的手膏抹大卫；2. 上帝在希伯伦立大卫为王；他们永远无法给出第三个行动。 但前者并非大卫从一个私人主体和无王的状态本质上和正式地转变为一个公众法官和至高无上的主宰和国王的方式；因为（正如我已经证明的那样），在大卫受膏为王之后，他只是被指定并分别出来在上帝适当的时机里；在这次受膏之后，他并不比多以和拿八尔更正式地成为国王，而是一个称呼扫罗为上帝受膏者和国王的臣民，并像其他臣民一样服从他的国王；但可以肯定的是，上帝没有通过其他方式在希伯仑使大卫成为国王，而是通过以色列自由选举他成为上帝子民的国王和领袖的行为，就像上帝通过融化云彩并使雨水降落在地上来降雨一样；因此，说以色列在希伯仑使大卫成为国王，也就是说以色列只是批准并同意上帝之前使大卫成为国王的行为，这只是说扫罗预言了，也就是说扫罗同意了上帝的圣灵之前预言的行为；彼得传道（使徒行传 2 章）也是如此，也就是说彼得批准并同意了圣灵传道的行为，这样说是幼稚的。

Assert. 4.—The king is an head of the commonwealth only metaphorically, by a borrowed speech in a politic sense, because he ruleth, commandeth, directeth the whole politic body in all their operations and functions. But he is not univocally and essentially the head of the commonwealth. 1. The very same life in number that is in the head, is in the members; there be divers distinct souls and lives in the king and in his subjects. 2. The head natural is not made an head by the free election and consent of arms, shoulders, legs, toes, fingers, &c. The king is made king only by the free election of his people. 3. The natural head, so long as the person liveth, is ever the head, and cannot cease to be a head while it is seated on the shoulders; the king, if he sell his people's persons and souls, may leave off to be a king and head. 4. The head and members live together and die together, the king and the people are not so; the king may die and the people live. 5. The natural head cannot destroy the members and preserve itself; but king Nero may waste and destroy his people. Dr Ferne, M. Symmons, the P. Prelate, when they draw arguments from the head, do but dream, as the members should not resist the head. Natural members should not or cannot resist the head, though the hand may pull a tooth out of the head, which is no small violence to the head; but the members of a politic body may resist the politic head. This or that king is not the adequate and total politic head of the commonwealth; and therefore though you cut off a politic head, there is nothing done against nature. If you cut off all kings of the royal line, and all governors aristocratical, both king and parliament, this were against nature; and a commonwealth which would cut off all governors and all heads, should go against nature and run to ruin quickly. I conceive a society of reasonable men cannot want governors. 6. The natural head communicateth life, sense, and motion to the members, and is the seat of external and internal senses; the king is not so.
断言 4：国王只是在政治意义上借用的比喻，象征着他统治、指挥和指导整个政治机构的所有运作和职能。但他并不是国家的头衔。1. 头部中存在的生命与成员中的生命是相同的；国王和他的臣民中有不同的灵魂和生命。2. 自然的头部不是通过武器、肩膀、腿、脚趾等的自由选举和同意而成为头部的。国王只是通过人民的自由选举成为国王。3. 自然的头部只要人还活着，就永远是头部，只要它坐在肩膀上，就不会停止成为头部；国王如果出卖人民的人身和灵魂，就可能停止成为国王和头部。4. 头部和成员一起生活，一起死去，国王和人民不是这样的；国王可以死去，人民可以活着。5. 自然的头部不能摧毁成员并保护自己；但尼禄国王可以浪费和摧毁他的人民。费恩博士，西蒙斯先生，P. 主教，当他们从头脑中得出论据时，只是在做梦，因为肢体不应该抵抗头部。自然的肢体不应该或不能抵抗头部，尽管手可以拔掉头部的牙齿，这对头部来说是一种不小的暴力；但是政治体的肢体可以抵抗政治头部。这个或那个国王并不是共和国的充分和完整的政治头部；因此，即使你砍掉一个政治头部，也没有违背自然。如果你砍掉所有皇室血统的国王和所有贵族的统治者，包括国王和议会，这就违背了自然；一个想要砍掉所有统治者和所有头部的共和国，将违背自然并迅速走向毁灭。我认为一个理智的社会不能没有统治者。自然的头部将生命、感觉和运动传递给肢体，并是外部和内部感觉的座位；国王并非如此。

Assert. 5.—Hence the king is not properly the head of a family, for, as Tholossa saith well, (de Rep. l. 5, c. 5,) Nature hath one intention in making the thumb, another intention in making the whole hand, another in forming the body; so there is one intention of the God of nature in governing of one man, another in governing a family, another in governing a city; nor is the thumb king of all the members; so domestic government is not monarchical properly. 1. The mother hath a parental power as the father hath, (Prov. 4:5; 10:3; 31:17,) so the fifth commandment saith, "Honour thy father and thy mother." 2. Domestic government is natural, monarchical politic. 3. Domestic is necessary, monarchical is not necessary; other government may be as well as it. 4. Domestic is universal, monarchical not so. 5. Domestic hath its rise from natural instinct without any farther instruction; a monarchical government is not but from election, choosing one government, not another. Hence that is a fiduciary power, or a power of trust, wherein the thing put in trust is not either his own proper heritage or gift, so as he may dispose of it as he pleaseth, as men dispose of their goods or heritage. But the king may not dispose of men as men, as he pleaseth; nor of laws as he pleaseth; nor of governing men, killing or keeping alive, punishing and rewarding, as he pleaseth. My life and religion, and so my soul, in some cases, are committed to the king as to a public watchman, even as the flock to the feeder, the city to the watchmen; and he may betray it to the enemy. Therefore, he hath the trust of life and religion, and hath both tables of the law in his custody, ex officio, to see that other men than himself keep the law. But the law is not the king's own, but given to him in trust. He who receiveth a kingdom conditionally, and may be dethroned if he sell it or put it away to any other, is a fiduciary patron, and hath it only in trust. So Hottoman, (quest. ill. 1.) Ferdinand. Vasquez, (illust. quest. I. 1, c. 4.) Althusius, (polit. c. 24, n. 35,) so saith the law of every factor or deputy, (l. 40, l. 63, procur. l. 16, C. dict. 1.) Antigonus dixit regnum esse nobilem servitutem. Tyberius Cæsar called the senate, dominum suum, his lord. (Suetonius in vita Tiberii, c. 29.)
断言。5. 因此，国王并不是一个家庭的合适领袖，正如托洛萨（Tholossa）所说得好（见《国家论》第 5 卷第 5 章），自然在创造拇指时有一个意图，在创造整个手时有另一个意图，在形成身体时有另一个意图；因此，自然之神在治理一个人时有一个意图，在治理一个家庭时有另一个意图，在治理一个城市时有另一个意图；拇指并不是所有成员的国王；因此，家庭政府并不是真正的君主制。1. 母亲和父亲一样有父母的权力（箴言 4:5；10:3；31:17）；因此，第五诫说：“要尊敬父亲和母亲。”2. 家庭政府是自然的、君主制的政治形式。3. 家庭是必要的，君主制并非必要；其他形式的政府同样可以存在。4. 家庭是普遍的，君主制则不是。5. 家庭的产生是出于自然的本能，不需要进一步的指导；君主制政府则不同，它是通过选举选择一种政府而不是另一种政府。因此，君主制是一种信托权力，或者说是一种受信托的权力，受信托的事物既不是他自己的财产，也不是他的礼物，因此他不能随心所欲地处理它，就像人们处理自己的财物或遗产一样。 但是国王不能随心所欲地支配人民，也不能随心所欲地制定法律，不能随心所欲地统治人民，杀人或保全人民，惩罚和奖励人民。我的生命、宗教和灵魂，在某些情况下，都委托给国王，就像羊群委托给饲养员，城市委托给守卫一样；而他可能会背叛它，交给敌人。因此，他拥有生命和宗教的信任，并且拥有法律的两个表格，作为职责，以确保除他自己以外的其他人遵守法律。但是法律不是国王自己的，而是受他委托的。那些有条件接受王国的人，如果他们出售或将其转让给其他人，可以被废黜，他们只是受托人，只是受托人。因此，Hottoman（问题三 1），Ferdinand. Vasquez（问题一 1，章 4），Althusius（政治章 24，编号 35），每个代理人或代表的法律都是如此（l.40，l.63，procur. l.16，C. dict. 1.）。安提戈努斯说王国是一种高贵的奴役。提比留斯·凯撒称参议院为他的主人。（斯威顿在提比留斯传记中，第 29 章）)

QUESTION XVIII
问题十八

WHAT IS THE LAW OF THE KING, AND HIS POWER?
国王的法律和权力是什么？

1 Sam. 8:11. "This will be the manner of the king who shall reign over you," &c.
撒母耳记上 8:11：“他必取你们的女儿为宫室的婢女、烧你们的田地、收割你们的庄稼、作他的臣仆。”

This place, (1 Sam. 8:11,) the law or manner of the king is alleged to prove both the absolute power of kings, and the unlawfulness of resistance; therefore I crave leave here to vindicate the place, and to make it evident to all that the place speaketh for no such matter. Grotius argueth thus: "that by this place, the people oppressed with injuries of a tyrannous king have nothing left them but prayers and cries to God; and therefore there is no ground for violent resisting." Barclay2 will have us to distinguish inter officium regis, et potestatem, between the king's office and the king's power; and he will have the Lord here speaking, not of the king's office, what he ought to do before God, but what power a king hath beside and above the power of judges, to tyrannise over the people, so as the people hath no power to resist it. He will have the office of the king spoken of Deut. 17, and the power of the king, 1 Sam. 8, and that power which the people was to obey and submit unto without resisting. But I answer, 1. It is a vain thing to distinguish betwixt the office and the power; for the power is either a power to rule according to God's law, as he is commanded, (Deut. 17) and this is the very office or official power which the King of kings hath given to all kings under him, and this is a power of the royal office of a king, to govern for the Lord his Maker; or this is a power to do ill and tyrannise over God's people; but this is accidental to a king and the character of a tyrant, and is not from God, and so the law of the king in this place must be the tyranny of the king, which is our very mind. 2. "Reges sine dominatione ne concipi quidem possunt;—judices dominationem in populum minime habebant." Hence it is clear that Barclay saith, that the judges of Israel and the kings are different in essence and nature; so that domination is so essential to a king, that you cannot conceive a king but he must have domination, whereas the judges of Israel had no domination over the people. Hence I argue, that whereby a king is essentially distinguished from a judge that must be from God; but by domination, which is a power to oppress the subject, a king is essentially distinguished from a judge of Israel; therefore, domination and a power to do acts of tyranny, as they are expressed, (ver. 11–13,) and to oppress a subject, is from God, and so must be a lawful power. But the conclusion is absurd; the assumption is the doctrine of Barclay. The major proposition I prove. 1. Because both the judge and the king was from God; for God gave Moses a lawful calling to be a judge, so did he to Eli and to Samuel, and hence (Deut. 17:15) the king is a lawful ordinance of God. If then the judge and the king be both lawful ordinances, and if they differ essentially, as Barclay saith, then that specific form which distinguished the one from the other, to wit, domination and a power to destroy the subject, must be from God; which is blasphemous: for God can give no moral power to do wickedly; for that is licence, and a power to sin against a law of God, which is absolutely inconsistent with the holiness of God; for so the Lord might deny himself, and dispense with sin. God avert such blasphemies! 2. Now if the kingly power be from God, that which essentially and specifically constituteth a king must be from God, as the office itself is from God. Barclay saith expressly that the kingly power is from God, and that same, which is the specific form that constituteth a king, must be that which essentially separateth the king from the judge, if they be essentially different, as Barclay dreameth. Hence have we this jus regis, this manner or law of the king to tyrannise and oppress, to be a power from God, and so a lawful power, by which you shall have this result of Barclay's interpretation,—that God made a tyrant as well as a king. 3. By this difference that Barclay putteth betwixt the king and the judge, the judge might be resisted; for he had not this power of domination that Saul hath, contrary to Rom. 13:2; Exod. 22:28; 20:12.
这个地方（撒母耳记上 8:11）被认为证明了国王的绝对权力和反抗的非法性；因此，我在这里要辩护这个地方，并让所有人明白这个地方并不支持这样的观点。格罗提乌斯这样论证：“这个地方表明，受到暴君压迫的人民除了向上帝祈祷和呼喊外别无他法；因此，没有理由进行暴力抵抗。”巴克利则要我们区分国王的职责和权力，他认为这里的上帝说的不是国王的职责，即他在上帝面前应该做什么，而是国王除了法官的权力之外，可以对人民进行暴政，以至于人民无法抵抗。他认为国王的职责在申命记 17 章中有所提及，而国王的权力在撒母耳记上 8 章中有所提及，人民应该服从并顺从这种无法抵抗的权力。但我回答说，1. 区分职责和权力是徒劳的；因为权力要么是按照上帝的律法统治，如他所命令的那样（申命记 17) 这正是万王之王赐予所有国王的职权和官方权力，这是国王的王权职责，为他的造物主主宰统治；或者这是一种对上帝子民行恶和暴政的权力；但这对于国王来说是偶然的，是暴君的特征，并非来自上帝，因此国王在这个地方的法律必然是国王的暴政，这是我们的真正意愿。2. “Reges sine dominatione ne concipi quidem possunt;—judices dominationem in populum minime habebant.” 因此，巴克莱说，以色列的法官和国王在本质和性质上是不同的；所以统治对于国王来说是如此重要，以至于你无法想象一个国王没有统治，而以色列的法官对人民没有统治。因此，我认为国王与以色列的法官在本质上的区别必然来自上帝；但通过统治，即对被统治者施加压迫的权力，国王在本质上与以色列的法官有所区别；因此，统治和行暴政的权力，正如所表达的那样，（第 11-13 年）并压迫一个主题，是来自上帝的，所以必须是合法的权力。但结论是荒谬的；假设是巴克利的教义。我证明了主要命题。1.因为法官和国王都是来自上帝的；因为上帝给了摩西一个合法的职责成为法官，他也给了以利和撒母耳，因此（申命记 17:15）国王是上帝的合法法令。如果法官和国王都是合法的法令，如果它们本质上不同，如巴克利所说，那么区分一个与另一个的特定形式，即统治和毁灭主题的权力，必须来自上帝；这是亵渎的：因为上帝不能给予任何作恶的道德权力；因为那是许可，是违背上帝的律法的权力，这与上帝的圣洁是绝对不一致的；因为这样，主可能否认自己，并宽恕罪恶。上帝远离这样的亵渎！2.现在，如果国王的权力来自上帝，那么本质上和特定地构成国王的东西必须来自上帝，就像职位本身来自上帝一样。 巴克莱明确表示，君权来自上帝，而那个特定的形式，即构成君王的要素，必须是将君王与法官本质上区分开来的东西，正如巴克莱所梦想的那样。因此，我们有了这个君王的法律权力，这种君王的法律权力可以用来暴虐和压迫，这是来自上帝的权力，因此是合法的权力，根据巴克莱的解释，你将得出这样的结论——上帝创造了一个暴君和一个君王。根据巴克莱对君王和法官之间的区别，法官可以被抵抗；因为他没有像扫罗那样的统治权力，这与罗马书 13:2；出埃及记 22:28；20:12 相反。

But let us try the text first, המלך משפט the word cannot enforce us to expone משפט a law, our English rendereth, Show them the manner of the king. Arri. Montanus turneth it ratio regis. I grant the LXX. render it, τὸ δικαιωμα τοῦ βασίλεως. The Chaldee Paraphrase saith, Statutum regis. Hieronimus translateth it jus regis, and also Calvin; but I am sure the Hebrew, both in words and sense, beareth a consuetude; yea, and the word משפט signifieth not always a law, as, (Josh. 6:14,) "They compassed the city כמשפט seven times:" the LXX. κατα τὸν κρίμα τουτό; 2 Kings 17:26, They "know not the manner of the God of the land; (ver. 33) they served their own gods, after the manner of the heathen." כמשפט הזיוﬦ cannot be according to the law or right of the heathen, except משפט, be taken in an evil part: the LXX. κατα τὸν κρῖμα τῶν ἐθνῶν, ver. 34, "Until this day they do after these manners;" 1 Kings 18:28, Baal's priests "cut themselves with knives כמשפטﬦ after their manner:" the LXX. κατα τὸν ἐθισμὸν; Gen. 40:13, Thou shalt give the cup to Pharaoh, according as thou wast wont to do; כמשפט, Exod. 21:9, "He shall deal with her after the manner of daughters;" 1 Sam. 27:11, "And David saved neither man nor woman alive, to bring tidings to Gath, saying, So did David, and so will his manner be," משפטוּ. It cannot be they meant that it was David's law, right, or privilege, to spare none alive; 1 Sam. 2:13, "And the priests' custom with the people was," &c. ומשפט הכהגיﬦ. This was a wicked custom, not a law; and the LXX. turneth it, καί τὸν δικὰιωμα τοῦ ἱερέως; and therefore δικαιώμα is not always taken in a good meaning: so P. Martyr, "He meaneth here of an usurped law;" Calvin,2 Non jus a deo prescriptum, sed tyranidem,—"He speaketh not of God's law here, but of tyranny;" and Rivetus, משפט signifieth not ever jus, law. Sed aliquando morem sive modum et rationem agendi,—"The custom and manner of doing:" so Junius and Tremellius. Diodatus5 exponeth jus,—This law, "namely, (saith he,) that which is now grown to a common custom, by the consent of nations and God's toleration." Glossa, (to speak of papists,) Exactionem et dominationem,—"The extortion and domination of king Saul is here meant;" Lyra exponeth it tyranny; Tostatus Abulens., "He meaneth here of kings indefinitely who oppressed the people with taxes and tributes, as Solomon and others;" Cornelius à Lapide,9 "This was an unjust law;" Cajetanus calleth it tyranny; Hugo Cardinal. nameth them, exactiones et servitutes,—"exactions and slaveries;" and Serrarius speaketh not here, Quid Reges jure possint,—"What they may do by right and law:" Sed quid audeant,—"What they will be bold to do, and what they tyranically decern against all laws of nature and humanity;" and so speaketh Thom. Aquinas; so also Mendoza1 speaketh of the "law of tyrants;" and, amongst the fathers, Clemens Alexandrinus saith on this place, Non humanum pollicetur dominum, sed insolentem daturum minatur tyrannum,—"He promiseth not a humane prince, but threateneth to give them an insolent tyrant;" and the like also saith Bede; and an excellent lawyer, Pet. Rebuffus saith,4 Etiam loquitur de tyranno qui non erat a Deo electus, and that he speaketh of Saul's tyrannical usurpation, and not of the law prescribed by God, Deut. 17, I prove,—1. He speaketh of such a power as is answerable to the acts here spoken of; but the acts here spoken of are acts of mere tyranny; ver. 11, "And this will be the manner of your king that shall reign over you: he will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and some shall run before his chariots." Now, to make slaves of their sons was an act of tyranny. 2. To take their fields, and vineyards, and oliveyards from them, and give them to his servants, was no better than Ahab's taking Naboth's vineyard from him, which by God's law he might not lawfully sell, except in the case of extreme poverty, and then, in the year of jubilee, he might redeem his own inheritance. 3. (Ver. 15, 16,) To put the people of God to bondage, and make them servants, was to deal with them as the tyrant Pharaoh did. 4. He speaketh of such a law, the execution whereof should "make them cry out to the Lord because of their king;" but the execution of the just law of the King (Deut. 17) is a blessing, and not a bondage which should make the people cry out of the bitterness of their spirit. 5. It is clear here that God is, by his prophet, not instructing the king in his duty, but, as Rabbi Levi Ben. Gersom. saith, "Terrifying them from their purpose of seeking a king, and foretelling the evil of punishment that they should suffer under a tyrannous king;" but he speaketh not one word of these necessary and comfortable acts of favour that a good king, by his good government, was to do for his people. Deut. 17:15, 16. But he speaketh of contrary facts here; and that he is dissuading them from suiting a king is clear from the text. (1.) Because he saith, Give them their will; but yet protest against their unlawful course. (2.) He biddeth the prophet lay before them the tyranny and oppression of their king; which tyranny Saul exercised in his time, as the story showeth. (3.) Because how ineffectual Samuel's exhortation was is set down, ver. 19, "Nevertheless they would not obey the voice of Samuel, but said, Nay, but we will have a king over us." If Samuel had not been deborting them from a king, how could they be said in this to refuse to hear the voice of Samuel? 6. The ground of Barclay and royalists here is weak; for they say, That the people sought a king like the nations, and the kings of the nations were all absolute, and so tyrants; and God granted their unlawful desire, and gave them a tyrant to reign over them such as the nations had.1 The plain contrary is true. They sought not a tyrant; but one of the special reasons why they sought a king was to be freed of tyranny; for 1 Sam. 8:3, "Because Samuel's sons turned aside after lucre, and took bribes, and perverted judgment; therefore all the elders of Israel gathered themselves together, and came to Samuel, to Ramah, and there they sought a king." 7. One could not more clearly speak with the mouth of a false prophet than the author of "Active and Passive Obedience" doth, while he will have Samuel here to describe a king, and to say, "Ye have formerly committed one error in shaking off the yoke of God, and seeking a king; so now beware you fall not in the next error, in casting off the yoke of a king, which God, at your own desire, hath laid on you; for God only hath power to make and unmake kings; therefore prepare yourselves patiently to suffer and bear.
但让我们先尝试一下这段文字，המלך משפט这个词不能强迫我们解释משפט一条法律，我们的英文翻译是 Show them the manner of the king. Arri. Montanus 把它翻译成 ratio regis。我承认 LXX 把它翻译成τὸ δικαιωμα τοῦ βασίλεως。Chaldee Paraphrase 说，Statutum regis。Hieronimus 把它翻译成 jus regis，Calvin 也是这样。但我确信希伯来语在词语和意义上都表达了一种习俗；是的，而且משפט这个词并不总是指一条法律，比如（约书亚记 6:14），“他们围绕这座城 כמשפט 七次”；LXX 翻译成κατα τὸν κρίμα τουτό；列王记下 17:26，“他们不认识这地之神的规矩；（33 节）他们侍奉自己的神，按照外邦人的方式。” כמשפט הזיוﬦ除非משפט被理解为恶意，否则不能按照外邦人的法律或权利来解释；LXX 翻译成κατα τὸν κρῖμα τῶν ἐθνῶν，34 节，“直到今日，他们仍然按照这些方式行事”；列王记上 18:28，巴力的祭司“用刀 כמשפטﬦ割伤自己”；LXX 翻译成κατα τὸν ἐθισμὸν；创世记 40:13，你要把杯交给法老，按照你过去的方式； כמשפט，出埃及记 21:9，“他要按照女儿的方式对待她”；撒母耳记上 27:11，“大卫没有留下一个男人或女人活着，去迦特报信，说：‘大卫这样行，他的作为必如此。’”这不是说大卫有权利或特权不留一个人活着；撒母耳记上 2:13，“祭司与百姓的规矩是...”这是一种邪恶的习俗，而不是法律；而且七十士译本将其翻译为“祭司的权利”；因此，“权利”并不总是有好的意义：所以 P. Martyr 说，“他在这里指的是一种篡夺的法律”；Calvin 说，“他在这里不是说神的律法，而是说暴政”；Rivetus 说，משפט并不总是指法律，而是指一种习俗或行为方式和理由；Junius 和 Tremellius 也是这样解释的。Diodatus 解释为法律，即“现在已经成为普遍习俗的那种，经过各国的同意和上帝的容忍。”Glossa（说到天主教徒）解释为“敲诈和国王执政的压迫”；Lyra 解释为暴政；Tostatus Abulens 解释为暴政。他在这里指的是那些通过征税和征收贡品压迫人民的国王，如所罗门和其他人；Cornelius à Lapide 称之为不公正的法律；Cajetanus 称之为暴政；Hugo Cardinal 称之为征收和奴役；Serrarius 在这里没有提到“国王在法律上可以做什么”，而是提到“他们敢于做什么，以及他们如何以暴政的方式违背自然和人道法律”；Thom. Aquinas 也是这样说的；Mendoza 在父辈中也是这样说的；克莱门特·亚历山大在这个地方说，他不是承诺给他们一个人道的君主，而是威胁要给他们一个傲慢的暴君；贝德也是这样说的；一位杰出的律师，Pet. Rebuffus 说，他还谈到了那些不是上帝所选的暴君，并且他说的是扫罗的暴政篡夺，而不是上帝规定的律法，申命记 17 章，我证明——1.他谈到的权力与这里所说的行为相一致；但这里所说的行为是纯粹的暴政行为；第 11，“你们的王怎样管辖你们，你们就怎样行。他必选取你们的儿子，派他们为他的战车和马兵，使他们跑在他的车前。”将他们的儿子变成奴隶是暴政的行为。2. 夺取他们的田地、葡萄园和橄榄园，分给他的仆人，这不比亚哈夺取拿伯的葡萄园更好，按照上帝的律法，他是不合法地出售的，除非极度贫困的情况下，然后在禧年他可以赎回自己的产业。3.（15、16 节）使上帝的子民受奴役，使他们成为仆人，就像暴君法老对待他们一样。4. 他谈到了这样一条法律，执行这条法律会使他们因为他们的王而向上帝呼求；但是执行公正的君王律法（申命记 17 章）是一种祝福，而不是一种奴役，会使人民因心灵的苦涩而呼求。5. 这里清楚地表明，上帝通过他的先知，并不是在教导君王的职责，而是像拉比利维·本·格尔松所说的那样。 他说：“吓唬他们，阻止他们寻找国王，并预言他们在暴君统治下将遭受的惩罚的邪恶。”但他没有提到一个好国王通过他的良好治理为人民做的这些必要和舒适的恩惠。申命记 17:15, 16。但他在这里说的是相反的事实；从文本中可以清楚地看出，他在劝阻他们寻找国王。（1）因为他说，给他们他们的意愿；但同时反对他们的非法行为。（2）他命令先知向他们揭示国王的暴政和压迫；扫罗在他的时代就实施了这种暴政，正如故事所示。（3）因为撒母耳的劝告是多么无效，这在第 19 节中有所记载：“然而他们不肯听从撒母耳的话，却说，不然，我们定要有一个王治理我们。”如果撒母耳没有劝阻他们寻找国王，他们怎么能说他们拒绝听从撒母耳的话呢？ 巴克利和王党在这里的理由站不住脚；因为他们说，人民寻求一个像其他国家一样的国王，而其他国家的国王都是绝对的，所以是暴君；上帝满足了他们非法的愿望，并给了他们一个像其他国家一样的暴君来统治他们。事实正好相反。他们并不寻求一个暴君；而他们寻求国王的一个特殊原因之一就是为了摆脱暴政；因为撒母耳记上 8:3 说，“因为撒母耳的儿子行事不公，贪图财利，受贿赂，屈枉正直；以致以色列的长老都聚集到拉玛，见撒母耳，说：‘你年纪老迈了，你的儿子不行你的道；现在求你为我们立一个王治理我们。’”7.《主动和被动的顺从》的作者在这里说话就像一个假先知一样，他要撒母耳在这里描述一个国王，并说：“你们以前犯了一个错误，摆脱了上帝的轭，寻求一个国王；所以现在要小心，不要犯下下一个错误，摒弃国王的轭，这是上帝按照你们的要求加在你们身上的；因为只有上帝有权力立国王和废国王；所以要准备好耐心忍受和承受。”

Ans. 1.—For if he were exhorting to patient suffering of the yoke of a king, he should presume it were God's revealed and regulating will that they should have a king. But the scope of Samuel's sermon is to dissuade them from a king, and they by the contrary, (ver. 19,) say, "Nay, but we will have a king;" and there is not one word in the text that may intimate patience under the yoke of a king. 2, There is here the description of a tyrant, not of a king. 3. Here is a threatening and a prediction, not anything that smelleth of an exhortation.
答案 1：因为如果他在劝告忍受国王的统治，那么他应该认为这是上帝揭示和规定的意愿，他们应该有一个国王。但撒母耳的讲道的目的是劝阻他们要一个国王，而他们却相反地说：“不，我们要一个国王”（第 19 节），而文本中没有一句话能表明要忍受国王的统治。答案 2：这里描述的是一个暴君，而不是一个国王。答案 3：这里是一个威胁和预言，没有任何味道是劝告的。

Obj.—But it is evident that God, teaching the people how to behave themselves under the unjust oppressions of their king, set down no remedy but tears, crying to God, and patience; therefore resistance is not lawful.
但显然，上帝在教导人民如何在不公正的压迫下行为时，并没有提供除了眼泪、向上帝哭泣和耐心之外的解决办法；因此，抵抗是不合法的。

Ans.—Though this be not the place due to the doctrine of resistance, yet, to vindicate the place,—1. I say, there is not one word of any lawful remedy in the text; only it is said, וּזעקתﬦ ביוּﬦ ההוּא מִלפּני מלּככם, Et clamatis in illa die a faciebus regis vestri. It is not necessarily to be exponed of praying to God; Job 35:9, "By reason of the multitude of oppressions, they make the oppressed to cry," חּעיקוּ clamare faciunt; Isa. 15:4, "And Heshbon shall cry: וּתזעק the armed soldiers of Moab shall cry out." There is no other word here than doth express the idolatrous prayers of Moab; Isa. 17:12; Hab. 2:11, "The stone shall cry out of the wall תזעק;" Deut. 22:24, "You shall stone the maid אשר לא־עלּ־דבד, because she cried not צעקה;" but she is not to be stoned because she prayed not to God; Psal. 18:4, "David's enemies cried, and there was none to save, even to the Lord, and he heard not." 2. Though it were the prophet's meaning, "they cried to the Lord," yet it is not the crying of a people humbled, and, in faith, speaking to God in their troubles; Zech. 7:13, "They cried, and I would not hear;" therefore royalists must make crying to God out of the bitterness of affliction, without humiliation and faith, and such prayers of sinners as God heareth not, (Psal. 18:41; John 9:31; Isa. 17:12,) to be the only remedy of a people oppressed by a tyrannous king. Now, it is certain God prescribeth no unlawful means to an oppressed people under their affliction; therefore it is clear here that God speaketh only of evils of punishment, such as is to cry in trouble and not be heard of God, and that he prescribeth here no duty at all, nor any remedy. 3. All protestant divines say, Ex particulari non valet argumentum negative,—"From one particular place, a negative argument is not good." This remedy is not written in this particular place, therefore it is not written at all in other places of Scripture; so 1 Tim. 1:19, the end of excommunication is, that the party excommunicated may learn not to blaspheme; therefore the end is not also that the church be not infected. It followeth not. The contrary is clear (1 Cor. 5:6). Dr Ferne, and other royalists, teach us that we may supplicate and make prayers to a tyrannous king. We may fly from a tyrannous king; but neither supplicating the king, nor flying from his fury, shall be lawful means left by this argument; because these means are no more in this text (where royalists say the Spirit of God speaketh of purpose of the means to be used against tyranny) than violent resistance is in this text.
答案-虽然这不是抵抗教义所应有的地方，但为了证明这一点，我说，文本中没有任何合法的解决办法；只是说，“你们在那一天必向你们的君王哀求”，这并不一定是指向上帝祈祷；约伯记 35:9，“因为他们因多次欺压使人哀求”，这里的“哀求”是指压迫者使人哀求；以赛亚书 15:4，“希实本要哀求，摩押的壮士要哀号”，这里没有其他词语，只是表达了摩押的偶像崇拜祈祷；以赛亚书 17:12；哈巴谷书 2:11，“墙上的石头要哀号”，申命记 22:24，“你们要用石头打死那女子，因为她没有哀求”，但她被石头打死不是因为她没有向上帝祈祷；诗篇 18:4，“我的仇敌哀求，却没有人救他们，他们哀求耶和华，他却不应允。”即使先知的意思是“他们向耶和华哀求”，也不是一个谦卑的、有信心的人民在困境中向上帝祈祷的哭泣；撒迦利亚书 7:13，“他们哭泣，我却不听。”因此，君主主义者必须在痛苦中向上帝哭泣，没有谦卑和信仰，以及上帝不听的罪人的祈祷（诗篇 18:41；约翰福音 9:31；以赛亚书 17:12），作为被暴君压迫的人民的唯一救济措施。现在，可以肯定的是，上帝不会为受苦的人民规定非法的手段；因此，很明显上帝只是在谈论惩罚的恶果，比如在困境中哭泣而上帝不听，他在这里既没有规定任何责任，也没有任何救济措施。3.所有的新教神学家都说，从一个特定的地方，否定的论证是无效的。这个救济措施没有写在这个特定的地方，所以在圣经的其他地方也没有写；所以提摩太前书 1:19，逐出教会的目的是让被逐出的一方学会不亵渎上帝；因此，目的并不是为了防止教会受到感染。这是不正确的（哥林多前书 5:6）。费恩博士和其他君主主义者教导我们可以向暴君祈求和祈祷。 我们可以逃离一个暴君的统治；但是，无论是向暴君乞求，还是逃离他的愤怒，都不是这个论点所留下的合法手段；因为这些手段在这个文本中并不存在（在这个文本中，君主主义者声称上帝的灵是有意要使用这些手段来对抗暴政），就像在这个文本中没有暴力抵抗一样。

Barclay, Ferne, Grotius, Arnisæus, the P. Prelate following them, saith, "An ill king is a punishment of God for the sins of the people, and there is no remedy but patient suffering."
巴克利、费恩、格罗修斯、阿尼塞乌斯以及随后的主教都说过：“一个恶劣的国王是上帝对人民罪恶的惩罚，唯一的解决办法就是忍受。”

Ans.—Truly it is a silly argument. The Assyrians coming against the people of God for their sins, is a punishment of God. (Isa. 10:5; 12:1–3.) But doth it follow that it is unlawful for Israel to fight and resist the Assyrians, and that they had warrant to do no other thing but lay down arms and pray to God, and fight none at all? Is there no lawful resisting of ills of punishment, but mere prayers and patience? The Amalekites came out against Israel for their sins, Sennacherib against Hezekiah for the sins of the people; Asa's enemies fought against him for his sins, and the people's sins. Shall Moses and the people, Hezekiah and Asa, do then nothing but pray and suffer? Is it unlawful with the sword to resist them? I believe not. Famine is often a punishment of God in a land, (Amos 4:7, 8,) is it therefore in famine unlawful to till the earth, and seek bread by our industry, and are we to do nothing but to pray for daily bread? It is a vain argument.
答案：这真是一个愚蠢的论点。亚述人因以色列人的罪而来攻击上帝的子民，这是上帝的惩罚。（以赛亚书 10:5；12:1-3）但这是否意味着以色列人抵抗亚述人是不合法的，他们只能放下武器向上帝祈祷，而不能采取其他行动呢？在惩罚中，难道只能通过祈祷和忍耐来合法地抵抗吗？亚玛力人因以色列人的罪而出来攻击以色列，西拿基立因百姓的罪而攻击希西家；亚撒的敌人因他的罪和百姓的罪而与他作战。难道摩西和百姓、希西家和亚撒就只能祈祷和忍受吗？用剑抵抗他们是不合法的吗？我不这么认为。饥荒经常是上帝在一个地方的惩罚（阿摩司书 4:7, 8），那么在饥荒中耕种土地、通过我们的努力寻找食物难道也是不合法的吗？我们难道只能祈求每日的食物而不能采取其他行动吗？这是一个徒劳的论点。

Observe, therefore, the wickedness of Barclay, (contra monarch. l. 2, p. 56,) for he would prove, that "a power of doing ill, and that without any punishment to be inflicted by man, is from God; because our laws punish not perjury, but leaveth it to be punished of God (l. 2, l. de Reb. cred. Cujacius, l. 2, obs. c. 19); and the husband in the law of Moses had power to give a bill of divorce to his wife and send her away, and the husband was not to be punished. And also stews and work-houses for harlots, and to take usury, are tolerated in many Christian commonwealths, and yet these are all sorts of murders by the confession of heathen; therefore, (saith Barclay,) God may give a power of tyrannous acts to kings, so as they shall be under no punishment to be inflicted by men.
因此，请注意巴克利的邪恶（反对君主论第 2 卷，第 56 页），因为他要证明“能够做恶，而且没有人类可以惩罚，这是来自上帝的；因为我们的法律不惩罚伪证，而是将其留给上帝来惩罚（君主论第 2 卷，第 2 卷，第 19 章）；根据摩西法律，丈夫有权给妻子发出离婚状并将她遣散，而丈夫不会受到惩罚。此外，许多基督教共和国容忍妓女的窑子和工作场所以及放高利贷，而这些都是根据异教徒的承认属于各种谋杀行为；因此，（巴克利说）上帝可以赋予国王暴政的权力，以至于他们不会受到人类的惩罚。

Ans.—All this is an argument from fact. 1. A wicked magistracy may permit perjury and lying in the commonwealth, and that without punishment; and some Christian commonwealths, he meaneth his own synagogue of Rome, spiritual Sodom, a cage of unclean birds, suffereth harlots by law, and the whores pay so many thousands yearly to the Pope, and are free of all punishment by law, to eschew homicides, adulteries of Romish priests, and other greater sins; therefore God hath given power to a king to play the tyrant without any fear of punishment to be inflicted by man. But if this be a good argument, the magistrate to whom God hath committed the sword to take vengeance on evil doers, (Rom. 13:3–6,) such as are perjured persons, professed whores and harlots, lath a lawful power from God to connive at sins and gross scandals in the commonwealth, as they dream that the king hath power given from God to exercise all acts of tyranny without any resistance. But, 1. This was a grievous sin in Eli, that he being a father and a judge, punished not his sons for their uncleanness, and his house, in God's heavy displeasure, was cut off from the priesthood therefor. Then God hath given no such power to the judge. 2. The contrary duty is lying on the judge, to execute judgment for the oppressed, (Job 29:12–17; Jer. 22:15, 16,) and perverting of judgment, and conniving at the heinous sins of the wicked, is condemned, (Num. 5:31, 32; 1 Sam. 15:23; 1 Kings 20:42, 43; Isa. 1:17; 10:1; 5:23,) and therefore God hath given no power to a judge to permit wicked men to commit grievous crimes, without any punishment. As for the law of divorce, it was indeed a permissive law, whereby the husband might give the wife a bill of divorce, and be free of punishment before men, but not free of sin and guiltiness before God, for it was contrary to God's institution of marriage at the beginning, as Christ saith; and the prophet saith, (Mal. 2,) that the Lord hateth putting away; but that God hath given any such permissive power to the king, that he may do what he pleaseth, and cannot be resisted, this is in question. 3. The law spoken of in the text is by royalists called, not a consuetude of tyranny, but the divine law of God, whereby the king is formally and essentially distinguished from the judge in Israel; now if so, a power to sin and a power to commit acts of tyranny, yea, and a power in the king's sergeants and bloody emissaries to waste and destroy the people of God, must be a lawful power given of God; for a lawful power it must be if it cometh from God, whether it be from the king in his own person, or from his servants at his commandment, and by either put forth in acts, as the power of a bill of divorce was a power from God, exempting either the husband from punishment before men, or freeing the servant, who at the husband's command should write it and put it in the hands of the woman. I cannot believe that God hath given a power, and that by law, to one man to command twenty thousand cut-throats to kill and destroy all the children of God, and that he hath commanded his children to give their necks and heads to Babel's sons without resistance. This I am sure is another matter than a law for a bill of divorce to one woman married by free election of a changeable and unconstant man. But sure I am, God gave no permissive law from heaven like the law of divorce, for the hardness of the heart, not of the Jews only, but also of the whole Christian and heathen kingdoms under a monarch, that one emperor may, by such a law of God as the law of divorce, kill, by bloody cutthroats, such as the Irish rebels are, all the nations that call on God's name, men, women, and sucking infants. And if Providence impede the catholic issue, and dry up the seas of blood, it is good; but God hath given a law, such as the law of divorce, to the king, whereby he, and all his, may, without resistance, by a legal power given of God, who giveth kings to be fathers, nurses, protectors, guides, yea the breath of nostrils of his church, as special mercies and blessings to his people, he may, I say, by a law of God, as it is 1 Sam. 8:9, 11, cut off nations, as that lion of the world, Nebuchadnezzar, did. So royalists teach us.
答案：这都是基于事实的论据。1. 一个邪恶的执法机构可能允许在共和国中发生伪证和谎言，而且没有惩罚；而一些基督教共和国，他指的是他自己的罗马会堂，精神上的索多玛，一个不洁鸟的笼子，允许妓女合法存在，并且这些妓女每年向教皇支付数千个金币，并且在法律上免于受到任何惩罚，以避免罗马神父的谋杀、通奸和其他更大的罪行；因此，上帝赋予了国王权力，可以无所畏惧地行使暴政，而不会受到人们的惩罚。但是，如果这是一个好的论据，那么上帝已经将剑交给了执法者，以对作恶者进行报复（罗马书 13:3-6），比如那些发假誓的人、公开的妓女和娼妓，他们梦想国王从上帝那里获得了行使一切暴政行为而不受任何抵抗的权力。但是，1. 以利犯了一个严重的罪，他作为一个父亲和一个法官，没有惩罚他的儿子们的污秽行为，因此，上帝对他的家庭发怒，剥夺了他们的祭司职位。 然而，上帝并未赋予法官这样的权力。2. 相反，法官有责任为受压迫者执行审判（约伯记 29:12-17；耶利米书 22:15,16），歪曲审判和纵容邪恶人的严重罪行是被谴责的（民数记 5:31,32；撒母耳记上 15:23；列王记上 20:42,43；以赛亚书 1:17；10:1；5:23），因此上帝并未赋予法官允许邪恶人犯下严重罪行而不受任何惩罚的权力。至于离婚法律，确实是一项允许性法律，丈夫可以给妻子发离婚状，而在人前不受惩罚，但在上帝面前仍有罪和有罪责任，因为这与上帝在起初设立的婚姻制度相违背，正如基督所说；先知也说（玛拉基书 2），主憎恶休妻；但是关于上帝是否赋予国王这样的允许权力，使他可以为所欲为，无法被抵抗，这是有争议的。3. 文中所提到的法律，被王党称为上帝的神圣法律，而不是暴政的习俗，这使得国王在以色列与法官在本质上有所区别；如果是这样的话，犯罪和暴政的权力，甚至国王的侍从和血腥使者对上帝的子民进行浪费和摧毁的权力，必须是上帝赋予的合法权力；因为如果它来自上帝，无论是来自国王本人，还是来自他的仆人按照他的命令行事，都必须是合法的权力，就像休书的权力是上帝赋予的权力一样，使丈夫在人前免受惩罚，或者使仆人在丈夫的命令下写下并交给妇人。我无法相信上帝赋予了一个人权力，并且通过法律赋予了这个权力，命令两万个杀人犯去杀害和摧毁上帝的子民，并且他命令他的子民不抵抗地把脖子和头交给巴比伦的子民。我确信这与一个由一个易变和不稳定的人自由选择妇女而结婚的休书法律是不同的事情。 但我确信，上帝没有像离婚法那样从天上给予许可的法律，这是为了心硬，不仅是犹太人，而且是整个基督教和异教国家在君主统治下，一个皇帝可以凭借上帝的离婚法这样的法律，通过血腥的杀人如爱尔兰叛乱者，杀死所有呼求上帝名字的国家的人，男人，女人和吃奶的婴儿。如果上帝的安排阻止了天主教的后代，并使血海干涸，那是好事；但上帝给了国王一条法律，就像离婚法一样，凭借上帝赋予的合法权力，他和他的所有人都可以毫无阻力地，上帝赐予国王作为父亲、保姆、保护者、指导者，甚至是他教会的鼻息，作为特殊的恩典和祝福赐予他的子民，他可以，我说，凭借上帝的法律，如撒母耳记上 8:9、11 所述，像世界之狮尼布甲尼撒王那样剪除国家。这就是皇室主义者教导我们的。

Barclay saith (l. 2. contra Monarch. p. 6)—The Lord spake to Samuel the law of the king, and wrote it in a book, and laid it up before the Lord. But what law? That same law which he proposed to the people when they first sought a king. But that was the law contemning precepts, rather for the people's obeying then for the king's commanding; for the people was to be instructed with those precepts, not the king. Those things that concerned the king's duty (Deut. 17.) Moses commanded to be put into the ark; but so if Samuel had commanded the king that which Moses (Deut. 17) commanded, he had done no new thing, but had done again what was once done actum egisset; but there was nothing before commanded the people concerning their obedience and patience under evil princes. Joseph. Antiq. (l. 6, c. 5,) wrote, τὰ μελλόντα κάτα the evils that were to befall them.
巴克利说（第 2 卷，反对君主论第 6 页）- 主对撒母耳说了关于国王的律法，并将其写在一本书中，放在主面前。但是是什么律法呢？当人们第一次寻求国王时，他提出的那个律法。但那是蔑视诫命的律法，更多是为了人民的服从而不是国王的命令；因为人民应该用那些诫命来受教育，而不是国王。摩西命令将与国王职责有关的事情（申命记 17 章）放入约柜中；但是如果撒母耳命令国王遵守摩西（申命记 17 章）所命令的，他没有做新的事情，而是再次做了一次已经做过的事情；但以前没有命令人民在邪恶的君主统治下忍受和顺从。约瑟夫斯（《犹太古代史》第 6 卷，第 5 章）写道，关于将要降临他们的灾祸。

Ans. 1.—It was not that same law, for though this law was written to the people, yet it was the law of the king; and, I pray you, did Samuel write in a book all the rules of tyranny, and teach Saul, and all the kings after him, (for this book was put in the ark of the covenant, where also was the book of the law) how to play the tyrant? And what instruction was it to king or people to write to them a book of the wicked ways of a king, which nature teacheth without a doctor? Sanctius saith on the place, These things which, by men's fraud and to the hurt of the public, may be corrupted, were kept in the tabernacle, and the book of the law was kept in the ark. Cornelius à Lapide saith, It was the law common to king and people, which was commonly kept with the book of the law in the ark of the covenant. Lyra contradicteth Barclay. He exponeth Legem, legem regni non secundum usurpationem supra positam, sed secundum ordinationem Dei positam. (Deut. 17) Theodatius excellently exponeth it, The fundamental laws of the kingdom, inspired by God to temper monarchy with a liberty befitting God's people, and with equity toward a nation—to withstand the abuse of an absolute power. 2. Can any believe Samuel would have written a law of tyranny, and put that book in the ark of the covenant before the Lord, to be kept to the posterity, seeing he was to teach both king and people the good and the right way, 1 Sam. 12:23–25. 3. Where is the law of the kingdom called a law of punishing innocent people? 4. To write the duty of the king in a book, and apply it to the king, is no more superfluous than to teach the people the good and the right way out of the law, and apply general laws to particular persons. 5. There is nothing in the law (1 Sam. 8:9–12) of the people's patience, but rather of their impatient crying out, God not hearing nor helping; and nothing of that in this book, for any thing that we know, and Josephus speaketh of the law in 1 Sam. 8, not of this law, 1 Sam. 12.
答案 1. - 这不是同一条法律，因为尽管这条法律是写给人民的，但它是国王的法律；请问，撒母耳是否在一本书中写下了所有暴政的规则，并教导扫罗和他之后的所有国王（因为这本书被放在约柜里，那里也有律法的书），如何行使暴政？对国王或人民来说，写一本关于国王邪恶行径的书有什么指导意义呢？这是自然法无需医生教导的。圣人在这个地方说，那些可能被人们欺骗并对公众造成伤害的事情，被保存在帐幕里，而律法的书被保存在约柜里。拉皮德说，这是国王和人民共同遵守的法律，通常与律法的书一起保存在约柜里。利拉与巴克利相矛盾。他解释了"法律，国王的法律，不是根据上述的用法，而是根据上帝的命令。"（申命记 17 章）西奥达修辞地解释说，这是上帝启示给国家的基本法律，以调和君主制与适合上帝子民的自由，并对国家公平，以抵制绝对权力的滥用。 2. 有人能相信撒母耳会写一部暴政的法律，并将那本书放在约柜前，供后代保留吗？毕竟他是要教导国王和人民善良和正确的道路（撒母耳记上 12:23-25）。3.哪里有称王国的法律是惩罚无辜者的法律？4.将国王的职责写在一本书中，并应用于国王，不比教导人民善良和正确的道路更多余，也不比将普遍法律应用于特定人更多余。5.在人民的法律（撒母耳记上 8:9-12）中，并没有关于他们耐心的内容，而是关于他们不耐烦地呼喊，上帝不听不帮助；至于这本书，据我们所知，没有任何相关内容，约瑟夫斯在撒母耳记上 8 中谈到的是那本法律，而不是撒母耳记上 12 中的这本法律。

QUESTION XIX
问题十九

WHETHER OR NO THE KING BE IN DIGNITY AND POWER ABOVE THE PEOPLE
无论国王是否在尊严和权力上高于人民

In this grave question, divers considerations are to be pondered. 1. There is a dignity material in the people scattered—they being many representations of God and his image, which is in the king also, and formally more as king, he being endued with formal magistratical and public royal authority. In the former regard, this or that man is inferior to the king, because the king hath that same remainder of the image of God that any private man hath, and something more—he hath a politic resemblance of the King of heavens, being a little god, and so is above any one man.
在这个严肃的问题中，有许多考虑因素需要思考。1. 人们分散在各处，他们具有一种尊严的物质——他们是上帝和他的形象的许多代表，这种形象在国王身上也存在，而且在国王身上更为明确，因为他具有正式的统治和公共王权。从前一种角度来看，这个人或那个人都不如国王，因为国王拥有与任何私人一样的上帝形象的残余，还有更多的东西——他具有天国之王的政治相似性，是一个小神，因此高于任何一个人。

2. All these of the people taken collectively having more of God, as being representations, are, according to this material dignity, more excellent than the king, because many are more excellent than one; and the king, according to the magistratical and royal authority he hath, is more excellent than they are, because he partaketh formally of royalty, which they have not formally.
所有这些人集体拥有更多的上帝，作为代表，根据这种物质尊贵，比国王更优秀，因为众多人比一个人更优秀；而国王根据他所拥有的行政和王权，比他们更优秀，因为他正式地参与了王权，而他们没有正式地参与。

3. A mean or medium, as it is such, is less than the end, though the thing materially that is a mean may be more excellent. Every mean, as a mean, under that reduplication, hath all its goodness and excellency in relation to the end; yet an angel that is a mean (or medium) and a ministering spirit, ordained of God for an heir of life eternal, (Heb. 1:13,) considered materially, is more excellent than a man. (Psal. 8:5; Heb. 2:6–8.)
3. 一个中间或中庸的东西，作为中间或中庸的东西，比终极目标要低，尽管在物质上，中间或中庸的东西可能更加优秀。每一个中间或中庸的东西，在这种重复中，其善良和卓越都是与终极目标相关的；然而，从物质上来看，一个被上帝指定为永生之子的中间或中庸的天使（希伯来书 1:13），比一个人更加优秀（诗篇 8:5；希伯来书 2:6-8）。

4. A king and leader, in a military consideration, and as a governor and conserver of the whole army, is more worth than ten thousand of the people, 2 Sam. 18:13.
一个国王和领袖，在军事考虑中，作为整个军队的统治者和保护者，价值超过一万人。撒母耳记下 18:13。

5. But simply and absolutely the people is above, and more excellent, then the king, and the king in dignity inferior to the people; and that upon these reasons:—
但是，简单而绝对地说，人民高于国王，更加优秀，而国王在尊严上不如人民；这是基于以下原因：

Arg. 1.—Because he is the mean ordained for the people, as for the end, that he may save them, (2 Sam. 19:9;) a public shepherd to feed them, (Psal. 78:70–72;) the captain and leader of the Lord's inheritance to defend them, (1 Sam. 10:1;) the minister of God for their good. (Rom. 13:4.)
因为他是为人民而设定的中间人，为了拯救他们，（撒母耳记下 19:9）一个公共的牧人来喂养他们，（诗篇 78:70-72）作为上主产业的队长和领袖来保护他们，（撒母耳记上 10:1）为他们的利益而事奉上帝。（罗马书 13:4）

Arg. 2.—The pilot is less than the whole passengers; the general less than the whole army; the tutor less than all the children; the physician less than all the living men whose health he careth for; the master or teacher less than all the scholars, because the part is less than the whole; the king is but a part and member (though I grant a very eminent and noble member) of the kingdom.
第二个论点——飞行员少于所有乘客；将军少于整个军队；导师少于所有孩子；医生少于他所关心的所有健康的人；导师或教师少于所有学生，因为部分少于整体；国王只是王国的一部分和成员（尽管我承认是非常杰出和高贵的成员）。

Arg. 3.—A Christian people, especially, is the portion of the Lord's inheritance, (Deut. 32:9) the sheep of his pasture—his redeemed ones—for whom God gave his blood, Acts 20:28. And the killing of a man is to violate the image of God, (Gen. 9:6,) and therefore the death and destruction of a church, and of thousand thousands of men, is a sadder and a more heavy matter than the death of a king, who is but one man.

Arg. 4.—A king as a king, or because a king, is not the inheritance of God, nor the chosen and called of God, nor the sheep or flock of the Lord's pasture, nor the redeemed of Christ, for those excellencies agree not to kings because they are kings; for then all kings should be endued with those excellencies, and God should be an acceptor of persons, if he put those excellencies of grace upon men for external respects of highness and kingly power, and worldly glory and splendour; for many living images and representations of God, as he is holy, or more excellent than a politic representation of God's greatness and majesty, such as the king is; because that which is the fruit of a love of God, which cometh nearer to God's most special love, is more excellent than that which is farther remote from his special love. Now, though royalty be a beam of the majesty of the greatness of the King of kings and Lord of lords, yet is it such a fruit and beam of God's greatness, as may consist with the eternal reprobation of the party loved; so now God's love, from whence he communicateth his image representing his own holiness, cometh nearer to his most special love of election of men to glory.
国王作为国王，并非上帝的遗产，也不是上帝所拣选和呼召的，也不是主牧场的羊群，也不是基督的救赎者，因为这些卓越之处并不适用于国王因为他们是国王；因为如果上帝因为高贵和王权、世俗的荣耀和辉煌而将这些恩典之卓越赋予人们，那么所有的国王都应该具备这些卓越之处，而上帝也应该是一个接受人的神。因为许多活生生的上帝的形象和表象，如他是圣洁的，或者比政治上对上帝伟大和威严的表象更卓越，就像国王一样；因为那是上帝的爱的果实，更接近上帝最特别的爱，比远离他特别的爱的更卓越。尽管王权是万王之王和万主之主的伟大威严的一束光芒，但它是上帝伟大的果实和光芒，可以与被永远拒绝的人的存在相一致；所以现在上帝的爱，从中他传达他自己的形象，代表他自己的圣洁，更接近他对人类荣耀的选举的最特别的爱。

Arg. 5.—If God give kings to be a ransom for his church, and if he slay great kings for their sake, as Pharaoh king of Egypt, (Isa. 43:3,) and Sihon king of the Amorites, and Og king of Bashan; (Psal. 136:18–20;) if he plead with princes and kings for destroying his people; (Isa. 3:12–14;) if he make Babylon and her king a threshing-floor, for the "violence done to the inhabitants of Zion," (Jer. 51:33–35,) then his people, as his people, must be so much dearer and more precious in the Lord's eyes than kings, because they are kings; by how much more his justice is active to destroy the one, and his mercy to save the other. Neither is the argument taken off by saying the king must, in this question, be compared with his own people; not a foreign king, with other foreign people, over whom he doth not reign, for the argument proveth that the people of God are of more worth than kings as kings; and Nebuchadnezzar and Pharaoh, for the time, were kings to the people of God, and foreign kings are no less essentially kings, than kings native are.
如果上帝给予君王作为他教会的赎价，并且为了他们的缘故杀死伟大的君王，如埃及的法老（以赛亚书 43:3）和亚摩利人的西宏王以及巴珊的王（诗篇 136:18-20）；如果他为了毁灭他的子民而与王子和君王争辩（以赛亚书 3:12-14）；如果他使巴比伦和她的国王成为一个踏场，因为对锡安居民的暴行（耶利米书 51:33-35），那么他的子民，作为他的子民，在主的眼中一定比君王更加珍贵和宝贵，因为他们是君王；他的公义毁灭一个人的行动越积极，他的怜悯拯救另一个人的行动就越积极。不能通过说君王在这个问题中必须与自己的子民相比来解释这个论点；而不是与其他外国人民的外国君王相比，他们并不统治那些人民，因为这个论点证明了上帝的子民作为君王比其他君王更有价值；尼布甲尼撒和法老在那个时候对上帝的子民来说是君王，外国君王与本土君王一样本质上都是君王。

Arg. 6.—Those who are given of God as gifts for the preservation of the people, to be nurse-fathers to them, those must be of less worth before God, than those to whom they are given, since the gift, as the gift, is less than the party on whom the gift is bestowed. But the king is a gift for the good and preservation of the people, as is clear, Isa. 1:26; and from this, that God gave his people a king in his wrath, we may conclude, that a king of himself, except God be angry with his people, must be a gift.
阿格六：那些被上帝赐予作为保护人民的礼物，成为他们的养父母的人，他们在上帝面前的价值必定比被赐予的人更低，因为作为礼物的赠品比被赐予的一方更小。但是国王是为了人民的利益和保护而赐予的礼物，这一点很明显，以赛亚书 1:26 也有所提及；从上帝在愤怒中赐予他的子民一个国王这一点来看，我们可以得出结论，除非上帝对他的子民发怒，否则国王本身必定是一份礼物。

Arg. 7.—That which is eternal, and cannot politically die, yea, which must continue as the days of heaven, because of God's promise, is more excellent than that which is both accidental, temporary, and mortal. But the people are both eternal as people, because (Eccles. 1:4) "one generation passeth away, and another generation cometh," and as a people in covenant with God, (Jer. 32:40, 41,) in respect that a people and church, though mortal in the individuals, yet the church, remaining the church, cannot die; but the king, as king, may and doth die. It is true, where a kingdom goeth by succession, the politicians say, the man who is king dieth, but the king never dieth, because some other, either by birth or free election, succeedeth in his room. But I answer,—1. People, by a sort of necessity of nature, succeedeth to people, generation to generation, except God's judgment, contrary to nature, intervene to make Babylon no people, and a land that shall never be inhabited (which I both believe and hope for, according to God's word of prophesy). But a king, by a sort of contingency, succeedeth to kings; for nature doth not ascertain us there must be kings to the world's end, because the essence of governors is kept safe in aristocracy and democracy, though there were no kings; and that kings should necessarily have been in the world, if man had never fallen in sin, I am not, by any cogent argument, induced to believe, I conceive there should have been no government but those of fathers and children, husband and wife, and (which is improperly government) some more gifted with supervenient additions to nature, as gifts and excellencies of engines. Now on this point Althusius (polit. c. 38. n. 114) saith, the king, in respect of office, is worthier than the people, (but this is but an accidental respect,) but as the king is a man, he is inferior to the people.
阿格. 7. ——那些永恒的，政治上不能死亡的，甚至必须像天堂的日子一样持续下去的东西，因为上帝的应许，比那些偶然的、暂时的和有限的东西更为优越。但人民既是永恒的人民，因为（传道书 1:4）“一代过去，一代又来”，又是与上帝立约的人民（耶利米书 32:40, 41），因为人民和教会，虽然个体是有限的，但教会作为教会，不能死亡；但国王作为国王，可以而且会死亡。当一个王国通过继承传承时，政治家们说，担任国王的人死了，但国王永远不会死，因为其他人，无论是出生还是自由选举，都会接替他的位置。但我回答——1. 人民根据一种自然的必然性，一代接替一代，除非上帝的判断违背自然，使巴比伦不再成为人民，成为一个永远不会有人居住的地方（这是我根据上帝的预言所相信和希望的）。 但是，国王的继承是一种偶然性，因为自然并没有确定世界必须有国王，因为统治者的本质在贵族和民主制度中得到保护，即使没有国王；而且如果人类从未堕入罪恶，世界上本来不需要国王，我没有任何有力的论据来相信，我认为除了父母和子女、丈夫和妻子之间的关系以及（这是不恰当的统治）一些在本质上更有天赋的人，如天赋和卓越的工具，不应该有其他形式的政府。关于这一点，阿尔图修斯（政治学第 38 章第 114 条）说，国王在职位上比人民更有价值（但这只是一种偶然的尊重），但作为一个人，国王比人民低下。

Arg. 8.—He who, by office, is obliged to expend himself, and to give his life for the safety of the people, must be inferior to the people. So Christ saith, the life is more than raiment or food, because both these give themselves to corruption for man's life; so the beasts are inferior to man, because they die for our life, that they may sustain our life. And Caiaphas prophesied right, that it was better that one man die than the whole nation perish (John 11:50); and in nature, elements, against their particular inclination, defraud themselves of their private and particular ends, that the commonwealth of nature may stand; as heavy elements ascend, light descend, lest nature should perish by a vacuity. And the good Shepherd (John 10) giveth his life for his sheep; so both Saul and David were made kings to fight the lord's battles, and to expose their lives to hazard for the safety of the church and people of God. But the king, by office, is obliged to expend his life for the safety of the people of God; he is obliged to fight the Lord's battles for them; to go betwixt the flock and death, as Paul was willing to be spent for the church. It may be objected, Jesus Christ gave himself a ransom for his church, and his life for the life of the world, and was a gift given to the world, (John 3:16; 4:10,) and he was a mean to save us; and so, what arguments we have before produced to prove that the king must be inferior to the people, because he is a ransom, a mean, a gift, are not conclusive, I answer,—1. Consider a mean reduplicatively, and formaliter, as a mean; and secondly, as a mean materially, that is, the thing which is a mean. 2. Consider that which is only a mean, and ransom, and gift, and no more; and that which, beside that it is a mean, is of a higher nature also. So Christ formally as a mean, giving his temporal life for a time, according to the flesh, for the eternal life of all the catholic church, to be glorified eternally—(not his blessed godhead and glory, which, as God, he had with the Father from eternity)—in that respect Christ hath the relation of a servant, ransom, gift, and some inferiority in comparison of the church of God; and his Father's glory as a mean, is inferior to the end, but materially, in concreto. Christ is is not only a mean to save his church, but, as God (in which consideration he was the immortal Lord of life) he was more than a mean,—even the Author, Efficient and Creator of heaven and earth; and so there is no ground to say that he is inferior to the church, but the absolute head, king,—the chief of ten thousand;—more in excellency and worth than ten thousand millions of possible worlds of men and angels. But such a consideration cannot befall any mortal king; because, consider the king man terially as a mortal man, he must be inferior to the whole church, for he is but one, and so of less worth than the whole church; as the thumb, though the strongest of the fingers, yet it is inferior to the hand, and far more to the whole body, as any part is inferior to the whole. Consider the king reduplicative and formally as king, and by the official relation he hath, he is no more then but a royal servant, an official mean tending, ex officio, to this end, to preserve the people, to rule and govern them; and a gift of God, given by virtue of his office, to rule the people of God, and so any way inferior to the people.
8. — 那些因职责而必须为人民的安全而奉献自己，甚至献出生命的人，必须低于人民。基督说，生命比衣食更重要，因为这两者都为人的生命而腐败；所以兽类低于人类，因为它们为我们的生命而死，以维持我们的生命。该亚法斯预言得对，一个人死去比整个国家灭亡更好（约翰福音 11:50）；在自然界中，元素违背它们的个别倾向，剥夺了它们的私人和特定目标，以维持自然界的共同体；重元素上升，轻元素下降，以免自然界因真空而灭亡。善牧（约翰福音 10）为他的羊群献出生命；所以扫罗和大卫都被立为国王，为了主的战斗，为了教会和上帝的子民的安全，他们冒着生命的危险。但国王根据职责，必须为上帝的子民的安全而献出生命；他必须为他们而战斗；为了教会，他必须在群羊和死亡之间走动，就像保罗愿意为教会而消耗自己一样。 耶稣基督为他的教会付出了赎价，为世界的生命献上了自己的生命，并成为了赐予世界的礼物（约翰福音 3:16；4:10）。他是拯救我们的手段。因此，我们之前提出的关于国王必须低于人民的论据，因为他是一个赎价、一个手段、一个礼物，都不是确凿的。我回答说，首先，要重复地、正式地考虑一个手段；其次，要考虑那个只是一个手段、赎价和礼物，没有其他更高的本质。所以，基督正式地作为一个手段，按照肉体的时间，为全体天主教会的永恒生命而献出了他的世俗生命，以永远得到荣耀（并不是他作为上帝从永远与父同有的神圣本质和荣耀）。从这个角度来看，基督在上帝的教会面前具有仆人、赎价、礼物的关系，并且与上帝的教会相比有一定的低下地位；而他父亲的荣耀作为一个手段，在具体情况下是低于目标的，但在具体实际中是高于目标的。 基督不仅是拯救教会的手段，而且作为上帝（在这个角度上，他是永生的主）他超越了手段，甚至是天地的创造者、效力者和创作者；因此，没有理由说他比教会低下，而是绝对的头、国王——万万之首；在尊贵和价值上超过了千百万个可能的世界中的人和天使。但这样的考虑不能应用于任何凡人国王；因为，从物质上来看，国王作为一个凡人，他必然比整个教会低下，因为他只是一个人，所以比整个教会的价值更低；就像拇指虽然是手指中最强壮的，但它比手还是低下，更不用说整个身体了，因为任何一部分都比整体低下。从国王作为国王的角度来看，他只是一个王室仆人，一个按职责而存在的手段，从职位上来说，他的目的是保护人民、统治和治理他们；他是上帝的恩赐，是因为他的职位而赋予的，以统治上帝的子民，所以在任何方面都比人民低下。

Arg. 9.—Those who are before the people, and may be a people without a king, must be of more worth than that which is posterior and cannot be a king without them. For thus, God's self-sufficiency is proved, in that he might be, and eternally was, blessed for ever, without his creature; but his creature cannot subsist in being without him. Now, the people were a people many years before there was a government, (save domestic,) and are a people where there is no king, but only an aristocracy or a democracy; but the king can be no king without a people. It is vain that some say, the king and kingdoms are relatives, and not one is before another, for it is true in the naked relation; so are father and son, master and servant, Relata simul natura; but sure there is a priority of worth and independency, for all that, in the father above the son, and in the master above the servant, and so in the people above the king; take away the people, and Dionysius is but a poor schoolmaster.
第九条：那些在人民之前的人，可能是一个没有国王的人民，他们的价值必须比那些在后面的人更高，因为后者没有他们就不能成为国王。因此，上帝的自给自足得到了证明，他可以并且永远是有福的，即使没有他的创造物；但是他的创造物不能在没有他的情况下存在。现在，人民在政府出现之前（除了家庭内部）就是一个人民，而在没有国王的情况下，他们是一个由贵族或民主组成的人民；但是国王没有人民就不能成为国王。有些人说国王和王国是相互关联的，没有一个在另一个之前，这是徒劳的，因为在裸露的关系中是真实的；父亲和儿子、主人和仆人也是如此，关系同时存在；但是毫无疑问，父亲在儿子之上，主人在仆人之上，人民在国王之上有着更高的价值和独立性；去掉人民，狄奥尼修斯只是一个可怜的教师。

Arg. 10.—The people in power are superior to the king, because every efficient and constituent cause is more excellent than the effect. Every mean is inferior in power to the end; (So Jun. Brutus, q. 31. Bucher l. 1. c. 16. Author Lib. de offic. Magistr, q. 6. Henænius disp. 2, n. 6. Joan Roffensis Epist. de potest. pap. l. 2, c. 5. Spalato de Repu. Ecclesiast. l. 6, c. 2, n. 3;) but the people is the efficient and constituent cause, the king is the effect; the people is the end; both intended of God to save the people, to be a healer and a physician to them (Isa. 3:7); and the people appoint and create the king out of their indigence, to preserve themselves from mutual violence. Many things are objected against this. That the efficient and constituent cause is God, and the people are only the instrumental cause; and Spalato saith, that the people doth indirectly only give kingly power, because God, at their act of election, ordinarily giveth it.
权力在人民手中比国王更高，因为每个有效和组成的原因都比效果更优秀。每个手段在力量上都不如目标；（所以 Jun. Brutus, q. 31. Bucher l. 1. c. 16. Author Lib. de offic. Magistr, q. 6. Henænius disp. 2, n. 6. Joan Roffensis Epist. de potest. pap. l. 2, c. 5. Spalato de Repu. Ecclesiast. l. 6, c. 2, n. 3;）但人民是有效和组成的原因，国王是效果；人民是目标；上帝意图拯救人民，成为他们的医治者和医生（以赛亚书 3:7）；人民根据自己的贫困任命和创造国王，以保护自己免受相互暴力。有很多反对意见。说有效和组成的原因是上帝，人民只是工具性原因；Spalato 说，人民只是间接地给予国王权力，因为上帝在他们的选举行为中通常给予权力。

Ans.—1. The Scripture saith plainly, as we heard before, the people made kings; and if they do, as other second causes produce their effects, it is all one that God, as the principal cause, maketh kings, else we should not argue from the cause to the effect amongst the creatures. 2. God, by that same action that the people createth a king, doth also, by them, as by his instruments, create a king; and that God doth not immediately, at the naked presence of the act of popular election, confer royal dignity on the man, without any action of the people, as they say, by the church's act of conferring orders, God doth immediately, without any act of the church, infuse from heaven supernatural liabilities on the man, without any active influence of the church, is evident by this. 1. The royal power to make laws with the king, and so a power eminent in their states representative to govern themselves, is in the people; for if the most high acts of royality be in them, why not the power also? And so, what need to fetch a royal power from heaven to be immediately infused in him, seeing the people hath such a power in themselves at hand? 2. The people can, and doth, limit and bind royal power in elected kings, therefore they have in them royal power to give to the king. Those who limit power, can take away so many degrees of royal power; and those who can take away power, can give power; and it is inconceiveable to say that people can put restraint upon a power immediately coming from God. If Christ immediately infused an apostolic spirit into Paul, mortal men cannot take from him any degrees of that infused spirit; if Christ infuse a spirit of nine degrees, the church cannot limit it to six degrees only. But royalists consent that the people may choose a king upon such conditions to reign, as he hath royal power of ten degrees, whereas his ancestor had by birth a power of fourteen degrees. 3. It is not intelligible that the Holy Ghost should give commandment unto the people to make this man king, (Deut. 17:15, 16,) and forbid them to make that man king, if the people had no active influence in making a king at all; but God, solely and immediately from heaven, did infuse royalty in the king without any action of the people, save a naked consent only; and that after God had made the king, they should approve only with an after-act of naked approbation. 4. If the people by other governors, as by heads of families and other choice men, govern themselves and produce these same formal effects of peace, justice, religion, on themselves, which the king doth produce, then is there a power of the same kind, and as excellent as the royal power, in the people; and there is no reason but this power should be held to come immediately from God, as the royal power; for it is every way of the same nature and kind, as I shall prove. Kings and judges differ not in nature and specie, but it is experienced that people do, by aristocratical guides, govern themselves, &c.; so then, if God immediately infuse royalty when the people chooseth a king, without any action of the people, then must God immediately infuse a beam of governing on a provost and bailie, when the people choose such, and that without any action of the people, because all powers are, in abstracto, from God, (Rom. 13:2.) And God as immediately maketh inferior judges as superior, (Prov. 8:6;) and all promotion (even to be a provost or mayor) cometh from God only, as to be a king; except royalists say, all promotion cometh from the east and from the west, and not from God, except promotion to the royal throne; the contrary whereof is said, Psal. 75:6, 7; 1 Sam. 2:7, 8. Not only kings, but all judges are gods, (Psal. 82:1, 2,) and therefore all must be the same way created and moulded of God, except by Scripture royalists can show us a difference. An English prelate giveth reasons why people, who are said to make kings as efficients and authors, cannot unmake them: the one is, because God, as chief and sole supreme moderator, maketh kings; but I say, Christ, as the chief moderator and head of the church, doth immediately confer abilities upon a man to be a preacher; and though, by industry, the man acquire abilities, yet in regard the church doth not so much as instrumentally confer those abilities, they may be said to come from God immediately, in relation to the church who calleth the man to the ministry. Yea, royalists, as our excommunicated Prelate learned from Spalato, say, that God, at the naked presence of the church's call, doth immediately infuse that from heaven by which the man is now in holy orders and a pastor, whereas he was not so before; and yet prelates cannot deny but they can unmake ministers, and have practised this in their unhallowed courts; and, therefore, though God immediately, without any action of the people, make kings, this is a weak reason to prove they cannot unmake them. As for their indellible character, that prelates cannot take from a minister; it is nothing, if the church may unmake a minister, though his character go to prison with him. We seek no more but to annul the reason, God immediately maketh kings and pastors, therefore no power on earth can unmake them. This consequence is as weak as water. 2. The other cause is, because God hath erected no tribunal on earth higher than the king's tribunal, therefore no power on earth can unmake a king. The antecedent and consequence is both denied, and is a begging of the question; for the tribunal that made the king is above the king. Though there be no tribunal formally regal and kingly above the king, yet is there a tribunal virtual eminently above him in the case of tyranny; for the states and princes have a tribunal above him.
答案：1. 圣经明确说，正如我们之前听到的，人民制造国王；如果他们像其他第二原因产生效果一样，那么上帝作为主要原因制造国王，否则我们就不能从造物主到造物之间的原因推论出效果。2. 上帝通过人民创造国王的同一行动，也通过他们作为他的工具创造国王；而且上帝并不是在人民的裸露选举行为的存在下立即将王权赋予这个人，没有任何人民的行动，正如他们所说，教会的授予职位的行为，上帝立即在没有教会的任何行动下，从天堂注入超自然的责任给这个人，没有教会的积极影响，这是显而易见的。1. 国王有权制定法律，因此在人民中有一种突出的权力，代表他们自己进行治理；因为如果最高的王权行为在他们中间，为什么权力不在呢？所以，为什么需要从天堂获取立即注入他的王权，而人民自己就有这样一种权力呢？2. 人民可以限制和约束选举国王的王权，因此他们拥有赋予国王的王权。那些限制权力的人可以剥夺王权的许多层次；那些可以剥夺权力的人可以赋予权力；而说人民可以对直接来自上帝的权力加以约束是不可思议的。如果基督直接将使徒的灵感注入保罗，凡人不能剥夺他任何一层次的灵感；如果基督注入了九层次的灵感，教会不能将其限制为仅有六层次。但君主主义者同意人民可以在某些条件下选择一个国王来统治，例如他拥有十个层次的王权，而他的祖先出生时拥有十四个层次的王权。3. 不可理解的是，圣灵应该命令人民立这个人为王（申。 17:15, 16 年，并禁止他们将那个人立为国王，如果人民在选举国王的过程中没有积极的影响; 但是上帝，仅仅直接从天上，注入了国王的王权，而没有人民的任何行动，只有赤裸裸的同意; 并且在上帝立了国王之后，他们只能通过赤裸裸的批准行为来批准。 4. 如果人民通过其他统治者，如家族长和其他精英，自己治理并产生与国王产生的和平，正义和宗教等形式效果相同的效果，那么人民就有一种与王权相同且同样优秀的权力; 并且没有理由认为这种权力不应该像王权一样直接来自上帝; 因为它在性质和种类上完全相同，我将证明。 国王和法官在性质和种类上没有区别，但是人们通过贵族指导自己治理，等等，这是有经验的。如果上帝在人民选择国王时立即注入王权，而无需人民的任何行动，那么当人民选择一位警长和法官时，上帝也必须立即注入治理的能力，而无需人民的任何行动，因为所有权力都是从上帝而来的（罗马书 13:2）。上帝像立即创造上级法官一样立即创造下级法官（箴言 8:6）；所有的晋升（甚至成为警长或市长）都只来自上帝，就像成为国王一样；除非君主主义者说，所有的晋升都来自东方和西方，而不是来自上帝，除非是晋升到王位；相反，诗篇 75:6, 7；撒母耳记上 2:7, 8 说了相反的话。不仅国王，所有的法官都是神（诗篇 82:1, 2），因此除非君主主义者能够通过圣经向我们展示一个区别，否则所有的法官都必须以同样的方式由上帝创造和塑造。 一位英国教士给出了人们不能废除国王的原因：首先，因为上帝作为最高的统治者，创造了国王；但我说，基督作为教会的最高统治者和领袖，直接赋予一个人成为传教士的能力；虽然这个人通过努力获得了能力，但由于教会并没有在仪式上赋予这些能力，所以可以说这些能力是直接来自上帝，与教会呼召这个人进入事奉有关。是的，正如我们的被逐出教会的教士从斯帕拉托那里学到的，君主主义者说，上帝在教会的呼召下，立即从天上注入了使这个人成为圣职人员和牧师所需的能力，而之前他并不是如此；然而，主教们不能否认他们可以废除牧师，并在他们不神圣的法庭上实践了这一点；因此，尽管上帝在人民的任何行动之外立即创造了国王，但这并不足以证明他们不能被废除。 至于他们不可磨灭的品格，主教不能从一位牧师身上剥夺；如果教会可以废除一位牧师，那么他的品格就算被关进监狱也无济于事。我们只是寻求废除这个理由，上帝立即立王和牧师，因此地上没有任何权力可以废除他们。这个推论就像水一样脆弱。另一个原因是，因为上帝在地上没有建立比国王法庭更高的法庭，所以地上没有任何权力可以废除国王。前提和结论都被否认了，这是一个问题的提出；因为创造国王的法庭在国王之上。虽然没有正式的国王法庭在国王之上，但在暴政的情况下，确实有一个在他之上的虚拟法庭；因为国家和君主有一个在他之上的法庭。

Assert.—To this the constituent cause is of more power and dignity than the effect, and so the people are above the king. The P. Prelate borrowed an answer from Arnisæus, and Barclay, and other royalists, and saith, If we knew anything in law, or were ruled by reason, "every constituent, (saith Arnisæus and Barclay, more accurately than the P. Prelate had a head to transcribe their words,) where the constituent hath resigned all his power in the hand of the prince whom he constitutes, is of more worth and power than he in whose hand he resigns the power: so the proposition is false. The servant who hath constituted his master lord of his liberty, is not more worthy than his master whom he hath made his lord, and to whom he hath given himself as a slave, (for after he hath resigned his liberty he cannot repent, he must keep covenant though to his hurt,) yea, such a servant is not only not above his master, but he cannot move his foot without his master." "The governor of Britain (saith Arnisæus) being despised by king Philip, resigned himself as vassal to king Edward of England; but did not for that make himself superior to king Edward. Indeed, he who constituteth another under him as a legate is superior; but the people do constitute a king above themselves, not a king under themselves; and, therefore, the people are not by this made the king's superior, but his inferior."
断言。在这里，构成原因比效果更有力量和尊严，因此人民高于国王。P. Prelate 从 Arnisæus、Barclay 和其他王党派借来一个答案，他说，如果我们懂法律，或者按理性行事，“每一个构成者（Arnisæus 和 Barclay 比 P. Prelate 更准确地引用了他们的话）在构成者将所有权力交给他所构成的君主的手中后，比他更有价值和权力：所以这个命题是错误的。那个把自己的自由让给主人的仆人，并不比他所让给的主人更有价值，也不比他所让给的主人更高，他把自己当作奴隶给了主人（因为在他放弃自由之后，他不能后悔，他必须遵守契约，即使对他自己有害），是的，这样的仆人不仅不高于他的主人，而且他不能没有主人的允许行动。”“不列颠的统治者（Arnisæus 说）被菲利普国王蔑视，作为臣子向英格兰的爱德华国王投降；但是他并没有因此而使自己高于爱德华国王。 事实上，将他人任命为自己的代表者的人是上级；但人民确实将国王置于自己之上，而不是将国王置于自己之下；因此，人民并非因此成为国王的上级，而是他的下级。"

Ans. 1.—It is false that the people doth, or can by the law of nature, resign their whole liberty in the hand of a king. 1. They cannot resign to others that which they have not in themselves, Nemo potest dare quod non habet; but the people hath not an absolute power in themselves to destroy themselves, or to exercise those tyrannous acts spoken of, 1 Sam. 8:11–15, &c.; for neither God nor nature's law hath given any such power. 2. He who constituteth himself a slave is supposed to be compelled to that unnatural act of alienation of that liberty which he hath from his Maker from the womb, by violence, constraint, or extreme necessity, and so is inferior to all free men; but the people doth not make themselves slaves when they constitute a king over themselves; because God, giving to a people a king, the best and most excellent governor on earth, giveth a blessing and special favour, (Isa. 1:26; Hos. 1:11; Isa. 3:6, 7; Psal. 78:70–72;) but to lay upon his people the state of slavery, in which they renounce their whole liberty, is a curse of God. (Gen. 9:25; 27:29; Deut. 28:32, 36.) But the people, having their liberty to make any of ten, or twenty, their king, and to advance one from a private state to an honourable throne, whereas it was in their liberty to advance another, and to give him royal power of ten degrees, whereas they might give him power of twelve degrees, of eight, or six, must be in excellency and worth above the man whom they consitute king, and invest with such honour; as honour in the fountain, and honos participans et originans, must be more excellent and pure than the derived honour in the king, which is honos participatus et originatus. If the servant give his liberty to his master, therefore he had that liberty in him, and in that act, liberty must be in a more excellent way in the servant, as in the fountain, than it is in the master; and so this liberty must be purer in the people than in the king; and therefore, in that both the servant is above the master, and the people worthier than the king. And when the people give themselves conditionally and covenant-wise to the king, as to a public servant, and patron, and tutor,—as the governor of Britain, out of his humour, gave himself to king Edward—there is even here a note of superiority. Every giver of a benefit, as a giver, is superior to him to whom the gift is given; though after the servant hath given away his gift of liberty, by which he was superior, he cannot be a superior, because by his gift he hath made himself inferior. The people constituteth a king above themselves, I distinguish supra se, above themselves; according to the fountain-power of royalty,—that is false; for the fountain-power remaineth most eminently in the people, 1. Because they give it to the king, ad modum recipientis, and with limitations; therefore it is unlimited in the people, and bounded and limited in the king, and so less in the king than in the people. 2. If the king turn distracted, and an ill spirit from the Lord come upon Saul, so as reason be taken from a Nebuchadnezzar, it is certain the people may put curators and tutors over him who hath the royal power. 3. If the king be absent and taken captive, the people may give the royal power to one, or to some few, to exercise it as custodes regni. And, 4. If he die, and the crown go by election, they may create another, with more or less power. All which evinceth, that they never constituted over themselves a king, in regard of fountain-power; for if they give away the fountain, as a slave selleth his liberty, they could not make use of it. Indeed they set a king above them, quoad potestatem legum executivam, in regard of a power of executing laws and actual government for their good and safety; but this proveth only that the king is above the people, κατὰ τὶ, in sonie respect. But the most eminent and fountain-power of royalty remaineth in the people as in an immortal spring, which they communicate by succession to this or that mortal man, in the manner and measure that they think good. Ulpian and Bartolus,2 cited by our Prelate out of Barclaius, are only to be understood of the derived, secondary, and borrowed power of executing laws, and not of the fountain-power, which the people cannot give away, no more than they can give away their rational nature; for it is a power natural to conserve themselves, essentially adhering to every created being. For if the people give all their power away, what shall they reserve to make a new king, if this man die? What if the royal line should cease? there be no prophets immediately sent of God to make kings. What if he turn tyrant, and destroy his subjects with the sword? The royalists say, they may fly; but, when they made him king, they resigned all their power to him, even their power of flying; for they bound themselves by an oath (say royalists) to all passive and lawful active obedience; and, I suppose, to stand at his tribunal, if he summoned the three estates, upon treason, to come before him, is contained in the oath, that royalists say, bindeth all, and is contradictory to flying.
答案 1.——人民并不会，也不能按照自然法则将他们的全部自由交给国王。1. 他们不能将自己没有的东西交给别人，Nemo potest dare quod non habet；但是人民并没有绝对的权力来毁灭自己，或者行使所说的那些暴虐的行为，撒母耳记上 8:11–15 等；因为上帝和自然法并没有赋予任何这样的权力。2. 自愿成为奴隶的人被认为是被暴力、强迫或极端的需要所迫而进行了这种不自然的剥夺他们从胎儿时期起就由造物主赋予的自由的行为，因此他们低于所有自由人；但是人民在选举国王时并没有使自己成为奴隶；因为上帝给予人民一个国王，这是地球上最好、最优秀的统治者，给予了祝福和特殊的恩宠，（以赛亚书 1:26；何西阿书 1:11；以赛亚书 3:6, 7；诗篇 78:70–72）；但是将人民置于他们放弃全部自由的奴隶状态，是上帝的诅咒。（创世记 9:25；27:29；申命记 28:32, 36）。但是人民有权利选择十个或二十个人中的任何一个作为他们的国王，并将一个私人晋升为崇高的王位，而他们有权选择另一个人，并赋予他十级的王权，而他们也可以给予他十二级、八级或六级的权力，因此，人民在卓越和价值上必须高于他们所任命的国王，并赋予他如此崇高的荣誉；因为荣誉在源头上是卓越和纯洁的，而在国王身上是派生和参与的。如果仆人将他的自由给了主人，那么他就在自己身上拥有了那种自由，在那个行为中，自由必须以比主人更卓越的方式存在于仆人身上，就像在源头上一样，因此，这种自由在人民身上必须比在国王身上更纯洁；因此，在仆人高于主人的同时，人民也比国王更有价值。 当人们有条件地和契约式地将自己交给国王，视其为公仆、保护人和导师时，就像英国的统治者出于自己的兴趣将自己交给爱德华国王一样，这里甚至有一种优越感的标志。作为施恩者，每个人都比接受礼物的人更高贵；尽管仆人通过放弃他的自由礼物，使自己变得卑微，但他不能再是上级，因为他通过礼物使自己变得卑微。人民在他们之上设立了一个国王，我将其区分为“高于自己”，根据王权的源泉权力来看，这是错误的；因为源泉权力最显著地留在人民手中，1.因为他们将其给予国王，按照接受者的方式，并加以限制；因此，人民的权力是无限的，而国王的权力是有限的，比人民的权力更小。2.如果国王变得疯狂，上帝降下了一个邪恶的灵魂，使其像尼布甲尼撒王一样失去理智，那么人民肯定可以在拥有王权的人身上设立监护人和导师。3. 如果国王不在或被俘，人民可以将皇权交给一个人或少数几个人来行使守护国家的职责。如果国王去世，王位通过选举传承，他们可以创造出一个具有更多或更少权力的新国王。这一切都表明，他们从未在自己身上设立过一个国王，因为如果他们放弃了源泉，就像奴隶出卖自己的自由一样，他们就无法利用它。实际上，他们将国王置于自己之上，就执行法律和实际治理的权力而言，是为了他们的利益和安全；但这只证明了国王在某种程度上高于人民。然而，最显著和源泉的王权仍然存在于人民中，就像一个不朽的泉源，他们通过继承将其传递给这个或那个凡人，以他们认为合适的方式和程度。 乌尔皮安和巴尔托洛斯，引用巴克莱斯的我们的教长所说的，只是指执行法律的派生、次要和借用的权力，而不是源头权力，人民不能放弃这种权力，就像他们不能放弃他们的理性本质一样；因为这是一种本质上与每个被创造的存在紧密相连的保护自己的权力。因为如果人民把他们所有的权力都放弃了，那么如果这个人死了，他们还能保留什么来选举新国王呢？如果皇室血统断绝了怎么办？没有立即由上帝派遣的先知来立国王。如果他变成暴君，用剑杀害他的臣民怎么办？皇室主义者说，他们可以逃跑；但是，当他们把他立为国王时，他们把所有的权力都放弃给了他，甚至包括逃跑的权力；因为他们通过誓言（皇室主义者说）对所有被动和合法的积极服从负责；而且，我想，如果他召集三个等级在叛国罪上出庭，他们必须站在他的法庭上，这是包含在皇室主义者所说的约束所有人的誓言中的，而且与逃跑是矛盾的。

Arnisæus, a more learned jurist and divine than the P. Prelate, answereth the other maxim, "The end is worthier than the mean leading to the end, because it is ordained for the end. These means, (saith he,) which refer their whole nature to the end, and have all their excellency from the end, and have excellency from no other thing but from the end, are less excellent than the end. That is true, such an end as medicine is for health." And Hugo Grotius, (l. 1, c. 3, n. 8,) "Those means which are only for the end, and for the good of the end, and are not for their own good, also are of less excellency, and inferior to the end; but so the assumption is false. But these means which, beside their relation to the end, have an excellency of nature in themselves, are not always inferior to the end. The disciple, as he is instituted, is inferior to the master; but as he is the son of a prince, he is above the master. But by this reason the shepherd should be inferior to brute beasts, to sheep; and the master of the family is for the family, and referreth all that he hath for the entertaining of the family; but it followeth not therefore the family is above him. The form is for the action, is therefore the action more excellent than the form, and an accident than the subject or substance?" And Grotius saith, "Every government is not for the good of another, but some for its own good, as the government of a master over the servant, and the husband over the wife.
Arnisæus,一位比 P. Prelate 更有学问的法学家和神学家，回答了另一个格言：“目标比达到目标的手段更有价值，因为它是为了目标而设定的。这些手段（他说），它们的整个本质都与目标相关，并且它们的卓越性都来自于目标，并且没有其他东西比目标更卓越。这是真实的，就像药物是为了健康而存在的目标一样。”而 Hugo Grotius（l. 1, c. 3, n. 8）说：“那些只为了目标而存在，为了目标的利益而存在，并且不是为了自身利益而存在的手段，也是较低级的，低于目标；但是这个假设是错误的。但是那些除了与目标的关系之外，本身具有卓越性的手段，并不总是低于目标。学生在受教育时低于导师；但是作为王子的儿子，他高于导师。但是按照这个理由，牧羊人应该低于畜牲，低于绵羊；家庭的主人是为了家庭而存在的，并且把他所有的东西都用于维持家庭的生活；但是并不因此意味着家庭高于他。” 这个形式是为了行动，因此行动比形式更出色，而事故比主体或物质更重要吗？"格罗修斯说："每个政府并非都是为了他人的利益，而是有些为了自身的利益，比如主人对仆人的统治，丈夫对妻子的统治。"

Ans.—I take the answer thus: Those who are mere means, and only means referred to the end, they are inferior to the end; but the king, as king, hath all his official and relative goodness in the world, as relative to the end. All that you can imagine to be in a king, as a king, is all relative to the safety and good of the people, (Rom. 13:4,) "He is a minister for thy good." He should not, as king, make himself, or his own gain and honour, his end. I grant, the king, as a man, shall die as another man, and so he may secondarily intend his own good; and what excellency he hath as a man, is the excellency of one mortal man, and cannot make him amount in dignity, and in the absolute consideration of the excellency of a man, to be above many men and a whole kingdom; for the more good things there be, the better they are, so the good things be multiplicable, as a hundred men are better than one; otherwise, if the good be such as cannot be multiplied, as one God, the multiplication maketh them worse, as many gods are inferior to one God. Now if royalists can show us any more in the king than these two, we shall be obliged to them; and in both he is inferior to the whole.
答案是这样的：我这样理解：那些只是手段，只是为了达到目的而存在的手段，他们比目的本身低劣；但是国王作为国王，在世界上拥有他所有的官方和相对的善良，与目的相关。你能想象到的国王作为国王的一切，都与人民的安全和福祉相关，（罗马书 13:4），“他是为你的利益而服务的。”作为国王，他不应该把自己或者自己的利益和荣誉作为目的。我承认，作为一个人，国王会像其他人一样死去，所以他可以次要地考虑自己的利益；作为一个人，他的卓越之处是一个凡人的卓越之处，不能使他在尊严和绝对考虑一个人的卓越之处时超过许多人和整个王国；因为越多的好事物，它们就越好，所以好事物是可倍增的，就像一百个人比一个人更好；否则，如果好事物是不能倍增的，比如一个神，倍增会使它们变得更差，因为许多神比一个神低劣。现在，如果君主派能够向我们展示国王比这两个方面更多的东西，我们将对他们表示感激；而在这两个方面，他都比整体低劣。

The Prelate and his followers would have the maxim to lose credit; for then (say they) the shepherd should be inferior to the sheep; but in this the maxim faileth indeed, because the shepherd is a reasonable man, and the sheep brute beasts, and so must be more excellent than all the flocks of the world. Now, as he is a reasonable man, he is not a shepherd, nor in that relation referred to the sheep and their preservation as a mean to the end; but he is a shepherd by accident, for the unruliness of the creatures, for man's sin, withdrawing themselves from that natural dominion that man had over the creatures before the fall; in that relation of a mean to the end, and so by accident, is this official relation put on him; and according to that official relation, and by accident, man is put to be a servant to the brutish creature, and a mean to so base an end. But all this proveth him, through man's sin and by accident, to be under the official relation of a mean to baser creatures than himself, as to the end, but not a reasonable man. But the king, as king, is an official and royal mean to this end, that the people may lead a godly and peaceable life under him; and this official relation being an accident, is of less worth than the whole people, as they are to be governed. And I grant the king's son, in relation to blood and birth, is more excellent than his teachers; but as he is taught, he is inferior to his teacher. But in both considerations the king is inferior to the people; or though he command the people, and so have an executive power of law above them, yet have they a fountain-power above him, because they made him king, and in God's intention he is given as king for their good, according to this, "Thou shalt feed my people Israel," and that, "I gave him for a leader of my people."
主教及其追随者会有这样的格言，即他们会失去信誉；因为（他们说）牧羊人应该比绵羊低人一等；但实际上这个格言是错误的，因为牧羊人是一个理智的人，而绵羊是愚蠢的动物，所以牧羊人必须比世界上所有的羊群更优秀。现在，作为一个理智的人，他不是一个牧羊人，也不是以那种与绵羊及其保护相关的关系来看待的；但他是一个偶然成为牧羊人的人，是因为动物的不服从，是因为人类的罪恶，是因为在堕落之前人类对动物拥有的自然统治权被撤销；在这种以一种手段为目的的关系中，他被偶然地赋予了这个职务；根据这个职务的关系，以及偶然的原因，人类被迫成为愚蠢生物的仆人，成为如此卑劣的目标的手段。但所有这一切都证明了，通过人类的罪恶和偶然的原因，他处于比自己更低级的生物的手段的官方关系之下，但并不是一个理智的人。 但是作为国王，他是一个官员和王室的手段，目的是让人民在他的统治下过上虔诚和和平的生活；而这种官方关系只是偶然的，价值不如整个人民，因为他们是被统治的对象。我承认国王的儿子在血统和出生方面比他的老师更优秀；但是在接受教育时，他比他的老师要逊色。但无论从哪个角度来看，国王都逊于人民；即使他命令人民，并且在法律上拥有执行权力，但他们拥有比他更高的权力，因为是他们让他成为国王，而且按照上帝的意图，他被赋予国王的身份是为了人民的利益，正如所说的，“你要牧养我的以色列民”，以及“我将他立为我的百姓的领袖”。"

The P. Prelate saith: "The constituent cause is more excellent than the effect constituted, where the constitution is voluntary, and dependeth upon the free act of the will, as when the king maketh a viceroy or a judge, durante beneplacito, during his free will, but not when a man maketh over his right to another; for then there should be neither faith nor truth in covenants, if people might make over their power to their king, and retract and take back what they hare once given.
教廷高级教士说：“在构成是自愿的、依赖意愿自由行为的情况下，构成原因比构成效果更为优秀，就像国王任命一位副王或法官，期限为自由意愿期间，但当一个人将自己的权利转让给他人时，就不是这样了；因为如果人们可以将他们的权力转让给国王，然后又收回，那么契约中就不会有信任和真实。”

Ans.—This is a begging of the question; for it is denied that the people can absolutely make away their whole power to the king. It dependeth on the people that they be not destroyed. They give to the king a politic power for their own safety, and they keep a natural power to themselves which they must conserve, but cannot give away; and they do not break their covenant when they put in action that natural power to conserve themselves; for though the people should give away that power, and swear though the king should kill them all, they should not resist, nor defend their own lives, yet that being against the sixth commandment, which enjoineth natural self-preservation, it should not oblige the conscience, for it should be intrinsically sinful; for it is all one to swear to non-self-preservation as to swear to self-murder.
答案：这是一个问题的开端；因为否认人民可以完全将他们的全部权力交给国王。人民的存在取决于他们不被摧毁。他们将政治权力交给国王是为了自己的安全，同时保留了自己的自然权力，这是他们必须保护的，但不能放弃的；当他们行使这种自然权力来保护自己时，并没有违反他们的契约；因为即使人民放弃了这种权力，并且发誓即使国王杀死他们所有人，他们也不会抵抗，也不会保卫自己的生命，但这违反了第六诫命，即要求自然自我保护，所以这不应该束缚良心，因为这是本质上的罪恶；因为发誓不保护自己就等于发誓自杀。

"If the people, (saith the Prelate, begging the answer from Barclay,) the constituent, be more excellent than the effect, and so the people above the king, because they constitute him king, then the counties and corporations may make void all the commissions given to the knights and burgesses of the House of Commons, and send others in their place, and repeal their orders; therefore Buchanan saith, that orders and laws in parliament were but προβουλέματα preparatory consultations, and had not the force of a law, till the people give their consent and have their influence authoritative, upon the statutes and acts of parliament; but the observator holdeth that the legislative power is whole and entire in the parliament. But when the Scots were preferring petitions and declarations they put all power in the collective body, and kept their distinct tables.
如果人民（请教巴克利的答案）比效果更优秀，因此人民高于国王，因为他们构成了国王，那么各县和公司可以废除所有授予下议院骑士和市民的委任状，并派其他人代替他们，并废除他们的命令；因此，布坎南说，议会中的命令和法律只是准备性的咨询，并没有法律的力量，直到人民给予他们的同意并对议会的法令和行为产生权威影响；但观察者认为立法权完全属于议会。但是当苏格兰人提出请愿书和宣言时，他们将所有权力集中在集体机构中，并保留了他们的独立机构。

Ans.—1. There is no consequence here the counties and incorporations that send commissioners to parliament, may make void their commissions and annul their acts, because they constitute them commissioners. If they be unjust acts, they may disobey them, and so disannul them; but, it is presumed, God hath given no moral power to do ill, nor can the counties and corporations give any such power to evil, for they have not any such from God. If they be just acts, they are to obey them, and cannot retract commissions to make just orders. Illud tantum possumus quod jure possumus, and therefore, as power to govern justly is irrevocably committed by the three estates who made the king to the king, so is that same power committed by the shires and corporations to their commissioners, to decree in parliament what is just and good irrevocably; and to take any just power from the king which is his due, is a great sin. But when he abuseth his power to the destruction of his subjects, it is lawful to throw a sword out of a madman's hand, though it be his own proper sword, and though he have due right td it, and a just power to use it for good; for all fiduciary power abused may be repealed. And if the knights and burgesses of the House of Commons abuse their fiduciary power to the destruction of these shires and corporations who put the trust on them, the observator did never say that parliamentary power was so entire and irrevocably in them, as that the people may not resist them, annul their commissions and rescind their acts, and denude them of fiduciary power, even as the king may be denuded of that same power by the three estates; for particular corporations are no more to be denuded of that fountain-power of making commissioners, and of the self-preservation, than the three estates are. 2. The P. Prelate cometh not home to the mind of Buchanan, who knew the fundamental laws of Scotland, and the power of parliaments; for his meaning was not to deny a legislative power in the parliament; but when he calleth their parliamentary declarations προβουλέματα, his meaning is only that which lawyers and schoolmen both say, Leges non promulgatæ non habent vim legis actu completo obligatoriæ,—"Laws not promulgated do not oblige the subject while they be promulgated;" but he fulfils Buchanan, when he saith, "Parliamentary laws must have the authoritative influence of the people, before they can be formal laws, or any more than προβουλέματα or preparatory notions. And it was no wonder when the king denied a parliament, and the supreme senate of the secret council was corrupted, that the people did then set up tables, and extraordinary judicatures of the three estates, seeing there could not be any other government for the time. 重试    错误原因

Barclay answereth to this: "The mean is inferior to the end, it holdeth not; the tutor and curator is for the minor, as for the end, and given for his good; but it followeth not that, therefore, the tutor, in the administration of the minor or pupil's inheritance, is not superior to the minor."
巴克利回答道：“中间状态不如最终目标，它是不可持续的；导师和监护人是为了未成年人，是为了最终目标，是为了他的利益；但这并不意味着，因此，在处理未成年人或学生的财产时，导师不比未成年人更有权力。”

Ans.—It followeth well that the minor virtually, and in the intention of the law, is more excellent than the tutor, though the tutor can exercise more excellent acts than the pupil, by accident, for defect of age in the minor, yet he doth exercise those acts with subordination to the minor, and with correction, because he is to render an account of his doings to the pupil coming to age; so the tutor is only more excellent and superior in some respect, κατὰ τὶ but not simply, and so is the king in some respect above the people.
答案：根据法律的意图，次要的在本质上比导师更出色，尽管导师可以在某些意外情况下比学生执行更出色的行为，但他在执行这些行为时是向学生屈从并受到纠正的，因为他需要向成年的学生交代自己的行为；因此，导师在某些方面只是更出色和更高级的，但并非绝对如此，就像国王在某些方面高于人民一样。

The P. Prelate beggeth from the royalists another of our arguments, Quod efficit tale, est magis tale,—"That which maketh another such, is far more such itself." If the people give royal power to the king, then far more is the royal power in the people. By this (saith the Prelate) it shall follow, if the observator give all his goods to me, to make me rich, the observator is more rich: if the people give most part of their goods to foment the rebellion, then the people are more rich, having given all they have upon the public faith.
主教请求皇室支持者提供我们的另一个论点，即"Quod efficit tale, est magis tale"——"使他人成为这样的东西，自身更加如此"。如果人民将皇权授予国王，那么人民中的皇权就更加强大。主教说，由此可推断，如果观察者把他所有的财产都给我，使我变得富有，那么观察者就更富有；如果人民将他们大部分的财产用于煽动叛乱，那么人民就更富有，因为他们把所有的财产都交给了公共信用。

Ans.—1. This greedy Prelate was made richer than ten poor pursuivants, by a bishopric; it will follow well,—therefore, the bishopric is richer than the bishop, whose goods die curse of God blasteth. 2. It holdeth in efficient causes, so working in other things as the virtue of the effect remaineth in the cause, even after the production of the effect. As the sun maketh all things light, the fire all things hot, therefore the sun is more light, the fire more hot; but where the cause doth alienate and make over, in a corporal manner, that which it hath to another, as the hungry Prelate would have the observator's goods, it holdeth not; for the effect may exhaust the virtue of the cause, but the people doth, as the fountain, derive a stream of royalty to Saul, and make him king, and yet so as they keep fountain-power of making kings in themselves; yea, when Saul is dead to make David king at Hebron, and when he is dead to make Solomon king, and after him to make Rehoboam king; and, therefore, in the people there is more fountain-power of making kings than in David, in Saul, in any king of the world. As for the Prelate's scoff about the people's giving of their goods to the good cause, I hope it shall, by the blessing of God, enrich them more; whereas prelates, by the rebellion in Ireland, (to which they assent, when they council his Majesty to sell the blood of some hundred thousands of innocents killed in Ireland,) are brought, from thousands a year, to beg a morsel of bread.
答案：1. 这个贪婪的主教通过主教职位比十个贫穷的追捕者更富有，因此可以得出结论，主教职位比那些被上帝诅咒的主教更富有。2. 它适用于有效原因，在其他事物中起作用，即使在产生效果之后，效果的力量仍然存在于原因中。太阳使一切变得明亮，火使一切变得炎热，因此太阳更明亮，火更炎热；但是当原因以物质的方式转让和转移其所拥有的东西时，例如贪婪的主教想要监察员的财产，这个原理就不适用；因为效果可能耗尽原因的力量，但人民就像泉水一样，将王权的流派传给扫罗，使他成为国王，但他们保留了自己制造国王的泉水力量；是的，当扫罗死后，在希伯仑使大卫成为国王，当大卫死后，使所罗门成为国王，之后又使罗波安成为国王；因此，在人民中，制造国王的泉水力量比大卫、扫罗或世界上任何国王都更强大。 至于主教对人们将他们的财物奉献给善事的嘲笑，我希望上帝的祝福能让他们更加富裕；而主教们因为爱尔兰的叛乱（他们在劝告陛下出售在爱尔兰杀害的数十万无辜者的血时表示同意），从每年数千英镑的收入，变得乞求一口面包。

The P. Prelate (p. 131) answereth that maxim, Quod efficit tale, id ipsum est magis tale,—"That which maketh another such, it is itself more such." It is true, de principio formali effectivo, (as I learned in the university,) of such an agent as is formally such in itself as is the effect produced. Next, it is such as is effective and productive of itself, as when fire heateth cold water, so the quality must be formally inherent in the agent; as wine maketh drunk, it followeth not, wine is more drunk, because drunkenness is not inherent in the wine, nor is it capable of drunkenness; and, therefore, Aristotle qualifieth the maxim with this, Quod efficit tale est magis tale, modo utrique insit,—"and it holdeth not in agents, who operate by donation, if the right of the king be transferred from the people to the king." The donation divesteth the people totally of it, except the king have it by way of loan, which, to my thinking, never yet any spoke; Sovereignty never was, never can be, in the community. Sovereignty hath power of life and death, which none hath over himself, and the community conceived without government, all as equal, endowed with nature's and native liberty, of that community no one can have power over the life of another. And so the argument may be turned home, if the people be not tales, such by nature, (as hath formally royal power, he should say,) they cannot give the king royal power; also, none hath power of life and death, either more eminently or formally, the people, either singly or collectively, have not power over their own life, much less over their neighbours'.
普雷拉特主教（第 131 页）回答了这个格言，即“使别人成为什么样，它本身就更加如此。”这是真实的，从形式上来说，（正如我在大学里学到的那样，）这是由一个在本质上与产生的效果相同的代理人所产生的。其次，它是自我有效和自我生产的，就像火加热冷水一样，质量必须在代理人中形式上固有；就像酒使人醉了一样，酒并不更醉，因为醉酒不是酒的固有属性，也不能醉酒；因此，亚里士多德用这个格言修饰了这个格言，即“使别人成为什么样，它本身就更加如此，只要两者都存在。”如果国王的权利从人民转移到国王，那么这个格言就不适用于行使赠与权的代理人。”赠与完全剥夺了人民的权利，除非国王以借贷的方式拥有它，但在我看来，从来没有人这样说过；主权从来不是，也永远不会在社区中存在。 主权拥有生死权力，没有人能够拥有自己的生死权力，没有政府的社群，所有人都是平等的，拥有天赋的自由，对于这个社群来说，没有人能够对他人的生命拥有权力。因此，如果人民不是天生的国王（他应该说），他们就不能给予国王王权；同样，没有人能够比人民更突出或正式地拥有生死权力，无论是个别地还是集体地，人民都没有权力支配自己的生命，更不用说邻居的生命了。

Ans.—1. The Prelate would make the maxim true of a formal cause, and this he learned in the University of St. Andrews. He wrongeth the university, he rather learned it while he kept the calves of Crail. The wall is white from whiteness; therefore, whiteness is more white by the Prelate's learning. Never such thing was taught in that learned university. 2. Principium formale effectivum is as good logic as principium effectivum materiale, formale, finale. The Prelate is in his accuracy of logic now. He yet maketh the causality of the formal cause all one with the causality of the efficient; but he is weak in his logic. 3. He confoundeth a cause equivocal and a cause univocal, and in that case the maxim holdeth not. Nor is it necessary to make true the maxim, that the quality be inherent in the cause the same way; for a city maketh a mayor, but to be a mayor is one way in the city, and another way in him who is created mayor. The Prelate's maxim would help him, if we reasoned thus: The people maketh the king, therefore the people is more a king, and more formally a sovereign than the king. But that is no more our argument than the simile that Maxwell used, as near heart and mouth both. Wine maketh drunk the Prelate, therefore wine is more drunk. But we reason thus: The fountain-power of making six kings is in the people, therefore there is more fountain-power of royalty in the people than in any one king. For we read that Israel made Saul king, and made David king, and made Abimelech king; but never that king Saul made another king, or that an earthly king made another absolute king. 4. The Prelate will have the maxim false, where the agent worketh by donation, which yet holdeth true by his own grant (c. 9, p. 98). The king giveth power to a deputy, therefore there is more power in the king. 5. He supposeth that which is the basis and foundation of all the question, that people divesteth themselves totally of their fountain-power, which is most false. 6. Either they must divest themselves totally (saith he) of their power, or the king hath power from the people, by way of loan, which, to my thinking, never any yet spake. But the P. Prelate's thinking is short, and no rule to divines and lawyers; for, to the thinking of the learned jurists, this power of the king is but fiduciary, and that is (whether the Prelate think it or think it not) a sort of power by trust, pawn or loan. Rex director Regni, non proprietarius, (Molinæ. in consuet. Parisi. Tit. 1, 9; 1 Gloss. 7, n. 9,)—"The king is a life-renter, not a lord, or proprietor of his kingdom." So Novel. 85, in princip, et c. 18, Quod magistratus sit nudus dispensator et defensor jurium regni, non pro-prietarius, constat, ex eo quod non posset alienare imperium, oppida, urbes, regiones ve, vel res subditorum, bonave regni. So Gregory, l. 3, c. 8, de Repub. per c. 1, Sect. præterea, de propo. feud. Hottoman, quest. illust. 1; Ferdinan. Vasquez, I. 1, c. 4; Bossius, de princip. et privileg. illius, n. 290,—"The king is only a steward, and a defender of the laws of the kingdom, not a proprietor, because he hath not power to make away the empire, cities, towns, countries, and goods of the subjects;" and, bona commissa magistratui, sunt subjecta restitutioni, et in prejudicium successorum alienari non possunt, (per l. ult. Sect. sed nost. C. Comment. de leg. l. peto 69, fratrem de leg. 2, l. 32, ult. d. t.)—"All the goods committed to any magistrate are under restitution; for he hath not power to make them away, to the prejudice of his successors." The Prelate's thoughts reach not the secrets of jurists, and therefore he speaketh with a warrant; he will say no more than his short-travelled thoughts can reach, and that is but at the door. 7. Sovereignty is not in the community, (saith the P. Prelate). Truly it neither is, nor can be, more than ten, or a thousand, or a thousand thousands, or a whole kingdom, can be one man; for sovereignty is the abstract, the sovereign is the concrete. Many cannot be one king or one soverign: a sovereign must be essentially one; and a multitude cannot be one. But what then? May not the sovereign power be eminently, fontaliter, originally and radically in the people? I think it may, and must be. A king is not an under judge: he is not a lord of council and session formally, because he is more. The people are not king formally, because the people are eminently more than the king; for they make David king, and Saul king; and the power to make a lord of council and session, is in the king (say royalists). 8. A community hath not power of life and death; a king hath power of life and death (saith the Prelate). What then? Therefore a community is not king. I grant all. The power of making a king, who hath power of life and death, is not in the people. Poor man! It is like prelates logic. Samuel is not a king, therefore he cannot make David a king. It followeth not by the Prelate's ground. So the king is not an inferior judge. What! Therefore he cannot make an inferior judge? 9. The power of life and death is eminently and virtually in the people, collectively taken, though not formally. And though no man can take away his own life, or hath power over his own life formally, yet a man, and a body of men, hath power over their own lives, radically and virtually, in respect they may render themselves to a magistrate, and to laws which, if they violate, they must be in hazard of their lives; and so they virtually have power of their own lives, by putting them under the power of good laws, for the peace and safety of the whole. 10. This is a weak consequence. None hath power of his own life, therefore, far less of his neighbour's (saith the Prelate). I shall deny the consequence. The king hath not power of his own life, that is, according to the Prelate's mind, he can neither, by the law of nature, nor by any civil law, kill himself; therefore, the king hath far less power to kill another; it followeth not: for the judge hath more power over his neighbour's life than over his own. 11. But, saith the P. Prelate, the community conceived without government, all as equal, endowed with nature's and native liberty, hath no power of life and death, because all are born free; and so none is born with dominion and power over his neighbour's life. Yea, but so, Mr P. Prelate, a king considered without government, and as born a free man, hath not power of any man's life more than a community hath; for king and beggar are born both alike free. But a community, in this consideration, as they come from the womb, have no politic consideration at all. If you consider them as without all policy, you cannot consider them as invested with policy; yea, if you consider them so as they are by nature, void of all policy, they cannot so much as add their after-consent and approbation to such a man to be their king, whom God immediately from heaven maketh a king; for to add such an after-consent, is an act of government. Now, as they are conceived to want all government, they cannot perform any act of government. And this is as much against himself as against us.
答案：1.主教会使形式原因的格言成为真理，他在圣安德鲁斯大学学到了这一点。他冤枉了大学，他更多是在照顾 Crail 的小牛时学到的。墙是白色的，因为白色；因此，主教的学问使白色更白。在那所有学问渊博的大学里从未教过这样的事情。2.效果形式原则和效果物质原则、形式原则、终极原则一样好。主教在逻辑的准确性方面很好。他仍然将形式原因的因果性与效果的因果性视为一体；但他在逻辑上很薄弱。3.他混淆了一个模棱两可的原因和一个单一的原因，在这种情况下，这个格言就不成立了。并且没有必要使这个格言成为真理，即质量以相同的方式存在于原因中；因为一个城市造就了市长，但成为市长在城市中是一种方式，在被任命为市长的人身上是另一种方式。如果我们这样推理，主教的格言会对他有所帮助：人民造就了国王，因此人民更像国王，更正式地成为君主。 但这不是我们的论点，就像麦克斯韦尔使用的比喻一样，近乎心口相连。酒使主教醉倒，因此酒更能使人醉倒。但我们的推理是这样的：使六个国王产生的源泉力量在人民手中，因此人民的源泉力量比任何一个国王都更具王权。因为我们读到以色列使扫罗成为国王，使大卫成为国王，使亚比米勒成为国王；但从未读到扫罗国王使另一个国王，或者地上的国王使另一个绝对的国王。4. 主教认为这个原则是错误的，当代理人通过捐赠行事时，这个原则仍然适用于他自己的授权（第 9 章，第 98 页）。国王给予代理人权力，因此国王的权力更大。5. 他假设这是所有问题的基础和根本，即人民完全剥夺了他们的源泉力量，这是最错误的。6. 要么他们必须完全剥夺自己的权力（他说），要么国王从人民那里获得权力，以借贷的方式，我认为从来没有人这样说过。但是 P. 主教的思维短浅，对神职人员和律师没有规定；对于学者们的思维来说，国王的权力只是信托的，无论主教是否认同，这是一种信任、抵押或借贷的权力。Rex director Regni, non proprietarius,（Molinæ. in consuet. Parisi. Tit. 1, 9; 1 Gloss. 7, n. 9,）- "国王是终身租户，而不是王国的主人或所有者。"所以 Novel. 85, in princip, et c. 18, Quod magistratus sit nudus dispensator et defensor jurium regni, non pro-prietarius, constat, ex eo quod non posset alienare imperium, oppida, urbes, regiones ve, vel res subditorum, bonave regni.所以 Gregory, l. 3, c. 8, de Repub. per c. 1, Sect. præterea, de propo. feud. Hottoman, quest. illust. 1; Ferdinan. Vasquez, I. 1, c. 4; Bossius, de princip. et privileg. illius, n. 290, - "国王只是一个管家和王国法律的捍卫者，而不是所有者，因为他没有权力处置帝国、城市、城镇、国家和臣民的财产"；而且，委托给官员的财产应归还，并且不能转让给继任者，（per l. ult. Sect. sed nost. C. Comment. de leg. l. 宠物 69，法兄第 2 条，第 32 条，最后一段（d.t.）——“所有委托给任何官员的财产都应归还；因为他没有权力将它们转让，以损害他的继任者。”大主教的思想没有触及法学家的秘密，因此他说话是有依据的；他不会说超出他有限思维范围的话，那只是在门口而已。7. 主权不在社区中（大主教说）。实际上，它既不是，也不能是，多于十个、一千个、一百万个或整个王国的人可以成为一个人；因为主权是抽象的，君主是具体的。多个人不能成为一个国王或一个君主：君主必须本质上是一个；而众多人不能成为一个。但是那又怎样呢？主权力量难道不可以在人民中显著地、源头地、最初地和根本地存在吗？我认为可以，也必须如此。国王不是下级法官：他不是正式的议会和法庭之主，因为他更高一级。人民不是正式的国王，因为人民比国王更高一级；因为他们让大卫成为国王，让扫罗成为国王；而授予议会和法庭之主的权力在国王手中（皇室主义者说）。8. 一个社区没有生死的权力；一个国王有生死的权力（主教如是说）。那又怎样？因此，一个社区不是国王。我承认这一点。赋予国王有生死权力的权力不在人民手中。可怜的人！这就像主教的逻辑。撒母耳不是国王，因此他不能立大卫为国王。这并不是根据主教的理由。所以国王不是一个次要的法官。什么！因此他不能任命一个次要的法官吗？9.生死的权力在人民中是显著的和潜在的，虽然不是正式的。虽然没有人可以剥夺自己的生命，或者正式地拥有自己的生命权力，但一个人和一群人在根本上和潜在上拥有对自己生命的权力，因为他们可以将自己归附于一个执法者和法律之下，如果违反了这些法律，他们就会冒生命危险；因此，他们通过将自己置于良好法律的权力之下，实际上拥有对自己生命的权力，以维护整个社会的和平与安全。10.这是一个弱的推论。没有人拥有自己生命的权力，因此，更不可能拥有他人的生命权力（主教如是说）。我将否认这个推论。 国王没有自己生命的权力，也就是说，根据教长的观点，他既不能根据自然法则，也不能根据任何民法来自杀；因此，国王杀害他人的权力远远小于此：因为法官对邻居的生命具有比对自己的生命更大的权力。然而，教长先生说，没有政府的社群，所有人都平等，拥有天赋的自由，没有生死的权力，因为所有人都是自由出生的；因此，没有人生来就拥有对邻居生命的统治和权力。是的，但是，教长先生，一个没有政府的国王，作为一个自由出生的人，对任何人的生命都没有比社群更多的权力；因为国王和乞丐都是同样自由地出生的。但是，在这种考虑下，社群从母体出来时根本没有政治上的考虑。 如果你认为他们没有任何政策，你就不能认为他们具有政策；是的，如果你认为他们天生就没有任何政策，他们甚至不能对上帝从天上立即成为国王的人表示同意和赞同；因为这样的后续同意是一种政府行为。现在，由于他们被认为没有任何政府，他们无法执行任何政府行为。这对他自己和我们都是不利的。

2. The power of a part and the power of the whole is not alike. Royalty never advanceth the king above the place of a member; and lawyers say, the king is above the subjects, in sensu diviso, in a divisive sense, he is above this or that subject; but he is inferior to all the subjects collectively taken, because he is for the whole kingdom, as a mean for the end.
部分的权力和整体的权力是不同的。皇权从不使国王超越成员的地位；律师们说，国王在主观上高于臣民，他高于这个或那个臣民；但他在整体上却低于所有臣民，因为他是整个王国的代表，是达到目标的手段。

Obj.—If this be a good reason, that he is a mean for the whole kingdom as for the end; that he is therefore inferior to the whole kingdom, then is he also inferior to any one subject; for he is a mean for the safety of every subject, as for the whole kingdom.
如果这是一个好的理由，那么他作为整个王国的目标的手段，他就比整个王国低下，那么他也比任何一个主体低下；因为他是每个主体的安全手段，就像是整个王国的安全手段一样。

Ans.—Every mean is inferior to its complete, adequate, and whole end; and such an end is the whole kingdom in relation to the king; but every mean is not always inferior to its incomplete, inadequate, and partial end. This or that subject is not adequate, but the inadequate and incomplete end in relation to the king.
每一种手段都不如它的完整、充分和整体的目标；而这样的目标对于国王来说就是整个王国；但并不是每一种手段都不如它的不完整、不充分和部分的目标。这个或那个主题不够充分，但对于国王来说是不充分和不完整的目标。

The Prelate saith, Kings are Dii Elohim, gods; and the manner of their propagation is by filiation, by adoption, sons of the Most High, and God's first-born. Now, the first-born is not above every brother severally; but if there were thousands, millions, numberless numbers, he is above all in precedency and power.
大主教说，国王是 Dii Elohim，即神；他们的传承方式是通过子嗣，通过收养，成为至高者的儿子和上帝的长子。现在，长子并不是超越每个兄弟个别存在的；但如果有成千上万、无数的兄弟，他在地位和权力上都是最高的。

Ans.—Not only kings but all inferior judges are gods. Psal. 82., God standeth in the congregation of the gods, that is not a congregation of kings. So (Exod. 22:8) the master of the house shall be brought אלּ־האלהיﬦ to the gods, or to the judges. And that there were more judges than one, is clear by ver. 9; and if they shall condemn ירשעוּז jarshignur, condemnarint, (John 10:35,) ἐπὶ θεοῦς He called them gods; Exod. 4:16, "Thou shalt be to Aaron לּאלִהיﬦ as a god." They are gods analogically only, God is infinite, not so the king. God's will is a law, not so the king's. God is an end to himself, not so the king. The judge is but God by office, and representation, and conservation of the people. It is denied that the first-born is in power before all his brethren, though there were millions. That is but said, one, as one, is inferior to a multitude. As the first-born was a politic ruler to his brethren, he was inferior to them politically.
答案：不仅国王，所有下级法官都是神。诗篇 82：神站在神的会中，这不是国王的会。所以（出埃及记 22：8）房主要被带到神那里，或者是法官那里。而且，有不止一个法官，这在第 9 节中很明显；如果他们要定罪，他们被称为神（约翰福音 10：35）；出埃及记 4：16，“你要向亚伦作神一样。”他们只是类比上的神，上帝是无限的，国王不是。上帝的旨意是法律，国王的旨意不是。上帝是自己的目标，国王不是。法官只是通过职务、代表和保护人民而成为神。否认长子在他的兄弟之前有权力，即使有数百万人。这只是说，一个人相对于众多人来说是次要的。作为长子对兄弟的政治统治者，他在政治上是次要的。

Obj.—The collective university of a kingdom are subjects, sons, and the king their father, no less than this or that subject is the king's subject. For the university of subjects are either the king, or the king's subjects; for all the kingdom must be one of these two; but they are not the king, therefore they are his subjects.
目标-一个王国的集体大学是臣民、儿子，而国王是他们的父亲，就像这个或那个臣民是国王的臣民一样。因为臣民的大学要么是国王，要么是国王的臣民；因为整个王国必须是这两者之一；但他们不是国王，所以他们是他的臣民。

Ans.—All the kingdom, in any consideration, is not either king or subjects. I give a third: The kingdom collective is neither properly king nor subject; but the kingdom embodied in a state, having collateral, is a co-ordinate power with the king.
答案：王国中，无论从任何角度考虑，既不是国王也不是臣民。我给出第三种观点：王国的整体既不是真正的国王也不是臣民；而是体现在一个国家中的王国，具有相互关联的权力，与国王地位相等。

Obj.—The university is ruled by laws, therefore they are inferior to the king who ruleth all by law
大学受法律统治，因此他们比以法律统治一切的国王低下。

Ans.—The university, properly, is no otherwise ruled by laws than the king is ruled by laws, The university, formally, is the complete politic body, endued with a nomothetic faculty, which cannot use violence against itself, and so is not properly under a law
大学，适当地说，并不是以其他方式受法律统治，就像国王受法律统治一样。大学，正式地说，是一个完整的政治实体，具有立法能力，不能对自己使用暴力，因此并不适用于法律。

QUESTION XX
问题 XX

WHETHER OR NO INFERIOR JUDGES BE UNIVOCALLY AND ESSENTIALLY JUDGES, AND THE IMMEDIATE VICARS OF GOD, NO LESS THAN THE KING, OR IF THEY BE ONLY THE DEPUTIES AND VICARS OF THE KING
无论次级法官是否是明确和本质上的法官，以及是否与国王一样是上帝的直接代理人，或者他们只是国王的代表和代理人

It is certain that, in one and the same kingdom, the power of the king is more in extension than the power of any inferior judge; but if these powers of the king and the inferior judges differ intensive and in spece, and nature is the question, though it be not all the question.
在同一个王国中，国王的权力在范围上比任何下级法官的权力更大是确定的；但如果这些国王和下级法官的权力在强度和种类上有所不同，并且涉及到自然的问题，尽管这不是全部问题。

Assert.—Inferior judges are no less essentially judges, and the immediate vicars of God, than the king, Those who judge in the room of God, and exercise the judgment of God, are essentially judges and deputies of God, as well as the king; but inferior judges are such, therefore the proposition is clear. The formal reason, why the king is univocally and essentially a judge, is, because the king's throne is the Lord's throne; 1 Chron. 29:23, "Then Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord, as king, instead of David his father." 1 Kings 1:13, It is called David's throne, because the king is the deputy of Jehovah; and the judgment is the Lord's. I prove the assumption. Inferior judges appointed by king Jehoshaphat have this place, 2 Chron. 19:6, "The king said to the judges, Take heed what ye do, כי לא לּארﬦ תשפטוּ כי לּיחוח for ye judge not for man, but for the Lord." Then, they were deputies in the place of the Lord, and not the king's deputies in the formal and official acts of judging. Ver. 7, "Wherefore, now, let the fear of the Lord be upon you, take heed and do it; for there is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, or taking of gifts.
断言。次要的法官与国王一样，本质上都是法官，是上帝的直接代理人。那些代替上帝行使审判权的人，本质上都是上帝的法官和代理人，就像国王一样；而次要的法官就是这样的人，因此命题是明确的。国王之所以是一位具有一致性和本质性的法官，是因为国王的宝座是上主的宝座；《历代志上》29:23：“所罗门坐在耶和华的宝座上作王，代替他父亲大卫。”《列王纪上》1:13，它被称为大卫的宝座，是因为国王是耶和华的代理人；审判是上主的。我证明了这个假设。国王约沙法所任命的次要法官在《历代志下》19:6 中有这样的地位：“国王对法官们说：‘你们要谨慎行事，因为你们不是为人行审判，而是为耶和华行审判。’”那么，他们是上主的代理人，而不是国王在正式和官方的审判行为中的代理人。第 7 节：“现在，你们要敬畏耶和华，谨慎行事；因为我们的神没有不义，也不看人的外貌，也不受贿赂。”

Hence I argue, 1. If the Holy Ghost, in this good king, forbid inferior judges, wresting of judgment, respecting of persons, and taking of gifts, because the judgment is the Lord's, and if the Lord himself were on the bench, he would not respect persons, nor take gifts, then he presumeth, that inferior judges are in the stead and place of Jehovah, and that when these inferior judges should take gifts, they make, as it were, the Lord, whose place they represent, to take gifts, and to do iniquity, and to respect persons; but that the Holy Lord cannot do. 2. If the inferior judges, in the act of judging, were the vicars and deputies of king Jehoshaphat, he would have said, judge righteous judgment. Why? For the judgment is mine, and if I, the king, were on the bench, I would not respect persons, nor take gifts; and you judge for me, the Supreme Judge, as my deputies. But the king saith, They judge not for man, but for the Lord. 3. If, by this, they were not God's immediate vicars, but the vicars and deputies of the king, then, being mere servants, the king might command them to pronounce such a sentence, and not such a sentence as I may command my servant and deputy, in so far as he is a servant and deputy, to say this, and say not that; but the king cannot limit the conscience of the inferior judge, because the judgment is not the king's, but the Lord's, 4. The king cannot command any other to do that as sing, for the doing whereof he hath no power from God himself; but the king hath no power from God to pronounce what sentence he pleaseth, because the judgment is not his own but God's. And though inferior judges be sent of the king, and appointed by him to be judges, and so have their external call from God's deputy the king, yet, because judging is an act of conscience, as one man's conscience cannot properly be a deputy for another man's conscience, so neither can an inferior judge, as a judge, be a deputy for a king. Therefore, the inferior judges have designation to their office from the king; but if they have from the king that they are judges, and be not God's deputies, but the king's, they could not be commanded to execute judgment for God, but for the king: (Deut. 1:17,) Moses appointed judges, but not as his deputies to judge and give sentence, as subordinate to him; for the judgment (saith he) is the Lord's, not mine, 5, If all the inferior judges in Israel were but the deputies of the king, and not immediately subordinate to God as his deputies, then could neither inferior judges be admonished nor condemned in God's word for unjust judgment, because their sentence should be neither righteous nor unrighteous judgment, but in so far as the king should approve it or disapprove it; and, indeed, that royalist, Hugo Grotius saith so,—that an inferior judge can do nothing against the will of the supreme magistrate if it be so. Whenever God commandeth inferior judges to execute righteous judgment, it must have this sense, "Respect not persons in judgment, except the king command you; crush not the poor, oppress not the fatherless, except the king command you." I understand not such policy. Sure I am the Lord's commandments, rebukes and threats, oblige, in conscience, the inferior judge as the superior, as is manifest in these scriptures, Jer. 5:1; Isa. 1:17, 21; 5:7; 10:2; 59:14; Jer. 22:3; Ezek. 18:8; Amos 5:7; Mic. 3:9; Hab. 1:4; Lev. 19:15; Deut. 17:11; 1:17; Exod. 23:2.
因此，我认为，1. 如果圣灵在这位好国王身上禁止下级法官歪曲判断、偏袒人、收受贿赂，因为判断是主的，如果主自己在法庭上，他不会偏袒人，也不会收受贿赂，那么他就认为，下级法官代替了耶和华的位置，当这些下级法官收受贿赂时，他们就好像是代表他们所代表的主收受贿赂，做不义之事，偏袒人；但圣洁的主是不能这样做的。2. 如果在判断的行为中，下级法官是约沙法王的代理人和副手，他会说，要公正地判断。为什么？因为判断是我的，如果我，国王，坐在法庭上，我不会偏袒人，也不会收受贿赂；而你们为我，至高的法官，作为我的代理人判断。但国王说，他们不是为人判断，而是为主判断。3. 如果他们不是上帝的直接代理人，而是国王的代理人和副手，那么作为仅仅是仆人的他们，国王可以命令他们宣布这样的判决，而不是像我可以命令我的仆人和代理人一样，就他作为仆人和代理人而言，要说这个，不要说那个；但国王不能限制下级法官的良心，因为判断不是国王的，而是上帝的。4.国王不能命令其他人做他没有从上帝那里获得权力去做的事情；但国王没有从上帝那里获得权力去宣布他所愿意的判决，因为判断不是他自己的，而是上帝的。虽然下级法官是由国王派遣和任命的法官，并且他们的外在召唤来自上帝的代理人国王，但因为判断是良心的行为，就像一个人的良心不能适当地代替另一个人的良心一样，一个下级法官作为法官也不能代替国王。 因此，下级法官从国王那里获得了他们的职位；但如果他们从国王那里成为法官，并且不是上帝的代表，而是国王的代表，他们就不能被命令为上帝执行审判，而是为国王执行审判：（申命记 1:17）摩西任命了法官，但不是作为他的代表来判断和宣判，而是作为他的下属；因为审判（他说）是上主的，不是我的，5，如果以色列的所有下级法官只是国王的代表，而不是上帝的代表，那么在上帝的话语中，下级法官既不能被劝告也不能被定罪为不公正的判断，因为他们的判决既不是公正的也不是不公正的判断，而是国王是否批准或不批准；事实上，那位君主主义者雨果·格罗提乌斯也是这样说的——如果情况是这样，下级法官对最高统治者的意愿无能为力。每当上帝命令下级法官执行公正的判断时，它必须有这样的意义：“在审判中不要偏袒任何人，除非国王命令你；不要压迫穷人，不要欺压孤儿，除非国王命令你。”我不理解这种政策。 当然，我是主的诫命，责备和威胁，要求在良心上，下级法官像上级一样行事，正如这些经文所表明的，耶利米书 5:1；以赛亚书 1:17, 21；5:7；10:2；59:14；耶利米书 22:3；以西结书 18:8；阿摩司书 5:7；弥迦书 3:9；哈巴谷书 1:4；利未记 19:15；申命记 17:11；1:17；出埃及记 23:2。

Grotius saith, "It is here as in a category; the middle specie is, in respect of the superior, a specie,—in respect of the inferior, a genus; so inferior magistrates in relation to those who are inferior to them and under them, are magistrates or public persons; but in relation to superior magistrates, especially the king, they are private persons, and not magistrates.
格罗修斯说：“这就像在一个范畴中一样；中间的种类，在与上级相比，是一种种类，而在与下级相比，是一种类别；所以，相对于比他们低级且在他们之下的人，下级官员是官员或公众人物；但相对于上级官员，尤其是国王，他们是私人，而不是官员。”

Ans.—Jehoshaphat esteemed not judges, appointed by himself, private men, 2 Chron. 19:6, 7, "Ye judge not for men, but for the Lord." We shall prove that underjudges are powers ordained of God; in Scotland the king can take no man's inheritance from him because he is the king; but if any man possess lands belonging to the crown, the king, by his advocate, must stand before the lord-judges of the session, and submit the matter to the laws of the land; and if the king, for property of goods, were not under a law, and were not to acknowledge judges as judges, I see not how the subjects in either kingdoms have any property I judge it blasphemy to say, that a sentence of an inferior judge must be no sentence, though never so legal nor just, if it be contrary to the king's will, as Grotius saith.
答案：约沙法不认为由他自己任命的私人法官是有价值的，历代志下 19:6, 7，“你们不是为人民而审判，而是为耶和华而审判。”我们将证明，下级法官是上帝所任命的权力；在苏格兰，国王不能夺取任何人的财产，因为他是国王；但如果有人占有属于王室的土地，国王必须通过他的代理人站在法庭的法官面前，并将此事提交给国家法律；如果国王对财产的所有权不受法律约束，不承认法官的权威，我不明白两个王国的公民如何拥有任何财产。我认为，如果下级法官的判决与国王的意愿相悖，即使这个判决是合法和公正的，它也不能成为判决，这是亵渎的，正如格罗蒂乌斯所说。

He citeth that of Augustine: "If the consul command one thing, and the emperor another thing, you contemn not the power, but you choose to obey the highest." Peter saith, He will have us one way to be subject to the king, as to the supreme, sine ulla exceptione, without any exception; but to those who are sent by the king, as having their power from the king.
他引用奥古斯丁的话：“如果执政官命令一件事，而皇帝命令另一件事，你并不轻视权力，而是选择服从最高权威。”彼得说，他希望我们以一种方式服从国王，就像服从至高无上的权威一样，没有任何例外；但对于那些受国王派遣、权力来自国王的人来说，我们也要服从。

Arg. 1.—When the consul commandeth a thing lawful, and the king that same thing lawful, or a thing not unlawful, we are to obey the king rather than the consul. So I expone Augustine, We are not to obey the king and the consul the same way, that is, with the same degree of reverence and submission; for we owe more submission of spirit to the king than to the consul; but magis et minus non variant speciem, more or less varieth not the nature of things. But if the meaning be that we are not to obey the inferior judge, commanding things lawful, if the king command the contrary, this is utterly denied. But saith Grotius, "The inferior Judge is but the deputy of the king, and hath all his power from him; therefore we are to obey him for the king."—Ans. The inferior judge may be called the deputy of the king, (where it is the king's place to make judges,) because he hath his external call from the king, and is judge in foro soli, in the name and authority of the king; but being once made a judge, in foro poli, before God, he is as essentially a judge, and in his official acts, no less immediately subjected to God than the king himself.
当领事命令一件合法的事情，而国王也认为同样是合法的，或者是一件不违法的事情，我们应该服从国王而不是领事。所以我解释奥古斯丁说，我们不应该以同样的方式服从国王和领事，也就是说，不同程度的尊敬和顺从；因为我们对国王应该更加顺从，而不是对领事；但是更多或更少并不改变事物的本质。但是如果意思是说，如果国王命令与领事命令相反，我们不应该服从下级法官的合法命令，这是完全不被接受的。但是格罗蒂乌斯说：“下级法官只是国王的代理人，他的权力都来自国王；因此我们应该为了国王而服从他。”回答：下级法官可以被称为国王的代理人（在国王有权任命法官的地方），因为他从国王那里得到了外部的召唤，并且以国王的名义和权威担任法官；但是一旦成为法官，在上帝面前，他在职务行为上与国王本人一样，同样直接受制于上帝。

Arg. 2.—These powers to whom we are to yield obedience, because they are ordained of God, these are as essentially judges as the supreme magistrate the king; but inferior judges are such, therefore inferior judges are as essentially judges as the supreme magistrate. The proposition is, Rom. 13:1, for that is the apostle's arguments; whence we prove kings are to be obeyed, because they are powers from God. I prove the assumption: inferior magistrates are powers from God, Deut. 1:17; 19:6, 7; Exod. 22:7; Jer. 5:1; and the apostle saith, "The powers that be are ordained of God."
第二点。我们要顺从的这些权力，因为他们是上帝所命定的，他们与至高无上的国王一样，本质上都是法官；而次要的法官也是如此，因此次要的法官与至高无上的国王一样，本质上都是法官。这个命题可以在罗马书 13:1 中找到，因为这是使徒的论证；从中我们可以证明国王应该被顺从，因为他们是上帝所赋予的权力。我证明这个假设：次要的官员是上帝所赋予的权力，申命记 1:17；19:6, 7；出埃及记 22:7；耶利米书 5:1；使徒说：“掌权的都是上帝所命定的。”

Arg. 3.—Christ testified that Pilate had power from God as a judge (say royalists) no less than Cæsar the emperor. (John 19:11; 1 Pet. 2:12.) We are commanded to obey the king and those that are sent by him, and that for the Lord's sake, and for conscience to God; and (Rom. 13:5) we must be subject to all powers that are of God, not only for wrath, but for conscience.
阿格。3. - 基督证明彼拉多作为法官拥有上帝的权力（皇室主义者说），不亚于凯撒大帝。（约翰福音 19:11；彼得前书 2:12。）我们被命令要为了主的缘故和为了对上帝的良心，顺服于国王和被他派遣的人；并且（罗马书 13:5）我们必须顺服于所有来自上帝的权力，不仅是因为愤怒，也是为了良心。

Arg. 4. Those who are rebuked because they execute not just judgment, as well as the king, are supposed to be essentially judges, as well as the king; but inferior judges are rebuked because of this, Jer. 22:15–17; Ezek. 45:9–12; Zeph. 3:3; Amos 5:6, 7; Eccles. 3:16; Mic. 3:2–4; Jer. 5:1, 31.
那些因为不执行公正判决而受到责备的人，被认为本质上是法官，与国王一样；但是次要的法官因此而受到责备，耶利米书 22:15-17；以西结书 45:9-12；西番雅书 3:3；阿摩司书 5:6,7；传道书 3:16；弥迦书 3:2-4；耶利米书 5:1,31。

Arg. 5.—He is the minister of God for good, and hath the sword not in vain, but to execute vengeance on the evil-doers, no less than the king. (Rom. 13:2–4.) He to whom agreeth, by an ordinance of God, the specific acts of a magistrate, is essentially a magistrate.
他是为善而存在的上帝的仆人，他手持剑不是无用的，而是为了对恶人实施报复，与国王一样。（罗马书 13:2-4）凡与上帝的法令相符的行为，本质上都是行政官的行为。

Arg 6.—The resisting of the inferior magistrate in his lawful commandments is the resisting of God's ordinance, and a breach of the fifth commandment, as is disobedience to parents; and not to give him tribute, and fear, and honour, is the same transgression, Rom. 13:1–7.
第六条：抵抗下级官员的合法命令是抵抗上帝的旨意，是违背第五诫的行为，就像不听从父母的命令一样；不给他纳税、敬畏和尊重也是同样的违法行为，罗马书 13:1-7。

Arg. 7.—These styles, of gods, of heads of the people, of fathers, of physicians and healers of the sons of the Most High, of such as reign and decree by the wisdom of God, &c., that are given to kings, for the which royalists make kings only judges, and all inferior judges but deputed, and judges by participation, and at the second hand, or given to inferior judges. (Exod. 22:8, 9; John 10:35.) Those who are appointed judges under Moses (Deut. 1:16) are called, in Hebrew or Chaldee, (1 Kings 8:1, 2; 5:2; Mic. 3:1; Josh. 23:2; Num. 1:16,) ראשי rasce, רישי fathers, (Acts 7:2; Josh. 14:1; 19:15; 1 Chron. 8:28,) healers, (Isa. 3:7,) gods, and sons of the Most High. (Psal. 82:1, 2, 6, 7; Prov. 8:16, 17.) I much doubt if kings can infuse godheads in their subjects. I conceive they nave, from the God of gods, these gifts whereby they are enabled to be judges; and that kings may appoint them judges, but can do no more: they are no less essentially judges than themselves.
阿格。7. - 这些风格，神的风格，人民的领袖，父亲的风格，医生和治疗者的风格，至高者的儿子的风格，那些凭借上帝的智慧统治和颁布法令的人，等等，这些风格是赋予国王的，因此君主主义者只让国王成为法官，而所有下级法官只是被委派的，通过参与成为法官，或者是赋予下级法官的。 （出埃及记 22:8, 9; 约翰福音 10:35。）在摩西之下被任命为法官的人（申命记 1:16）在希伯来语或迦勒底语中被称为（列王纪上 8:1, 2; 5:2; 弥迦书 3:1; 约书亚记 23:2; 民数记 1:16）拉斯斯，父亲，医生，神和至高者的儿子。 （诗篇 82:1, 2, 6, 7; 箴言 8:16, 17。）我非常怀疑国王是否能够使他们的臣民具有神性。我认为他们从众神之神那里获得了这些赋予他们成为法官的能力的礼物；国王可以任命他们为法官，但不能做更多：他们本质上与国王一样是法官。

Arg. 8.—If inferior judges be deputies of the king, not of God, and have all their authority from the king, then may the king limit the practice of these inferior judges. Say that an inferior judge hath condemned to death a paricide, and he be conveying him to the place of execution, the king cometh with a force to rescue him out of his hand; if this inferior magistrate bear God's sword for the terror of ill-doers, and to execute God's vengeance on murderers, he cannot but resist the king in this, which I judge to be his office; for the inferior judge is to take vengeance on ill-doers, and to use the co-active force of the sword, by virtue of his office, to take away this paricide. Now, if he be the deputy of the sing, he is not to break the jaws of the wicked (Job 29:17); not to take vengeance on evil-doers (Rom. 13:4); nor to execute judgment on the wicked, (Psal. 149:9); nor to execute judgment for the fatherless (Deut. 10:18); except a mortal man's creator, the king, say Amen. Now, truly then, God, in all Israel, was to rebuke no inferior judge for perverting judgment,—as he doth, Exod. 23:26; Mic. 3:2–4; Zech. 3:3; Num. 25:5; Deut. 1:16; for the king only is lord of the conscience of the inferior judge who is to give sentence, and execute sentence righteously, upon condition that the king, the only univocal and proper judge, first decree the same, as royalists teach.
如果下级法官是国王的代表，而不是上帝的代表，并且他们所有的权力都来自国王，那么国王可以限制这些下级法官的行为。假设一个下级法官判处了一个弑父者死刑，并且他正在将他押送到执行地点，国王带着一支部队前来营救他。如果这个下级法官拿着上帝的剑来威慑作恶者，并对凶手执行上帝的复仇，他不能不在这件事上抵抗国王，这是我认为他的职责；因为下级法官的职责是对作恶者进行复仇，并凭借他的职权使用强制性的武力，将这个弑父者除掉。现在，如果他是国王的代表，他就不能打破恶人的颚骨（约伯记 29:17）；不能对作恶者进行复仇（罗马书 13:4）；不能对恶人行审判（诗篇 149:9）；不能为孤儿行审判（申命记 10:18）；除非一个凡人的创造者，国王，说阿门。那么，事实上，上帝在以色列中不会责备任何下级法官颠倒判决的行为，正如他在出埃及记 23:26、弥迦书 3:2-4、撒迦利亚书 3:3、民数记 25:5、申命记所做的那样。 1:16; 因为只有国王才是下级法官良心的主宰，他们负责判决和执行判决，前提是国王作为唯一明确和适当的法官首先下达相同的法令，正如君主主义者所教导的。

Hear our Prelate (c, 4, p. 46).—How is it imaginable that kings can be said to judge in God's place, and not receive the power from God? But kings judge in God's place. (Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6.) Let no man stumble (this is his prolepsis) at this, that Moses in the one place, and Jehoshaphat in the other, spake to subordinate judges under them. This weakeneth nowise our argument; for it is a ruled case in law, Quod quis facit per alium, facit per se, all judgments of inferior judges are in the name, authority, and by the power of the supreme, and are but communicatively and derivatively from the sovereign power.
听从我们的主教（见《圣经》，第 4 章，第 46 页）。难以想象国王如何能被说成是代替上帝行使审判权，而不是从上帝那里获得权力？但是国王代替上帝行使审判权（申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6）。不要因为这个而犯错误（这是他的预见），摩西在一个地方，约沙法在另一个地方，对他们下属的法官说话。这并不削弱我们的论点；因为在法律中有一个规定的案例，即“一个人通过他人所做的事情，就是他自己所做的事情”，所有下级法官的判决都是以最高权力的名义、权威和力量进行的，并且只是从最高权力中传递和衍生出来的。

Ans.—How is it possible that inferior judges (Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6) can be said to judge in God's place, and not receive the power from God immediately, without any consent or covenant of men? So saith the P. Prelate. But inferior judges judge in the place of God, as both the P. Prelate and Scripture teach. (Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6.) Let the Prelate see to the stumbling conclusion, for so he feareth it proves to his bad cause. He saith the places, Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6, prove that the king judgeth in the room of God, because his deputies judge in the place of God. The Prelate may know we would deny this stumbling and lame consequence; for 1. Moses and Jehoshaphat are not speaking to themselves, but to other inferior judges, and doth publicly exhort them. Moses and Jehoshaphat are persuading the regulation of the personal actions of other men who might pervert judgment. 2. The Prelate is much upon his law, after he had foresworn the gospel and religion of the church where he was baptized. "What the king doth by another, that he doth by himself." But were Moses and Jehoshaphat afraid that they should pervert judgment in the unjust sentence pronounced by under judges, of which sentence they could not know any thing? And do inferior judges so judge in the name, authority, and power of the king, as not in the name, authority, and power of the Lord of lords and King of kings? or is the judgment the king's? No; the Spirit of God saith no such matter. The judgment executed by those inferior judges is the Lord's, not a mortal king's; therefore, a mortal king may not hinder them to execute judgment.
答案：下级法官如何能被称为代替上帝行使审判权，而不是直接从上帝获得权力，而无需任何人的同意或契约？如此说道教长。但是下级法官是代替上帝行使审判权的，正如教长和圣经所教导的那样。让教长看看这个令人绊倒的结论，因为他担心这证明了他的错误观点。他说，申命记 1:17 和历代志下 19:6 这些经文证明国王是代替上帝行使审判权的，因为他的代理人代替上帝行使审判权。教长可能知道我们会否认这个令人绊倒和无力的推论；因为 1. 摩西和约沙法不是在对自己说话，而是对其他下级法官说话，并公开劝告他们。摩西和约沙法是在劝告对可能扭曲审判的其他人的个人行为进行规范。2. 教长在发誓放弃他受洗的教会的福音和宗教之后，非常依赖他的法律。"国王通过他人所做的，他自己也在做。"但是，摩西和约沙法是否担心他们会在不公正的判决中扭曲正义，而他们对这些判决一无所知？次要的法官是否以国王的名义、权威和权力来判决，而不是以万主之主和诸王之王的名义、权威和权力来判决？或者判决是国王的？不，上帝的灵没有这样说。这些次要法官执行的判决是主的，而不是凡人国王的；因此，凡人国王不能阻止他们执行判决。

Obj.—He cannot suggest an unjust sentence, and command an inferior judge to give out a sentence absolvatory on cut-throats, but he may hinder the execution of any sentence against Irish cut-throats.
他不能提出不公正的判决，并命令一位下级法官对刺客做出无罪判决，但他可以阻止对爱尔兰刺客执行任何判决。

Ans.—It is all one to hinder the execution of a just sentence, and to suggest or command the inferior judge to pronounce an unjust one; for inferior judges, by conscience of their office, are both to judge righteously, and by force and power of the sword given to them of God (Rom. 13:1–4) to execute the sentence; and so God hath commanded inferior judges to execute judgment, and hath forbidden them to wrest judgment, to take gifts, except the king command them so to do.
答：阻止执行公正判决和建议或命令下级法官宣布不公正判决是一样的；因为下级法官凭借他们的职责良知，既要公正地判断，又要依靠上帝赋予他们的权力和剑的力量（罗马书 13:1-4）来执行判决；因此，上帝命令下级法官执行审判，并禁止他们歪曲判决，接受贿赂，除非国王命令他们这样做。

The king is by the grace of God, the inferior judge is judge by the grace of the king; even as the man is the image of God, and the woman the man's image.
国王是上帝的恩赐，卑微的法官是国王的恩赐；就像男人是上帝的形象，女人是男人的形象。

Ans. 1.—This distinction is neither true in law nor conscience. Not in law, for it distinguisheth not betwixt ministros regis, et ministros regni. The servants of the king are his domestics, the judges are ministri regni, non regis; the ministers and judges of the kingdom, not of the king. The king doth not show grace, as he is a man, in making such a man a judge; but justice as a king, by a royal power received from the people, and by an act of justice, he makes judges of deserving men; he should neither for favour nor bribes make any one judge in the land. 2. It is by the grace of God that men are to be advanced from a private condition to be inferior judges, as royal dignity is a free gift of God; 1 Sam. 2:7, "The Lord bringeth low and lifteth up;" Psal. 75:7, "God putteth down one and setteth up another." Court flatterers take from God and give to kings; but to be a judge inferior is no less an immediate favour of God than to be king, though the one be a greater favour than the other. Magis honos and Majoc honos are to be considered.
答案 1. - 这种区别在法律和良心上都是不正确的。在法律上，它没有区分国王的仆人和王国的仆人。国王的仆人是他的家人，而法官是王国的仆人，而不是国王的仆人。国王并不是作为一个人来展示恩典，而是作为一个国王，通过从人民那里获得的王权和正义行为，使得有能力的人成为法官；他既不应该因为偏爱也不应该因为贿赂而让任何人成为法官。 2. 人们从私人地位晋升为下级法官是上帝的恩典，因为王权是上帝的自由赐予；撒母耳记上 2:7，“耶和华使人卑微，也使人升高”；诗篇 75:7，“神使这人卑微，使那人升高”。朝臣们夺取了上帝的权力，赋予了国王；但成为下级法官与成为国王一样，都是上帝的直接恩典，尽管一个比另一个更大的恩典。应该考虑更大的荣誉和较小的荣誉。

Arg 9.—Those powers which differ gradually, and per magis et minus, by more and less only, differ not in nature and species, and constitute not kings and inferior judges different univocally. But the power of kings and inferior judges are such; therefore kings and inferior judges differ not univocally. That the powers are the same in nature, I prove, 1. by the specific acts and formal object of the power of both; for both are powers ordained of God. (Rom. 13:1.) To resist either, is to resist the ordinance of God. 2. Both are by office a terror to evil workers, ver. 3. 3. Both are the ministers of God for good. Though the king send and give a call to the inferior judge, that doth no more make the inferior judge's powers in nature and specie different than ministers of the Word, called by ministers of the Word, have offices different in nature. Timothy's office to be preacher of the Word differeth not in specie from the office of the presbytery which laid hands on him, though their office by extension be more than Timothy's office. The people's power is put forth in those same acts, when they choose one to be their king and supreme governor, and when they set up an aristocratical government, and choose many, or more than one, to be their governors; for the formal object of one or many governors is justice and religion, as they are to be advanced. The form and manner of their operation is, brachio seculari, by a co-active power, and by the sword. The formal acts of king and many judges in aristocracy are these same, the defending of the poor and needy from violence, the conservation of a community in a peaceable and a godly life. (1 Tim. 2:2; Job 29:12, 13; Isa. 1:17.) These same laws of God that regulateth the king in all his acts of royal government, and tyeth and obligeth his conscience, as the Lord's deputy, to execute judgment for God, and not in the stead of men, in God's court of heaven, doth in like manner tie, and oblige the conscience of aristocratical judges, and all inferior judges, as is clear and evident by these places, 1 Tim. 2:2, not only kings, but all in authority κάντις ὃε ἐν ὑπεροχῆ ὅντες are obliged to procure that their subjects lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty All in conscience are obliged (Deut. 1:16) to judge righteomely between every man and his brother and the stranger that is with them Neither are they to respect persons in judgment, but are to hear the small as well as the great, nor to be afraid of the face of men,—the judgment administered by all, is God's. (2 Chron. 19:6.) All are obliged to fear God, (Deut. 17:19, 20,) to keep the words of the law; not to be lifted up in heart above their brethren. (Isa. 1:17; Jer. 22:2, 3.) Let any man show me a difference, according to God's word, but in the extension, that what the king is to do as a king, in all the kingdom and whole dominions, (if God give to him many, as he save to David, and Solomon, and Joshua,) that the inferior judges are to do in such and such circuits, and limited places, and I quit the cause; so as the inferior judges are little kings, and the king a great and delated judge,—as a compressed hand or fist, and the hand stretched out in fingers and thumb, are one hand; so here. 4. God owneth inferior judges as a congregation of gods; (Psal. 82:1, 2;) for that God sitteth in a congregation or senate of kings or monarchs, I shall not believe till I see royalists show to me a commonwealth of monarchs convening in one judicature. All are equally called gods, (John 10:35; Exod. 22:8,) if for any cause, but because all judges, even inferior, are the immediate deputies of the King of kings, and their sentence in judgment as the sentence of the Judge of all the earth, I shall be informed by the P. Prelate, when he shall answer my reasons, if his interdicted lordship may cast an eye to a poor presbyter below; and as wisdom is that by which kings reign, (Prov. 8:15, so also, ver. 16,) by which princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth; all that is said against this is, that the king hath a prerogative royal, by which he is differenced from all judges in Israel, called jus regis משטת, for, (saith Barclay,) the king, as king, essentially hath a domination and power above all, so as none can censure him, or punish him, but God, because there be no thrones above his but the throne of God. The judges of Israel, as Samuel, Gideon, &c. had no domination,—the dominion was in God's hand. "We may resist an inferior judge, (saith Arnisceus,2) otherwise there were no appeal from him, and the wrong we suffer were irreparable" as saith Marantius. "And all the judges of the earth (saith Edward Symmons4) are from God more remotely; namely, mediante rege, by the mediation of the Supreme, even as the lesser stars have their light from God by the mediation of the. sun. To the first I answer;—There was a difference betwixt the kings of Israel and their judges, no question; but if it be an essential difference, it is a question. For, 1. The judges were raised up in an extraordinary manner, out of any tribe, to defend the people, and vindicate their liberty, God remaining their king; the king, by the Lord's appointment, was tyed, after Saul, to the royal tribe of Judah, till the Messiah's coming. God took his own blessed liberty to set up a succession in the ten tribes. 2. The judges were not by succession from father to son; the kings were, as I conceive, for the typical eternity of the Messiah's throne, presignified to stand from generation to generation. 3. Whether the judges were appointed by the election of the people, or no, some doubt; because Jephthah was so made judge: but I think it was not a law in Israel that it should be so. But the first mould of a king (Deut. 17) is by election. But that God gave power of domineering, that is, of tyrannising, to a king, so as he cannot be resisted, which he gave not to a judge, I think no scripture can make good. For by what scripture can royalists warrant to us that the people might rise in arms to defend themselves against Moses, Gideon, Eli, Samuel, and other judges, if they should have tyrannised over the people; and that it is unlawful to resist the most tyrannous king in Israel and Judah? Yet Barclay and others must say this, if they be true to that principle of tyranny, that the jus regis, the law or manner of the king (1 Sam. 8:9, 11; and 1 Sam. 10:25) doth essentially differ betwixt the kings of Israel and the judges of Israel. But we think God gave never any power of tyranny to either judge or king of Israel; and domination in that sense was by God given to none of them. Arnisæus hath as little for him, to say the inferior magistrate may be resisted, because we may appeal from him; but the king cannot be resisted, quia sanctitas majestatis id non permittit, the sanctity of royal majesty will not permit us to resist the king.
第九条：那些逐渐不同的权力，通过更多或更少的方式，仅仅在程度上有所不同，它们在本质和种类上并不不同，并且不能构成不同的一致的国王和下级法官。但是国王和下级法官的权力是这样的；因此，国王和下级法官并不一致。我通过以下方式证明这些权力在本质上是相同的：1.通过它们的具体行为和权力的正式对象；因为它们都是上帝所命定的权力。（罗马书 13:1）抵抗其中任何一方，就是抵抗上帝的命令。2.它们都是对邪恶工作者的威慑。（罗马书 13:3）3.它们都是上帝的仆人，为善事而存在。尽管国王派遣并给予下级法官召唤，但这并不能使下级法官的权力在本质和种类上有所不同，就像被传道者召唤的道职事工人的职责与按手给他的传道者的职责在本质上并不不同一样，尽管他们的职责在范围上超过了蒂莫太的职责。 人民的权力体现在同样的行为中，当他们选择一个人作为他们的国王和最高统治者时，当他们建立一个贵族政府，并选择许多人或多于一个人作为他们的统治者时；因为一个或多个统治者的正式目标是正义和宗教，因为他们要被提升。他们的运作形式和方式是通过世俗的手臂，通过强制力和剑来实现的。国王和贵族政府中的许多法官的正式行为是相同的，即保护穷人和有需要的人免受暴力侵害，维护社区的和平和虔诚的生活。（提摩太前书 2:2；约伯记 29:12,13；以赛亚书 1:17）这些同样的上帝的律法，在国王在他所有的王权行为中调节，并且约束和义务他的良心，作为主的代表，在上帝的法庭中为上帝行使审判，而不是代替人类，在上帝的法庭中，同样地约束和义务贵族法官和所有下级法官的良心，正如这些经文所清楚明白地表明的那样，提摩太前书... 2:2，不仅仅是国王，而是所有有权力的人都有责任确保他们的臣民过上宁静和和平的生活，以及在一切敬虔和正直中。所有人都有责任（申命记 1:16）在每个人和他的兄弟以及与他们同在的外国人之间公正地判断。他们在审判中不应偏袒任何人，而是要听取小人物和大人物的意见，也不要害怕人的面孔 - 所有人行使的审判都是上帝的（历代志下 19:6）。所有人都有责任敬畏上帝（申命记 17:19, 20），遵守律法的话语；不要心高气傲地超过自己的兄弟（以赛亚书 1:17；耶利米书 22:2, 3）。让任何人根据上帝的话语向我展示一个区别，除了在范围上的扩展，即国王在整个王国和领土上所要做的事情（如果上帝给予他许多，就像给大卫、所罗门和约书亚一样），那么次要的法官在特定的地区和有限的地方也要做同样的事情，我就放弃这个论点；因此，次要的法官就是小国王，国王就是一个伟大而广泛的法官 - 就像一个握紧的手或拳头和伸开的手指和拇指是一只手一样；就是这样。 上帝拥有下级法官，就像是众神的集会一样；（诗篇 82:1, 2；）因为上帝坐在国王或君主的集会或议会中，我不会相信，直到我看到君主派给我一个由君主组成的共和国在一个法庭中开庭。所有人都被称为神，（约翰福音 10:35；出埃及记 22:8，）如果有任何原因，那是因为所有的法官，即使是下级法官，都是万王之王的直接代表，他们在审判中的判决就像是全地的审判者的判决一样。当主教回答我的理由时，我将会被告知他被禁止的尊贵是否会关注一个低微的长老；正如智慧是君王统治的基础一样，（箴言 8:15，同样，16 节，）也是统治王子和贵族，甚至是地上所有的法官；对此的反驳是，国王有一项王室特权，使他与以色列的所有法官有所区别，称为王权法则 משטת，因为（巴克利说）国王作为国王，本质上在所有人之上拥有统治和权力，所以没有人能够批评他或惩罚他，除了上帝，因为除了上帝的宝座之外，没有任何宝座能够超越他。以色列的法官，如撒母耳、基甸等。 没有统治权，统治权在上帝手中。“我们可以抵抗一个下级法官，否则就没有上诉的机会，我们所遭受的不公将是无法弥补的”，如马兰修所说。“地球上的所有法官（爱德华·西蒙斯说）都是通过上帝更为间接的方式存在，即通过至高者的调解，就像较小的星星通过太阳的调解获得光明一样。”对于第一个问题，我回答说：以色列的国王和他们的法官之间有区别，这是毫无疑问的；但如果这是一个本质上的区别，那就是一个问题。因为，1.法官是以非同寻常的方式被提拔起来的，他们不属于任何一个支派，是为了保卫人民，维护他们的自由，上帝仍然是他们的国王；根据上帝的指示，国王在扫罗之后，被限制在犹大支派的王室，直到弥赛亚的降临。上帝为十个支派建立了自己祝福的自由来设置继承权。2.法官不是由父亲传给儿子的；国王是，我认为这是为了预示弥赛亚的王位的典型永恒，代表代代相传。3. 无论法官是由人民选举产生的与否，有些人存疑；因为耶弗他就是这样成为法官的：但我认为在以色列并没有这样的法律规定。但是，关于国王的第一个模板（申命记 17 章）是通过选举产生的。但是，上帝赋予国王统治的权力，也就是暴政的权力，以至于他无法被抵抗，而这种权力并没有赋予法官，我认为没有任何经文可以证明这一点。因为根据哪一段经文，君主主义者可以向我们保证，人民可以起来武装保护自己，反抗摩西、基甸、以利、撒母耳和其他法官，如果他们对人民实施了暴政；以及在以色列和犹大，反抗最暴虐的国王是非法的？然而，巴克利和其他人必须这样说，如果他们忠于暴政的原则，即国王的法律或方式（撒母耳记上 8:9、11；撒母耳记上 10:25）在以色列的国王和法官之间有本质的区别。但是我们认为，上帝从未赋予以色列的法官或国王任何暴政的权力；在那个意义上，上帝没有赋予他们统治的权力。 阿尼斯乌斯认为，较低级的官员可以被抵抗，因为我们可以向他们上诉；但国王不能被抵抗，因为王权的神圣性不允许我们抵抗国王。

Ans.—That is not Paul's argument to prove it unlawful to resist kings, as kings, and doing their office, because of the sanctity of their majesty; that is, as the man intendeth, because of the supreme, absolute, and unlimited power that God hath given him. But this is a begging of the question, and all one as to say, the king may not be resisted, because he may not be resisted; for sanctity of majesty, if we believe royalists, includeth essentially an absolute supremacy of power, whereby they are above the reach of all thrones, laws, powers, or resistance on earth. But the argument is, resist not, because the power is of God. But the inferior magistrate's power is of God. Resist not, because you resist God's ordinance in resisting the judge; but the inferior judge is God's ordinance. (Rom. 13:1; Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6.) Mr Symmons saith, "All judges on earth are from the king, as stars have their light from the sun." I answer, 1. Then aristocracy were unlawful, for it hath not its power from monarchy. Had the lords of the Philistines, have the states of Holland, no power but from a monarchy? Name the monarch. Have the Venetians any power from a king? Indeed, our Prelate saith from Augustine, (Confess. lib. 3, cap. 8,) Generale pactum est societatis humanæ, obedire Regibus suis, it is an universal covenant of human society, and a dictate of nature, that men obey their kings. "I beg the favour of sectaries (saith he) to show as much for aristocracy and democracy." Now all other governments, to those born at court, are the inventions of men. But I can show that same warrant for the one as for the other; because it is as well the dictate of nature that people obey their judges and rulers as it is that they obey their kings. And Augustine speaketh of all judges in that place, though he name kings; for kingly government is no more of the law of nature than aristocracy or democracy; nor are any born judges or subjects at all. There is a natural aptitude in all to either of these, for the conservation of nature, and that is all. Let us see that men, naturally inclining to government, incline rather to royal government than to any other. That the P. Prelate shall not be able to show; for fatherly government, being in two, is not kingly, but nearer to aristocracy; and when many families were on earth, every one independent within themselves, if a common enemy should invade a tract of land governed by families, I conceive, by nature's light, they should incline to defend themselves, and to join in one politic body for their own safety, as is most natural. But, in that case they, having no king, and there were no reason of many fathers all alike loving their own families and self-preservation, why one should be king over all, rather than another, except by voluntary compact. So it is clear that nature is nearer to aristocracy before this contract than a monarchy. And let him show us in multitudes of families dwelling together, before there was a king, as clear a warrant for monarchy as here is for aristocracy; though to me both be laudable and lawful ordinances of God, and the difference merely accidental, being one and the same power from the Lord, (Rom. 13:1,) which is in divers subjects; in one as a monarchy, in many as in aristocracy; and the one is as natural as the other, and the subjects are accidental to the nature of the power. 2. The stars have no light at all but in actual aspect toward the sun; and they are not lightsome bodies by the free will of the sun, and have no immediate light from God formally, but from the sun; so as if there were no sun, there should be no stars. 3. For actual shining and sending out of beams of light actu secundo, they depend upon the presence of the sun; but for inferior judges, though they have their call from the king, yet have they gifts to govern from no king on earth, but only from the King of kings. 4. When the king is dead, the judges are judges, and they depend not on the king for their second acts of judging; and for the actual emission and putting forth their beams and rays of justice upon the poor and needy, they depend on no voluntary aspect, information or commandment of the king, but on that immediate subjection of their conscience to the King of kings. And their judgment which they execute is the Lord's immediately, and not the king's; and so the comparison halteth.
答案：这不是保罗用来证明抵抗国王是不合法的论点，因为他们是国王，履行他们的职责，因为他们的威严是神圣的；也就是说，正如这个人的意图所指，因为神赋予了他至高无上、绝对无限的权力。但这是一个问题的提出，等同于说，国王不能被抵抗，因为他不能被抵抗；因为如果我们相信君主主义者，威严的神圣性本质上包含了绝对的至高无上的权力，使他们超越了地球上所有的宝座、法律、权力或抵抗。但这个论点是，不要抵抗，因为权力是来自上帝。但是下级法官的权力也是来自上帝。不要抵抗，因为你在抵抗法官时抵抗了上帝的命令；但下级法官是上帝的命令。（罗马书 13:1；申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6。）西蒙斯先生说：“地球上的所有法官都是来自国王，就像星星从太阳那里得到光芒一样。”我回答说，1.那么贵族政治就是不合法的，因为它的权力不是来自君主制。非利士人的领主们，荷兰的各州，他们的权力不是来自君主制吗？告诉我君主的名字。威尼斯人有权力来自国王吗？ 确实，我们的主教引用奥古斯丁的话说（《忏悔录》第 3 卷第 8 章）：“人类社会的普遍契约是服从他们的国王”，这是人类社会的普遍契约，也是自然的规定，人们应该服从他们的国王。“我请求异端派别（他说）也对贵族政府和民主政府表现出同样的尊重。”现在，对于在宫廷出生的人来说，所有其他政府形式都是人类的发明。但我可以证明对于这两种政府形式都有同样的授权；因为人们服从他们的法官和统治者，就像他们服从国王一样，这是自然的规定。奥古斯丁在那个地方谈到的是所有的法官，尽管他提到了国王；因为君主政府与贵族政府或民主政府一样，并不是自然法则；也没有人生来就是法官或臣民。所有人都有一种天生的倾向，要么倾向于这种政府形式，要么倾向于那种政府形式，这是为了保护自然而存在的。让我们看到，人们天生倾向于君主政府，而不是其他任何形式的政府。 主教将无法展示；因为父权政府，虽然有两个，但并非王权，而更接近贵族政府；当地球上有许多家庭时，每个家庭都独立存在，如果一个共同的敌人入侵了由家庭统治的土地，我认为根据自然的光明，他们应该倾向于自卫，并联合成一个政治实体来保护自己，这是最自然的。但在这种情况下，他们没有国王，也没有理由让许多父亲都同样热爱自己的家庭和自我保存，为什么一个人应该成为所有人的国王，而不是另一个人，除非是自愿的协议。因此，很明显，在这个契约之前，自然更接近贵族政府而不是君主制。让他向我们展示，在没有国王的情况下，许多家庭居住在一起，就像这里对贵族政府的授权一样明确；尽管对我来说，两者都是可赞美和合法的上帝法令，区别仅仅是偶然的，都是来自主的同一权力。（罗马书） 13:1，）涉及各种主题；有的是君主制，有的是贵族制；而且一个与另一个一样自然，主权的性质与被统治的对象无关。2. 星星只有在实际朝向太阳的时候才有光；它们并不是太阳自由意志的光明体，也没有直接来自上帝的光明，而是来自太阳；所以如果没有太阳，就不会有星星。3. 对于实际发光和发出光束的行为，它们依赖于太阳的存在；但对于下级法官来说，虽然他们是由国王任命的，但他们的执政能力并不来自地上的任何国王，而只来自万王之王。4. 当国王死了，法官仍然是法官，他们不依赖国王来进行第二次审判；对于对穷人和有需要的人实际执行公正的行为，他们不依赖国王的自愿观察、信息或命令，而是依赖他们的良心对万王之王的直接顺从。他们执行的判断是主的判断，而不是国王的判断；所以这个比较是不准确的。

Arg. 10.—If the king dying, the judges inferior remain powers from God, the deputies of the Lord of Hosts, having their power from God, then are they essentially judges; yea, and if the estates, in their prime representators and leaders, have power in the death of the king to choose and make another king, then are they not judges and rulers by derivation and participation, or improperly; but the king is rather the ruler by derivation and participation than those who are called inferior judges. Now, if these judges depend in their sentences upon the immediate will of him who is supposed to be the only judge, when this only judge dieth, they should cease to be judges: for Expirante mandatore expirat mandatum; because the fountains-judge drying up, the streams must dry up. Now, when Saul died, the princes of the tribes remain by God's institution princes, and they by God's law and warrant (Deut. 17) choose David their king.
如果国王去世，下级法官仍然从上帝获得权力，作为万军之主的代表，他们的权力来自上帝，那么他们本质上就是法官；是的，如果各个阶层在国王去世时有权力选择和任命另一位国王作为他们的代表和领导者，那么他们就不是通过派生和参与成为法官和统治者，或者说不正确；相反，国王更像是通过派生和参与成为统治者，而那些被称为下级法官的人。现在，如果这些法官在他们的判决中依赖于被认为是唯一的法官的直接意愿，当这个唯一的法官去世时，他们应该停止成为法官：因为当掌握权力的法官消失时，权力也会消失。现在，当扫罗去世时，各支派的首领仍然是上帝所任命的首领，他们根据上帝的律法和授权（申命记 17 章）选择了大卫作为他们的国王。

Arg. 11.—If the king, through absolute power, do not send inferior judges, and constitute them, but only by a power from the people; and if the Lord have no less immediate influence in making inferior judges than in making kings, then there is no ground that the king should be sole judge, and the inferior judge only judge by derivation from him, and essentially his deputy, and not the immediate deputy of God. If the former is true, therefore, so is the latter. And, 1. That the king's absolute will maketh not inferior judges, is clear, from Deut. 1:15. Moses might not follow his own will in making inferior judges whom he pleased: God tyed him to a law, (ver. 13,) that he should take wise men, known amongst the people, and fearing God, and hating covetousness. And these qualifications were not from Moses, but from God; and no less immediately from God than the inward qualification of a king (Deut. 17); and therefore, it is not God's law that the king may make inferior judges only, Durante beneplacito, during his absolute will; for if these divine qualifications remain in the seventy elders, Moses, at his will, could not remove them from their places. 2. That the king can make heritable judges more than he can communicate faculties and parts of judging, I doubt. Riches are of fathers, but not promotion, which is from God, and neither from the east nor the west: that our nobles are born lords of parliament, and judges by blood, is a positive law. 3. It seemeth to me, from Isa. 3:1–4, that the inferior judge is made by consent of the people; nor can it be called a wronging of the king, that all cities and burghs of Scotland and England have power to choose their own provosts, rulers, and mayors. 4. If it be warranted by God, that the lawful call of God to the throne be the election of the people, the call of inferior judges must also be from the people, mediately or immediately. So I see no ground to say, that the inferior judge is the king's vicegerent, or that he is in respect of the king, or in relation to supreme authority, only a private man.
如果国王不是通过绝对权力派遣和任命下级法官，而是通过人民的授权，如果上帝在任命下级法官时与在任命国王时一样具有直接影响力，那么就没有理由国王应该是唯一的法官，下级法官只是从他那里派生出来的，本质上是他的代理人，而不是上帝的直接代理人。如果前者是真的，那么后者也是真的。首先，国王的绝对意愿不能决定下级法官，这一点从申命记 1:15 可以明确得出。摩西不能随意任命他所喜欢的下级法官：上帝限制了他的行为，要求他按照一条法律（第 13 节）选择在人民中间有名望、敬畏上帝、憎恶贪婪的智慧人。这些资格不是来自摩西，而是来自上帝；它们与国王的内在资格（申命记 17 章）一样直接来自上帝；因此，国王不能根据自己的意愿制定上帝的法律，只能任命下级法官，而这些神圣的资格仍然存在于七十位长老中，摩西不能随意将他们撤职。其次， 国王能够任命继承的法官，但我对他能否传达判断的能力和部分表示怀疑。财富是父亲的，但晋升是来自上帝，既不来自东方也不来自西方：我们的贵族生来就是议会的领主，也是血统上的法官，这是一项明确的法律。根据以赛亚书 3:1-4，我认为次要的法官是经过人民同意而产生的；所有苏格兰和英格兰的城市和市镇都有权选择自己的市长和市长，这不能算是对国王的冒犯。如果合乎上帝的旨意，合法的上帝召唤到王位上是人民的选举，那么次要的法官的召唤也必须来自人民，无论是直接还是间接。因此，我看不出有任何理由说，次要的法官是国王的代理人，或者他只是一个私人，与国王或最高权威的关系。

Arg. 12. These judges cannot but be univocally and essentially judges no less than the king, without which in a kingdom justice is physically impossible; and anarchy, and violence, and confusion, must follow, if they be wanting in the kingdom. But without inferior judges, though there be a king, justice is physically impossible; and anarchy and confusion, &c. must follow.
这些法官无疑是与国王一样的明确和本质的法官，如果在一个王国中没有他们，正义就是不可能的；如果缺少他们，无政府、暴力和混乱必将随之而来。但是，即使有国王，如果没有下级法官，正义也是不可能的；无政府和混乱等等必将随之而来。

Now this argument is more considerable, that without inferior judges, though there be a king in a kingdom, justice and safety are impossible; and if there be inferior judges, though there be no king, as in aristocracy, and when the king is dead, and another not crowned, or the king is minor, or absent, or a captive in the enemy's land, yet justice is possible, and the kingdom preserved; the medium of the argument is grounded upon God's word, Num. 11:14, 15, when Moses is unable alone to judge the people, seventy elders are joined with him (ver. 16, 17); so were the elders adjoined to help him (Exod. 24:1; Deut. 5:23; 22:16; Josh. 23:2; Judg. 8:14; 11:5, 11; 1 Sam. 11:3; 1 Kings 20:7; 2 Kings 6:32; 2 Chron. 34:29; Ruth 4:4; Deut. 19:12; Ezek. 8:1; Lam. 1:19); then were the elders of Moab thought to have a king. The natural end of judges hath been indigence and weakness, because men could not in a society defend themselves from violence; therefore, by the light of nature they gave their power to one or more, and made a judge or judges to obtain the end of self-preservation. But nature useth the most efficacious means to obtain its end; but in a great society and kingdom, the end is more easily attained by many governors than by one only; for where there is but one, he cannot minister justice to all; and the farther that the children are removed from their father and tutor, they are the nearer to violence and injustice. Justice should be at as easy a rate to the poor as a draught of water. Samuel went yearly through the land to Bethel, Gilgal, Mizpeh, (1 Sam. 7:16,) and brought justice to the doors of the poor. So were our kings of Scotland obliged to do of old; but now justice is as dear as gold. It is not a good argument to prove inferior judges to be only vicars and deputies of the king, because the king may censure and punish them when they pervert judgment. 1. Because the king, in that punisheth them not as judges, out as men. 2. That might prove all the subjects to be vicars and deputies of the king, because he can punish them all, in the case of their breach of laws.
现在这个论点更加值得考虑，即使在一个国家有国王，如果没有下级法官，正义和安全是不可能的；而如果有下级法官，即使没有国王，比如在贵族政体中，或者当国王去世、另一个国王未加冕、国王未成年、国王不在或被敌人俘虏时，正义是可能的，国家也能够保持下去；这个论点的中间立足点是建立在上帝的话语上，如《民数记》11:14, 15 所述，当摩西一个人无法判断人民时，七十位长老与他一同被加入（第 16, 17 节）；同样，长老们也被加入帮助他（出埃及记 24:1；申命记 5:23；22:16；约书亚记 23:2；士师记 8:14；11:5, 11；撒母耳记上 11:3；列王纪上 20:7；列王纪下 6:32；历代志下 34:29；路得记 4:4；申命记 19:12；以西结书 8:1；耶利米哀歌 1:19）；然后摩押的长老们被认为有一个国王。法官的自然目的是因为贫困和无力，因为人们在社会中无法自卫免受暴力侵害；因此，根据自然法则，他们将权力交给一个或多个人，任命一个法官或法官来实现自我保护的目的。 但是自然界使用最有效的手段来达到目的；但在一个大社会和王国中，通过许多统治者比仅有一个统治者更容易实现目标；因为如果只有一个统治者，他无法为所有人提供正义；而孩子们离开父亲和导师越远，他们离暴力和不公正就越近。正义对穷人来说应该像喝一口水一样容易。撒母耳每年都会穿越这片土地到伯特利、吉甲、密斯巴（撒母耳记上 7:16），为穷人们带来正义。我们苏格兰的国王过去也有这样的义务；但现在正义如同黄金一样昂贵。不能以国王可以惩罚和惩治他们扭曲判决来证明下级法官只是国王的代理人和副手，这不是一个好的论据。1. 因为国王在惩罚他们时并不是作为法官，而是作为个人。2. 这可能证明所有的公民都是国王的代理人和副手，因为在他们违反法律的情况下，他可以惩罚他们所有人。

QUESTION XXI
问题二十一

WHAT POWER THE PEOPLE AND STATES OF PARLIAMENT HAVE OVER THE KING, AND IN THE STATE
人民和议会对国王以及国家有什么权力

It is true the king is the head of the kingdom; but the states of the kingdom are as the temples of the head, and so, as essentially parts of the head as the king is the crown of the head.
国王是王国的头，这是事实；但王国的各个州就像头部的寺庙，与国王作为头部的皇冠一样，是头部的本质组成部分。

Assert. 1.—These ordines regni, the states, have been in famous nations: so there were fathers of families, and princes of tribes amongst the Jews: the Ephori amongst the Lacedemonians, (Polyb. hist. l. 6;) the senate amongst the Romans; the forum superbiense amongst the Arragonians; the parliaments in Scotland, England, France, Spain. Abner communed with the elders of Israel to bring the king home; (2 Sam. 3:17;) and there were elders in Israel, both in the time of the judges, and in the time of the kings, who did not only give advice and counsel to the judges and kings, but also were judges no less than the kings and judges, which I shall make good by these places: Deut. 21:19, the rebellious son is brought to the elders of the city, who had power of life and death, and caused to stone him; Deut. 22:18, "The elders of the city shall take that man and chastise him;" Josh. 20:4, but beside the elders of every city, there were the elders of Israel and the princes, who had also judicial power of life and death, as the judges and king had; Josh. 22:30, even when Joshua was judge in Israel, the princes of the congregation and heads of the thousands of Israel did judicially cognosce whether the children of Reuben, of Gad, and of half the tribe of Manasseh, were apostates from God, and the religion of Israel; 2 Sam. 5:3, all the elders of Israel made David king at Hebron; and Num. 12, they are appointed by God not to be the advisers only and helpers of Moses; but (ver. 14–16) to bear a part of the burden of ruling and governing the people, that Moses might be eased. Jeremiah is accused, (26:10,) upon his life, before the princes; Josh. 7:4, the princes sit in judgment with Joshua; Josh. 9:15, Joshua and the princes of the congregation sware to the Gibeonites that they would not kill them. The princes of the house of Israel could not be rebuked for oppression in judgment (Mic. 3:1–3) if they had not had power of judgment. So (Zeph. 3:3; Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6, 7) they are expressly made judges in the place of God; and (1 Sam. 8:2) without advice or knowledge of Samuel, the supreme judge, they convene and ask a king; and without any head or superior, when there is no king, they convene a parliament, and made David king at Hebron; and when David is banished, they convene to bring him home again; when tyrannous Athalia reigneth, they convene and make Joash king, and that without any king; and (Josh. 22) there is a parliament convened, and, for any thing we can read, without Joshua, to take cognisance of a new altar. It had been good that the parliaments both of Scotland and of England had convened, though the king had not indicted and summoned a parliament, without the king, to take order with the wicked clergy, who had made many idolatrous altars; and the P. Prelate should have brought an argument to prove it unlawful, in foro Dei, to set up the tables and conventions in our kingdom, when the prelates were bringing in the grossest idolatory into the church—a service for adoring of altars, of bread, the work of the hand of the baker—a god more corruptible than any god of silver and gold.
断言。1.——这些王国的 ordines regni，在著名的国家中存在：犹太人中有家族的父亲和部落的王子：斯巴达人中有埃弗拉人（Polyb. hist. l. 6）；罗马人中有参议院；阿拉贡人中有 superbiense 论坛；苏格兰、英格兰、法国、西班牙中有议会。亚伯纳与以色列的长老商议将国王带回家（撒母耳记下 3:17）；以色列中有长老，既在士师时代，也在王时代，他们不仅给士师和王提供建议和指导，而且也是与王和士师一样的法官，我将通过以下地方证明这一点：申命记 21:19，叛逆的儿子被带到城里的长老面前，他们有生死的权力，并命令用石头砸死他；申命记 22:18，“城里的长老要拿住那人，责打他”；约书亚记 20:4，除了每个城市的长老外，还有以色列的长老和王子，他们也有生死的司法权力，就像士师和国王一样；约书亚记 22:30，即使约书亚在以色列担任士师时，以色列会众的首领和千夫长也会审判性地判断流便人、迦得人和玛拿西半支派的子孙是否背离了上帝和以色列的宗教；撒母耳记下 5:3，以色列的众长老在希伯仑立大卫为王；民数记 12，他们被上帝任命不仅仅是摩西的顾问和助手，而且（第 14-16 节）要分担统治和治理人民的负担，以便减轻摩西的负担。耶利米在王子们面前（26:10）被控告，约书亚与王子们一同审判（约书亚记 7:4）；约书亚和以色列会众的首领向基遍人发誓不杀他们（约书亚记 9:15）。以色列家的首领如果没有审判权，就不会因为在审判中的压迫而受到指责（弥迦书 3:1-3）。因此，他们明确被任命为上帝的代理人（西番雅书 3:3；申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6, 7）；而且（撒母耳记上） （8:2）在没有塞缪尔这位最高法官的建议或知识下，他们召集并询问一个国王；在没有任何领导或上级的情况下，当没有国王时，他们召集议会，并在希伯伦立大卫为王；当大卫被放逐时，他们召集以将他带回家；当暴虐的亚他利雅统治时，他们召集并立约阿施为王，而没有任何国王；（约书亚记 22 章）有一个召集的议会，据我们所知，没有约书亚的参与，来审理一个新的祭坛。苏格兰和英格兰的议会都应该召集，即使国王没有召集和召唤议会，也应该在没有国王的情况下，对那些建立了许多偶像祭坛的邪恶教士进行处理；主教应该提出一个论据，证明在上帝的法庭上，在我们的王国中设立桌子和会议是不合法的，因为主教们正在教堂中引入最严重的偶像崇拜——崇拜祭坛、面包和面包师傅的作品——这是一个比任何银和金的神都更容易腐败的神。

And against Achab's will and mind, (1 Kings 18:19,) Elias causeth to kill the priests of Baal, according to God's express law. It is true it was extraordinary; but no otherwise extraordinary than it is at this day. When the supreme magistrate will not execute the judgment of the Lord, those who made him supreme magistrate, under God, who have, under God, sovereign liberty to dispose of crowns and kingdoms, are to execute the judgment of the Lord, when wicked men make the law of God of none effect. 1 Sam. 15:32, so Samuel killed Agag, whom the Lord expressly commanded to be killed, because Saul disobeyed the voice of the Lord. I deny not but there is necessity of a clear warrant that the magistrate neglect his duty, either in not convening the states, or not executing the judgment of the Lord. I see not how the convening of a parliament is extraordinary to the states; for none hath power ordinary when the king is dead, or when he is distracted, or captive in another land, to convene the estates and parliament, but they only; and in their defect, by the law of nature, the people may convene. But, if they be essentially judges no less than the king, as I have demonstrated to the impartial reader, in the former chapter, I conceive, though the state make a positive law, for order's cause, that the king ordinarily convene parliaments; yet, if we dispute the matter in the court of conscience, the estates have intrinsically (because they are the estates, and essentially judges of the land) ordinary power to convene themselves. Because, when Moses, by God's rule, hath appointed seventy men to be catholic judges in the land, Moses, upon his sole pleasure and will, hath not power to restrain them in the exercise of judgment given them of God; for, as God hath given to any one judge power to judge righteous judgment, though the king command the contrary, so hath he given to him power to sit down in the gate, or the bench, when and where the necessity of the oppressed people calleth for it. For the express commandment of God, which saith to all judges, execute judgment in the morning, involveth essentially a precept to all the physical actions, without which it is impossible to execute judgment;—as, namely, if, by a divine precept, the judge must execute judgment; therefore he must come to some public place, and he must cause party and witnesses come before him, and he must consider, cognosce, examine, in the place of judgment, things, persons, circumstances: and so God, who commandeth positive acts of judging, commandeth the judge's locomotive power, and his natural actions of compelling, by the sword, the parties to come before him, even as Christ, who commandeth his servants to preach, commandeth that the preacher and the people go to church, and that he stand or sit in a place where all may hear, and that he give himself to reading and meditating before he come to preach. And if God command one judge to come to the place of judgment, so doth he command seventy, and so all estates to convene in the place of judgment. It is objected, "That the estates are not judges, ordinary and habitually, but only judges at some certain occasions, when the king, for cogent and weighty causes, calleth them, and calleth them not to judge, but to give him advice and counsel how to judge."
以利亚违背阿哈布的意愿和心意，按照上帝明确的法律，使巴力的祭司被杀害。（列王纪上 18:19）这确实是非同寻常的，但与今天并无不同。当最高统治者不执行上帝的审判时，那些使他成为最高统治者的人，在上帝的权威下，有权力支配王冠和王国，当邪恶的人使上帝的法律失效时，他们有责任执行上帝的审判。撒母耳记上 15:32，撒母耳杀死了亚迦，因为扫罗违背了上帝的命令。我不否认，确实需要明确的授权，即当统治者忽视自己的职责，无论是不召集国会，还是不执行上帝的审判。我不明白召集国会对于国家来说是非同寻常的；因为当国王死亡、或者他精神错乱、或者被囚禁在他国时，除了他们之外，没有其他人有权力召集国会和议会；在他们无法行使职责时，根据自然法则，人民可以召集。 但是，如果他们与国王一样是本质上的法官，正如我在前一章中向公正的读者证明的那样，我认为，尽管国家出于秩序的原因制定了一项积极的法律，要求国王通常召集议会；然而，如果我们在良心的法庭上争论这个问题，各个阶层本质上（因为他们是各个阶层，也是土地的法官）有权力自行召集。因为，当摩西按照上帝的规定在这个土地上任命了七十个人作为普遍的法官时，摩西凭借他自己的意愿和决定，没有权力限制他们行使上帝赋予他们的审判权；因为，正如上帝赋予任何一个法官公正审判的权力一样，尽管国王命令相反，他也赋予了他在门口或法庭上坐下的权力，当压迫的人民的需要呼唤时，他可以在何时何地坐下。 为了神的明确命令，对所有的法官说，在早晨执行审判，实质上涉及到所有物理行动的规定，如果没有这些行动是不可能执行审判的；比如，如果按照神的命令，法官必须执行审判，那么他必须去一些公共场所，他必须让当事人和证人出庭，他必须在审判场所考虑、审查、调查事物、人员、情况：因此，神命令执行判断的积极行为，也命令法官的运动能力和他通过剑的自然行动来强迫当事人出庭，就像基督命令他的仆人去传道一样，命令传道者和人民去教堂，他站在或坐在所有人都能听到的地方，他在传道之前要自己阅读和沉思。如果神命令一个法官去审判场所，那么他也命令七十个法官，以及所有的阶层都在审判场所集会。 有人反对说：“贵族并非常规性和习惯性的法官，而只是在某些特定场合下才担任法官，当国王因为紧迫而重要的原因召集他们时，并非要他们担任法官，而是要他们给予他建议和指导，以便他如何行使审判权。”"

Arg. 1.—They are no less judges habitually than the king, when the common affairs of the whole kingdom necessitateth these public watchmen to come together; for even the king judgeth not actually, but upon occasion. This is to beg the question, to say that the estates are not judges but when the king calleth them at such and such occasions; for the elders, princes, and heads of families and tribes, were judges ordinary, because they made the king.
他们通常不比国王少作为法官，当整个王国的公共事务需要这些公共守夜人聚集在一起时；因为即使国王也不是经常实际行使审判权，只是在特定场合下才会行使。这是在回避问题，说各个阶层只有在国王在特定场合召集他们时才能作为法官；因为长老、王子和家族部落的首领是常任法官，因为他们造就了国王。

Arg. 2.—The kingdom, by God, yea, and church, justice and religion, so far as they concern the whole kingdom, are committed not to the keeping of the king only, but to all the judges, elders, and princes of the land: and they are rebuked as evening wolves, lions, oppressors, (Ezek. 22:27; Zec. 3:3; Isa. 3:14, 15; Mic. 3:1–3,) when they oppress the people in judgment, so are they (Deut. 1:15–17; 2 Chron. 19:6, 7) made judges, and therefore they are no more to be restrained not to convene by the king's power, (which is in this accumulative and auxiliary, not privative,) than they can be restrained in judgment, and in pronouncing such a sentence, as the king pleased, and not such a sentence; because, as they are to answer to God for unjust sentences, so also for no just sentences, and for not convening to judge, when religion and justice, which are fallen in the streets, calleth for them.
王国，上帝，教堂，正义和宗教，只要涉及整个王国，不仅仅是国王，而是所有的法官，长老和王子们都负有责任：当他们在审判中压迫人民时，他们被斥责为晚上的狼，狮子，压迫者（以西结书 22:27；撒迦利亚书 3:3；以赛亚书 3:14,15；弥迦书 3:1-3）；他们被任命为法官，因此他们不再受到国王权力的限制（这是累积和辅助的，而不是否定的），就像他们在审判中不能受到限制一样，不能宣布国王满意的判决，而不是这样的判决；因为他们不仅要对不公正的判决负责，也要对没有公正的判决和不召开审判负责，当宗教和正义在街头倒下时，他们应该被召唤。

Arg. 3.—As God in a law of nature hath given to every man the keeping and self-preservation of himself and of his brother, Cain ought in his place to be the keeper of Abel his brother; so hath God committed the keeping of the commonwealth, by a positive law, not to the king alone, because that is impossible. (Num. 11:14, 17; 2 Chron. 19:1–6; 1 Chron. 27.)
阿格。3. - 上帝在自然法中赋予每个人保护和自我保存自己和他的兄弟的权利，所以该隐应该在他的位置上成为亚伯的守护者；同样，上帝通过一项积极的法律将国家的保护责任委托给了国王，因为这是不可能的。（民数记 11:14, 17；历代志上 19:1-6；历代志下 27）

Arg. 4.—If the king had such a power as king, and so from God, he should have power to break up the meeting of all courts of parliament, secret councils, and all inferior judicatures; and when the congregation of gods, as Psal. 82, in the midst of which the Lord standeth, were about to pronounce just judgment for the oppressed and poor, they might be hindered by the king; and so they should be as just as the king maketh them, and might pervert judgment, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him, (Isa. 5:23,) because the king commandeth; and the cause of the poor should not come before the judge, when the king so commandeth. And shall it excuse the estates, to say, we could not judge the cause of the poor, nor crush the priests of Baal, and the idolatrous mass-prelates, because the king forbade us? So might the king break up the meeting of the lords of session, when they were to decern that Naboth's vineyard should be restored to him, and hinder the states to repress tyranny; and this were as much as if the states should say, We made this man our king, and with our good-will we agree he shall be a tyrant. For if God gave it to him as a king, we are to consent that he enjoy it.
如果国王作为国王拥有这样的权力，并且这权力来自上帝，那么他应该有权力解散所有议会、秘密会议和所有下级法院的会议；当众神的会众（如诗篇 82 所描述的）在主的中间要为受压迫和贫穷的人宣判公正的判决时，他们可能会被国王阻止；因此，他们将与国王一样公正，并可能颠倒判决，夺走义人的公义（以赛亚书 5:23），因为国王有命令权；当国王这样命令时，穷人的案件不会提交给法官。难道这样说可以为贵族辩解吗？我们不能审判穷人的案件，不能打压巴力的祭司和拜偶像的大主教，因为国王禁止我们吗？国王也可以解散法院大法官的会议，当他们要判决拿伯的葡萄园应该归还给他时，阻止国家镇压暴政；这就等于国家说，我们选择了这个人作为国王，我们自愿同意他成为一个暴君。 如果上帝将国王的地位赐予他，我们应该同意他享受这个地位。

Arg. 5.—If Barclay and other flatterers have leave to make the parliament but counsellors and advisers of the king, and the king to be the only and sole judge, the king is, by that same reason, the sole judge, in relation to all judges; the contrary whereof is clear. (Num. 11:16; Deut. 1:15–17; Chron. 19:6; Rom. 13:1, 2; 1 Pet. 2:13, 14.) Yea, but (say they) the king, when he sendeth an ambassador, he may tie him to a written commission; and in so far as he exceedeth that, he is not an ambassador; and clear it is, that all inferior judges (1 Pet. 2:13, 14) are but sent by the king; therefore, they are so judges as they are but messengers, and are to adhere to the royal pleasure of the prince that sent them. Ans. (1.)—The ambassador is not to accept an unjust ambassage, that fighteth with the law of nature. (2.) The ambassador and the judge differ, the ambassador is the king and states' deputy, both in his call to the ambassy, and also in the matter of the ambassy; for which cause he is not to transgress what is given to him in writ as a rule; but the inferior judges, and the high court of parliament, though they were the king's deputies, (as the parliament is in no sort his deputy, but he their deputy royal) yet it is only in respect of their call, not in respect of the matter of their commission, for the king may send the judge to judge in general according to the law, justice, and religion, but he cannot depute the sentence, and command the conscience of the judge to pronounce such a sentence, not such. The inferior judge in the act of judging is as independent, and his conscience as immediately subject to God as the king; therefore, the king owes to every sentence his approbative suffrage as king, but not either his directive suffrage, or his imperative suffrage of absolute pleasure.
如果巴克利和其他谄媚者被允许将议会变成国王的顾问和劝告者，而国王成为唯一和独立的法官，那么按照同样的理由，国王也是与所有法官相关的唯一法官；而相反的情况是明确的。（民数记 11:16；申命记 1:15-17；历代志上 19:6；罗马书 13:1,2；彼得前书 2:13,14）是的，但是（他们说）国王在派遣大使时，可以将他绑定在书面委任状上；只要他超出了那个范围，他就不是大使了；而且明确的是，所有下级法官（彼得前书 2:13,14）都只是国王派遣的；因此，他们是法官，但只是信使，必须遵守派遣他们的王子的意愿。回答：（1.）大使不应接受与自然法相抵触的不公正使命。（2.）大使和法官有所不同，大使是国王和各州的代表，无论是在他的使命中还是在使馆的事务上都是如此；因此，他不得违背他所获得的书面规定；但是，尽管下级法官和议会高等法院是国王的代表（因为议会根本不是他的代表，而是他们的皇家代表），但这仅仅是在他们的职位上，而不是在他们的委托事项上，因为国王可以派遣法官根据法律、正义和宗教进行普遍审判，但他不能委托判决，并命令法官的良心宣布这样的判决，而不是那样的判决。在审判行为中，下级法官与国王一样独立，他们的良心与上帝直接相关；因此，作为国王，国王对每个判决都应给予赞同的支持，但不是指导性的支持，也不是绝对快乐的命令性支持。

Arg. 6.—If the king should sell his country, and bring in a foreign army, the estates are to convene, to take course for the safety of the kingdom.
如果国王出售他的国家，并引进外国军队，各个领地应召开会议，采取措施确保王国的安全。

Arg. 7.—If David exhort the princes of Israel to help king Solomon in governing the kingdom, and in building the temple (2 Chron. 32:3):—if Hezekiah took counsel with his princes, and his mighty men in the matter of holding off the Assyrians, who were to invade the land: if David (1 Chron. 13:1–4) consult with the captains of thousands and hundreds, to bring the ark of God to Kirjath-jearim: if Solomon (1 Kings 8:1) "assemble the elders of Israel, and all the heads of the tribes, and the chief of the fathers, to bring the ark of the tabernacle to the congregation of the Lord:" if Achab gathered together the states of Israel, in a matter that nearly concerned religion: if the elders and people (1 Kings 20:8) counsel and decree that king Achab should hearken to Ben-hadad king of Syria, and if Ahasuerus make no decrees, but with consent of his princes, (Esth. 1:21,) nor Darius any act without his nobles and princes: if Hamor and Shechem (Gen. 34:20) would not make a covenant with Jacob's sons, without the consent of the men of the city, and Ephron the Hittite would not sell Abraham a burial place in his land without the consent of the children of Heth (Gen. 23:10):—then must the estates have a power of judging with the king or prince in matters of religion, justice, and government, which concern the whole kingdom. But the former is true by the records of Scripture; therefore, so is the latter.
亚述王入侵以色列时，希西家与他的王子和勇士商议对抗。大卫请以色列的首领帮助所罗门管理国家和建造圣殿。大卫也与千夫长和百夫长商议将神的约柜带到基列耶琳。所罗门召集以色列的长老、各支派的首领和族长，将约柜带到耶和华的会幕。亚哈聚集以色列的众民商议与宗教相关的事宜。以色列的长老和百姓商议决定亚哈应听从叙利亚王便哈达的命令。亚哈随后颁布法令，但只有在王子们的同意下才能生效。亚哈隆和示剑不会与雅各的儿子们立约，除非得到城中人的同意。赫人以弗仑也不会在自己的土地上向亚伯拉罕出售墓地，除非得到赫人子民的同意。 23:10): —那么，贵族必须与国王或王子一起在涉及整个王国的宗教、正义和政府事务上行使裁决权。但前者在圣经的记录中是真实的；因此，后者也是真实的。

Arg. 8.—The men of Ephraim complain that Jephthah had gone to war against the children of Ammon without them, and hence rose war betwixt the men of Ephraim and the men of Gilead, (Judges 12:1–3,) and the men of Israel fiercely contended with the men of Judah, because they brought king David home again without them, pleading that they were therein despised, (2 Sam. 19:41–43,) which evinceth that the whole states have hand in matters of public government, that concern all the kingdom; and when there is no king, (Judg. 20) the chief of the people, and of all the tribes, go out in battle against the children of Benjamin.
争论八：以法莲人抱怨耶弗他在没有他们的情况下与亚扪人开战，因此以法莲人和基列人之间爆发了战争（士师记 12:1-3），以色列人与犹大人激烈争斗，因为他们将大卫王带回家而没有带上他们，声称他们在其中受到蔑视（撒母耳记下 19:41-43），这表明整个国家在涉及全国的公共事务和政府问题上都有参与，当没有国王时（士师记 20），人民和各支派的首领会出战对抗便雅悯人。

Arg. 9.—Those who make the king, and so have power to unmake him in the case of tyranny, must be above the king in power of government; but the elders and princes made both David and Saul kings.
那些使国王成为国王，并且在暴政的情况下有权力废黜他的人，必须在政府的权力上高于国王；但是长老和王子们使大卫和扫罗都成为了国王。

Arg. 10.—There is not any who say that the princes and people, (1 Sam. 14) did not right in rescuing innocent Jonathan from death, against the king's will and his law.
阿格。10. - 没有人说，王子和人民（撒母耳记上 14 章）在违背国王的意愿和法律的情况下，救出无辜的约拿单，是不对的。

Arg. 11.—The special ground of royalists is, to make the king the absolute supreme, giving all life and power to the parliament and states, and of mere grace convening them. So saith Ferne, the author of Ossorianum, (p. 69,) but this ground is false, because the king's power is fiduciary, and put in his hand upon trust, and must be ministerial, and borrowed from those who put him in trust, and so his power must be less, and derived from the parliament. But the parliament hath no power in trust from the King, because the time was when the man who is the king had no power, and the parliament had the same power that they now have; and now, when the king hath received power from them, they have the whole power that they had before—that is, to make laws; and resigned no power to the king, but to execute laws; and his convening of them is an act of royal duty, which he oweth to the parliament by virtue of his office, and is not an act of grace; for an act of grace is an act of free will; and what the king doth of free will, he may not do, and so he may never convene a parliament. But, when David, Solomon, Asa, Hezekiah, Jehoshaphat, Ahaz, convened parliaments, they convened parliaments as kings, and so ex debito et virtute officii, out of debt and royal obligation, and if the king as the king, be lex animata, a breathing and living law, the king, as king, must do by obligation of law what he doth as king, and not from spontaneous and arbitrary grace. If the Scripture holds forth to us a king in Israel, and two princes and elders who made the king, and had power of life and death, as we have seen; then is there in Israel monarchy tempered with aristocracy; and if there were elders and rulers in every city, as the Scripture saith, here was also aristocracy and democracy; and for the warrant of the power of the estates, I appeal to jurists, and to approved authors: Arg. I. aliud. 160, sect. 1; De Jur. Reg. l. 22; Mortuo de fidei. l. 11, 14, ad Mum. l. 3, 1, 4; Sigenius De Rep. Judæor. l. 6, c. 7; Cornelius Bertramo, c. 12; Junius Brutus, Vindic. contra. Tyran. sect. 2; Author Libelli de jur Magistrat. in subd. q. 6; Althus. Politic. c. 18; Calvin Institut. l. 4, c, 20; Pareus Coment, in Rom. xiii.; Pet. Martyr in Lib. Judic. c. 3; Joan Marianus de rege lib. 1, c. 7; Hottoman de jure Antiq. Regni Gallici l. 1, c. 12; Buchanan de jure Regni apud Scotos.
第 11 条。王党的特殊立场是将国王视为绝对至高，将所有权力和生命赋予议会和国家，并凭借纯粹的恩典召集他们。正如《奥西里亚纳》的作者费恩所说（第 69 页），但这个立场是错误的，因为国王的权力是信托的，是基于信任而授予他的，必须是行政的，并从将他委托的人那里借来的，所以他的权力必须较小，并源自议会。但议会没有从国王那里获得信托的权力，因为曾经有一段时间，现在成为国王的人没有权力，而议会拥有他们现在拥有的同样的权力；现在，当国王从他们那里获得权力时，他们拥有了他们以前拥有的全部权力，也就是制定法律的权力；他们没有将任何权力让给国王，只是让他执行法律；他召集他们是出于他作为国王的职责，是对议会的义务，而不是出于恩典的行为；因为恩典的行为是出于自由意志的行为；国王所做的任何出于自由意志的行为都是不可行的，所以他可能永远不会召集议会。 但是，当大卫、所罗门、亚撒、希西家、约沙法、亚哈斯召集议会时，他们是作为国王召集的，因此根据法律的义务和王室义务，国王作为国王必须按照法律的义务行事，而不是出于自发和任意的恩典。如果圣经向我们展示了以色列的国王，以及两位王子和长老们如何制定国王，并拥有生死权力，正如我们所见；那么在以色列，君主制与贵族制相结合；而如果圣经所说的每个城市都有长老和统治者，这里也有贵族制和民主制；至于国家权力的授权，我向法学家和经过验证的作者求证：Arg. I. aliud. 160, sect. 1; De Jur. Reg. l. 22; Mortuo de fidei. l. 11, 14, ad Mum. l. 3, 1, 4; Sigenius De Rep. Judæor. l. 6, c. 7; Cornelius Bertramo, c. 12; Junius Brutus, Vindic. contra. Tyran. sect. 2; Author Libelli de jur Magistrat. in subd. q. 6; Althus. Politic. c. 18; Calvin Institut. l. 4, c, 20; Pareus Coment, in Rom. xiii.; Pet. Martyr in Lib. Judic. c. 3; Joan Marianus de rege lib. 1，第 7 章；Hottoman 关于法国古代王国的法律，第 1 卷，第 12 章；Buchanan 关于苏格兰王国的法律。

Obj.—The king after a more noble way representeth the people than the estates doth; for the princes and commissioners of parliament have all their power from the people, and the people's power is concentrated in the king.
国王以一种更高尚的方式代表人民，胜过议会的各个阶层；因为王子和议会委员会的权力都来自人民，而人民的权力集中在国王身上。

Ans.—The estates taken collectively do represent the people both in respect of office, and of persons, because they stand judges for them; for many represent many, ratione numeri et officii, better than one doth. The king doth improperly represent the people, though the power for actual execution of laws be more in the king, yet a legislative power is more in the estates. Neither will it follow, that if the estates of a kingdom do any thing but counsel a king, they must then command him, for a legal and judicial advice hath influence in the effect to make it a law, not on the king's will, to cause him give the being of a law to that, which without his will is no law, for this supposeth that he is only judge.
答案：庄园总体上代表了人民，无论是在职位上还是在个人上，因为他们为人民担任法官的角色；因为许多人比一个人更好地代表了许多人，无论是在数量上还是在职位上。国王不恰当地代表了人民，尽管实际执行法律的权力更多地掌握在国王手中，但立法权力更多地掌握在庄园手中。也不能因此得出结论，如果一个王国的庄园除了给国王提供建议之外还做其他事情，那么他们必须命令国王，因为法律和司法建议对于产生影响以使其成为法律是有影响力的，而不是对国王的意愿，使其成为法律的存在，因为这假设他只是一个法官。

Obj.—What power the people reserveth, they reserve it to themselves in unitate, as united in a parliament; and therefore what they do out of a parliament is tumultuous.
人民保留的权力，是作为一个整体，即在议会中团结一致的形式；因此，他们在议会之外所做的一切都是骚乱的。

Ans.—I deny the consequence; they reserve the power of self-preservation out of a parliament, and a power of convening in parliament for that effect, that they may by common counsel defend themselves.
答：我否认这个结论；他们保留了在议会之外自我保护的权力，并且保留了在议会中召集的权力，以便通过共同的商议来保护自己。

QUESTION XXII
问题二十二

WHETHER THE POWER OF THE KING AS KING BE ABSOLUTE, OR DEPENDENT AND LIMITED BY GOD'S FIRST MOULD AND PATTERN OF A KING
无论国王作为国王的权力是绝对的，还是依赖于上帝对国王的首次塑造和模式的限制

Dr Ferne (sect. 3, p. 12) showeth us it was never his purpose to plead for absoluteness of an arbitrary commandment, free from all moral restraint laid on the power by God's law; but only he striveth for a power in the king that cannot be resisted by the subject. But truly we never disputed with royalists of any absolute power in the king, free from moral subjection to God's law. 1. Because any bond that God's law imposeth on the king, cometh wholly from God, and the nature of a divine law, and not from any voluntary contract or covenant, either express or tacito, betwixt the king and the people who made him king; for, if he fail against such a covenant, though he should exceed the cruelty of a king or a man, and become a lion, a Nero, and a mother-killer, he should in all his inhumanity and breach of covenant be accountable to God, not to any man on earth. 2. To dispute with royalists if God's law lay any moral restraint upon the king, were to dispute whether the long be a rational man or no, and whether he can sin against God, and shall cry in the day of God's wrath, (if he be a wicked prince) Hills fall on us and cover us, as it is Rev. 6:15, 16; and whether Tophet be prepared for all workers of iniquity; and certainly I justify the schoolmen in that question: Whether or no God could have created a rational creature, such a one as by nature is impeccable, and not naturally capable of sin before God? If royalists dispute this question of their absolute monarch, they are wicked divines.
弗恩博士（第 3 节，第 12 页）向我们展示，他从未打算为任意命令的绝对性辩护，而是为国王争取一种无法被臣民抵抗的权力。但事实上，我们从未与王权主义者争论过国王是否拥有绝对权力，是否不受上帝法律的道德约束。1. 因为上帝法律对国王施加的任何约束完全来自上帝和神圣法律的本质，而不是来自国王和选举他为国王的人民之间的任何自愿契约或默示契约；因此，即使他违反了这样的契约，即使他超越了国王或人的残忍，成为狮子、尼禄和杀母者，他在所有的野蛮行为和违约中都要对上帝负责，而不是对地上的任何人负责。2. 如果与王权主义者争论上帝的法律是否对国王施加道德约束，那就是争论龙是否是一个理性的人，他是否能违背上帝，并在上帝的愤怒之日呼喊：“山岭啊，倒在我们身上，掩盖我们”，正如启示录所说。 6:15, 16; 无论地狱是否为一切邪恶的人准备好；对于那个问题，我确实支持学者们的观点：上帝是否能够创造一个理性的生物，一个天生无罪、在上帝面前不会犯罪的人？如果君主主义者对他们的绝对君主提出质疑，他们就是邪恶的神职人员。

We plead not at this time, (saith the Prelate, c. 14, p. 163, stealing from Grotius, Barclay, Arnisæus, who spake it with more sinews of reason;) for a masterly or despotical, or rather for a slavish sovereignty, which is dominium herile, an absolute power, such as the great Turk this day exerciseth over his subjects, and the king of Spain hath over and in his territories without Europe: we maintain only regiam potestatem, quæ fundatur in paterna, such royal, fatherly sovereignty, as we live under, blessed be God, and our predecessors. This, (saith he,) as it hath its royal prerogative inherent to the crown naturally, and inseparable from it, so it trencheth not upon the liberty of the person, or the property of the goods of the subject, but in and by the lawful and just acts of jurisdiction.
我们在此时不认罪，（如主教所说，第 14 章，第 163 页，从格罗提乌斯、巴克利、阿尼塞乌斯那里偷来的，他们用更有理性的论据说出了这一点）因为我们主张的是一种精通或专制的，或者更确切地说是一种奴隶制的主权，即 dominium herile，一种绝对的权力，就像今天大土耳其对其臣民所行使的权力，以及西班牙国王对其领土内外的权力一样：我们只维护 regiam potestatem，即以父权为基础的王权，感谢上帝和我们的前辈，我们生活在这样的王权之下。正如他所说，这种王权作为皇冠的固有特权，与之不可分割，因此它不侵犯个人的自由或财产，而是通过合法和公正的司法行为来实现。

Ans.—1. Here is another absolute power disclaimed to be in the king; he hath not such a masterly and absolute liberty as the Turk hath. Why? John P. P., in such a tender and high point as concerneth soul and body of subjects in three Christian kingdoms, you should have taught us. What bonds and fetters any covenant or paction betwixt the king and people layeth upon the king,—why he hath not, as king, the power of the great Turk, I will tell you. The great Turk may command any of his subjects to leap into a mountain of fire, and burn himself quick, in conscience of obedience to his law. And what if the subject disobey the great Turk? if the great Turk be a lawful prince, as you will not deny;—and if the king of Spain should command foreign conquered slaves to do the like. By your doctrine, neither the one nor the other were obliged to resist by violence, but to pray, or fly; which both were to speak to stones, and were like the man who, in case of shipwreck, made his devotion of praying to the waves of the sea, not to enter the place of his bed and drown him. But a Christian king hath not this power; why? and a Christian king (by royalist's doctrine) hath a greater power than the Turk (if greater can be): he hath power to command his subjects to cast themselves into hell-fire; that is, to press on them a service wherein it is written,—Adore the work of men's hands in the place of the living God; and this is worse than the Turk's commandment of bodily burning quick. And what is left to the Christian subjects in this case is the very same, and no other than is left to the Turkish and foreign Spanish subject. Either fly, or make prayers. There is no more left to us.
答案：1. 这里又是另一种绝对权力被否认在国王身上；他没有像土耳其人那样的主宰和绝对自由。为什么？约翰·P·P.，在涉及三个基督教王国的臣民的灵魂和身体这样一个敏感而重要的问题上，你应该教导我们。任何国王和人民之间的契约或协议对国王施加了什么束缚和枷锁，为什么他作为国王没有像大土耳其人那样的权力，我会告诉你。大土耳其人可以命令他的任何臣民跳进火山中燃烧自己，以顺从他的法律。如果臣民不服从大土耳其人怎么办？如果大土耳其人是合法的君主，你不会否认；如果西班牙国王命令征服的外国奴隶做同样的事情。根据你的教义，无论是一个还是另一个都不需要通过暴力来抵抗，而是要祈祷或逃跑；这两者都是对石头说话，就像那个在遇到船只失事时，祈祷海浪不要进入他的床位并淹死他的人一样。但是一个基督教国王没有这种权力；为什么？ 一个基督教国王（按照王权主义的教义）比土耳其人（如果可以更大的话）拥有更大的权力：他有权命令他的臣民投入地狱之火；也就是说，迫使他们崇拜人手所造的东西，而不是活着的上帝；这比土耳其人命令活活烧死人更糟糕。在这种情况下，基督教臣民所剩下的选择与土耳其和外国西班牙臣民所剩下的选择完全相同，没有其他选择。要么逃跑，要么祈祷。我们没有其他选择。

2. Many royalists maintain that England is a conquered nation. Why, then, see what power, by law of conquest, the king of Spain hath over his slaves; the same must the king of England have over his subjects. For, to royalists, a title by conquest to a crown is as lawful as a title by birth or election; for lawfulness, in relation to God's law, is placed in an indivisible point, if we regard the essence of lawfulness; and therefore there is nothing left to England, but that all protestants who take the oath of a protestant king, to defend the true protestant religion, should, after prayers conveyed to the king through the fingers of prelates and papists, leave the kingdom empty to papists, prelates, and atheists.
许多王室支持者认为英格兰是一个被征服的国家。那么，根据征服的法律，西班牙国王对他的奴隶拥有的权力，英格兰国王也必须对他的臣民拥有同样的权力。对于王室支持者来说，通过征服获得王位的称号与通过出生或选举获得的称号一样合法；因为在与上帝的法律相关的合法性方面，合法性被置于一个不可分割的点上，如果我们考虑合法性的本质；因此，英格兰只剩下一个选择，那就是所有接受护卫真正的新教国王的誓言的新教徒，应该在通过主教和天主教徒的手指传达给国王的祈祷之后，将王国留给天主教徒、主教和无神论者。

3. All power restrained that it cannot arise from ten degrees to fourteen,—from the kingly power of Saul (1 Sam. 8:9, 11) to lie kingly power of the great Turk, to fourteen,—must either be restrained by God's law, or by man's law, or by the innate goodness and grace of the prince, or by the providence of God. A restraint from God's law is vain; for it is no question between us and royalists but God hath laid a moral restraint on kings, and all men, that they have not moral power to sin against God. Is the restraint laid on by man's law? What law of man? The royalist saith, the king, as king, is above all law of man. Then (say I) no law of man can hinder the king's power of ten, to arise to the Turkish power of fourteen. All law of man, as it is man's law, is seconded either with ecclesiastical and spiritual co-action, such as excommunication, or with civil and temporal co-action, such as is the sword, if it be violated. But royalists deny that either the sword of the church in excommunication, or the civil sword, should be drawn against the king. This law of man should be produced by this profound jurist, the P. Prelate, who mocketh at all the statists and lawyers of Scotland. It is not a covenant betwixt the king and people at his coronation; for though there were any such covenant, yet the breach of it doth bind before God, but not before man. Nor can I see, or any man else, how a law of man can lay a restraint on the king's power of two degrees, to cancel it within a law, more than on a power of ten or fourteen degrees. If the king of Spain, the lawful sovereign of those over-European people, (as royalists say,) have a power of fourteen degrees over those conquered subjects, as a king, I see not how he hath not the like power over his own subjects of Spain, to wit, even of fourteen; for what agreeth to a king, as a king, (and kingly power from God he hath as king,) he hath it in relation to all subjects, except it be taken from him in relation to some subjects, and given by some law of God, or in relation to some other subjects. Now no man can produce any such law. The nature of the goodness and grace of the prince cannot lay bonds on the king to cancel his power, that be should not usurp the power of the king of Spain toward his over-Europeans. 1. Royalists plead for a power due to the king, as king, and that from God, such as Saul had; (1 Sam. 8:9, 11;10:25;) but this power should be a power of grace and goodness in the king as a good man; not in the king as a king, and due to him by law: and so the king should have his legal power from God to be a tyrant. But if he were not a tyrant, but should lay limits on his own power, through the goodness of his own nature, no thanks to royalists that he is not a tyrant; for, actu primo, and as he is a king, (as they say) he is a tyrant, having from God a tyrannous power of ten degrees, as Saul had; (1 Sam. 8;) and why not of fourteen degrees as well as the great Turk, or the king of Spain? If he use it not, it is his own personal goodness, not his official and royal power. The restraint of providence laid by God upon any power to do ill, hindereth only the exercise of the power not to break forth in as tyrannous acts as ever the king of Spain or the great Turk can exercise toward any. Yea, providence layeth physical restraint, and possibly moral, sometimes, upon the exercise of that power that devils and the most wicked men of the world hath. But royalists must show us that providence hath laid bounds on the king's power, and made it fatherly and not I masterly; so that if it, the power, exceed bounds of fatherly power, and pass over to the despotical and masterly power, it may be resisted by the subjects; but that they will not say.
3. 所有权力都受到限制，无法从十度上升到十四度——从扫罗的王权（撒母耳记上 8:9, 11）到伟大土耳其的王权，必须要么受到上帝的法律限制，要么受到人的法律限制，要么受到君主的内在善良和恩典的限制，要么受到上帝的安排。上帝的法律的限制是徒劳的；因为这不是我们和君主主义者之间的问题，而是上帝对君王和所有人都施加了道德的限制，使他们没有道德上的权力去违背上帝。这是人的法律所施加的限制吗？是哪个人的法律？君主主义者说，国王作为国王，高于一切人的法律。那么（我说）没有人的法律能够阻止国王的权力从十度上升到十四度的土耳其的权力。所有人的法律，作为人的法律，要么得到教会和精神上的共同行动的支持，比如逐出教会，要么得到民事和世俗上的共同行动的支持，比如刀剑，如果违反了法律。但君主主义者否认教会的刀剑，即逐出教会，或者民事的刀剑，应该对国王使用。这个人的法律应该由这位深思熟虑的法学家、P. Prelate 提出，他嘲笑苏格兰的所有政治家和律师。 这不是国王加冕时国王与人民之间的契约；即使有这样的契约，违反它也只会在上帝面前有约束力，而不是在人面前。我和其他人都看不出，或者说任何人都看不出，人的法律如何能够对国王的权力施加两个程度的限制，以便在法律内部取消它，而不是对十个或十四个程度的权力施加限制。如果西班牙国王作为那些超欧洲人民的合法君主（正如王党派所说），作为国王对那些被征服的臣民有十四个程度的权力，我看不出他为什么对自己的西班牙臣民没有同样的权力，即十四个程度的权力；因为作为国王，他所拥有的权力（作为国王，他从上帝那里得到了国王的权力）是与所有臣民相关的，除非有某个上帝的法律将这些权力从他那里夺走，或者与其他臣民相关的某个法律将这些权力赋予他。现在没有人能够提出任何这样的法律。君主的善良和恩典的本质不能对国王施加束缚，以取消他的权力，使他不得像对待超欧洲人民那样篡夺权力。1. 王党派主张国王作为国王应该拥有的权力，是来自上帝的权力，就像扫罗一样拥有的权力一样；（撒上 8:9, 11; 10:25;) 但这种权力应该是国王作为一个好人的恩典和善良的力量；不是国王作为国王的力量，并且是由法律赋予他的：因此，国王应该从上帝那里获得他的合法权力，成为一个暴君。但是，如果他不是一个暴君，而是通过他自己的本性的善良来限制自己的权力，那不是皇室主义者的功劳，因为从根本上说，他作为国王（正如他们所说）就是一个暴君，拥有上帝赋予的十级暴政权力，就像扫罗一样；（撒母耳记上 8 章）为什么他不能像伟大的土耳其国王或西班牙国王一样拥有十四级权力呢？如果他不使用它，那是他个人的善良，而不是他的官方和皇家权力。上帝对任何权力施加的限制只是阻止了权力行使，使其不会像西班牙国王或伟大的土耳其国王那样发展出对任何人施加的暴政行为。是的，上帝对权力的行使施加了物理上的限制，可能有时也施加了道德上的限制，这种权力甚至超过了魔鬼和世界上最邪恶的人所拥有的权力。 但皇室支持者必须向我们展示，上天已经限制了国王的权力，并使其具有父亲般的性质，而非主宰性的；因此，如果这种权力超出了父亲般的界限，转而变为专制和主宰性的权力，那么它可以被臣民抵抗；但他们不会这样说。

4. This paternal and fatherly power that God hath given to kings, as royalists teach, trencheth not upon the liberty of the subjects and the property of their goods, but in and by lawful and just acts of jurisdiction (saith the P. Prelate). Well; then it may trench upon the liberty of soul and body of the subjects but in and by lawful and just acts of jurisdiction. But none are to judge of these acts of jurisdiction, whether they be just or not just, but the king, the only judge of supreme and absolute authority and power. And if the king command the idolatrous service in the obtruded service-book, it is a lawful and a just act of jurisdiction. For to royalists, who make the king's power absolute, all acts are so just to the subject, though he command idolatry and Mahommedanism, that we are to suffer only, and not to resist.
这种神赋予国王的父权和父爱的权力，正如皇家主义者所教导的那样，不侵犯臣民的自由和财产，而是通过合法和公正的司法行为来实现（主教先生说）。好吧，那么它可能侵犯臣民的灵魂和身体的自由，但只有通过合法和公正的司法行为才能实现。但是，只有国王，也就是至高无上的权力和权威的唯一裁判官，才能判断这些司法行为是否公正。如果国王命令在强加的礼拜书中进行拜偶像的仪式，那就是一种合法和公正的司法行为。因为对于皇家主义者来说，使国王的权力绝对化，所有的行为对臣民来说都是如此公正，即使他命令拜偶像和穆罕默德教，我们只能忍受，而不能抵抗。

5. The Prelate presumeth that fatherly power is absolute; but so, if a father murder his child, he is not accountable to the magistrate there for, but, being absolute over his children, only the Judge of the world, not any power on earth, can punish him.
5. Prelate 认为父权是绝对的；但是，如果一个父亲谋杀了他的孩子，他不需要对法官负责，因为他对自己的孩子有绝对的权力，只有世界的审判者，而不是地球上的任何权力，可以惩罚他。

6. We have proved that the king's power is paternal or fatherly only by analogy, and improperly.
我们已经证明了国王的权力只是通过类比和不恰当地被称为父权。

7. What is this prerogative royal, we shall hear by and by.
这个皇家特权，我们很快就会听到。

8. There is no restraint on earth laid upon this fatherly power of the king but God's law, which is a moral restraint. If then, the king challenge as great a power as the Turk hath, he only sinneth against God, but no mortal man on earth may control him, as royalists teach. And who can know what power it is that royalists plead for, whether a despotical power of lordly power, or a fatherly power? If it be a power above law, such as none on earth may resist it, it is no matter whether it be above law of two degrees, or of twenty, even to the great Turk's power.
这位国王的父权力量在地上没有任何限制，除了上帝的法律，这是一种道德限制。如果国王挑战像土耳其人那样的强大力量，他只是得罪了上帝，但地上没有任何凡人可以控制他，正如皇权主义者所教导的。而且，谁能知道皇权主义者所辩护的是什么样的权力，是专制的权力还是父权的权力？如果这是一种超越法律的权力，没有人可以抵抗它，那么无论它超越法律的程度是两个还是二十个，甚至是像土耳其大帝的权力，都无关紧要。

These go for oracles at court: Tacitus,—Principi summun rerum arbitrium Dii dederunt, subditis obsequii gloria relicta est; Seneca,—Indigna digna habenda sunt, Rex qua facit; Salust,—Impune quidvis facere, id est, Regem esse. As if to be a king and to be a god who cannot err were all one. But certainly these authors are taxing the license of kings, and not commanding their power.
这些适用于宫廷的预言家：塔西佗——众神赋予了君主最高的决策权，而臣民只剩下顺从的荣耀；塞内加——应当将不值得的事视为值得，因为国王所做的就是如此；撒卢斯特——无所顾忌地做任何事，那就是做国王。仿佛做国王和做一个不会犯错的神是一样的。但是这些作者显然是在限制国王的权力，而不是命令他们的权力。

But that God hath given no absolute and unlimited power to a king above the law, is evident by this:—
但是，上帝并没有赋予国王绝对和无限的权力，超越法律的限制，这一点是显而易见的：

Arg. 1.—He who, in his first institution, is appointed of God by office, even when he sitteth on the throne, to take heed to read on a written copy of God's law, that he may "learn to fear the Lord his God, and keep all the words of this law," &c., he is not of absolute power above law. But (Deut. 17:18, 19) the king as king, while he sitteth on the throne, is to do this; therefore the assumption is clear, for this is the law of the king as king, and not of a man as a man. But as he sitteth on the throne, he is to read on the book of the law; and (ver. 20) because he is king, "his heart is not to be lifted up above his brethren;" and as king, (ver. 16,) "he is not to multiply horses," &c. So politicians make this argument good:—they say, Rex est lex viva, animata, et loquens lex, the king as king, is a living, breathing, and speaking law. And there be three reasons of this,—1. If all were innocent persons, and could do no violence one to another, the law would rule all, and all men would put the law in execution, agendo sponte, by doing right of their own accord; and there should be no need of a king to compel men to do right. But now, because men are by nature averse to good laws, therefore there was need of a ruler, who, by office, should reduce the law into practice; and so is the king the law reduced in practice. 2. The law is ratio sive mens, the reason or mind, free from all perturbations of anger, lust, hatred, and cannot be tempted to ill; and the king, as a man, may be tempted by his own passions, and therefore, as king, he cometh by office out of himself to reason and law; and so much as he hath of law, so much of a king; and in his remotest distance from law and reason he is a tyrant. 3. Abstracta concretis sunt puriora et perfectiora. Justice is more perfect than a just man, whiteness more perfect than the white wall; so the nearer the king comes to a law, for the which he is a king, the nearer to a king, Propter quod unumquodque tale, id ipsum magis tale. Therefore, kings throwing laws to themselves as men, whereas they should have conformed themselves to the law, have erred. Cambyses, the son of Cyrus, because he loved his own sister, would have "the marriage of the brother with the sister lawful." Anaxarchus said to Alexander, (grieved in mind that he had killed Clytus,) Regi ac Jovi themin atque institiam assidere:—Judgment and righteousness did alway accompany God and the king in all they do; but some, to this purpose, say better:—The law, rather than the king, hath power of life and death.
第一条：在他的首次设立中，他被上帝指定为职位，即使他坐在王位上，也要谨慎阅读上帝的律法的书写副本，以便“学习敬畏他的上帝，并遵守这律法的一切话语”等等，他并不拥有绝对的超越法律的权力。但是（申命记 17:18,19），国王作为国王，当他坐在王位上时，就要这样做；因此，这个假设是清楚的，因为这是国王作为国王的法律，而不是一个人作为一个人的法律。但是当他坐在王位上时，他要阅读律法书；而且（第 20 节）因为他是国王，“他的心不可高傲超过他的弟兄”；作为国王，（第 16 节）“他不可多买马匹”等等。所以政治家们证明了这个论点：他们说，Rex est lex viva, animata, et loquens lex，国王作为国王，是一部活生生、有呼吸、有言语的法律。这有三个原因：1. 如果所有人都是无辜的，彼此不能相互伤害，法律将统治一切，所有人都会自愿执行法律，通过自愿行使权利来做正确的事情；就不需要国王来强迫人们做正确的事情了。 但是现在，因为人们天性上厌恶好的法律，所以需要一个统治者，通过职责将法律付诸实践；因此，国王就是将法律付诸实践的人。2. 法律是理性或思维，摆脱了愤怒、欲望、仇恨等所有扰乱，不能被引诱做坏事；而国王作为一个人，可能会被自己的激情所引诱，因此作为国王，他通过职责超越自己来理性和法律；他拥有多少法律，就是多少国王；而在他与法律和理性的距离最远时，他就是一个暴君。3. 抽象比具体更纯净更完美。正义比一个正直的人更完美，洁白比白墙更完美；因此，国王越接近他作为国王所依据的法律，他就越接近国王的本质，因为每个事物都是因为其特性而更加特殊。因此，国王将法律适用于自己作为人，而不是按照法律来约束自己，这是错误的。居鲁士的儿子坎比孛斯因为爱自己的妹妹，想要将“兄弟与妹妹的婚姻”合法化。安纳克萨克鲁斯对亚历山大说，（心中悲痛他杀了克吕托斯），判断和公正总是伴随着上帝和国王在他们所做的一切中；但有些人更好地说：法律，而不是国王，拥有生死的权力。

Arg. 2.—The power that the king hath (I speak not of his gifts) he hath it from the people who maketh him king, as I proved before; but the people have neither formally nor virtually any power absolute to give the king. All the power they have is a legal and natural power to guide themselves in peace and godliness, and save themselves from unjust violence by the benefit of rulers. Now, an absolute power above a law is a power to do ill and to destroy the people, and this the people have not themselves, it being repugnant to nature that any should have a natural power in themselves to destroy themselves, or to inflict upon themselves an evil of punishment to destruction. Though therefore it were given, which yet is not granted, that the people had resigned all power that they have into their king, yet if he use a tyrannical power against the people for their hurt and destruction, he useth a power that the people never gave him, and against the intention of nature; for they invested a man with power to be their father and defender for their good; and he faileth against the people's intention in usurping an over-power to himself, which they never gave, never had, never could give; for they cannot give what they never had, and power to destroy themselves they never had.
阿尔格二：国王拥有的权力（我不是指他的天赋），是由选举他为国王的人民赋予的，正如我之前证明的那样；但是人民既没有正式的也没有实质性的绝对权力来赋予国王。他们拥有的所有权力只是在和平与敬神中自我引导，并通过统治者的恩惠来保护自己免受不公正的暴力侵害。现在，超越法律的绝对权力是一种能够做恶和摧毁人民的权力，而人民自己并没有这种权力，因为任何人都不可能在自己身上拥有一种自然的权力来毁灭自己，或者对自己施加惩罚性的恶行以至于毁灭自己，这是与自然相悖的。 即使假设人民已经放弃了他们所拥有的所有权力并将其授予国王，但如果他使用暴政对待人民，造成他们的伤害和毁灭，那么他使用的是人民从未授予他的权力，违背了自然的意愿；因为他们授予一个人权力，使他成为他们的父亲和捍卫者，为了他们的利益；而他在霸占超过自己的权力时，违背了人民的意愿，他们从未授予过这种权力，也从未拥有过，也无法拥有；因为他们无法给予他们从未拥有过的东西，也无法给予毁灭自己的权力。

Arg. 3.—All royal power, whereby a king is a king and differenced from a private man, armed with no power of the sword, is from God. But absolute power to tyrannise over the people and to destroy them is not a power from God; therefore there is not any such royal power absolute. The proposition is evident, because that God who maketh kings and disposeth of crowns, (Prov. 8:15, 16; 2 Sam. 12:7; Dan. 4:32,) must also create and give that royal and official power by which a king is a king. 1. Because God created man, he must be the author of his reasonable soul. If God be the author of things, he must be the author of their forms by which they are that which they are. 2. All power is God's, (1 Chron. 29:11; Matt. 6:13; Psal. 62:11; 68:35; Dan. 2:37,) and that absolute power to tyrannise, is not from God. 1. Because, if this moral power to sin be from God, it being formally wickedness, God must be the author of sin. 2. Whatever moral power is from God, the exercises of that power, and the acts thereof, must be from God, and so these acts must be morally good and just; for if the moral power be of God, as the author, so must the acts be. Now, the acts of a tyrannical power are acts of sinful injustice and oppression, and cannot be from God. 3. Politicians say, there is no power in rulers to do ill, but to help and defend the people,—as the power of a physician to destroy, of a pilot to cast away the ship on the rock, the power of a tutor to waste the inheritance of the orphan, and the power of father and mother to kill their children, and of the mighty to defraud and oppress, are not powers from God. So Ferdinand. Vasquez illustr. quest. L. 1, c. 26, c. 45; Prickman d. c. 3, sect. Soluta potestas; Althus. pol. cap. 9, n. 25.
第三论点：所有王权，使国王成为国王并与普通人区别开来的权力，没有持剑的权力，都来自上帝。但是，对人民进行暴政和毁灭的绝对权力不是来自上帝的权力；因此，并不存在这样的绝对王权。这个命题是显而易见的，因为那位创造国王并赐予王冠的上帝（箴言 8:15,16；撒母耳记下 12:7；但以理书 4:32）也必须创造并赋予那个使国王成为国王的王权和官方权力。1.因为上帝创造了人，他必须是他们理性灵魂的创造者。如果上帝是事物的创造者，他必须是它们的形式的创造者，使它们成为它们自己。2.所有权力都属于上帝（历代志上 29:11；马太福音 6:13；诗篇 62:11；68:35；但以理书 2:37），而那种绝对的暴政权力不是来自上帝的。1.因为，如果这种道德上的犯罪权力来自上帝，它作为形式上的邪恶，上帝必须是罪恶的创造者。2.无论什么样的道德权力来自上帝，该权力的行使和行为必须来自上帝，因此这些行为必须是道德善良和公正的；因为如果道德权力是来自上帝的，作为创造者，行为也必须如此。 现在，暴政的行为是罪恶的不公和压迫，不可能来自上帝。3. 政治家们说，统治者没有做坏事的权力，只有帮助和保护人民的权力，就像医生摧毁、船长将船撞上岩石、导师浪费孤儿的遗产、父母杀害子女以及强者欺诈和压迫的权力都不是来自上帝。所以费迪南德·瓦斯克斯（Ferdinand Vasquez）在《问题解释》第 1 卷第 26 章第 45 章中阐述；普里克曼（Prickman）在第 3 章第 Soluta potestas 节中阐述；阿尔图斯（Althus）在《政治学》第 9 章第 25 条中阐述。

Barclaius, Grotius, Dr Ferne, (The P. Prelate's wit could come up to it,) say, "That absolute power to do ill, so as no mortal man can lawfully resist it, is from God; and the king hath this way power from God as no subject can resist it, but he must resist the ordinance of God, and yet the power of tyranny is not simply from God."
巴克莱斯、格罗修斯、费恩博士（主教的智慧可以与之媲美）说：“无论如何，那种无人能够合法地抵抗的绝对恶行权力是来自上帝的；国王以这种方式获得了上帝的权力，没有任何臣民能够抵抗，但他必须抵抗上帝的命令，而暴政的权力并非完全来自上帝。”

Ans.—The law saith, Illud possumus quod jure possumus, Papinus F. filius, D. de cond. Just. It is no power which is not lawful power. The royalists say, power of tyranny, in so far as it may be resisted, and is punishable by men, is not from God. But what is the other part of the distinction? It must be, that tyrannical power is simpliciter from God, or in itself it is from God; but as it is punishable or restrainable by subjects, it is not from God. Now, to be punishable by subjects is but an accident, and tyrannical power is the subject; yea, and it is a separable accident; for many tyrants are never punished, and their power is never restrained: such a tyrant was Saul, and many persecuting emperors. Now, if the tyrannical power itself was from God, the argument is yet valid, and remaineth unanswered. And shall not this fall to the ground as false, which Arnisæus saith, (de autho. princ. c. 2, n. 10,) Dum contra officium facit, magistratus non est magistratus, quippe a quo non injuria, sed jus nasci debeat, l. meminerint: 6. C. unde vi. din. in C. quod quis, 24, n. 4, 5.—Et de hoc neminem dubitare aut dissentire scribit, Marant. disp. 1, num. 14. When the magistrate doth anything by violence, and without law, in so far doing against his office, he is not a magistrate. Then, say I, that power by which he doth, is not of God. None doth, then, resist the ordinance of God who resist the king in tyrannous acts. If the power, as it cannot be punished by the subject nor restrained, be from God, therefore the tyrannical power itself, and without this accident—that it can be punished by men—it must be from God also. But the conclusion is absurd, and denied by royalists. I prove the connection: If the king have such a power above all restraint, the power itself, to wit, king David's power to kill innocent Uriah, and deflower Bathsheba, without the accident of being restrained or punished by men, it is either from God or not from God. If it be from God, it must be a power against the sixth and seventh commandments, which God gave to David, and not to any subject; and so David lied when he confessed this sin, and this sin cannot be pardoned because it was no sin: and kings, because kings, are under no tie of duties of mercy, and truth, and justice to their subjects, contrary to that which God's law requireth of all judges (Deut. 1:15–17; 17:15–20; 2 Chron. 19:6, 7; Rom. 13:3, 4): if this power be from God, as it is unrestrainable and unpunishable by the subject, it is not from God at all; for how can God give a power to do ill, that is unpunishable by men, and not give that power to do ill? It is inconceivable; for in this very thing that God giveth to David—a power to murder the innocent—with this respect, that it shall be punishable by God only, and not by men, God must give it as a sinful power to do ill, which must be a power of dispensation to sin, and so not to be punished by either God or man, which is contrary to his revealed will in his word. If such a power as not restrainable by man be from God by way of permission, as a power to sin in devils and men is, then it is no royal power, nor any ordinance of God; and to resist this power, is not to resist the ordinance of God.
答案——法律说，Illud possumus quod jure possumus，Papinus F. filius，D. de cond. Just. 非法的权力不是真正的权力。王党说，暴政的权力，只要可以被抵抗，并且可以受到人们的惩罚，就不是来自上帝。但是区分的另一部分是什么呢？必须是，暴政的权力是来自上帝，或者说它本身就是来自上帝；但是作为受到臣民惩罚或限制的权力，它不是来自上帝。现在，被臣民惩罚只是一个偶然事件，而暴政的权力是主体；是的，它是一个可分离的偶然事件；因为许多暴君从未受到惩罚，他们的权力从未受到限制：扫罗就是这样一个暴君，还有许多迫害的皇帝。现在，如果暴政的权力本身就是来自上帝，那么这个论点仍然有效，而且没有得到答复。而阿尼塞乌斯所说的（de autho. princ. c. 2, n. 10），Dum contra officium facit, magistratus non est magistratus, quippe a quo non injuria, sed jus nasci debeat, l. meminerint: 6. C. unde vi. din. in C. quod quis, 24, n. 4, 5.——关于这一点，没有人怀疑或反对，Marant. disp. 1, num. 14. 当地方官员使用暴力和违法行为时，违背了他的职责，他就不是一个官员。那么，我说，他所使用的权力不是来自上帝。那些反抗国王的暴政行为的人，并没有违背上帝的命令。如果这种权力既不能受到人民的惩罚和限制，那么它就是来自上帝的，因此，这种暴政的权力本身，即使没有被人类惩罚的这种情况，也必须是来自上帝的。但这个结论是荒谬的，被君主主义者否认。我证明这个联系：如果国王拥有这种超越一切限制的权力，即大卫王杀害无辜的乌利亚和玷污拔示巴的权力，而不受人类的限制和惩罚，那么这个权力要么来自上帝，要么不来自上帝。如果它来自上帝，那么它必须是违背上帝给大卫的第六和第七诫命的权力，而不是违背任何臣民的权力；所以大卫在承认这个罪的时候撒谎了，这个罪是不能被宽恕的，因为它不是罪过；而君王，因为是君王，不受怜悯、真理和公正的义务的约束，这与上帝的法律对所有法官的要求相反（申命记）。 1:15–17; 17:15–20; 代下 19:6, 7; 罗 13:3, 4): 如果这权力来自上帝，因为它是不可限制和不可惩罚的，那么它根本不是来自上帝；因为上帝怎么会给予一种可以做恶的权力，而这种权力却不受人类的惩罚呢？这是无法想象的；因为在上帝给大卫的这种权力——杀害无辜者的权力上，上帝必须给予它作为一种可以受到上帝惩罚而不受人类惩罚的罪恶权力，这必须是一种允许犯罪的权力，因此既不受上帝也不受人类的惩罚，这与上帝在他的话语中所启示的旨意相违背。如果这种不受人类限制的权力是上帝通过许可的方式给予的，就像恶魔和人类的犯罪权力一样，那么它就不是一种王权，也不是上帝的任命；而抵抗这种权力，并不是抵抗上帝的任命。

Arg. 4.—That power which maketh the benefit of a king to be no benefit, but a judgment of God, as a making all the people slaves, such as were slaves amongst the Romans and Jews, is not to be asserted by any Christian; but an absolute power to do ill, and to tyrannise, which is supposed to be an essential and constitutive of kings, to difference them from all judges, maketh the benefit of a king no benefit, but a judgment of God, as making all the people slaves. That the major may be clear, it is evident, 1. To have a king is a blessing of God, because to have no king is a judgment; Judg. 17:6, "Every man doth what seemeth good in his own eyes." (Judg. 18:1; 19:1; 21:25.) 2. So it is a part of God's good providence to provide a king for his people, (1 Sam. 16:1; so 2 Sam. 5:12.) And David perceived that the Lord had established him king over Israel, and that he had exalted his kingdom for his people Israel's sake, 2 Sam. 15:2, 3, 6; 18:3; Rom. 13:2–4. If the king be a thing good in itself, then can he not, actu primo, be a curse and a judgment, and essentially a bondage and slavery to the people; also the genuine and intrinsical end of a king is the good, (Rom. 13:4,) and the good of a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty (1. Tim. 2:2); and he is by office, custos utriusque tabulæ, whose genuine end is to preserve the law from violence, and to defend the subject;—he is the people's debtor for all happiness possible to be procured by God's sword, either in peace or war, at home or abroad. For the assumption is evident. An absolute and arbitrary power is a king-law, such as royalists say God gave to Saul (1 Sam. 8:9, 11; 10:25) to play the tyrant; and this power, arbitrary and unlimited, above all laws, is that which, (1.) Is given to God; (2.) Distinguished essentially the kings of Israel from the judge, saith Barclary, Grotius, Arnisæus; (3.) A constitutive form of a king, therefore it must be actu primo, a benefit, and a blessing of God; but if God hath given any such power absolute to a king: as, 1. His will must be a law, either to do or suffer all the tyranny and cruelty of a tiger, a leopard, a Nero, or a Julian; then hath God given, actu primo, a power to a king, as king, to enslave the people and flock of God, redeemed by the blood of God, as the slaves among the Romans and Jews, who were so under their masters, as their bondage was a plague of God, and the lives of the people of God under Pharaoh, who compelled them to work in brick and clay. 2. Though he cut the throats of the people of God, as the lioness Queen Mary did, and command an army of soldiers to come and burn the cities of the land, and kill man, wife, and children; yet in so doing, he doth the part of a king, so as you cannot resist him as a man, and obey him as a king, but must give your necks to him, upon this ground, because this absolute power of his is ordained of God; and there is no power even to kill and destroy the innocent, but it is of God. So saith Paul, Rom. 13, if we believe court-prophets, or rather lying-spirits, who persuade the king of Britain to make war against his three dominions. Now, it is clear that the distinction of bound and free continued in Israel even under the most tyrannous kings; (2 Kings 4:1;) yea, even when the Jews were captives under Ahasuerus. (Esth. 7:4.) And what difference should there be between the people of God under their own kings, and when they were captives under tyrants, serving wood and stone, and false gods, as was threatened as a curse in the law? (Deut. 28:25, 36, 64, 68.) If their own kings, by God's appointment, have the same absolute power over them, and if he be a tyrant, actu primo, that is, if he be indued with absolute power, and so have power to play the tyrant, then must the people of God be actu primo, slaves, and under absolute subjection; for they are relatives, as lord and servant, conqueror and captive. It is true, they say, kings by office are fathers, they cannot put forth in action their power to destroy. I answer, it is their goodness of nature that they put not forth in action all their absolute power to destroy, which God hath given them as kings, and therefore, thanks are due to their goodness, for that they do not, actu secundo, play the tyrant; for royalists teach, that by virtue of their office God hath given to them a royal power to destroy; therefore, the Lord's people are slaves under them, though they deal not with them as slaves, but that hindereth not but the people by condition are slaves. So many conquerors of old did deal kindly with their slaves whom they took in war, and dealt with them as sons; but as conquerors they had power to sell them, to kill them, to put them to work in brick and clay. So say I here, royal power and a king cannot be a blessing, and actu primo a favour of God to the people, for the which they are to pray when they want a king that they may have one, or to praise God when they have one. But a king must be a curse and a judgment, if he be such a creature as essentially, and in the intention and nature of the thing itself, hath by office a royal power to destroy, and that from God; for then the people praying—"Lord give us a king," should pray, "Make us slaves, Lord; take our liberty and power from us, and give a power unlimited and absolute to one man, by which he may, if he please, waste and destroy us, as all the bloody emperors did the people of God." Surely, I see not but they should pray for a temptation, and to be led into temptation when they pray God to give them a king; and, therefore, such a power is a vain thing.
第四论点——认为使国王的利益成为上帝的审判，使全体人民成为奴隶，如罗马人和犹太人中的奴隶一样，这种权力不应该被任何基督徒所主张；但是，一种绝对的能力去做坏事和暴政，被认为是国王的本质和构成要素，使其与所有的法官区别开来，使国王的利益不再是利益，而是上帝的审判，使全体人民成为奴隶。为了使这一点更加清楚，有以下几点证据：1. 有国王是上帝的祝福，因为没有国王是一种审判；士师记 17:6，“那时以色列中没有王，各人任意而行。”（士师记 18:1；19:1；21:25。）2. 为自己的子民提供国王是上帝善意的安排，撒母耳记上 16:1；撒母耳记下 5:12。大卫知道耶和华立他作以色列的王，并且为了他的子民以色列的缘故，他升高了他的国度，撒母耳记下 15:2，3，6；18:3；罗马书 13:2-4。如果国王本身是一件好事，那么他就不能成为诅咒和审判，也不能本质上成为人民的奴役和奴隶；此外，国王的真正和内在的目标是为了人民的利益。（罗马书 13:4)和在虔诚和诚实中过着宁静和和平的生活的好处（提摩太前书 2:2）；他的职责是保护法律免受暴力侵害，并保护公民；他是人民在和平或战争中，无论在国内还是国外，通过上帝的剑获得的一切可能的幸福的债务人。因为这个假设是明显的。绝对和专断的权力是一种国王法，正如君主主义者所说上帝赋予扫罗的权力（撒母耳记上 8:9, 11; 10:25）来作暴君；而这种权力，任意和无限制，高于一切法律，是（1.）赋予上帝的；（2.）本质上区别以色列的君王和法官，巴克拉里、格罗提乌斯、阿尼塞乌斯说；（3.）国王的构成形式，因此它必须是第一行动，是上帝的恩赐和祝福；但是如果上帝赋予国王任何这样的绝对权力：例如，1. 他的意志必须成为法律，无论是执行还是承受老虎、豹子、尼禄或朱利安的所有暴政和残酷；那么上帝就赋予了国王作为国王的权力，去奴役上帝的子民和羊群，他们是被上帝的血所救赎的，就像罗马和犹太人中的奴隶一样，他们在主人的统治下，他们的奴役是上帝的惩罚，就像法老统治下的上帝的子民的生活一样，法老强迫他们在砖和泥中工作。2. 即使他像狮子女王玛丽那样割断上帝的子民的喉咙，并命令一支军队来烧毁土地上的城市，杀死男人、妻子和孩子；然而，在这样做的过程中，他是作为国王的一部分行动的，所以你不能抵抗他作为一个人，而要作为一个国王服从他，必须向他屈服，因为他的绝对权力是上帝所命定的；没有权力甚至杀害和摧毁无辜的人，除非这是上帝的旨意。保罗在罗马书 13 章如此说道，如果我们相信宫廷的先知，或者更确切地说是撒谎的灵，他们劝说英国国王对他的三个领土发动战争。 现在，很明显，在以色列，即使在最暴虐的国王统治下，奴隶和自由的区别仍然存在；（列王记下 4:1；）甚至当犹太人在亚哈随鲁王统治下被俘虏时也是如此。（以斯帖记 7:4。）在上帝的律法中，威胁到作为诅咒的奴役木头、石头和假神的人民，他们在自己的国王统治下与在暴君统治下有何区别？（申命记 28:25、36、64、68。）如果按照上帝的任命，他们自己的国王对他们拥有同样的绝对权力，如果他是一个暴君，那么他就有权力成为暴君，那么上帝的子民就必须成为奴隶，处于绝对服从之下；因为他们是相对的，如主人和仆人，征服者和俘虏。诚然，他们说，国王按职责是父亲，他们不能行使毁灭的权力。 我回答，是因为他们的天性善良，他们没有将他们作为国王所拥有的绝对权力用于毁灭，因此，应该感谢他们的善良，因为他们没有行使暴政；因为君主主义者教导，凭借他们的职位，上帝赋予了他们毁灭的王权；因此，主的子民是他们的奴隶，尽管他们并不像对待奴隶那样对待他们，但这并不妨碍人民的地位是奴隶。因此，许多古代的征服者对待他们在战争中俘虏的奴隶是友善的，并像对待儿子一样对待他们；但作为征服者，他们有权力出售他们，杀死他们，让他们做砖瓦工作。因此，我在这里说，王权和国王不能成为祝福，也不能成为上帝对人民的恩赐，人们在没有国王时需要祈祷得到一个国王，或者当他们有国王时需要赞美上帝。 但是，如果国王本质上是一个诅咒和审判的存在，如果他拥有一种由上帝赋予的、本质上具有毁灭性的皇权，那么国王就是一个诅咒和审判。因此，人们祈求上帝说：“主啊，给我们一个国王”，实际上是在祈求：“主啊，让我们成为奴隶；夺走我们的自由和权力，并将无限和绝对的权力赋予一个人，他可以随意地浪费和摧毁我们，就像所有血腥的皇帝对待上帝的子民一样。”我确实看不出他们为什么不应该祈求一种诱惑，并在祈求上帝给他们一个国王时被引入诱惑；因此，这样的权力是虚无的。

Arg. 5.—A power contrary to justice, to peace and the good of the people, that looketh to no law as a rule, and so is unreasonable, and forbidden by the law of God and the civil law, (L. 15. filius de condit. Instit.,) cannot be lawful power, and cannot constitute a lawful judge; but an absolute and unlimited power is such. How can the judge be the minister of God for good to the people (Rom. 13:4) if he have such a power as a king, given him of God, to destroy and waste the people?
第五条：与正义、和平和人民利益相悖的权力，不以法律为准则，因此是不合理的，也被上帝的法律和民法禁止（L. 15. filius de condit. Instit.），不能成为合法的权力，也不能构成合法的法官；而绝对和无限的权力就是这样的。如果法官拥有像国王一样的权力，由上帝赋予他来摧毁和浪费人民，他如何能成为为人民的福祉而服务的上帝的仆人（罗马书 13:4）？

Arg. 6. An absolute power is contrary to nature, and so unlawful; for it maketh the people give away the natural power of defending their life against illegal and cruel violence, and maketh a man who hath need to be ruled and lawed by nature above all rule and law, and one who, by nature, can sin against his brethren such a one as cannot sin against any but God only, and maketh him a lion and an unsocial man. What a man is Nero, whose life is poetry and painting! Domitian, only an archer; Valentinian, only a painter; Charles IX. of France, only a hunter; Alphonsus Dux Ferrariensis, only an astronomer; Philip of Macedonia, a musican; and all because they are kings. This our king denieth, when he saith, (art. 13,) "There is power legally placed in the parliament more than sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of tyranny." But if they had not power to play the lions, it is not much that kings are musicians, hunters, &c.
第 6 条。绝对权力违背自然法，因此是非法的；因为它使人民放弃了保护自己生命免受非法和残暴暴力的自然权力，并使一个需要被自然统治和约束的人高于一切统治和法律，使一个能够违背自己的兄弟而不违背任何人的人成为只能违背上帝的人，使他成为狮子和不合群的人。尼禄是何等的人，他的生活是诗歌和绘画！多米提安只是一个弓箭手；瓦伦丁尼安只是一个画家；法国的查理九世只是一个猎人；费拉拉的阿方索斯公爵只是一个天文学家；马其顿的菲利普只是一个音乐家；这都是因为他们是国王。我们的国王否认了这一点，当他说（第 13 条）：“议会合法地拥有足够的权力来防止和制约暴政的权力。”但如果他们没有权力扮演狮子，那么国王是音乐家、猎人等也没什么了不起。

Arg. 7.—God, in making a king to preserve his people, should give liberty without all politic restrain, for one man to destroy many, which is contrary to God's end in the fifth commandment, if one have absolute power to destroy souls and bodies of many thousands.

Arg. 8.—If the kings of Israel and Judah were under censures and rebukes of the prophets, and sinned against God and the people in rejecting these rebukes, and in persecuting the prophets, and were under this law not to take their neighbour's wife, or his vineyard from him against his will; and the inferior judges were to accept the persons of none in judgment, small or great; and if the king yet remain a brother, notwithstanding he be a king, then is his power not above any law, nor absolute. For what reason?—1. He should be under one law of God to be executed by men, and not under another law? Royalists are to show a differrence from God's word. 2. His neighbours, brother, or subjects, may by violence keep back their vineyards, and chastity from the king. Naboth may by force keep his own vineyard from Achab. By the laws of Scotland, if a subject obtain a decree of the king, of violent possession of the heritages of a subject, he hath by law power to cast out, force, apprehend, and deliver to prison those who are tenants, brooking these lands by the king's personal commandment. If a king should force a damsel, she may violently resist, and by violence, and bodily opposing of violence to violence, defend her own chastity. Now, that the prophets have rebuked kings is evident: Samuel rebuked Saul, Nathan David, Elias king Achab; Jeremiah is commanded to prophecy against the kings of Judah, (Jer. 1:18,) and the prophets practised it. (Jer. 19:3; 21:2; 22:13–15; Hos. 5:1.) Kings are guilty before God because they submitted not their royal power and greatness to the rebukes of the prophets, but persecuted them.
阿格 8.——如果以色列和犹大的国王受到先知们的谴责和责备，并在拒绝这些责备和迫害先知的过程中违背了上帝和人民，那么他们就受到了不得违背邻居的妻子或葡萄园意愿的法律的约束；而次要的法官在审判中不得偏袒任何人，无论是小人还是大人；如果国王仍然是兄弟，尽管他是国王，那么他的权力就不高于任何法律，也不是绝对的。为什么呢？——1.他应该受到上帝的一条法律的约束，由人来执行，而不是受到另一条法律的约束？君主主义者应该展示出与上帝的话语的不同之处。2.他的邻居、兄弟或臣民可能会通过暴力阻止国王占有他们的葡萄园和贞操。拿伯可能会用武力阻止亚哈占有他自己的葡萄园。根据苏格兰的法律，如果一个臣民获得国王的强制占有他人遗产的判决，他就有法律上的权力驱逐、逮捕并将那些凭借国王的个人命令占有这些土地的承租人送入监狱。 如果国王强迫一个少女，她可以采取激烈的抵抗，通过暴力和身体对抗来保护自己的贞操。现在，先知们责备国王是显而易见的：撒母耳责备扫罗，拿但责备大卫，以利亚责备亚哈王；耶利米被命令对犹大的君王们进行预言（耶 1:18），而先知们也实践了这一点（耶 19:3；21:2；22:13-15；何 5:1）。国王在上帝面前有罪，因为他们没有将自己的王权和伟大归顺于先知们的责备，反而迫害了他们。

Deut. 17:20, The king on the throne remaineth a brother; Psal. 22:22, and so the judges or three estates are not to accept of the person of the king for his greatness in judgment; Deut. 1:16, 17, and the judge is to give out such a sentence in judgment as the Lord, with whom there is no iniquity, would give out if the Lord himself were sitting in judgment; because the judge is in the very stead of God, as his lieutenant; (2 Chron. 19:6, 7; Psal. 82:1, 2; Deut. 1:17;) and with God there is no respect of persons. (2 Chron. 19:7; 1 Pet. 1:17; Acts 10:34.) I do not intend that any inferior judge sent by the king is to judge the king; but those who gave him the throne, and made him king, are truly above him, and to judge him without respect of persons, as God himself would judge if he were sitting on the bench.
申命记 17:20，国王在宝座上仍然是兄弟；诗篇 22:22，所以法官或三个阶级不应因国王的伟大而接受他的人；申命记 1:16,17，法官在审判中应该给出像主一样公正的判决，因为主没有不公正，如果主亲自坐在审判席上，他会给出这样的判决；因为法官就是上帝的代理人，代表上帝的地位；（历代志下 19:6,7；诗篇 82:1,2；申命记 1:17；）上帝不看人的外貌。（历代志下 19:7；彼得前书 1:17；使徒行传 10:34。）我并不是说任何由国王派来的下级法官要审判国王；但那些给他王位并立他为国王的人，确实高于他，并且要公正地审判他，如同上帝自己坐在法庭上审判一样。

God is the author of civil laws and government, and his intention is therein the external peace, and quiet life, and godliness of his church and people, and that all judges, according to their places, be nurse-fathers to the church. (Isa. 49:23.) Now God must have appointed sufficient means for this end; but there is no sufficient means at all, but a mere anarchy and confusion, if to one man an absolute and unlimited power be given of God, whereby, at his pleasure, he may obstruct the fountains of justice, and command lawyers and laws to speak not God's mind, that is justice, righteousness, safety, true religion, but the sole lust and pleasure of one man. And this one having absolute and irresistible influence on all the inferior instruments of justice, may, by this power, turn all into anarchy, and put the people in a worse condition than if there were no judge at all in the land. For that of politicians, that tyranny is better than anarchy, is to be taken cum grano salis; but I shall never believe that absolute power of one man, which is actu primo tyranny, is God's sufficient way of peaceable government. Therefore, Barclaius saith nothing for the contrary, when he saith, "The Athenians made Draco and Solon absolute law-givers, for, a facto ad jus non valet consequentia." What if a roving people, trusting Draco and Solon to be kings above mortal men, and to be gods, gave them power to make laws, written not with ink, but with blood, shall other kings have from God the like tyrannical and bloody power from that to make bloody laws? Chytreus (lib. 2) and Sleidan citeth it, (l. 1;) Sueron, Sub pæna periurii non tenentur fidem sevare regi degeneri.
上帝是民事法律和政府的创立者，他的意图是为了教会和信徒的外在和平、宁静的生活和敬虔，以及所有的法官都要按照自己的职责成为教会的养育者。（以赛亚书 49:23）现在，上帝必须为此目的指定足够的手段；但是，如果上帝给予一个人绝对和无限的权力，他可以随意阻碍正义的源泉，并命令律师和法律不说上帝的心意，即正义、公正、安全、真正的宗教，而是一个人的私欲和快乐，那么就没有任何足够的手段，只会导致纯粹的无政府状态和混乱。这个人对所有下级司法工具具有绝对和不可抗拒的影响力，通过这种权力，他可以将一切变成无政府状态，并使人民处于比国家没有法官更糟糕的境地。对于政治家们说暴政比无政府状态好，我持保留态度；但我永远不会相信一个人的绝对权力，这是实际上的暴政，是上帝实现和平政府的足够方式。 因此，巴克莱乌斯在说“雅典人让德拉科和索伦成为绝对的立法者时，并没有提到相反的情况，因为从事实到法律的推理是无效的。”如果一个流浪的民族相信德拉科和索伦是超凡之人，是神，给予他们制定法律的权力，这些法律不是用墨水写的，而是用鲜血写的，那么其他国王是否也能从上帝那里获得类似的暴虐和血腥的权力来制定血腥的法律呢？奇特雷乌斯（第二卷）和斯莱丹引用了这一观点（第一卷）；苏伦说，他们不受誓言的惩罚，不需要对卑劣的国王保持忠诚。

Arg. 9.—He who is regulated by law, and sweareth to the three estates to be regulated by law, and accepteth the crown covenant-wise, and so as the estates would refuse to make him their king, if either he should refuse to swear, or if they did believe certainly that he would break his oath, hath no unlimited and absolute power from God or the people; for, fædus conditionatum, aut promissio conditionalis mutua, facit jus alteri in alterum, a mutual conditional covenant giveth law and power over one to another. But, from that which hath been said, the king sweareth to the three estates to be regulated by law—he accepteth the crown upon the tenor of a mutual covenant, &c.; for if he should, as king, swear to be king, that is, one who hath absolute power above a law, and also to be regulated by a law, he should swear things contradictory, that is, that he should be their king, having absolute power over them, and according to that power to rule them; and he should swear not to be their king, and to rule them, not according to absolute power, but according to law. If, therefore, this absolute power be essential to a king, as a king, no king can lawfully take the oath to govern according to law, for then he should swear not to reign as king, and not be their king; for how could he be their king, wanting that which God hath made essential to a king as a king?
第 9 条：凡受法律约束，并向三个阶级宣誓受法律约束，并以契约方式接受王位的人，如果他拒绝宣誓，或者他们确信他会违背誓言，那么他就没有来自上帝或人民的无限和绝对权力；因为相互有条件的契约赋予了对方对他人的法律和权力。但从前面所说的，国王向三个阶级宣誓受法律约束——他接受王位是根据相互契约的条款等等；因为如果他作为国王宣誓成为国王，也就是说，拥有超越法律的绝对权力，并且受法律约束，那么他就在宣誓相互矛盾的事情，也就是说，他应该成为他们的国王，对他们拥有绝对权力，并根据这种权力来统治他们；他还应该宣誓不成为他们的国王，并且按照法律而不是绝对权力来统治他们。 如果这种绝对权力对于一个国王来说是必不可少的，作为一个国王，没有国王可以合法地宣誓按照法律来统治，因为那样他就应该发誓不作为国王统治，不再是他们的国王；因为如果他缺乏上帝作为国王所必需的那个东西，他怎么能成为他们的国王呢？

QUESTION XXIII
问题二十三

WHETHER THE KING HATH ANY ROYAL PREROGATIVE, OR A POWER TO DISPENSE WITH LAWS; AND SOME OTHER GROUNDS AGAINST ABSOLUTE MONARCHY
无论国王是否拥有任何王权特权或者有权力豁免法律；以及一些反对绝对君主制的理由

A prerogative royal I take two ways: either to be an act of mere will and pleasure above or beside reason or law, or an act of dispensation beside or against the letter of the law.
我有两种皇家特权的方式：一种是纯粹基于意愿和快乐，超越或旁边于理性或法律之上；另一种是在法律的字面上旁边或违背之外进行的豁免行为。

Assert. 1.—That which royalists call the prerogative royal of princes is the salt of absolute power; and it is a supreme and highest power of a king, as a king, to do above, without or contrary to a law or reason, which is unreasonable. 1. When God's word speaketh of the power of kings and judges, Deut. 17:15–17; 1:15–17, and elsewhere there is not any footstep or any ground for such a power; and, therefore, (if we speak according to conscience,) there is no such thing in the world; and because royalists cannot give us any warrant, it is to be rejected. 2. A prerogative royal must be a power of doing good to the people, and grounded upon some reason or law; but this is but a branch of an ordinary limited power, and no prerogative above or beside law; yea, any power not grounded on a reason different from mere will or absolute pleasure is an irrational and brutish power; and, therefore, it may well be jus personæ, the power of the man who is king; it cannot be jus coronæ, any power annexed to the crown; for this holdeth true of all the actions of the king, as a king, illud potest rex, et illud tantum quod jure potest. The king, as king, can do no more than that which upon right and law he may do. 3. To dispute this question, whether such a prerogative agree to any king, as king, is to dispute whether God hath made all under a monarch slaves by their own consent; which is a vain question. Those who hold such a prerogative, must say the king is so absolute and unlimited a god on earth, that either by law, or his sole pleasure beside law, he may regularly and rationally move all wheels in policy; and his uncontrolled will shall be the axletree on which all the wheels are turned. 4. That which is the garland and proper flower of the King of kings, as he is absolute above his creatures, and not tied to any law, without himself, that regulateth his will, that must be given to no mortal man or king, except we would communicate that which is God's proper due to a sinful man, which must be idolatory. But to do royal acts out of an absolute power above law and reason, is such a power as agreeth to God, as is evident in positive laws and in acts of God's mere pleasure, where we see no reason without the Almighty for the one side rather than for the other, as God's forbidding the eating of the tree of knowledge maketh the eating sin and contrary to reason; but there is no reason in the object: for if God should command eating of that tree, not to eat should also be sin. So God's choosing Peter to glory and his refusing Judas, is a good and a wise act, but not good or wise from the object of the act, but from the sole wise pleasure of God; because, if God had chosen Judas to glory and rejected Peter, that act had been no less a good and a wise act than the former. For when there is no law in the object but only God's will, the act is good and wise, seeing infinite wisdom cannot be separated from the perfect will of God; but no act of a mortal king, having sole and only will, and neither law nor reason in it, can be a lawful, a wise, or a good act.
断言。1.——王室主义者所称之为王权特权的东西是绝对权力的精髓；作为国王，他有权在法律或理性之外、之中或之反上行事，这是他的至高无上的权力。1. 当上帝的话语谈到国王和法官的权力时，申命记 17:15-17；1:15-17 以及其他地方都没有任何迹象或依据来支持这种权力；因此，（如果我们按照良心说话），世界上没有这样的东西；而且因为王室主义者无法给我们任何授权，所以这个观点应该被拒绝。2. 王权特权必须是对人民有益的权力，并且基于某种理由或法律；但这只是一种普通有限权力的分支，不是超越法律的特权；是的，任何不以与纯粹意愿或绝对快乐不同的理由为基础的权力都是非理性和野蛮的权力；因此，它可能是君主的权力，但不能是附加在王冠上的权力；因为这对于国王的所有行动都是正确的，作为国王，只有那些他有权行使的事情。 国王作为国王，只能做符合权利和法律的事情。争论这个问题，即国王是否具有这样的特权，就是争论上帝是否让所有人都成为了君主的奴隶，这是一个无谓的问题。那些持有这种特权的人必须说国王在地上是如此绝对和无限的神，以至于他可以按照法律或者他自己的意愿超越法律，合理地操纵政策中的所有机制；他无法无天的意愿将成为所有机制转动的轴心。作为至高无上的国王，他不受任何法律的约束，只有他自己来调节他的意愿，这是属于万王之王的荣耀和特权，不应该给予任何凡人或国王，除非我们愿意将属于上帝的特权赋予一个有罪的人，这将是崇拜偶像。 但是，出于超越法律和理性的绝对权力来执行皇家行为，这种权力是与上帝一致的，正如在正面法律和上帝纯粹喜悦的行为中所清楚地看到的那样，我们看不到除了全能者之外的任何理由支持一方而不是另一方，就像上帝禁止吃知识树的果实使得吃变成了罪恶，违背了理性；但是在对象中没有理由：因为如果上帝命令吃那棵树的果实，不吃也将成为罪恶。所以，上帝选择彼得得荣耀而拒绝犹大，是一个善良而明智的行为，但不是因为行为的对象而善良或明智，而是因为上帝的唯一明智的喜悦；因为，如果上帝选择犹大得荣耀并拒绝彼得，那个行为将与前者一样善良而明智。因为当对象中没有法律，只有上帝的意愿时，行为是善良和明智的，因为无限的智慧不能与上帝完美的意愿分离；但是一个只有意愿而没有法律和理性的凡人国王的行为不能是合法、明智或善良的行为。

Assert. 2.—There is something which may be called a prerogative by way of dispensation. There is a threefold dispensation,—one of power, another of justice, and a third of grace. 1. A dispensation of power is when the will of the law-giver maketh that act to be no sin, which without that will would have been sin,—as if God's commanding will had not intervened, the Israelites borrowing the ear-rings and jewels of the Egyptians, and not restoring them, had been a breach of the eighth commandment; and in this sense no king hath a prerogative to dispense with a law. 2. There is a dispensation of law and justice not flowing from any prerogative, but from the true intent of the law; and thus the king, yea, the inferior judge, is not to take the life of a man whom the letter of the law would condemn, because the justice of the law is the intent and life of the law; and where nothing is done against the intent of the law, there is no breach of any law. 3. The third is not unlike unto the second, when the king exponeth the law by grace, and this is twofold: (1.) Either when he exponeth it of his wisdom and merciful nature, inclined to mercy and justice, yet, according to the just intent, native sense, and scope of the law, considering the occasion, circumstances of the fact, and comparing both with the law,—and this dispensation of grace I grant to the king, as when the tribute is great and the man poor, the king may dispense with the custom. (2.) The law saith, in a doubtful case the prince may dispense, because it is presumed the law can have no sense against the principal sense and intent of the law.
断言。2.——有一种可以称之为特权的豁免方式。有三种豁免方式，一种是权力的豁免，另一种是正义的豁免，第三种是恩典的豁免。1.权力的豁免是指当立法者的意愿使本应是罪的行为成为非罪时，没有这种意愿的话，这个行为本来是罪的——比如，如果上帝的命令意愿没有介入，以色列人借用埃及人的耳环和珠宝而不归还，就是违反了第八条诫命；在这个意义上，没有国王有权力豁免法律。2.有一种法律和正义的豁免，不是源于任何特权，而是源于法律的真正意图；因此，国王，甚至是下级法官，不应该对那些按照法律的字面意思应该被判处死刑的人执行死刑，因为法律的正义是法律的意图和生命；只要没有违反法律的意图，就没有违反任何法律。3.第三种方式与第二种方式相似，当国王以恩典解释法律时，这是双重的：（1.) 无论是当他展示他的智慧和仁慈本性时，倾向于怜悯和公正，还是根据法律的公正意图、本意和目的，考虑到情况、事实的环境，并将两者与法律进行比较，我同意向国王提供这种恩典，就像当税收很高而人民贫穷时，国王可以免除关税一样。(2.) 法律说，在一个疑点的情况下，君主可以豁免，因为可以假定法律不会违背法律的主要意义和目的。

But there is another dispensation that royalists do plead for, and that is, a power in the king, ex mera gratia absolutæ potestatis regalis, out of mere grace of absolute royal power to pardon crimes which God's law saith should be punished by death. Now, this they call a power of grace;—but it is not a power of mere grace.
但是，皇室主义者还主张另一种特权，那就是国王拥有的权力，纯粹出于绝对王权的恩典，可以赦免上帝法律规定应该处以死刑的罪行。现在，他们称之为恩典的权力，但这并不是纯粹的恩典的权力。

1. Though princes may do some things of grace, yet not of mere grace; because what kings do as kings, and by virtue of their royal office, that they do ex debito officii, by debt and right of their office; and that they cannot but do, it not being arbitrary to them to do the debtful acts of their office: but what they do of mere grace, that they do as good men, and not as kings, and that they may not do. As, for example, some kings, out of their pretended prerogative, have given four pardons to one man for four murders. Now this the king might have left undone without sin, but of mere grace he pardoned the murderer who killed four men. But the truth is, the king killed the three last, because he hath no power in point of conscience to dispense with blood, Num. 35:31; Gen. 9:6. These pardons are acts of mere grace to one man, but acts of blood to the community.
虽然王子们可能会做一些优雅的事情，但并非完全出于优雅的原因；因为国王所做的事情是作为国王，凭借他们的王室职责和权力所做的，他们是根据职责和权力的债务来行事的，他们不得不这样做，因为对他们来说，履行职责是义不容辞的。但是，他们所做的纯粹出于优雅的事情，他们是作为善良的人而不是国王来做的，他们可能不会这样做。例如，有些国王以他们所谓的特权，给一个人四次赦免四次谋杀罪。现在，国王本可以不这样做而没有罪过，但他纯粹出于优雅的原因，赦免了杀害了四个人的凶手。但事实上，国王杀了最后三个人，因为他在良心上没有权力放弃血债（见民数记 35:31；创世记 9:6）。这些赦免对一个人来说是纯粹出于优雅的行为，但对整个社会来说是血债的行为。

2. Because the prince is the minister of God for the good of the subject; and therefore the law saith, "He cannot pardon and free the guilty of the punishment due to him; (Contra l. quod favore, F. de leg. I. non ideo minus, F. de proc. I. legata inutiliter, F. de lega. 1;) and the reason is clear: He is but the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. And if the judgment be the Lord's, not man's, not the king's, as it is indeed, (Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6,) he cannot draw the sword against the innocent, nor absolve the guilty, except he would take on himself to carve and dispose of that which is proper to his master. Now certain it is, God only, univocally and essentially as God, is the judge, (Psal. 75:7,) and God only and essentially king, (Psal. 97:1; 99:1,) and all men in relation to him are mere ministers, servants, legates, deputies; and in relation to him, equivocally and improperly, judges or kings, and mere created and breathing shadows of the power of the King of kings. And look, as the scribe following his own device, and writing what sentence he pleaseth, is not an officer of the court in that point, nor the pen and servant of the judge, so are kings and all judges but forged intruders and bastard kings and judges, in so far as they give out the sentences of men, and are not the very mouths of the King of kings to pronounce such a sentence as the Almighty himself would do, if he were sitting on the throne or bench.
因为王子是上帝的仆人，为了臣民的利益而任职；因此法律规定，“他不能宽恕和释放罪人应受的惩罚；（反对法律，F. de leg. I. 非因此而减少，F. de proc. I. 无用的遗赠，F. de lega. 1；）原因很明确：他只是上帝的仆人，是为了对作恶者执行报应。如果审判是主的，不是人的，也不是国王的，正如实际情况一样，（申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6，）他不能对无辜者动刀，也不能宽恕罪人，除非他愿意承担起为主人分配和处理适当事物的责任。现在可以确定的是，只有上帝，作为上帝，是公正的审判者，（诗篇 75:7，）只有上帝，作为上帝，是国王，（诗篇 97:1；99:1，）而所有人与他的关系只是纯粹的仆人、服务员、使者、代表；与他的关系是模糊和不恰当的，是法官或国王，只是万王之王的权力的创造和呼吸的影子。 看吧，就像文士按照自己的意愿写字，写下他所喜欢的句子一样，他在这一点上并不是法庭的官员，也不是法官的笔和仆人，同样，国王和所有的法官只是伪造的侵入者和私生子国王和法官，因为他们发表的是人的判决，而不是万王之王亲自宣布的判决，如果他坐在宝座或法庭上的话。

3. If the king, from any supposed prerogative royal, may do acts of mere grace without any warrant of law, because he is above law by office, then also may he do acts of mere rigorous justice, and kill and destroy the innocent, out of the same supposed prerogative; for God's word equally tyeth him to the place of a mere minister in doing good, as in executing wrath on evil-doers, Rom. 13:3, 4. And reason would say, he must be as absolute in the one as in the other, seeing God tyeth him to the one as to the other, by his office and place; yea, by this, acts of justice to ill-doers, and acts of reward to well-doers, shall be arbitrary morally, and by virtue of office to the king, and the word prerogative royal saith this; for the word prerogative is a supreme power absolute that is loosed from all law, and so from all reason of law, and depending on the king's mere and naked pleasure and will; and the word royal or kingly is an epithet of office and of a judge,—a created and limited judge, and so it must tie this supposed prerogative to law, reason, and to that which is debitum legale officii and a legal duty of an office; and by this our masters, the royalists, make God to frame a rational creature, which they call a king, to frame acts of royalty, good and lawful, upon his own mere pleasure and the super-dominion of his will above a law and reason. And from this it is that deluded counsellors made king James (a man not of shallow understanding) and king Charles to give pardons to such bloody murderers as James a Grant; and to go so far on, by this supposed prerogative royal, that king Charles in parliament at Edinburgh, 1633, did command an high point of religion:—that ministers should use, in officiating in God's service, such habits and garments as he pleaseth, that is, all the attire and habits of the idolatrous mass-priests that the Romish priests of Baal useth in the oddest point of idolatry (the adoring of bread) that the earth has; and by this prerogative the king commanded the Service Book in Scotland, anno 1637, without or above law and reason. And I desire any man to satisfy me in this, if the king's prerogative royal may overleap law and reason in two degrees, and if he may as king, by a prerogative royal, command the body of popery in a popish book;—if he may not, by the same reason, over-leap law and reason by the elevation of twenty degrees;—and if you make the king a Julian, (God avert, and give the spirit of revelation to our king,) may he not command all the Alkoran and the religion of the heathen and Indians? Royalists say the prerogative of royalty excludeth not reason, and maketh not the king to do as a brute beast, without all reason, but it giveth a power to a king to do by his royal pleasure, not fettered to the dictates of a law; for in things which the king doth by his prerogative royal he is to follow the advice and counsel of his wise council, though their counsel and advice doth not bind the royal will of the king.
如果国王，基于所谓的王权特权，可以在没有法律授权的情况下进行纯粹的恩赐行为，因为他作为国王超越了法律，那么他也可以进行纯粹的严厉正义行为，杀害和摧毁无辜者，基于同样的所谓特权；因为上帝的话语同样要求他在行善方面成为纯粹的仆人，就像在对作恶者执行愤怒时一样，罗马书 13:3, 4。 而理性会说，他在这两个方面都必须是绝对的，因为上帝通过他的职责和地位将他与这两者联系在一起；是的，凭借这一点，对恶人的正义行为和对善人的奖励行为将在道义上是任意的，并且是基于国王的职责和地位的；而皇家特权一词也是这样说的；因为特权一词是指一种绝对的至高无上的权力，它不受任何法律的约束，因此也不受任何法律理由的约束，完全取决于国王的纯粹和裸露的意愿；而皇家或国王一词是职责和法官的修饰语，是一个被创造和有限的法官，因此它必须将这种所谓的特权与法律、理性以及履行职责的法律义务联系起来；通过这一点，我们的主人，皇家主义者，让上帝创造了一个他们称之为国王的理性生物，根据他自己的纯粹意愿和超越法律和理性的意志来制定合法和合理的皇权行为。 从这一点来看，被蒙蔽的顾问们让詹姆斯国王（一个并非浅薄的人）和查尔斯国王宽恕了像詹姆斯·格兰特这样的血腥凶手；并且通过这种所谓的王权特权，查尔斯国王在 1633 年的爱丁堡议会上下令高度宗教化：即牧师在执事上应该使用他所喜欢的服装和装饰，也就是所有偶像崇拜的弥撒祭司所使用的服饰和装饰，这是罗马巴力教的祭司在偶像崇拜（崇拜面包）中使用的最奇特的一点，而地球上有；并且通过这种特权，国王在 1637 年命令苏格兰使用《礼拜仪式书》，无视法律和理性。 我希望有人能满足我，如果国王的王权特权可以超越法律和理性两个层面，如果他作为国王，凭借王权特权，可以命令天主教的教义在一本天主教的书中；如果他不能，按照同样的理由，通过提升二十个层面来超越法律和理性；如果你让国王成为一个朱利安（愿上帝保佑，并赐予我们国王启示的精神），他难道不能命令整本《古兰经》和异教徒和印度人的宗教吗？王党派说，王权特权并不排除理性，也不使国王像一只野兽一样，毫无理性可言，而是赋予国王按照他的意愿行事的权力，不受法律的约束；因为在国王凭借王权特权所做的事情中，他应该遵循他明智的顾问的建议和劝告，尽管他们的建议和劝告不能束缚国王的意愿。

Ans. 1.—I answer, it is to me, and I am sure to many more learned, a great question,—if the will of any reasonable creature, even of the damned angels, can will or choose anything which their reason, corrupted as it is, doth not dictate hic et nunc to be good? For the object of the will of all men is good, either truly, or apparently good to the doer; for the devil could not suit in marriage souls except he war in the clothes of an angel of light; sin, as sin, cannot sell, or obtrude itself upon any, but under the notion of good. I think it seemeth good to the great Turk to command innocent men to cast themselves over a precipice two hundred fathoms high into the sea, and drown themselves to pleasure him; so the Turk's reason (for he is rational, if he be a man) dictateth, to his vast pleasure, that that is good which he commandeth.
答案 1. - 我回答，对我来说，也对许多更有学问的人来说，这是一个重要的问题 - 任何理性生物的意愿，即使是被诅咒的天使，是否可以选择或选择任何他们的理性，尽管被腐化，不会立即指示为善的事物？因为所有人的意愿的对象都是善的，要么真正地，要么对行动者来说表面上是善的；因为魔鬼除非他以光明天使的形象出现，否则无法与灵魂结婚；罪恶作为罪恶，不能以善的概念出现，也不能强迫任何人接受。我认为，对于伟大的土耳其人来说，命令无辜的人从 200 浔高的悬崖上跳入海中淹死，以取悦他，似乎是好的；因此，土耳其人的理性（如果他是一个人的话）指示他，他所命令的是好的，对他来说是巨大的快乐。

2. Counsellors to the king, who will speak what will please the queen, are but naked empty titles, for they speak que placent, non que prosunt, what may please the king whom they make glad with their lies, not what law and reason dictateth.
国王的顾问，只会说讨好皇后的话，只是虚有其表的头衔，因为他们说的是讨好国王的话，而不是法律和理性所指示的。

3. Absoluteness of an unreasonable prerogative doth not deny counsel and law also, for none more absolute, de facto, I cannot say de jure, than the kings of Babylon and Persia; for Daniel saith of one of them, (Dan. 5:19,) "Whom he would he slew, and whom he would he kept alive, and whom he would he set up, and whom he would he put down;" and yet these same kings did nothing but by advice of their princes and counsellors; yea, so as they could not alter a decree and law, as is clear; (Esth. 1:14–17, 21) yea, Darius, de facto, an absolute prince, was not able to deliver Daniel, because the law was passed; that he should be cast into the lions' den. (Dan. 6:14–16.)
3. 不合理特权的绝对性并不否认咨询和法律，因为在实际上，没有什么比巴比伦和波斯的国王更绝对的了，我不能说在法律上也是如此；因为但以理在其中的一个国王身上说道（但 5:19）：“他愿意杀谁就杀谁，他愿意留谁就留谁，他愿意升谁就升谁，他愿意贬谁就贬谁。”然而，这些国王所做的一切都是在他们的王子和顾问的建议下进行的；是的，他们甚至不能改变法令和法律，这是显而易见的（以斯帖记 1:14-17, 21）；是的，事实上，绝对的国王大流士也无法救出但以理，因为法律已经通过了；他应该被扔进狮子坑（但 6:14-16）。

4. That which the Spirit of God condemned as a point of tyranny in Nebuchadnezzar, is no lawful prerogative royal; but the Spirit of God condemneth this as tyranny in Nebuchadnezzar,—that he slew whom he would, he kept alive whom he would, he set up whom he would, he put down whom he would. This is too God-like. (Deut. 32:39.) So Polanus and Rollocus2 on the place say, he did these things, (ver 19,) Ex abusu legitimæ potestatis; for Nebuchadnezzar's will, in matters of death and life, was his law, and he did what pleased himself, above all law, beside and contrary to it. And our flatterers of kings draw the king's prerogative out of Ulpian's words, who saith, "That is a law which seemeth good to the prince;" but Ulpian was far from making the prince's will a rule of good and ill; for he saith the contrary, "That the law ruleth the just prince."
神的灵指责尼布甲尼撒王的暴政，这并不是合法的王权特权；但神的灵谴责尼布甲尼撒王的暴政，他随意杀人，随意保留生命，随意提拔人，随意降职人。这太像神了（申命记 32:39）。所以波拉努斯和罗洛库斯在这个地方说，他做这些事情（第 19 节），是滥用合法权力；因为尼布甲尼撒王在生死问题上，他的意愿就是法律，他随心所欲，超越一切法律，违背法律。而我们那些谄媚君王的人从乌尔皮安的话中引用君王特权，乌尔皮安说：“王认为好的就是法律”；但乌尔皮安远离将君王的意愿作为善恶的准则；因为他说相反的话，“法律统治公正的君王”。

5. It is considerable here, that Sanches defineth the absolute power of kings to be a plenitude and fulness of power, subject to no necessity, and bounded with rules of no public law; and so did Baldus4 before him. But all politicians condemn that of Caligula, (as Suetonius saith,) which he spake to Alexander the Great, "Remember that thou must do all things, and that thou hast a power to do to all men what thou pleasest." And lawyers say, that this is tyranny. Chilon, one of the seven wise of Greece, (as Rodigi,6) saith better, "Princes are like gods, because they only can do that which is just; and this power, being merely tyrannical, can be no ground of a royal prerogative. There is another power (saith Sanches) absolute, by which a prince dispenseth without a cause in a human law; and this power, saith he, may be defended. But he saith, what the king doth by this absolute power he doth it valide, validly, but not jure, by law; but by valid acts the Jesuit must mean royal acts. But no acts void of law and reason (say we) can be royal acts; for royal acts are acts performed by a king, as a king, and by a law, and so cannot be acts above or beside a law. It is true a king may dispense with the breach of a human law, as a human law, that is, if the law be death to any who goeth upon the walls of the city, the king may pardon any, who, going up, discovereth the enemies approach, and saveth the city. But, 1. The inferior judge according to the ἐπεικείκ that benign interpretation that the soul and intent of the law requireth, may do this as well as the king. 2. All acts of independent prerogative are above a law, and acts of free will having no cause or ground in the law, otherwise it is not founded upon absolute power, but on power ruled by law and reason. But to pardon a breach of the letter of the law of man by exponing it according to the true intent of the law, and benignly, is an act of legal obligation, and so of the ordinary power of all judges; and if either king or judge kill a man for the violation of the letter of the law, when the intent of the law contradicteth the rigid sentence, he is guilty of innocent blood. If that learned Ferdinandus Vasquez be consulted, he is against this distinction of a power ordinary and extraordinary in men; and certainly, if you give to a king a prerogative above a law, it is a power to do evil as well as good; but there is no lawful power to do evil; and Dr Ferne is plunged in a contradiction by this, for he saith, (sect. 9, p. 58,) "I ask when these emperors took away lives and goods at pleasure? Was that power ordained by God? No; but an illegal will and tyranny; but (p. 61) the power, though abused to execute such a wicked commandment, is an ordinance of God."
在这里需要考虑的是，桑切斯定义了国王的绝对权力是一种无需遵守任何必要性和不受公共法规限制的权力充盈和充实；在他之前，巴尔都斯也是这样认为的。但是所有的政治家都谴责加里古拉的那句话（正如斯威顿所说），他对亚历山大大帝说：“记住，你必须做所有的事情，你有权力对所有人做任何你想做的事情。”律师们说，这就是暴政。希腊七贤之一的奇隆（如罗迪吉所说），说得更好：“君主就像神一样，因为他们只能做正义的事情；而这种权力，完全是暴政的，不能成为王权的基础。还有另一种权力（桑切斯说），是君主在人类法律中无需理由地进行分配；他说，这种权力是可以被辩护的。但他说，国王通过这种绝对权力所做的事情是有效的，但不是合法的，也就是说，耶稣会士所说的有效行为必须是王权行为。但是我们说，没有法律和理由的行为不能成为王权行为；因为王权行为是由国王作为国王，依照法律执行的行为，因此不能超越或违背法律。 国王可以豁免违反人法的行为，也就是说，如果法律规定任何人上城墙就要处死，国王可以赦免那些上去发现敌人来袭并拯救城市的人。但是，1.根据仁慈的解释，次级法官可以像国王一样根据法律的灵魂和意图来做到这一点。2.所有独立特权的行为都高于法律，都是没有法律依据或根据的自由意志行为，否则就不是建立在绝对权力上，而是建立在受法律和理性约束的权力上。但是，根据法律的真实意图和仁慈的解释来赦免违反人法的行为是一种法律义务的行为，也是所有法官的常规权力；如果国王或法官因违反法律的字面意义而杀人，而法律的意图与严厉的判决相矛盾，那么他们就是有罪的。 如果咨询了博学的费迪南多斯·瓦斯克斯，他反对将权力分为普通和特殊的区别；如果给予国王超越法律的特权，那么他既有做坏事的权力，也有做好事的权力；但是没有合法的权力可以做坏事；而弗恩博士在这一点上陷入了矛盾，因为他说（第 9 节，第 58 页）：“我问这些皇帝随意剥夺生命和财产的权力是什么时候被神所命令的？不是，而是非法的意愿和暴政；但是（第 61 页）这种权力，尽管被滥用来执行这样邪恶的命令，却是神的命令。”"

Obj. 1.—For the lawfulness of an absolute monarchy,—the Eastern, Persian, and Turkish monarchy maketh absolute monarchy lawful, for it is an oath to a lawful obligatory thing; and judgment (Ezek. 17:16, 18) is denounced against Judah for breaking the oath of the king of Babylon, and it is called the oath of God, and doubtless was an oath of absolute subjection; and the power (Rom. 13) was absolute, and yet the apostle calleth it an ordinance of God. The sovereignty of masters over servants was absolute, and the apostle exhorteth not to renounce that title as too rigid, but exhorteth to moderation in the use of it.
对于绝对君主制的合法性，东方、波斯和土耳其的君主制使得绝对君主制合法，因为它是对一种合法的义务事物的誓言；对于犹大人违背巴比伦王的誓言，以西结书 17:16,18 中宣告了审判，并称其为上帝的誓言，无疑是绝对服从的誓言；权力（罗马书 13）是绝对的，然而使徒称其为上帝的命令。主人对仆人的主权是绝对的，使徒劝勉不要放弃这个称号，而是劝勉在使用中要适度。

Ans. 1.—That the Persian monarchy was absolute is but a facto ad jus, and no rule of a lawful monarchy; but that it was absolute, I believe not. Darius, who was an absolute prince, as many think, but I think not, would gladly have delivered Daniel from the power of a law, (Dan. 6:14,) "And he set his heart on Daniel to deliver him, and he laboured till the going down of the sun to deliver him," and was so sorrowful that he could not break through a law, that he interdicted himself of all pleasures of musicians; and if ever he had used the absoluteness of a prerogative royal, I conceive he would have done it in this, yet he could not prevail. But in things not established by law I conceive Darius was absolute, as to me is clear, (Dan 6:24,) but absolute not by a divine law, but de facto, quod transierat in jus humanum, by fact, which was now become a law.
答案 1：波斯帝国的君主是绝对的，这只是一个事实，而不是合法君主的规则；但我不相信它是绝对的。大流士被许多人认为是一个绝对的君主，但我不这么认为。他很愿意解救但以理脱离法律的束缚（但以理书 6:14），"他专心要救但以理，直到日落时分，他努力要救他"，他非常悲伤，因为他无法打破法律，他禁止自己享受音乐家的乐趣；如果他曾经利用王权的绝对性，我认为他会在这方面做出努力，但他无法成功。但在法律未确立的事情上，我认为大流士是绝对的，对我来说是清楚的（但以理书 6:24），但他的绝对性不是来自神的法律，而是事实上，已经成为法律。

2. It was God's oath, and God tied Judah to absolute subjection, therefore, people may tie themselves. It followeth not, except you could make good this inference: 1. God is absolute, therefore the king of Babylon may lawfully be absolute. This is a blasphemous consequence. 2. That Judah was to swear the oath of absolute subjection in the latitude of the absoluteness of the kings of Chaldea, I would see proved. Their absoluteness by the Chaldean laws was to command murder, idolatry, (Dan. 3:4, 5,) and to make wicked laws. (Dan. 6:7, 8.) I believe Jeremiah commanded not absolute subjection in this sense, but the contrary. (Jer. 10:11.) They were to swear the oath in the point of suffering; but what if the king of Chaldea had commanded them all, the whole holy seed, men, women and children, out of his royal power, to give their necks all in one day to his sword, were they obliged by this oath to prayers and tears, and only to suffer? and was it against the oath of God to defend themselves by arms? I believe the oath did not oblige to such absolute subjection, and though they had taken arms in their own lawful defence, according to the law of nature, they had not broken the oath of God. The oath was not a tie to an absolute subjection of all and every one, either to worship idols, or then to fly or suffer death. Now, the Service Book commanded, in the king's absolute authority, all Scotland to commit grosser idolatry, in the intention of the work, if not in the intention of the commander, than was in Babylon. We read not that the king of Babylon pressed the consciences of God's people to idolatry, or that all should either fly the kingdom, and leave their inheritances to papists and prelates, or then come under the mercy of the sword of papists and atheists by sea or land. 3. God may command against the law of nature, and God's commandment maketh subjection lawful, so as men may not now, being under that law of God, defend themselves. What then? Therefore we owe subjection to absolute princes, and their power must be a lawful power, it nowise is consequent. God's commandment by Jeremiah made the subjection of Judah lawful, and without that commandment they might have taken arms against the king of Babylon, as they did against the Philistines; and God's commandment maketh the oath lawful. As suppose Ireland would all rise in arms, and come and destroy Scotland, the king of Spain leading, then we were by this argument not to resist. 4. It is denied, that the power, (Rom. 13,) as absolute, is God's ordinance. And I deny utterly that Christ and his apostles did swear non-resistance absolute to the Roman emperor.
这是上帝的誓约，上帝使犹大完全屈服，因此人们也可以自愿屈服。但这并不意味着，除非你能证明以下推论成立：1. 上帝是绝对的，因此巴比伦王可以合法地成为绝对的。这是亵渎的结论。2. 犹大必须在迦勒底王的绝对统治范围内发誓绝对屈服，我想看到证据。根据迦勒底的法律，他们的绝对统治是命令谋杀、拜偶像（但以理书 3:4, 5），并制定邪恶的法律（但以理书 6:7, 8）。我相信耶利米并不是以这个意义上的绝对屈服为命令，而是相反的（耶利米书 10:11）。他们发誓是为了忍受苦难；但是，如果迦勒底王命令他们所有的圣洁后裔，男人、女人和儿童，在一天之内都向他的剑低头，他们是否因为这个誓约而只能祈祷、流泪和忍受？他们用武器保护自己是否违背了上帝的誓约？ 我相信誓言并没有义务使人完全屈服，虽然他们根据自然法的规定为了自己的合法防卫而拿起了武器，但他们并没有违背上帝的誓言。誓言并不是要求人们完全屈服于崇拜偶像，或者逃离或者忍受死亡。现在，礼拜书以国王的绝对权威命令整个苏格兰去犯下更严重的偶像崇拜，无论是在行为的意图上还是在命令者的意图上，都比巴比伦更严重。我们没有读到巴比伦王强迫上帝的子民崇拜偶像，或者要求所有人要么逃离王国，把自己的产业留给天主教徒和主教，要么就接受天主教徒和无神论者的刀剑的怜悯，无论是在海上还是在陆地上。3. 上帝可以命令违背自然法，上帝的命令使屈服合法，因此人们现在不能在上帝的法律之下自卫。那又怎样呢？因此我们应该服从绝对君主，他们的权力必须是合法的权力，这一点绝不是必然的。 神藉由耶利米的命令使犹大的服从合法，如果没有这个命令，他们可以像对待非利士人一样对抗巴比伦王；神的命令使誓言合法。假设爱尔兰全体起来武装，前来摧毁苏格兰，由西班牙国王领导，那么根据这个论点，我们不应该抵抗。否认权力（罗马书 13 章）是绝对的，是神的命令。我完全否认基督和他的使徒对罗马皇帝发誓绝对不抵抗。

Obj. 2.—It seemeth, (1 Pet. 2:18, 19,) if well-doing be mistaken by the reason and judgment of an absolute monarch for ill-doing, and we punished, yet the magistrate's will is the command of a reasonable will, and so to be submitted unto; because such a one suffereth by law, where the monarch's will is a law, and in this case some power must judge. Now in an absolute monarchy all judgment resolveth in the will of the monarch, as the supreme law; and if ancestors have submitted themselves by oath, there is no repeal or redressment.
目标 2：似乎（彼得前书 2:18, 19），如果善行被绝对君主的理性和判断误认为恶行，并且我们受到惩罚，那么统治者的意愿是一个理性意愿的命令，因此应该服从；因为这样的人受到法律的制裁，而君主的意愿就是法律，在这种情况下必须有一些权力来判断。在绝对君主制中，所有的判断都归结为君主的意愿，作为最高法律；如果祖先们曾经宣誓服从，那就没有废除或纠正的可能。

Ans.—Whoever was the author of this treatise he is a bad defender of the defensive wars in England, for all the lawfulness of wars then must depend on this: 1. Whether England be a conquered nation at the beginning? 2. If the law-will of an absolute monarch, or a Nero, be a reasonable will, to which we must submit in suffering ill, I see not but we must submit to a reasonable will, if it be reasonable will in doing ill, no less than in suffering ill. 3. Absolute will in absolute monarchies is no judge de jure, but an unlawful and a usurping judge. (1 Pet. 2:18, 19.) Servants are not commanded simply to suffer. (I can prove suffering formally not to fall under any law of God, but only patient suffering. I except Christ, who was under a peculiar commandment to suffer.) But servants, upon supposition that they are servants, and buffeted unjustly by their masters, are, by the apostle Peter, commanded (ver. 20) to suffer patiently. But it doth not bind up a servant's hand to defend his own life with weapons if his master invade him, without cause, to kill him; otherwise, if God call him to suffer, he is to suffer in the manner and way as Christ did, not reviling, not threatening. 4. To be a king and an absolute master to me are contradictory. A king essentially is a living law; an absolute man is a creature that they call a tyrant, and no lawful king. Yet do I not mean that any that is a king, and usurpeth absoluteness, leaveth off to be a king; but in so far as he is absolute he is no more a king than in so far as he is a tyrant. But further, the king of England saith in a declaration, 1. The law is the measure of the king's powers 2. Parliaments are essentially lord-judges, to make laws essentially, as the king is, therefore, the king is not above the law. 3. Magna Charta, saith the king, can do nothing but by laws, and no obedience is due to him but by law. 4. Prescriptions taketh away the title of conquests.
答案-无论这篇论文的作者是谁，他都是英国防御战争的糟糕辩护者，因为当时战争的合法性必须取决于以下几点：1. 英国在一开始是否是一个被征服的国家？2. 如果绝对君主或者尼禄的法定意愿是合理的意愿，我们在遭受苦难时不得不顺从合理的意愿，我看不出我们为什么不必顺从在做恶时的合理意愿。3. 绝对君主制中的绝对意愿不是合法的法官，而是非法和篡权的法官。（彼得前书 2:18, 19）仆人们不仅仅被命令忍受。（我可以证明忍受正式地不属于上帝的任何法律，只属于忍受。我除外基督，他受到特殊的命令要忍受。）但是，假设仆人们是仆人，并且受到主人的不公正的殴打，使徒彼得命令他们（第 20 节）要忍受耐心。但是，如果他的主人无缘无故地侵犯他并试图杀害他，这并不限制仆人用武器保护自己的生命；否则，如果上帝召唤他去忍受，他应该像基督一样以某种方式和方式忍受，不辱骂，不威胁。4. 对我来说，成为国王和绝对的主宰是矛盾的。国王本质上是活法律；而绝对的人是他们称之为暴君的生物，不是合法的国王。然而，我并不是说任何一个成为国王并篡夺绝对权力的人就不再是国王；但他在绝对权力方面与暴君一样，他就不再是国王。此外，英国国王在一份声明中说：1.法律是国王权力的衡量标准；2.议会本质上是法官，与国王一样有权制定法律，因此国王并不高于法律；3.国王说，大宪章只能通过法律发挥作用，对他的服从只有在法律下才是应有的；4.习惯法剥夺了征服的称号。

Obj. 3.—The king, not the parliament, is the anointed of God.
王，而不是议会，是上帝的受膏者。

Ans.—The parliament is as good, even a congregation of gods. (Ps. 82:6.)
答案：议会就像是一群神一样好。（诗篇 82:6）

Obj. 4.—The parliament in the court, in their acts, they say, with consent of our sovereign lord.
议会在法庭上，在他们的行为中，他们说，经过我们的君主陛下的同意。

Ans.—They say not at the commandment and absolute pleasure of our sovereign lord. He is their lord materially, not as they are formally a parliament, for the king made them not a parliament; but sure I am the parliament had power before he was king, and made him king. (1 Sam. 10:17, 18.)
答案：他们说不是根据我们至高无上的君主的命令和绝对喜好。他在物质上是他们的主，而不是正式的议会，因为国王并没有将他们设立为议会；但我确信议会在他成为国王之前就有权力，并且是他们将他立为国王。（撒母耳记上 10:17, 18）

Obj. 5.—In an absolute monarchy there is not a resignation of men to any will as will, but to the reasonable will of the monarch, which, having the law of reason to direct it, is kept from injurious acts.
在绝对君主制中，人们并不是向任何意愿而是向君主的合理意愿屈服，君主的意愿受到理性法则的指导，从而避免了伤害行为。

Ans.—If reason be a sufficient restraint, and if God hath laid no other restraint upon some lawful king, then is magistracy a lame, a needless ordinance of God; for all mankind hath reason to keep themselves from injuries, and so there is no need of judges or kings to defend them from either doing or suffering injuries. But certainly this must be admirable,—if God, as author of nature, should make the lion king of all beasts, the lion remaining a devouring beast, and should ordain by nature all the sheep and lambs to come and submit their bodies to him, by instinct of nature, and to be eaten at his will, and then say, the nature of a beast in a lion is a sufficient restraint to keep the lion from devouring lambs. Certainly, a king being a sinful man, and having no restraint on his power but reason, he may think it reason to allow rebels to kill, drown, hang, torture to death, an hundred thousand protestants, men, women, infants in the womb, and sucking babes, as is clear in Pharaoh, Manasseh, and other princes. 重试    错误原因

Obj. 6.—There is no court or judge above the king, therefore he is absolutely supreme.
没有任何法院或法官能够超越国王，因此他是绝对至高无上的。

Ans.—The antecedent is false. 1. The court that made the king of a private man is above him; and here are limitations laid on him at his coronation. 2. The states of parliament are above him, to censure him. 3. In case of open tyranny, though the states had not time to convene in parliament, if he bring on his people an host of Spaniards or foreign rebels, his own conscience is above him, and the conscience of the people far more, called conscientia terra, may judge him in so far as they may rise up and defend themselves.
答案：前提是错误的。1.使国王成为私人的法院高于他；在他加冕时有限制。2.议会的各个国家高于他，有权指责他。3.在公开的暴政情况下，即使各国家没有时间在议会中召开会议，如果他带来一支西班牙人或外国叛乱者的军队给他的人民，他自己的良心高于他，而人民的良心更高，被称为“良心之地”，可以判断他，因为他们可以起来保护自己。

Obj. 7.—Here the Prelate, (c. 14, p. 144,) borrowing from Grotius, Barclay, Arnisæus, (or it is possible he be not so far travelled, for Dr Ferne hath the same,) "Sovereignty weakened in aristocracy cannot do its work, and is in the next place to anarchy and confusion. When Zedekiah was overlorded by his nobles, he could neither save himself nor the people, nor the prophet, the servant of God, Jeremiah; nor could David punish Joab when he was overawed by that power he himself had put in his head. To weaken the hand is to distemper the whole body; if any good prince, or his royal ancestors, be cheated of their sacred right by fraud or force, he may, at his fittest opportunity, resume it. What a sin it is to rob God or the king of their due!"
第 7 条：在这里，主教（第 14 章，第 144 页），借鉴了格罗蒂乌斯、巴克利、阿尼塞乌斯的观点（或者他可能没有那么远的旅行经历，因为费恩博士也有相同的观点），“在贵族统治下，主权被削弱，无法发挥作用，接近无政府状态和混乱。当泽德基雅被贵族们压制时，他既无法拯救自己和人民，也无法保护作为上帝仆人的先知耶利米；当大卫被自己任命的权力所压制时，他也无法惩罚约押。削弱手腕就是扰乱整个身体；如果任何善良的君主或他的祖先被欺骗或强迫剥夺了他们神圣的权利，他可以在最合适的时机重新夺回。抢夺上帝或国王的应得之物是多么的罪恶！”

Ans.—Aristocracy is no less an ordinance of God than royalty, for (Rom. 13:1, and 1 Tim. 2.)—1. All in authority are to be acknowledged as God's vice-regents, the senate, the consuls, as well as the emperor; and so one ordinance of God cannot weaken another, nor can any but a lawless animal say, aristocracy bordereth with confusion; but he must say, order and light are sister-germans to confusion and darkness. 2. Though Zedekiah, a man void of God, was over-awed by his nobles, and so could not help Jeremiah, it followeth not that because kings may not do this and this good, therefore they are to be invested with power to do all ill: if they do all the good that they have power to do, they will find way to help the oppressed Jeremiahs, And, because power to do both good and evil is given by the devil to our Scottish witches, it is a poor consequent that the states should give to the king power absolute to be a tyrant. 3. A state must give a king more power than ordinary, especially to execute laws, which requireth singular wisdom, when a prince cannot always have his great council about with him to advise him. 1. That is power borrowed, and by loan, and not properly his own; and therefore it is no sacrilege in the states to resume what the king hath by a fiduciary title, and borrowed from them. 2. This power was given to do good, not evil. David had power over Joab to punish him for his murder, but he executed it not upon carnal fears, and abused his power to kill innocent Uriah, which power neither God nor the states gave him. But how proveth he the states took power from David, or that Joab took power from David to put to death a murderer? That I see not. 3. If princes' power to do good be taken from them, they may resume it when God giveth opportunity; but this is to the Prelate perjury, that the people by oath give away their power to their king and resume it when he abuseth it to tyranny. But it is no perjury in the king to resume a taken-away power, which, if it be his own, is yet lis sub judice, a great controversy, Quod in Cajo licet, in Nevio non licet. So he teacheth the king that perjury and sacrilege is lawful to him. If princes' power to do ill and cut the whole land off as one neck, (which was the wicked desire of Caligula,) be taken from them by the states, I am sure this power was never theirs, and never the people's; and you cannot take the prince's power from him which was never his power. I am also sure the prince should never resume an unjust power, though he were cheated of it.
答案：贵族制度与君主制一样，都是上帝的命令，因为（罗马书 13:1 和提摩太前书 2）——1. 所有有权力的人都应被承认为上帝的代理人，包括参议院、执政官和皇帝；因此，一个上帝的命令不能削弱另一个命令，只有一个无法无天的动物才会说贵族制度与混乱接壤；但他必须承认，秩序和光明与混乱和黑暗是姐妹关系。2. 尽管没有上帝的人泽德基雅被他的贵族们吓住，无法帮助耶利米，但这并不意味着因为国王不能做这些好事，所以他们就应该被赋予做所有坏事的权力：如果他们尽他们有能力做的一切好事，他们将找到帮助受压迫的耶利米的方法。而且，因为我们苏格兰的女巫被魔鬼赋予了同时做好事和坏事的能力，所以国家给国王绝对权力成为暴君是一个可怜的推论。3. 一个国家必须给予国王比普通人更多的权力，特别是执行法律的权力，这需要非凡的智慧，因为一个王子不能总是有他的大议会陪伴他给予建议。1. 这是借来的权力，通过贷款，不是真正属于他自己的；因此，国家收回国王以受托人身份从他们那里借来的东西并不是亵渎。2. 这种权力是用来做好事的，而不是做坏事的。大卫有权力惩罚约押因谋杀而他没有执行，因为他没有出于肉体上的恐惧而滥用权力杀害无辜的乌利亚，这种权力既不是上帝给予的，也不是国家给予的。但他如何证明国家从大卫那里夺走了权力，或者约押从大卫那里夺走了权力以处死一个杀人犯？我看不出来。3. 如果君主的行善权力被夺走，他们可以在上帝给予机会时重新获得它；但对于主教来说，这是伪誓，因为人民通过誓言将他们的权力交给国王，并在他滥用权力进行暴政时重新获得它。但国王收回被夺走的权力并不是伪誓，如果这是他自己的权力，那么它仍然是争议中的，就像“在凯撒那里是合法的，在涅维奥那里是不合法的”一样。因此，他教导国王伪誓和亵渎对他来说是合法的。 如果君主的权力可以为非作歹，像卡利古拉那样将整个国家割裂成一块脖子，（这是邪恶的欲望），如果这种权力被国家剥夺，我确信这种权力从来不属于他们，也不属于人民；而且你不能夺走从未属于君主的权力。我也确信君主不应该恢复不公正的权力，即使他被骗了。

P. Prelate.—It is a poor shift to acknowledge no more for the royal prerogative than the municipal law hath determined, as some smatterers in the law say. They cannot distinguish betwixt a statute declarative and a statute constitutive; but the statutes of a kingdom do declare only what is the prerogative royal, but do not constitute or make it. God Almighty hath by himself constituted it. It is laughter to say the decalogue was not a law till God wrote it.
P. Prelate.——承认市政法所决定的皇家特权不再多一点，这是一个可怜的转变，正如一些对法律略有了解的人所说。他们无法区分一项法令是解释性的还是构成性的；但一个王国的法令只是声明了皇家特权是什么，而不是构成或创造它。全能的上帝亲自构成了它。说十诫在上帝写下之前不是法律，这是可笑的。

Ans.—Here a profound lawyer calleth all smatterers in the law, who cannot say that non ens, a prerogative royal, that is, a power contrary to God and man's law to kill and destroy the innocent, came not immediately down from heaven. But I profess myself no lawyer; but do maintain against the Prelate that no municipal law can constitute a power to do ill, nor can any law either justly constitute or declare such a fancy as a prerogative royal. So far is it from being like the decalogue, that is, a law before it be written, that this prerogative is neither law before it be written, nor after court-hunters have written for it; for it must be eternal as the decalogue if it have any blood from so noble a house. In what scripture hath God Almighty spoken of a fancied prerogative royal?
答案：这里有一个深思熟虑的律师称呼所有对法律一知半解的人，他们不能说 non ens，即一种王权特权，即一种违背上帝和人类法律的权力，来自天堂。但我自己并不是律师；我坚持反对主教，认为没有任何市政法律可以构成一种做坏事的权力，也没有任何法律可以公正地构成或宣布一种幻想的王权特权。这与十诫相去甚远，即在写成法律之前就是一种法律，这种特权既不是在写成法律之前就是一种法律，也不是在法庭猎人为其写成法律之后；因为如果它有任何来自如此高贵家族的血统，它必须像十诫一样永恒。上帝在哪本经文中提到过一种幻想的王权特权？

P. Prelate (p. 145).—Prerogative resteth not in its natural seat, but in the king. God saith, Reddite, not Date, render to kings that which is kings, not give to kings; it shall never be well with us if his anointed and his church be wronged.
P. Prelate（第 145 页）。特权不在其自然位置，而在国王身上。上帝说：“归还”，而不是“给予”，要归还给国王属于国王的东西，而不是给国王；如果他的受膏者和他的教会受到冤枉，我们将永远不会好过。

Ans.—The Prelate may remember a country proverb: he and his prelates (called the church,—the scum of men, not the church,) are like the tinker's dogs,—they like good company—they must be ranked with the king. And hear a false prophet: It shall never be well with the land while arbitrary power and popery be erected, saith he, in good sense.
答案：大主教可能会记得一句乡间谚语：他和他的主教们（被称为教会，是人类的渣滓，而不是真正的教会）就像锡匠的狗一样，喜欢与上层社会交往，必须与国王并列。还有一个假先知说：只要专制权力和天主教得以建立，这个国家永远不会好，他这样说是有道理的。

P. Prelate (c. 16, p. 170, 171).—The king hath his right from God, and cannot make it away to the people. Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. Kings' persons, their charge, their right, their authority, their prerogative, are by Scriptures, fathers, jurists, sacred, inseparable ordinances inherent in their crowns,—they cannot be made away; and when they are given to inferior judges, it is not ad minuendam majestatem, sed solicitudinem, to lessen sovereign majesty, but to ease them.
P. Prelate（约 16，第 170，171 页）。国王的权力来自上帝，不能将其转让给人民。将属于凯撒的东西归还给凯撒。国王的人身、职责、权利、权威、特权，都是根据圣经、教父、法学家的规定，与他们的王冠紧密相连，不能被剥夺；当它们被赋予下级法官时，并不是为了削弱君主的威权，而是为了减轻他们的负担。

Ans.—The king hath his right from God, What, then not from the people? I read in Scripture, the people made the king, never that the king made the people. All these are inseparably in the crown, but he stealeth in prerogative royal, in the clause which is now in question, "Render to Cæsar all Cæsar's;" and therefore, saith he, render to him a prerogative, that is, an absolute power to pardon and sell the blood of thousands. Is power of blood either the the king's, or inherent inseparably in his crown? Alas! I fear prelates have made blood an inseparable accident of his throne. When kings, by that public power given to them at their coronation, maketh inferior judges, they give them power to judge for the Lord, not for men. (Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6,) Now, they cannot both make away a power and keep it also; for the inferior judge's conscience hangeth not at the king's girdle. He hath no less power to judge in his sphere than the king hath in his sphere, though the orb and circle of motion be larger in compass in the one than in the other; and if the king cannot give himself royal power, but God and the people must do it, how can he communicate any part of that power to inferior judges except by trust? Yea, he hath not that power that other men have in many respects:—
答案——国王的权力来自上帝，那么不是来自人民吗？我在圣经中读到，是人民创造了国王，而不是国王创造了人民。所有这些都不可分割地存在于皇冠中，但他在王权特权中偷偷摸摸，就是现在有争议的条款中，“凡属凯撒的，就该归还凯撒。”因此，他说，归还给他一项特权，即绝对权力来赦免和出卖成千上万人的鲜血。鲜血的权力是属于国王的吗？还是与他的皇冠紧密相连？唉！我担心主教们已经把鲜血变成了他的王位上不可分割的附属品。当国王通过加冕仪式赋予他们的公共权力使下级法官成为可能时，他们赋予他们的是为上帝而不是为人民行使审判权。（申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6）现在，他们既不能剥夺权力，又不能保留权力；因为下级法官的良心并不取决于国王。 他在自己的领域中拥有与国王在自己的领域中一样的裁决权力，尽管一个人的运动轨迹和范围比另一个人更大；如果国王不能自己赋予自己王权，而是需要上帝和人民来赋予，那么他如何能将这种权力的任何一部分传达给下级法官，除非通过信任？是的，他在许多方面没有其他人拥有的能力

1. He may not marry whom he pleaseth; for he might give his body to a leper woman, and so hurt the kingdom.—2. He may not do as Solomon and Ahab, marry the daughter of a strange god, to make her the mother of the heir of the crown. He must in this follow his great senate. He may not expose his person to hazard of wars.—3. He may not go over sea and leave his watch-tower, without consent.—4. Many acts of parliament of both kingdoms discharge papists to come within ten miles of the king,—5. Some pernicious counsellors have been discharged his company by laws.—6. He may not eat what meats he pleaseth.—7. He may not make wasters his treasurers.—8. Nor dilapidate the rents of the crown.—9. He may not disinherit his eldest son of the crown at his own pleasure.—10. He is sworn to follow no false gods and false religions, nor is it in his power to go to mass.—11. If a priest say mass to the king, by the law he is hanged, drawn and quartered.—12. He may not write letters to the Pope, by law.—13. He may not, by law, pardon seducing priests and Jesuits.—14. He may not take physic for his health but from physicians, sworn to be true to him.—15. He may not educate his heir as he pleaseth.—16. He hath not power of his children, nor hath he that power that other fathers have, to marry his eldest son as he pleaseth.—17. He may not befriend a traitor.—18. It is high treason for any woman to give her body to the king, except she be his married wife.—19. He ought not to build sumptuous houses without advice of his council.—20. He may not dwell constantly where he pleaseth.—21. Nor may he go to the country to hunt, far less to kill his subjects and desert the parliament.—22. He may not confer honours and high places without his council.—23. He may not deprive judges at his will.—24. Nor is it in his power to be buried where he pleaseth, but amongst the kings. Now, in most of these twenty-four points, private persons have their own liberty far less restricted than the king.
他可能不能随意选择结婚对象；因为他可能会把自己的身体交给一个麻风病女人，从而伤害王国。——2. 他不能像所罗门和亚哈一样，娶一个异教女神的女儿，让她成为王位继承人的母亲。在这方面，他必须遵循他的伟大参议院的决定。他不能将自己的人身置于战争的危险之中。——3. 未经同意，他不能远渡重洋，离开他的瞭望塔。——4. 两国议会的许多法令禁止天主教徒靠近国王十英里以内。——5. 一些有害的顾问已经被法律禁止与他交往。——6. 他不能随意选择食物。——7. 他不能让挥霍者成为他的财务官。——8. 也不能挥霍皇室的租金。——9. 他不能随意剥夺他的长子王位继承权。——10. 他宣誓不追随虚假的神和虚假的宗教，也无法去参加弥撒。——11. 如果一个神父对国王说弥撒，根据法律，他将被绞死、拉扯和四分五裂。——12. 根据法律，他不能给教皇写信。——13. 根据法律，他不能赦免诱导人心的神父和耶稣会士。——14. 他不能随意服用药物来保持健康，只能从对他忠诚的医生那里获得。——15. 他不能随意教育他的继承人。——16. 他没有对自己的子女有权力，也没有其他父亲拥有的权力，可以随意嫁给他的长子。-17.他不能帮助叛徒。-18.任何女人将自己的身体给国王，除非她是他的妻子，否则都是叛国罪。-19.他不应该在没有咨询他的议会的情况下建造豪华住宅。-20.他不能随意居住在任何地方。-21.他也不能去乡村打猎，更不用说杀害他的臣民并逃离议会了。-22.他不能在没有咨询他的议会的情况下授予荣誉和高职。-23.他不能随意剥夺法官的职位。-24.他也不能随意选择自己的安葬地点，而是必须葬在国王之间。现在，在这二十四个观点中，普通人的自由要比国王受到的限制要少得多。

QUESTION XXIV
问题二十四

WHAT POWER THE KING HATH IN RELATION TO THE LAW AND THE PEOPLE, AND HOW A KING AND A TYRANT DIFFER
国王在法律和人民方面拥有什么权力，以及国王和暴君的区别

Mr Symmons saith, (sect. 6, p. 19,) that authority is rooted rather in the prince than in the law; for as the king giveth being to the inferior judge, so he doth to the law itself, making it authorisable; for propter quod unum-quodque tale, id ipsum magis tale, and therefore the king is greater than the law; others say, that the king is the fountain of the law, and the sole and only lawgiver.
辛蒙斯先生说，（第 6 节，第 19 页）权威更多地根植于君主而非法律；因为正如国王赋予下级法官存在，他也赋予法律本身，使其具有权威性；因为每个事物因其原因而成为某种性质，所以国王比法律更伟大；其他人说，国王是法律的源泉，也是唯一的立法者。

Assertion First.—1. The law hath a twofold consideration,—(1.) Secundum esse pænale, in relation to the punishment to be inflicted by man. (2.) Secundum esse legis, as it is a thing legally good in itself. In the former notion it is this way true,—human laws take life and being, so as to be punished or rewarded by men, from the will of princes and law-givers; and so Symmons saith true, because men cannot punish or reward laws but where they are made; and the will of rulers putteth a sort of stamp on a law, that if bringeth the commonwealth under guiltiness it they break this law. But this maketh not the king greater than the law, for therefore do rulers put the stamp of relation to punishment on the law, because there is intrinsical worth in the law prior to the act of the will of lawgivers for which it meriteth to be enacted; and, therefore, because it is authorisable as good and just, the king putteth on it this stamp of a politic law. God formeth being and moral aptitude to the end in all laws, to wit, the safety of the people, and the king's will is neither the measure nor the cause of the goodness of kings.
第一断言。1.法律有两个考虑因素，（1）根据刑罚而言，与人类所要施加的惩罚有关。（2）根据法律本身而言，作为一件在法律上合法的事物。从前一概念来看，这是正确的，人类法律的生命和存在，以便受到人类的惩罚或奖励，来自于统治者和立法者的意愿；所以 Symmons 说得对，因为人们只能在法律被制定的地方惩罚或奖励法律；统治者的意愿给法律贴上了一种标签，如果他们违反了这个法律，那么这个法律就会使整个国家陷入有罪的境地。但这并不使国王比法律更伟大，因为统治者之所以给法律贴上与惩罚有关的标签，是因为在立法者的意愿行动之前，法律本身就有内在的价值，因此它有资格被制定；而且，因为它是可授权的善良和公正，国王给它贴上了这个政治法律的标签。上帝在所有法律中形成存在和道德的适应性，即人民的安全，国王的意愿既不是国王善良的尺度，也不是善良的原因。

2. If the king be he who maketh the law good and just, because he is more such himself, then as the law cannot crook, and err, nor sin, neither can the king sin, nor break a law. This is blasphemy; every man is a liar: a law which deserveth the name of a law cannot lie.
如果国王之所以能制定良好公正的法律，是因为他自己更加如此，那么由于法律不能弯曲、错误或犯罪，国王也不能犯罪或违反法律。这是亵渎；每个人都是说谎者：一部配得上法律名字的法律不能说谎。

3. His ground is, that there is such majesty in kings, that their will must be done either in us or on us. A great untruth. Ahab's will must neither be done of Elias, for he commandeth things unjust, nor yet on Elias, for Elias fled, and lawfully we may fly tyrants; and so Ahab's will in killing Elias was not done on him.
他的观点是，国王具有如此威严，他们的意愿必须在我们身上或对我们施加。这是一个巨大的谬论。以利亚斯不应该屈服于亚哈的意愿，因为他命令不公正的事情；而以利亚斯也不应该受到亚哈的意愿的影响，因为以利亚斯逃跑了，合法地我们可以逃避暴君；所以亚哈杀害以利亚斯的意愿并没有实现在他身上。

Assertion Second.—1. Nor can it be made good, that the king only hath power of making laws, because his power were then absolute to inflict penalties on subjects, without any consent of theirs; and that were a dominion of masters, who command what they please, and under what pain they please. And the people consenting to be ruled by such a man, they tacitly consent to penalty of laws, because natural reason saith, an ill-doer should be punished; (Florianus in l. inde. Vasquez, l. 2, c. 55, n. 3,) therefore they must have some power in making these laws.
主张二：1.也无法证明国王独有制定法律的权力，因为如果如此，他的权力就变得绝对，可以在没有他们任何同意的情况下对臣民施加惩罚；这将是一个主人统治的领域，他们可以随意命令和施加任何惩罚。而人民同意受这样一个人的统治，就默认同意接受法律的惩罚，因为自然理性认为，应该对恶人进行惩罚（Florianus 在 l. inde. Vasquez, l. 2, c. 55, n. 3），因此他们必须在制定这些法律方面拥有一定的权力。

2. Jer. 26, It is clear the princes judge with the people. A nomothetic power differeth gradually only from a judicial power, both being collateral means to the end of government, the people's safety. But parliaments judge, therefore they have a nomothetic power with, the king.
耶利米书 26，明显可以看出王子们与人民一起行使审判权。立法权与司法权只是政府维护人民安全的并列手段，二者之间只有逐渐的差异。但议会有审判权，因此他们与国王一样拥有立法权。

3. The parliament giveth all supremacy to the king, therefore to prevent tyranny, it must keep a co-ordinate power with the king in the highest acts.
议会将所有至高无上的权力赋予国王，因此为了防止暴政，议会必须在最高行为中与国王保持协调的权力。

4. If the kingly line be interrupted, if the king be a child or a captive, they make laws who make kings; therefore, this nomothetic power recurreth into the states, as to the first subject.
如果王室血脉中断，如果国王是个孩子或被俘虏，那么制定国王的法律的人将成为统治者；因此，这种立法权力将回归到各个国家，作为第一主体。

Obj.—The king is the fountain of the law, and subjects cannot make laws to themselves more than they can punish themselves. He is only the supreme.
国王是法律的源泉，臣民不能为自己制定法律，就像他们不能惩罚自己一样。他只是至高无上的存在。

Ans.—The people being the fountain of the king must rather be the fountain of laws. It is false that no man maketh laws to himself. Those who teach others teach themselves also, (1 Tim. 2:12; 1 Cor. 14:34,) though teaching be an act of authority. But they agree to the penalty of the law secondarily only; and so doth the king who, as a father, doth not will evil of punishment to his children, but by a consequent will. The king is the only supreme in the power ministerial of executing laws; but this is a derived power, so as no one man is above him; but in the fountain-power of royalty the states are above him.
答案——作为国王的源泉，人民应该是法律的源泉。说没有人给自己制定法律是错误的。教导他人的人也在教导自己（提摩太前书 2:12；哥林多前书 14:34），尽管教导是一种权威行为。但他们只是次要地同意法律的惩罚；国王也是如此，作为父亲，他不希望对子女施加恶意的惩罚，而是出于一种因果关系的意愿。国王是唯一拥有执行法律的行政权力的最高者；但这是一种派生的权力，因此没有人可以超越他；但在王权的源泉权力上，各个国家高于他。

5. The civil law is clear, that the laws of the emperor have force only from this fountain, because the people have transferred their power to the king. Lib. 1, digest. tit. 4, de constit. Princip. leg. 1, sic Ulpian. Quod principi placuit, (loquitur de principe formaliter, qua princeps est, non qua est homo,) legis habet vigorem, utpote cum legi regia, quæ de imperio ejus lata est. populus ei, et in cum, omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat. Yea, the emperor himself may be convened before the prince elector. (Aurea Bulla Carol. 4, Imper. c. 5.) The king of France may be convened before the senate of Paris. The states may resist a tyrant, as Bossius saith, (de principe, et privileg. ejus, n. 55. Paris de puteo, in tract, syno. tit. de excess, reg. c. 3.) Divines acknowledge that Elias rebuked the halting of Israel betwixt God and Baal, that their princes permitted Baal's priests to converse with the king. And is not this the sin of the land, that they suffer their king to worship idols? And, therefore, the land is punished for the sins of Manasseh, as Knox observeth in his dispute with Lethington, where he proveth that the states of Scotland should not permit the queen of Scotland to have her abominable mass. (Hist. of Scotland.) Surely the power, or sea prerogative, of a sleepy or mad pilot, to split the ship on a rock, as I conceive, is limited by the passengers. Suppose a father in a distemper would set his own house on fire, and burn himself and his ten sons, I conceive his fatherly prerogative, which neither God nor nature gave, should not be looked to in this, but they may bind him. Yea, Althusius (polit. c. 39), answering this, "That in democracy the people cannot both command and obey," saith, It is true, secundum idem, ad idem, et eodem tempore. But the people may (saith he) choose magistrates by succession. Yea, I say, 1. They may change rulers yearly to remove envy: a yearly king were more dangerous, the king being almost above envy. Men incline more to flatter than to envy kings. 2. Aristotle saith, (polit. l. 4, c. 4, l. 6, c. 2,) The people may give their judgment of the wisest.
5. 民法明确规定，皇帝的法律只有从这个源头获得力量，因为人民已经将他们的权力转让给了国王。根据《罗马法典》第一册第四章第一条，乌尔皮安如此说：“皇帝所喜欢的事情（这里指的是皇帝作为皇帝的事情，而不是作为个人的事情），具有法律效力，因为皇帝颁布的皇家法律是关于他的统治的。人民将他们所有的统治权和权力都赋予了皇帝。”是的，皇帝本人可以在选举王子面前受到传唤。（查理四世的《金牌法令》第五章第五条）法国国王可以在巴黎参议院面前受到传唤。众所周知，神学家承认以利亚斥责以色列人在上帝和巴力之间摇摆不定，他们的王子允许巴力的祭司与国王交谈。这难道不是这个国家的罪过吗？他们容忍国王崇拜偶像。 因此，正如诺克斯在与莱辛顿的争论中所观察到的那样，曼纳西的罪孽使这片土地受到了惩罚，他在争论中证明苏格兰的统治者不应该允许苏格兰女王举行她可憎的弥撒。（苏格兰历史）毫无疑问，一个沉睡或疯狂的船长的权力或海洋特权，将船撞在岩石上，我认为是由乘客限制的。假设一个父亲在发烧时要放火烧自己和他的十个儿子，我认为他既不是上帝也不是自然给予的父权，不应该被考虑在内，但他们可以约束他。是的，阿尔图修斯（政治学第 39 章）回答说，“在民主制度中，人民既不能命令也不能服从”，他说，这是真的，根据相同的原则，同时也是如此。但人民可以（他说）通过继任来选择官员。是的，我说，1.他们可以每年更换统治者以消除嫉妒：每年一位国王更加危险，因为国王几乎是超越嫉妒的。人们更倾向于奉承而不是嫉妒国王。2.亚里士多德说（政治学第 4 卷第 4 章，第 6 卷第 2 章），人民可以对最聪明的人发表自己的判断。

Obj. 1.—Williams, bishop of Ossory, in Vindic. Reg. (a looking-glass for rebels,) saith, "To say the king is better than any one, doth not prove him to be better than two; and if his supremacy be no more, then any other may challenge as much, for the prince is singulis major. A lord is above all knights; a knight above all esquires; and so the people have placed a king under them, not above them.
Obj. 1. — 奥索里主教威廉姆斯在《国王辩护》（叛乱者的镜子）中说：“说国王比任何人都好，并不能证明他比两个人都好；如果他的至高无上不再存在，那么其他人也可以要求同样的地位，因为君主在个人之上。贵族高于所有骑士，骑士高于所有侍从，所以人民将国王置于他们之下，而不是置于他们之上。”

Ans.—The reason is not alike: 1. For all the knights united cannot make one lord; and all the esquires united cannot make one knight; but all the people united made David king at Hebron. 2. The king is above the people, by eminence of derived authority as a watchman, and in actual supremacy; and he is inferior to them in fountain-power, as the effect to the cause.
答案是不同的：1. 所有的骑士联合起来也不能成为一个领主；所有的侍从联合起来也不能成为一个骑士；但是所有的人民联合起来使大卫在希伯仑成为了国王。2. 国王凭借派生权威和实际统治地位高于人民，就像一个守望者一样；但是在权力源泉上，他却低于人民，就像效果低于原因一样。

Obj. 2.—The parliament (saith Williams) "may not command the king; why, then, make they supplication to him, if their vote be a law?
目标 2：议会（威廉姆斯说）“不能命令国王；那么，如果他们的投票是法律，为什么他们要向他祈求呢？”

Ans.—They supplicate, ex decentia, of decency and conveniency for his place, as a city supplicate a lord mayor; but they supplicate not ex debito, of obligation, as beggars seek alms, then should they be cyphers. When a subject oppressed supplicateth his sovereign for justice, the king is obliged, by office, to give justice; and to hear the oppressed is not an act of grace and mercy, as to give alms, though it should proceed from mercy in the prince, (Psal. 72:13,) but an act of royal debt.
答案：他们恳求，出于体面和方便，为他的位置，就像一个城市恳求一位市长；但他们不是出于义务，像乞丐寻求施舍，那样他们就是零。当一个受压迫的主题恳求他的君主给予正义时，国王有义务根据职责给予正义；而听取受压迫者的请求不是一种恩典和怜悯的行为，就像施舍一样，尽管这可能是出于君主的怜悯（诗篇 72:13），而是一种皇家债务的行为。

Obj. 3.—The P. Prelate (c. 9, pp. 103, 104) objecteth: The most you claim to parliament is a co-ordinate power, which, in law and reason, run in equal terms. In law, par in parem non habet imperium; an equal cannot judge an equal, much less may an inferior usurp to judge a superior. Our Lord knew, gratia visionis, the woman taken in adultery to be guilty, but he would not sentence her; to teach us, not improbably, not to be both judge and witness. The parliament are judges, accusers, and witnesses against the king in their own cause, against the imperial laws.
第三点反驳：教皇代表（第 9 章，第 103 页，第 104 页）反驳道：你们声称对议会的权力最多只是一个同等的权力，在法律和理性上是平等的。在法律上，平等者不能统治平等者；更不用说一个下级去审判一个上级了。我们的主知道，凭借他的神圣视力，那个被捉奸的妇人是有罪的，但他不愿意判她；这或许是为了教导我们，不要同时充当法官和证人。议会在自己的案件中，根据帝国法律，既是法官、控告者，又是证人，对国王进行审判。

Ans. 1.—The parliament is co-ordinate ordinarily with the king in the power of making laws; but the co-ordination on the king's part is by derivation, on the parliament's part, originaliter et fontaliter, as in the fountain. 2. In ordinary there is co-ordination; but if the king turn tyrant, the estates are to use their fountain-power. And that of the law, par in parem, &c. is no better from his pen, that stealeth all he hath, than from Barclaius, Grotius, Arnisæus, Blackwood, &c.: it is cold and sour. We hold the parliament that made the king at Hebron to be above their own creature, the king. Barclaius saith more accurately, (l. 5, cont. Monarch, p. 129,) "It is absurd that the people should both be subject to the king, and command the king also.—Ans. 1. It is not absurd that a father natural, as a private man, should be subject to his son; even that Jesse, and his elder brother, the lord of all the rest, be subject to David their king. Royalists say, Our late queen, being supreme magistrate, might by law have put to death her own husband, for adultery or murder. 2. The parliament should not be both accuser, judge, and witness in their own cause. 1. It is the cause of religion, of God, of protestants, and of the whole people. 2. The oppressed accuse; there is no need of witnesses in raising arms against the subjects. 3. The P. Prelate could not object this, if against the imperial laws the king were both party and judge in his own cause; and in these acts of arbitrary power, which he hath done through bad counsel, in wronging fundamental laws, raising arms against his subjects, bringing in foreign enemies into both his kingdoms, &c. Now this is properly the cause of the king, as he is a man, and his own cause, not the cause of God; and by no law of nature, reason, or imperial statutes, can he be both judge and party. 4. If the king be sole supreme judge without any fellow sharers in power, (1.) He is not obliged by law to follow counsel or hold parliaments; for counsel is not command. (2.) It is impossible to limit him even in the exercises of his power, which yet Dr Ferne saith cannot be said; for if any of his power be retrenched, God is robbed, saith Maxwell. (3.) He may by law play the tyrant gratis.
答案 1. -议会在制定法律的权力上通常与国王协调一致；但国王的协调是通过派生的方式，而议会的协调是原始的和源自的，就像泉水一样。2. 在普通情况下存在协调；但如果国王变成暴君，各个阶层就要利用他们的源泉力量。而那些关于法律的，平等对待平等等等的观点，不管是从他那偷来一切的人的笔下，还是从巴克莱、格罗提乌斯、阿尼塞乌斯、布莱克伍德等人的笔下，都是冷漠和苦涩的。我们认为在希伯伦制定国王的议会高于他们自己创造的国王。巴克莱更准确地说（第 5 卷，反对君主制，第 129 页）：“人民既然既要服从国王，又要指挥国王，这是荒谬的。”答案 1. 一个自然的父亲作为一个普通人应该服从他的儿子，即使是那个耶西和他的哥哥，其他人的主人，也要服从他们的国王大卫。君主主义者说，我们的前女王作为最高法官，根据法律可以处死她自己的丈夫，因为他犯了通奸或谋杀罪。2. 议会不应该在自己的案件中既是控告人、法官又是证人。1. 它是宗教、上帝、新教徒和整个人民的原因。2. 受压迫者指责；在反对臣民时不需要证人。3. 如果国王在自己的案件中既是当事人又是法官，那么总主教无法反对这一点；在这些任意行使权力的行为中，他通过糟糕的建议违反了基本法律，对臣民动武，引进外国敌人进入他的两个王国等等。现在，这是国王的事情，因为他是一个人，是他自己的事情，而不是上帝的事情；根据自然法、理性或帝国法令，他不能同时充当法官和当事人。4. 如果国王是唯一的最高法官，没有任何权力共享者，（1）他不受法律的约束，不需要听从建议或召开议会；因为建议不是命令。（2）甚至在行使权力的范围内也无法限制他，然而费恩博士说这是不可能的；因为如果他的权力被削减，上帝就会被剥夺，麦克斯韦尔说。（3）他可以合法地免费行使暴政。

Ferne objecteth, (sect. 7, p. 26,)—The king is a fundamental with the estates; now foundations are not to be stirred or removed.
弗恩反驳道，（第 7 节，第 26 页）——国王是与贵族一起的基本要素；现在基础不应该被动摇或移除。

Ans.—The king, as king, inspired with law, is a fundamental, and his power is not to be stirred; but as a man wasting his people, he is a destruction to the house and community, and not a fundamental in that notion.
答案：国王作为国王，以法律为依据，是根本的，他的权力不可动摇；但作为一个浪费人民的人，他对国家和社区是一种破坏，不是在那个概念中的根本。

Some object: The three estates, as men, and looking to their own ends, not to law and the public good, are not fundamentals, and are to be judged by the king.
一些物体：三个阶级，作为人类，追求自己的利益，而不是法律和公共利益，它们不是基本原则，应该由国王来判断。

Ans.—By the people, and the conscience of the people, they are to be judged.
通过人民和人民的良心来判断。

Obj.—But the people also do judge as corrupt men, and not as the people, and a politic body providing for their own safety.
但是人们也会将他们视为腐败的人，而不是视为人民，作为一个为自己安全着想的政治机构。

Ans.—I grant all; when God will bring a vengeance on Jerusalem, prince and people both are hardened to their own destruction. Now, God hath made all the three. In every government where there is democracy, there is some chosen ones resembling an aristocracy, and some one for order, presiding in democratical courts, resembling a king. In aristocracy, as in Holland, there is somewhat of democracy,—the people have their commissioners, and one duke or general, as the prince of Orange is some umbrage of royalty; and in monarchy there are the three estates of parliament, and these contain the three estates, and so somewhat of the three forms of government; and there is no one government just that hath not some of all three. Power and absolute monarchy is tyranny; unmixed democracy is confusion; untempered aristocracy is factious dominion; and a limited monarchy hath from democracy respect to public good, without confusion. From aristocracy safety in multitude of counsels without factious emulation, and so a bar laid on tyranny by the joint powers of many; and from sovereignty union of many children in one father; and all the three thus contempered have their own sweet fruits through God's blessing, and their own diseases by accident, and through men's corruption; and neither reason nor Scripture shall warrant any one in its rigid purity without mixture. And God having chosen the best government to bring men fallen in sin to happiness, must warrant in any one a mixture of all three, as in mixed bodies the four elements are reduced to a fit temper resulting of all the four, where the acrimony of all the four first qualities is broken, and the good of all combined in one.
答案：我承认一切；当上帝要对耶路撒冷进行报复时，王子和人民都会变得顽固，以至于自取灭亡。现在，上帝已经创造了这三种形式。在每个民主政府中，都有一些被选出的人类似于贵族，还有一些用于维持秩序的人，他们在民主法庭中担任主席，类似于国王。在贵族政府中，比如荷兰，也有一些民主的成分——人民有他们的代表，还有一个公爵或将军，就像奥兰治亲王是王权的一种遮蔽；而在君主制中，有议会的三个阶层，这些阶层包含了这三种形式的政府；因此，没有一个政府是完全公正的，没有这三种形式的一些成分。权力和绝对君主制是暴政；纯粹的民主制是混乱；没有调和的贵族政府是党派统治；而有限的君主制从民主制度中尊重公共利益，避免了混乱。 从贵族的安全中，通过众多的建议而避免党派争斗，从而通过众多力量对暴政设置障碍；从君主制中，将许多子女统一在一个父亲之下；这三者的结合，通过上帝的祝福，有着自己的甜美果实，但也会因为偶然事件和人们的腐败而带来疾病；既没有理性，也没有圣经会支持任何一种纯粹而没有混合的形式。上帝选择了最好的政府来使堕入罪恶的人们获得幸福，因此在任何一种形式中，都必须有三者的混合，就像混合体中的四种元素被调和成适当的状态，其中四种元素的刺激性都被削弱，而所有的好处都融合在一起。

1. The king, as the king, is an unerring and living law, and by grant of Barclay, of old, was one of excellent parts, and noble through virtue and goodness; and the goodness of a father as a father, of a tutor as a tutor, of a head as a head, of a husband as a husband, do agree to the king as a king; so, as king, he is the law itself, commanding, governing, saving. 2. His will as king, or his royal will, is reason, conscience, law. 3. This will is politicly present (when his person is absent) in all parliaments, courts, and inferior judicatures. 4. The king, as king, cannot do wrong or violence to any. 5. Amongst the Romans the name king and tyrant were common to one thing. (1.) Because, de facto, some of their kings were tyrants, in respect of their dominion, rather than kings. (2.) Because he who was a tyrant, de facto, should have been, and was a king too, de jure. 6. It is not lawful either to disobey or resist a king as a king, no more than it is lawful to disobey a good law. What violence, what injustice and excess of passion the king mixeth in with his acts of government, are merely accidental to a king as king; for, because men by their own innate goodness will not, yea, morally cannot do that which is lawful and just one to another, and do naturally, since the fall of man, violence one to another; therefore, if there had not been sin, there should not have been need of a king, more than there should have been need of a tutor to defend the child whose father is not dead, or of a physician to cure sickness where there is health; for, remove sin, and there is neither death nor sickness; but because sin is entered into the world, God devised, as a remedy of violence and injustice, a living, rational, breathing law, called a king, a judge, a father. Now the aberrations, violence, and oppression of this thing which is the living, rational, breathing law, is no medium, no mean intended by God and nature to remove violence. How shall violence remove violence? Therefore an unjust king, as unjust, is not that genuine ordinance of God, appointed to remove injustice, but accidental to a king. So we may resist the injustice of the king, and not resist the king. 8. If, then, any cast off the nature of a king, and become habitually a tyrant, in so far he is not from God, nor any ordinance which God doth own. If the office of a tyrant (to speak so) be contrary to a king's offices, it is not from God, and so neither is the power from God. 9. Yea, laws, (which are no less from God than the king's are,) when they begin to be hurtful, cessant materialiter, they leave off to be laws; because they oblige non secundum vim verborum, sed in vim sensus, not according to the force of words, but according to sense,—l. non figura literarum F. de actione et obligatione, I. ita stipulatus. But who (saith the royalists) shall be judge betwixt the king and the people, when the people allege that the king is a tyrant.
1. 国王作为国王，是一条无误且有生命力的法律，根据巴克利的授予，他曾是一个具有卓越才能、通过美德和善行而高贵的人；作为父亲的善行、作为导师的善行、作为领导者的善行、作为丈夫的善行，都适用于国王作为国王；因此，作为国王，他就是法律本身，命令、统治、拯救。2. 作为国王的意愿，或者说他的皇家意愿，就是理性、良心、法律。3. 当他的人不在场时，这种意愿在所有议会、法院和下级法庭中以政治方式存在。4. 作为国王，他不能对任何人做出错误或暴力行为。5. 在古罗马，国王和暴君这个名字是通用的。（1.）因为事实上，他们的一些国王在统治方面更像是暴君，而不是国王。（2.）因为那些事实上是暴君的人，本应该是，也确实是合法的国王。6. 不服从或抵抗国王作为国王是不合法的，就像不服从一项良好的法律一样。 国王在其治理行为中所混入的暴力、不公和激情过度，仅仅是作为国王的偶然事件；因为人们凭借自身的善良本性不愿意，甚至在道义上不能够对待他人公正合法，而自人类堕落以来，人们天然地对待他人采取暴力行为；因此，如果没有罪恶存在，就不需要国王，就像一个父亲未亡的孩子不需要导师来保护，或者在健康的情况下不需要医生来治疗疾病一样；因为罪恶进入了世界，上帝设计了一种治疗暴力和不公的活生生、理性的、有呼吸的法律，称之为国王、法官、父亲。现在，这个活生生、理性的、有呼吸的法律的偏离、暴力和压迫，并不是上帝和自然意图用来消除暴力的中介或手段。暴力如何能够消除暴力呢？因此，一个不公正的国王，作为不公正的国王，并不是上帝指定的真正的法令，用来消除不公正，而是国王的偶然事件。因此，我们可以抵制国王的不公正，而不是抵制国王本身。 8. 如果有人放弃了国王的本性，成为了一个习惯性的暴君，那么他就不是来自上帝，也不是来自上帝认可的任何法令。如果暴君的职位（这样说）与国王的职责相反，那么它就不是来自上帝，因此权力也不是来自上帝。 9. 是的，法律（与国王的法令一样，同样来自上帝），当它们开始变得有害时，它们就不再是法律；因为它们的约束力不是基于字面上的力量，而是基于意义的力量——根据法律的解释，而不是字面上的文字——《行动与义务法典》中的法律条款，以及《契约法典》中的规定。但是皇权主义者说，当人民声称国王是暴君时，谁来判断国王和人民之间的争议呢？

Ans.—There is a court of necessity no less than a court of justice; and the fundamental laws must then speak, and it is with the people, in this extremity, as if they had no ruler.
答案：有一个必要的法庭，不亚于正义的法庭；在这种极端情况下，基本法律必须发言，人民就像没有统治者一样。

Obj. 1.—But if the law be doubtful, as all human, all civil, all municipal laws may endure great dispute,—the peremptory person exponing the law must be the supreme judge. This cannot be the people, therefore it must be the king.
但如果法律存在争议，就像所有人类、民事和市政法律可能会引起争议一样，解释法律的决定性人物必须是最高法官。这个人不能是人民，所以必须是国王。

Ans. 1.—As the Scriptures in all fundamentals are clear, and expone themselves, and actu primo condemn heresies, so all laws of men in their fundamentals, which are the law of nature and of nations, are clear; and, 2. Tyranny is more visible and intelligible than heresy, and is soon decerned. If a king bring in upon his native subjects twenty thousand Turks armed, and the king lead them, it is evident they come not to make a friendly visit to salute the kingdom, and depart in peace. The people have a natural throne of policy in their conscience to give warning, and materially sentence against the king as a tyrant, and so by nature are to defend themselves. Where tyranny is more obscure, and the thread small, that it escape the eye of men, the king keepeth possession; but I deny that tyranny can be obscure long.
答案 1：圣经在所有基本原则上都是清晰的，并且自己解释，首先谴责异端邪说，所以所有人类的法律在它们的基本原则上，即自然法和国际法上，也是清晰的；答案 2：暴政比异端邪说更加明显和可理解，并且很快就会被发现。如果一个国王带领二万名武装土耳其人进入他的本国，显然他们不是来友好访问并和平离开的。人们在他们的良心中有一个自然的政治王座来发出警告，并对国王作为暴君做出实质性的判决，因此按照自然法，他们有权自卫。当暴政更加隐蔽，线索更小，以至于逃过人们的眼睛时，国王保持着统治；但我否认暴政能够长时间保持隐蔽。

Obj. 2.—Dr Ferne (p. 3, sect. 5, p. 39).—A king may not, or cannot easily alter the frame of fundamental laws, he may make some actual invasion in some transient and unfixed acts; and it is safer to bear these, than to raise a civil war of the body against the head.
目标 2. ——费尔恩博士（第 3 页，第 5 节，第 39 页）——国王可能不会或很难改变基本法律的框架，他可以在一些短暂和不固定的行为中进行一些实际的侵犯；忍受这些行为比对抗国王引发内战更安全。

Ans. 1.—If the king, as king, may alter any one wholesome law, by that same reason he may alter all. 2. You give short wings to an arbitrary prince, if he cannot overfly all laws to the subversion of the fundamentals of a state, if you make him, as you do, (1.) One who hath the sole legislative power, who allenarly by himself maketh laws, and his parliament and council are only to give him advice, which by law he may as easily reject as they can speak words to him, he may in one transient act (and it is but one) cancel all laws made against idolatry and popery, and command, through bad counsel, in all his dominions, the Pope to be acknowledged as Christ's vicar, and all his doctrine to be established as the catholic true religion. It is but one transient act to seal a pardon to the shedding of the blood of two hundred thousand killed by papists. (2.) If you make him a king, who may not be resisted in any case, and though he subvert all fundamental laws, he is accountable to God only: his people have no remedy, but prayers or flight.
答案 1. - 如果国王作为国王可以改变任何一项有益的法律，那么他同样可以改变所有法律。2. 如果你让一个专制的君主无法超越所有法律，以颠覆国家的基本原则，那么你就给了他短翅膀。如果你让他成为唯一的立法权力的人，他可以独自制定法律，而他的议会和顾问只能给他建议，而他可以像拒绝他们说话一样轻易地拒绝他们的建议，他可以通过坏的建议，在他的所有领土上一次性地取消所有反对偶像崇拜和天主教的法律，并命令承认教皇是基督的代理人，并将他的教义确立为天主教的真正宗教。一次性行为就可以为天主教徒杀害的二十万人签署赦免令。如果你让他成为一个国王，在任何情况下都不能被抵抗，即使他颠覆了所有基本法律，他只对上帝负责：他的人民没有其他办法，只能祈祷或逃亡。

Obj. 3.—Ferne (p. 3. sect. 5, p. 39).—Limitations and mixtures in monarchies do not imply a forcible restraining power in subjects, for the preventing of the dissolution of the state, but only a legal restraining power; and if such a restraining power be in the subjects by reservation, then it must be expressed in the constitution of the government, and in the covenant betwixt the monarch and his people. But such a condition is unlawful, which will not have the sovereign power secured,—is unprofitable for king and people,—a seminary for seditions and jealousies.
第三点——弗恩（第 3 页，第 5 节，第 39 页）。君主制中的限制和混合并不意味着对于阻止国家解体而言，主体们有一种强制性的约束力，而只是一种合法的约束力；如果这种约束力是通过保留在主体中的话，那么它必须在政府的宪法和君主与人民之间的契约中明确表达。但这样的条件是不合法的，因为它不会确保君主权力的安全，对国王和人民都没有益处，反而是鼓动叛乱和嫉妒的温床。

Ans. 1.—I understand not a difference betwixt forcible restraining and legal restraining: for he must mean by "legal," man's law, because he saith it is a law in the covenant betwixt the monarch and his people. Now, if this be not forcible and physical, it is only moral in the conscience of the king, and a cypher and a mere vanity; for God, not the people, putteth a restraint of conscience on the king, that he may not oppress his poor subjects; but he shall sin against God—that is a poor restraint: the goodness of the king, a sinful man, inclined from the womb to all sin, and so to tyranny, is no restraint. 2. There is no necessity that the reserve be expressed in the covenant between king and people, more than in contract of marriage between a husband and a wife; beside her jointure, you should set down this clause in the contract, that if the husband attempt to kill the wife, or the wife the husband, in that case it shall be lawful to either of them to part company. For Dr Ferne saith, "That personal defence is lawful in the people, if the king's assault be sudden, without colour of law, or inevitable." Yet the reserve of this power of defence is not necessarily to be expressed in the contract betwixt king and people. Exigencies of the law of nature cannot be set down in positive covenants, they are presupposed. 3. He saith, "A reservation of power whereby sovereignty is not secured, is unlawful." Lend me this argument: the giving away of a power of defence, and a making the king absolute, is unlawful, because by it the people is not secured; but one man hath thereby the sword of God put in his hand, whereby ex officio he may, as king, cut the throats of thousands, and be accountable to none therefor, but to God only. Now, if the non-securing of the king make a condition unlawfiil, the non-securing of a kingdom and church, yea, of the true religion, (which are infinitely in worth above one single man,) may far more make the condition unlawful. 4. A legal restraint on a king is no more unprofitable, and a seminary of jealousies between king and people, than a legal restraint upon people; for the king, out of a non-restraint, as out of seed, may more easily educe tyranny and subversion of religion. If outlandish women tempt even a Solomon to idolatry, as people may educe sedition out of a legal restraint laid upon a king, to say nothing that tyranny is a more dangerous sin than sedition, by how much more the lives of many, and true religion, are to be preferred to the safety of one, and a false peace.
答案 1.——我不明白强制约束和合法约束之间的区别：因为他所说的“合法”必须是指人的法律，因为他说这是君主与人民之间契约中的一项法律。现在，如果这不是强制和物理的，那么它只是国王的良心中的道德约束，是一个无关紧要的东西；因为上帝，而不是人民，对国王的良心进行约束，使他不能压迫他的贫穷的臣民；但他会得罪上帝——这是一个微弱的约束：国王的善良，一个从出生时就倾向于犯罪和暴政的罪人，不是一种约束。2. 在国王和人民之间的契约中，没有必要明确保留权利，就像在丈夫和妻子之间的婚姻合同中一样；除了她的嫁妆之外，你应该在合同中写下这个条款，即如果丈夫试图杀害妻子，或者妻子试图杀害丈夫，在这种情况下，任何一方都可以合法地分开。因为费恩博士说：“如果国王的袭击是突然的，没有法律依据或不可避免的，那么人民的个人防卫是合法的。”然而，这种防御力量的保留并不一定要在国王和人民之间的合同中表达。自然法的紧急情况不能写入明确的契约中，它们是预设的。他说：“一种没有确保主权的权力保留是非法的。”借给我这个论点：放弃防御力量并使国王绝对统治是非法的，因为这样人民就没有得到保障；但是一个人因此而拥有上帝的剑，作为国王，他可以作为职责，割断成千上万人的喉咙，而只对上帝负责，而不对任何人负责。现在，如果不保障国王使条件非法，那么不保障一个王国和教会，甚至是真正的宗教（其价值远远超过一个人），可能会更加使条件非法。对国王的法律限制并不比对人民的法律限制更没有益处，也不会在国王和人民之间造成猜忌，因为国王在没有限制的情况下，就像种子一样，更容易产生暴政和宗教的颠覆。 即使是像所罗门这样的智者也会被奇特的女人引诱到崇拜偶像的行为，就像人们可以从对国王施加的合法限制中引发叛乱一样。更不用说暴政比叛乱更危险，因为许多人的生命和真正的宗教信仰比一个人的安全和虚假的和平更值得珍惜。

Obj. 4.—An absolute monarch is free from all forcible restraint, and so far as he is absolute from all legal restraints of positive laws. Now, in a limited monarch, there is only sought a legal restraint; and limitation cannot infer a forcible restraint, for an absolute monarch is limited also, not by civil compact, but by the law of nature and nations, which he cannot justly transgress. If therefore an absolute monarch, being exorbitant, may not be resisted because he transgresseth the law of nature, how shall we think a limited monarch may be resisted for transgressing the bounds set by civil agreement.
第四点：绝对君主没有任何强制约束，只要他是绝对的，就没有任何正面法律约束。而在有限君主制中，只寻求法律约束；而限制并不能推断出强制约束，因为绝对君主也是有限的，不是通过民事契约，而是通过不能公正违反的自然法和国际法来限制。因此，如果一个过度的绝对君主不能被抵抗，因为他违反了自然法，那么我们如何认为一个有限的君主可以因为违反民事协议设定的界限而被抵抗呢？

Ans. 1.—A legal restraint on the people is a forcible restraint; for if law be not backed with force, it is only a law of rewarding well-doing, which is no restraint, but an encouragement to do evil. If, then, there be a legal restraint upon the king, without any force, it is no restraint, but only such a request as this: be a just prince, and we will give your majesty two subsidies in one year. 2. I utterly deny that God ever ordained such an irrational creature as an absolute monarch. If a people unjustly, and against nature's dictates, make away irrevocably their own liberty, and the liberty of their posterity, which is not their's to dispose off, and set over themselves as base slaves, a sinning creature, with absolute power, he is their king, but not as he is absolute, and that he may not be forcibly resisted, notwithstanding the subjects did swear to his absolute power, (which oath in the point of absoluteness is unlawful, and so not obligatory,) I utterly deny. 3. An absolute monarch (saith he) is limited, but by law of nature. That is, Master Doctor, he is not limited as a monarch, not as an absolute monarch, but as a son of Adam; he is under the limits of the law of nature, which he should have been under though he had never been a king all his days, but a slave. But what then? Therefore, he cannot be resisted. Yes, Doctor, by your own grant he can be resisted: if he invade an innocent subject (say you) suddenly, without colour of law, or inevitably; and that because he transgresseth the law of nature. You say a limited monarch can less be resisted for transgressing the bounds set by civil agreement. But what if the thus limited monarch transgress the law of nature, and subvert fundamental laws? He is then, you seem to say, to be resisted. It is not for simple transgression of a civil agreement that he is to be resisted. The limited monarch is as essentially the Lord's anointed, and the power ordained of God, as the absolute monarch. Now resistance by all your grounds is unlawful, because of God's power and place conferred upon him, not because of men's positive covenant made with him.
答案 1：对人民的法律限制是一种强制性的限制；因为如果法律没有用武力支持，那只是一种奖励善行的法律，这不是一种限制，而是鼓励做恶。因此，如果对国王有一种法律限制，没有任何武力，那就不是限制，只是这样的要求：做一个公正的君主，我们将在一年内给予陛下两个补贴。答案 2：我完全否认上帝曾经任命过一个绝对君主这样一个非理性的生物。如果一个人民不公正地、违背自然法则地无可挽回地剥夺了自己和他们后代的自由，而将自己作为卑贱的奴隶，设置一个有绝对权力的犯罪生物作为统治者，他是他们的国王，但不是因为他是绝对的，也不是因为他不能被强制抵抗，尽管臣民们曾经宣誓效忠他的绝对权力（在绝对性问题上的宣誓是非法的，因此不具有约束力），我完全否认。答案 3：一个绝对君主（他说）只受自然法律的限制。 那就是说，大夫先生，他不是作为君主受限制，也不是作为绝对君主受限制，而是作为亚当的儿子；他受制于自然法则的限制，即使他从未做过国王，而是做了一辈子的奴隶，他也应该受到这些限制。但是，那又怎样呢？因此，他不能被抵抗。是的，大夫，根据您自己的承认，他可以被抵抗：如果他无理由地、突然地侵犯一个无辜的臣民，并且这是因为他违反了自然法则。您说，一个受限制的君主因为违反了民众所达成的协议而更不容易被抵抗。但是，如果这个受限制的君主违反了自然法则，颠覆了基本法律，那又怎么办呢？您似乎在说，那时就应该抵抗他。他被抵抗，不是因为简单地违反了民众的协议，而是因为他是上帝所指定的受膏者，是上帝所命定的权力。根据您的所有理由，抵抗是不合法的，因为这是上帝赋予他的权力和地位，而不是因为人们与他达成的积极契约。

To find out the essential difference betwixt a king and a tyrant, we are to observe, that it is one thing to sin against a man, another thing against a state. David, killing Uriah, committed an act of murder. But upon this supposition, that David is not punished for that murder, he did not so sin against the state, and catholic good of the state, that he turneth tyrant and ceaseth to be a lawful king. A tyrant is he who habitually sinneth against the catholic good of the subjects and state, and subverteth law. Such a one should not be, as Jason, of whom it is said by Æneas Silvius, Graviter ferebat, si non regnaret, quasi nesciret esse privatus. When such as are monstrous tyrants are not taken away by the estates, God pursueth them in wrath. Domitian was killed by his own family, his wife knowing of it; Aurelianus was killed with a thunderbolt; Darius was drowned in a river; Dioclesian, fearing death, poisoned himself; Salerius died eaten with worms,—the end also of Herod and Antiochus; Maxentius was swallowed up in a standing river; Julian died, being stricken through with a dart thrown at him by a man or an angel, it is not known; Valens, the Arian, was burnt with fire in a litttle village by the Gothes; Anastasius, the Eutychian emperor, was stricken by God with thunder; Gundericus Vandalus, when he rose against the church of God, being apprehended by the devil, died. Sometime the state have taken order with tyrants: the empire was taken from Vitellius, Heliogabalus, Maximums, Didius, Julianus; so was the two Childerici of France served; so were also Sigebertus, Dagabertus, and Luodovic II. of France: Christiernus of Denmark, Mary of Scotland, who killed her husband and raised forces against the kingdom; so was Henricus Valesius of Poland, for flying the kingdom; Sigismundus of Poland, for violating his faith to the states.
为了找出国王和暴君之间的本质区别，我们需要观察，得罪一个人和得罪一个国家是不同的。大卫杀害乌利亚是一种谋杀行为。但是在这种假设下，如果大卫没有因为那次谋杀而受到惩罚，他并没有对国家和国家的普遍利益犯罪，他并没有成为一个暴君，也没有停止成为合法的国王。暴君是那些经常违背臣民和国家的普遍利益，颠覆法律的人。像杰森一样的人不应该存在，关于他，埃涅阿斯·西尔维乌斯说：“如果他不统治，他几乎无法忍受，好像他不知道如何成为一个普通人。”当这些怪物般的暴君没有被国家机构除去时，上帝会以愤怒追究他们。 多米提安被自己的家人杀害，他的妻子知道这件事；奥勒利安被雷击而死；达里乌斯在河中溺水；戴克里先因害怕死亡而自毒身亡；萨勒里乌斯被蠕虫吃死，同样的结局也发生在希律和安提阿克；马克森提乌斯被一条静止的河水吞噬；朱利安被人或天使投掷的箭刺中身亡，不得而知；阿里乌斯，这位阿里乌斯派的皇帝，在哥特人的一个小村庄里被火烧死；尤提基安派的皇帝阿纳斯塔修斯被上帝雷击；当瓦达尔人贡德里克反对上帝的教会时，被魔鬼逮捕并死亡。有时国家会对暴君采取措施：维特里乌斯、赫利奥加巴卢斯、马克西姆斯、迪迪乌斯、朱利安努斯都被剥夺了帝国权力；法国的两位查尔德里克也是如此；西格贝尔图斯、达加贝尔图斯和法国的路易二世也是如此；丹麦的克里斯蒂安和苏格兰的玛丽，她杀害了丈夫并起兵反对王国；波兰的亨利克·瓦列维也是如此，因为他逃离了王国；波兰的西吉斯蒙德因违背对国家的信约而受到处罚。

QUESTION XXV
问题二十五

WHAT FORCE THE SUPREME LAW HATH OVER THE KING, EVEN THAT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S SAFETY, CALLED "SALUS POPULI."
最高法律对国王的权力有何限制，即人民安全的法律，被称为“人民的安全”。

The law of the twelve tables is, salus populi, suprema lex. The safety of the people is the supreme and cardinal law to which all laws are to stoop. And that from these reasons:—
十二表法是“人民的安全是至高无上的法律”，所有法律都必须屈服于此。原因如下：

1. Originally: Because if the people be the first author, fountain and efficient under God, of law and king, then their own safety must be principally sought, and their safety must be far above the king, as the safety of a cause, especially of an universal cause, such as is the people, must be more than the safety of one, as Aristotle saith, (l. 3. polit., alias l. 5,) οὐ μήτι πὲφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντὲς—"The part cannot be more excellent than the whole;" nor the effect above the cause.
因为如果人民是法律和国王的首要创造者、源泉和效力之神，那么他们自己的安全必须是首要考虑的，他们的安全必须远远高于国王，就像一个普遍事业的安全，尤其是人民这样的普遍事业的安全，必须比一个人的安全更重要，正如亚里士多德所说的（政治学第三卷，又名第五卷）：“部分不能比整体更优秀”；效果不能超过原因。

2. Finaliter. This supreme law must stand; for if all law, policy, magistrates and power be referred to the people's good as the end, (Rom. 13:4,) and to their quiet and peaceable life in godliness and honesty, then must this law stand, as of more worth than the king, as the end is of more worth than the means leading to the end, for the end is the measure and rule of the goodness of the mean; and, finis ultimus in influxu est potentissimus, the king is good, because he conduceth much for the safety of the people; therefore, the safety of the people must be better.
最终。这个至高无上的法律必须存在；因为如果所有的法律、政策、官员和权力都是为了人民的利益作为目标（罗马书 13:4），为了他们在敬虔和诚实中过安宁和平静的生活，那么这个法律必须存在，因为它比国王更有价值，就像目标比通往目标的手段更有价值一样，因为目标是衡量和规定手段的好坏的标准；而且，finis ultimus in influxu est potentissimus，国王是好的，因为他为人民的安全做出了很多贡献；因此，人民的安全必须更重要。

3. By way of limitation: because no law in its letter hath force where the safety of the subject is in hazard; and if law or king be destructive to the people they are to be abolished. This is clear in a tyrant or a wicked man.
3. 限制性地说：因为当公民的安全受到威胁时，法律本身没有力量；如果法律或国王对人民造成破坏，它们应该被废除。这在暴君或邪恶的人身上是明显的。

4. In the desires of the most holy: Moses, a prince, desired for the safety of God's people, and rather than God should destroy his people, that his name should be rased out of the book of life; and David saith, (1 Chron. 21:17,) "Let thine hand, I pray thee, O Lord my God, be on me, and on my father's house; but not on thy people, that they should be plagued." This being a holy desire of these two public spirits, the object must be in itself true, and the safety of God's people and their happiness must be of more worth than the salvation of Moses and the life of David and his father's house.
在最圣洁的愿望中：摩西，一位王子，为了上帝子民的安全而渴望，宁愿上帝将他的名字从生命之书上抹去；大卫说（历代志上 21:17）：“求你的手加在我和我父的家上，不要加在你的百姓身上，使他们受瘟疫。”这是这两位公众精神的圣洁愿望，目标本身必须是真实的，上帝子民的安全和幸福必须比摩西的救赎和大卫及其父的生命更有价值。

The Prelate (c. 16, p. 159) borroweth an answer to this—for he hath none of his own—from Dr Ferne (sect. 7, p. 28): The safety of the subjects is the prime end of the constitution of government; but it is not the sole and adequate end of government in monarchy; for that is the safety of both king and people. And it beseemeth the king to proportion his laws for their good; and it becometh the people to proportion all their obedience, actions, and endeavours for the safety, honour, and happiness of the king. It is impossible the people can have safety when sovereignty is weakened,
大主教（第 16 页，第 159 行）从费恩博士（第 7 节，第 28 页）那里借来了一个答案，因为他自己没有答案：臣民的安全是政府组织的首要目标；但在君主制政府中，这并不是唯一和充分的目标；因为君王和人民的安全都是目标。君王应该为人民的利益制定法律；人民应该为君王的安全、荣誉和幸福而调整他们的服从、行动和努力。当主权被削弱时，人民不可能拥有安全。

Ans.—The Prelate would have the other half of the end, why a king is set over a people, to be the safety and happiness of the king, as well as the safety of the people. This is new logic indeed, that one and the same thing should be the mean and the end. The question is, For what end is a king made so happy as to be exalted king? The Prelate answereth, He is made happy that he may be happy, and made a king that he may be made a king. Now, is the king, as king, to intend this half end? that is, whether or no accepteth he the burden of setting his head and shoulders under the crown, for this end, that he may not only make the people happy, but also that he may make himself rich and honourable above his brethren, and enrich himself? I believe not; but that he feed the people of God; for if he intend himself, and his own honour, it is the intention of the man who is king, and intentio operantis, but it is not the intention of the king, as the king, or intentio operis. The king, as a king, is formally and essentially the "minister of God for our good," (Rom. 13:4; 1 Tim. 2:2,) and cannot come under any notion as a king, but as a mean, not as an end, nor as that which he is, to seek himself. I conceive God did forbid this in the moulding of the first king. (Deut. 17:18, 19, 20.) He is a minister by office, and one who receiveth honour and wages for this work, that, ex officio, he may feed his people. But the Prelate saith, the people are to intend his riches and honour. I cannot say but the people may intend to honour the king; but the question is not, whether the people be to refer the king and his government as a mean to honour the king? I conceive not. But that end which the people, in obeying the king, in being ruled by him, may intend, is, (1 Tim. 2:2,) "That under him they may lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty." And God's end in giving a king is the good and safety of his people.
答案——大主教希望国王作为人民的统治者，不仅要确保人民的安全和幸福，也要确保自己的安全和幸福。这确实是一种新的逻辑，同一件事既是手段又是目的。问题是，国王被封为国王的目的是什么？大主教回答说，他被封为国王是为了成为幸福的国王，成为国王是为了成为国王。那么，作为国王，他是否要追求这个目的的一半？也就是说，他是否接受了戴上王冠的重担，不仅要让人民幸福，还要让自己比兄弟们更富有和尊贵，并且使自己富裕起来？我不相信；相反，他要养育上帝的子民；因为如果他只关注自己和自己的荣誉，那就是作为一个人的意图，也就是操作者的意图，但这不是作为国王的意图，也不是作为国王的行为的意图。作为国王，他在本质上是“上帝的仆人，为我们的利益而服务”（罗马书 13:4；提摩太前书）。 2:2，）并且不能被视为国王的任何概念，而是作为一种手段，不是作为目的，也不是作为他自己，来寻求自己。我认为上帝在塑造第一位国王时禁止了这一点。（申命记 17:18, 19, 20。）他是一位按职责行事的仆人，一个为这项工作接受荣誉和报酬的人，以便他可以按职责喂养他的人民。但是主教说，人民应该关注他的财富和荣誉。我不能说人民不可能想要尊重国王；但问题不在于人民是否将国王和他的统治作为一种手段来尊重国王？我认为不是。但人民在服从国王、被他统治时可能打算追求的目标是（提摩太前书 2:2）：“为了在他的统治下，他们可以过上宁静和和平的生活，以及一切敬虔和正直。”上帝给予国王的目的是他人民的福祉和安全。

P. Prelate (c. 16, p. 160).—To reason from the one part and end of monarchical government—the safety of the subjects, to the destruction and weakening of the other part of the end—the power of sovereignty and the royal prerogative, is a caption a divisis. If the king be not happy, and invested with the full power of a head, the body cannot be well. By anti-monarchists, the people at the beginning were necessitated to commit themselves, lives and fortunes, to the government of a king, because of themselves they had not wisdom and power enough to do it; and therefore, they enabled him with honour and power, without which he could not do this, being assured that he could not choose, but most earnestly and carefully endeavour this end, to wit, his own and the people's happiness; therefore, the safety of the people issueth from the safety of the king, as the life of the natural body from the soul. Weak government is near to anarchy. Puritans will not say, Quovis modo esse, etiam pænale, is better than non esse: the Scripture saith the contrary; it were better for some never to have been born than to be. Tyranny is better than no government.
P. Prelate（约 16，第 160 页）。——从君主政府的一部分和目标——臣民的安全，推导出破坏和削弱另一部分目标——主权和皇家特权的权力，是一个从分离中引出的标题。如果国王不幸福，并且没有拥有完全的头衔，身体就无法健康。在反君主主义者看来，人民在开始时被迫将自己的生命和财产委托给国王的统治，因为他们自己没有足够的智慧和力量来做到这一点；因此，他们赋予了他荣誉和权力，没有这些，他无法做到这一点，他们确信他不能选择，但最热切和仔细地努力实现这个目标，即他自己和人民的幸福；因此，人民的安全来自国王的安全，就像自然身体的生命来自灵魂一样。虚弱的政府接近无政府状态。清教徒不会说，任何方式的存在，即使是惩罚性的，也比不存在好：圣经说相反；对于某些人来说，不如不曾出生。暴政比没有政府好。

Ans. 1.—He knows not sophisms of logic who calleth this argument a divisis; for the king's honour is not the end of the king's government. He should seek the safety of state and church, not himself; himself is a private end, and a step to tyranny.
答案 1：他不懂逻辑的诡辩，称这个论点为分裂论者，因为国王的荣誉不是国王政府的目标。他应该追求国家和教会的安全，而不是自己；自己是一个私人目标，也是暴政的一步。

2. The Prelate lieth when he maketh us to reason from the safety of the subject to the destruction of the king. Ferne, Barclay, Grotius, taught the hungry scholar to reason so. Where read he this? The people must be saved, that is the supreme law, therefore, destroy the king. The devil and the Prelate both shall not fasten this on us. But thus we reason: when the man who is the king endeavoureth not the end of his royal place, but, through bad counsel, the subversion of laws, religion, and bondage of the kingdom, the free estates are to join with him for that end of safety, according as God hath made them heads of tribes and princes of the people; and if the king refuse to join with them, and will not do his duty, I see not how they are in conscience liberated before God from doing their part.
大主教撒谎了，他让我们从主体的安全推导出国王的毁灭。费恩、巴克利、格罗修斯教导饥饿的学者这样推理。他在哪里读到这个？人民必须被拯救，这是至高无上的法律，因此，摧毁国王。魔鬼和大主教都不能把这个强加给我们。但我们这样推理：当作为国王的人不追求他的王位的目标，而是通过恶劣的建议来颠覆法律、宗教和束缚王国时，自由的贵族应该与他们一起为了安全的目标而行动，正如上帝使他们成为部落的首领和人民的王子；如果国王拒绝与他们合作，不履行自己的职责，我不明白他们如何在上帝面前有良心地免除自己的责任。

3. If the P. Prelate call resisting the king by lawful defensive wars, the destruction of the head, he speaketh with the mouth of one excommunicated and delivered up to Satan.
如果 P. Prelate 称合法的防御战为抵抗国王，那么他说的就是一个被逐出教会并交给撒旦的人的话。

4. We endeavour nothing more than the safety and happiness of the king, as king; but his happiness is not to suffer him to destroy his subjects, subvert religion, arm papists who have slaughtered above two hundred thousand innocent protestants, only for the profession of that true religion which the king hath sworn to maintain. Not to rise in arms to help the king against these were to gratify him as a man, but to be accessory to his soul's destruction as a king. 重试    错误原因

5. That the royal prerogative is the end of a monarchy ordained by God, neither Scripture, law, nor reason can admit.
皇家特权是上帝所命定的君主制的终结，无论是圣经、法律还是理性都无法接受。

6. The people are to intend the safety of other judges as well as the king's. If parliaments be destroyed, whose it is to make laws and kings, the people can neither be safe, free to serve Christ, nor happy.
人们的意图是保护其他法官和国王的安全。如果议会被摧毁，制定法律和国王的责任将归于谁，人民既无法安全，也无法自由地为基督服务，也无法幸福。

7. It is a lie that people were necessitated at the beginning to commit themselves to a king; for we read of no king while Nimrod arose; fathers of families (who were not kings), and others, did govern till then.
人们在最初被迫臣服于国王是个谎言；因为在尼米罗德出现之前，我们没有听说过国王；在那之前，家长（不是国王）和其他人都在统治。

8. It was not want of wisdom, (for in many, and in the people, there must be more wisdom than in one man,) but rather corruption of nature and reciprocation of injuries that created kings and other judges.
这不是因为缺乏智慧（因为在许多人和人民中，必定比一个人更有智慧），而是因为人性的腐败和互相伤害的循环造就了国王和其他法官。

9. The king shall better compass his end, to wit, the safety of the people, with limited power, (placent mediocria,) and with other judges added to help him, (Num. 11:14, 16; Deut. 1:12–15,) than to put in one man's hand absolute power; for a sinful man's head cannot bear so much new wine, such as exorbitant power is.
国王应该更好地实现他的目标，即人民的安全，通过有限的权力（placent mediocria），并加入其他法官来帮助他（民数记 11:14, 16；申命记 1:12-15），而不是将绝对权力放在一个人手中；因为一个罪恶的人无法承受如此多的新酒，即过度的权力。

10. He is a base flatterer who saith, The king cannot choose, but earnestly and carefully endeavour his own and the people's happiness; that is, the king is an angel, and cannot sin and decline from the duties of a king. Of the many kings of Judah and Israel, how many chose this? All the good kings that have been may be written in a gold ring.
他是一个卑鄙的谄媚者，说道：“国王不能选择，但必须努力追求自己和人民的幸福。”也就是说，国王是天使，不能犯罪和违背国王的职责。在犹大和以色列的众多国王中，有多少人选择了这样做？所有好的国王都可以写在一枚金戒指上。

11. The people's safety dependeth indeed on the king, as a king and a happy governor; but the people shall never be fattened to eat the wind of an imaginary prerogative royal.
人民的安全确实依赖于国王，作为一位国王和幸福的统治者；但人民永远不会被喂养以吃虚构的皇家特权的风。

12. Weak government, that is, a king with a limited power, who hath more power about his head than within his head, is a strong king, and far from anarchy.
12. 薄弱的政府，也就是说，国王权力有限，他在头脑之外比在头脑之内更有权力，这样的国王是强大的，远离无政府状态。

13. I know not what he meaneth, but his master Arminius's way and words are here, for Arminians say, "That being in the damned, eternally tormented, is no benefit; it were better they never had being than to be eternally tormented;" and this they say to the defiance of the doctrine of eternal reprobation, in which we teach, that though by accident, and because of the damned's abuse of being and life, it were to them better not to be, as is said of Judas, yet simpliciter comparing being with non-being, and considering the eternity of miserable being in relation to the absolute liberty of the Former of all things, who maketh use of the sinful being of clay-vessels for the illustration of the glory of his justice and power, (Rom. 9:17, 22; 1 Pet. 2:8; Jude v. 4,) it is a censuring of God and his unsearchable wisdom, and a condemning of the Almighty of cruelty, (God avert blasphemy of the unspotted and holy Majesty,) who, by Arminian grounds, keepeth the damned in life and being, to be fuel eternally for Tophet, to declare the glory of his justice. But the Prelate behoved to go out of his way to salute and gratify a proclaimed enemy of free grace, Arminius, and hence he would infer that the king, wanting his prerogative royal and fulness of absolute power to do wickedly, is in a penal and miserable condition, and that it were better for the king to be a tyrant, with absolute liberty to destroy and save alive at his pleasure, as is said of a tyrant, (Dan. 5:19,) than to be no king at all. And here consider a principle of royalists' court faith:—1. The king is no king, but a lame and miserable judge, if he have not irresistible power to waste and destroy. 2. The king cannot be happy, nor the people safe, nor can the king do good in saving the needy, except he have the uncontrollable and unlimited power of a tyrant to crush the poor and needy, and lay waste the mountain of the Lord's inheritance. Such court-ravens who feed upon the souls of living kings, are more cruel than ravens and vultures, who are but dead carcases.
我不知道他的意思，但他的主人阿米尼乌斯的方式和言辞在这里，因为阿米尼乌斯派说：“在地狱中永远受折磨并没有好处；与其永远受折磨，他们宁愿从未存在过。”他们这样说是对永恒的拒绝救赎的教义的挑衅，我们教导说，虽然因为被诅咒者滥用生命和存在的原因，对他们来说不存在可能更好，就像对犹大所说的那样，但是简单地将存在与不存在进行比较，并考虑到痛苦存在的永恒与造物主的绝对自由的关系，造物主利用罪恶的泥土器皿的存在来彰显他的公义和权能的荣耀，（罗马书 9:17, 22; 彼得前书 2:8; 犹大书 v.4），这是对上帝和他深奥智慧的指责，对全能者残忍的谴责，（愿上帝远离对纯洁和圣洁的尊严的亵渎），根据阿米尼乌斯派的观点，上帝保持被诅咒者的生命和存在，永远成为托费特的燃料，以彰显他的公义的荣耀。 但是，主教必须绕道去向自由恩典的公开敌人阿米纳斯致敬和取悦，因此他推断出国王缺乏他的王权和绝对权力来行恶，处于惩罚和悲惨的境地，国王最好成为一个暴君，拥有完全自由地随意毁灭和拯救的绝对权力，正如有关暴君的说法（但以理书 5:19），而不是根本不做国王。在这里考虑一下皇家法庭信仰的原则：1. 如果国王没有无法抵挡的权力来浪费和摧毁，他就不是国王，而是一个跛脚和可怜的法官。2. 国王不能幸福，人民也不能安全，国王不能在拯救贫穷的人时行善，除非他拥有无法控制和无限制的暴君权力来压制贫穷的人，并摧毁主的产业山。这样的法庭乌鸦，它们以活着的国王的灵魂为食，比乌鸦和秃鹰更残忍，后者只吃死尸。

Williams, bishop of Ossory, answereth to the maxim, Salus populi, &c. "No wise king but will carefully provide for the people's safety, because his safety and honour is included in theirs, his destruction in theirs." And it is, saith Lipsius, egri animi propria um nihil diu pati. Absalom was persuaded there was no justice in the land when he intendeth rebellion; and the poor Prelate, following him, spendeth pages to prove that goods, life, chastity, and fame, dependeth on the safety of the king, as the breath of our nostrils, our nurse-father, our head, corner-stone, and judge (c. 17, 6, 18, 1). The reason why all disorder was in church and state was not because there was no judge, no government; none can be so stupid as to imagine that. But because, 1. They wanted the most excellent of governments. 2. Because aristocracy was weakened so as there was no right. No doubt priests there were, but (Hos. 4) either they would not serve, or were over-awed. No doubt in those days they had judges, but priests and judges were stoned by a rascally multitude, and they were not able to rule; therefore it is most consonant to Scripture to say, Salus regis suprema populi salus, the safety of the king and his prerogative royal is the safest sanctuary for the people. So Hos. 3:4; Lament 2:9.
威廉姆斯，奥索里主教，回应了这句格言：“没有明智的国王会不关心人民的安全，因为他的安全和荣誉包含在他们的安全中，他的毁灭也包含在他们的毁灭中。” 正如利普修斯所说，egri animi propria um nihil diu pati。当抱有叛乱意图时，押沙龙相信这个国家没有正义；而这位可怜的主教则花费了很多篇幅来证明财产、生命、贞操和名誉都取决于国王的安全，就像我们鼻孔的呼吸、我们的养父、我们的头、基石和法官一样（第 17 章，第 6 节，第 18 章，第 1 节）。教会和国家之所以混乱不堪，并不是因为没有法官，没有政府；没有人会如此愚蠢地想象。而是因为，第一，他们缺乏最优秀的政府。第二，贵族阶层被削弱，没有权力。毫无疑问，那里有祭司，但是（何西阿书 4 章）他们要么不愿意服务，要么被压制。 毫无疑问，在那些日子里他们有法官，但是祭司和法官被一群恶棍用石头砸死，他们无法统治；因此，根据圣经的说法，国王的安全和他的王权是人民最安全的庇护所。因此，如何书中所说：“国王的安全是人民的最高安全。”（何西阿书 3:4；耶利米哀歌 2:9）

Ans. 1.—The question is not of the wisdom, but of the power of the king, if it should be bounded by no law.
答案 1：问题不在于国王的智慧，而在于他的权力是否应受到法律的限制。

2. The flatterer may know, there be more foolish kings in the world than wise, and that kings misled with idolatrous queens, and by name Ahab ruined himself, and his posterity and kingdom.
奉承者可能知道，世界上愚蠢的国王比智慧的国王更多，国王们被崇拜偶像的王后所误导，以及亚哈这个名字毁了自己、他的后代和王国。

3. The salvation and happiness of men standing in the exalting of Christ's throne and the gospel, therefore every king and every man will exalt the throne; and so let them have an uncontrollable power, without constraint of law, to do what they list, and let no bounds be set to kings over subjects. By this argument their own wisdom is a law to lead them to heaven.
3. 人类的救赎和幸福在于基督王座的升高和福音，因此每个国王和每个人都会赞扬王座；因此让他们拥有无法控制的权力，不受法律的约束，随心所欲地行事，不要对君王对臣民设立任何限制。根据这个论点，他们自己的智慧就是一条引导他们走向天堂的法律。

4. It is not Absalom's mad malcontents in Britain, but there were really no justice to protestants,—all indulgence to papists, popery, Arminianism,—idolatry printed, preached, professed, rewarded by authority, parliaments and church assemblies; the bulwarks of justice and religion were denied, dissolved, crushed, &c.
这不是英国阿伯沙龙的疯狂不满，而是对新教徒没有真正的公正，对天主教徒却给予了宽容，对天主教、阿米妥主义的崇拜，印刷、宣讲、信奉、受到当局、议会和教会集会的奖励；正义和宗教的堡垒被否认、解散、粉碎等。

5. That by a king he understandeth a monarch, (Judg. 17) and that such a one as Saul, of absolute power, and not a judge, cannot be proved, for there were no kings in Israel in the judges' days,—the government not being changed till near the end of Samuel's government.
他认为国王指的是君主（士师记 17），像扫罗那样拥有绝对权力而不是法官的人是无法证明的，因为在士师时代以色列没有国王，政权直到撒母耳执政末期才发生改变。

6. And that they had no judges, he saith, it is not imaginable. But I rather believe God than the Prelate. Every one did what was right in his own eyes, because there was none to put ill-doers to shame. Possibly the estates of Israel governed some way for mere necessity, but wanting a supreme judge, which they should have, they were loose; but this was not because where there is no king, as P. P. would insinuate, there was no government, as is clear.
6. 他说他们没有法官，这是不可想象的。但我更相信上帝而不是主教。每个人都按自己的意愿行事，因为没有人来羞辱作恶者。也许以色列的贵族们出于纯粹的需要进行了一些管理，但由于缺乏应有的最高法官，他们变得松散；但这并不是因为没有国王就没有政府，这一点是明确的。

7. Of tempered and limited monarchy I think as honourably as the Prelate, but that absolute and unlimited monarchy is more excellent than aristocracy, I shall then believe when royalists shall prove such a government, in so far as it is absolute, to be of God.
我对有节制和有限的君主制持与主教一样的尊重，但绝对和无限的君主制比贵族制更优越，当王党派能够证明这种政府在绝对程度上是上帝所赐的时候，我才会相信。

8. That aristocracy was now weakened I believe not, seeing God so highly commendeth it, and calleth it his own reigning over his people. (1 Sam. 8:7.) The weakening of it through abuse is not to a purpose, more than the abuse of monarchy.
那个贵族阶层现在被削弱了，我认为不是这样的，因为上帝如此高度赞扬它，并称之为他自己统治他的子民。（撒母耳记上 8:7）它因滥用而削弱并没有意义，就像君主制的滥用一样。

9. No doubt, saith he, (Hos. 4) they were priests and judges, but they were over-awed, as they are now. I think he would say, (Hos. 3:4,) otherwise he citeth Scripture sleeping, that the priests of Antichrist be not only over-awed, but out of the earth. I yield that the king be limited, not over-awed, I think God's law and man's law alloweth.
毫无疑问，他说，（何西阿书 4 章）他们是祭司和法官，但他们被威吓住了，就像现在一样。我认为他会说，（何西阿书 3:4）否则他引用圣经时是在睡觉，以示反基督的祭司不仅被威吓，而且被从地上除掉。我承认国王应该受到限制，而不是被威吓，我认为上帝的法律和人的法律都允许这样做。

10. The safety of the king, as king, is not only safety, but a blessing to church and state, and therefore this P. Prelate and his fellows deserve to be hanged before the sun, who have led him on a war to destroy him and his protestant subjects. But the safety and flourishing of a king, in the exercises of an arbitrary unlimited power against law and religion, and to the destruction of his subjects, is not the safety of the people, nor the safety of the king's soul, which these men, if they be the priests of the Lord, should care for. 重试    错误原因

The Prelate cometh to refute the learned and worthy Observator. The safety of the people is the supreme law, therefore the king is bound in duty to promote all and every one of his subjects to all happiness. The Observator hath no such inference, the king is bound to promote some of his subjects, even as king, to a gallows, especially Irish rebels, and many bloody malignants. But the Prelate will needs have God rigorous (hallowed be his name) if it be so; for it is impossible to the tenderest-hearted father to do so. Actual promotion of all is impossible. That the king intend it of all his subjects, as good subjects, by a throne established on righteousness and judgment is that which the worthy Observator meaneth. Other things here are answered.
主教前来反驳博学而有价值的观察家。人民的安全是至高无上的法律，因此国王有责任促进他的每一个臣民的幸福。观察家没有这样的推论，国王有责任促进他的一些臣民，尤其是爱尔兰叛乱者和许多血腥的恶棍，上绞刑架。但是主教坚持认为上帝是严厉的（愿他的名字受到尊崇），如果是这样的话；因为即使对于最慈爱的父亲来说，这是不可能的。实际上促进所有人是不可能的。尊贵的观察家所指的是国王以公正和审判为基础的王座，他打算促进所有他的臣民，作为好的臣民。其他问题在这里得到了回答。

The sum of his second answer is a repetition of what he hath said. I give my word, in a pamphlet of one hundred and ninety-four pages, I never saw more idle repetitions of one thing twenty times before said; but (p. 168) he saith, "The safety of the king and his subjects, in the moral notion, may be esteemed morally the same, no less than the soul and the body make one personal subsistence."
他的第二个回答的总和是他之前所说的东西的重复。我发誓，在一本一百九十四页的小册子中，我从未见过如此多次无意义地重复同一件事情；但是（第 168 页）他说：“从道德的角度来看，国王和他的臣民的安全可以被认为在道义上是相同的，就像灵魂和身体构成一个人的存在一样。”

Ans.—This is strange logic. The king and his subjects are ens per aggregationem, and the king, as king, hath one moral subsistence, and the people another. Hath the father and the son, the master and the servant, one moral subsistence? But the man speaketh of their well-being, and then he must mean that our king's government—that was not long ago, and is yet, to wit, the popery, Arminianism, idolatry, cutting off men's ears and noses, banishing, imprisonment for speaking against popery, arming of papists to slay protestants, pardoning the blood of Ireland, that I fear, shall not be soon taken away, &c.,—is identically the same with the life, safety, and happiness of protestants. Then life and death, justice and injustice, idolatry and sincere worship, are identically one, as the soul of the Pre late and his body are one.
答案：这是奇怪的逻辑。国王和他的臣民是通过集合而存在的，国王作为国王有一个道德存在，而人民有另一个。父亲和儿子，主人和仆人，他们有一个道德存在吗？但是这个人谈论的是他们的幸福，那么他一定是指我们国王的政府——即不久前和现在的天主教、阿尔明主义、偶像崇拜、割掉人们的耳朵和鼻子、流放、因反对天主教而被监禁、武装天主教徒杀害新教徒、宽恕爱尔兰的血腥，我担心这些都不会很快消失，等等——与新教徒的生命、安全和幸福完全相同。那么生与死、正义与非正义、偶像崇拜与真诚的崇拜，就像主教的灵魂和他的身体一样，完全是一体的。

The third is but a repetition. The acts of royalty (saith the Observator) are acts of duty and obligation, therefore, not acts of grace properly so called; therefore we may not thank the king for a courtesy. This is no consequence. What fathers do to children are acts of natural duty and of natural grace, and yet children owe gratitude to parents, and subjects to good kings, in a legal sense. No, but in way of courtesy only. The observator said, the king is not a father to the whole collective body, and it is well said he is son to them, and they his maker. Who made the king? Policy answereth, The state made him, and divinity, God made him.
第三个只是重复。王权的行为（如观察家所说）是义务和责任的行为，因此不是真正的恩典行为；因此我们不能因为一种礼貌而感谢国王。这是没有逻辑的。父亲对孩子的行为是自然的责任和自然的恩典，然而孩子们对父母应该心存感激，而臣民对好国王也是如此，从法律意义上讲。不，只是一种礼貌。观察家说，国王不是整个集体的父亲，很好地说他是他们的儿子，而他们是他的创造者。谁创造了国王？政策回答说，国家创造了他，神学上，上帝创造了他。

The Observator said well, the people's weakness is not the king's strength. The Prelate saith, Amen. He said, That that perisheth not to the king, which is granted to the people. The Prelate (p. 170) denieth, because, what the king hath in trust from God, the king cannot mate away to another, nor can any take it from him without sacrilege.
观察者说得好，人民的弱点并非国王的力量。主教说，阿门。他说，那些不会消失的东西对国王来说并非是赐予人民的。主教否认了这一点，因为国王从上帝那里得到的东西，国王不能将其转让给他人，也没有人可以在不亵渎的情况下夺走它。

Ans.—True indeed, if the king had royalty by immediate trust and infusion by God, as Elias had the spirit of prophecy, that he cannot make away. Royalists dream that God, immediately from heaven, now infuseth faculty, and right to crowns without any word of God. It is enough to make an enthusiast leap up to the throne and kill kings. Judge if these fanatics be favourers of kings. But if the king have royalty mediately, by the people's free consent, from God, there is no reason but people give as much power, even by ounce weights, (for power is strong wine and a great mocker,) as they know a weak man's head will bear, and no more. Power is not an immediate inheritance from heaven, but a birthright of the people borrowed from them; they may let it out for their good, and resume it when a man is drunk with it. The man will have it conscience on the king to fight and destroy his three kingdoms for a dream, his prerogative above law. But the truth is, prelates do engage the king, his house, honour, subjects, church, for their cursed mitres.
答案：确实如此，如果国王的王权是由上帝直接信任和注入的，就像以利亚斯拥有预言的灵魂一样，那他是无法放弃的。王党人梦想着上帝直接从天堂注入权力和王冠的权利，而没有上帝的任何话语。这足以让一个狂热者跳上王位并杀死国王。判断一下这些狂热者是否是国王的支持者。但是，如果国王通过人民的自由同意，间接地拥有王权，那么人民没有理由不按照他们所知道的一个弱者能够承受的程度，甚至按照盎司的重量给予同样多的权力（因为权力是烈酒，是一个伟大的嘲弄者），而不再给予更多。权力不是来自天堂的直接继承，而是从人民那里借来的人民的天赋；他们可以出租权力以谋求自己的利益，并在一个人被权力冲昏头脑时收回它。这个人会让国王的良心为了一个梦想而战斗，摧毁他的三个王国，他在法律之上的特权。但事实是，主教们为了他们那该死的主教帽子，牵涉到国王、他的家庭、荣誉、臣民和教会。

The Prelate (p. 172) vexeth the reader with repetitions, and saith, The king must proportion his government to the safety of the people on the one hand, and to his own safety and power on the other hand.
大主教（第 172 页）以重复的方式困扰读者，并说国王必须在一方面根据人民的安全，另一方面根据自己的安全和权力来调整他的统治。

Ans.—What the king doth as king, he doeth it for the happiness of his people. The king is a relative; yea, even his own happiness that he seeketh, he is to refer to the good of God's people. He saith farther, The safety of the people includeth the safety of the king, because the word populus is so taken; which he proveth by a raw, sickly rabble of words, stolen out of Passerat's dictionary. His father, the schoolmaster, may whip him for frivolous etymologies.
答案：国王作为国王所做的一切，都是为了人民的幸福。国王是一个亲戚；是的，甚至他追求的自己的幸福，也要以上帝的子民的利益为准。他进一步说，人民的安全包括国王的安全，因为 populus 这个词是这样理解的；他通过从 Passerat 的词典中偷来的一堆无聊的词语来证明这一点。他的父亲，那个学校老师，可能会因为这些无聊的词源学而鞭打他。

This supreme law, saith the Prelate, (p. 175,) is not above the law of prerogative royal, the highest law, nor is rex above lex. The democracy of Rome had a supremacy above laws, to make and unmake laws; and will they force this power on a monarch, to the destruction of sovereignty?
这位教长说，这部至高无上的法律（第 175 页）并不高于皇室特权法，也不是国王高于法律。罗马的民主制度在法律之上有至高无上的权力，可以制定和废除法律；他们会强迫君主拥有这种权力，以破坏主权吗？

Ans.—This, which is stolen from Spalato, Barclay, Grotius, and others, is easily answered. The supremacy of people is a law of nature's self-preservation, above all positive laws, and above the king, and is to regulate sovereignty, not to destroy it. If this supremacy of majesty was in people before they have a king, then, 1. They lose it not by a voluntary choice of a king; for a king is chosen for good, and not for the people's loss, therefore, they must retain this power, in habit and potency, even when they have a king. 2. Then supremacy of majesty is not a beam of divinity proper to a king only. 3. Then the people, having royal sovereignty virtually in them, make, and so unmake a king,—all which the Prelate denieth.
答案——这个观点是从斯帕拉托、巴克利、格罗修斯等人那里偷来的，很容易回答。人民的至高无上是自然自我保护的法则，高于一切正面法律，高于国王，它的目的是调节主权，而不是摧毁它。如果人民在拥有国王之前就拥有至高无上的权力，那么，1. 他们不会因为自愿选择国王而失去这个权力；因为国王是为了好处而被选择的，而不是为了人民的损失，因此，即使他们有了国王，他们必须保留这个权力，无论是在习惯上还是在潜力上。2. 那么至高无上的权力不仅仅是国王所特有的神圣光芒。3. 那么人民在虚拟中拥有皇家主权，可以创造和废除国王——这一切都是主教否认的。

This supreme law (saith the Prelate, p. 176, begging it from Spalato, Arnisæus, Grotius) advances the king, not the people; and the sense is, the kingdom is really some time in such a case that the sovereign must exercise an arbitrary power, and not stand upon private men's interests, or transgressing of laws made for the private good of individuals, but for the preservation of itself, and the public, may break through all laws. This he may, in the case when sudden foreign invasion threateneth ruin inevitably to king and kingdom: a physician may rather cut a gangrened member than suffer the whole body to perish. The dictator, in case of extreme dangers, (as Livy and Dion. Halicarnast show us,) had power according to his own arbitrament, had a sovereign commission in peace and war, of life, death, persons, &c., not co-ordinate, not subordinate to any.
这部至高无上的法律（如主教所说，第 176 页，引自斯帕拉托、阿尼塞乌斯、格罗蒂乌斯）提升了国王，而不是人民；意思是，王国有时真的处于这样的情况，君主必须行使专断权力，不考虑个人利益或违反为个人私利而制定的法律，而是为了自身和公众的保护，可以突破一切法律。在外敌入侵威胁到国王和王国不可避免地面临毁灭的情况下，他可以这样做：医生宁可切除一个腐烂的部位，也不愿整个身体毁灭。独裁者在极端危险的情况下（正如利维和戴奥尼修斯·哈利卡尔纳斯特所展示的），拥有根据自己的裁量权行使权力的能力，在和平与战争中拥有至高无上的权力，包括生死、人身等，既不是同等地位，也不是从属地位。

Ans. 1.—It is not an arbitrary power, but naturally tied and fettered to this same supreme law, solus populi, the safety of the people, that a king break through not the law, but the letter of the law, for the safety of the people; as the chirurgeon, not by any prerogative that he hath above the art of chirurgery, but by necessity, cutteth off a gangrened member. Thus it is not arbitrary to the king to save his people from ruin, but by the strong and imperious law of the people's safety he doth it; for if he did it not, he were a murderer of his people. 2. He is to stand upon transgression of laws according to their genuine sense of the people's safety; for good laws are not contrary one to another, though, when he breaketh through the letter of the law, yet he breaketh not the law; for if twenty thousand rebels invade Scotland, he is to command all to rise, though the formality of a parliament cannot be had to indict the war, as our law provideth; but the king doth not command all to rise and defend themselves by prerogative royal, proper to him as king, and incommunicable to any but to himself.
答案 1：这不是一种任意的权力，而是自然地与至高无上的法律——人民的安全——紧密相连并受到限制，国王不是打破法律，而是打破法律的字面意义，为了人民的安全；就像外科医生不是凭借他在外科医学上的特权，而是出于必要性切除了一个坏疽的部位。因此，国王拯救他的人民不是任意的，而是根据人民安全的强大而强制性的法律来做的；因为如果他不这样做，他就是他的人民的凶手。答案 2：他必须根据人民安全的真正意义来对违反法律的行为进行评判；因为良好的法律并不相互矛盾，尽管当他打破法律的字面意义时，他并没有违反法律；例如，如果两万名叛乱分子入侵苏格兰，他应该命令所有人起来反抗，尽管无法按照我们法律规定的方式召开议会来宣布战争；但国王并不是凭借他作为国王的特权，而是命令所有人起来自卫，这种特权只属于他自己，不可与他人分享。

1. There is no such din and noise to be made for a king and his incommunicable prerogative; for though the king were not at all, yea, though he command the contrary, (as he did when he came against Scotland with an English army,) the law of nature teacheth all to rise, without the king.
对于国王及其无法沟通的特权，不应该制造这样的喧嚣和噪音；因为即使国王根本不存在，甚至他命令相反（就像他率领英军进攻苏格兰时所做的那样），自然法则也教导所有人在没有国王的情况下起立。

2. That the king command this, as king, is not a particular positive law; but he doth it as a man and a member of the kingdom. The law of nature (which knoweth no dream of such a prerogative) forceth him to it, as every member is, by nature's indictment, to care for the whole.
国王作为国王下令这样做，并不是一项特定的正式法律；而是作为一个人和王国的一员来执行。自然法则（不知道这种特权的存在）迫使他这样做，就像每个成员都被自然的指控要关心整体一样。

3. It is poor hungry skill in this new statist, (for so he nameth all Scotland,) to say that any laws are made for private interests, and the good of some individuals. Laws are not laws if they be not made for the safety of the people.
在这个新的统治者（他把整个苏格兰都称为如此）那里，说任何法律是为了私人利益和某些个人的利益而制定的，这是一种可怜的饥饿技巧。如果法律不是为了人民的安全而制定的，那它们就不是法律。

4. It is false that the king, in a public danger, is to care for himself as a man, with the ruin and loss of any; yea, in a public calamity, a good king, as David, is to desire he may die that the public may be saved, 2 Sam. 24:17; Exod. 32:32. It is commended of all, that the emperor Otho, yea, and Richard II. of England, as M. Speed saith, (Hist, of England, p. 757,) resigned their kingdoms to eschew the effusion of blood. The Prelate adviseth the king to pass over all laws of nature, and slay thousands of innocents, and destroy church and state of three kingdoms, for a straw, and supposed prerogative royal.
4. 国王在公共危险中只关心自己的生死，并不是真实的；事实上，在公共灾难中，像大卫一样的好国王会希望自己死去以拯救公众，参见撒母耳记下 24:17；出埃及记 32:32。众人称赞奥托皇帝，甚至英国的理查二世，如历史学家斯皮德所说，（《英国史》第 757 页），他们放弃了王位以避免流血冲突。主教劝告国王放弃一切自然法则，杀害成千上万的无辜人民，摧毁三个王国的教堂和政权，只为了一根稻草和所谓的王权特权。

1. Now, certainly, prerogative and absoluteness to do good and ill, must be inferior to a law, the end whereof is the safety of the people. For David willeth the pestilence may take him away, and so his prerogative, that the people may be saved (2. Sam. 24:17); for prerogative is cumulative to do good, not privative to do ill; and so is but a mean to defend both the law and the people.
现在，毫无疑问，行善和作恶的特权和绝对权力必须低于一项法律，其目的是保护人民的安全。因为大卫希望瘟疫夺走他的生命，以此来拯救人民（撒母耳记下 24:17）；因为特权是累积行善的手段，而不是作恶的特权；因此，它只是为了保护法律和人民的一种手段。

2. Prerogative is either a power to do good or ill, or both. If the first be said, it must be limited by the end and law for which it is ordained. A mean is no farther a mean, but in so far as it conduceth to the end, the safety of all. If the second be admitted, it is licence and tyranny, not power from God. If the third be said, both reasons plead against this, that prerogative should be the king's end in the present wars.
特权是可以做好事或坏事的权力，或者两者兼有。如果说是前者，那么它必须受到为其设立的目的和法律的限制。只有在它有助于所有人的安全这一目标时，中庸才是中庸。如果承认是后者，那就是许可和暴政，而不是来自上帝的权力。如果说是第三种情况，两个理由都反对特权应该是国王在当前战争中的目标。

3. Prerogative being a power given by the mediation of the people; yea, suppose (which is false) that it were given immediately of God, yet it is not a thing for which the king should raise war against his subjects; for God will ask no more of the king than he giveth to him. The Lord reapeth not where he soweth not. If the militia, and other things, be ordered hitherto for the holding off Irish and Spanish invasion by sea, and so for the good of the land, seeing the king in his own person cannot make use of the militia, he is to rejoice that his subjects are defended. The king cannot answer to God for the justice of war on his part. It is not a case of conscience that the king should shed blood for, to wit, because the under-officers are such men, and not others of his choosing, seeing the kingdom is defended sufficiently except where cavaliers destroy it. And to me this is an unanswerable argument, that the cavaliers destroy not the Kingdoms for this prerogative royal, as the principal ground, but for a deeper design, even for that which was working by prelates and malignante before the late troubles in both kingdoms.
3. 特权是通过人民的调解而赋予的权力；是的，假设（这是错误的）它是直接由上帝赋予的，但这不是国王应该对他的臣民发动战争的理由；因为上帝对国王的要求不会超过他所给予的。主在他没有播种的地方不会收割。如果民兵和其他事物迄今为止是为了抵御爱尔兰和西班牙的海上入侵，以及为了国家的利益，鉴于国王本人无法动用民兵，他应该为他的臣民受到保护而感到高兴。国王不能对他发动的战争的正义性向上帝负责。国王不应该为了下级官员是这样的人而流血，而不是他选择的其他人，因为除了骑士破坏它的地方，王国已经得到了足够的保护。对我来说，这是一个无法反驳的论点，骑士们并不是为了这个皇家特权而破坏王国，而是为了更深层次的设计，即在两个王国最近的麻烦之前，主教和恶意分子正在进行的设计。

4. The king is to intend the safety of his people, and the safety of the king as a governor; but not as this king, and this man Charles,—that is a selfish end. A king David is not to look to that; for when the people was seeking his life and crown, he saith, (Psal. 3:8,) "Thy blessing upon thy people." He may care for, and intend that the king and government be safe; for if the kingdom be destroyed, there cannot be a new kingdom and church on earth again to serve God in that generation, (Psal. 89:47,) but they may easily have a new king again; and so the safety of the one cannot in reason be intended as a collateral end with the safety of the other; for there is no imaginable comparison betwixt one man, with all his accidents of prerogative and absoluteness, and three national churches and kindgoms. Better the king weep for a childish trifle of a prerogative than that popery be erected, and three kingdoms be destroyed by cavaliers for their own ends.
国王的意图是保护他的人民和作为统治者的国王的安全；但不是作为这个国王和这个人查尔斯——那是一种自私的目的。国王大卫不应该考虑这个；因为当人民寻求他的生命和王冠时，他说（诗篇 3:8）：“愿你赐福给你的百姓。”他可以关心并打算国王和政府的安全；因为如果王国被摧毁，就不可能再有一个新的王国和教会在这一代人中侍奉上帝（诗篇 89:47），但他们可以很容易地再次有一个新的国王；因此，一个人的安全不能以理性的方式作为另一个人的安全的附带目的；因为一个人，带有他所有的特权和绝对权力的意外事件，与三个国家教会和王国之间没有可想象的比较。国王为一种儿童般的特权而哭泣要比天主教教义建立起来，三个王国被骑士为了他们自己的目的而摧毁要好。

5. The dictator's power is, 1. A fact, and proveth not a point of conscience. 2. His power was in an exigence of extreme danger of the commonwealth. The P. Prelate pleadeth for a constant absoluteness above laws to the king at all times, and that jure divino. 3. The dictator was the people's creature; therefore the creator, the people, had that sovereignty over him. 4. The dictator was not above a king; but the Romans ejected kings. 5. The dictator's power was not to destroy a state: he might be, and was resisted; he might be deposed.
5. 独裁者的权力是一个事实，不是一个良心问题。2. 他的权力是在国家极度危险的紧急情况下产生的。主教为国王在任何时候都主张一种常态的绝对权力，并以神权为依据。3. 独裁者是人民的创造物；因此，创造者人民对他拥有主权。4. 独裁者并不高于国王；但罗马人驱逐了国王。5. 独裁者的权力并不是为了摧毁一个国家：他可能会被抵抗；他可能会被废黜。

P. Prelate (p. 177).—The safety of the people is pretended as a law, that the Jews must put Christ to death, and that Saul spared Agag.

Ans. 1.—No shadow for either in the word of God. Caiaphas prophecied, and knew not what he said; but that the Jews intended the salvation of the elect, in killing Christ, or that Saul intended a public good in sparing Agag, shall be the Prelate's divinity, not mine. 2. What, howbeit many should abuse this law of the people's safety, to wrong good kings, it ceaseth not therefore to be a law, and licenceth not ill kings to place a tyrannical prerogative above a just dictate of nature.
答案 1：在上帝的话语中，两者都没有阴影。该亚法斯预言，却不知道自己在说什么；但是，犹太人在杀害基督时意图拯救选民，或者扫罗在放过亚迦时意图造福公众，这将是主教的神学，而不是我的。2. 即使许多人滥用这个保护人民安全的法律来伤害善良的国王，它仍然是一条法律，并且不允许邪恶的国王将暴政的特权置于正义的自然规定之上。

In the last chapter (c. 16) the Prelate hath no reasons, only he would have kings holy, and this he proveth from Apocrypha books, because he is ebb in Holy Scripture; but it is Romish holiness, as is clear,—1. He must preach something to himself, that the king adore a tree-altar. Thus kings must be most reverend in their gestures (p. 182). 2. The king must hazard his sacred life and three kingdoms, his crown, royal posterity, to preserve sacred things, that is, antichristian Romish idols, images, altars, ceremonies, idolatry, popery. 4. He must, upon the same pain, maintain sacred persons, that is, greasy apostate prelates. The rest, I am weary to trouble the reader with-all, but know ex ungue leonem.
在最后一章（第 16 章）中，主教没有理由，只是希望国王成为圣人，他从伪经中证明了这一点，因为他在圣经中的地位已经下降；但这是罗马式的圣洁，如下所示：1.他必须对自己传道，让国王崇拜树木祭坛。因此，国王在他们的姿态上必须最为尊敬（第 182 页）。2.国王必须冒着自己神圣的生命和三个王国的风险，他的王冠、王室后代，来保护神圣之物，也就是反基督的罗马偶像、形象、祭坛、仪式、拜偶像、教皇制度。4.他必须以同样的惩罚来维护神圣的人，也就是油腻的背叛者主教。其他的，我已经厌倦了给读者带来麻烦，但知道从爪子可以看出狮子。

QUESTION XXVI
问题二十六

WHETHER THE KING BE ABOVE THE LAW OR NO
无论国王是否凌驾于法律之上

We may consider the question of the law's supremacy over the king, either in the supremacy of constitution of the king, or of direction, or of limitation, or of co-action and punishing. Those who maintain this, "The king is not subject to the law," if their meaning be, "The king as king is not subject to the law's direction," they say nothing; for the king, as the king, is a living law; then they say, "The law is not subject to the law's direction:" a very improper speech; or, the king, as king, is not subject to the coaction of the law: that is true; for he who is a living law, as such, cannot punish himself, as the law saith.
我们可以考虑法律对国王的至高无上，无论是在国王的宪法至高无上，还是在指导、限制、共同行动和惩罚方面。那些主张“国王不受法律约束”的人，如果他们的意思是“作为国王，国王不受法律指导”，那他们什么也没说；因为国王作为国王，就是活法律；然后他们说，“法律不受法律指导”，这是非常不恰当的说法；或者，国王作为国王，不受法律的强制：这是正确的；因为作为活法律的人，他不能像法律所说的那样惩罚自己。

Assert. 1.—The law hath a supremacy of constitution above the king:—
断言。1.——法律在宪法上高于国王：——

1. Because the king by nature is not king, as is proved; therefore, he must be king by a politic constitution and law; and so the law, in that consideration, is above the king, because it is from a civil law that there is a king rather than any other kind of governor. 2. It is by law, that amongst many hundred men, this man is king, not that man; and because, by the which a thing is constituted, by the same thing it is, or may be dissolved; therefore, 3. As a community, finding such and such qualifications as the law requireth to be in a king, in this man, not in that man,—therefore upon law-ground they make him a king, and, upon law-grounds and just demerit, they may unmake him again; for what men voluntary do upon condition, the condition being removed, they may undo again.
因为国王本质上并非国王，这一点已被证明；因此，他必须通过一项政治宪法和法律成为国王；因此，从这个角度来看，法律高于国王，因为国王是由民法而非其他形式的统治者产生的。根据法律，在众多人中，这个人是国王，而不是那个人；因为通过构成一件事物的法律，同样的法律也可以解散它。因此，作为一个社群，如果发现某个人具备法律要求的国王资格，而另一个人没有，他们就会根据法律的依据将他立为国王；而且，基于法律和公正的原因，他们也可以再次废黜他；因为人们在条件下自愿做的事情，条件一旦被移除，他们就可以撤销。

Assert. 2.—It is denied by none but the king is under the directive power of the law, though many liberate the king from the co-active power of a civil law. But I see not what direction a civil law can give to the king if he be above all obedience, or disobedience, to a law, seeing all law-direction is in ordine ad obedientiam, in order to obey, except thus far, that the light that is in the civil law is a moral or natural guide to conduct a king in his walking; but this is the morality of the law which enlighteneth and informeth, not any obligation that aweth the king; and so the king is under God's and nature's law. This is nothing to the purpose.
断言 2：除了许多人将国王从民法的共同行动力中解放出来之外，没有人否认国王受法律的指导权。但是，如果国王高于所有法律的服从或不服从，我看不出民法可以给国王什么指导。因为所有法律的指导都是为了服从，除非在这个方面，民法中的光明是指导国王行为的道德或自然指南；但这是法律的道德性，它启示和教导，而不是任何威胁国王的义务；因此，国王受上帝和自然法的约束。这与问题无关。

Assert. 3.—The king is under the law, in regard of some coercive limitation; because, 1. There is no absolute power given to him to do what he listeth, as a man. And because, 2. God, in making Saul a king, doth not by any royal stamp give him a power to sin, or to play the tyrant; for which cause I expone these of the law, omnia sunt possibilia regi, imperator omnia potest. Baldus in sect. F. de no. for. fidel. in F. et in prima constitut. C. col. 2. Chassanæus in catalog, gloriæ mundi. par. 5. considerat. 24. et tanta est ejus celritudo, ut non posset ei imponi lex in regno suo. Curt. in consol. 65. col. 6. ad. F. Petrus Rebuff. Notab. 3. repet. l. unicæ. C. de sentent. quæ pro eo quod n. 17, p. 363. All these go no otherwise but thus, The king can do all things which by a law he can do, and that holdeth him, id possumus quod jure possumus; and, therefore, the king cannot be above the covenant and law made betwixt him and his people at his coronation-oath; for then the covenant and oath should bind him only by a natural obligation, as he is a man, not by a civil or politic obligation, as he is a king. So then, 1. It were sufficient that the king should swear that oath in his cabinet-chamber, and it is but a mocking of an oath that he swear it to the people. 2. That oath given by the representative-kingdom should also oblige the subjects naturally, in foro Dei, not politically, in foro humano, upon the same reason. 3. He may be resisted as a man.
断言 3.——国王在某种强制限制下受法律约束；因为，1. 他没有绝对的权力去随心所欲地行事，就像一个普通人一样。而且，2. 上帝在立撒母耳为国王时，并没有通过任何皇家印章赋予他犯罪或暴虐的权力；因此，我解释法律中的这些内容，即凡事都是国王可以做到的，君主可以做到一切。巴尔都斯在 F. de no. for. fidel. in F. et in prima constitut. C. col. 2. Chassanæus 在 catalog, gloriæ mundi. par. 5. considerat. 24. et tanta est ejus celritudo, ut non posset ei imponi lex in regno suo. Curt.在 consol. 65. col. 6. ad. F. Petrus Rebuff. Notab. 3. repet. l. unicæ. C. de sentent. quæ pro eo quod n. 17, p. 363. 所有这些都是这样说的，国王可以做他可以依法做的一切，而这就束缚了他，我们能做的就是我们可以依法做的；因此，国王不能超越他与人民在加冕誓言中所订立的契约和法律；否则，契约和誓言只会以他作为一个人的自然义务来约束他，而不是以他作为国王的公民义务或政治义务来约束他。因此，1. 国王在内阁室发誓已足够，对人民发誓只是嘲弄誓言。2. 代表王国发出的誓言也应该在上帝的法庭上自然地约束臣民，而不是在人类的法庭上政治地约束。3. 作为一个人，他可以被抵抗。

Assert. 4.—The fourth case is, if the king be under the obliging politic co-action of civil laws, for that he, in foro Dei, be under the morality of civil laws, so as he cannot contravene any law in that notion but he must sin against God, is granted on all hands. (Deut. 17:20; Josh. 1:8; 1 Sam. 12:15.) That the king bind himself to the same law that he doth bind others, is decent, and obligeth the king as he is a man; because, 1. (Matt. 7:12,) It is said to be the law and the prophets, "All things whatsoever ye would men should do unto you, do ye even so to them." 2. It is the law, imperator l. 4. digna vox. C. de lege et tit. Quod quisque juris in alium statuit, eodem et ipse utatur. Julius Cæsar commanded the youth who had deflowered the emperor's daughter to be scourged above that which the law allowed. The youth said to the emperor, Dixisti legem Cæsar,—"You appointed the law, Cæsar." The emperor was so offended with himself that he had failed against the law, that for the whole day he refused to taste meat.
断言第四点。如果国王受到民事法律的强制约束，因为在上帝的法庭上，他受到民事法律的道德约束，以至于他不能违反任何法律，否则他就会得罪上帝，这一点是公认的。（申命记 17:20；约书亚记 1:8；撒母耳记上 12:15。）国王将自己约束于他约束他人的法律是合适的，这使国王作为一个人受到约束；因为，1.（马太福音 7:12）所说的是律法和先知，“凡你们愿意人怎样待你们的，你们也要怎样待人。”2.这是法律，皇帝法典第 4 卷，有尊严的声音。关于法律和标题，每个人都应该按照自己所制定的法律行事。凯撒大帝命令那个玷污了皇帝女儿的年轻人受到超过法律允许的鞭打。年轻人对皇帝说：“你制定了法律，凯撒。”皇帝对自己违反法律感到非常愤怒，整整一天他拒绝品尝食物。

Assert. 5.—The king cannot but be subject to the co-active power of fundamental laws. Because, 1. This is a fundamental law that the free estates lay upon the king, that all the power that they give to the king, as king, is for the good and safety of the people; and so what he doth to the hurt of his subjects, he doth it not as king. 2. The law saith, Qui habet potestatem constituendi etiam et jus adimendi, l. nemo. 37. l. 21. de reg. jure. Those who have power to make have power to unmake kings. 3. Whatever the king doth as king, that he doth by a power borrowed from (or by a fiduciary power which is his by trust) the estates, who made him king. He must then be nothing but an eminent servant of the state, in the punishing of others. If, therefore, he be unpunishable, it is not so much because his royal power is above all law co-action, as because one and the same man cannot be both the punisher and the punished; and this is a physical incongruity rather than a moral absurdity. So the law of God layeth a duty on the inferior magistrate to use the sword against the murderer, and that by virtue of his office; but I much doubt, if for that he is to use the sword against himself in the case of murder, for this is a truth I purpose to make good, That suffering, as suffering, according to the substance and essence of passion, is not commanded by any law of God or nature to the sufferer, but only the manner of suffering. I doubt if it be not, by the law of nature, lawful even to the ill-doer, who hath deserved death by God's law, to fly from the sword of the lawful magistrate; only the manner of suffering with patience is commanded of God. I know the law saith here, That the magistrate is both judge and the executor of the sentence against himself, in his own cause, for the excellency of his office. Therefore these are to be distinguished, whether the king, ratione demeriti et jure, by law be punishable, or if the king can actually be punished corporally by a law of man, he remaining king; and since he must be a punisher himself, and that by virtue of his office. In matters of goods, the king may be both judge and punisher of himself, as our law provideth that any subject may plead his own heritage from the king before the inferior judges, and if the king be a violent possessor, and in mala fide for many years, by law he is obliged, upon a decree of the lords, to execute the sentence against himself, ex officio, and to restore the lands, and repay the damage to the just owner; and this the king is to do against himself, ex officio. I grant here the ling, as king, punisheth himself as an unjust man, but because bodily suffering is mere violence to nature, I doubt if the king, ex officio, is to do or inflict any bodily punishment on himself. Nemo potest a scipso cogi. I. ille a quo, sect. 13.
断言 5：国王不得不受制于基本法的共同力量。因为，1. 这是一个基本法，自由阶层对国王施加的，他们给予国王的所有权力，作为国王，都是为了人民的利益和安全；所以，他对臣民的伤害，并不是作为国王而行动。2. 法律说，Qui habet potestatem constituendi etiam et jus adimendi, l. nemo. 37. l. 21. de reg. jure. 有权力创造的人也有权力废除国王。3. 无论国王作为国王做什么，他都是借用（或者说是出于信任而拥有的受托权力）由使他成为国王的阶层所赋予的权力。因此，他只能是国家的一位杰出仆人，在惩罚他人时。因此，如果他是不可惩罚的，这并不是因为他的王权高于所有法律的共同力量，而是因为同一个人不能既是惩罚者又是被惩罚者；这是一种物理上的不协调，而不是道义上的荒谬。 所以，上帝的法律要求下级官员使用刀剑对付杀人犯，这是根据他们的职责；但我非常怀疑，在谋杀案中，他是否应该用刀剑对付自己，因为我打算证明一个事实，那就是根据激情的实质和本质，作为受苦者，苦难本身并没有被上帝或自然法律所命令，只有苦难的方式。我怀疑，即使是那些按照上帝的法律应该受到死刑的恶人，根据自然法律，也是可以逃避合法官员的刀剑的；只有以耐心忍受的方式是上帝所命令的。我知道法律在这里说，官员在自己的案件中既是法官又是执行者，这是因为他们的职责的卓越性。因此，我们需要区分这些情况，即国王是否根据罪行和法律而受到惩罚，或者国王是否可以在仍然是国王的情况下受到人的法律的实际体罚，因为他必须自己成为惩罚者，这是根据他们的职责。 在物品的事务中，国王可以既是自己的法官，也是自己的惩罚者，因为我们的法律规定，任何公民都可以在下级法官面前主张自己从国王那里继承的权利，如果国王是一个强占者，并且在恶意占有多年，根据法律，他有义务在贵族的裁决下，依法对自己执行判决，并归还土地，赔偿合法的所有者的损失；国王必须在这方面履行自己的职责。我承认，作为国王，他以不公正的身份惩罚自己，但因为身体上的痛苦是对自然的纯粹暴力，我怀疑国王是否有义务在职责范围内对自己施加任何身体上的惩罚。Nemo potest a scipso cogi. I. ille a quo, sect. 13.

Assert. 6.—There be some laws made in favour of the king, as king, as to pay tribute. The king must be above this law as king. True, but if a nobleman of a great rent be elected king, I know not if he can be free from paying to himself, as king, tribute, seeing this is not allowed to the king by a divine law, (Rom. 13:6,) as a reward of his work; and Christ expressly maketh tribute a thing due to Cæsar as a king. (Matt. 22:21.) There be some solemnities of the law from which the king may be free; Prickman (D. c. 3, n. 78) relateth what they are; they are not laws, but some circumstances belonging to laws, and he answereth to many places alleged out of the lawyers, to prove the king to be above the law. Malderus (in 12. Art. 4, 5, 9, 96,) will have the prince under that law, which concerneth all the commonwealth equally in regard of the matter, and that by the law of nature; but he will not have him subject to these laws which concerneth the subjects as subjects, as to pay tribute. He citeth Francisc. a Vict. Covarruvias, and Turrecremata. He also will have the prince under positive laws, such as not to transport victuals; not because the law bindeth him as a law, but because the making of the law bindeth him, tanquam conditio sine qua non, even "as he who teacheth another that he should not steal, he should not steal himself." (Rom. 2) But the truth is, this is but a branch of the law of nature, that I should not commit adultery, and theft, and sacrilege, and such sins as nature condemneth, if I shall condemn them in others, and doth not prove that the king is under the co-active power of civil laws. Ulpianus (l. 31. F. de regibus) saith, "The prince is loosed from laws." Bodine (de Repub. l. 7, c. 8).—"Nemo imperat sibi," no man commanded himself. Tholosanus saith, (de Rep. l. 7, c. 20,) "Ipsius est dare, non accipere leges," the prince giveth laws, but receiveth none. Donellus (Lib. 1, Comment, c. 17) distinguisheth betwixt a law and a royal law proper to the king. Trentlerus (vol. i. 79, 80) saith, "The prince is freed from laws;" and that he obeyeth laws, de honestate, non de necessitate, upon honesty, not of necessity. Thomas P. (1. q. 96, art. 6,) and with him Soto Gregorius de Valentia, and other schoolmen, subject the king to the directive power of the law, and liberate him of the co-active power of the law.
断言。第六条——有一些法律是为了国王的利益而制定的，比如纳税。作为国王，国王必须高于这个法律。没错，但如果一个拥有巨额租金的贵族被选为国王，我不知道他是否可以免除作为国王向自己纳税，因为这是根据神的法律不允许国王的（罗马书 13:6），作为他工作的回报；而基督明确地将纳税视为应归凯撒为国王的事情（马太福音 22:21）。有一些法律的庄重仪式国王可以免除；普里克曼（D. c. 3, n. 78）列举了它们是什么；它们不是法律，而是一些与法律有关的情况，他回答了很多从律师那里引用的地方，以证明国王高于法律。马尔德鲁斯（在第 12 条第 4、5、9、96 款中）认为，君主应该受到与整个共和国在事物上平等相关的法律的约束，这是根据自然法；但他不认为他应该受到那些涉及公民作为公民的法律的约束，比如纳税。他引用了弗朗西斯科·维克多·科瓦鲁维亚斯和图雷克雷马塔。 他还将使王子受制于积极的法律，比如不运输粮食；不是因为法律束缚他，而是因为制定法律束缚他，正如“教导别人不偷窃的人自己也不应该偷窃”（罗马书 2 章所说）。但事实上，这只是自然法的一个分支，即如果我要谴责别人的通奸、偷窃、亵渎等罪行，那么我自己也不应该犯这些罪行，这并不能证明国王受制于强制性的民法。乌尔皮亚努斯（法典第 31 卷）说，“君主不受法律约束。”博丁（《国家论》第 7 卷第 8 章）说，“没有人能够命令自己。”托洛萨努斯（《国家论》第 7 卷第 20 章）说，“君主可以制定法律，但不接受法律。”多内卢斯（《注释》第 1 卷第 17 章）区分了一般法律和专属于国王的王法。特伦特勒斯（第一卷第 79、80 页）说，“君主不受法律约束”；他遵守法律是出于道义而非必要。托马斯·P（第 1 题第 96 条第 1 款） 6）与他一起的还有索托·格雷戈里乌斯·德·瓦伦西亚和其他学者，他们将国王置于法律的指导权下，并解除了法律的强制权力。

Assert. 7.—If a king turn a parricide, a lion, and a waster and destroyer of the people, as a man he is subject to the co-active power of the laws of the land. If any law should hinder that a tyrant should not be punished by law, it must be because he hath not a superior but God, for royalists build all upon this; but this ground is false:—
断言。第 7 条——如果一个国王成为一个杀父者、一个狮子和一个荒废和摧毁人民的人，作为一个人，他受制于国家法律的共同力量。如果有任何法律阻止暴君受到法律惩罚，那必须是因为他没有上级，只有上帝，因为君主主义者都是建立在这个基础上的；但这个基础是错误的：

Arg. 1.—Because the estates of the kingdom, who gave him the crown, are above him, and they may take away what they gave him; as the law of nature and God saith, If they had known he would turn tyrant, they would never have given him the sword; and so, how much ignorance is in the contract they made with the king, as little of will is in it; and so it is not every way willing, but, being conditional, is supposed to be against their will. They gave the power to him only for their good, and that they may make the king, is clear. (2 Chron. 23:11; 1 Sam. 10:17, 24; Deut. 17:14–17; 2 Kings 11:12; 1 Kings 16:21; 2 Kings 10:5; Judg. 9:6.) Fourscore valiant men of the priests withstood Uzziah with corporal violence, and thrust him out, and cut him off from the house of the Lord. (2 Chron. 26:18.)
因为给予他王冠的王国的财产高于他，他们可以拿回他们给予的东西；正如自然法和上帝所说，如果他们知道他会变成暴君，他们永远不会给他剑；所以，他们与国王所达成的契约中有多少无知，其中有多少意愿，就有多少条件，被认为是违背他们的意愿；他们只是为了自己的利益给予他权力，并且他们可以制造国王，这是明确的。（历代志下 23:11；撒母耳记上 10:17, 24；申命记 17:14-17；列王纪下 11:12；列王纪上 16:21；列王纪下 10:5；士师记 9:6）八十个勇敢的祭司用肉体上的暴力阻止乌西雅，将他赶出，并割除他与耶和华的关系。（历代志下 26:18）

Arg. 2.—If the prince's place do not put him above the laws of church discipline, (Matt. 18, for Christ excepteth none, and how can men except?) and if the rod of Christ's "lips smite the earth, and slay the wicked," (Isa. 11:4,) and the prophets Elias, Nathan, Jeremiah, Isaiah, &c., and John Baptist, Jesus Christ, and his Apostles, have used this rod of censure and rebuke, as servants under God, against kings, this is a sort of spiritual co-action of laws put in execution by men; and by due proportion corporal co-action being the same ordinance of God, though of another nature, must have the like power over all, whom the law of God hath not excepted; but God's law excepteth none at all.
如果君王的地位不能使他超越教会纪律的法律（马太福音 18 章，因为基督没有例外，人又怎么能例外呢？），如果基督的“口中的杖击打地，恶人必被杀戮”（以赛亚书 11:4），以及先知以利亚、拿单、耶利米、以赛亚等等，还有施洗约翰、耶稣基督和他的使徒，作为上帝的仆人，都使用了这种谴责和责备的杖，那么这就是一种由人执行的法律的一种精神上的强制力量；而按照合理的比例，肉体上的强制力量也是上帝的命令，虽然性质不同，但对所有未被上帝的法律例外的人都具有同样的权力；而上帝的法律没有例外。

Arg. 3.—It is presumed that God hath not provided better for the safety of the part than of the whole, especially when he maketh the part a mean for the safety of the whole. But if God have provided that the king, who is a part of the commonwealth, shall be free of all punishment, though he be a habitual destroyer of the whole kingdom, seeing God hath given him to be a father, tutor, saviour, defender thereof, and destined him as a mean for their safety, then must God have worse, not better, provided for the safety of the whole than of the part. The proposition is clear, in that God (Rom. 13:4; 1 Tim. 2:2) hath ordained the ruler, and given to him the sword to defend the whole kingdom and city; but we read nowhere that the Lord hath given the sword to the whole kingdom, to defend one man, a king, though a ruler, going on in a tyrannical way of destroying all his subjects. The assumption is evident: for then the king, turning tyrant, might set an army of Turks, Jews, or cruel Papists to destroy the church of God, without all fear of law or punishment. Yea, this is contrary to the doctrine of royalists: for Winzetus (adversus Buchananum, p. 275) saith of Nero, that he, seeking to destroy the senate and people of Rome, and seeking to make new laws for himself, excidit jure regni, lost right to the kingdom. And Barclaius (Monarch. l. 3, c. ult. p. 213,) saith, a tyrant, such as Caligula, spoliare se jure regni spoileth himself of the right to the crown. And in that same place, regem, si regnum suum alienæ ditioni manciparit, regno cadere, if the king sell his kingdom, he loseth the title to the crown. Grotius, (de jure belli et pacis, l. i. c. 4, n. 7,) Si rex hostili animo in totius populi exitium feratur, amittit regnum, if he turn enemy to the kingdom, for their destruction, he loseth his kingdom, because (saith he) voluntas imperandi, et voluntas perdendi, simul consistere non possunt, a will or mind to govern and to destroy cannot consist together in one. Now, if this be true, that a king, turning tyrant, loseth title to the crown, this is either a falling from his royal title only in God's court, or it is a losing of it before men, and in the court of his subjects. If the former be said, 1. He is no king, having before God lost his royal title; and yet the people is to obey him as "the minister of God," and a power from God, when as he is no such thing. 2. In vain do these authors provide remedies to save the people from a tyrannous waster of the people, if they speak of a tyrant who is no king in God's court only, and yet remaineth a king to the people in regard of the law: for the places speak of remedies that God hath provided against tyrants cum titulo, such as are lawful Kings, but turn tyrants. Now by this they provide no remedy at all, if only in God's court, and not in man's court also, a tyrant lose his title. As for tyrants sine titulo, such as usurp the throne, and have no just claim to it, Barclaius (adver. Monarch, l iv. c. 10. p. 268) saith, "Any private man may kill him as a public enemy of the state:" but if he lose his title to the crown in the court of men, then is there a court on earth to judge the king, and so he is under the co-active power of a law;—then a kings may be resisted, and yet those who resist him do not incur damnation; the contrary whereof royalists endeavour to prove from Rom. 13;—then the people may unking one who was a king. But I would know who taketh that θεῖον τὶ from him, whereby he is a king, that beam of divine majesty? Not the people; because royalists say, they neither can give nor take away royal dignity, and so they cannot unking him.
第三论点——可以假设上帝对整体的安全提供的保护不会比对部分的安全提供得更好，尤其是当他将部分作为整体安全的手段时。但是，如果上帝确实提供了国王的免于惩罚的权利，即使他是整个王国的习惯性破坏者，因为上帝赋予了他作为父亲、导师、救世主和保护者的角色，并将他指定为他们安全的手段，那么上帝对整体的安全提供的就是更差，而不是更好。这个命题很明确，因为上帝（罗马书 13:4；提摩太前书 2:2）已经任命了统治者，并赋予他剑来保卫整个王国和城市；但我们从未读到上帝将剑赋予整个王国，来保卫一个人，即使他是国王，也是一个以暴虐方式摧毁所有臣民的统治者。这个假设是明显的：因为那样的话，国王变成暴君后，可以派遣一支由土耳其人、犹太人或残忍的天主教徒组成的军队来摧毁上帝的教会，而不用担心法律或惩罚。是的，这与君主主义者的教义相矛盾：因为温泽特（反对布坎南，第 p.） 275) 尼禄被说成是寻求摧毁罗马的参议院和人民，并试图为自己制定新法律，他失去了王位的权利。巴克莱（《君主论》第 3 卷，第 213 页）说，暴君（如加里古拉）剥夺自己王位的权利。在同一地方，如果国王出售自己的王国，他将失去王冠的称号。格罗蒂乌斯（《战争与和平法》第一卷，第 4 章，第 7 条）说，如果国王出于对王国的敌意而导致整个人民的毁灭，他将失去王位，因为（他说）统治的意愿和毁灭的意愿不能同时存在。现在，如果一个国王变成暴君，失去了王冠的称号，这要么只是在上帝的法庭中失去了他的王位，要么是在人们面前失去了它，在他的臣民的法庭中失去了它。如果是前者，1. 他不是国王，在上帝面前失去了他的王位；然而，人民却要服从他作为“上帝的仆人”和来自上帝的权力，尽管他并不是这样的人。2. 如果这些作者只在上帝的法庭中提到了一个不是国王但在人民法律中仍然是国王的暴君，那么他们提供的拯救人民免受暴君浪费的方法就是徒劳的：因为这些地方提到了上帝为合法国王但变成暴君提供的解决办法。现在，如果只在上帝的法庭中，而不在人的法庭中，一个暴君失去了他的王位，他们根本没有提供任何解决办法。至于那些无正当理由篡夺王位的无王之君，巴克莱（adver. Monarch, l iv. c. 10. p. 268）说，“任何私人都可以将他视为国家的公敌而杀死他”；但是，如果他在人的法庭中失去了对王位的主张，那么地球上就有一个法庭来审判国王，所以他受到了法律的强制力；—那么国王可以被抵抗，而抵抗他的人并不会遭受谴责；这与王权主义者试图从罗马书 13 章证明的相反；—那么人民可以废黜一个曾经是国王的人。 但我想知道是谁夺走了他的神圣之光，使他成为国王，那束神圣威严的光芒？不是人民；因为君主主义者说，他们既不能赋予也不能剥夺王权，所以他们不能废黜他。

Arg. 4.—The more will be in the consent, (saith Ferd. Vasquez, 1. i. c. 41,) the obligation is the stricter. So doubled words (saith the law, l. 1, sect. 13, n. 13) oblige more strictly. And all laws of kings, who are rational fathers, and so lead us by laws, as by rational means to peace and external happiness, are contracts of king and people. Omnis lex sponsio et contractus Reip. sect. 1, Inst. de ver. relig. Now the king, at his coronation-covenant with the people, giveth a most intense consent, an oath, to be a keeper and preserver of all good laws: and so hardly he can be freed from the strictest obligation that law can impose. And if he keep laws by office, he is a mean to preserve laws; and no mean can be superior and above the end, but inferior thereunto.
阿尔格. 4. - 费尔南多·瓦斯克斯（Ferd. Vasquez）说，同意越多，义务就越严格。所以，重复的词语（法律说，第 1 卷，第 13 节，第 13 号）义务更严格。所有国王的法律，他们是理性的父亲，通过法律引导我们，通过理性手段实现和平和外部幸福，都是国王和人民之间的契约。Omnis lex sponsio et contractus Reip. sect. 1, Inst. de ver. relig. 王在加冕时与人民立下了最强烈的同意，发誓要成为所有良好法律的守护者和保护者：因此，他很难从法律所能施加的最严格的义务中解脱出来。如果他通过职务遵守法律，他就是保护法律的手段；没有任何手段可以超越目标，只能低于目标。

Arg. 5.—Bodine proveth, (de Rep. l. 2, c. 5, p. 221,) that emperors at first were but princes of the commonwealth, and that sovereignty remained still in the senate and people. Marius Salomonius, a learned Roman civilian, wrote six books de principatu, to refute the supremacy of emperors above the state. Ferd. Vasq. (illust. quest. part. 1. l. 1, n. 21) proveth, that the prince, by royal dignity, leaveth not off to be a citizen, a member of the politic body, and not a king, but a keeper of laws.
阿格。5. - 博丁证明（de Rep. l. 2, c. 5, p. 221），最初的皇帝只是共和国的王子，主权仍然掌握在参议院和人民手中。马里乌斯·萨洛蒙尼乌斯，一位博学的罗马法学家，写了六本关于皇权的书，以反驳皇帝在国家之上的至高无上。费尔德·瓦斯克（illust. quest. part. 1. l. 1, n. 21）证明，通过皇家尊严，君主并没有停止成为一个公民，一个政治团体的成员，而不是国王，而是法律的守护者。

Arg. 6.—Hence, the prince remaineth, even being a prince, a social creature, a man as well as a king; one who must buy, sell, promise, contract, dispose: therefore, he is not regula regulans, but under rule of law; for it is impossible, if the king can, in a political way, live as a member of a society, and do and perform acts of policy, and so perform them, as he may, by his office, buy and not pay; promise, and vow, and swear to men, and not perform, nor be obliged to men to render a reckoning of his oath, and kill and destroy,—and yet in curia politicæ societatis, in the court of human policy, be free: and that he may give inheritances, as just rewards of virtue and well-doing, and take them away again. Yea, seeing these sins that are not punishable before men, are not sins before men, if all the sins and oppressions of a prince be so above the punishment that men can inflict, they are not sins before men; by which means the king is loosed from all guiltiness of the sins against the second table: for the ratio formalis, the formal reason, why the judge, by warrant from God, condemneth, in the court of men, the guilty man, is, that he hath sinned against human society through the scandal of blasphemy, or that through some other heinous sin he hath defiled the land. Now this is incident to the king as well as to some other sinful man.
因此，即使作为王子，王子仍然是一个社会性的生物，既是一个人也是一个国王；他必须买卖、承诺、签订合同、处置财产：因此，他不是“规则的规则者”，而是受法律约束的；因为如果国王可以以政治方式作为社会成员生活，并进行政策行动，并且可以通过他的职位购买而不支付；对人们承诺、发誓，但不履行，也不需要向人们交代他的誓言，并且可以杀戮和破坏，但在人类政策法庭中仍然是自由的；并且他可以给予继承权，作为对美德和善行的公正奖励，并再次收回这些继承权。 是的，看到这些在人们面前不可惩罚的罪恶，在人们面前并不是罪恶，如果一个君主的所有罪恶和压迫都超出了人们可以施加的惩罚，那么在人们面前它们就不是罪恶；这样一来，国王就摆脱了对违背第二诫的罪恶的所有罪责：因为法官根据上帝的授权，在人们的法庭上定罪的正式原因是，他通过亵渎的丑闻或其他严重罪行违背了人类社会，而这对国王和其他一些有罪之人来说都是一样的。

To these, and the like, hear what the excommunicated Prelate hath to say, (c. 15, p. 146, 147,) "They say (he meaneth the Jesuits) every society of men is a perfect republic, and so must have within itself a power to preserve itself from ruin, and by that to punish a tyrant." He answereth, "A society without a head, is a disorderly rout, not a politic body; and so cannot have this power.
对于这些事情，以及类似的事情，听听被逐出教会的主教所说的话（第 15 章，第 146 页，147 页），他说：“他们说（他指的是耶稣会士）每个社团都是一个完美的共和国，因此必须拥有自我保护的力量，以免毁灭，并通过这种力量来惩罚暴君。”他回答说：“一个没有头领的社团是一个无秩序的群体，而不是一个有组织的机构；因此不能拥有这种权力。”

Ans. 1.—The Pope giveth to every society politic power to make away a tyrant, or heretical king, and to unking him, by his brethren, the Jesuits', way. And observe how papists (of which number I could easily prove the P. Prelate to be, by the popish doctrine that he delivered, while the iniquity of time, and dominion of prelates in Scotland, advanced him, against all worth of true learning and holiness, to be a preacher in Edinburgh) and Jesuits agree, as the builders of Babylon. It is the purpose of God to destroy Babylon.
答案 1.——教皇赋予每个政治团体权力，以按照耶稣会士的方式消灭暴君或异端国王，并使其失去王位。请注意天主教徒（其中我可以轻易证明教皇的主教是其中之一，因为他传达的天主教义在苏格兰的时间不义和主教的统治推动他成为爱丁堡的传教士，违背了真正学问和圣洁的价值）和耶稣会士如何一致，就像巴比伦的建造者一样。上帝的目的是摧毁巴比伦。

2. This answer shall infer, that the aristocratical governors of any free state, and that the Duke of Venice, and the senate there, is above all law, and cannot be resisted, because without their heads they are a disorderly rout.
这个答案应该推断出，任何自由国家的贵族统治者，以及威尼斯公爵和那里的参议院，都高于一切法律，不能被抵抗，因为没有他们的领导，他们就是一群无秩序的人。

3. A political society, as by nature's instinct they may appoint a head, or heads, to themselves, so also if their head, or heads, become ravenous wolves, the God of nature hath not left a perfect society remediless; but they may both resist, and punish the head, or heads, to whom they gave all the power that they have, for their good, not for their destruction.
一个政治社会，正如自然的本能所指示的，他们可以选择一个或多个领导人，同样，如果他们的领导人变成了贪婪的狼，自然之神并没有让一个完美的社会无法挽救；他们可以抵抗并惩罚那些他们赋予了所有权力的领导人，这些权力是为了他们的利益而不是毁灭他们。

4. They are as orderly a body politic, to unmake a tyrannous commander, as they were to make a just governor. The Prelate saith, "It is alike to conceive a politic body without a governor, as to conceive the natural body without a head." He meaneth, none of them can be conceivable. I am not of his mind. When Saul was dead, Israel was a perfect politic body; and the Prelate, if he be not very obtuse in his head, (as this hungry piece, stolen from others, showeth him to be,) may conceive a visible political society performing a political action, (2 Sam. 5:1–3,) making David king at a visible and conceivable place, at Hebron, and making a covenant with him. And that they wanted not all governors, is nothing to make them chimeras inconceivable. For when so many families, before Nimrod, were governed only by fathers of families, and they agreed to make either a king, or other governors, a head, or heads, over themselves, though the several families had government, yet these associated families had no government; and yet so conceivable a politic body, as if Maxwell would have appeared amongst them, and called them a disorderly rout, or an unconceivable chimera, they should have made the Prelate know that chimeras can knock down prelates. Neither is a king the life of a politic body, as the soul is of the natural body. The body createth not the soul; but Israel created Saul king, and when he was dead, they made David king, and so, under God, many kings, as they succeeded, till the Messiah came. No natural body can make souls to itself by succession; nor can sees create new prelates always.
他们是一个有秩序的政治团体，能够推翻一个暴虐的指挥官，就像他们能够选出一个公正的统治者一样。主教说：“想象一个没有统治者的政治团体，就像想象一个没有头的自然身体一样。”他的意思是，两者都是无法想象的。我不同意他的观点。当扫罗死后，以色列成为一个完整的政治团体；而主教，如果他的头脑不是非常迟钝的话（正如这篇抄袭他人的文章所显示的那样），可以想象到一个可见的政治社会在一个可见且可想象的地方，即希伯仑，进行政治行动（撒母耳记下 5:1-3），选举大卫为国王，并与他立约。而他们并不缺少统治者，并不能使他们成为无法想象的幻想。 在尼姆罗德之前，许多家庭仅由家长统治，他们同意选择一个国王或其他统治者作为他们的头，尽管各个家庭有自己的政府，但这些联合家庭没有政府；然而，这是一个可以想象的政治实体，如果麦克斯韦尔出现在他们中间，并称他们为无序的群体或难以想象的妄想，他们会让主教知道妄想可以打倒主教。国王也不是政治实体的生命，就像灵魂是自然身体的生命一样。身体不能创造灵魂；但以色列人选举扫罗为国王，他死后，他们选举大卫为国王，如此，在上帝的带领下，许多国王相继而来，直到弥赛亚降临。没有自然身体可以通过继承为自己创造灵魂；教区也不能一直创造新的主教。

P. Prelate.—Jesuits and puritans differ infinitely: we are hopeful God shall cast down this Babel. The Jesuits, for ought I know, seat the superintendent power in the community. Some sectaries follow them, and warrant any individual person to make away a king in case of defects, and the work is to be rewarded as when one killeth a ravenous wolf. Some will have it in a collective body; but how? Not met together by warrant, or writ of sovereign authority, but when fancy of reforming church and state calleth them. Some will have the power in the nobles and peers; some in the three estates assembled by the king's writ; some in the inferior judges. I Know not where this power to curb sovereignty is, but in Almighty God.
普雷拉特主教- 耶稣会士和清教徒有着无尽的分歧：我们希望上帝会推翻这个巴别塔。据我所知，耶稣会士将最高权力置于社群中。一些教派追随他们，并授权个人在国王有缺陷的情况下除掉国王，这项工作将得到奖赏，就像杀死一只凶猛的狼一样。有些人认为这种权力应该集中在一个集体机构中，但是如何实现呢？不是通过授权或君主权威的命令而是当改革教会和国家的想法召唤他们时。有些人认为这种权力应该掌握在贵族和贵族之手；有些人认为应该由国王的命令召集三个阶级；有些人认为应该由下级法官掌握。我不知道这种限制主权的权力在哪里，除了全能的上帝。

Ans. 1. Jesuits and puritans differ infinitely; true. Jesuits deny the Pope to be antichrist, hold all Arounian doctrine, Christ's local descension to hell,—all which the Prelate did preach. We deny all this.
1. 耶稣会士和清教徒有着无尽的差异；是的。耶稣会士否认教皇是敌基督，坚持阿罗尼亚教义，相信基督曾下降到地狱等等，而这些都是主教所宣讲的。我们否认这一切。

2. We hope also the Lord shall destroy the Jesuits' Babel; the suburbs whereof, and more, are the popish prelates in Scotland and England.

3. The Jesuits, for ought he knoweth, place all superintendent power in the community. The Prelate knoweth not all his brethren, the Jesuits', ways; but it is ignorance, not want of good-will. For Bellarmine, Beucanus, Suarez, Gregor. de Valentia, and others, his dear fellows, say, that all superintendent power of policy, in ordine ad spiritualia is in the man, whose foot Maxwell would kiss for a cardinal's hat.
耶稣会士，据他所知，将所有的监督权力都放在社区中。主教并不了解他的兄弟们，即耶稣会士们的一切行为；但这是无知，而不是缺乏善意。因为贝拉尔米诺、贝乌卡努斯、苏亚雷斯、格雷戈尔·德·瓦伦西亚等他亲爱的同僚们都说，所有关于政策的监督权力，在 ordine ad spiritualia 方面，都在那个人手中，麦克斯韦尔为了红衣主教帽而愿意亲吻他的脚。

4. If these be all the differences, it is not much. The community is the remote and last subject, the representative body the nearest subject, the nobles a partial subject; the judges, as judges sent by the king, are so in the game, that when an arbitrary prince at his pleasure setteth them up, and at command that they judge for men, and not for the Lord, and accordingly obey, they are by this power to be punished, and others put in their place.
如果这些就是所有的差异，那就不算多。社区是最遥远和最后的主题，代表机构是最近的主题，贵族是部分的主题；作为由国王派遣的法官，他们在这个游戏中是法官，当一个专制的君主随意任命他们，并命令他们为人民而不是为上帝审判，并相应地服从时，他们将受到惩罚，并有其他人取而代之。

5. A true cause of convening parliaments the Prelate maketh a fancy at this time: it is as if the thieves and robbers should say a justice-court were a fancy; but if the Prelate might compear before the parliament of Scotland, (to which he is an outlaw like his father, 2 Thess. 2:4,) such a fancy, I conceive, should hang him, and that deservedly.

P. Prelate (p. 147, 148).—The subject of this superintending power must be secured from error in judgment and practice, and the community and states then should be infallible.
P. Prelate（第 147 页，148 页）。这种监督权的主体必须在判断和实践中免于错误，并且社区和国家应该是不可错误的。

Ans.—The consequence is nought. No more than the king, the absolute independent, is infallible. It is sure the people are in less hazard of tyranny and self-destruction than the king is to subvert laws and make himself absolute; and for that cause there must be a superintendent power above the king, and God Almighty also, must be above all.
答案是：后果是零。与国王一样，绝对独立的人并非不可错误。可以肯定的是，人民比国王更不容易遭受暴政和自我毁灭的危险，因为国王有可能颠覆法律并使自己成为绝对统治者；因此，必须有一个高于国王的监督权力，而全能的上帝也必须高于一切。

P. Prelate.—The parliament may err, then God hath left the state remediless, except the king remedy it.
教长：议会可能犯错，那么上帝就让国家无法挽救，除非国王来解决。

Ans.—There is no consequence here, except the king be impeccable. Posterior parliaments may correct the former. A state is not remediless, because God's remedies, in sinful men's hands, may miscarry. But the question is now, Whether God hath given power to one man to destroy men, subvert laws and religion, without any power above him to coerce, restrain, or punish?
答案是：除非国王无可挑剔，否则这里没有任何后果。后来的议会可以纠正之前的错误。一个国家并非无法挽救，因为上帝的救治在罪人手中可能会失败。但现在的问题是，上帝是否赋予了某个人权力来毁灭人类，颠覆法律和宗教，而没有任何权力来强制、限制或惩罚他？

P. Prelate (c. 15, p. 148).—If, when the parliament erreth, the remedy is left to the wisdom of God, why not when the king erreth?
如果议会犯错时，解决办法留给上帝的智慧，那么国王犯错时为什么不是呢？

Ans.—Neither is antecedent true, nor the consequence valid, for the sounder part may resist; and it is easier to one to destroy many, having a power absolute, which God never gave him, than for many to destroy themselves. Then, if the king Uzziah intrude himself and sacrifice, the priests do sin in remedying thereof.
答案：既然前提不成立，结论也就无效，因为更明智的一方可能会反抗；一个拥有绝对权力的人比许多人自我毁灭更容易摧毁许多人，而这种权力是上帝从未给予他的。因此，如果国王乌西雅擅自介入并进行祭祀，祭司们在纠正这一行为时犯了罪。

P. Prelate.—Why might not the people of Israel, peers or sanhedrim, have convened before them, judged and punished David for his adultery and murder? Romanists and new statists acknowledge no case lawful, but heresy, apostacy, or tyranny; and tyranny, they say, must be universal, manifest as the sun, and with obstinacy, and invincible by prayers, as is recorded of Nero, whose wish was rather a transported passion, than a fixed resolution. This cannot fall in the attempts of any but a madman. Now this cannot be proved our king; but though we grant in the foresaid case, that the community may resume their power, and rectify what is amiss, which we cannot grant; but this will follow by their doctrine, in every case of male administration.
P. Prelate. - 以色列人民，无论是贵族还是圣会，为什么不能召集在一起，对大卫的通奸和谋杀进行审判和惩罚？罗马教徒和新统治者承认除了异端、背教或暴政之外，没有其他合法的情况；而暴政，他们说，必须是普遍的，明显如太阳，并且要顽固不化，无法被祈祷所打败，就像尼禄一样，他的愿望更像是一种短暂的激情，而不是一个坚定的决心。这种情况只会发生在疯子身上。现在这不能被证明是我们的国王；但即使在上述情况下，我们承认社群可以恢复他们的权力，并纠正错误，这是我们无法接受的；但根据他们的教义，在每一种男性管理的情况下都会出现这种情况。

Ans.—The Prelate draweth me to speak of the case of the king's unjust murder, confessed (Psal. 51); to which I answer: He taketh it for confessed, that it had been treason in the sanhedrim or states of Israel to have taken on them to judge and punish David for his adultery and his murder; but he giveth no reason for this, nor any word of God; and truly, though I will not presume to go before others in this, God's law (Gen. 9:6, compared with Num. 35:30, 31) seemeth to say against them.
答案——主教引导我谈论国王不公正的谋杀案，这在诗篇 51 中被承认；对此我回答：他认为，以色列的圣会或国家对大卫的通奸和谋杀进行审判和惩罚将是叛国行为；但他没有给出理由，也没有引用上帝的话语；实际上，虽然我不敢在这方面超越他人，但上帝的律法（创世纪 9:6 与民数记 35:30, 31 相比）似乎对他们说了不。

6. Nor can I think that God's law, or his deputy the judges, are to accept the persons of the great, because they are great; (Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6, 7;) and we say, we cannot distinguish where the law distinguisheth not. The Lord speaketh to under judges, (Lev. 19:15,) "Thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty," or of the prince, for we know what these names גדול and רבא meaneth. I grant it is not God's meaning that the king should draw the sword against himself, but yet it followeth not, that if we speak of the demerit of blood, that the law of God accepteth any judge, great or small; and if the estates be above the king, as I conceive they are, though it be a human politic constitution, that the king be free of all co-action of law, because it conduceth for the peace of the commonwealth; yet if we make a matter of conscience, for my part I see no exception that God maketh it; if men make, I crave leave to say, a facto ad jus non sequitur; and I easily yield that in every case the estates may coerce the king, if we make it a case of conscience. And for the place, (Ps. 51:4,) "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned," לּךָ לּבדוּהטאהי flatterers allege it to be a place proving that the king is above all earthly tribunals, and all laws, and that there was not on earth any who might punish king David; and so they cite Clemens Alexandrin. (Strom. 1. 4,) Arnobi., Psal. 1., Dydimus, Hieronim.; but Calvin on the place, giveth the meaning that most of the fathers give,—Domine, etiam si me totus mundus absolvat, mihi tamen plusquam satis est, quod te solum judicem sentio. It is true, Beda, Euthymius, Ambrosius, (Apol. David, c. 4 and c. 10,) do all acknowledge from the place, de facto, there was none above David to judge him, and so doth Augustine, Basilius Theodoret, say, and Chrysostomus, and Cyrillus, and Hieronimus, (Epist. 22.) Ambrose (Sermon 16, in Psal. 116) Gregorius, and Augustine (Joan 8,) saith, he meaneth no man durst judge or punish him, but God only. Lorinus, the Jesuit, observeth eleven interpretations of the fathers all to this sense: "Since (Lyra saith) he sinned only against God, because God only could pardon him;" Hugo Cardinalis, "Because God only could wash him," which he asketh in the text. And Lorinus, "Solo Deo conscio peccavi." But the simple meaning is, 1. Against thee only have I sinned, as my eye-witness and immediate beholder; and, therefore, he addeth—and have done this evil in thy sight. 2. Against thee only, as my judge, that thou mayest be justified when thou judgest, as clear from all unrighteousness, when thou shalt send the sword on my house. 3. Against thee, O Lord only, who canst wash me, find pardon me (ver. 1, 2). And if this "thee only" exclude altogether Uriah, Bathsheba, and the law of the judges, as if he had sinned against none of these in their kind, then is the king, because a king, free, not only from a punishing law of man, but from the duties of the second table simply, and so a king cannot be under the best and largest half of the law, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. He shall not need to say, Forgive us our sins, as we forgive them that sin against us; for there is no reason, from the nature of sin, and the nature of the law of God, why we can say more the subjects and sons sin against the king and father, than to say the father and king sin against the sons and subjects. By this, the king killing his father Jesse, should sin against God, but not break the fifth command, nor sin against his father. God should in vain forbid fathers to provoke their children to wrath.
6. 我也不认为上帝的律法，或者他的代理人法官，会因为他们是伟大的人而偏袒他们；（申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6,7；）我们说，我们不能在律法没有区别的情况下进行区分。主对下级法官说，（利未记 19:15，）“不可在审判中偏袒穷人，也不可重视有权势的人”，或者王子，因为我们知道这些名字 גדול 和 רבא 的意思。我承认上帝的意思不是让国王对自己使用剑，但这并不意味着，如果我们谈论到血的罪过，上帝的律法会接受任何法官，无论是伟大的还是小的；而且如果贵族地位高于国王，正如我所认为的，尽管这是一种人类的政治构成，国王可以免于受到法律的强制，因为这有助于国家的和平；然而，如果我们把它作为一个良心问题，我看不出上帝有任何例外；如果人们这样做，我请求允许我说，从事实到法律是不成立的；而且我很容易同意，在每种情况下，贵族可以强制国王，如果我们把它作为一个良心问题。至于这个地方，（诗篇 只有你，只有你，我得罪了你，"这是那些谄媚者声称的一个地方，证明国王高于一切世俗法庭和法律，地上没有人可以惩罚大卫王；所以他们引用了克莱门特·亚历山大（Clemens Alexandrin）、阿尔诺比（Arnobi）、诗篇 1、迪迪默斯（Dydimus）、希罗尼姆（Hieronim）的观点；但是加尔文在这个地方的解释是，大多数教父的意思是，主啊，即使全世界都宣判我无罪，我仍然感到只有你是我的审判者，这是足够的。确实，贝达（Beda）、尤西米乌斯（Euthymius）、安布罗修斯（Ambrosius）（《大卫的辩护》第 4 章和第 10 章）都承认，从事实上来看，没有人能够超越大卫来审判他，奥古斯丁（Augustine）、巴西略（Basilius）、西奥多雷特（Theodoret）也是如此，克里斯斯多福（Chrysostomus）和西里尔（Cyrillus）和希罗尼姆（Epist. 22）也是如此。安布罗斯（Sermon 16, in Psal. 116）、格雷戈里（Gregorius）和奥古斯丁（Joan 8）说，他的意思是没有人敢审判或惩罚他，只有上帝能够。耶稣会士洛里纳斯（Lorinus）观察到教父们对这个意义的十一种解释：“因为（Lyra 说）他只得罪了上帝，因为只有上帝能够宽恕他”；红衣主教雨果（Hugo Cardinalis）说：“因为只有上帝能够洗净他”，这是他在文中所问的。洛里纳斯（Lorinus）说：“只有上帝知道我犯了罪。”但简单的意思是，1. 我只得罪了你，作为我亲眼见证和直接目击者；因此，他补充说——我在你眼前行了这恶事。2. 我只得罪了你，作为我的审判者，当你审判时，你可以被证明是公正的，当你向我的家庭派遣刀剑时，你可以摆脱一切不公正。3. 我只得罪了你，主啊，只有你能洗净我，赦免我（第 1、2 节）。如果这个“只有你”完全排除了乌利亚、拔示巴和法官的法律，好像他没有违背这些人的种类，那么国王就因为是国王而自由，不仅不受人的惩罚法律的约束，而且不受第二诫命的简单义务的约束，所以国王不能遵守最好、最广泛的法律的一半，就是“要爱你的邻舍如同爱自己”。他不需要说：“赦免我们的罪，如同我们赦免得罪我们的人”；因为从罪的本质和上帝的法律的本质来看，我们不能说子民和儿子得罪了国王和父亲，而不能说父亲和国王得罪了子民和儿子。 因此，国王杀害他的父亲耶西，会得罪上帝，但不违反第五诫，也不得罪他的父亲。上帝徒劳地禁止父亲激怒他们的子女。

1. And kings to do injustice to their subjects, because by this the superior cannot sin against the inferior, forasmuch as kings can sin against none but those who have power to judge and punish them; but God only, and no inferiors, and no subjects, have power to punish the kings; therefore kings can sin against none of their subjects; and where there is no sin, how can there be a law? Neither major or minor can be denied by royalists.
国王对他们的臣民施加不公正待遇，因为这样上级就不会对下级犯罪，因为国王只能对那些有权审判和惩罚他们的人犯罪；但只有上帝，没有下级或臣民有权惩罚国王；因此国王不能对他们的臣民犯罪；而没有罪行，又怎么可能有法律呢？君主主义者不能否认这一点。

2. We acknowledge tyranny must only unking a prince. The Prelate denieth it, but he is a green statist. Barclay, Grotius, Winzetus, as I have proved, granteth it.
我们承认暴政只能废除一个王子的统治。大主教否认了这一点，但他是一个幼稚的统计学家。巴克利、格罗蒂乌斯、温泽图斯，正如我已经证明的那样，都承认了这一点。

3. He will excuse Nero, as of infirmity, wishing all Rome to have one neck, that he may cut it off. And is that charitable of kings, that they will not be so mad as to destroy their own kingdom? But when histories teach us there have been more tyrants than kings, the kings are more obliged to him for flattery than for state-wit, except we say that all kings who eat the people of God, as they do bread, owe him little for making them all mad and frantic.
他将原谅尼禄，因为他身体虚弱，希望整个罗马只有一个脖子，这样他就可以砍掉它。这对国王来说是仁慈的吗？他们不会如此疯狂地摧毁自己的王国吧？但是当历史告诉我们，暴君比国王更多时，国王对他更感激，因为他们需要他的谄媚而不是政治智慧，除非我们说所有把上帝的子民当作面包吃的国王，都应该对他感激不尽，因为他让他们都变得疯狂和狂躁。

4. But let them be Neroes, and mad, and worse, there is no coercing of them, but all must give their necks to the sword, if the poor Prelate be heard; and yet kings cannot be so mad as to destroy their subjects. Mary of England was that mad. The Romish princes who have given (Rev. 17:13) their power and strength to the beast, and do make war with the Lamb; and kings inspired with the spirit of the beast, and drunk with the wine of the cup of Babel's fornications, are so mad; and the ten emperors are so mad, who wasted their faithfulest subjects.
但让他们成为尼禄，疯狂和更糟糕的人，无法强制他们，但所有人都必须把脖子伸向刀剑，如果可怜的主教被听到的话；然而，国王们不可能如此疯狂地毁灭他们的臣民。英国的玛丽就是那么疯狂。那些将他们的权力和力量交给兽的罗马教皇，与羔羊作战的罗马教皇，以及被兽的精神所激发、醉心于巴比伦淫乱之杯的国王们，都是如此疯狂；十位皇帝也是如此疯狂，他们浪费了他们最忠诚的臣民。

P. Prelate.—If there be such a power in the peers, resumable in the exigent of necessity, as the last necessary remedy for safety of church and state, God and nature not being deficient in things necessary, it must be proved out of the Scripture, and not taken on trust, for affirmanti incumbit probatio.
主教先生——如果贵族拥有这样的权力，在紧急情况下可以收回，作为保护教会和国家安全的最后必要的手段，那么上帝和自然在必要的事情上不会缺乏，这必须通过圣经来证明，而不是凭信任，因为证明责任在于肯定者。

Ans.—Mr Bishop, what better is your affirmanti incumbit, &c., than mine? for you are the affirmer. 1. I can prove a power in the king, limited only to feed, govern, and save the people; and you affirm that God hath given to the king, not only a power official and royal to save, but also to destroy and cut off, so as no man may say, Why doest thou this? Shall we take this upon the word of an excommunicated prelate? Profer tabulas, John P. P., I believe you not, royal power is, Deut. 17:18; Rom. 3:14. I am sure there is there a power given to the king to do good, and that from God. Let John P. P. prove a power to do ill, given of God to the king. 2. We shall quickly prove that the states may repress this power, and punish the tyrant—not the king, when he shall prove that a tyrannous power is an ordinance of God, and so may not be resisted; for the law of nature teacheth,—if I give my sword to my fellow to defend me from the murderer, if he shall fall to and murder me with my own sword, I may (if I have strength) take my sword from him.
答案：主教先生，你的肯定性责任有什么比我的更好呢？因为你是肯定者。1.我可以证明国王有权力，只限于养育、治理和拯救人民；而你声称上帝赋予国王的权力不仅是官方和王权的，而且还包括毁灭和剪除的权力，以至于没有人能说，你为什么这样做？我们要相信一个被逐出教会的主教的话吗？拿出证据来，约翰 P.P.，我不相信你，国王的权力在申命记 17:18；罗马书 3:14 中是明确的。我确信国王有权力行善，这是来自上帝的。让约翰 P.P.证明一下，上帝赋予国王行恶的权力。2.我们很快就能证明，国家可以制约这种权力，并惩罚暴君，而不是国王，当他证明暴虐的权力是上帝的命令，所以不能反抗；因为自然法则教导我们——如果我把我的剑交给我的同伴来保护我免受谋杀，如果他用我的剑来谋杀我，我可以（如果我有力量）夺回我的剑。

P. Prelate.—1. It is infidelity to think that God cannot help us, and impatience that we will not wait on God. When a king oppresseth us, it is against God's wisdom that he hath not provided another mean for our safety than intrusion on God's right. 2. It is against God's power,—3. His holiness,—4. Christian religion, that we necessitate God to so weak a mean as to make use of sin, and we cast the aspersion of treason on religion, and deter kings to profess reformed catholic religion;—5. We are not to jostle God out of his right.
教长先生。- 1. 认为上帝不能帮助我们是不信仰，不耐烦是我们不愿等待上帝。当国王压迫我们时，他没有提供其他保护我们安全的方式，这是违背上帝的智慧。- 2. 这是违背上帝的能力，- 3. 违背上帝的圣洁，- 4. 违背基督教，我们迫使上帝使用罪恶这样一个软弱的手段，并且诋毁了宗教的忠诚，阻止了国王信奉改革的天主教。- 5. 我们不能夺走上帝的权利。

Ans. 1.—I see nothing but what Dr Ferne, Grotius, Barclay, Blackwood, have said before, with some colour of proving the consequence. The P. Prelate giveth us other men's arguments, but without bones. All were good, if the state's coercing and curbing a power which God never gave to the king were a sin and an act of impatience and unbelief; and if it were proper to God only, by his immediate hand, to coerce tyranny. 2. He calleth it not protestant religion, either here or elsewhere, but cunningly giveth a name that will agree to the Roman catholic religion. For the Dominicans, Franciscans, and the Parisian doctors and schoolmen, following Occham, Gerson, Almoin, and other papists, call themselves reformed catholics. He layeth this for a ground, in three or four pages,—where these same arguments are again and again repeated in terminus, as his second reason, (p. 149,) was handled ad nauseam (p. 148); his third reason is repeated in his sixth reason, (p. 151.) He layeth down, I say, this ground, which is the begged conclusion, and maketh the conclusion the assumption, in eight raw and often-repeated arguments,—to wit, That the parliament's coercing and restraining of arbitrary power is rebellion, and resisting the ordinance of God. But he dare not look the place, Rom. 13, on the face. Other royalists have done it with bad success. This I desire to be weighed, and I retort the Prelate's argument. But it is indeed the trivial argument of all royalists, especially of Barclay,—obvious in his third book. If arbitrary and tyrannical power, above any law that the lawful magistrate commandeth under the pain of death,—Thou shalt not murder one man, Thou shalt not take away the vineyard of one Naboth violently—be lawful and warrantable by God's word, then an arbitrary power, above all divine laws, is given to the keeping of the civil magistrate. And it is no less lawful arbitrary, or rather tyrannical power, for David to kill all his subjects, and to plunder all Jerusalem, (as I believe prelates and malignants and papists would serve the three kingdoms, if the king should command them,) than to kill one Uriah, or for Ahab to spoil one Naboth. The essence of sin must agree alike to all, though the degrees vary.
答案 1. — 我只看到了费尔内博士、格罗修斯、巴克利、布莱克伍德之前说过的东西，有些证明后果的色彩。主教给我们其他人的论点，但没有根据。如果国家对上帝从未给予国王的权力进行约束和控制是一种罪恶、不耐烦和不信仰的行为；如果只有上帝通过他的直接手来制约暴政，那么这一切都是正确的。2. 他在这里和其他地方都没有称之为新教宗教，而是狡猾地给了一个与罗马天主教相符的名字。因为多明我会士、方济我会士和巴黎医生和学者们，遵循奥卡姆、格尔松、阿尔蒙和其他天主教徒的脚步，称自己为改革天主教徒。他在三四页中将此作为基础，这些论点一次又一次地在术语中重复，就像他的第二个理由（第 149 页）一样，被反复处理到令人作呕（第 148 页）；他的第三个理由在他的第六个理由中重复出现（第 151 页）。他提出了这个论点，即议会对任意权力的强制和限制是叛乱，是违背上帝的命令。但他不敢直接引用罗马书 13 章的内容。其他皇室主义者也曾尝试过，但效果不佳。我希望大家能权衡一下这个观点，并反驳主教的论证。这实际上是所有皇室主义者的常见论证，尤其是巴克利在他的第三本书中明显提到。如果任意和暴虐的权力，超过合法的统治者根据上帝的命令所制定的任何法律，都是合法和有权的，那么这就意味着文明统治者被赋予了超越所有神圣法律的任意权力。对于大卫杀害他的所有臣民，并掠夺耶路撒冷的行为（我相信主教、恶意分子和天主教徒如果国王命令他们这样做，他们会对三个王国采取同样的行动），与大卫杀害乌利亚一人或亚哈掠夺纳波一人一样合法，甚至更加暴虐。 罪恶的本质必须对所有人都一致，尽管程度有所不同。

Of God's remedy against arbitrary power hereafter, in the question of resistance; but the confused engine of the Prelate bringeth it in here, where there is no place for it.
上帝对抵抗专制权力的解决办法，但是主教混乱的方式把它带到了这里，而这里并没有适合它的地方。

7. His seventh argument is:—Before God would authorise rebellion, and give a bad precedent thereof for ever, he would rather work extraordinary and wonderful miracles; and therefore would not authorise the people to deliver themselves from under Pharaoh, but made Moses a prince, to bring them out of Egypt with a stretched-out arm. Nor did the Lord deliver his people by the wisdom of Moses, or strength of the people, or any act that way of theirs, but by his own immediate hand and power.
他的第七个论点是：在上帝授权反叛并为此永远树立不良先例之前，他宁愿施行非凡而奇妙的奇迹；因此，他不会授权人民从法老手中解救自己，而是让摩西成为领袖，以伸出的手将他们带出埃及。上帝没有凭借摩西的智慧、人民的力量或者他们的任何行动来拯救他的子民，而是凭借他自己的直接手和力量。

Ans—I reduce the Prelate's confused words to a few; for I speak not of his popish term of St. Steven, and others the like; because all that he hath said in a book of 149 pages might have been said in three sheets of paper. But, I pray you, what is this argument to the question in hand, which is, whether the king be so above all laws, as people and peers, in the case of arbitrary power, may resume their power and punish a tyrant? The P. Prelate draweth in the question of resistance by the hair. Israel's not rising in arms against king Pharaoh proveth nothing against the power of a free kingdom against a tyrant.
答案 - 我将主教混乱的言辞简化为几句话；因为我不谈论他关于圣史蒂芬等的教皇术语；因为他在一本 149 页的书中所说的一切都可以用三张纸来表达。但是，请问，这个论点与手头的问题有什么关系？问题是，国王是否如此高于所有法律，以至于人民和贵族在任意权力的情况下可以恢复他们的权力并惩罚暴君？主教通过这个问题牵扯出了抵抗的问题。以色列人不起来反抗法老王并不能证明自由王国对抗暴君的权力不存在。

1. Moses, who wrought miracles destructive to Pharaoh, might pray for vengeance against Pharaoh, God having revealed to Moses that Pharaoh was a reprobate; but may ministers and nobles pray so against king Charles? God forbid.
摩西曾施展毁灭法老的奇迹，或许他可以为法老祈求复仇，因为上帝向摩西启示法老是一个被拒绝的人；但是牧师和贵族能为查尔斯国王这样祈祷吗？愿上帝禁止。

2. Pharaoh had not his crown from Israel.
法老的王冠并非来自以色列。

3. Pharaoh had not sworn to defend Israel, nor became he their king upon condition he should maintain and profess the religion of the God of Israel; therefore Israel could not, as free estates, challenge him in their supreme court of parliament of breach of oath; and upon no terms could they unking Pharaoh: he held not his crown of them.
法老并没有宣誓捍卫以色列，也没有成为他们的国王，条件是他要维护和信奉以色列的上帝的宗教；因此，以色列作为自由的国家，不能在他们的最高法院中指责法老违背誓言；无论如何，他们都不能废黜法老：他的王冠并不是由他们授予的。

4. Pharaoh was never circumcised, nor within the covenant of the God of Israel in profession.
法老从未受过割礼，也没有加入以色列神的约定。

5. Israel had their lands by the mere gift of the king. I hope the king of Britain standeth to Scotland and England in a fourfold contrary relation.
以色列仅凭国王的恩赐获得了他们的土地。我希望英国国王与苏格兰和英格兰之间有着四倍的相反关系。

All divines know that Pharaoh, his princes, and the Egyptians, were his peers and people, and that Israel were not his native subjects, but a number of strangers, who, by the laws of the king and princes, by the means of Joseph, had gotten the land of Goshen for their dwelling, and liberty to serve the God of Abraham, to whom they prayed in their bondage, (Exod. 2:23, 24,) and they were not to serve the gods of Egypt, nor were they of the king's religion. And therefore, his argument is thus: A number of poor exiled strangers under king Pharaoh, who were not Pharaoh's princes and peers, could not restrain the tyranny of king Pharaoh; therefore, the three estates in a free kingdom may not restrain the arbitrary power of a king.
所有神明都知道，法老、他的王子和埃及人是他的同辈和臣民，以色列人不是他的本国臣民，而是一群外来者，通过国王和王子的法律，借助约瑟夫的手段，得到了歌珊地作为他们的居所，并获得了事奉亚伯拉罕的上帝的自由，在他们的奴役中向他祈祷（出埃及记 2:23, 24）。他们不得事奉埃及的神，也不信奉国王的宗教。因此，他的论点是这样的：一群贫穷的流亡外国人在法老国王统治下无法制止法老的暴政；因此，在一个自由王国中，三个阶级也不能制约国王的专制权力。

1. The Prelate must prove that God gave a royal and kingly power to king Pharaoh, due to him by virtue of his kingly calling, (according as royalists explain 1 Sam. 8:9, 11,) to kill all the male children of Israel, to make slaves of themselves, and compel them to work in brick and clay, while their lives were a burden to them; and that if a Roman catholic, Mary of England, should kill all the male children of protestants, by the hands of papists, at the queen's commandment, and make bondslaves of all the peers, judges, and three estates, who made her a free princess; yet, notwithstanding that Mary had sworn to maintain the protestant religion, they were to suffer and not to defend themselves. But if God give Pharaoh a power to kill all Israel, so as they could not control it, then God giveth to a king a royal power by office to sin, only the royalist saveth God from being the author of sin in this, that God gave the power to sin; but yet with this limitation, that the subjects should not resist this power. 2. He must prove that Israel was to give their male children to Pharaoh's butchers,—for to hide them was to resist a royal power; and to disobey a royal power given of God, is to disobey God. 3. The subjects may not resist the king's butchers coming to kill them and their male children; for to resist the servant of the king in that wherein he is a servant, is to resist the king. (1 Sam. 8:7; 1 Pet. 2:14; Rom. 13:1.) 4. He must prove, that upon the supposition that Israel had been as strong as Pharaoh and his people; that without God's special commandment, (they then wanting the written word,) they should have fought with Pharaoh; and that we now, for all wars, must have a word from heaven, as if we had not God's perfect will in his word, as at that time Israel behoved to have in all wars, Judg. 18:5; 1 Sam. 14:37; Isa. 30:2; Jer. 38:17; 1 Kings 22:5; 1 Sam. 30:5; Judg. 20:27; 1 Sam. 23:2; 2 Sam. 16:23; 1 Chron. 10:14. But because God gave not them an answer to fight against Pharaoh, therefore we have no warrant now to fight against a foreign nation invading us; the consequence is null, and therefore this is a vain argument. The prophets never reprove the people for not performing the duty of defensive wars against tyrannous kings; therefore, there is no such duty enjoined by any law of God to us. For the prophets never rebuke the people for non-performing the duty of offensive wars against their enemies, but where God gave a special command and response from his own oracle, that they should fight. And if God was pleased never to command the people to rise against a tyrannous king, they did not sin where they had no commandment of God; but I hope we have now a more sure word of prophecy to inform us. 5. The Prelate conjectureth Moses' miracles, and the deliverance of the people by dividing the Red Sea, was to forbid and condemn defensive wars of people against their king; but he hath neither Scripture nor reasons to do it. The end of these miracles was to seal to Pharaoh the truth of God's calling of Moses and Aaron to deliver the people, as is clear, Exod. 4:1–4, compared with 7:8–10. And that the Lord might get to himself a name on all the earth, Rom. 9:17; Exod. 9:16; 13:13, 14. But of the Prelate's conjectural end, the Scripture is silent, and we cannot take an excommunicated man's word. What I said of Pharaoh, who had not his crown from Israel, that I say of Nebuchadnezzar and the kings of Persia, keeping the people of God captive.
主教必须证明上帝赋予法老王王权和王权，因为他是按照他的王职所应得的（正如君主主义者解释撒母耳记上 8:9,11），他可以杀死以色列的所有男婴，使他们成为奴隶，并强迫他们在砖和泥中工作，而他们的生活是负担；如果一个罗马天主教徒，英国的玛丽女王，按照女王的命令，通过天主教徒的手杀死所有新教徒的男婴，并使所有贵族、法官和三个阶级成为奴隶，而这些人曾使她成为自由公主；然而，尽管玛丽曾发誓要维护新教，他们必须忍受而不是自卫。但是，如果上帝给了法老杀死以色列的权力，以至于他们无法控制，那么上帝就是通过职位给予国王犯罪的权力，只有君主主义者才能使上帝不成为犯罪的创造者，因为上帝给了犯罪的权力；但是有一个限制，那就是臣民不应该抵抗这种权力。2. 他必须证明以色列应该把他们的男孩交给法老的屠夫，因为隐藏他们就是对皇权的抵抗；而违抗上帝赋予的皇权就是违抗上帝。3.臣民不能抵抗国王的屠夫前来杀害他们和他们的男孩；因为在那个屠夫作为仆人的方面抵抗国王就是抵抗国王。（撒母耳记上 8:7；彼得前书 2:14；罗马书 13:1）4.他必须证明，假设以色列和法老及其人民一样强大；那么在没有上帝特别的命令下（那时他们没有书面的话语），他们应该与法老作战；而我们现在，为了所有的战争，必须有一个来自天上的话语，好像我们没有上帝在他的话语中的完全旨意，就像当时以色列在所有战争中必须有的一样，士师记 18:5；撒母耳记上 14:37；以赛亚书 30:2；耶利米书 38:17；列王纪上 22:5；撒母耳记上 30:5；士师记 20:27；撒母耳记上 23:2；撒母耳记下 16:23；历代志上 10:14。但因为上帝没有给他们回答去与法老作战，所以我们现在没有权力去与入侵我们的外国国家作战；这个推论是无效的，因此这是一个徒劳的论点。 先知们从未因人们不履行对抗暴君的防御战而责备他们；因此，上帝的任何法律都没有要求我们有这样的责任。因为先知们从未因人们不履行对敌人的攻击战的责任而责备他们，除非上帝通过特殊的命令和神谕告诉他们要战斗。如果上帝从未命令人们起来反抗暴君，他们在没有上帝的命令下并没有犯罪；但我希望我们现在有更确切的预言来告诉我们。主教猜测摩西的奇迹和人民通过分开红海得到解救是为了禁止和谴责人民对抗他们的国王的防御战；但他既没有经文也没有理由来支持这个观点。这些奇迹的目的是向法老证实上帝召唤摩西和亚伦拯救人民的真理，正如出埃及记 4:1-4 与 7:8-10 所清楚表明的。并且，为了在全地上得到自己的名字，罗马书 9:17；出埃及记 9:16；13:13, 14。但关于主教的猜测目的，圣经是沉默的，我们不能相信一个被逐出教会的人的话。 我对法老的评价，他的王冠并非来自以色列，同样适用于尼布甲尼撒和波斯的君王，他们将上帝的子民囚禁起来。

P. Prelate (p. 153).—So in the book of Judges, when the people were delivered over to the hand of their enemies, because of their sins, he never warranted the ordinary judges or community to be their own deliverers; but when they repented, God raised up a judge. The people had no hand in their own deliverance out of Babylon; God effected it by Cyrus, immediately and totally. Is not this a real proof God will not have inferior judges to rectify what is amiss; but we must wait in patience till God provide lawful means, some sovereign power immediately sent by himself, in which course of his ordinary providence, he will not be deficient.
P. Prelate（第 153 页）。在士师记中，当人民因为他们的罪孽被交给敌人时，他从未授权普通的士师或社区成为他们自己的救赎者；但当他们悔改时，上帝会兴起一位士师。人民没有参与自己从巴比伦的解救中；上帝通过古列立即而完全地实现了这一点。这不是上帝不愿意有下级法官来纠正错误的真正证明吗？我们必须耐心等待上帝提供合法的手段，一些由他自己立即派遣的至高无上的权力，在他的普通恩典的过程中，他不会缺乏。

Ans. 1.—All this is beside the question, and proveth nothing less than that peers and community may not resume their power to curb an arbitrary power. For, in the first case, their is neither arbitrary nor lawful supreme judge. 2. If the first prove any thing, it proveth that it was rebellion in the inferior judges and community of Israel to fight against foreign kings, not set over them by God; and that offensive wars against any kings whatsoever, because they are kings, though strangers, are unlawful. Let Socinians and anabaptists consider if the P. Prelate help not them in this, and may prove all wars to be unlawful. 3. He is so malignant to all inferior judges, as if they were not powers sent of God, and to all governors that are not kings, and so upholders of prelates, and of himself as he conceiveth, that by his arguing he will have all deliverance of kings only, the only lawful means in ordinary providence; and so aristocracy and democracy, except in God's extraordinary providence, and by some divine dispensation, must be extraordinary and ordinarily unlawful. 1. The acts of a state, when a king is dead and they choose another, shall be an anticipating of God's providence. 2. If the king be a child, a captive, or distracted, and the kingdom oppressed with malignants, they are to wait, while God immediately from heaven create a king to them, as he did Saul long ago. But have we now kings immediately sent as Saul was? How is the spirit of prophecy and government infused in them, as in king Saul? or are they by prophetical inspiration, anointed as David was? I conceive their calling to the throne on God's part differs as much from the calling of Saul and David, in some respect, as the calling of ordinary pastors, who must be gifted by industry and learning and called by the church, and the calling of apostles. 3. God would deliver his people from Babylon by moving the heart of Cyrus immediately, the people having no hand in it, not so much as supplicating Cyrus; therefore, the people and peers who made the king cannot curb his tyrannical power, if he make captives and slaves of them, as the kings of Chaldea made slaves of the people of Israel. What! Because God useth another mean, therefore, this mean is not lawful. It followeth in no sort. If we must use no means but what the captive people did under Cyrus, we may not lawfully fly, nor supplicate, for the people did neither.
答案 1. 这一切都与问题无关，证明了贵族和社区不能恢复他们的权力来限制专制权力。因为在第一种情况下，既没有专制的，也没有合法的最高法官。2. 如果第一个证明了什么，那就证明以色列的下级法官和社区反抗外国国王是叛乱，而不是上帝所任命的国王；而且反对任何国王的进攻性战争，因为他们是国王，即使是外国人，也是不合法的。让索西尼派和重洗派考虑一下，如果主教没有帮助他们，是否可以证明所有战争都是不合法的。3. 他对所有下级法官都如此恶意，好像他们不是上帝派来的权力，对所有不是国王的统治者也是如此，因此他认为，按照他的论证，只有国王的解救才是唯一合法的普通方式；所以在普通的神意中，除非是上帝的特殊神意和某种神圣的安排，贵族制和民主制都必须是特殊的和通常是不合法的。1. 当国王死去，他们选择另一个国王时，国家的行为将是对上帝的预见。2. 如果国王是个孩子、被俘虏或精神错乱，而王国受到恶势力的压迫，他们应该等待，直到上帝从天上立即为他们创造一个国王，就像他很久以前为扫罗所做的那样。但是现在我们是否有像扫罗那样立即派遣的国王呢？他们是如何被赋予预言和统治的灵感，就像扫罗王一样？还是他们是通过先知的启示，像大卫一样受膏的？我认为他们上帝邀请他们登上王位的方式在某种程度上与扫罗和大卫的方式有所不同，就像普通牧师的召唤方式与使徒的召唤方式不同一样。3. 上帝通过直接感动居鲁士的心来拯救他的子民脱离巴比伦，人民对此没有任何参与，甚至没有向居鲁士祈求；因此，人民和贵族们不能制约国王的暴政权力，如果他们被他们的国王俘虏和奴役，就像迦勒底的国王奴役以色列人民一样。什么！因为上帝使用了另一种方式，所以这种方式就不合法了。这种推理完全不成立。 If we must use no means but what the captive people did under Cyrus, we may not lawfully fly, nor supplicate, for the people did neither.

P. Prelate.—You read of no covenant in Scripture made without the king. (Exod. 34) Moses king of Jeshurun: neither tables nor parliament framed it. Joshua another, (Josh. 24) and Asa, (2 Chron. 15; 2 Chron. 34; Ezra 10) The covenant of Jehoiada in the nonage of Joash, was the high priest's act, as the king's governor. There is a covenant with hell, made without the king, and a false covenant. (Hos. 10:3, 4)
P. Prelate. - 你在圣经中没有读到没有国王参与的盟约。（出埃及记 34 章）摩西是耶书仑的国王：这不是由法板或议会制定的。约书亚也是如此（约书亚记 24 章），亚撒也是如此（历代志下 15 章；历代志下 34 章；以斯拉记 10 章）。在约阿施年幼时，约耶大的盟约是大祭司的行为，作为国王的统治者。有一个与地狱的盟约，没有国王参与，是一个虚假的盟约。（何西阿书 10:3, 4）

Ans.—We argue this negatively. 1. This is neither commanded, nor practised, nor warranted by promise; therefore, it is not lawful. But this is not practised in Scripture; therefore, it is not lawful. It followeth it. Show me in Scripture the killing of a goring ox who killed a man; the not making battlements on a house; the putting to death of a man lying with a beast; the killing of seducing prophets, who tempted the people to go a whoring, and serve another God than Jehovah: I mean, a god made by the hand of the baker, such a one as the excommunicated Prelate is known to be, who hath preached this idolatry in three kingdoms. (Deut. 13) This is written, and all the former laws are divine precepts. Shall the precept make them all unlawful, because they are not practised by some in Scripture? By this? I ask, Where read ye that the people entered in a covenant with God, not to worship the golden image, and the king; and those who pretended they are the priests of Jehovah, the churchmen and prelates, refused to enter in covenant with God? By this argument, the king and prelates, in non-practising with us, wanting the precedent of a like practised in Scripture, are in the fault. 2. This is nothing to prove the conclusion in question. 3. All these places prove it is the king's duty, when the people under him, and their fathers, have corrupted the worship of God, to renew a covenant with God, and to cause the people to do the like, as Moses, Asa, and Jehoshaphat did. 4. If the king refuse to do his duty, where is it written that the people ought also to omit their duty, and to love to have it so, because the rulers corrupt their ways? (Jer. 5:31) To renew a covenant with God is a point of service due to God that the people are obliged unto, whether the king command it or no. What if the king command not his people to serve God; or, what if he forbid Daniel to pray to God? Shall the people in that case serve the King of kings, only at the nod and royal command of an earthly king? Clear this from Scripture. 5. Ezra (ch. 5) had no commandment in particular from Artaxerxes, king of Persia, or from Darius, but a general. (Ezra 7:23.) "Whatsoever is commanded by the God of heaven, let it be diligently done for the house of the God of heaven." But the tables in Scotland, and the two parliaments of England and Scotland, who renewed the covenant, and entered in covenant not against the king, (as the P. P. saith,) but to restore religion to its ancient purity, have this express law both from king james and king Charles, in many acts of parliament, that religion be kept pure. Now, as Artaxerxes knew nothing of the covenant, and was unwilling to subscribe it, and yet gave to Ezra and the princes a warrant, in general, to do all that the God of heaven required to be done, for the religion and house of the God of heaven, and so a general warrant for a covenant, without the king; and yet Ezra and the people, in swearing that covenant, failed in no duty against their king, to whom, by the fifth commandment, they were no less subject than we are to our king: just so we are, and so have not failed. But they say, the king hath committed to no lieutenant and deputy under him, to do what they please in religion, without his royal consent in particular, and the direction of his clergy, seeing he is of that same religion with his people; whereas Artaxerxes was of another religion than were the Jews and their governor.—Ans. Nor can our king take on himself to do what he pleaseth, and what the prelates (amongst whom those who ruled all are known, before the world and the sun, to be of another religion than we are) pleaseth, in particular. But see what religion and worship the Lord our God, and the law of the land (which is the king's revealed will) alloweth to us, that we may swear, though the king should not swear it; otherwise, we are to be of no religion but of the king's, and to swear no covenant but the king's, which is to join with papists against protestants. 6. The strangers of Ephraim and Manasseh, and out of Simeon fell out of Israel in abundance to Asa, when they saw that the Lord his God was with him, (2 Chron. 15:9, 10,) and sware that covenant without their own king's consent, their own king being against it. If a people swear a religious covenant, without their king, who is averse thereunto, for more may the nobles, peers, and estates of parliament do it without their king; and here is an example of a practice, which the P. Prelate requireth. 7. That Jehoiada was governor and viceroy during the nonage of Joash, and that by this royal authority the covenant was sworn, is a dream, to the end he may make the Pope, and the archprelate, now viceroys and kings, when the throne varieth. The nobles were authors of the making of that covenant, no less than Jehoiada was; yea, and the people of the land, when the king was but a child, went unto the house of Baal, and brake down his images, &c. Here is a reformation, made without the king, by the people. 8. Grave expositors say, that the covenant with death and hell (Isa. 28) was the king's covenant with Egypt. 9. And the covenant (Hos. 10) is by none exponed of a covenant made without the king. I have heard said, this Prelate, preaching on this text before the king, exponed it so; but he spake words (as the text is) falsely. The P. Prelate, to the end of the chapter, giveth instance of the ill success of popular reformation, because the people caused Aaron to make a golden calf, and they revolted from Rehoboam to Jeroboam, and made two golden calves, and they conspired with Absalom against David.—Ans. If the first example make good any thing, neither the high priest, as was Aaron, nor the P. Prelate, who claimeth to be descended of Aaron's house, should have any hand in reformation at all; for Aaron erred in that. And to argue from the people's sins to deny their power, is no better than to prove Ahab, Jeroboam, and many kings in Israel and Judah, committed idolatry, therefore they had no royal power at all. In the rest of the chapter, for a whole page, he singeth over again his matins in a circle, and giveth us the same arguments we heard before; of which you have these three notes:—1. They are stolen, and not his own. 2. Repeated again and again to fill the field. 3. All hang on a false supposition, and a begging of the question. That the people, without the king, have no power at all.
答案：我们以否定的方式进行辩论。1. 这既没有被命令，也没有被实践，也没有被承诺保证；因此，这是不合法的。但是这在圣经中没有被实践；因此，这是不合法的。这是由此推出的。在圣经中给我看看哪里有杀死杀人的牛的记录；哪里有不在房屋上建造护栏的记录；哪里有杀死与兽交的人的记录；哪里有杀死引诱人民行淫、事奉除耶和华以外的其他神的诱惑先知的记录：我指的是由面包师傅制造的神，就像被逐出教会的主教所知道的那样，他在三个王国中宣扬这种偶像崇拜。（申命记 13 章）这是写在圣经中的，所有前面的法律都是神的诫命。难道因为一些人在圣经中没有实践，就会使所有的诫命都变得不合法吗？根据这个？我问，你们在哪里读到人民与上帝立约，不崇拜金像和国王；而那些自称是耶和华的祭司、教会人员和主教，却拒绝与上帝立约？根据这个论点，国王和主教，在不与我们实践的情况下，缺乏在圣经中类似实践的先例，是有错的。2. 这并不能证明问题的结论。3. 所有这些地方证明，当国民和他们的祖先败坏了对上帝的崇拜时，国王有责任与上帝重新立约，并促使人民做同样的事情，就像摩西、亚撒和约沙法所做的一样。4. 如果国王拒绝履行他的职责，哪里写着人民也应该忽视他们的职责，并且喜欢这样做，因为统治者败坏了他们的行径？（耶利米书 5:31）与上帝重新立约是人民对上帝的一项服务，无论国王是否命令。如果国王不命令他的人民事奉上帝；或者，如果他禁止但以理向上帝祷告，那又怎么样？在这种情况下，人民是否只能在地上国王的点头和命令下事奉万王之王？从圣经中找出明确的答案。5. 以斯拉（第 5 章）没有特别受波斯国王亚达薛西斯或大流士的命令，只有一个一般的命令。（以斯拉记 7:23）“凡上天之神所吩咐的，都要殷勤办理，为上天之神的殿办理。”但是苏格兰的议会和英格兰与苏格兰的两个议会，在更新盟约并订立盟约时，并不是反对国王（正如 P.P.所说），而是为了恢复宗教的古老纯洁性，他们在国王詹姆斯和国王查尔斯的多个议会法案中都有明确规定，要保持宗教的纯洁。现在，正如亚达薛西所不知道盟约的内容，并且不愿意签署它，但他给了以斯拉和王子们一份授权，总体上要做上天之神所要求的一切事情，为了上天之神的宗教和宫殿，因此是一份没有国王的总体授权书，但以斯拉和人民在宣誓盟约时，并没有违背他们的国王的任何职责，根据第五诫，他们对国王的服从程度与我们对国王的服从程度一样：就是这样，我们也没有违背。但他们说，国王没有委任任何副手和代理人，在没有他的特别皇家同意和他的神职人员的指导下，随心所欲地处理宗教事务，因为他与他的人民信仰同一宗教；而亚达薛西与犹太人及其总督信仰的是不同的宗教。 我们的国王也不能随心所欲地做任何事，也不能随从主教们（其中那些在世界和太阳之前都被认为信仰与我们不同的宗教）的个人意愿。但是，我们要看看上帝和国家法律（即国王的意愿）允许我们信仰和崇拜什么，即使国王不愿意宣誓，我们也可以宣誓；否则，我们只能信仰国王的宗教，宣誓国王的盟约，这就是与天主教徒对抗新教徒。以法莲、玛拿西和西缅的外族人在亚撒的时候离开以色列，因为他们看到他的上帝与他同在（《历代志下》15:9, 10），他们在没有他们自己国王同意的情况下宣誓了盟约。如果一个民族在没有国王的情况下宣誓宗教盟约，那么贵族、贵族和议会的成员也可以在没有国王的情况下这样做；这是大主教要求的做法的一个例子。 约阿施年幼时，耶何耶大是总督和摄政王，通过这个王权，人们宣誓了盟约，这是一个梦想，目的是在王位更迭时使教皇和大主教成为摄政王和国王。贵族们与耶何耶大一样，是制定这个盟约的创作者；是的，当国王还是个孩子的时候，这个国家的人民去了巴力的庙宇，打碎了他的偶像等等。这是一个在国王不在场的情况下，由人民进行的改革。严肃的解释者说，与死亡和地狱的盟约（以赛亚书 28 章）是国王与埃及的盟约。而（何西阿书 10 章）的盟约没有人解释为国王不在场的盟约。我听说这位大主教在国王面前讲道时解释了这个意思，但他说的话（正如经文所说）是错误的。大主教在本章的最后，举出了人民改革的不良结果的例子，因为人民让亚伦制造了一个金牛犊，他们背叛了罗波安，归附了耶罗波安，制造了两个金牛犊，他们与押沙龙密谋反对大卫。 如果第一个例子有所作为，那么既不是亚伦那样的大祭司，也不是声称自己是亚伦家族后裔的主教，都不应该参与改革；因为亚伦在这方面犯了错误。而从人民的罪恶来推断否定他们的权力，不比证明亚哈、耶罗波安和以色列和犹大的许多国王都犯了拜偶像的罪，因此他们根本没有王权更好。在本章的其余部分，他在一个圈子里再唱了一遍他的早课，并给出了我们之前听到的相同的论据；其中有以下三个要点：1. 这些论据是偷来的，不是他自己的。2. 反复重复以填满篇幅。3. 所有的论证都建立在错误的假设和问题的提出上。即人民在没有国王的情况下根本没有权力。

QUESTION XXVII
问题二十七

WHETHER OR NO THE KING BE THE SOLE, SUPREME, AND FINAL INTERPRETER OF THE LAW
无论国王是否是法律的唯一、至高和最终解释者

This question conduceth not a little to the clearing of the doubts concerning the king's absolute power, and the supposed sole nomothetic power in the king. And I think it not unlike to the question, Whether the Bope and Romish church have a sole and penemptory power of exponing laws, and the word of God? We are to consider that there is a twofold exposition of laws; 1. One speculative in a school way, so exquisite jurists have a power to expone laws. 2. Practical, in so far as the sense of the law falleth under our practice; and this is twofold,—either private and common to all, or judicial and proper to judges; and of this last is the question.
这个问题对于澄清关于国王绝对权力和国王所谓的唯一立法权力的疑虑有着不小的帮助。我认为这个问题与一个问题相似，即教皇和罗马教会是否拥有解释法律和上帝的话语的唯一和绝对权力？我们需要考虑到法律有两种解释方式：一种是学术上的理论解释，因此卓越的法学家有权解释法律；另一种是实践上的，即法律的意义如何适用于我们的实践；而这又可以分为两种情况，一种是私人的，适用于所有人，另一种是司法的，适用于法官；而这个问题涉及的是后者。

For this public, the law hath one fundamental rule, solus populi, like the king of planets, the sun, which lendeth star-light to all laws, and by which they are exponed: whatever interpretation swerveth either from fundamental laws of policy, or from the law of nature, and the law of nations, and especially from the safety of the public, is to be rejected as a perverting of the law; and therefore, conscientia humani generis, the natural conscience of all men, to which the oppressed people may appeal unto when the king exponeth a law unjustly, at his own pleasure, is the last rule on earth for exponing of laws. Nor ought laws to be made so obscure, as an ordinary wit cannot see their connexion with fundamental truths of policy, and the safety of the people; and therefore I see no inconvenience, to say, that the law itself is norma et regula juduicandi, the rule and directory to square the judge, and that the judge is the public practical interpreser of the law.
对于这个公众来说，法律有一个基本原则，即 solus populi，就像行星之王太阳一样，它为所有法律提供了星光，并通过它们来解释：任何偏离政策的基本法律、自然法和国际法，尤其是偏离公众安全的解释，都应被拒绝为对法律的歪曲；因此，人类良知，即受压迫的人民可以在国王不公正地解释法律时诉诸的所有人的天然良知，是解释法律的最后准则。法律不应该被制定得如此晦涩，以至于普通人无法看到它们与政策的基本真理和人民安全的联系；因此，我认为说法律本身是 norma et regula juduicandi，即裁判的规则和指南，而裁判是公众实际的法律解释者，没有任何不便之处。

Assert. 1.—The king is not the sole and final interpreter of the law.
断言。1.——国王不是法律的唯一和最终解释者。

1. Because then inferior judges should not be interpreters of the law; but inferior judges are no less essentially judges than the king, (Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6; 1 Pet. 2:14; Rom. 13:1, 2,) and so by office must interpret the law, else they cannot give sentence according to their conscience and equity. Now, exponing of the law judicially is an act of judging, and so a personal and incommunicable act; so as I can no more judge and expone the law according to another man's conscience, than I can believe with another man's soul, understand with another man's understanding, or see with another man's eye. The king's pleasure, therefore, cannot be the rule of the inferior judge's conscience, for he giveth an immediate account to God, the Judge of all, of a just or an unjust sentence. Suppose Cæsar shall expone the law to Pilate, that Christ deserveth to die the death, yet Pilate is not in conscience to expone the law so. If therefore inferior judges judge for the king, they judge only by power borrowed from the king, not by the pleasure, will, or command of the king thus and thus exponing the law, therefore the king cannot be the sole interpreter of the law.
因为次级法官不应该是法律的解释者；但是次级法官与国王一样本质上都是法官（申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6；彼得前书 2:14；罗马书 13:1, 2），所以按照职责他们必须解释法律，否则他们无法根据自己的良心和公正作出判决。现在，司法上解释法律是一种判断的行为，因此是个人的、不可传达的行为；所以我不能按照另一个人的良心来判断和解释法律，就像我不能用另一个人的灵魂来相信，用另一个人的理解力来理解，或者用另一个人的眼睛来看。因此，国王的意愿不能成为次级法官良心的准则，因为他要对上帝，众人的审判者，对公正或不公正的判决作出直接的负责。假设凯撒向彼拉多解释法律，说基督应该受死刑，但彼拉多在良心上不能这样解释法律。因此，如果次级法官为国王判断，他们只是凭借从国王借来的权力判断，而不是根据国王的意愿、意志或命令来解释法律，因此国王不能是法律的唯一解释者。

2. If the Lord say not to the king only, but also to other inferior judges, "Be wise, understand, and the cause that you know not, search out," then the king is not the only interpreter of the law. But the Lord saith not to the king only, but to other judges also, Be wise, understand, and the cause that you know not, search out; therefore the king is not the sole law-giver. The major is clear from Psal. 2:10, "Be wise now therefore, O ye kings, be instructed, ye judges of the earth." So are commands and rebukes for unjust judgment given to others than to kings. (Ps. 82:1–5; 58:1, 2; Isa. 1:17, 23, 25, 26; 3:14; Job 29:12–15; 31:21, 22.)
如果主对国王说的话不仅仅是对国王，而且也对其他低级法官说：“要聪明，要明白，要查明你所不知道的事情”，那么国王就不是唯一的法律解释者。但是主不仅对国王说，也对其他法官说：“要聪明，要明白，要查明你所不知道的事情”，因此国王不是唯一的立法者。这一点在诗篇 2:10 中很清楚：“现在你们应当聪明，世上的君王！受教训，地上的审判官！”因此，对于不公正的判断，命令和责备不仅仅是针对国王，而是针对其他人。（诗篇 82:1–5; 58:1, 2; 以赛亚书 1:17, 23, 25, 26; 3:14; 约伯记 29:12–15; 31:21, 22.）

3. The king is either the sole interpreter of law, in respect he is to follow the law as his rule, and so he is a ministerial interpreter of the law, or he is an interpreter of the law according to that super-dominion of absolute power that he hath above the law. If the former be holden, then it is clear that the king is not the only interpreter, for all judges, as they are judges, have a ministerial power to expone the law by the law: but the second is the sense of royalists.
国王要么是法律的唯一解释者，因为他必须遵循法律作为他的准则，所以他是法律的部长解释者；要么他是根据他在法律之上拥有的绝对权力来解释法律的解释者。如果坚持前者，那么显然国王不是唯一的解释者，因为所有法官作为法官，都有权利按照法律解释法律；但后者是王党派的观点。

Assert. 2.—Hence our second assertion is, That the king's power of exponing the law is a mere ministerial power, and he hath no dominion of any absolute royal power to expone the law as he will, and to put such a sense and meaning of the law as he pleaseth.
断言 2：因此，我们的第二个断言是，国王解释法律的权力是一种纯粹的行政权力，他没有任何绝对的王权来随意解释法律，并赋予法律任何他所愿的意义和含义。

1. Because Saul maketh a law, (1 Sam. 14:24,) "Cursed be the man that tasteth any food till night, that the king may be avenged on his enemies," the law, according to the letter, was bloody; but, according to the intent of the lawgiver and substance of the law, profitable, for the end was that the enemies should be pursued with all speed. But king Saul's exponing the law after a tyrannical way, against the intent of the law, which is the diamond and pearl of all laws—the safety of the innocent people, was justly resisted by the innocent people, who violently hindered innocent Jonathan to be killed. Whence it is clear, that the people and princes put on the law its true sense and meaning; for Jonathan's tasting of a little honey, though as it was against that sinful and precipitate circumstance, a rash oath, yet it was not against the substance and true intent of the law, which was the people's speedy pursuit of the enemy. Whence it is clear, that the people, including the princes, hath a ministerial power to expone the law aright, and according to its genuine intent, and that the king, as king, hath no absolute power to expone the law as he pleaseth.
因为扫罗制定了一项法律（撒母耳记上 14:24），“凡在晚上以前尝过食物的人必受咒诅，为的是国王能够向他的敌人复仇”，这项法律在字面上是血腥的；但根据立法者的意图和法律的实质来看，它是有益的，因为目的是要迅速追击敌人。但是，扫罗国王以暴虐的方式解释法律，违背了法律的意图，而法律的意图是所有法律的钻石和珍珠——保护无辜人民的安全，因此无辜的人民有正当理由反抗，他们强烈阻止了对无辜的约拿单的杀害。由此可见，人民和君主赋予法律其真正的意义和目的；因为约拿单尝了一点蜜，虽然违背了那个罪恶和仓促的情况下的誓言，但并没有违背法律的实质和真正的意图，即人民迅速追击敌人。由此可见，人民，包括君主，有权正确解释法律，并根据其真正的意图来解释，而国王作为国王，没有绝对的权力随心所欲地解释法律。

2. The king's absolute pleasure can no more be the genuine sense of a just law than his absolute pleasure can be a law; because the genuine sense of the law is the law itself, as the formal essence of a thing differeth not really, but in respect of reason, from the thing itself. The Pope and Romish church cannot put on the Scripture, ex plenitudine potestatis, whatever meaning they will, no more than they can, out of absolute power, make canonic scripture. Now so it is, that the king, by his absolute power, cannot make law no law. 1. Because he is king by, or according to, law, but he is not king of law. Rex est rex secundum legem, sed non est dominus et rex legis. 2. Because, although it have a good meaning, which Ulpian saith, "Quod principi placet legis vigorem habet,"—the will of the prince is the law; yet the meaning is not that anything is a just law, because it is the prince's will, for its rule formally; for it must be good and just before the prince can will it,—and then, he finding it so, he putteth the stamp of a human law on it.
国王的绝对快乐不能成为公正法律的真正意义，就像他的绝对快乐不能成为法律一样；因为法律的真正意义就是法律本身，正如事物的形式本质与事物本身并没有真正的区别，只是在理性上有所不同。教皇和罗马教会不能随意解释圣经，就像他们不能凭借绝对权力制定教规一样。现在事实是，国王凭借他的绝对权力不能使法律成为非法。1. 因为他是依据法律成为国王，但他不是法律的主宰和国王。Rex est rex secundum legem, sed non est dominus et rex legis. 2. 因为，尽管乌尔皮安说过“Quod principi placet legis vigorem habet”（君主的意愿就是法律的力量），但这并不意味着任何事物只因为是君主的意愿就成为公正的法律；因为它必须在君主意愿之前就是好的和公正的，然后君主发现它是这样的，才会给予它人为法律的标志。

3. This is the difference between God's will and the will of the king, or any mortal creature. Things are just and good, because God willeth them,—especially things positively good, (though I conceive it hold in all things,) and God doth not will things, because they are good and just; but the creature, be he king or any never so eminent, do will things, because they are good and just, and the king's willing of a thing maketh it not good and just; for only God's will—not the creature's—can be the cause why things are good and just. If, therefore, it be so, it must undeniably hence follow, that the king's will maketh not a just law to have an unjust and bloody sense; and he cannot, as king, by any absolute super-dominion over the law, put a just sense on a bloody and unjust law.
这是上帝的意愿和国王的意愿，或者任何凡人的意愿之间的区别。事物之所以公正和善良，是因为上帝愿意它们，尤其是积极善良的事物（尽管我认为这适用于所有事物），上帝不是因为事物善良和公正而愿意它们；但是凡人，无论是国王还是其他任何显赫的人，愿意事物是因为它们善良和公正，国王的意愿并不能使事物变得善良和公正；因为只有上帝的意愿——而不是凡人的意愿——才能成为事物善良和公正的原因。因此，如果是这样的话，不可否认地，国王的意愿并不能使一个公正的法律具有不公正和血腥的意义；作为国王，他不能通过对法律的绝对超越来赋予一个血腥和不公正的法律以公正的意义。

4. The advancing of any man to the throne and royal dignity putteth not the man above the number of rational men. No rational man can create, by any act of power never so transcendent or boundless, a sense to a law contrary to the law. Nay, give me leave to doubt if Omnipotence can make a just law to have an unjust and bloody sense, aut contra, because it involveth a contradiction;—the true meaning of a law being the essential form of the law. Hence judge what brutish, swinish flatterers they are who say, "That it is the true meaning of the law which the king, the only supreme and independent expositor of the law, saith is the true sense of the law." There was once an animal—a fool of the first magnitude—who said he could demonstrate, by invincible reasons, that the king's dung was more nourishing food than bread of the flour of the finest wheat. For my part I could wish it were the demonstrator's only food for seven days, and that should be the best demonstration he could make for his proof.
4. 任何人的晋升到王位和皇家尊严并不能使他超越理性人的数量。没有任何理性的人能够通过任何超越或无限的权力行为来创造一种与法律相悖的意义。不，让我怀疑无所不能的力量是否能够使一个公正的法律具有不公正和血腥的意义，或者反之，因为这涉及到矛盾；法律的真正意义是法律的本质形式。因此，请判断那些说“国王，作为唯一的最高和独立的法律解释者，所说的法律真正意义就是法律的真正意义”的野蛮、猪一样的谄媚者是多么愚蠢。曾经有一种动物——一个愚蠢的大傻瓜——他说他可以通过无懈可击的理由证明国王的粪便比最好的小麦面包更有营养。就我而言，我希望他只吃这个证明七天，那将是他能够为他的证明做出的最好的证明。

5. It must follow that there can be no necessity of written laws to the subjects, against Scripture and natural reason, and the law of nations, in which all accord: that laws not promulgated and published cannot oblige as law; yea, Adam, in his innocency, was not obliged to obey a law not written in his heart by nature, except God had made known the law; as is clear, Gen. 3:11, "Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?" But if the king's absolute will may put on the law what sense he pleaseth, out of his independent and irresistible supremacy, the laws promulgated and written to the subjects can declare nothing what is to be done by the subjects as just, and what is to be avoided as unjust; because the laws must signify to the subjects what is just and what is unjust, according to their genuine sense. Now, their genuine sense, according to royalists, is not only uncertain and impossible to be known, but also contradictory; for the king obligeth us, without gainsaying, to believe that the just law hath this unjust sense. Hence this of flattering royalists is more cruel to kings than ravens, (for these eat but dead men, while they devour living men,) When there is a controversy between the king and the estates of parliament, who shall expone the law and render its native meaning? Royalists say, Not the estates of parliament, for they are subjects, not judges, to the king, and only counsellors and advisers of the king. The king, therefore, must be the only judicial and final expositor. "As for lawyers, (said Strafford,) the law is not enclosed in a lawyer's cap." But I remember this was one of the articles laid to the charge of Richard II., that he said, "The law was in his head and breast." And, indeed, it must follow, if the king, by the plenitude of absolute power, be the only supreme uncontrollable expositor of the law, that is not law which is written in the acts of parliament, but that is the law which is in the king's breast and head, which Josephus (lib. 19, Antiq. c. 2.) objected to Caius. And all justice and injustice should be finally and peremptorily resolved on the king's will and absolute pleasure.
因此，可以得出结论，根据圣经、自然理性和国际法，对于臣民来说，没有必要制定书面法律；未经宣布和公布的法律不能作为法律约束人们；甚至在亚当无罪的状态下，他也不必服从未写在他内心中的法律，除非上帝已经让他知道这个法律，正如创世纪 3:11 所清楚表明的：“你岂是吃了我所禁止你吃的那树上的果子吗？”但是，如果国王的绝对意愿可以根据他的独立和不可抗拒的至高无上来赋予法律任何意义，那么对于臣民来说，对他们宣布和写下的法律不能明确表示什么是公正的，什么是不公正的；因为法律必须根据其真实含义告诉臣民什么是公正的，什么是不公正的。现在，根据君主主义者的观点，他们的真实含义不仅不确定且无法知晓，而且相互矛盾；因为国王无可辩驳地要求我们相信公正的法律具有这种不公正的含义。 因此，对君主的谄媚者比乌鸦更残忍（因为乌鸦只吃死人，而他们吞噬活人）。当国王与议会的贵族之间存在争议时，谁应该解释法律并阐明其本意？君主派说，不是议会的贵族，因为他们是臣民，不是国王的法官，只是国王的顾问。因此，国王必须是唯一的司法和最终解释者。“至于律师，（斯特拉福德说，）法律并不局限于律师的帽子里。”但我记得这是对理查二世的指控之一，他说：“法律在他的头脑和胸膛中。”事实上，如果国王凭借绝对权力的充分性成为法律的唯一至高无上的不可控制的解释者，那么写在议会法案中的就不是法律，而在国王的胸脯和头脑中才是法律，这是约瑟福斯（《犹太古代史》第 19 卷第 2 章）对凯乌斯提出的质疑。所有的正义和非正义都应该最终和决定性地取决于国王的意愿和绝对的喜好。

6. The king either is to expone the law by the law itself; or by his absolute power, loosed from all law, he exponeth it; or according to the advise of his great senate. If the first be said, he is nothing more than other judges. If the second be said, he must be omnipotent, and more. If the third be said, he is not absolute, if the senate be only advisers, and he yet the only judicial expositor. The king often professeth his ignorance of the laws; and he must then both be absolute above the law, and ignorant of the law, and the sole and final judicial exponer of the law. And by this, all parliaments, and their power of making laws, and of judging, are cried down.
国王要么通过法律本身来解释法律，要么通过他的绝对权力来解释法律，解除所有法律的束缚；要么根据他的大议院的建议来解释法律。如果说第一种情况，他与其他法官没有什么不同。如果说第二种情况，他必须是全能的，甚至更多。如果说第三种情况，如果议院只是顾问，而他是唯一的司法解释者，那么他就不是绝对的。国王经常声称对法律一无所知；那么他既必须是法律之上的绝对者，又对法律一无所知，还是法律的唯一和最终的解释者。通过这一点，所有的议会及其制定法律和审判的权力都被贬低了。

Obj. 1.—Prov. 16:10, "A divine sentence is in the lips of the king; his mouth trangresseth not in judgment;" therefore he only can expone the law.
目标 1.——箴言 16:10，“王的嘴唇里有神圣的判决；他的口舌在审判时不会犯错。”因此，只有他才能解释法律。

Ans.—Lavater saith, (and I see no reason on the contrary,) "By a king he meaneth all magistrates." Aben Ezra and Isidorus read the words imperatively. The Tigurine version,—"They are oracles which proceed from his lips; let not therefore his mouth transgress in judgment." Vatabulus,—"When he is in his prophecies, he lieth not." Jansenius,—"Non facile errabit in judicando." Mich. Jermine,—"If he pray." Calvin,—"If he read in the book of the law, as God commandeth him," Deut. 17. But why stand we on the place? "He speaketh of good kings, (saith Cornel, à Lapide,) otherwise Jeroboam, Ahab, and Manasseh, erred in judgment." "And except (as Mercerus exponeth it) we understand him to speak of kings according to their office, not their facts and practice, we make them popes, and men who cannot give out grievous and unjust sentences on the throne,"—against both the Word and experience.
答案：拉瓦特说（我没有看到任何相反的理由），“他所指的是所有的官员。”阿本·以斯拉和伊西多鲁斯以命令的方式阅读这些话。苏黎世版本：“这些都是从他嘴唇流出的神谕，所以他的口不应该在审判中犯错。”瓦塔布卢斯：“当他在预言时，他不会说谎。”詹森尼乌斯：“在判断中不容易犯错。”迈克·杰尔米：“如果他祈祷。”加尔文：“如果他按照上帝的命令阅读律法书”，申命记 17 章。但我们为什么要纠缠于这个地方呢？“他谈论的是好国王，（科尼尔·拉皮德说）否则耶罗波安、亚哈和玛拿西在判断上就犯了错误。”“除非（如梅尔塞尔解释）我们理解他是根据国王的职责而不是他们的行为和实践来说的，否则我们就把他们当作教皇和不能在王位上做出严重和不公正判决的人”，这与圣经和经验都相悖。

Obj. 2.—Sometimes all is cast upon one man's voice; why may not the king be this one man?
有时候一切都依赖于一个人的声音；为什么国王不能成为这个人呢？

Ans.—The antecedent is false; the last voter in a senate is not the sole judge, else why should others give suffrages with him? This were to take away inferior judges, contrary to God's word, Deut. 1:17; 2 Chron. 19:6, 7; Rom. 13:1–3.
答案：前提是错误的；参议院中的最后一位选民不是唯一的裁判，否则为什么其他人要与他一起投票？这将违背上帝的话语，申命记 1:17；历代志下 19:6, 7；罗马书 13:1-3。

QUESTION XXVIII
问题二十八

WHETHER OR NO WARS RAISED BY THE SUBJECTS AND ESTATES, FOR THEIR OWN JUST DEFENCE AGAINST THE KING'S BLOODY EMISSARIES, BE LAWFUL
无论是否由臣民和财产阶级发动，为了自己对抗国王血腥使者的正当防御而引发的战争是否合法

Arnisæus perverteth the question; he saith, "The question is, Whether or no the subjects may, according to their power, judge the king and dethrone him; that is, Whether or no it is lawful for the subjects in any case to take arms against their lawful prince, if he degenerate, and shall wickedly use his lawful power."
阿尼修斯曲解了问题；他说：“问题是，主题是否可以根据他们的能力来评判国王并废黜他；也就是说，无论何种情况下，主题是否可以合法地对付他们合法的君主，如果他堕落并恶意地使用他的合法权力。”

1. The state of the question is much perverted, for these be different questions, Whether the kingdom may dethrone a wicked and tyrannous prince, and whether the kingdom may take up arms against the man who is the king, in their own innocent defence. For the former is an act offensive, and of punishing; the latter is an act of defence.
问题的状态被严重扭曲，因为这是两个不同的问题，一个是国家是否可以废黜邪恶和暴虐的君主，另一个是国家是否可以为了自身的无辜防卫而对国王采取武装行动。前者是一种进攻和惩罚的行为，而后者是一种自卫行为。

2. The present question is not of subjects only, but of the estates, and parliamentary lords of a kingdom. I utterly deny these, as they are judges, to be subjects to the king; for the question is, Whether is the king or the representative kingdom greatest, and which of them be subject one to another? I affirm, amongst judges, as judges, not one is the commander or superior, and the other the commanded or subject. Indeed, one higher judge may correct and punish a judge, not as a judge, but as an erring man.
现在的问题不仅仅是关于主题，还涉及到王国的财产和议会贵族。我完全否认这些人作为法官是国王的臣民；因为问题是，国王和代表王国哪个更伟大，哪个是彼此的臣民？我断言，在法官中，作为法官，没有一个是指挥官或上级，另一个是被指挥或下级。确实，一个更高的法官可以纠正和惩罚一个法官，但不是作为法官，而是作为一个犯错的人。

3. The question is not so much concerning the authoritative act of war, as concerning the power of natural defence, upon supposition, that the king be not now turned an habitual tyrant; but that upon some acts of misinformation, he come in arms against his subjects.
问题不在于战争的权威行为，而在于自然防御的力量，假设国王现在没有成为习惯性的暴君；而是在某些错误信息的影响下，他以武力对抗他的臣民。

Arnisæus maketh two sort of kings,—"Some kings integræ majestatis, of entire power and sovereignty; some kings by pactions, or voluntary agreement between king and people." But I judge this a vain distinction; for the limited prince, so he be limited to a power only of doing just and right, by this is not a prince integraæ majestatis, of entire royal majesty, whereby he may both do good and also play the tyrant; but a power to do ill being no ways essential, yea, repugnant to the absolute majesty of the King of kings, cannot be an essential part of the majesty of a lawful king; and therefore the prince, limited by voluntary and positive paction only to rule according to law and equity, is the good, lawful, and entire prince, only if he have not power to do every thing just and good in that regard, he is not an entire and complete prince. So the man will have it lawful to resist the limited prince, not the absolute prince; by the contrary, it is more lawful to me to resist the absolute prince than the limited, inasmuch as we may with safer consciences resist the tyrant and the lion, than the just prince and lamb. Nor can I assent to Cunnerius (de officio princip. Christia. c. 5 and 17,) who holdeth, "that these voluntary pactions betwixt king and people, in which the power of the prince is diminished, cannot stand, because their power is given to them by God's word, which cannot be taken from them by any voluntary paction, lawfully;" and from the same ground, Winzetus (in velit. contr. Buchan. p. 3) "will have it unlawful to resist kings, because God hath made them irresistible." I answer,—If God, by a divine institution, make kings absolute, and above all laws, (which is a blasphemous supposition—the holy Lord can give to no man a power to sin, for God hath not himself any such power,) then the covenant betwixt the king and people cannot lawfully remove and take away what God by institution has given; but because God (Deut. 17) hath limited the first lawful king, the mould of all the rest, the people ought also to limit him by a voluntary covenant; and because the lawful power of a king to do good is not by divine institution placed in an indivisible point. It is not a sin for the people to take some power, even of doing good, from the king, that he solely, and by himself, shall not have power to pardon an involuntary homicide, without advice and the judicial suffrages of the council of the kingdom, least he, instead of this, give pardons to robbers, to abominable murderers; and in so doing, the people robbeth not the king of the power that God gave him as king, nor ought the king to contend for a sole power in himself of ministering justice to all; for God layeth not upon kings burdens impossible; and God by institution hath denied to the king all power of doing all good; because it is his will that other judges be sharers with the king in that power, (Num. 14:16; Duet. 1:14–17; 1 Pet. 2:14; Rom. 13:1–4;) and therefore the duke of Venice, to me, cometh nearest to the king moulded by God, (Deut. 17) in respect of power, de jure, of any king I know in Europe. And in point of conscience, the inferior judge discerning a murderer and bloody man to die, may in foro conscientiæ despise the king's unjust pardon, and resist the King's force by his co-active power that God hath given him, and put to death the bloody murderer; and he sinneth if he do not this; for to me it is clear, that the king cannot judge so justly and understandingly of a murderer in Scotland, as a judge to whom God hath committed the sword in Scotland. Nor hath the Lord laid that impossible burden on a king to judge so of a murder four hundred miles removed from the king, as the judge nearer to him, as is clear by Num. 14:16; 1 Sam. 7:15–17. The king should go from place to place and judge; and whereas it is impossible to him to go through three kingdoms, he should appoint faithful judges, who may not be resisted,—no, not by the king.
阿尼斯斯制造了两种类型的国王——“一些国王具有完整的权力和主权；一些国王通过国王和人民之间的契约或自愿协议而产生。”但我认为这是一个徒劳的区分；因为有限的君主，只要他被限制在只能做正义和公正的权力范围内，他就不是一个完整的王权，他既可以行善也可以行暴；但是，能够做坏事的权力绝不是必要的，甚至与万王之王的绝对权威相抵触，不能成为合法国王权威的必要组成部分；因此，只有通过自愿和积极的契约限制在法律和公正原则下统治的君主，才是善良、合法和完整的君主，只有在这方面他没有权力去做每一件正义和善良的事情，他才不是一个完整和完全的君主。所以这个人认为反抗有限的君主是合法的，而不是绝对的君主；相反，对我来说，反抗绝对的君主比有限的君主更合法，因为我们可以以更安全的良心反抗暴君和狮子，而不是正义的君主和羔羊。我也不能同意康纳里乌斯（关于基督教君主职责的章节）。 5 和 17，）他们认为，“国王和人民之间的这些自愿契约，在其中王权被削弱，是不能持续的，因为他们的权力是由上帝的话语赋予的，这是不能被任何自愿契约合法地夺走的；出于同样的理由，温泽图斯（在他的著作《反对布坎》中）认为“反抗国王是不合法的，因为上帝使他们无法抵挡。”我回答说，如果上帝通过神圣的制度使国王绝对无上，高于一切法律（这是一种亵渎的假设——圣洁的主不能给任何人犯罪的权力，因为上帝自己也没有这样的权力），那么国王和人民之间的契约不能合法地移除和夺走上帝通过制度赋予的东西；但是因为上帝（申命记 17 章）限制了第一个合法的国王，所有其他国王的模板，人民也应该通过自愿的契约来限制他；而且因为国王的合法权力不是由上帝的制度放置在一个不可分割的点上，他可以行善。 人民从国王那里夺取一些权力，即使是为了做好事，也不是罪过，这样国王就不能独自一人拥有赦免非故意杀人罪的权力，而需要依靠国王委员会的建议和司法投票，以免他反而赦免强盗和可憎的凶手；这样做，并不是剥夺国王作为国王所赋予的权力，国王也不应该争夺自己独自行使所有司法权力的权力；因为上帝不会让国王承担不可能的负担；上帝通过制度否定了国王行使所有善行的权力；因为他愿意其他法官与国王共享这种权力（民数记 14:16；申命记 1:14-17；彼得前书 2:14；罗马书 13:1-4）；因此，对我来说，威尼斯公爵在权力上，按照法律，比我所知道的欧洲任何国王都更接近上帝所塑造的国王（申命记 17 章）。 在道德上，辨别出一个谋杀犯和血腥之人应该死亡的下级法官，可以在良心的庭审中蔑视国王的不公正赦免，并通过上帝赋予他的共同行动力量抵抗国王的武力，并处死血腥的谋杀犯；如果他不这样做，他就犯了罪；因为对我来说很清楚，国王无法像上帝委托剑的法官那样公正而明智地判断苏格兰的谋杀犯。上帝没有把这个不可能的负担放在国王身上，要求他在距离国王四百英里的地方判断谋杀犯，而是更接近他的法官来判断，这在民数记 14:16；撒母耳记上 7:15-17 中是清楚的。国王应该走遍各地审判；而他不可能穿越三个王国，他应该任命忠诚的法官，他们不应该被抵抗，甚至不被国王抵抗。

1. The question is, If the king command A. B. to kill his father or his pastor,—the man neither being cited nor convicted of any fault, he may lawfully be resisted.
问题是，如果国王命令 A 或 B 杀死他的父亲或牧师，而这个人既没有被传唤也没有被判有任何过错，那么可以合法地进行抵抗。

2. Queritur.—If, in that case in which the king is captived, imprisoned, and not sui juris, and awed or overawed by bloody papists, and so is forced to command a barbarous and unjust war; and if, being distracted physically or morally through wicked counsel, he command that which no father in his sober wits would command, even against law and conscience,—that the sons should yield obedience and subjection to him in maintaining, with lives and goods, a bloody religion and bloody papists: if in that case the king may not be resisted in his person, because the power lawful and the sinful person cannot be separated. We hold, that the king using, contrary to the oath of God and his royal office, violence in killing, against law and conscience, his subjects, by bloody emissaries, may be resisted by defensive wars, at the commandment of the estates of the kingdom.
2. 有人提问：如果国王被俘虏、监禁，失去自主权，并受到血腥的天主教徒的威胁或控制，因此被迫下令进行野蛮和不公正的战争；如果国王在身体或道德上因邪恶的建议而分心，下令做出任何一个清醒的父亲都不会下令的事情，甚至违反法律和良心，要求儿子们在维护血腥的宗教和血腥的天主教徒方面服从和顺从他，不惜生命和财产。在这种情况下，国王是否可以被抵抗，因为合法的权力和罪恶的个人是无法分离的。我们认为，如果国王违背上帝的誓约和他的皇家职责，使用违法和违背良心的手段，通过血腥的特工杀害他的臣民，那么可以根据王国的议会命令进行防御性战争来抵抗他。

But before I produce arguments to prove the lawfulness of resistance, a little of the case of resistance. 1. Dr Ferne (part 3, sect. 5, p. 39) granteth resistance by force to the king to be lawful, when the assault is sudden, without colour of a law or reason, and inevitable. But if Nero burn Rome, he hath a colour of law and reason; yea, though all Rome, and his mother, in whose womb he lay, were one neck. A man who will I with reason go mad, hath colour of reason, and so of law, to invade and kill the innocent. 2. Arnisæus saith, (c. 2, n. 10,) "If the magistrate proceed extra-judicialiter, without order of law by violence, the laws giveth every private man power to resist, if the danger be irrecoverable; yea, though it be recoverable." (L. prohibitum, C. de jur. fisc. l. que madmodum, sect. 39, magistratus ad l. aquil. l. nec. magistratibus, 32, de injur.) Because, while the magistrate doth against his office, he is not a magistrate; for law and right, not injury, should come from the magistrate. (L. meminerint. 6, C. unde vi.) Yea, if the magistrate proceed judicially, and the loss be irrecoverable, jurists say that a private man hath the same law to resist. (Marantins. dis. 1, n. 35). And in a recoverable loss they say, every man is holden to resist, si evidenter constet de iniquitate, if the iniquity be known to all. (D. D. Jason, n. 19, des. n. 26, ad I. ut vim de just. et jur.) 3. I would think it not fit easily to resist the king's unjust exactors of custom or tribute. (1.) Because Christ paid tribute to Tiberius Cæsar, an unjust usurper, though he was free from that, by God's law, lest he should offend. (2.) Because we have a greater dominion over goods than over our lives and bodies; and it is better to yield in a matter of goods than to come to arms, for of sinless evils we may choose the least. 4. A tyrant, without a title, may be resisted by any private man. Quia licet vim vi repellere, because we may repel violence by violence; yea, he may be killed. Ut I. et vim. F. de instit. et jure, ubi plene per omnes. Vasquez, l. 1, c. 3, n. 33; Barclaius, contra Monarch. l. 4, c. 10, p. 268.
但在我提出证据证明抵抗的合法性之前，先谈一下抵抗的情况。1. 弗恩博士（第 3 部分，第 5 节，第 39 页）承认，当袭击突然发生，没有法律或理由的借口，并且不可避免时，对国王的武力抵抗是合法的。但是，如果尼禄焚烧罗马，他就有了法律和理由的借口；是的，即使整个罗马和他的母亲（他在她的子宫里）都是一个整体。一个理智的人会发疯，他有理由，也有法律的借口侵犯和杀害无辜者。2. 阿尼塞乌斯说（第 2 章，第 10 条）：“如果行政官员在没有法律命令的情况下采取暴力行动，法律赋予每个私人权力来抵抗，如果危险是无法挽回的，即使它是可以挽回的。”（禁止法，关于财政法律，第 39 节，关于鹰法律，第 32 节，关于侵权行为）因为，当行政官员违背他的职责时，他不再是行政官员；因为法律和正义，而不是伤害，应该来自行政官员。（记住法律，第 6 条，从暴力开始）是的，如果行政官员进行司法程序，而且损失是无法挽回的，法学家们说私人有同样的法律来抵抗。（马兰廷斯。讨论） 1、n. 35）。在可恢复的损失中，他们说，每个人都有责任抵抗，如果不公正是众所周知的话。（D. D. Jason，n. 19，des. n. 26，ad I. ut vim de just. et jur.）3. 我认为不容易抵抗国王不公正的征收者的关税或贡品。（1.）因为基督向提比留·恺撒纳税，他是一个不公正的篡夺者，尽管他不受上帝的法律约束，以免触犯。（2.）因为我们对财产的控制权大于对生命和身体的控制权；在财产问题上屈服比动武更好，因为在无罪的邪恶中我们可以选择最小的。4. 一个没有头衔的暴君可以被任何私人抵抗。因为我们可以用暴力来抵御暴力；是的，他可以被杀死。

For the lawfulness of resistance in the matter of the king's unjust invasion of life and religion, we offer these arguments.
对于国王不公正侵犯生命和宗教的抵抗合法性，我们提出以下论点。

Arg. 1.—That power which is obliged to command and rule justly and religiously for the good of the subjects, and is only set over the people on these conditions, and not absolutely, cannot tie the people to subjection without resistance, when the power is abused to the destruction of laws, religion, and the subjects. But all power of the law is thus obliged, (Rom. 13:4; Deut. 17:18–20; 2 Chron. 19:6; Ps. 132:11, 12; 89:30, 31; 2 Sam. 7:12; Jer. 17:24, 25,) and hath, and may be, abused by kings, to the destruction of laws, religion, and subjects. The proposition is clear. 1. For the powers that tie us to subjection only are of God. 2. Because to resist them, is to resist the ordinance of God. 3. Because they are not a terror to good works, but to evil. 4. Because they are God's ministers for our good, but abused powers are not of God, but of men, or not ordinances of God; they are a terror to good works, not to evil; they are not God's ministers for our good.
第一条：那些被迫公正、宗教地统治和命令，为了子民的利益而被设立的权力，而不是绝对的权力，当权力被滥用以破坏法律、宗教和子民时，不能将人民束缚在服从之下而没有反抗。但所有法律的权力都是这样被迫的（罗马书 13:4；申命记 17:18-20；历代志下 19:6；诗篇 132:11,12；89:30,31；撒母耳记下 7:12；耶利米书 17:24,25），并且国王可能滥用权力，破坏法律、宗教和子民。这个命题是明确的。1.因为束缚我们服从的权力只来自上帝。2.因为抵抗他们就是抵抗上帝的命令。3.因为他们不是对善行的威胁，而是对恶行的威胁。4.因为他们是上帝为我们的利益而设立的仆人，但被滥用的权力不是来自上帝，而是来自人，或者不是上帝的命令；他们对善行是威胁，而不是对恶行；他们不是上帝为我们的利益而设立的仆人。

Arg. 2.—That power which is contrary to law, and is evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection, but is a mere tyrannical power and unlawful; and if it tie not to subjection, it may lawfully be resisted. But the power of the king, abused to the destruction of laws, religion, and subjects, is a power contrary to law, evil, and tyrannical, and tyeth no man to subjection: wickedness by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. Obligation to suffer of wicked men falleth under no commandment of God, except in our Saviour. A passion, as such, is not formally commanded, I mean a physical passion, such as to be killed. God hath not said to me in any moral law, Be thou killed, tortured, beheaded; but only, Be thou patient, if God deliver thee to wicked men's hands, to suffer these things.
第二条：那种违法、邪恶和暴虐的权力不能束缚任何人，它只是一种暴虐和非法的权力；如果它不能束缚人，那么可以合法地进行抵抗。但是，国王滥用权力破坏法律、宗教和臣民的权力是违法、邪恶和暴虐的，它不能束缚任何人：任何理由都不能使任何人受到邪恶人的约束。受邪恶人的迫害不受上帝的任何诫命约束，除非在我们的救主那里。作为一种情感，它并没有被正式命令，我指的是一种物理上的情感，比如被杀害。上帝在任何道德法律中都没有对我说过：“你要被杀、被折磨、被斩首”；只是说，如果上帝把你交给邪恶人的手，要忍耐这些事情。

Arg. 3.—There is not a stricter obligation moral betwixt king and people than betwixt parents and children, master and servant, patron and clients, husband and wife, the lord and the vassal, between the pilot of a ship and the passengers, the physician and the sick, the doctor and the scholars, but the law granteth, (l. Minime 35, de Relig. et sumpt. funer,) if these betray their trust committed to them, they may be resisted: if the father turn distracted, and arise to kill his sons, his sons may violently apprehend him, and bind his hands, and spoil him of his weapons; for in that he is not a father. Vasquez, (Lib. 1, Illustr. quest. c. 8, n. 18,)—Si dominus subditum enormiter et atrociter oneraret, princeps superior vassallum posset ex toto eximere a sua jurisdictione, et etiam tacente subdito et nihil petente. Quid papa in suis decis. parliam. grat. decis. 62. Si quis Baro. abutentes dominio privari possunt. The servant may resist the master if he attempts unjustly to kill him, so may the wife do to the husband; if the pilot should wilfully run the ship on a rock to destroy himself and his passengers, they might violently thrust him from the helm. Every tyrant is a furious man, and is morally distracted, as Althusius saith, Polit. c. 28, n. 30, and seq.
国王和人民之间的道德义务比父母和子女、主人和仆人、赞助人和客户、丈夫和妻子、领主和臣民、船长和乘客、医生和病人、教师和学生之间的道德义务更为严格，但法律规定（法律最小 35 条，关于宗教和葬礼）如果这些人背叛了他们所托付的信任，他们可以被抵抗；如果父亲发疯并试图杀害他的儿子，他的儿子可以强行逮捕他，绑住他的手，夺取他的武器；因为在那种情况下他不再是一个父亲。瓦斯克斯（第一卷，第 8 章，第 18 条）-如果主人对仆人施加过度和残忍的压迫，上级君主可以完全解除他对臣民的管辖权，即使臣民保持沉默并不提出要求。教皇在他的决定中也有类似的规定。如果某个领主滥用权力，他可以被剥夺领地。仆人可以抵抗主人，如果主人试图不公正地杀害他，妻子也可以对丈夫这样做；如果船长故意将船撞上岩石以毁灭自己和乘客，他们可以强行将他从舵上推开。 每个暴君都是愤怒的人，道德上心神不宁，如阿尔图修斯所说，政治学第 28 章，第 30 号及其后续。

Arg. 4.—That which is given as a blessing, and a favour, and a screen, between the people's liberty and their bondage, cannot be given of God as a bondage and slavery to the people. But the power of a king is given as a blessing and favour of God to defend the poor and needy, to preserve both tables of the law, and to keep the people in their liberties from oppressing and treading one upon another. But so it is, that if such a power be given of God to a king, by which, actu primo, he is invested of God to do acts of tyranny, and so to do them, that to resist him in the most innocent way, which is self-defence, must be a resisting of God, and rebellion against the king, his deputy; then hath God given a royal power as uncontrollable by mortal men, by any violence, as if God himself were immediately and personally resisted, when the king is resisted, and so this power shall be a power to waste and destroy irresistibly, and so in itself a plague and a curse; for it cannot be ordained both according to the intention and genuine formal effect and intrinsical operation of the power, to preserve the tables of the law, religion and liberty, subjects and laws, and also to destroy the same. But it is taught by royalists that this power is for tyranny, as well as for peaceable government; because to resist this royal power put forth in acts either ways, either in acts of tyranny or just government, is to resist the ordinance of God, as royalists say, from Rom. 13:1–3. And we know, to resist God's ordinances and God's deputy, formaliter, as his deputy, is to resist God himself, (1 Sam. 8:7; Matt. 10:40,) as if God were doing personally these acts that the king is doing; and it importeth as much as the King of kings doth these acts in and through the tyrant. Now, it is blasphemy to think or say, that when a king is drinking the blood of innocents, and wasting the church of God, that God, if he were personally present, would commit these same acts of tyranny, (God avert such blasphemy!) and that God in and through the king, as his lawful deputy and vicegerent in these acts of tyranny, is wasting the poor church of God. If it be said, in these sinful acts of tyranny, he is not God's formal vicegerent, but only in good and lawful acts of government, yet he is not to be resisted in these acts, not because the acts are just and good, but because of the dignity of his royal person. Yet this must prove that those who resist the king in these acts of tyranny, must resist no ordinance of God, but only resist him who is the Lord's deputy, though not as the Lord's deputy. What absurdity is there in that more than to disobey him, refusing active obedience to him who is the Lord's deputy, not as the Lord's deputy, but as a man commanding besides his master's warrant?
第四条：作为上帝赐予人民自由和奴役之间的祝福、恩惠和屏障的东西，不能作为上帝赐予人民奴役和奴隶制。但是，国王的权力是上帝赐予的祝福和恩惠，是为了保护贫穷和需要帮助的人，维护法律的两个原则，并保护人民的自由，防止他们相互压迫和践踏。然而，如果这样的权力是上帝赐予国王的，通过这个权力，国王首先被上帝授权行使暴政行为，以至于以最无辜的方式，即自卫，抵抗他就成了抵抗上帝，反抗国王及其代理人，那么上帝就赋予了一种无法受到凡人控制的王权，无论通过任何暴力手段，都无法阻止，就好像上帝自己被直接和个人地抵抗一样，当国王受到抵抗时，这种权力将是一种无法抵挡的浪费和破坏力量，因此本身就是一种灾祸和诅咒；因为它既不能按照权力的意图、真正的形式效果和内在运作来制定，以保护法律、宗教和自由、臣民和法律，也不能摧毁它们。 但是，王党认为这种权力既可以用于暴政，也可以用于和平的治理；因为抵抗这种王权在行动中的表现，无论是暴政还是公正的政府，都是抵抗上帝的命令，正如王党从罗马书 13:1-3 中所说的那样。我们知道，正式地抵抗上帝的命令和上帝的代理人，就是抵抗上帝自己（撒母耳记上 8:7；马太福音 10:40），好像上帝亲自在做国王所做的这些行为；这意味着万王之王在暴君身上通过这些行为来实现。现在，认为或者说当国王喝着无辜者的鲜血，浪费上帝的教会时，上帝如果亲自在场，会做这些暴政的行为，这是亵渎（愿上帝远离这样的亵渎！）；上帝通过国王作为他合法的代理人和副手，在这些暴政行为中浪费上帝的贫穷教会。 如果有人说，在这些罪恶的暴政行为中，他并不是上帝正式的代理人，而只是在善良和合法的政府行为中才是，然而在这些行为中，他不应该被抵抗，不是因为这些行为是公正和善良的，而是因为他作为皇室人物的尊贵。然而，这必须证明那些在这些暴政行为中抵抗国王的人，不是抵抗上帝的命令，而只是抵抗那个作为主的代理人，尽管不是作为主的代理人。这比不服从他，拒绝对他作为主的代理人的积极服从还荒谬吗？

Arg. 5.—That which is inconsistent with the care and providence of God in giving a king to his church is not to be taught. Now God's end in giving a king to his church, is the feeding, safety, preservation, and the peaceable and quiet life of his church. (1 Tim. 2:2; Isa. 49:23; Psal. 78:71). But God should cross his own end in the same act of giving a king, if he should provide a king, who, by office, were to suppress robbers, murderers, and all oppressors and wasters in his holy mount, and yet should give an irresistible power to one crowned lion, a king, who may kill ten hundred thousand protestants for their religion, in an ordinary providence; and they are by an ordinary law of God to give their throats to his emissaries and bloody executioners. If any say the king will not be so cruel,—I believe it; because, actu secundo, it is not possibly in his power to be so cruel. We owe thanks to his good will that he killeth not so many, but no thanks to the nature and genuine intrinsical end of a king, who hath power from God to kill all these, and that without resistance made by any mortal man. Yea, no thanks (God avert blasphemy!) to God's ordinary providence, which (if royalists may be believed) putteth no bar upon the unlimited power of a man inclined to sin, and abuse his power to so much cruelty. Some may say, the same absurdity doth follow if the king should turn papist, and the parliament all were papists. In that case there might be so many martyrs for the truth put to death, and God should put no bar of providence upon this power, then more than now; and yet, in that case, the king and parliament should be judges given of God, actu primo, and by virtue of their office obliged to preserve the people in peace and godliness. But I answer, If God gave a lawful official power to king and parliament to work the same cruelty upon millions of martyrs, and it should be unlawful for them by arms to defend themselves, I should then think that king and parliament were both ex officio, by virtue of their office, and actu primo, judges and fathers, and also by that same office, murderers and butchers,—which were a grievous aspersion to the unspotted providence of God.
阿格。5.与上帝赐予教会国王的关怀和预备不一致的事物不应该被教导。上帝赐予教会国王的目的是为了教会的滋养、安全、保护以及和平安宁的生活。（提摩太前书 2:2；以赛亚书 49:23；诗篇 78:71）。但是，如果上帝在赐予国王的同时，提供给一个加冕的狮子国王无法抵挡的权力，他可以在普通的神意下杀死十万个基督教徒，而他们按照上帝的普通法律必须向他的密使和血腥执行者献出他们的喉咙，那么上帝将违背自己的目的。如果有人说国王不会那么残忍，我相信；因为在第二行动中，他不可能如此残忍。我们应该感谢他的善意，他没有杀那么多人，但是我们不能感谢国王的本质和真正的目的，他有上帝的权力杀死所有这些人，而且没有任何凡人能够抵抗。是的，我们不能感谢（愿上帝远离亵渎！对于上帝的普通恩典，如果皇室派的观点可信，它对于一个倾向于犯罪并滥用权力以施行残暴的人的无限权力没有任何限制。有人可能会说，如果国王皈依天主教，而议会全都成为天主教徒，那么同样的荒谬情况也会出现。在那种情况下，可能会有许多为真理而殉道的人被处死，而上帝却没有对这种权力施加任何限制，比现在更甚。然而，在那种情况下，国王和议会应该是上帝所赋予的、根据他们的职责而有义务维护人民的和平和虔诚的法官。但我回答说，如果上帝赋予国王和议会合法的官方权力，使他们对数百万殉道者施行同样的残暴，而他们用武力保护自己是不合法的，那么我会认为国王和议会都是根据他们的职责和行动而成为法官和父亲，也是凭借同样的职责成为凶手和屠夫——这将是对上帝无瑕疵的恩典的严重诽谤。

Arg. 6.—If the estates of a kingdom give the power to a king, it is their own power in the fountain; and if they give it for their own good, they have power to judge when it is used against themselves, and for their evil, and so power to limit and resist the power that they gave. Now, that they may take away this power, is clear in Athaliah's case. It is true she was a tyrant without a title, and had not the right of heaven to the crown, yet she had, in men's court, a title. For supposing all the royal seed to be killed, and the people consent, we cannot say that, for these six years or thereabout, she was no magistrate: that there were none on the throne of David at this time: that she was not to be obeyed as God's deputy. But grant that she was no magistrate; yet when Jehoash is brought forth to be crowned, it was a controversy to the states to whom the crown should belong. 1. Athaliah was in possession. 2. Jehoash himself being but seven years old, could not be judge. 3. It might be doubted if Joash was the true son of Ahaziah, and if he was not killed with the rest of the blood royal.
如果一个王国的财产给予国王权力，那么这是他们自己在源头上的权力；如果他们给予这个权力是为了自己的利益，那么他们有权力判断这个权力是否被用于对抗他们自己、对他们的恶行，并且有权力限制和抵抗他们所给予的权力。现在，他们可以夺走这个权力是很明显的，就像亚他利雅的情况一样。诚然，她是一个没有正当称号的暴君，并没有天上的权利来继承王位，然而在人们的法庭上，她有一个称号。假设所有的王室后裔都被杀害了，并且人民同意，我们不能说，在这大约六年的时间里，她不是一个执政者，不能说在大卫的宝座上没有人，不能说她不应该被当作上帝的代理人来服从。但是即使承认她不是一个执政者，当约阿施被带出来加冕时，对于王位应该归属于谁，这是一个争议。1. 亚他利雅占据了王位。2. 约阿施自己只有七岁，不能作出判断。3. 人们可能怀疑约阿施是否是亚哈谢的真正儿子，以及他是否和其他王室成员一起被杀害。

Two great adversaries say with us; Hugo Grotius (de jur. belli et pacis, l. 1, c. 4, n. 7,) saith he dare not condemn this, if the lesser part of the people, and every one of them indifferently, should defend themselves against a tyrant, ultimo necessitatis præsidio. The case of Scotland, when we were blocked up by sea and land with armies: the case of England, when the king, induced by prelates, first attempted to bring an army to cut off the parliament, and then gathered an army, and fortified York, and invaded Hull, to make the militia his own, sure is considerable. Barclay saith, the people hath jus se tuendi adversus immanem sævitiem, (advers. Monarch. l. 3, c. 8,) a power to defend themselves against prodigious cruelty. The case of England and Ireland, now invaded by the bloody rebels of Ireland, is also worthy of consideration. I could cite hosts more.
两个伟大的对手与我们说; 雨果·格罗蒂乌斯（《战争与和平法》第 1 卷第 4 章第 7 节）说，如果人民中的少数派和每个人都能公正地为自己抵抗暴君，他就不敢谴责这种行为，这是最后的必要手段。当我们被陆海封锁时，苏格兰的情况；英格兰的情况，当国王在主教的鼓动下，首次试图带领军队割断议会，并集结军队，在约克筑起堡垒，并入侵赫尔，以使民兵成为他自己的力量，这是非常重要的。巴克利说，人民有权利反抗巨大的残暴（《反君主论》第 3 卷第 8 章）。现在，英格兰和爱尔兰被爱尔兰血腥的叛乱分子入侵，这也值得考虑。我还可以举出更多例子。

QUESTION XXIX
问题二十九

WHETHER, IN THE CASE OF DEFENSIVE WAR, THE DISTINCTION OF THE PERSON OF THE KING, AS A MAN, WHO CAN COMMIT ACTS OF HOSTILE TYRANNY AGAINST HIS SUBJECTS, AND OF THE OFFICE AND ROYAL POWER THAT HE HATH FROM GOD AND THE PEOPLE, AS A KING, CAN HAVE PLACE
无论在防御战中，作为一个人，国王是否能够对他的臣民实施敌对的暴政行为，以及他作为国王所拥有的来自上帝和人民的职位和王权之间是否存在区别

Before I can proceed to other Scripture proofs for the lawfulness of resistance, this distinction, rejected by royalists, must be cleared. This is an evident and sensible distinction:—The king in concreto, the man who is king, and the ling in abstracto, the royal office of the king. The ground of this distinction we desire to be considered from Rom. 13. We affirm with Buchanan, that Paul here speaketh of the office and duty of good magistrates, and that the text speaketh nothing of an absolute king, nothing of a tyrant; and the royalists distinguish where the law distinguisheth not, against the law, (1. pret. 10, gl. Bart, de pub. in Rem.); and therefore we move the question here, Whether or no to resist the illegal and tyrannical will of the man who is king, be to resist the king and the ordinance of God; we say no. Nor do we deny the king, abusing his power in unjust acts, to remain king, and the minister of God, whose person for his royal office, and his royal office, are both to be honoured, reverenced, and obeyed. God forbid that we should do so as the sons of Belial, imputing to us the doctrine of anabaptists, and the doctrine falsely imputed to Wicliffe,—that dominion is founded upon supernatural grace, and that a magistrate being in the state of mortal sin, cannot be a lawful magistrate,—we teach no such thing. The P. Prelate showeth us his sympathy with papists, and that he buildeth the monuments and sepulchres of the slain and murdered prophets, when he, refusing to open his mouth in the gates for the righteous, professeth he will not purge the witnesses of Christ, the Waldenses, and Wicliffe, and Huss, of these notes of disloyalty, but that these acts proceeding from this root of bitterness, the abused power of a king, should be acknowledged with obedience active or passive, in these unjust acts, we deny.
在我继续提供其他证明抵抗合法性的经文之前，必须澄清这个被君主主义者所拒绝的区别。这是一个明显而明智的区别：具体的国王，即担任国王职务的人，和抽象的国王，即国王的王权。我们希望从罗马书 13 章考虑这个区别的基础。我们赞同布坎南的观点，保罗在这里谈到的是善良执政者的职责和义务，这段经文没有提到绝对君王，也没有提到暴君；而君主主义者在法律没有区分的地方进行区分，违背了法律（1. pret. 10, gl. Bart, de pub. in Rem.）；因此，我们在这里提出问题，抵抗担任国王职务的人的非法和暴虐意愿是否等同于抵抗国王和上帝的命令；我们的回答是否定的。我们也不否认国王在不公正行为中滥用权力时仍然是国王，是上帝的仆人，他的人格和王权都应受到尊敬、敬畏和服从。 愿上帝禁止我们像比利亚的儿子那样行事，将重洗派的教义和错误归咎于我们，即统治是建立在超自然恩典之上，而一个处于罪恶状态的执政者不能成为合法的执政者。我们并不教导这样的事情。这位主教向我们展示了他对天主教徒的同情，他建造了被杀害的先知们的纪念碑和坟墓，而他自己却拒绝在门户之间为义人开口，他宣称不会为基督的见证人——瓦尔登斯派、威克里夫和胡斯——洗刷这些不忠诚的标记，而这些行为源于这个苦涩之根——国王滥用的权力，应该以积极或被动的服从方式承认这些不公正的行为，我们否认这一点。

Assert. 1.—It is evident from Rom. 13 that all subjection and obedience to higher powers commanded there, is subjection to the power and office of the magistrate in abstracto, or, which is all one, to the person using the power lawfully, and that no subjection is due by that text, or any word of God, to the abused and tyrannical power of the king, which I evince from the text, and from other Scriptures.
从罗马书 13 章可以明显看出，对上级权力的所有服从和顺从，是对抽象的执法者的权力和职位的服从，或者说，对合法行使权力的个人的服从。根据这段经文和其他经文，可以得出结论，这段经文和上帝的话语并没有要求对国王滥用和暴虐的权力进行服从。

1. Because the text saith, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." But no powers commanding things unlawful, and killing the innocent people of God, can be ἐχυσίαι ὑπερεχύσαι higher powers, but in that lower powers. He that commandeth not what God commandeth, and punisheth and killeth where God, if personally and immediately present, would neither command nor punish, is not in these acts to be subjected unto, and obeyed as a superior power, though in habit he may remain a superior power; for all habitual, all actual superiority is a formal participation of the power of the Most High. Arnisæus well saith, (c. 4, p. 96,) "That of Aristotle must be true, It is against nature, better and worthier men should be in subjection to unworthier and more wicked men;" but when magistrates command wickedness, and kill the innocent, the non-obeyers, in so far, are worthier than the commanders (whatever they be in habit and in office) actually, or in these wicked acts are unworthier and inferior, and the non-obeyers are in that worthier, as being zealous adherents to God's command and not to man's will. I desire not to be mistaken; if we speak of habitual excellency, godly and holy men, as the witnesses of Christ in things lawful, are to obey wicked and infidel kings and emperors, but in that these wicked kings have an excellency in respect of office above them; but when they command things unlawful, and kill the innocent, they do it not by virtue of any office, and so in that they are not higher powers, but lower and weak ones. Laertius doth explain Aristotle well, who defineth a tyrant by this, "That he commandeth his subjects by violence;" and Arnisæus condemneth Laertius for this, "Because one tyrannical action doth no more constitute a tyrant, than one unjust action doth constitute an unjust man." But he may condemn, as he doth indeed, (Covarruvias pract. quest, c. 1, and Vasquez lllustr. quest. l. 1, c. 47, n. 1, 12,) for this is essential to a tyrant, to command and rule by violence. If a lawful prince do one or more acts of a tyrant, he is not a tyrant for that, yet his action in that is tyrannical, and he doth not that as a king, but in that act as a sinful man, having something of tyranny in him.
因为经文说：“凡心里存敬畏主的，都要顺服那上级的权柄。”但是，没有命令不合法的事情，也没有杀害神的无辜之民的权力，可以被称为更高的权力，而只能是较低的权力。那些不遵守上帝的命令，惩罚和杀害上帝在场时既不会命令也不会惩罚的人，在这些行为中不应该服从和顺从他们，视他们为上级权力，尽管他们在习惯上可能仍然是上级权力；因为所有习惯上的、实际上的优越性都是对至高者权力的正式参与。阿尼塞乌斯很好地说过（第 4 章，第 96 页）：“亚里士多德的话必须是真实的，更好、更有价值的人应该服从不值得和更邪恶的人；但是当官员命令邪恶，并杀害无辜者时，不服从者在某种程度上比命令者更有价值（无论他们在习惯和职位上是什么），实际上或在这些邪恶行为中是不值得和低下的，而不服从者在这方面是更有价值的，因为他们是对上帝的命令而不是人的意愿的热心追随者。 我不希望被误解；如果我们谈论习惯性的卓越，虔诚和圣洁的人，作为基督的见证人，在合法的事情上，应该服从邪恶和不信者的国王和皇帝，但是在这些邪恶的国王在职位上比他们更卓越的时候；但是当他们命令不合法的事情，并杀害无辜者时，他们并不是凭借任何职位，所以在这一点上他们不是更高的权力，而是更低和脆弱的。拉尔修斯很好地解释了亚里士多德的定义，他将暴君定义为“用暴力命令臣民的人”；而阿尼塞乌斯则谴责拉尔修斯，因为“一个暴政行为并不能构成一个暴君，就像一个不公正的行为并不能构成一个不公正的人一样。”但他可以谴责，正如他确实做到的那样，（科瓦鲁维亚斯实践问题，第 1 章，和瓦斯克斯插图问题，第 1 卷，第 47 章，第 1、12 号，）因为这对于一个暴君来说是必不可少的，他通过暴力来命令和统治。如果一个合法的君主做了一个或多个暴君的行为，他并不是一个暴君，然而他在那个行为中是暴政的，他并不是作为国王这样做的，而是作为一个有着暴政特质的罪人。

2. The powers (Rom. 13:1) that be, are ordained of God, as their author and efficient; but kings commanding unjust things, and killing the innocent, in these acts, are but men, and sinful men; and the power by which they do these acts, a sinful and an usurped power, and so far they are not powers ordained of God, according to his revealed will, which must rule us. Now the authority and official power, in abstracto, is ordained of God, as the text saith, and other Scriptures do evidence. And this politicians do clear, while they distinguish betwixt jus personæ, and jus coronæ, the power of the person, and the power of the crown and royal office. They must then be two different things.
2. 执政者（罗马书 13:1）是上帝所命定的，作为他们的创造者和效力者；但是，那些命令不公正的事情并杀害无辜者的国王，在这些行为中，只是人，是有罪的人；而他们执行这些行为的权力，是一种有罪的和篡夺的权力，所以在这个意义上，他们不是按照上帝的启示意愿所命定的权力，这个意愿必须统治我们。现在，权威和官方权力，抽象地说，是上帝所命定的，正如经文所说，其他经文也证明了这一点。政治家们在区分人的权力和王冠和皇家职位的权力时，就清楚地表明了这一点。他们必须是两个不同的事物。

3. He that resisteth the power, that is, the official power, and the king, as king, and commanding in the Lord, resisteth the ordinance of God, and God's lawful constitution. But he who resisteth the man, who is the king, commanding that which is against God, and killing the innocent, resisteth no ordinance of God, but an ordinance of sin and Satan; for a man commanding unjustly, and ruling tyrannically, hath, in that, no power from God.
抵抗权力的人，即官方权力和国王作为国王，并在主的名义下发号施令，抵制了上帝的法令和上帝的合法宪法。但是，抵抗那个国王，即那个命令违背上帝的人，并杀害无辜者的人，并没有违背上帝的法令，而是违背了罪恶和撒旦的法令；因为一个不公正地命令和暴虐统治的人，在这方面没有来自上帝的权力。

4. They that resist the power and royal office of the king in things just and right, shall receive to themselves damnation, but they that resist, that is, refuse, for conscience, to obey the man who is the king, and choose to obey God rather than man, as all the martyrs did, shall receive to themselves salvation. And the eighty valiant men, the priests, who used bodily violence against king Uzziah's person, "and thrust him out of the house of the Lord," from offering incense to the Lord, which belonged to the priest only, received not damnation to themselves, but salvation in doing God's will, and in resisting the king's wicked will.
那些在公正和正义的事情上抵抗国王的权力和王室职位的人，将自己招致谴责；但那些抵抗，也就是出于良心拒绝服从国王这个人，选择服从上帝而不是人的人，就像所有的殉道者一样，将自己获得救赎。而那八十个勇敢的人，那些祭司，他们对乌西雅王的人身施加了暴力，“将他从主的殿中赶出去”，阻止他向主献香，这只属于祭司的职责，他们并没有自招谴责，而是在履行上帝的旨意和抵抗国王的邪恶意愿中获得了救赎。

5. The lawful ruler, as a ruler, and in respect of his office, is not to be resisted, because he is not a terror to good works, but to evil; and no man who doth good is to be afraid of the office or the power, but to expect praise and a reward of the same. But the man who is a king may command an idolatrous and superstitious worship—send an army of cut-throats against them, because they refuse that worship, and may reward papists, prelates, and other corrupt men, and may advance them to places of state and honour because they kneel to a tree altar,—pray to the east,—adore the letters and sound of the word Jesus—teach and write Arminianism, and may imprison, deprive, confine, cut the ears, and slit the noses, and burn the faces of those who speak and preach and write the truth of God; and may send armies of cut-throats, Irish rebels, and other papists and malignant atheists, to destroy and murder the judges of the land, and innocent defenders of the reformed religion, &c.,—the man, I say, in these acts is a terror to good works,—an encouragement to evil; and those that do good are to be afraid of the king, and to expect no praise, but punishment and vexation from him; therefore, this reason in the text will prove that the man who is the king, in so far as he doth those things that are against his office, may be resisted; and that in these we are not to be subject, but only we are to be subject to his power and royal authority, in abstracto, in so far as, according to his office, he is not a terror to good works, but to evil.
5. The lawful ruler, as a ruler, and in respect of his office, is not to be resisted, because he is not a terror to good works, but to evil; and no man who doth good is to be afraid of the office or the power, but to expect praise and a reward of the same. But the man who is a king may command an idolatrous and superstitious worship—send an army of cut-throats against them, because they refuse that worship, and may reward papists, prelates, and other corrupt men, and may advance them to places of state and honour because they kneel to a tree altar,—pray to the east,—adore the letters and sound of the word Jesus—teach and write Arminianism, and may imprison, deprive, confine, cut the ears, and slit the noses, and burn the faces of those who speak and preach and write the truth of God; and may send armies of cut-throats, Irish rebels, and other papists and malignant atheists, to destroy and murder the judges of the land, and innocent defenders of the reformed religion, &c., - 这个人，我说，通过这些行为对善行是一种恐吓，对恶行是一种鼓励；那些行善的人应该害怕国王，并且不要期望赞扬，而是要受到惩罚和困扰；因此，文中的这个理由将证明，只要国王在他的职责范围内做了违背他职责的事情，他可以被抵抗；在这些事情上，我们不应该屈服，只有在抽象的意义上，我们应该服从他的权力和王权，只要他根据他的职责不对善行构成恐吓，而是对恶行构成恐吓。

6. The lawful ruler is the minister of God, or the servant of God, for good to the commonwealth; and to resist the servant in that wherein he is a servant, and using the power that he hath from his master, is to resist the Lord his master. But the man who is the king, commanding unjust things, and killing the innocent, in these acts is not the minister of God for the good of the commonwealth;—he serveth himself, and papists, and prelates, for the destruction of religion, laws, and commonwealth; therefore the man may be resisted, by this text, when the office and power cannot be resisted.
合法的统治者是上帝的仆人，为了公共利益而服务；而抵抗这个仆人在他作为仆人的职责范围内行使他从主人那里获得的权力，就是抵抗他的主人上帝。但是，那个命令不公正的事情并杀害无辜的国王，在这些行为中并不是为了公共利益而服务上帝的仆人；他是为了自己，天主教徒和主教，为了破坏宗教、法律和公共利益；因此，当职位和权力无法抵抗时，根据这段经文，可以抵抗这个人。

7. The ruler, as the ruler, and the nature and intrinsical end of the office is, that he bear God's sword as an avenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil,—and so cannot be resisted without sin. But the man who is the ruler, and commandeth things unlawful, and killeth the innocent, carrieth the papist's and prelate's sword to execute, not the righteous judgment of the Lord upon the ill-doer, but his own private revenge upon him that doth well; therefore, the man may be resisted, the office may not be resisted; and they must be two different things.
7. 统治者作为统治者，其职责的本质和内在目标是，他要承担上帝的剑作为复仇者，对作恶者执行愤怒的惩罚，因此不能无罪地抵抗。但是，那个作为统治者的人，如果命令违法之事，杀害无辜者，他就使用了天主教徒和主教的剑来执行的不是上帝对作恶者的公正审判，而是他自己对行善者的私人复仇；因此，可以抵抗这个人，但不能抵抗这个职位；它们必须是两个不同的事物。

8. We must needs be subject to the royal office for conscience, by reason of the fifth commandment; but we must not needs be subject to the man who is king, if he command things unlawful; for Dr Ferne warranteth us to resist, if the ruler invade us suddenly, without colour of law or reason, and unavoidably; and Winzetus, Barclay, and Grotius, as before I cited, give us leave to resist a king turning a cruel tyrant; but Paul (Rom. 13) forbiddeth us to resist the power, in abstracto; therefore, it must be the man, in concreto, that we must resist.
我们必须出于良心而顺从国王的职权，这是因为第五诫命；但如果国王命令违法之事，我们不必顺从他本人；因为费恩博士保证我们可以抵抗，如果统治者突然侵犯我们，没有法律或理由的借口，并且是不可避免的；而温泽特斯、巴克利和格罗修斯，正如我之前引用的，允许我们抵抗变成残暴暴君的国王；但保罗（罗马书 13 章）禁止我们抵抗权力，抽象地说；因此，我们必须抵抗具体的人。

9. Those we may not resist to whom we owe tribute, as a reward of the onerous work on which they, as ministers of God, do attend continually. But we owe not tribute to the king as a man,—for then should we be indebted tribute to all men,—but as a king, to whom the wages of tribute is due, as to a princely workman,—a king as a king;—therefore, the man and the king are different.
我们对那些我们欠纳贡的人无法抗拒，因为他们作为上帝的仆人，不断地从事辛勤的工作。但我们对国王不欠纳贡，因为如果是作为一个人，我们就欠所有人纳贡了，而是作为一个国王，纳贡的报酬是应该给予的，就像给予一个王者般的工人一样，一个国王作为国王；因此，人和国王是不同的。

10. We owe fear and honour as due to be rendered to the man who is king, because he is a king, not because he is a man; for it is the highest fear and honour due to any mortal man, which is due to the king, as king.
我们应该对作为国王的人给予敬畏和尊敬，因为他是国王，而不是因为他是一个人；因为对于任何凡人来说，对国王的敬畏和尊敬是最高的。

11. The man and the inferior judge are different; and we cannot, by this text, resist the inferior judge, as a judge, but we resist the ordinance of God, as the text proveth. But cavaliers resist the inferior judges as men, and have killed divers members of both houses of parliament; but they will not say that they killed them as judges, but as rebels. If, therefore, to be a rebel, as a wicked man, and to be a judge, are differenced thus, then, to be a man, and commit some acts of tyranny, and to be the supreme judge and king, are two different things.
11. 这个人和下级法官是不同的；根据这段文字，我们不能抵抗下级法官作为法官，但我们抵抗的是上帝的命令，正如这段文字所证明的。但是骑士们抵抗下级法官是作为人，他们杀害了议会的许多成员；但他们不会说他们杀害他们是作为法官，而是作为叛乱者。因此，如果作为一个邪恶的人成为叛乱者，和成为一个法官是有区别的，那么作为一个人并犯下一些暴政行为，和成为最高法官和国王是两回事。

12. The congregation, in a letter to the nobility, (Knox, Hist. of Scotland, l. 2.) say, "There is great difference betwixt the authority, which is God's ordinance, and the persons of those who are placed in authority. The authority and God's ordinance can never do wrong, for it commandeth that vice and wicked men be punished, and virtue, with virtuous men and just, be maintained; but the corrupt person placed in this authority may offend, and most commonly do contrary to this authority. And is then the corruption of man to be followed, by reason that it is clothed with the name of authority?" And they give instance in Pharaoh and Saul, who were lawful kings and yet corrupt men. And certainly the man and the divine authority differ, as the subject and the accident,—as that which is under a law and can offend God, and that which is neither capable of law nor sin.
12. 教众在给贵族的信中（《苏格兰史》第 2 卷）说：“神所设立的权威与担任权威职位的人是有很大区别的。权威和神的命令永远不会做错事，因为它命令惩罚邪恶和恶人，维护美德和正直的人；但是担任这个权威职位的腐败人可能会犯错，而且通常违背这个权威。那么，难道应该因为这个人的腐败而追随他，只因为他身上有权威的名号吗？”他们举了法老和扫罗的例子，他们是合法的国王，但却是腐败的人。确实，人和神圣的权威是不同的，就像主体和附属物一样，就像受法律约束并可能得罪上帝的东西，与不受法律和罪恶束缚的东西不同。

13. The king, as king, is a just creature, and by office a living and breathing law. His will, as he is king, is nothing but a just law; but the king, as a sinful man, is not a just creature, but one who can sin and play the tyrant; and his will, as a private sinful man, is a private will, and may be resisted. So the law saith, "The king, as king, can do no wrong," but the king, as a man, may do a wrong. While as, then, the parliaments of both kingdoms resist the king's private will, as a man, and fight against his illegal cutthroats, sent out by him to destroy his native subjects, they fight for him as a king, and obey his public legal will, which is his royal will, de jure; and while he is absent from his parliaments as a man, he is legally and in his law-power present, and so the parliaments are as legal as if he were personally present with them.
国王作为国王，是一个公正的存在，按职责而言是一个活生生的法律。他作为国王的意愿，无非是公正的法律；但是作为一个有罪的人，国王并不是一个公正的存在，而是一个可以犯罪和暴虐的人；他作为一个私人有罪的人的意愿，是一个私人意愿，可以被抵抗。所以法律说，“国王作为国王，不会犯错”，但是作为一个人，国王可能会犯错。因此，两个王国的议会抵抗国王作为一个人的私人意愿，并与他派出的非法杀手作斗争，以摧毁他的本国臣民，他们为了国王而战，服从他的公共合法意愿，这是他的皇家意愿，合法上的；而当他作为一个人不在议会时，他在法律上和在法律权力上是存在的，所以议会的合法性就像他亲自与他们在一起一样。

Let me answer royalists.—The P. Prelate saith it is Solomon's word, "By me kings reign;"—kings, in concreto, with their sovereignty. He saith not, by me royalty or sovereignty reigneth. And elsewhere he saith that Barclay saith, "Paul, writing to the Romans, keepeth the usual Roman diction in this,—who express by powers, in abstracto, the persons authorised by power,—and it is the Scripture's dialect: by him were created "thrones, dominions, principalities," that is, angels; to say angels, in abstracto, were created, (2 Pet. 2:10,) They "speak evil of dignities," Jude 8, "despise dominion," that is, they speak ill of Cajus, Caligula, Nero. Our Levites rail against the Lord's anointed,—the best of kings in the world. Nero, (Rom. 12:4,) in concreto, beareth not the sword in vain. Arnisæus saith it better than the Prelate, (he is a witless thief,) Rom. 13:4, "The royal power, in abstracto, doth not bear the sword, but the person; not the power, but the prince himself beareth the sword." And the Prelate, poor man, following Dr Ferne, saith, "It is absurd to pursue the king's person with a cannon bullet at Edgehill, and preserve his authority at London, or elsewhere." So saith Ferne, (sect. 10, p. 64,) "The concrete powers here are purposed as objects of our obedience, which cannot be directed but upon power in some person; for it is said, αἱ οὐσαι εξουσίαι The powers that be are of God." Now power cannot be οὐσα existent but in some person; and, saith Ferne, "Can power in the abstract have praise? Or is tribute paid to the power in the abstract? Yea, the power is the reason why we yield obedience to the person," &c.
让我回答皇室主义者。大主教说这是所罗门的话，“国王由我统治”——指的是具有主权的国王。他没有说是由我统治的王权或主权。而且他还说巴克利说，“保罗在写给罗马人的信中使用了通常的罗马措辞，用抽象的权力来表达被授权的人——这是圣经的用语：他创造了“宝座、主权、首领”，也就是天使；也就是说，用抽象的方式说天使被创造了（彼得后书 2:10），他们“说谤讪的话”，犹大书 8，“蔑视统治”，也就是说，他们说加约、加利古拉、尼禄的坏话。我们的利未人谩骂上帝的受膏者——世界上最好的国王。尼禄（罗马书 12:4）不是抽象的，他拿着剑并不是徒劳无功。阿尼塞乌斯比大主教说得更好（他是个无知的小偷），罗马书 13:4，“抽象的王权并不拿着剑，而是人；不是权力，而是王子自己拿着剑。”可怜的大主教，跟随费恩博士说，“在埃奇希尔用大炮追击国王的人是荒谬的，在伦敦或其他地方保护他的权威却是合理的。"费恩如此说道，（第 10 节，第 64 页）：“这里的具体权力被用作我们顺从的对象，而这种顺从只能指向某个人的权力；因为有人说过，αἱ οὐσαι εξουσίαι，即‘现存的权力是出于上帝的’。”现实中的权力只能存在于某个人身上；费恩还说：“抽象的权力能受到赞美吗？或者说我们向抽象的权力支付贡品吗？是的，正是这个权力的原因，我们才向某个人顺从。”"

The Prelate hath as much learning as to copy out of Ferae, Barclay, Arnisæus, and others, these words and the like, but hath not wit to add the sinews of these authors' reason; and with all this he can in his preface call it his own, and "provoke any to answer him if they dare;" whereas, while I answer this excommunicated pamphleteer, I answer these learned authors, from which he stealeth all he hath; and yet he must persuade the king he is the only man who can defend his Majesty's cause, and "the importunity (forsooth) of friends extorted this piece," as if it were a fault that this delphic oracle (giving out railings and lies for responses) should be silent. 1. Not we only, but the Holy Ghost, in terminis, hath this distinction, Acts 4:19; 5:29, "We ought to obey God rather than men." Then rulers (for of rulers sitting in judgment is that speech uttered) commanding and tyrannising over the apostles, are men contradistinguished from God; and as they command and punish unjustly, they are but men, otherwise commanding for God, they are gods, and more than men. 2. From Theophylact also, or from Chrysostom on Rom. xiii. we have this,—The apostle speaketh not (say they) περὶ τῶν καθ ἐτασον ἀρχόντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀυτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος 3. Sovereignty or royalty doth not properly reign or bear the sword, or receive praise, and this accident doth not bear a sword; nor do we think (or Paul speak, Rom. 13) of the abstracted due of power and royalty, subsisting out of its subject; nor dream we that the naked accident of royal authority is to be feared and honoured as the Lord's anointed; the person or man who is the king, and beareth the crown on his head, and holdeth the sceptre in his hand, is to be obeyed. Accidents are not persons; but they speak nonsense, and are like brute beasts who deny that all the kingly honour due to the king must be due to him as a king, and because of the royal dignity that God hath given to him, and not because he is a man; for a pursuivant's son is a man; and if a pursuivant's son would usurp the throne, and take the crown on his head, and the sceptre in his hand, and command that all souls be subject to such a superior power, because he is a man, the laws of Scotland would hang a man for a less fault, we know; and the P. Prelate was wont to edify women, and converted souls to Christ, with such a distinction as objectum quod and objectum quo, in the pulpits of Edinburgh, and it hath good use here; we never took abstract royalty to be the king. The kings of Scotland of old were not second notions, and we exclude not the person of the king; yet we distinguish, with leave of the P. Prelate, betwixt the person in linea physica (we must take physica largly here) and in linea morali, obedience, fear, tribute, honour is due to the person of the king, and to the man who is king, not because of his person, or because he is a man, (the P. Prelate may know in what notion we take the name person,) but because God, by the people's election, hath exalted him to royal dignity; and for this cause ill-doers are to subject their throats and necks to the sword of the Lord's anointed's executioner or hangman, with patience, and willingly; because, in taking away the head of ill-doers, for ill-doing, he is acting the office of the Lord, by whom he reigneth; but if he take away their heads, and send out the long-tusked vultures and boars of Babylon, the Irish rebels, to execute his wrath, as he is in that act a misinformed man, and wanteth the authority of God's law and man's law, he may be resisted with arms. For, 1. If royalists say against this, then, if a king turn an habitual tyrant, and induce an hundred thousand Turks to destroy his subjects upon mere desire of revenge, they are not to resist, but to be subject, and suffer for conscience. I am sure Grotius saith, "If a king sell his subjects, he loseth all title to the crown, and so may be resisted;" and Winzetus saith,2 "A tyrant may be resisted;" and Barclay, "It is lawful for the people, in case of tyranny, to defend themselves, adversus immanent sævetiam, against extreme cruelty." And I desire the Prelate to answer how people are subject in suffering such cruelty of the higher power, because he is God's ordinance, and a power from God, except he say, as he selleth his people, and barbarously destroyeth by the cut-throat Irishmen, his whole subjects refusing to worship idols, he is a man and a sinful man, eatenus, and an inferior power inspired by wicked counsel, not a king, eatenus, not a higher power; and that in resisting him thus, the subjects resist not the ordinance of God. Also suppose king David defend his kingdom and people against Jesse, his natural father, who we suppose cometh in against his son and prince, king David, with a huge army of the Philistines to destroy him and his kingdom, if he shall kill his own native father m that war, at some Edgehill, how shall he preserve at Jerusalem that honour and love that he oweth to his father, by virtue of the fifth commandment, "Honour thy father and thy mother, &c.," let them answer this; except king David consider Jesse in one relation, in abstracto, as his father, whom he is to obey, and as he is a wicked man, and a perfidious subject, in another relation; and except king David say, he is to subject himself to his father, as a father, according to the fifth commandment, and that in the act of his father's violent invasion, he is not to subject himself to him, as he is a violent invader, and as a man. Let the royalist see how he can answer the argument, and how Levi is not to know his father and mother, as they are sinful men, (Deut. 33:9,) and yet to know and honour them as parents; and how an Israelite is not to pity the wife that lieth in his bosom, when she enticeth him "to go a whoring after strange gods," but is to kill her, (Deut. 13:6–8,) and yet the husband is to "love the wife, as Christ loved his church," Eph. 5:25. If the husband take away his wife's life in some mountain in the Holy Land, as God's law commandeth, let the royalists answer us, where is then the marital love he owes to her, and that respect due to her as she is a wife and a helper? 2. But let not the royalist infer that I am from these examples pleading for the killing of kings; for lawful resistance is one thing, and killing of kings is another,—the one defensive and lawful, the other offensive and unlawful, so long as he remaineth a king, and the Lord's anointed; but if he be a murderer of his father, who doth counsel his father to come to a place of danger where he may be killed, and where the king ought not to be; as Abner was worthy of death, who watched not carefully king Saul, but slept when David came to his bedside, and had opportunity to kill the king; they are traitors and murderers of the king, who either counselled his Majesty to come to Edgehill, where the danger was so great, or did not violently restrain him from coming thither, seeing kings' safety and lives are as much, yea, more, in the disposing of the people than in their own private will (2 Sam. 18:2, 3); for certainly the people might have violently restrained king Saul from killing himself; and the king is guilty of his own death, and sinneth against his office and subjects, who cometh out in person to any such battles where he may be killed, and the contrary party free of his blood. And here our Prelate is blind, if he see not the clear difference between the king's person and his office as king, and between his private will and his public and royal will. 3. The angels may be named thrones and dominions in abstracto, and yet created in concreto, and we may say the angel and his power are both created at once; but David was not both born the son of Jesse and a king at once; and the P. Prelate by this may prove it is not lawful to resist the devil, (for he is of the number of these created angels, Col. 1,) as he is a devil; because in resisting the devil as a devil, we must resist an angel of God and a principality. 4. To speak evil of dignities, (2 Pet. 2; Jude 8,) Piscator insinuateth, is, to speak evil of the very office of rulers, as well as of their manners; and Theodat. saith, on 2 Pet. 2, that "these railers speak evil of the place of governors and masters, as unbeseeming believers." All our interpreters, as Beza, Calvin, Luther, Bucer, Marloratus, from the place, saith it is a special reproof of anabaptists and libertines, who in that time maintained that we are all free men in Christ, and that there should not be kings, masters, nor any magistrates. However the abstract is put for the concrete, it is true, and it saith we are not to rail upon Nero; but to say Nero was a persecutor of Christians, and yet obey him commanding what is just, are very consistent. 5. "The persons are proposed (Rom. 13) to be the object of our obedience," saith Dr Ferne. This is very true: but he is ignorant of our mind in exponing the word person. We never meant that fear, honour, royalty, tribute, must be due to the abstracted accident of kingly authority, and not to the man who is king; nor is it our meaning that royalty, in abstracto, is crowned king, and is anointed, but that the person is crowned and anointed. But, again, by a person, we mean nothing less than the man Nero wasting Rome, burning, crucifying Paul, and torturing Christians; and that we owe subjection to Nero, and to his person in concreto, as to God's ordinance, God's minister, God's swordbearer, in that notion of a person, is that only that we deny. Nay, in that Nero, in concreto, to us is no power ordained of God, no minister of God, but a minister of the devil, and Satan's armour-bearer, and therefore we owe not fear, honour, subjection, or tribute to the person of Nero. But the person thus far is the object of our obedience, that fear, honour, subjection and tribute must be due to the man in concreto, to his person who is prince, but not because he is a man, or a person simply, or a sword-bearer of papists, but for his office,—for that eminent place of royal dignity that God hath conferred on his person. We know the light of the sun, the heat of fire, in abstracto, do not properly give light and heat, but the sun and fire in concreto; yet the principium quo, ratio qua, the principles of these operations in sun and fire be light and heat; and we ascribe illuminating of dark bodies, heating of cold bodies, to sun and fire in concreto, yet not to the subjects simply, but to them as affected with such accidents; so here we honour and submit to the man who is king, not because he is a man, that were treason; not because he useth his sword against the church, that were impiety; but because of his royal dignity, and because he useth it for the Lord. It is true, Arnisæus, Barclay, and Ferne, say, "That kings leave not off to be kings when they use their power and sword against the church and religion. And also it is considerable, that when the worst of emperors, bloody Nero, did reign, the apostle presseth the duty of subjection to him, as to a power appointed of God, and condemneth the resisting of Nero, as the resisting of an ordinance of God. And certainly, if the cause and reason, in point of duty moral, and of conscience before God remain in kings, to wit, that while they are enemies and persecutors, as Nero was, their royal dignity, given them of God remaineth, then subjection upon that ground is lawful, and resistance unlawful."—Ans. It is true, so long as kings remain kings, subjection is due to them because kings; but that is not the question. The question is, if subjection be due to them, when they use their power unlawfully and tyrannically. Whatever David did, though he was a king, he did it not as king; he deflowered not Bathsheba as king, and Bathsheba might with bodily resistance and violence lawfully have resisted king David, though kingly power remained in him, while he should thus attempt to commit adultery; else David might have said to Bathsheba, "Because I am the Lord's anointed, it is rebellion in thee, a subject, to oppose any bodily violence to my act of forcing of thee; it is unlawful to thee to cry for help, for if any shall offer violently to rescue thee from me, he resisteth the ordinance of God." Subjection is due to Nero as an emperor, but not any subjection is due to him in the burning of Rome, and torturing of Christians, except you say that Nero's power abused in these acts of cruelty was, 1. A power from God. 2. An ordidance of God. 3. That in these he was the minister of God for the good of the commonwealth. Because some believed Christians were free from the yoke of magistracy, and that the dignity itself was unlawful; and because (c. 12) he had set down the lawful church rulers, and in this and the following chapter, the duties of brotherly love of one toward another; so here (c. 13) he teacheth that all magistrates, suppose heathen, are to be obeyed and submitted unto in all things, so far as they are ministers of God. Arnisæus objecteth to Buchanan, "If we are by this place to subject ourselves to every power, in abstracto, then also to a power contrary to the truth, and to a power of a king exceeding the limits of a king; for such a power is a power, and we are not to distinguish where the law distinguisheth not."
主教具备足够的学识，可以从费拉、巴克利、阿尼塞乌斯等人那里抄袭这些话，但他没有智慧来补充这些作者的论据；尽管如此，他在序言中却可以称之为自己的作品，并“挑衅任何敢回应他的人”；然而，当我回应这个被逐出教会的小册子作者时，我也在回应这些有学问的作者，他从他们那里偷取了一切；然而，他必须说服国王，他是唯一能够捍卫陛下事业的人，“朋友们的强烈要求逼迫他写下这篇文章”，仿佛这个神谕（以谩骂和谎言作为回应）保持沉默是一种过错。1. 不仅是我们，而且圣灵在行动 4:19；5:29 中也有这个区别，“我们应当顺从神，不顺从人。”然后统治者（因为那句话是对坐在审判席上的统治者说的）命令和压迫使徒，他们是与神区别开来的人；当他们不公正地命令和惩罚时，他们只是人，但如果他们为神而命令，他们就是神，超越人类。2. 还可以从西奥菲拉克特或从基督思多姆在罗马书 13 章中得到这个观点。 我们有这个，使徒并没有说（他们说）περὶ τῶν καθ ἐτασον ἀρχόντων，ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀυτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος 3。主权或王权并不适当地统治或持剑，或受赞美，而这个意外并不持剑；我们也不认为（或保罗在罗马书 13 章所说）权力和王权的抽象义务存在于其主体之外；我们也不梦想光秃秃的皇权意外应该像主的受膏者一样受到恐惧和尊敬；那个人或者说是国王的人，戴着王冠，手持权杖，应该被服从。意外不是人；但他们说的是无意义的话，就像野兽一样否认所有应该归于国王的尊荣应该归于他作为国王，因为上帝赋予了他王权的尊严，而不是因为他是一个人；因为传令官的儿子也是一个人；如果传令官的儿子想篡夺王位，戴上王冠，手持权杖，并命令所有灵魂服从这样一个上级权力，因为他是一个人，我们知道苏格兰的法律会因为一个更小的过错而处死一个人；而且 P. 大主教常常以"objectum quod"和"objectum quo"的区别来教导妇女，并使他们归向基督，在爱丁堡的讲坛上，这在这里也有好处；我们从未将抽象的王权视为国王。古代苏格兰的国王并不是第二个概念，我们并不排除国王的人格；然而，我们在物理线上（在这里我们必须广泛理解物理）和道德线上区分，对国王的人格应该给予服从、敬畏、贡税和尊敬，对于作为国王的人来说，不是因为他的人格，也不是因为他是一个人（大主教的许可）。 主教可能知道我们对“人”的概念有何理解，但因为上帝通过人民的选举将他提升为王位，所以作恶者应该以耐心和乐意地将他们的喉咙和脖子交给上主受膏者的刽子手或绞刑手，因为他在为上主行使职责时，是在为了惩罚作恶者而割去他们的头颅；但如果他割去他们的头颅，并派遣巴比伦的长牙秃鹰和野猪——爱尔兰叛乱者来执行他的愤怒，那么他就是一个被误导的人，缺乏上帝法律和人法的权威，可以用武力抵抗他。因为，1. 如果王党人士对此提出异议，那么如果国王成为习惯性的暴君，并引导十万土耳其人仅仅出于复仇的欲望来摧毁他的臣民，他们不应该抵抗，而应该顺从，并为良心而受苦。 我确信格罗修斯说过：“如果国王出卖他的臣民，他就失去了王位的所有权利，因此可以被抵抗。”温泽图斯说：“暴君可以被抵抗。”巴克利说：“在暴政的情况下，人民有权自卫，对抗极端残忍。”我希望主教回答一下，人民如何忍受上位者的残暴，因为他是上帝的命令和来自上帝的权力，除非他说，他出卖了他的人民，并且通过刽子手般的爱尔兰人野蛮地摧毁了他的所有臣民，他们拒绝崇拜偶像，他是一个人，一个有罪的人，到此为止，一个受邪恶的建议激发的下级权力，而不是一个国王，到此为止，不是一个更高的权力；在这样抵抗他的情况下，臣民并不是抵抗上帝的命令。 也假设大卫王保卫他的王国和人民免受杰西的攻击，杰西是他的亲生父亲，我们假设他带领一支庞大的非利士军队来摧毁他和他的王国。如果他在战争中杀死自己的亲生父亲，那么他将如何在耶路撒冷保持对父亲的尊重和爱，根据第五诫的规定：“要孝敬父母”？让他们回答这个问题；除非大卫王将杰西看作是他的父亲，他必须顺从他，同时将他看作是一个邪恶的人和一个不忠的臣民；除非大卫王说，在父亲的暴力入侵行为中，他不必顺从他作为一个暴力入侵者和一个人。让君主主义者看看他们如何回答这个论点，以及利未人如何不认识他们的父母是罪人（申命记。 33:9，然而要尊重并尊敬他们作为父母；以色列人不可怜他怀抱中的妻子，当她引诱他“去追随外邦的神”，而是要杀死她（申命记 13:6-8），然而丈夫要“爱妻子，如同基督爱教会”（以弗所书 5:25）。如果丈夫按照上帝的律法在圣地的某座山上夺走妻子的生命，让王党派回答我们，他对妻子应该有的夫妻之爱和作为妻子和帮助者应得的尊重在哪里？2. 但是，不要让王党人以此为由认为我在这些例子中为杀害国王辩护；因为合法的抵抗是一回事，而杀害国王是另一回事——前者是防御性和合法的，后者是攻击性和非法的，只要他仍然是国王和上帝的受膏者；但如果他是杀害自己父亲的凶手，他劝告他的父亲去一个危险的地方，可能会被杀害，而国王不应该去那里；正如亚伯尼尔没有仔细看守扫罗王，而是在大卫来到他的床边时睡着了，并有机会杀死国王，他们是国王的叛徒和凶手，他们要么劝告陛下去埃奇希尔，那里的危险如此之大，要么没有强烈阻止他去那里，因为国王的安全和生命在于人民的决定，甚至更多，而不是他们自己的私人意愿（撒母耳记下 18:2, 3）；因为人民肯定可以强烈阻止扫罗王自杀；国王对自己的死负有责任，违背了他的职责和臣民，如果他亲自参加可能被杀害的战斗，而对立派别却不负有他的血债。 这里我们的主教是盲目的，如果他看不出国王的人和他作为国王的职责之间的明显区别，以及他的私人意愿和他的公共和王室意愿之间的区别。3.天使可以在抽象上被称为王座和主宰，但在具体上是被创造的，我们可以说天使和他的力量同时被创造出来；但大卫不是同时出生为耶西的儿子和国王；而且主教通过这个可以证明抵抗魔鬼是不合法的（因为他是这些被创造的天使之一，歌罗西书 1），因为在抵抗魔鬼时，我们必须抵抗上帝的天使和统治者。4.诽谤尊贵的人（彼得后书 2；犹大书 8），皮斯卡托暗示，是对统治者的职责以及他们的品行说坏话；而泰奥达特在彼得后书 2 中说，“这些诽谤者说出了统治者和主人的地位，这是不适合信徒的。”我们所有的解释者，如贝扎、加尔文、路德、布塞尔、马洛拉图斯，都从这个地方说，这是对浸礼派和自由派的特别指责，他们在那个时候主张我们在基督里都是自由的人，不应该有国王、主人或任何官员。 无论抽象的东西如何被放置在具体的东西之前，它是真实的，它说我们不应该嘲笑尼禄；但是说尼禄是基督徒的迫害者，然而服从他的正义命令是非常一致的。"人们被提出来（罗马书 13 章）作为我们顺从的对象，"费恩博士说。这是非常正确的：但他对我们解释"人"一词的意思是无知的。我们从来没有意味着对国王权威的抽象事故要付出敬畏、尊敬、尊贵和贡税，而不是对作为国王的人；我们的意思也不是国王权威的抽象本质被加冕为国王，被膏抹，而是人被加冕和膏抹。但是，再次强调，我们所指的"人"，绝不仅仅是尼禄这个人，他浪费罗马，焚烧、钉十字架上的保罗，折磨基督徒；我们对尼禄及其具体人格的服从，作为上帝的命令、上帝的仆人、上帝的剑佩，我们完全否认。不仅如此，对我们来说，尼禄这个具体的人并不是上帝所命定的权力，也不是上帝的仆人，而是魔鬼的仆人，撒旦的武装仆从，因此我们对尼禄的人格不欠任何敬畏、尊敬、顺从或贡税。 但迄今为止，这个人是我们顺从的对象，我们必须对这个具体的人，对他作为王子的人，怀有敬畏、尊重、顺从和贡品，而不是因为他是一个人，或者仅仅是一个人，或者是天主教徒的持剑者，而是因为他的职位——因为上帝赋予他的王室尊严的显赫地位。我们知道，太阳的光和火的热，抽象地说，并不能真正提供光和热，而是太阳和火具体地提供；然而，这些操作的原则在太阳和火中是光和热；我们将黑暗物体的照明、冷物体的加热归因于太阳和火具体地作用，但不仅仅是简单地归因于这些对象，而是归因于它们受到这些属性的影响；所以在这里，我们尊敬和顺从作为国王的人，不是因为他是一个人，那将是叛国；也不是因为他用剑对付教会，那将是不虔诚；而是因为他的王室尊严，因为他为主而使用它。阿尼塞乌斯、巴克利和费恩说得对，"当国王们使用他们的权力和剑对抗教会和宗教时，他们并没有停止做国王。" 而且，值得注意的是，即使最糟糕的皇帝，血腥的尼禄统治时，使徒也强调了对他的顺从责任，视其为上帝所指定的权力，并谴责抵抗尼禄，就像是抵抗上帝的命令一样。当然，如果在道义和在上帝面前的良心责任方面，国王仍然具有原因和理由，即使他们是敌人和迫害者，就像尼禄一样，他们从上帝那里得到的王权仍然存在，那么基于这个理由的顺从是合法的，而抵抗是不合法的。——答：没错，只要国王仍然是国王，就应该对他们表示顺从，因为他们是国王；但这不是问题所在。问题是，当他们非法和暴虐地使用权力时，是否应该对他们表示顺从。 无论大卫做了什么，尽管他是国王，他并不是以国王的身份行事；他没有像国王那样玷污巴实巴，而巴实巴可以通过肉体上的抵抗和暴力合法地抵抗国王大卫，尽管他仍然拥有国王的权力，但他这样企图犯奸淫罪；否则大卫可能对巴实巴说：“因为我是主的受膏者，你作为臣民，反对我对你的强迫行为使用任何肉体上的暴力是叛乱；对你来说呼救是非法的，因为如果有人试图强行救你脱离我的控制，他就是违抗上帝的命令。”尼禄作为皇帝应该受到顺从，但在罗马大火和对基督徒的折磨中，他并不应该受到任何顺从，除非你说尼禄在这些残忍行为中滥用了权力，1. 这是上帝的权力。2. 这是上帝的命令。3. 在这些行为中，他是上帝的仆人，为了国家的利益而行动。因为有些人相信基督徒不受政府的约束，而且这个尊严本身是不合法的；并且因为（第 12 章）他已经列出了合法的教会领袖，并在这一章和下一章中，列出了彼此之间的兄弟爱的责任；所以在这里（第 他教导说，所有的官员，即使是异教徒，都应该在一切事情上服从和顺从，只要他们是上帝的仆人。阿尼塞斯反驳布坎南说：“如果我们根据这个地方要将自己屈服于每一个权力，那么也要屈服于与真理相悖的权力，以及超越国王职权范围的权力；因为这样的权力就是权力，我们不应该在法律没有区分的地方区分。”"

Ans. 1.—The law clearly distinguisheth we are to obey parents in the Lord, and if Nero command idolatry, this is an excessive power. Are we obliged to obey, because the law distinguisheth not? 2. The text saith we are to obey every power from God that is God's ordinance, by which the man is a minister of God for good; but an unjust and excessive power is none of these three. 3. The text in words distinguisheth not obedience active in things wicked and lawful, yet we are to distinguish.
答案 1：法律明确区分我们应该在主内服从父母，如果尼禄命令拜偶像，这是一种过度的权力。我们是否因为法律没有区分而被迫服从？2.经文说我们应该服从每一个来自上帝的权力，这是上帝的命令，通过这个人成为上帝的仆人，为了善行；但不公正和过度的权力不属于这三者之一。3.经文在字面上没有区分服从在邪恶和合法事物中的积极行动，但我们需要区分。

Symmons.—Is authority subjected solely in the king's law, and no whit in his person, though put upon him both by God and man? Or, is authority only the subject, and the person exercising the authority, a bare accident to that, being in it only more separably, as pride and folly are in a man. Then, if one in authority command out of his own will, and not by law,—if I neither actively nor passively obey, I do not so much as resist abused authority; and then must the prince, by his disorderly will, have quite lost his authority and become like another man; and yet his authority has not fled from him.
Symmons. —国王的法律是否是唯一的权威，而与他的人格无关，尽管这种权威是由上帝和人类赋予的？或者，权威只是主题，行使权威的人只是其中的一个偶然因素，就像骄傲和愚蠢在一个人身上一样。那么，如果一个有权力的人凭自己的意愿而不是依法命令，如果我既不积极地也不被动地服从，我甚至没有抵抗滥用权威；那么，国王凭借他的无序意愿已经完全失去了他的权威，变得像另一个人一样；然而，他的权威并没有离开他。

Ans. 1.—If we speak accurately, neither the man solely, nor his power only, is resisted; but the man clothed with lawful habitual power, is resisted in such and such acts flowing from an abused power. 2. It is an ignorant speech to ask, Is authority subjected solely in the king's law, and no whit in his person, for the authority hath all its power by law, not from the man's person? The authority hath nothing from the person but a naked inheritance in the person, as in the subject; and the person is to be honoured for the authority, not the authority for the person. 3. Authority is not so separable from the person, as that for every act of lawless will the king loseth his royal authority and ceaseth to be king. No, but every act of a king, in so far, can claim subjection of the inferior, as the act of commanding and ruling hath law for it; and in so far as it is lawless, the person in that act repugnant to law loseth all due claim of actual subjection in that act, and in that act power actual is lost, as is clear, Acts 4:19; 5:29 The apostles say to rulers, It is safer to obey God than man. What! Were not these rulers lawful magistrates armed with power from God? I answer, habitually they were rulers and more than men, and to obey them in things lawful is to obey God. But, actually, in these unlawful commandments, especially being commanded to speak no more in the name of Jesus, the apostles do acknowledge them to be no more but men; and so their actual authority is as separable from the person, as pride and folly from men.
答案 1：准确地说，不仅仅是这个人，也不仅仅是他的权力受到了抵制；而是这个身着合法习惯权力的人，在滥用权力的行为中受到了抵制。答案 2：问“权威是否仅仅受制于国王的法律，而与他的人格无关”是无知的言论，因为权威的力量完全来自法律，而不是来自个人。权威在个人身上只有一个裸露的继承权，就像在主体身上一样；而应该尊重的是权威的人格，而不是人格的权威。答案 3：权威与个人并不是那么分离的，以至于国王每一次违法的意愿都会失去他的王权，不再是国王。不，但是国王的每一个行为，只要是命令和统治的行为，都可以要求下级服从，因为这些行为是有法律依据的；而在违法的程度上，个人在那个行为中与法律相抵触，就在那个行为中失去了实际服从的权利，也失去了实际的权力，正如《使徒行传》4:19；5:29 所清楚表明的那样，使徒对统治者说，服从上帝比服从人更安全。什么！这些统治者难道不是由上帝授予权力的合法官员吗？ 我回答，习惯上他们是统治者，超越常人，顺从他们在合法事务上就是顺从上帝。但实际上，在这些不合法的命令中，特别是被命令不再以耶稣的名义讲话时，使徒们承认他们只是普通人；因此，他们的实际权威与个人是可以分离的，就像傲慢和愚蠢与人类一样。

Symmons.—The distinction holdeth good of inferior magistrates, that they may be considered as magistrates and as men, because their authority is only sacred, and addeth veneration to their persons, and is separable from the person. The man may live when his authority is extinguished, but it holdeth not in kings. King Saul's person is venerable as his authority, and his authority cometh by inheritance, and dieth, and liveth, inseparably with his person; and authority and person add honour, each one to another.
西蒙斯。对于下级官员来说，这种区别是适用的，因为他们既可以被视为官员，也可以被视为人，因为他们的权威只是神圣的，给他们的人格增添了崇敬，而且可以与人格分离。当他的权威消失时，人可以继续生活，但对于国王来说却不适用。国王扫罗的人格和他的权威一样令人尊敬，他的权威是通过继承获得的，与他的人格不可分割，权威和人格相互增添荣誉。

Ans. 1.—If this be true, Manasseh, a king, did not shed innocent blood and use sorcery. He did not these great wickednesses as a man, but as a king. Solomon played the apostate as a king, not as a man, if so, the man must make the king more infallible than the Pope; for the pope, as a man, can err;—as a pope he cannot err, say papists. But prophets, in their persons, were anointed of God as Saul and David were, then must we say, Nathan and Samuel erred not as men, because their persons were sacred and anointed, and sure they erred not as prophets, therefore they erred not all. A king, as a king, is an holy ordinance of God, and so cannot do injustice, therefore they must do acts of justice as men. 1. The inferior judge is a power from God. 2. To resist him is to resist an ordinance of God. 3. He is not a terror to good works, but to evil. 4. He is a minister of God for good. 5. He is God's sword-bearer. His official power to rule may by as good right come by birth as the crown; and the king's person is sacred only for his office, and is anointed only for his office. For then the Chaldeans dishonoured not inferior judges (Lam. 5:12,) when they "hanged the prince, and honoured not the faces of elders." It is in question, if the king's actual authority be not as separable from him, as the actual authority of the judge.
答案 1.——如果这是真的，玛拿西，一个国王，没有流无辜的血，也没有使用巫术。他不是作为一个人而犯下这些大恶行，而是作为一个国王。所罗门作为一个国王背叛了信仰，而不是作为一个人，如果是这样，那么这个人必须使国王比教皇更无误；因为教皇作为一个人可以犯错；—作为教皇他不能犯错，天主教徒这样说。但是，先知们在他们的人身上受到了上帝的膏抹，就像扫罗和大卫一样，那么我们必须说，拿单和撒母耳不是作为人犯了错误，因为他们的人是神圣和受膏的，而且肯定他们不是作为先知犯了错误，所以他们没有犯错。一个国王作为一个国王，是上帝的圣洁的制度，所以不能不公正，因此他们必须作为人行公正的行为。1.下级法官是上帝的权力。2.抵抗他就是抵抗上帝的制度。3.他不是对善行的恐吓，而是对恶行的恐吓。4.他是上帝的仆人，为了善行而存在。5.他是上帝的剑手。他的官方统治权力可以像王冠一样通过出生获得；国王的人只是因为他的职位而受到尊重，只是因为他的职位而受膏。因此，迦勒底人没有侮辱下级法官（耶哀米哀歌）。 5:12）当他们“吊死了王子，不尊重长者的面孔”时。问题是，国王的实际权威是否与他本人一样不可分割，就像法官的实际权威一样。

Symmons (p. 24).—The king himself may use this distinction. As a Christian he may forgive any that offendeth against his person, but as a judge, he must punish, in regard of his office.
辛蒙斯（第 24 页）——国王本人可以使用这种区别。作为一个基督徒，他可以原谅任何冒犯他的人，但作为一名法官，他必须根据他的职责进行惩罚。

Ans.—Well, then, flatterers will grant the distinction, when the king doth good and pardoneth the blood of protestants, shed by bloody rebels; but when the king doth acts of injustice, he is neither man nor king, but some independent absolute god.
答案：好吧，那么，奉承者会承认这个区别，当国王行善并宽恕被血腥叛乱者杀害的新教徒的血时；但当国王行不义之事时，他既不是人也不是国王，而是某个独立的绝对神。

Symmons (p. 27).—God's word tyeth me to every one of his personal commandments, as well as his legal commandments. Nor do I obey the king's law, because it is established, or because of its known penalty, nor yet the king himself, because he ruleth according to law, but I obey the king's law, because I obey the king; and I obey the king, because I obey God; I obey the king and his law, because I obey God and his law. Better obey the command for a reverent regard to the prince than for a penalty.
Symmons（第 27 页）-上帝的话将我与他的个人命令以及他的法律命令联系在一起。我不是因为法律已经确立或因为其已知的惩罚而遵守国王的法律，也不是因为国王按照法律统治而遵守国王本人，而是因为我遵守国王的法律，所以我遵守国王；我遵守国王，因为我遵守上帝；我遵守国王和他的法律，因为我遵守上帝和他的法律。为了对王子怀有敬畏之心而遵守命令比为了惩罚而遵守命令更好。

Ans.—It is hard to answer a sick man. It is blasphemy to seek this distinction of person and office in the King of kings, because by person in a mortal king, we understand a man that can sin. 1. I am not obliged to obey his personal commandment, except I were his domestic; nor his unlawful personal commandments, because they are sinful. 2. It is false that you obey the king's law, because you obey the king; for then you say but this, I obey the king because I obey the king. The truth is, obedience is not formally terminated on the person of the king. Obedience is relative to a precept, and it is men-service to obey a law, not because it is good and just, but upon this formal motive, because it is the will of a mortal man to command it. And reverence, love, fear, being acts of the affection, are not terminated on a law, but properly on the person of the judge; and they are modifications, or laudable qualifications of acts of obedience, not motives, not the formal reason why I obey, but the manner how I obey. And the apostle maketh expressly (Rom. 13:4) fear of punishment a motive of obedience, while he saith, "He beareth not the sword in vain," therefore be subject to the king; and this hindereth not personal resistance to unjust commandments.
答案：回答一个生病的人是困难的。在万王之王中寻求个人和职位的区别是亵渎的，因为在一个凡人国王中，我们理解的个人是一个可以犯罪的人。1.除非我是他的家人，否则我没有义务遵守他的个人命令；也不会遵守他的非法个人命令，因为它们是罪恶的。2.你遵守国王的法律是虚假的，因为你遵守国王；因为你只是这样说，我遵守国王，因为我遵守国王。事实上，服从并不是正式终止在国王的个人上。服从是相对于规定的，服从法律是为了服从一个法律，而不是因为它是好的和公正的，而是因为一个凡人的意愿命令它。而尊敬、爱、恐惧是情感的行为，它们不是终止在法律上，而是适当地终止在法官的人身上；它们是服从行为的修饰或可称赞的品质，而不是动机，不是我服从的正式理由，而是我服从的方式。使徒明确地说（罗马书）。 13:4) 惩罚的恐惧是服从的动机，正如他所说，“他不是空手持剑”，所以要顺服于国王；这并不妨碍对不公正命令的个人抵抗。

Symmons (p. 27–29).—"You say, 'To obey the prince's personal commandment against his legal will, is to obey himself against himself.' So say I, 'To obey his legal will against his personal will, is to obey himself against himself, for I take his person to be himself.' "
Symmons（第 27-29 页）：“你说，‘遵守君主的个人命令而违背他的法定意愿，就是违背他自己对自己的命令。’我也这样说，‘遵守他的法定意愿而违背他的个人意愿，就是违背他自己对自己的命令，因为我认为他的人就是他自己。’”

Ans.—1. To obey the king's personal will, when it is sinful, (as we now suppose,) against his legal will, is a sin, and a disobedience to God and the king also, seeing the law is the king's will as king; but to obey his legal will, against his sinful personal will, (as it must be sinful if contrary to a just law,) is obedience to the king as king, and so obedience to God. 2. You take the king's person to be himself, but you take quid pro quo; for his person here you must not take physically, for his suppost of soul and body, but morally: it is the king, as a sinful man doing his worst will against the law, which is his just and best will, and the rule of the subjects. And the king's personal will is so far just, and to regulate the subjects, in so far as it agreeth with his legal will or his law, and this will can sin, and therefore may be crossed without breach of the fifth commandment; but his legal will cannot be crossed without disobedience both to God and the king.
答案：1. 如果国王的个人意愿是罪恶的（我们现在假设是这样），违背他的合法意愿去遵从他的个人意愿是一种罪恶，也是对上帝和国王的不顺从，因为法律就是国王作为国王的意愿；但是，如果违背他的罪恶个人意愿去遵从他的合法意愿（如果违背公正的法律就是罪恶的），那么就是对国王作为国王的顺从，也是对上帝的顺从。2. 你认为国王的人就是他本人，但你弄错了；在这里，你不能从物理上理解他的人，而是从道德上理解：国王是一个犯罪的人，他在违背法律时做出最坏的意愿，而法律是他公正和最好的意愿，也是臣民的准则。国王的个人意愿在与他的合法意愿或法律一致的程度上是公正的，并且在这种程度上可以用来管理臣民，而这个意愿可以犯罪，因此可以违背而不违反第五条诫命；但是，违背他的合法意愿就是对上帝和国王的不顺从。

Symmons (p. 28).—The king's personal will doth not always presuppose passion; and if it be attended with passion, yet we must bear it for conscience sake.—Ans. We are to obey the king's personal will, when the thing commanded is not sin; but his subjects, as subjects, have little to do with his personal will in that notion. It concerneth his domestic servant, and is the king's will as he is the master of servants, not as he is king in relation to subjects; but we speak of the king's personal will as repugnant to law, and contrary to the king's will as king, and so contrary to the fifth commandment; and this is attended often not only with passion, but also with prejudice; and we owe no subjection to prejudice and passions, or to actions commanded by these disordered powers, because they are not from God, nor his ordinances, but from men and the flesh, and we owe no subjection to the flesh.
辛蒙斯（第 28 页）- 国王的个人意愿并不总是带有激情；即使带有激情，我们也必须为了良心而忍受。- 答：当所命令的事情不是罪恶时，我们应该服从国王的个人意愿；但作为臣民，与他的个人意愿关系不大。这关系到他的家仆，是国王作为仆人的主人的意愿，而不是作为国王与臣民的关系；但我们所说的国王的个人意愿是与法律相抵触的，与国王作为国王的意愿相反，因此与第五诫相违背；这通常不仅带有激情，还带有偏见；我们对偏见和激情，或者对这些无序力量所命令的行为，不需要服从，因为它们不是来自上帝，也不是他的命令，而是来自人和肉体，我们不需要服从肉体。

Dr Ferne (sect. 9, p. 58).—The distinction of personal and legal will hath place in evil actions, but not in resistance, where we cannot sever the person and the dignity, or authority, because we cannot resist the power but we must resist the person who hath the power. Saul had lawfully the command of arms, but that power he useth unjustly, against innocent David. I ask, When these emperors took away lives and goods at their pleasure, was that a power ordained of God? No, but an illegal will, a tyranny—but they might not resist; nay, but they cannot resist; for that power and sovereignty employed to compass these illegal commandments was ordained and settled in them. When Pilate condemned our Saviour, it was an illegal will, yet our Saviour acknowledgeth in it, that Pilate's power was given him from above.
弗恩博士（第 9 节，第 58 页）。个人意愿和法律意愿的区别存在于邪恶行为中，但在抵抗中不存在，因为我们无法分离人和尊严或权威，因为我们不能抵抗拥有权力的人。扫罗合法地拥有武器的指挥权，但他不公正地使用这种权力对付无辜的大卫。我问，当这些皇帝随意夺取生命和财产时，那是上帝所命定的权力吗？不，那是非法的意愿，是暴政，但他们不能反抗；不，他们不能反抗；因为用来实施这些非法命令的权力和主权是被命定和确立在他们身上的。当彼拉多定罪我们的救主时，那是非法的意愿，然而我们的救主承认，彼拉多的权力是从上面赐给他的。

Ans.—1. Here we have the distinction denied by royalists, granted by Dr Ferne. But if, when the king commands us to do wickedness, we may resist that personal will, and when he commandeth us to suffer unjustly we cannot resist his will but we must resist also his royal person; what! is it not still the king, and his person sacred, as his power is sacred, when he commandeth the subjects to do unjustly, as when he commandeth them to suffer unjustly? It were fearful to say, when kings command any one act of idolatry, they are no longer kings. If, for conscience, I am to suffer unjustly, when Nero commandeth unjust punishment, because Nero commanding so, remaineth God's minister, why, but when Nero commandeth me to worship an heathen god, I am upon the same ground to obey that unjust will in doing ill; for Nero, in commanding idolatry, remaineth the Lord's minister, his person is sacred in the one commandment of doing ill, as in inflicting ill of punishment. And do I not resist his person in the one as in the other? His power and his person are as inseparably conjoined by God in the one as in the other. 2. In bodily thrusting out of Uzziah from the temple, these fourscore valiant men did resist the king's person by bodily violence, as well as his power. 3. If the power of killing the martyrs in Nero was no power ordained of God, then the resisting of Nero, in his taking away the lives of the martyrs, was but the resisting of tyranny; and certainly, if that power in Nero was τεταγμένη a power ordained of God, and not to be resisted, as the place (Rom. 13) is alleged by royalists, then it must be a lawful power, and no tyranny; and if it cannot be resisted, because it was a power ordained and settled in him, it is either settled by God, and so not tyranny, (except God be the author of tyranny,) or then settled by the devil, and so may well be resisted. But the text speaketh of no power but of that which is of God. 4. We are not to be subject to all powers in concreto, by the text; for we are not to be subject to powers lawful, yet commanding active obedience to things unlawful. Now subjection includeth active obedience of honour, love, fear, paying tribute, and therefore of need force, some powers must be excepted. 5. Pilate's power is merely a power by divine permission, not a power ordained of God, as are the powers spoken of, Rom. 13. Gregorius (mor. l. 3, c. 11) expressly saith,—"This was Satan's power given to Pilate against Christ. Manibus Satanæ pro nostra redemptione se tradidit." Lyra, "A principibus Romanorum et ulterius permissum a deo, qui est potestas, superior" Calvin, Beza and Diodatus, saith the same; and that he cannot mean of legal power from God's regulating will is evident, 1. Because Christ is answering Pilate, (John 19:10,) "Knowest though not that I have power to crucify thee?" This was an untruth. Pilate had a command to worship him, and believe in him; and whereas Ferne saith, (sect. 9, p. 59,) "Pilate had power to judge any accused before him;" it is true; but he being obliged to believe in Christ, he was obliged to believe in Christ's innocency, and so neither to judge nor receive accusation against him; and the power he saith he had to crucify, was a law-power in Pilate's meaning, but not in very deed any law power; because a law-power is from God's regulating will in the fifth commandment, but no creature hath a lawful or a law-power to crucify Christ. 2. A law-power is for good, (Rom. 13:4,) a power to crucify Christ is for ill. 3. A law-power is a terror to ill works, and a praise to good: Pilate's power to crucify Christ was the contrary. 4. A law-power is to execute wrath on ill-doing, a power to crucify Christ is no such. 5. A law-power conciliateth honour, fear, and veneration, to the person of the judge, a power to crucify Christ conciliateth no such thing, but a disgrace to Pilate. 6. The genuine acts of a lawful power are lawful acts; for such as is the fountain-power, such are the acts flowing therefrom. Good acts flow not from bad powers, neither hath God given a power to sin, except by way of permission.
答案：1. 在这里，我们有了王党派否认的区别，但是费恩博士承认了这一点。但是，如果当国王命令我们做邪恶的事情时，我们可以抵抗他的个人意愿，而当他命令我们受到不公正的待遇时，我们不能只抵抗他的意愿，而必须同时抵抗他的王室人格；那么！难道他不仍然是国王吗？他的人格和他的权力一样神圣，当他命令臣民做不公正的事情时，就像他命令他们受不公正的待遇时一样神圣吗？如果国王命令任何一种偶像崇拜的行为，说他们不再是国王，那将是可怕的。如果因为良心的原因，我要受到不公正的待遇，当尼禄命令不公正的惩罚时，因为尼禄这样命令，他仍然是上帝的仆人，那么，当尼禄命令我崇拜异教神时，我在做坏事时也应该遵守那不公正的意愿；因为尼禄在命令偶像崇拜时，他仍然是主的仆人，他的人格在做坏事的命令中是神圣的，就像在施加惩罚的不公正中一样。难道我在一个命令中不抵抗他的人格，就像在另一个命令中一样吗？他的权力和他的人格在上帝的安排下在一个命令中是不可分割的，就像在另一个命令中一样。2. 在乌西雅从圣殿中被强行驱逐的过程中，这八十个勇士通过肉体上的暴力抵抗了国王的人身攻击，也抵抗了他的权力。3. 如果尼禄杀害殉道者的权力不是上帝所命定的权力，那么在尼禄夺走殉道者生命时抵抗尼禄就只是抵抗暴政；而且，如果尼禄的权力是上帝所命定的权力，不容抵抗，正如王权派所引用的经文（罗马书 13 章），那么它必须是合法的权力，而不是暴政；如果不能抵抗，因为这是上帝在他身上安排的权力，那么它要么是上帝安排的，所以不是暴政（除非上帝是暴政的创造者），要么是魔鬼安排的，所以可以被抵抗。但这段经文只谈到了上帝的权力。4. 根据这段经文，我们不必对所有权力都服从，因为我们不必服从合法的权力，而这些权力命令我们积极服从不合法的事情。现在，服从包括尊敬、爱、敬畏、纳税等积极服从，因此必须排除一些权力。5. 彼拉多的权力仅仅是上帝允许的权力，不是上帝所命定的权力，正如罗马书 13 所说的那些权力。格雷戈里（mor. l. 3, c. 11）明确说道：“这是撒旦赋予彼拉多反对基督的权力。他为我们的救赎将自己交给了撒旦。”利拉说：“这是罗马统治者的权力，而且更进一步是上帝所允许的权力，上帝是至高无上的权力。”加尔文、贝扎和迪奥达图斯也说了同样的话；而且他所说的不可能是指来自上帝调节意愿的合法权力，这是显而易见的。首先，因为基督是在回答彼拉多的问题（约翰福音 19:10），“难道你不知道我有权柄把你钉在十字架上吗？”这是不真实的。彼拉多有一个命令要崇拜基督，并相信他；而且弗恩说（第 9 节，第 59 页），“彼拉多有权力审判任何被告在他面前；”这是正确的；但是他被迫相信基督的无辜，所以既不能审判也不能接受对他的指控；而且他所说的有权力将基督钉在十字架上，是指彼拉多的意思中的法律权力，但实际上并不是真正的法律权力；因为法律权力是来自上帝在第五诫命中的调节意愿，但没有任何受造物有合法或法律权力将基督钉在十字架上。其次， 法律权力是为了善，（罗马书 13:4），而用来钉死基督的权力是为了恶。3.法律权力对恶行是一种恐吓，对善行是一种赞扬：彼拉多钉死基督的权力则相反。4.法律权力是为了对恶行进行惩罚，而用来钉死基督的权力则不是这样。5.法律权力使人尊敬、敬畏和崇敬法官的人，而用来钉死基督的权力则不会产生这样的效果，反而是对彼拉多的耻辱。6.合法权力的真正行为是合法的行为；因为源头权力如何，其所产生的行为也如何。善行不会从恶势力中产生，除非上帝以许可的方式给予犯罪的权力。

QUESTION XXX
问题 XXX

WHETHER OR NO PASSIVE OBEDIENCE BE A MEAN TO WHICH WE ARE SUBJECTED IN CONSCIENCE, BY VIRTUE OF A DIVINE COMMANDMENT; AND WHAT A MEAN RESISTANCE IS. THAT FLYING IS RESISTANCE
无论被动服从是否是我们在良心中受到的一种手段，根据神的命令；以及什么是一种适度的抵抗。逃避是一种抵抗。

Much is built, to commend patient suffering of ill, and to condemn all resistance of superiors, by royalists, on the place, 1 Pet. 2:18, where we are commanded, being servants, to suffer buffets not only for ill-doing of good masters, but also undeservedly; and when we do well, we are to suffer of those masters that are evil; and so much more are we patiently without resistance to suffer of kings. But it is clear, the place is nothing against resistance, as in these assertions I clear:—
许多人建立了一种赞扬病痛中的耐心忍受，并谴责王权主义者对上级的任何抵抗的观点，这在彼得前书 2:18 中得到了体现。在这里，我们被命令作为仆人，不仅要忍受善良主人的责打，也要忍受不应受到的责打；当我们做得好时，我们要忍受那些邪恶的主人的责打；因此，我们更应该耐心地忍受国王的压迫。但很明显，这个地方并不能反对抵抗，正如我在这些论断中所解释的那样：

Assert. 1.—Patient suffering of wicked men, and violent resisting are not incompatible, but they may well stand together; so this consequence is the basis of the argument, and it is just nothing: to wit, servants are to suffer unjustly wounds and buffeting of their wicked masters, and they are to bear it patiently; therefore, servants are in conscience obliged to non-resistance. Now, Scripture maketh this clear,—1. The church of God is to bear with all patience the indignation of the Lord, because she hath sinned, and to suffer of wicked enemies which were to be trodden as mire in the streets (Micah 7:9–12); but withal, they were not obliged to non-resistance and not to fight against these enemies, yea, they were obliged to fight against them also. If these were Babylon, Judah might have resisted and fought if God had not given a special commandment of a positive law, that they should not fight; if these were the Assyrians and other enemies, or rather both, the people were to resist by fighting, and yet to endure patiently the indignation of the Lord. David did bear most patiently the wrong that his own son Absalom, and Ahitophel, and the people inflicted on him, in pursuing him to take his life and the kingdom from him, as is clear by his gracious expressions (2 Sam. 15:25, 26; 16:10–12; Psal. 3:1–3); yea, he prayeth for a blessing on the people that conspired against him (Psal. 3:8); yet did he lawfully resist Absalom and the conspirators, and sent out Joab and a huge army in open battle against them, (2 Sam. 18:1–4, &c.,) and fought against them. And were not the people of God patient to endure the violence done to them in the wilderness by Og, king of Bashan; Sihon, king of Heshbon; by the Amorites, Moabites, &c.? I think God's law tyeth all men, especially his people, to as patient a suffering in wars. (Deut. 8:16) God then trying and humbling his people, as the servant is to endure patiently, unjustly inflicted buffets (1 Pet. 2:18); and yet God's people at God's commaud did resist these kings and people, and did fight and kill them, and possess their land, as the history is clear. See the like Josh. 11:18, 19. 2. One act of grace and virtue is not contrary to another; resistance is in the children of God an innocent act of self-preservation, as is patient suffering, and therefore they may well subsist in one. And so saith Amasa by the Spirit of the Lord, 1 Chron. 12:18, "Peace, peace be unto thee, and peace to thy helpers, for God helpeth thee." Now, in that, David and all his helpers were registers of king Saul. 3. The scope of the place (1 Pet. 2) is not to forbid all violent resisting, as is clear he speaketh nothing of violent resisting either one way or other, but only he forbiddeth revengeful resisting of repaying one wrong with another, from the example of Christ, who, "when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not;" therefore, the argument is a falacy, ab so quod doeitur κατὰ τὶ, ad illud quod dieitur απλῶς. Though therefore the master should attempt to kill an innocent servant, and invade him with a weapon of death suddenly, without all reason or cause, or unavoidably, Dr Ferne, (p. 3, sect. 2, p. 10,) in that case, doth free a subject from guiltiness if he violently resist his prince; therefore, the servant who should violently resist his master in the aforesaid case should, and might patiently suffer and violently resist, notwithstanding anything that royalists can conclude on the contrary. 4. No prince hath a masterly or lordly dominion over his subjects, but only a free, ingenuous, paternal and tutorly oversight for the good of the people. (Rom. 13:4) The master, especially in the apostle Peter's time, had a dominion over servants as over their proper goods.
断言 1：患难与邪恶之人的暴力抵抗并不矛盾，它们可以同时存在；因此，这个结论是论证的基础，但实际上什么都不是：也就是说，仆人应该忍受邪恶主人的非正义伤害和殴打，并且他们应该耐心忍受；因此，仆人在良心上有义务不抵抗。现在，圣经明确表明了这一点——1.上帝的教会应该忍受上帝的愤怒，并且因为她犯了罪，应该忍受邪恶的敌人的折磨，这些敌人将被践踏如街上的泥土（弥迦书 7:9-12）；但与此同时，他们并不被要求不抵抗，也不要与这些敌人战斗，是的，他们也被要求与他们战斗。如果这些是巴比伦，犹大可以抵抗和战斗，如果上帝没有给出特殊的命令，规定他们不得战斗；如果这些是亚述人和其他敌人，或者更确切地说，两者都是，人们应该通过战斗来抵抗，同时耐心忍受上帝的愤怒。 大卫对自己的儿子押沙龙、亚希多弗和人民对他的冤屈忍耐得最多，他们追逐他要夺取他的生命和王国，这一点在他亲切的表达中是明显的（撒母耳记下 15:25, 26; 16:10–12; 诗篇 3:1–3）；是的，他为那些密谋反对他的人民祈求祝福（诗篇 3:8）；然而，他合法地抵抗了押沙龙和密谋者，并派出约押和一支庞大的军队公开与他们作战（撒母耳记下 18:1–4 等），并与他们战斗。难道神的子民在旷野中忍受奥格、巴珊王；希实本王；亚摩利人、摩押人等对他们的暴力不是忍耐吗？我认为神的律法约束所有人，尤其是他的子民，在战争中要忍耐。 （申命记 8:16）神试验和谦卑他的子民，就像仆人要忍耐不公正的打击一样（彼得前书 2:18）；然而，神的子民在神的命令下抵抗了这些国王和人民，与他们战斗并杀死他们，占领了他们的土地，历史上是清楚的。参见约书亚记 11:18, 19。 恩典和美德的行为并不相互矛盾；在上帝的子民中，抵抗是一种无辜的自我保护行为，就像忍耐受苦一样，因此它们可以共存。正如阿玛撒在耶和华的灵中所说的：“愿平安归与你，愿你的帮助者都平安！因为你的神帮助你。”（历代志上 12:18）现在，大卫和他所有的帮助者都是扫罗王的记录者。这段经文（彼得前书 2）的目的不是禁止所有的暴力抵抗，明显地他并没有谈到任何形式的暴力抵抗，而只是禁止以报复的方式对待别人的错误，以基督的榜样为例，他“被骂不还口，受害不威吓”。因此，这个论点是一个谬误，从绝对的角度来看是错误的。因此，即使主人试图杀害一个无辜的仆人，并突然用致命的武器侵犯他，没有任何理由或原因，或者是不可避免的，弗恩博士（第 3 页，第 2 节，第 p.） 在这种情况下，如果一个人强烈反抗他的君主，他将免除罪责；因此，在上述情况下，仆人应该并且可以耐心忍受和强烈反抗他的主人，无论王党派能得出什么相反的结论。4. 没有君主对其臣民拥有主宰或统治的权力，只有对人民的自由、高尚、父爱和导师般的监督，为了人民的利益。（罗马书 13:4）主人，尤其是在使徒彼得的时代，对仆人有着对待自己财产的统治权。

Assert. 2.—Neither suffering formally as suffering, and so neither can non-resisting passive fall under any moral law of God, except in two conditions: 1. In the point of Christ's passive obedience, he being the eternal God as well as man, and so lord of his own blood and life, by virtue of a special commandment imposed on him by his Father, was commanded to lay down his life, yea, and to be an agent as well as a patient in dying (Job. 10:18); yea, and actively he was to contribute something for his own death, and offer himself willingly to death (Matt. 28:20); and, knowing the hour that he was to depart out of this world unto the Father, (John 13:1,) would not only not fly—which is to royalists lawful, to us a special point of resistance (John 14:31; 18:4–7)—but upbraided Peter as the agent of Satan, who would dissuade him to die, (Matt. 16:22, 23,) and would fight for him. And he doth not fetch any argument against Peter's drawing of his sword from the unlawfulness of self-defence and innocent resistance, (which he should have done if royalists plead with any colour of reason from his example, against the lawfulness of resistance and self-defence,) but from the absolute power of God. 2. From God's positive will, who commanded him to die. (Matt. 26:53, 54.) If therefore royalists prove anything against the lawfulness of resisting kings, when they offer (most unjustly) violence to the life of God's servants, from this one merely extraordinary and rare example of Christ, the like whereof was never in the world, they may, from the same example, prove it unlawful to fly, for Christ would not fly. (Psal. 40:6, 7; Heb. 10:6–9; John 14:31; 18:4–7.) 1. They may prove that people sought by a tyrant to be crucified for the cause of God, are to reveal and discover themselves to an army of men who come to seek them. (John 13:1, 2; 18:4–7). 2. That martyrs are of purpose to go to the place where they know they shall be apprehended and put to death, for this Christ did, and are willingly to offer themselves to the enemy's army, for so did Christ (John 14:3; Mark 14:41, 42; Matt. 26:46, 47); and so by his example, all the parliament, all the innocents of the city of London, and assembly of divines, are obliged to lay down arms and to go to their own death to prince Rupert, and the bloody Irish rebels. 3. By this example it is unlawful to resist the cut-throats of a king, for Cæsar in his own royal person—the high priest in person, came not out against Christ; yea, it is not lawful for the parliament to resist a Judas, who hath fled as a traitorous apostate from the truth and the temple of Christ. 4. It is not lawful for innocents to defend themselves by any violence against the invasion of superiors, in Dr Ferne's three cases in which he alloweth resistance: (1.) When the invasion is sudden. (2.) Unavoidable. (3.) Without all colour of law and reason. In the two last cases, royalists defend the lawfulness of self-defence. 5. If the example be pressed,—Christ did not this and that, he resisted not with violence, to save his own life, therefore, we are to abstain from resistance and such and such means of self-preservation; then, because Christ appealed not from inferior judges to the emperor Cæsar; who, no doubt, would have shown him more favour than the scribes and pharisees did, and because Christ conveyed not a humble supplication to his sovereign and father Cæsar,—then because he proffered not a humble petition to prince Pilate for his life, he being an innocent man, and his cause just,—because he neither procured an orator to plead his own just cause, nor did he so plead for himself, and give in word and writ, all lawful and possible defences for his own safety, but answered many things with silence, to the admiration of the judge, (Mark 15:3–5,) and was thrice pronounced by the judge to be innocent (Luke 22:23); because, I say, Christ did not all these for his own life, therefore it is unlawful for Scotland and England to appeal to the king, to supplicate, to give in apologies, &c. I think royalists dare not say so. But if they say he would not resist, and yet might have done all these lawfully, because these be lawful means, and resistance with the sword unlawful,—because "He that taketh the sword, shall perish by the sword,"—let me answer then, 1. They leave the argument from Christ's example, who was thus far subject to higher powers, that he would not resist, and plead from the unlawfulness of resistance; this is petitio principii. 2. He that taketh the sword without God's warrant, which Peter had not, but the contrary, he was himself a Satan to Christ, who would but counsel him not to die; but there is no shadow of a word to prove that violent resisting is unlawful, when the king and his Irish cut-throats pursue us unjustly; only Christ saith, when God may deliver extraordinarily by his angels, except it be his absolute will that his Son should drink the cup of death, then to take the sword, when God hath declared his will on the contrary, is unlawful; and that is all; though do not question but Christ's asking for swords, and his arresting all his enemies to the ground (John 18:6) backward, is a justifying of self-defence. But hitherto it is clear, by Christ's example, that he only was commanded to suffer. Now the second case in which suffering falleth under a commandment, is indirectly and comparatively, when it cometh to the election of the witness of Jesus, that it is referred to them, either to deny the truth of Christ and his name, or then to suffer death. The choice is apparently evident; and this choice that persecutors refer us unto, is to us a commandment of God, that we must choose suffering for Christ, and refuse sinning against Christ. But the supposition must stand, that this alternative is unavoidable, that is not in our power to decline either suffering for Christ, or denying of Christ before men; otherwise no man is to expect the reward of a witness of Jesus, who having a lawful possible means of eschewing suffering, doth yet cast himself into suffering needlessly. But I prove that suffering by men of this world falleth not formally and directly under any divine positive law; for the law of nature,—whatever Arminians in their declaration, or this Arminian excommunicate think with them, (for they teach that God gave a commandment to Adam, to abstain from such and such fruit, with pain and trouble to sinless nature,)—doth not command suffering, or anything contrary to nature, as nature is sinless: I prove it thus:—
断言 2. - 既然苦难并非正式的苦难，因此非抵抗性的被动也不受上帝的任何道德法律约束，除非满足以下两个条件：1. 在基督被动顺服的点上，他既是永恒的上帝又是人，因此他是自己血和生命的主人，凭借他父亲对他所下的特别命令，他被命令舍弃自己的生命，甚至在死亡中既是行动者又是受害者（约伯记 10:18）；是的，他还要为自己的死亡做出一些贡献，并自愿献身于死亡（马太福音 28:20）；并且，他知道他将离开这个世界去见父亲的时刻（约翰福音 13:1），不仅不逃避（这对君主主义者来说是合法的，对我们来说是一种特殊的抵抗（约翰福音 14:31；18:4-7）），而且还责备彼得作为撒旦的代理人，试图劝阻他去死（马太福音 16:22, 23），并为他而战。 他并没有从自卫和无辜抵抗的非法性（如果王党从他的例子中以任何合理的理由来反对抵抗和自卫的合法性，他应该这样做）来反驳彼得拔剑的行为，而是从上帝的绝对权力来反驳。2.从上帝的明确意愿，他命令他去死。（马太福音 26:53, 54）因此，如果王党从基督这个仅仅是非凡而罕见的例子中对反抗国王的合法性提出任何异议，他们可能会（非常不公正地）对上帝的仆人的生命施加暴力，他们可以从同样的例子中证明逃跑是不合法的，因为基督不会逃跑。（诗篇 40:6, 7; 希伯来书 10:6-9; 约翰福音 14:31; 18:4-7）1.他们可以证明，那些为了上帝的事业而被暴君追求的人，应该向前来寻找他们的一支军队揭示和暴露自己。（约翰福音 13:1, 2; 18:4-7）2. 那些烈士们是有目的地去他们知道自己会被逮捕并处死的地方，因为基督也是这样做的，并且他们愿意向敌人的军队献身，因为基督也是这样做的（约翰福音 14:3；马可福音 14:41, 42；马太福音 26:46, 47）；所以根据他的榜样，所有的议会、伦敦市的无辜者和神学家大会都有义务放下武器，去面对鲁珀特王子和血腥的爱尔兰叛乱者的死亡。3. 根据这个例子，抵抗国王的刺客是不合法的，因为凯撒亲自——大祭司亲自没有出来对抗基督；是的，议会也不可以抵抗犹大，他已经作为一个背叛真理和基督殿堂的叛徒逃走了。4. 无辜者不可以用任何暴力手段来抵御上级的侵犯，在费恩博士的三种情况中，他允许抵抗：（1）当侵犯是突然的时候。（2）不可避免的时候。（3）没有任何法律和理由的情况下。在后两种情况下，保皇党人辩护自卫的合法性。5. 如果以这个例子为例，基督没有这样做或那样做，他没有用暴力抵抗来拯救自己的生命，因此，我们应该避免抵抗和其他自保手段；然后，因为基督没有向下级法官上诉到凯撒大帝；毫无疑问，凯撒大帝会对他比文士和法利赛人更加宽容；因为基督没有向他的君主和父亲凯撒谦卑地祈求；然后，因为他没有为他的生命向比拉多王子提出谦卑的请愿，他是一个无辜的人，他的事业是公正的；因为他既没有请来一个演说家为他自己辩护，也没有为自己辩护，并且没有用言辞和书面材料提供所有合法和可能的辩护来保护自己的安全，而是对许多事情保持沉默，使法官惊讶（马可福音 15:3-5），并且法官三次宣布他是无辜的（路加福音 22:23）；因为基督没有为了自己的生命做所有这些事情，所以苏格兰和英格兰向国王上诉、恳求、提出辩护等都是非法的。我认为君主派敢不敢这么说。 但是，如果他们说他不会抵抗，但他本可以合法地做所有这些事情，因为这些都是合法的手段，而用剑抵抗是不合法的——因为“拿剑的，必死在剑下”，那么让我回答一下，1. 他们离开了基督的榜样的论据，基督在这方面是服从上级权威的，他不会抵抗，并且从抵抗的不合法性来辩护；这是一个先验原则。2. 拿剑而没有上帝的许可，彼得没有，相反，他自己是基督的撒旦，只是劝告他不要死亡；但没有任何证据证明，在国王和他的爱尔兰刽子手不公正地追捕我们时，暴力抵抗是不合法的；只有基督说，当上帝可以通过他的天使以非凡的方式拯救时，除非他的儿子喝下死亡之杯是他的绝对意愿，否则拿剑是不合法的；这就是全部；尽管不要怀疑，基督要求剑，并将他的所有敌人逮捕到地上（约翰福音 18:6）是为了自卫的辩护。 但迄今为止，根据基督的榜样，明显只有他被命令受苦。现在第二种情况是，当苦难成为一个命令时，是间接地和相对地，当涉及到选择作为耶稣的见证人时，要么是否认基督和他的名字的真理，要么就是忍受死亡。选择显然是明显的；而迫害者把这个选择引导给我们，对我们来说是上帝的命令，我们必须选择为基督而受苦，拒绝得罪基督。但前提是，这个选择是不可避免的，我们无法避免为基督受苦，或在人前否认基督；否则，没有人可以期望成为耶稣的见证人的奖赏，因为他有合法的可能手段来避免受苦，却仍然自愿陷入不必要的苦难中。但我证明，这个世界上的人所遭受的苦难并不是正式和直接地属于任何神圣的正面法律；因为自然法则——无论阿尔米尼派在他们的宣言中，或者这个被阿尔米尼派逐出教会的人怎么想（因为他们教导上帝曾经命令亚当戒除某些水果，以无罪的本性带来痛苦和困扰）——并没有命令受苦，或者与本性相反的任何事物，因为本性是无罪的：我这样证明：

1. Whatever falleth under a positive commandment of God, I may say here, under any commandment of God, is not a thing under the free will and power of others, from whom we are not descended necessarily by natural generation, but that men of the world kill me, even these from whom I am not descended by natural generation (which I speak to exclude Adam, who killed all his posterity) is not in my free will, either as if they had my common nature in that act, or as if I were accessory by counsel, consent, or approbation to that act, for this is under the free will and power of others, not under my own free will; therefore, that I suffer by others is not under my free will, and cannot fall under a commandment of God; and certainly it is an irrational law (glorified be his name) that God should command Antipas either formally to suffer, or formally not to suffer death by these of the synagogue of Satan, (Rev. 2:13,) because if they be pleased not to kill him, it is not in his free will to be killed by them; and if they shall have him in their power (except God extraordinarily deliver) it is not in his power, in an ordinary providence, not to be killed.
无论是在上帝的正面命令下，还是在任何上帝的命令下，我可以在这里说，这不是一个在他人自由意志和权力之下的事情，我们并非必然通过自然的繁衍而来，但是世人杀害我，即使是那些并非通过自然繁衍而来的人（我说这话是为了排除亚当，他杀害了他的后代），这并不是我自由意志的选择，无论是他们在那个行为中拥有我的共同本质，还是我在那个行为中通过咨询、同意或赞同成为从属者，因为这是在他人的自由意志和权力之下，而不是在我自己的自由意志之下；因此，我受到他人的苦难并不是我自由意志的选择，也不能成为上帝的命令；而且，可以肯定的是，（愿他的名得荣耀）上帝不会命令安提帕要么正式地受苦，要么正式地不受那些属撒但的会堂的人杀害（启示录 2:13），因为如果他们不愿意杀害他，他就无法自愿被他们杀害；而且，如果他们将他置于他们的权力之下（除非上帝以非凡的方式拯救），在普通的安排下，他无法避免被杀害。

2. All these places of God's word, that recommendeth suffering to the followers of Christ, do not command formally that we suffer; therefore, suffering falleth not formally under any commandment of God. I prove the antecedent, because if they be considered, they prove only that comparatively we are to choose rather to suffer than to deny Christ before men, (Mat. 10:28, 32; Rev. 2:13; Mat. 10:37; 16:24; 19:29,) or then they command not suffering according to the substance of the passion, but according to the manner that we suffer, willingly, cheerfully, and patiently. Hence Christ's word to take up his cross, which is not a mere passion, but commendeth an act of the virtue of patience. Now no Christian virtue consisteth in a mere passion, but in laudable habits, and good and gracious acts, and the text we are now on (1 Pet. 2:18, 19) doth not recommend suffering from the example of Christ, but patient suffering; and so the word ὑποτασσόμενου, not simply enjoined, but ἐν παντὶ τῶ φόβω in all fear, (ver. 18,) and the words ὑποφέρειν and ὑπομενεῖν to suffer with patience, as 2 Tim. 3:11; 1 Cor. 10:13, and ὑπομνεῖν is to suffer patiently, 1 Cor. 13:7, love πάντα ὑπομένει suffereth all things; Heb. 12:17, if you suffer correction; 1 Tim. 5:5, she continueth patiently in prayers; Heb. 12:2, Christ endureth the cross patiently (Rom. 15:6; 8:25; Luke 8:15; 21:29). The derivations hence signify patience; so do all our interpreters, Beza, Calvin, Marloratus, and popish expositors, as Lorinus, Estius, Carthusian, Lyra, Hugo Cardinalis, expound it of patient suffering; and the text is clear, it is suffering like Christ, without rendering evil for evil, and reviling for reviling.
所有这些上帝的话语所推荐给基督的追随者的苦难，并没有正式命令我们去受苦；因此，苦难并没有正式地属于上帝的任何诫命之下。我证明前提是正确的，因为如果考虑到它们，它们只能证明相对而言，我们应该选择宁愿受苦也不愿在人前否认基督（马太福音 10:28、32；启示录 2:13；马太福音 10:37；16:24；19:29），或者它们根据我们受苦的方式，即愿意、欢快和耐心地受苦，而不是根据受苦的实质。因此，基督说要背起他的十字架，这不仅仅是一种激情，而是称赞忍耐的一种行为。现在，没有一个基督徒的美德仅仅存在于一种激情中，而是存在于可赞美的习惯、善良和仁慈的行为中，而我们现在所讲的经文（彼得前书 2:18、19）并不是从基督的榜样中推荐受苦，而是推荐忍耐的受苦；所以，ὑποτασσόμενου这个词，并不是简单地命令，而是在一切恐惧中（第 18 节），而ὑποφέρειν和ὑπομενεῖν这两个词是指忍耐地受苦，如提摩太后书 3:11；哥林多前书 10:13，而ὑπομνεῖν是指忍耐地受苦（哥林多前书）。 13:7，爱是忍受一切；希伯来书 12:17，如果你受到纠正；提摩太前书 5:5，她在祷告中持续忍耐；希伯来书 12:2，基督忍耐十字架（罗马书 15:6；8:25；路加福音 8:15；21:29）。因此，这些词的意思是忍耐；我们所有的解释者，包括贝扎、加尔文、马洛拉图斯和天主教的解释者，如洛里纳斯、埃斯蒂乌斯、卡尔图西安、利拉、雨果红衣主教，都解释它是指忍耐的受苦；而且这段经文很清楚，它是像基督一样忍受，不以恶报恶，以辱骂还辱骂。

3. Suffering simply, according to substance of the passion, (I cannot say action,) is common to good and ill, and to the wicked, yea to the damned in hell, who suffer against their will, and that cannot be joined according to its substance as an act of formal obedience and subjection to higher powers, kings, fathers, masters, by force of the fifth commandment, and of the place, Rom. 13:1, 2 Which, according to its substance, wicked men suffer, and the damned in hell also against their will.
苦难根据激情的本质（我不能说是行动）是善恶和邪恶共同的，甚至是地狱中的被诅咒者，他们不情愿地遭受苦难，这不能根据其本质作为对上级权力、国王、父亲、主人的正式服从和顺从的行为，根据第五诫命的力量和罗马书 13:1, 2 的地位。根据其本质，邪恶的人和地狱中的被诅咒者也不情愿地遭受苦难。

4. Passive obedience to wicked emperors can but be enjoined (Rom. 13) but only in the manner, and upon supposition, that we must be subject to them, and must suffer, against our wills all the ill of punishment that they can inflict; we must suffer patiently, and because it is God's permissive will that they punish us unjustly; for it is not God's ruling and approving will (called voluntas signi) that they should, against the law of God and man, kill us, and persecute us; and therefore neither Rom. 13, nor 1 Pet. 2, nor any other place in God's word, any common divine, natural, national or any municipal law, commandeth formally obedience passive, or subjection passive, or non-resistance under the notion of passive obedience; yea, to me, obedience passive (if we speak of obedience, properly called, as relative essentially to a law) is a chimera, a dream, and repugnantia in adjecto; and therefore I utterly deny that resistance passive, or subjection passive, doth formally fall under either commandment of God affirmative or negative; only the unlawful manner of resistance by way of revenge, or for defence of popery and false religion, and out of impatient toleration of monarchy or any tyranny, is forbidden in God's word; and certainly all the words used Rom. 13, as they fall under a formal commandment of God, are words of action, not of any chimerical passive obedience, as we are not to resist actively God's ordinance, as his ordinance, (ver. 1, 2,) that is, to resist God actively. We are to do good works, not evil, if we would have the ruler no terror to us (ver. 3). We must not do ill if we would be free of vengeance's sword (ver. 7); we are to pay tribute and to give fear and honour to the ruler, all which are evidently actions, not passive subjection; and if any passive subjection be commanded, it is not here, nor in the first commandment, commanded, but in the first commandment under the hand of patience and submission under God's hand in sufferings, or in the third commandment under the hand of rather dying for Christ than denying his truth before men. Hence I argue here (Rom. 13; 1 Pet. 2; Tit. 3) is nothing else but an exposition of the fifth commandment; but in the fifth commandment only active obedience is formally commanded, and the subordination of inferiors to superiors is ordained, and passive obedience is nowhere commanded, but only modus rei, the manner of suffering, and the occasion of the commandment, here it is thought that the Jews converted under this pretext, that they were God's people, believed that they should not be subject to the Romans. A certain Galilean made the Galileans believe that they should not pay tribute to strangers, and that they should call none lord, but the God of heaven; as Josephus saith, (Antiq. Judaic. l. 20, c. 2, and de bell. Judaic. l. 7, c. 29,) yea and Hieron. (Com. in Tit.,) saith, At this time the sect of the Galileans were on foot. It is like the Jews were thought to be Galileans, and that their liberty, purchased in Christ, could not consist with the order of master and servant, king and subject. And to remove this, Paul established magistracy, and commandeth obedience in the Lord; and he is more to prove the office of the magistrate to be of God than any other thing, and to show what is his due, than to establish absoluteness in Nero to be of God; yea, to me, every word in the text speaketh limitedness of princes, and crieth down absoluteness:—(1.) No power of God, (2.) no ordinance of God, who is a terror to evil, but a praise to good works, (3.) no minister of God for good, &c. can be a power to which we submit ourselves on earth, as next unto God, without controlment. That passive obedience falleth formally under no commandment of God, I prove thus: All obedience liable to a divine commandment, doth commend morally the performer of obedience, as having a will conformed to God's moral law, and deformity betwixt the will of him who performeth not obedience, involveth the non-obedient in wrath and guiltiness. But non-passive subjection to the sword of the judge doth not morally commend him that suffereth not punishment; for no man is formally a sinner against a moral law because he suffereth not the ill of punishment, nor is he morally good, or to be commended, because he suffereth ill of punishment, but because he doth the ill of sin. And all evil of punishment unjustly inflicted hath God's voluntas beneplaciti, the instrumental and hidden decree of God, which ordereth both good and ill, (Ephes. 1:11,) for its rule and cause, and hath not God's will or approbation called, voluntas signi, for its rule, both is contrary to that will, I am sure Epiphanius, (1. 1, tom. 3, heres. 40,) Basilius (in Psal. 32), Nazianzen Orat. (ad subd. et imperat.), Hilar. (li. ad Constant.), and Augustine, all citeth these words, and saith the same. If, then, passive subjection be not commanded, non-subjection passive cannot be forbidden, and this text, Rom. 13, and 1 Pet. 2 cannot a whit help the bad cause of royalists. All then must be reduced to some action of resisting; arguments for passive subjection, though there were shipfuls of them, they cannot help us.
4. 对邪恶的皇帝的被动服从只能被吩咐（罗马书 13 章），但只有在我们必须顺从他们，并且必须忍受他们可以施加的所有惩罚的情况下；我们必须耐心忍受，因为这是上帝允许的意愿，他们不公正地惩罚我们；因为这不是上帝的统治和赞成的意愿（称为 voluntas signi），他们不应该违背上帝和人的法律杀害我们和迫害我们；因此，罗马书 13 章和彼得前书 1 章都不是如此。 在上帝的话语中，也没有其他地方，任何普通的神圣、自然、国家或任何市政法律，正式命令被动服从，或被动顺从，或被动不抵抗的概念；是的，对我来说，被动服从（如果我们谈论的是被称为服从的服从，作为与法律本质上相关的）是一个幻想，一个梦想，和矛盾的附加物；因此，我完全否认被动抵抗或被动顺从正式地属于上帝的肯定或否定的任何诫命；只有以复仇的方式进行非法抵抗，或为了捍卫教皇制和错误的宗教，以及出于对君主制或任何暴政的不耐烦容忍，这是上帝的话语中禁止的；而且，罗马书 13 章使用的所有词语，作为上帝正式诫命的一部分，都是行动的词语，而不是任何幻想的被动服从，因为我们不应该主动抵抗上帝的命令，作为他的命令（第 1、2 节），也就是说，主动抵抗上帝。我们应该行善，而不是作恶，如果我们不想被惩罚之剑所惧怕（第 3 节）。 7); 我们应该向统治者致敬，并给予敬畏和尊重，这些显然是行动，而不是被动的顺从；如果有任何被动的顺从被命令，那不是在这里，也不是在第一诫命中被命令，而是在第一诫命中在忍耐和顺从上帝的手中，在受苦中，或者在第三诫命中宁愿为基督而死，也不愿在人前否认他的真理。因此，我在这里辩论（罗马书 13 章；彼得前书 2 章；提多书 3 章）的意思只是第五诫命的解释；但在第五诫命中只有正式命令的积极服从，以及下级对上级的服从被规定，而被动服从没有被命令，只有 modus rei，即受苦的方式和命令的场合，这里人们认为犹太人是在这个借口下皈依，即他们是上帝的子民，相信他们不应该服从罗马人。一个加利利人使加利利人相信他们不应该向陌生人纳税，也不应该称呼任何人为主，只应称呼天上的上帝；正如约瑟夫所说，（犹太古代史第 20 卷，第 2 章，和犹太战争史第 7 卷，第 29，）是的，还有希伦。（在提多书中的注释）说，这个时候加利利人的派别正在兴起。犹太人被认为是加利利人，他们在基督里获得的自由与主仆、君王臣民的秩序不一致。为了消除这种疑虑，保罗建立了政府，并命令在主里顺服；他更多地证明了政府的职责是来自上帝，而不是其他任何事情，并展示了政府的权利，而不是确立尼禄的绝对权力来自上帝；是的，对我来说，文本中的每个字都表明了君主的有限性，并呼喊着否定绝对性：（1.）没有上帝的权力，（2.）没有上帝的命令，他是对恶行的威慑，对善行的赞美，（3.）没有为善的上帝的仆人等等。在地上，我们向上帝之后，没有受到控制的权力，我们自己服从。我这样证明被动顺从在上帝的诫命下并没有形式上的命令：所有服从上帝诫命的服从都在道德上称赞服从者，因为他们的意愿符合上帝的道德法律，而不服从的人的意愿与之相悖，使不服从者陷入愤怒和罪恶之中。 但是，对于不受判决之剑的被动服从，并不能道德上称赞那些不受惩罚的人；因为没有人因为不受惩罚的痛苦而正式成为违背道德法律的罪人，也没有人因为受到惩罚的痛苦而道德上是善良的或值得称赞的，而是因为他们犯了罪恶。所有不公正施加的惩罚之恶都有上帝的善意意愿，上帝的秘密决定，它既规定了善良也规定了恶（以弗所书 1:11），作为其规则和原因，并且不是上帝的意愿或认可所称为的，即 voluntas signi，因为它的规则是相反的，我确信 Epiphanius（第 1 卷，第 3 册，第 40 章），Basilius（在诗篇 32 中），Nazianzen Orat.（ad subd. et imperat.），Hilar.（li. ad Constant.）和 Augustine 都引用了这些话，并且说了同样的话。因此，如果被动服从没有被命令，那么被动不服从也不能被禁止，而罗马书 13 章和彼得前书 2 章的这段经文对君主主义者的不良立场毫无帮助。因此，一切都必须归结为抵抗的某种行动；尽管有很多关于被动服从的论据，它们对我们没有帮助。

Assert. 3.—By the place, 1 Pet. 2, the servant unjustly buffeted is not to buffet his master again, but to bear patiently as Christ did, who, when he was reviled, did not revile again. Not because the place condemneth resistance for self-defence, but because buffeting again is formally re-offending—not defending: defending is properly a warding off a blow or stroke. If my neighbour come to kill me, and I can by no means save my life by flight, I may defend myself; and all divines say I may rather kill ere I be killed, because I am nearer, by the law of nature, and dearer to myself and my own life than to my brother;—but if I kill him, out of malice or hatred, the act of defending, by the unlawful manner of doing, becometh an act of offending and murder; whence the mind of the blood-shedder will vary the nature of the action from whence this corollary doth naturally issue, that the physical action of taking away the life maketh not murder nor homicide, and so the physical action of offending my neighbour is, not murder. 1. Abraham may kill his son,—he for whom the cities of refuge were ordained, and did kill his brother, yet, not hating him, he was not, by God's law, judged a murderer; and, 2. It necessarily hence followeth, that an act which is. physically an act of offending my brother, yea even to the taking away of his life, is often morally and legally an act of lawful self-defence: an offending of another, necessitated from the sole invention of self-defence, is no more but an act of innocent self-defence. If David, with his men, had killed any of I Saul's men in a set battle, David and his men only intending self-defence, the war on David's part was mere defensive; for physical actions of killing, indifferent of themselves, yet imperated by a principle of natural self-defence, and clothed with this formal end of self-defence, or according to the substance of the action, the act is of self-defence. If, therefore, one shall wound me deadly, and I know it is my death, after that, to kill the killer of myself, I being only a private man, must be no act of self-defence, but of homicide; because it cannot be imperated by a sinless dictate of a natural conscience, for this end of self-defence, after I know I am killed. Any mean not used for preventing death must be an act of revenge, not of self-defence, for it is physically unsuitable for the intended end of self-defence. And so, for a servant buffeted to buffet again, is of the same nature,—the second buffet not being a conducible mean to ward the first buffet, but a mean to procure heavier strokes, and, possibly, killing, it cannot be an act of self-defence; for an act of self-defence must be an act destinated ex natura rei, only for defence; and if it be known to be an act of sole offending, without any known necessary relation of a mean to self-defence as the end, it cannot be properly an act of self-defence.
断言 3. 根据彼得前书 2 章的地方，受到不公正的打击的仆人不应再次打击他的主人，而是要像基督一样耐心忍受，因为当他受辱时，他没有还口。这并不是因为这个地方谴责自卫的抵抗，而是因为再次打击是正式的再犯罪行，而不是自卫：自卫是适当地避开打击或攻击。如果我的邻居来杀我，而我无法通过逃跑来保全自己的生命，我可以自卫；所有神学家都说我可以在被杀之前杀死对方，因为按照自然法则，我对自己和自己的生命更亲近、更珍视，而不是对我的兄弟；但如果我出于恶意或仇恨而杀死他，那么这种自卫行为，通过非法的方式，就变成了一种冒犯和谋杀行为；因此，流血者的心态将改变这个行为的本质，从而导致这个推论自然地产生，即夺取生命的物理行为并不构成谋杀或杀人，因此冒犯我的邻居的物理行为也不是谋杀。1. 亚伯拉罕可能会杀死他的儿子，他为了他的兄弟杀死了他的兄弟，然而，他并不憎恨他，根据上帝的法律，他并不被判定为谋杀犯；而且，从这里必然可以得出结论，一个在物理上冒犯我的兄弟的行为，甚至夺走他的生命，往往在道德上和法律上是一种合法的自卫行为：从纯粹出于自卫的发明而必须冒犯他人，不过是一种无辜的自卫行为。如果大卫和他的人在一场决战中杀死了扫罗的人，大卫和他的人只是出于自卫的意图，那么大卫一方的战争只是纯粹的防御性战争；因为杀人的物理行为本身并不重要，但是由于自然自卫的原则而被命令，并且以自卫的形式目标来实施，或者根据行为的实质来说，这个行为是自卫的行为。 如果有人致我于死地，我知道这是我的死亡，那么为了杀死伤害我的人，作为一个普通人，这不是自卫行为，而是杀人行为；因为在我知道自己已经被杀之后，这并不能由一个无罪的本能良知所命令，用于自卫的目的。任何不用于防止死亡的手段都是复仇行为，而不是自卫行为，因为它在物理上不适合于自卫的预期目标。因此，对于一个被打的仆人再去还击，也是同样的性质——第二次打击并不是为了防御第一次打击，而是为了引来更重的打击，甚至可能致命，它不能算作自卫行为；因为自卫行为必须是根据事物的本质而确定的，只为了自卫；如果它被认定为单纯的攻击行为，没有任何已知的与自卫目的相关的必要手段，那么它就不能被正确地称为自卫行为。

Assert. 4.—When the matter is lighter, as in paying tribute, or suffering a buffet of a rough master, though unjustly, we are not to use any act of re-offending. For, though I be not absolute lord of my own goods, and so may not at my sole pleasure give tribute and expend monies to the hurting of my children, where I am not, by God's law or man's law, obliged to pay tribute; and though I be not an absolute lord of my members, to expose face, and cheeks, and back, to stripes and whips at my own mere will, yet have we a comparative dominion given to us of God in matters of goods, and disposing of our members, (I think I may except the case of mutilation, which is a little death,) for buffets, because Christ, no doubt to teach us the like, would rather give of his goods, and pay tribute where it was not due, than that this scandal be in the way of Christ, that Christ was no loyal subject to lawful emperors and kings. And (1 Cor. 9.) Paul would rather not take stipend, though it was due to him, than hinder the course of the gospel. And the like is 1 Cor. 6, where the Corinthians were rather to suffer loss in their goods than to go to law before infidel judges, and by the like to prevent greater inconveniences, and mutilation, and death. The Christian servant hath that dominion over his members, rather to suffer buffets than to ward off buffets with, violent resistance. But it is no consequence, that innocent subjects should suffer death of tyrants, and servants be killed by masters, and yet that they shall not be allowed, by the law of nature, to defend themselves, by re-offending, when only self-defence is intended, because we have not that dominion over life and death. And therefore, as a man is his brother's murderer, who, with froward Cain, will not be his brother's keeper, and may preserve his brother's life, without loss of his own life, when his brother is unjustly preserved; so, when he may preserve his own life, and doth not that which nature's law alloweth him to do, (rather to kill ere he be killed,) he is guilty of self-murder, because he is deficient in the duty of lawful self-defence. But I grant, to offend or kill is not of the nature of defensive war, but accidental thereunto; and yet killing of cutthroats, sent forth by the illegal commandment of the king, may be intended as a mean, and a lawful mean, of self-defence. Of two ills of punishment, we have a comparative dominion over ourselves,—a man may cast his goods into the sea to redeem his life; so, for to redeem peace, we may suffer buffets, but because death is the greatest ill of punishment, God hath not made it eligible to us when lawful self-defence is at hand. But, in defending our own life against tyrannical power, though we do it by offending and killing, we resist no ordinance of God, only I judge killing of the king in self-defence not lawful, because self-defence must be national on just causes.
断言。第四条——当事情较轻时，比如支付贡金或遭受不公正的主人的打击，我们不应采取任何再犯的行为。因为，虽然我对自己的财产并没有绝对的控制权，所以不能随心所欲地支付贡金和花费金钱来伤害我的子女，但在上帝的法律或人的法律中，我并没有义务支付贡金；虽然我对自己的身体没有绝对的控制权，不能随意地暴露脸颊和背部接受鞭打，但在财产和处理我们的身体方面，上帝给予了我们一种相对的统治权（我认为我可以排除残害的情况，那是一种小小的死亡），因为基督无疑是为了教导我们类似的事情，宁愿拿出他的财产，支付不应该支付的贡金，也不愿让这种丑闻成为基督的道路上的绊脚石，即基督不是合法的皇帝和国王的忠实臣民。保罗在哥林多前书 9 章也是如此，他宁愿不领取应得的薪水，也不愿阻碍福音的传播。哥林多前书中也有类似的情况。 6，哥林多人宁愿在财产上遭受损失，也不愿在异教徒的法庭上打官司，以避免更大的不便、伤残和死亡。基督教仆人对自己的身体有支配权，宁愿忍受打击也不愿用暴力反抗。但这并不意味着无辜的人应该被暴君杀害，仆人被主人杀害，而他们却不被允许根据自然法则进行自卫，因为我们对生死没有那种支配权。因此，当一个人不按照自然法则允许的方式保护自己的生命时，他就是自杀的罪犯，因为他在合法自卫的责任上有所缺失。 但我承认，冒犯或杀戮并非防御战的本质，而是偶然发生的；然而，杀死那些受非法国王命令派遣的刺客，可以被视为一种手段，一种合法的自卫手段。在惩罚的两个罪恶中，我们对自己有相对的掌控权——一个人可以将他的财物投入海中以换取生命；因此，为了维护和平，我们可以忍受打击，但因为死亡是最大的惩罚之恶，当合法的自卫手段在手时，上帝并没有使其成为我们可选择的。但是，在抵抗暴政对我们自己的生命进行自卫时，即使我们通过冒犯和杀戮来做到，我们并没有违背上帝的命令，只是我认为在自卫中杀死国王是不合法的，因为自卫必须是国家的正当原因。

Let here the reader judge Barclay, (l. 3, c. 8, p. 159, con. Monar.) "If the king (saith he) shall vex the commonwealth, or one part thereof, with great and intolerable cruelty, what shall the people do? They have (saith he) in that case a power to resist and defend themselves from injury; but only to defend themselves, nor to invade the prince, nor to resist the injury, or to recede from reverence due to the prince."
让读者来评判巴克利（第 3 行，第 8 章，第 159 页，关于君主）。"如果国王（他说）以极大和不可忍受的残暴困扰国家或其中一部分，人民该怎么办？在那种情况下，他们有权力抵抗并保护自己免受伤害；但只能保护自己，不能侵犯君主，也不能抵抗伤害，或者违背对君主应有的尊敬。"

I answer, 1. Let Barclay or the Prelate, (if he may carry Barclay's books) or any, difference these two,—the people may resist a tyrant, but they may not resist the injuries inflicted by a tyrant's officers and cutthroats. I cannot imagine how to conciliate these two; for to resist the cruelty of a king is but to hold off the injury by resistance. 2. If this Nero waste the commonwealth insufferably with his cruelty, and remain a lawful king, to be honoured as a king, who may resist him, according to the royalists' way? But, from Rom. 13, they resist the ordinance of God. Resisting is not a mere suffering, nor is it a moral resisting by alleging laws to be broken by him. We had never a question with royalists about such resisting. Nor is this resisting non-obedience to unjust commandments; that resisting was never yet in question by any except the papists, who in good earnest, by consequent, say, It is better to obey men than God. 3. It is then resisting by bodily violence. But if the king have such an absolute Power given him by God, as royalists fancy, from Rom. 13:1, 2; 1 Sam. 8:9–11, I know not how subjects have any power given them of God to resist the power from God, and God's ordinance. And if this resisting extend not itself to defensive wars, how shall the people defend themselves from injuries, and the greatest injuries imaginable,—from an army of cut-throats and idolaters, in war coming to destroy religion, set up idolatry, and root out the name of God's people, and lay waste the mountain of the Lord's house? And if they may defend themselves by defensive wars, how can wars be without offending? 4. The law of nature teacheth to repel violence with violence, when one man is oppressed, no less than when the commonwealth is oppressed. Barclay should have given either Scripture or the law of nature for his warrant here. 5. Let us suppose a king can be perjured, how are the estates of the kingdom, who are his subjects, by Barclay's way, not to challenge such a tyrant of his perjury? He did swear he should be meek and clement, and he is now become a furious lion. Shall the flock of God be committed to the keeping of a furious lion?
我回答，1. 让巴克利或主教（如果他能带着巴克利的书）或任何人，区分这两者 - 人民可以抵抗暴君，但不能抵抗暴君的官员和刽子手所造成的伤害。我无法想象如何调和这两者; 因为抵抗国王的残暴只是通过抵抗来抵挡伤害。2. 如果这个尼禄用他的残暴无法容忍地摧毁共和国，并且仍然是一个合法的国王，应该被尊为国王，谁能按照王党派的方式抵抗他呢？但是，根据罗马书 13 章，他们抵抗神的命令。抵抗不仅仅是受苦，也不是通过引用被他违反的法律来进行道德上的抵抗。我们从来没有与王党派就这种抵抗问题争论过。这种抵抗也不是不服从不公正的命令; 这种抵抗从来没有被任何人提出过，除了天主教徒，他们真诚地说，服从人胜过服从上帝。3. 那么这就是通过肉体暴力进行抵抗。但是如果国王拥有王党派想象中神赋予他的绝对权力，来自罗马书 13:1, 2; 撒上 8:9-11，我不知道神如何赋予人民抵抗来自神和神的命令的权力。如果这种抵抗不包括自卫战，那么人民如何保护自己免受伤害，免受一支由杀人者和拜偶像者组成的军队的伤害？他们来战争是为了摧毁宗教，建立偶像崇拜，根除神的子民的名字，破坏主的殿宇。如果他们可以通过自卫战来保护自己，那么战争怎么可能没有冒犯呢？4. 自然法教导我们用暴力来回击暴力，当一个人受压迫时，不亚于整个国家受压迫。巴克利应该在这里提供圣经或自然法作为他的授权依据。5. 让我们假设国王可以发誓失信，按照巴克利的方式，国家的各个阶层作为他的臣民，难道不应该质疑这样一个暴君的失信吗？他曾发誓要温和仁慈，现在却变成了一只狂暴的狮子。难道神的羊群应该交给一只狂暴的狮子来保护吗？

Dr Ferne (p. 3, sect. 2, p. 9,) addeth, "Personal defence is lawful against sudden and illegal invasion, such as Elisha practised, even if it were against the prince, to ward blows, and to hold the prince's hand, but not to return blows; but general resistance by arms cannot be without many unjust violences, and doth immediately strike at the order, which is the life of the commonwealth.
弗恩博士（第 3 页，第 2 节，第 9 页）补充道：“个人防卫是合法的，可以用于突然和非法的入侵，就像以利沙所做的那样，即使是对付王子，也可以用来避开打击，抓住王子的手，但不能还击；但是，通过武器进行一般性的抵抗会导致许多不公正的暴力行为，并且会直接打击到秩序，而秩序是国家的生命。

Ans.—1. If it be natural to one man to defend himself against the personal invasion of a prince, then is it natural and warrantable to ten thousand, and to a whole kingdom; and what reason to defraud a kingdom of the benefit of self-defence more than one man? 2. Neither grace nor policy destroyeth nature; and how shall ten or twenty thousand be defended against cannons and muskets, that killeth afar off, except they keep towns against the king, (which Dr Ferne and others say had been treason in David, if he had kept Keilah against king Saul,) except they be armed to offend, with weapons of the like nature to kill rather than be killed, as the law of nature teacheth. 3. To hold the hands of the prince is no less resisting violence than to cut the skirt of his garment, which royalists think unlawful, and is an opposing of external force to the king's person. 4. It is true, wars merely defensive cannot be but they must be offensive; but they are offensive by accident, and intended for mere defence, and they cannot be without wars sinfully offensive, nor can any wars be in rerum natura now, (I except the wars commanded by God, who only must have been sinful in the manner of doing,) but some innocent must be killed; but wars cannot for that be condemned. 5. Neither are offensive wars against those who are no powers and no ordinances of God, such as are cut-throat Irish, condemned prelates and papists now in arms, more destructive to the order established by God than acts of lawful war are, or the punishing of robbers. And by all this, protestants in Scotland and England should remain in their houses unarmed, while the papists and Irish come on them armed, and cut their throats, and spoil, and plunder at will.
答案：1. 如果一个人自然而然地保护自己免受君主的个人侵犯，那么对于一万人或整个王国来说，保护自卫也是自然和合理的；为什么要剥夺王国享受自卫的权益，而不是一个人呢？2. 既没有恩典也没有策略能够摧毁自然；如果不用与远程杀伤力相当的武器来保护一万或两万人免受大炮和火枪的伤害，他们如何能够防御，（正如弗恩博士和其他人所说，如果大卫保卫基拉不让扫罗王进攻，那就是叛国行为），除非他们武装起来，用能够杀人而不是被杀的同类武器进行攻击，这是自然法则所教导的。3. 抓住君主的手与剪裁他的衣袍一样，都是抵抗暴力的行为，而王党派认为这是不合法的，是对君主人身进行外部力量的反对。4. 是的，战争只有防御性的战争是不可能的，它们必须是进攻性的；但它们是偶然的进攻，旨在纯粹的自卫，它们不能没有罪恶的进攻性战争，也不能在现实中存在任何战争（我除了上帝命令的战争，只有在执行方式上可能有罪恶）。但是，一些无辜的人必须被杀害；但是战争不能因此而被谴责。对于那些不是权力和上帝的法令的人进行的进攻性战争，比如刺客式的爱尔兰人、被谴责的主教和天主教徒，对上帝所建立的秩序的破坏并不比合法战争的行为或对强盗的惩罚更大。通过这一切，苏格兰和英格兰的新教徒应该无武装地留在家中，而天主教徒和爱尔兰人则武装前来，割断他们的喉咙，任意掠夺和抢劫。

Nor can we think that resistance to a king, in holding his hands, can be natural; if he be stronger, it is not a natural mean of self-preservation. Nature hath appointed innocent and offending violence, against unjust violence, as a means of self-preservation. Goliath's sword is no natural means to hold Saul's hands, for a sword hath no fingers; and if king Saul suddenly, without colour of law or reason, or inevitably, should make personal invasion on David to kill him, Dr Ferne saith he may resist; but resisting is essentially a re-action of violence. Show us Scripture or reason for violent holding a king's hands in an unjust personal invasion, without any other re-action of offence. Walter Torrils killed king W. Rufus as he was shooting at a deer; the Earl of Suffolk killed Henry VIII. at tilting: there is no treasonable intention here, and so no homicide. Defensive wars are offensive, ex eventu et effectu, not ex causa, or ex intentione.
我们也不能认为抵抗国王在控制他的手时是自然的；如果他更强大，这不是自我保护的自然手段。自然规定了无辜和有罪的暴力，以对抗不公正的暴力，作为自我保护的手段。歌利亚的剑不是控制扫罗的手的自然手段，因为剑没有手指；如果国王扫罗突然、没有法律或理由的情况下，或者不可避免地对大卫进行个人侵犯以杀害他，费恩博士说他可以抵抗；但抵抗本质上是对暴力的反应。给我们看看圣经或理由，证明在不公正的个人侵犯中，用暴力控制国王的手是合理的，而没有其他的攻击反应。沃尔特·托里尔斯在狩猎时杀死了威廉·鲁弗斯国王；萨福克伯爵在比武中杀死了亨利八世国王：这里没有叛国的意图，因此也没有杀人罪。防御性战争是攻击性的，从事件和效果上看，而不是从原因或意图上看。

But it may be asked, if no passive subjection at all be commanded as due to superiors.—Ans. None properly so called, that is, purely passive, only we are, for fear of the sword, to do our duty. We are to suffer ill of punishment of tyrants, ex hypothesi that they inflict that ill on us some other way, and in some other notion than we are to suffer ill of equals; for we are to suffer of equals not for any paternal authority that they have over us, as certainly we are to suffer ill inflicted by superiors. I demand of royalists, If tyrants inflicting evil of punishment upon subjects unjustly be powers ordained of God: if to resist a power in tyrannical acts be to resist God. Since we are not to yield active obedience to all the commandments of superiors, whether they be good or ill, by virtue of this place, Rom. 13 how is it that we may not deny passive subjection to all the acts of violence exercised, whether of injustice, whether in these acts of violence wherein the prince in actu exercito and formally, punisheth not in God's stead, or in these wherein he punisheth tyrannically, in no formal or actual subordination to God, we owe passive subjection? I desire an answer to these.
但是有人可能会问，如果没有任何被动服从被命令作为对上级的应尽义务，那该怎么办。答案是，没有真正所谓的被动服从，也就是纯粹的被动，只是出于对刀剑的恐惧，我们才去履行我们的职责。我们要忍受暴君的惩罚，假设他们以其他方式对我们施加了那种苦难，以及以其他方式而不是我们忍受平辈的苦难。因为我们忍受平辈的苦难并不是因为他们对我们有任何父权，就像我们必须忍受上级所施加的苦难一样。我向君主主义者们提问，如果暴君对公民不公正地施加惩罚的行为是上帝所命定的权力，那么抵抗暴政行为是否就是抵抗上帝。既然我们不必对上级的所有命令都服从，无论是善是恶，根据罗马书 13 章的这个地方，为什么我们不能对所有的暴力行为拒绝被动服从，无论是不公正的行为，还是在这些行为中，君主在实际行动和形式上都没有代替上帝进行惩罚，或者在这些行为中，他以暴政方式进行惩罚，而没有实际或形式上服从上帝，我们就要被动服从？我希望得到这些问题的答案。

Assert, 5.—Flying from the tyranny of abused authority, is a plain resisting of rulers in their unlawful oppression and perverting of judgment.
断言，5.——逃离滥用权威的暴政，是对统治者在他们的非法压迫和歪曲判断的明确抵抗。

All royalists grant it lawful, and ground it upon the law of nature, that those that are persecuted by tyrannous princes may flee, and it is evident from Christ's commandment, "If they persecute you in one city, flee to another," Matt. 10:23, and by Matt. 23:34. Christ fled from the fury of the Jews till his hour was come; Elias, Uriah, (Jer. 26:20,) and Joseph and Mary fled; the martyrs did hide themselves in caves and dens of the earth (Heb. 11:37, 38); Paul was let down through a window in a basket at Damascus. This certainly is resistance; for look, what legal power God hath given to a tyrannous ruler, remaining a power ordamed of God, to summon legally, and set before his tribunal the servants of God, that he may kill them, and murder them unjustly, that same legal power he hath to murder them; for if it be a legal power to kill the innocent, and such a power as they are obliged in conscience to submit unto, they are obliged in conscience to submit to the legal power of citing; for it is one and the same power. 1. Now, if resistance to the one power be unlawful, resistance to the other must be unlawful also; and if the law of self-defence, or command of Christ, warrant me to disobey a tyrannous power commanding me to compear to receive the sentence of death, that same law far more shall warrant me to resist and deny passive subjection in submitting to the unjust sentence of death. 2. When a murderer, self-convicted, fleeth from the just power of a judge lawfully citing him, he resisteth the just power ordained of God (Rom. 3); therefore, by the same reason, if we flee from a tyrannous power, we resist that tyrannous power, and so, by royalists' ground, we resist the ordinance of God by flying. Now, to be disobedient to a just power summoning a malefactor, is to hinder that lawful power to be put forth in lawful acts; for the judge cannot purge the land of blood if the murderer flee. 3. When the king of Israel sendeth a captain and fifty lictors to fetch Elisha, these come instructed with legal power from the king; if I may lay fetters on their power by flight, upon the ground of self-preservation, the same warrant shall allow me to oppose harmless violence for my own safety. 4. Royalists hold it unlawful to keep a stronghold against the king, though the fort be not the king's house, and though that David should not have offended if he had kept Keilah against Saul: Dr Ferne and royalists say it had been unlawful resistance. What more resistance is made to royal power by walls interposed than by seas and miles of earth interposed? Both are physical resistance, and violent in their kind.
所有皇室主义者都认为这是合法的，并以自然法为依据，即那些受到暴君迫害的人可以逃离。这从基督的命令中是明显的，“如果他们在一个城市迫害你，就逃到另一个城市”（马太福音 10:23），以及马太福音 23:34。基督逃离了犹太人的愤怒，直到他的时刻到来；以利亚、乌利亚（耶利米书 26:20）、约瑟夫和马利亚也逃离了；殉道者们藏身在地洞和山洞中（希伯来书 11:37, 38）；保罗被人用篮子从大马士革的窗户里放下。这无疑是抵抗；因为看看上帝赋予暴君合法权力的范围，作为上帝所命定的权力，合法地传唤并将上帝的仆人带到他的法庭上，以便他可以杀害他们，不公正地谋杀他们，他也有同样的合法权力来谋杀他们；因为如果杀害无辜者是合法权力，而且这是他们在良心上必须顺从的权力，那么他们在良心上也必须顺从传唤的合法权力；因为这是同一种权力。1. 现在，如果对一种权力的抵抗是非法的，对另一种权力的抵抗也必须是非法的；如果自卫法或基督的命令使我有权不服从一个命令我出庭接受死刑判决的暴政，那么同样的法律更应该使我有权抵抗并拒绝被动服从，不服从不公正的死刑判决。2. 当一个自证有罪的杀人犯逃离合法传唤他的公正权力时，他抵抗了上帝所命定的公正权力（罗马书 3 章）；因此，按照同样的理由，如果我们逃离一个暴政，我们就抵抗了那个暴政，所以按照王权主义者的观点，我们通过逃跑抵抗了上帝的命令。现在，对一个传唤罪犯的公正权力不服从，就是阻碍那个合法权力进行合法行为；因为如果杀人犯逃跑，法官就无法净化土地上的血。3. 当以色列国王派遣一个队长和五十名执法官来带走以利沙时，他们带着合法权力的指示来自国王；如果我可以通过逃跑来限制他们的权力，以自我保护为理由，同样的授权也将允许我反对对我自己的安全构成无害的暴力。4. 保皇派认为，即使堡垒不是国王的住所，即使大卫抵抗扫罗并没有犯错，保持对国王的强大抵抗也是非法的。费恩博士和保皇派认为这是非法的抵抗。墙壁与海洋和大片土地的隔离一样，都是对皇权的物理抵抗，都是暴力的。

QUESTION XXXI
问题 XXXI

WHETHER OR NO SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST ANY UNJUST VIOLENCE OFFERED TO THE LIFE, BE WARRANTED BY GOLD'S LAW, AND THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS
无论是否自卫，对于任何对生命的不公正暴力行为，是否受到金法、自然法和国际法的保护

Self-preservation in all creatures in which is nature, is in the creatures suitable to their nature. The bull defendeth itself by its horns, the eagle by her claws and bill, it will not follow that a lamb will defend itself against a wolf any other way than by flying. So men, and Christian men, do naturally defend themselves; but the manner of self-defence in a rational creature is rational, and not always merely natural; therefore, a politic community, being a combination of many natures, as neither grace, far less can policy, destroy nature, then must these many natures be allowed of God to use a natural self-defence. If the king bring in an army of foreigners, then a politic community must defend itself in a rational way. Why? Self-defence is natural to man, and natural to a lamb, but not the same way. A lamb or a dove naturally defend themselves against beasts of another kind only by flight, not by re-action and re-offending; but it followeth not that a man defendeth himself from his enemy only by flight. If a robber invade me, to take away my life and my purse, I may defend myself by re-action; for reason and grace both may determine the way of self-preservation. Hence royalists say, a private man against his prince hath no way to defend himself but by flight; therefore, a community hath no other way to defend themselves but by flight.
自保是所有生物的本性，适合于它们的本性。公牛用角自卫，老鹰用爪子和喙自卫，但这并不意味着羔羊会用其他方式对抗狼，只能通过逃跑。同样，人类和基督徒天生会自卫；但是，理性生物的自卫方式是理性的，而不仅仅是自然的；因此，一个政治社区作为许多本性的结合体，既然恩典不能，更不用说政策能摧毁本性，那么上帝必须允许这些多种本性使用自然的自卫方式。如果国王引进外国军队，那么一个政治社区必须以理性的方式自卫。为什么？自卫对人类来说是自然的，对羔羊也是自然的，但方式不同。羔羊或鸽子只会通过逃跑来自卫，而不是通过反击；但这并不意味着人类只能通过逃跑来自卫。如果有强盗入侵我，企图夺走我的生命和钱包，我可以通过反击来自卫；因为理性和恩典都可以决定自保的方式。 因此，保皇派说，一个普通人对抗他的君主没有其他办法来保护自己，只能逃跑；因此，一个社区没有其他办法来保护自己，只能逃跑。

1. The antecedent is false. Dr Ferne alloweth to a private man supplications, and denying of subsidies and tribute to the prince, when he employeth tribute to the destruction of the commonwealth; which, by the way, is a clear resistance, and an active resistance made against the king (Rom. 13:6, 7) and against a commandment of God, except royalists grant tyrannous powers may be resisted. 2. The consequence is naught, for a private man may defend himself against unjust violence, but not any way he pleaseth; the first way is by supplications and apologies,—he may not presently use violence to the king's servants before he supplicate, nor may he use re-offending, if flight may save. David used all the three in order. He made his defence by words, by the mediation of Jonathan; when that prevailed not, he took himself to flight, as the next; but because he knew flight was not safe every way, and nature taught him self-preservation, and reason and light of grace taught him the means, and the religious order of these means for self-preservation, therefore he addeth a third, "He took Goliath's sword, and gathered six hundred armed men," and after that made use of an host. Now a sword and armour are not horsing and shipping for flight, but contrary to flight; so re-offending is policy's last refuge. A godly magistrate taketh not away the life of a subject if other means can compass the end of the law, and so he is compelled and necessitated to take away the life; so the private man, in his natural self-defence, is not to use re-action, or violent re-offending, in his self-defence against any man, far less against the servants of a king, but in the exigence of the last and most inexorable necessity. And it is true that M. Symmons saith, (sect. 11, p. 35,) "Self-defence is not to be used where it cannot be without sin." It is certain, necessity is but a hungry plea for sin, (Luke 14:18,) but it is also true, re-offending comparatively, that I kill rather than I be killed, in the sinless court of nature's spotless and harmless necessity, is lawful and necessary, except I be guilty of self-murder, in the culpable omission of self-defence. Now a private man may fly, and and that is his second necessity, and violent re-offending is the third mean of self-preservation; but, with leave, violent re-offending is necessary to a private man, when his second mean, to wit, flight, is not possible, and cannot attain the end, as in the case of David: if flight do not prevail, Goliath's sword and an host of armed men are lawful. So, to a church and a community of protestants, men, women, aged, sucking children, sick, and diseased, who are pressed either to be killed or forsake religion and Jesus Christ, flight is not the second mean, nor a mean at all, because not possible, and therefore not a natural mean of preservation; for the aged, the sick, the sucking infants, and sound religion in the posterity cannot flee; flight here is physically, and by nature's necessity, impossible, and therefore no lawful mean. What is to nature physically impossible is no lawful mean. If Christ have a promise that the ends of the earth (Psal. 2:8) and the isles shall be his possession, (Isa. 49:1,) I see not how natural defence can put us to flee, even ail protestants and their seed, and the weak and sick, whom we are obliged to defend as ourselves, both by the law of nature and grace. I read that seven wicked nations and idolatrous were cast out of their land to give place to the church of God to dwell there, but show me a warrant in nature's law and in God's word that three kingdoms of protestants, their seed, aged, sick, suking children, should flee out of England, Scotland, Ireland, and leave religion and the land to a king and to papists, prelates, and bloody Irish, and atheists; and therefore to a church and community having God's right and man's law to the land, violent re-offending is their second mean (next to supplications and declarations, &c.) and flight is not required of them as of a private man; yea flight is not necessarily required of a private man, but where it is a possible mean of self-preservation; violent and unjust invasion of a private man, which is unavoidable, may be obviated with violent re-offending. Now the unjust invasion made on Scotland in 1640, for refusing the service-book, or rather the idolatry of the mass, therein intended, was unavoidable; it was impossible for the protestants, their old and sick, their women and sucking children to flee over sea, or to have shipping betwixt the king's bringing an army on them at Dunse Law, and the prelates' charging of the ministers to receive the mass book. Althusius saith well, (Polit. c. 38, n. 78,) Though private men may flee, yet the estates, if they flee, they do not do their duty, to commit a country, religion and all, to a lion. Let not any object, We may not devise a way to fulfil the prophecy, Psal. 2:8, 9; Isa. 49:1; it is true, if the way be our own sinful way; nor let any object, a colony went to New England and fled the persecution. Answer, True, but if fleeing be the only mean after supplication, there was no more reason that one colony should go to New England than it is necessary, and by a divine law obligatory, that the whole protestants in the three kingdoms, according to royalists' doctrine, are to leave their native country and religion to one man, and to popish idolators and atheists, willing to worship idols with them, and whither then shall the gospel be, which we are obliged to defend with our lives? 重试    错误原因

There is tutela vitæ proxima, et remota, a mere and immediate defence of our life, and a remote or mediate defence; when there is no actual invasion made by a man seeking our life, we are not to use violent re-offending. David might have killed Saul when he was sleeping, and when he cut off the lap of his garment, but it was unlawful for him to kill the Lord's anointed, because he is the Lord's anointed, as it is unlawful to kill a man, because he is the image of God, (Gen. 9:6,) except in case of necessity. The magistrate in case of necessity may kill the malefactor, though his maleficus do not put him in that case, that he hath not now the image of God; now prudence and light of grace determineth, when we are to use violent re-offending for self-preservation, it is not left to our pleasure. In a remote posture of self-defence, we are not to use violent re-offending: David having Saul in his hand was in a remote posture of defence, the unjust invasion then was not actual, not unavoidable, not a necessary mean in human prudence for self-preservation, for king Saul was then in a habitual, not in an actual pursuit of the whole princes, elders, and judges of Israel, or of a whole community and church; Saul did but seek the life of one man, David, and that not for religion, or a national pretended offence, and therefore he could not in conscience put hands on the Lord's anointed; but if Saul had actually invaded David for his life, David might, in that case, make use of Goliath's sword, (for he took not that weapon with him as a cypher to boast Saul—it is no less unlawful to threaten a king than to put hands on him,) and rather kill or be killed by Saul's emissaries; because then he should have been in an immediate and nearest posture of actual self-defence. Now the case is far otherwise between the king and the two parliaments of England and Scotland, for the king is not sleeping in his emissaries, for he hath armies in two kingdoms, and now in three kingdoms, by sea and land, night and day, in actual pursuit, not of one David, but of the estates, and a Christian community in England and Scotland, and that for religions, laws, and liberties; for the question is now between papist and protestant, between arbitrary or tyrannical government, and law government, and therefore by both the laws of the politic societies of both kingdoms, and by the law of God and nature, we are to use violent re-offending for self-preservation, and put to this necessity, when armies are in actual pursuit of all the protestant churches of the three kingdoms, to actual killing, rather than we be killed, and suffer laws and religion to be undone.
有 tutela vitæ proxima 和 remota，即对我们生命的直接和间接保护；当没有人实际入侵寻求我们的生命时，我们不应该使用暴力反击。大卫本可以在扫罗睡觉时杀死他，也可以割下他衣服的边角，但他杀死受膏者是不合法的，因为他是受膏者，就像杀死一个人是不合法的，因为他是上帝的形象（创世记 9:6），除非在必要情况下。在必要情况下，执法者可以杀死罪犯，即使罪犯的罪行没有使他失去上帝的形象；现在智慧和恩典的光明决定了我们何时应该使用暴力反击来自我保护，这不是由我们的意愿决定的。 在一种遥远的自卫姿态中，我们不应使用暴力的再犯罪行为：大卫手中拿着扫罗时，处于一种遥远的防御姿态，那时的不公正入侵不是实际的，不是不可避免的，不是人类谨慎自保的必要手段，因为扫罗当时并没有实际追捕以色列的所有王子、长老和法官，也没有追捕整个社区和教会；扫罗只是寻求一个人的生命，即大卫的生命，并且这并不是因为宗教或国家所谓的冒犯，因此他不能在良心上对上帝的受膏者动手；但是如果扫罗实际上为了大卫的生命而入侵，大卫可以在那种情况下使用歌利亚的剑（因为他拿着那把武器并不是为了威胁扫罗，威胁国王和对他动手一样是不合法的），宁愿被扫罗的使者杀死或杀死他们；因为那样他将处于最直接和最近的实际自卫姿态。 Now the case is far otherwise between the king and the two parliaments of England and Scotland, for the king is not sleeping in his emissaries, for he hath armies in two kingdoms, and now in three kingdoms, by sea and land, night and day, in actual pursuit, not of one David, but of the estates, and a Christian community in England and Scotland, and that for religions, laws, and liberties; for the question is now between papist and protestant, between arbitrary or tyrannical government, and law government, and therefore by both the laws of the politic societies of both kingdoms, and by the law of God and nature, we are to use violent re-offending for self-preservation, and put to this necessity, when armies are in actual pursuit of all the protestant churches of the three kingdoms, to actual killing, rather than we be killed, and suffer laws and religion to be undone.

But, saith the royalist, David's argument, "God forbid that I stretch out my hand against the Lord's anointed, my master the king," concludeth universally, that the king in his most tyrannous acts, still remaining the Lord's anointed, cannot be resisted.
但是，皇室支持者说，大卫的论点：“我绝不敢伸手攻击耶和华的受膏者，我的主，国王”，普遍得出结论，即使国王在他最暴虐的行为中，仍然是耶和华的受膏者，不能被抵抗。

Ans.—1. David speaketh of stretching out his hand against the person of king Saul: no man in the three kingdoms did so much as attempt to do violence to the king's person. But this argument is inconsequent, for a king invading, in his own royal person, the innocent subject, suddenly, without colour of law or reason, and unavoidably, may be personally resisted, and that with opposing a violence bodily, yet in that invasion he remaineth the Lord's anointed. 2. By this argument the life of a murderer cannot be taken away by a judge, for he remaineth one indued with God's image, and keepeth still the nature of a man under all the murders that he doth, but it followeth nowise, that because God hath endowed his person with a sort of royalty, of a divine image, that his life cannot be taken; and certainly, if to be a man endued with God's image, (Gen. 6:9, 10,) and to be an ill-doer worthy of evil punishment, are different, to be a king and an ill-doer may be distinguished.
答案：1. 大卫说起伸手攻击扫罗王的人：在三个王国中，没有人敢对国王的人身进行暴力行为。但这个论点是不相关的，因为国王在自己的王权人身上对无辜的臣民进行突然的、没有法律或理由的侵犯时，可以被个人抵抗，甚至可以使用肢体上的暴力，但在这种侵犯中，他仍然是上帝的受膏者。 2. 根据这个论点，一个杀人犯的生命不能被法官夺走，因为他仍然是被赋予上帝形象的人，并且在他所犯的所有谋杀行为中仍然保持着人的本性，但这丝毫不意味着，因为上帝赋予了他的人身以某种王权的神圣形象，他的生命就不能被夺取；而且可以肯定的是，如果作为一个被赋予上帝形象的人（创世纪 6:9, 10），和一个应受恶罚的作恶者是不同的，那么作为一个国王和一个作恶者也可以区分开来。

1. The grounds of self-defence are these:—A woman or a young man may violently oppose a king, if he force the one to adultery and incest, and the other to sodomy, though court flatterers should say, the king, in regard of his absoluteness, is lord of life and death; yet no man ever said that the king is lord of chastity, faith, and oath that the wife hath made to her husband.
自卫的理由是这样的：如果国王强迫一个女人犯奸淫和乱伦之罪，或者强迫一个年轻人犯同性恋之罪，那么她们可以采取暴力反抗，尽管朝臣们可能会说，由于国王的绝对权力，他有生杀予夺的权力；然而，从来没有人说国王有统治贞洁、忠诚和妻子对丈夫所作的誓言的权力。

2. Particular nature yields to the good of universal nature, for which cause heavy bodies ascend, airy and light bodies descend. If, then, a wild bull or a goring ox, may not be let loose in a great market-confluence of people, and if any man turn so distracted as he smite himself with stones and kill all that pass by him, or come at him, in that case the man is to be bound, and his hands fettered, and all whom he invadeth may resist him, were they his own sons, and may save their own lives with weapons, much more a king turning a Nero. King Saul, vexed with an evil spirit from the Lord, may be resisted; and far more if a king endued with use of reason, shall put violent hands on all his subjects, kill his son and heir; yea, and violently invaded, by nature's law, may defend themselves, and the violent restraining of such a one is but the hurting of one man, who cannot be virtually the commonwealth, but his destroying of the community of men sent out in wars, as his bloody emissaries, to the dissolution of the commonwealth.
特定的性质屈服于普遍性质的利益，因此重物上升，轻物下降。因此，一头野牛或一头顶人的公牛不能在人群聚集的大市场上放任自流，如果有人变得疯狂到用石头打自己并杀死经过他或接近他的人，那么这个人应该被捆绑，双手被束缚，所有被他侵犯的人都可以抵抗他，即使他们是他自己的儿子，他们也可以用武器保护自己的生命，更何况一个变成尼禄的国王。受到上帝的邪灵困扰的扫罗王可以被抵抗；如果一个有理智的国王对所有臣民采取暴力行为，杀死他的儿子和继承人，那么更应该被抵抗；而且根据自然法则，被暴力侵犯的人可以自卫，对这样的人进行强制约束只是伤害一个人，他不能代表整个国家，但他的行为却会导致派出作为他血腥使者的人在战争中被消灭，从而导致国家的解体。

3. The cutting off of a contagious membor, that by a gangrene, would corrupt the whole body, is well warranted by nature, because the safety of the whole is to be preferred to the safety of a part. Nor is it much that royalists say, The king being the head, destroy him, and the whole body of the commonwealth is dissolved; as cut off a man's head, and the life of the whole man is taken away. Because, 1. God cutteth off the spirits of tyrannous kings, and yet the commonwealth is not dissolved, no more than when a leopard or a wild boar, running through children, is killed, can be the destruction of all the children in the land. 2. A king indefinitely is referred to the commonwealth as an adequate head to a monarchical kingdom; and remove all kings and the politic body, as monarchical, in its frame, is not monarchical, but it leaveth not off to be a politic body, seeing it hath other judges; but the natural body without the head cannot live. 3. This or that tyrannous king, being a transient mortal thing, cannot be referred to the immortal commonwealth, as it is adequate correlate. They say, "the king never dieth," yet this king can die; an immortal politic body, such as the commonwealth, must have an immortal head, and that is a king as a king, not this or that man, possibly a tyrant, who is for the time (and eternal things abstract from time) only a king.
3. 切断传染性疾病的肢体，以免腐败整个身体，是符合自然法的，因为整体的安全比部分的安全更重要。王党人说国王是头，摧毁他，整个国家就会解体，这并不重要，就像砍掉一个人的头，整个人的生命也会消失一样。因为，1. 上帝会割断暴君的灵魂，但国家并没有解体，就像当一只豹子或野猪穿过孩子们时被杀死，并不会毁灭整个国家的孩子们一样。2. 国王无限地被视为君主国家的充分头领，移除所有国王，政治体制中的君主制不再是君主制，但它仍然是一个政治体，因为它有其他的法官；然而没有头的自然身体无法生存。3. 这个或那个暴君，作为一个短暂的凡人，无法与不朽的国家相对应，因为它是充分的相关物。 他们说，“国王永不死亡”，然而这位国王可以死亡；一个永恒的政治实体，如共和国，必须有一个永恒的头领，那就是一个真正的国王，而不是这个或那个人，可能是一个暴君，他只是在某个时刻（而永恒的事物超越时间）才是国王。

4. The reason of Fortunius Garcias, a skilful lawyer in Spain, is considerable, (Comment. in I. ut vim vi ff. de justit. et jure,) God hath implanted in every creature natural inclinations and motions to preserve itself, and we are to love ourselves for God, and have a love to preserve ourselves rather than our neighbour; and nature's law teacheth every man to love God best of all, and next ourselves more than our neighbour; for the law saith, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Then saith Malderius, (com. in 12, q. 26, tom. 2, c. 10, concl. 2,) "The love of ourselves is the measure of the love of our neighbour." But the rule and the measure is more perfect, simple, and more principal than the thing that is measured. It is true I am to love the salvation of the church, it cometh nearer to God's glory, more than my own salvation, as the wishes of Moses and Paul do prove; and I am to love the salvation of my brother more than my own temporal life; but I am to love my own temporal life more than the life of any other, and therefore, I am rather to kill than to be killed, the exigence of necessity so requiring. Nature without sin owneth this as a truth, in the case of loss of life, Proximus sum egomet mihi, (Ephes. 5:28, 29,) "He that loveth his wife, loveth himself; for no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth it, and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the church." As then nature tyeth the dam to defend the young birds, and the lion her whelps, and the husband the wife, and that by a comparative re-offending, rather than the wife or children should be killed; yea, he that his wanting to his brother, (if a robber unjustly invade his brother,) and helpeth him not, is a murderer of his brother, so far God's spiritual law requiring both conservation of it in our person, and preservation in others. The forced damsel was commanded to cry for help, and not the magistrate only, but the nearest private man or woman was to come, by an obligation of a divine law of the seventh commandment, to rescue the damsel with violence, even as a man is to save his enemy's ox or his ass out of a pit. And if a private man may inflict bodily punishment of two degrees, to preserve the life and chastity of his neighbour, far rather than suffer his life and chastity to be taken away, then he may inflict violence of four degrees, even to killing, for his life, and much more for his own life. So when a robber, with deadly weapons, invadeth an innocent traveller to kill him for his goods, upon the supposition that if the robber be not killed, the innocent shall be killed. Now the question is, which of the two, by God's moral law and revealed will, in point of conscience, ought to be killed by his fellow? For we speak not now of God's eternal decree of permitting evil, according to the which murderers may crucify the innocent Lord of glory. By no moral law of God should the unjust robber kill the innocent traveller; therefore, in this exigence of providence, the traveller should rather kill the robber. If any say, by God's moral law not one should kill his fellow, and it is a sin against the moral law in either to kill the other, I answer,—If a third shall come in when the robber and the innocent are invading each other for his life, all acknowledge by the sixth commandment the third may cut off the robber's arm to save the innocent; but by what law of God he may cut off his arm, he may take his life also to save the other; for it is murder to wound unjustly, and to dismember a man by private authority, as it is to take away his life; if, therefore, the third may take away the robber's member, then also his life, so he do it without malice or appetite of revenge, and if he may do it out of this principle, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself;" because a man is obliged more to love his own flesh than his neighbour's, Ephes. 5:28,) and so more to defend himself than to defend his neighbour,—then may he oppose violence to the robber. As two men drowning in a water, the one is not obliged by God's law to expose himself to drowning to save his neighbour; but by the contrary, he is obliged rather to save himself, though it were with the loss of his neighbour's lite. As in war, if soldiers in a strait passage be pursued on their life, nature teacheth them to flee; if one fall, his fellow in that exigence is not only not obliged to lift him up, but he and the rest flying, though they trample on him and kill him, they are not guilty of murder, seeing they hated him not before, (Deut. 19:4, 6;) so Chemnit. (loc. com. de vindic. q. 3) alloweth private defence. 1. When the violence is sudden. 2. And the violence manifestly inevitable. 3. When the magistrate is absent and cannot help. 4. When moderation is kept as lawyers require. 1. That it be done incontinent; if it be done after the injury, it is revenge, not defence. 2. Not of desire of revenge. 3. With proportion of armour. If the violent invader invade not with deadly weapons, you must not invade him with deadly weapons; and certainly the law (Exod. 22.) of a man's defending his house is clear. 1. If he come in the night, it is presumed he is a robber. 2. If he be taken with a weapon breaking the house, he cometh to kill, a man may defend himself, wife, and children, 3. But he is but to wound him, and if he die of the wound, the defender is free; so the defender is not to intend his death, but to save himself.
4. 西班牙的熟练律师 Fortunius Garcias 的理由是值得考虑的，（注释在 I. ut vim vi ff. de justit. et jure 中，）上帝在每个生物中植入了自我保护的自然倾向和动力，我们应该为了上帝而爱自己，并且有一种保护自己而不是邻居的爱；自然法教导每个人首先要最爱上帝，其次是比邻居更爱自己；因为法律说：“你要爱你的邻舍如同爱自己。”然后马尔德里乌斯说（com. in 12, q. 26, tom. 2, c. 10, concl. 2，）“我们对自己的爱是对邻舍爱的度量。”但是规则和度量比被度量的事物更完美、更简单、更重要。诚然，我应该爱教会的救赎，它比我自己的救赎更接近上帝的荣耀，正如摩西和保罗的愿望所证明的那样；我应该比我自己的世俗生命更爱我的兄弟的救赎；但是我应该比任何其他人的生命更爱我自己的世俗生命，因此，在必要的情况下，我宁愿杀人也不愿被杀。 自然无罪地拥有这个真理，在生命丧失的情况下，Proximus sum egomet mihi（以弗所书 5:28, 29），“爱妻子的，就是爱自己；因为没有人恨恶自己的身体，总是保养顾惜，正如基督爱教会一样。”因此，自然将母亲与幼鸟、狮子与幼崽、丈夫与妻子紧密联系在一起，宁愿自己再犯错误，也不愿妻子或孩子丧命；是的，如果强盗不公正地侵犯他的兄弟，那么不帮助他的人就是他兄弟的凶手，因此，上帝的属灵法律要求我们在自己身上保护它，在他人身上保护它。被强迫的少女被命令呼救，不仅是法官，而且最近的男人或女人都应该根据第七诫的神圣法律的义务，用暴力解救少女，就像一个人要救他敌人的牛或驴免于陷入深坑一样。 如果一个普通人可以施加两度的身体惩罚，以保护他的邻居的生命和贞操，而不是让他的生命和贞操被夺走，那么他可以施加四度的暴力，甚至杀人，来保护自己的生命，对于他自己的生命来说更是如此。所以当一个持有致命武器的强盗袭击一个无辜的旅行者，为了抢夺他的财物而打算杀害他，假设如果不杀死强盗，无辜者将被杀害。现在的问题是，根据上帝的道德法和启示意志，在良心的问题上，哪一个应该被他的同伴杀死？因为我们现在不谈上帝允许邪恶的永恒决定，根据这个决定，凶手可以钉死那位无辜的荣耀主。根据上帝的任何道德法，不正义的强盗都不应该杀害无辜的旅行者；因此，在这种神的安排下，旅行者应该杀死强盗。 如果有人说，按照上帝的道德法则，任何人都不应该杀害他的同胞，而且无论是哪一方杀害另一方都是违反道德法则的罪行，我回答说，如果有第三者在强盗和无辜者互相侵害对方的生命时介入，所有人都承认根据第六条诫命，第三者可以砍掉强盗的手臂来拯救无辜者；但是根据上帝的哪条法律，他可以割掉他的手臂，他也可以为了拯救另一个人而夺取他的生命；因为无理地伤害和私自割断一个人的身体，就像夺走他的生命一样是谋杀的行为；因此，如果第三者可以夺走强盗的肢体，那么他也可以夺走他的生命，只要他这样做没有恶意或报复的欲望，并且如果他可以出于这个原则而这样做，“你要爱你的邻舍如同爱自己”；因为一个人对自己的肉体比对邻舍的肉体有更大的责任（以弗所书 5:28），所以他对自己的保护比对邻舍的保护更重要，那么他可以对抗强盗的暴力。就像两个人在水中溺水，一个人没有按照上帝的法律义务将自己置于溺水的危险中来拯救邻舍；相反，他更应该拯救自己，即使以牺牲邻舍的生命为代价。 就像在战争中，如果士兵在狭窄的通道中被追杀，本能会告诉他们逃跑；如果有人倒下，其他人在那种紧急情况下不仅不需要扶起他，而且他们自己也在逃跑，即使他们踩到他并杀死他，他们也不会被判谋杀罪，因为他们之前并不憎恨他（申命记 19:4, 6）；因此，Chemnit.（loc. com. de vindic. q. 3）允许私人自卫。1. 当暴力是突然发生的时候。2. 当暴力是明显不可避免的时候。3. 当政府官员不在场且无法提供帮助的时候。4. 当遵循律师要求的适度行为。1. 必须立即采取行动；如果在受伤之后才采取行动，那就是复仇，而不是自卫。2. 不出于复仇的欲望。3. 使用适当的武器。如果暴力侵犯者没有使用致命武器进行侵犯，你就不能使用致命武器进行反击；而且确实，保卫自己住宅的法律（出埃及记 22 章）是明确的。1. 如果他在夜间进入，可以假定他是个强盗。2. 如果他带着破坏住宅的武器被抓住，他是来杀人的，一个人可以保护自己、妻子和孩子。3. 但他只是要伤害他，如果他因伤而死，辩护者就可以获得自由；所以辩护者并不打算让他死，而是要保护自己。

5. It were a mighty defect in providence to man, if dogs by nature may defend themselves against wolves, bulls against lions, doves against hawks, if man, in the absence of the lawful magistrate, should not defend himself against unjust violence; but one man might raise armies of papists, sick for blood, to destroy innocent men. They object, "When the king is present in his person, and his invaders, he is not absent, and so though you may rather kill a private man than suffer yourself to be killed, yet, because prudence determineth the means of self-defence, you are to expose your life to hazard for justice of your king, and therefore not to do violence to the life of your king; nor can the body, in any self-defence, fight against the head, that must be the destruction of the whole."—Ans. 1. Though the king be present as an unjust invader in wars against his innocent subjects, he is absent as a king, and a father and defender, and present as an unjust conqueror, and therefore the innocent may defend themselves when the king neither can, nor will defend them. "Nature maketh a man, (saith the law, Gener. c. de decur. l. 10, l. si alius sect. Bellissime ubique Gloss. in vers ex magn. not. per. ilium text. ff. quod vi aut clam. l. ait prætor. sect. si debitorem meum. ff. de hisque in fraud credito.,) even a private man, his own judge, magistrate, and defender, quando copiam judicis, qui sibi jus reddat, non habet, when he hath no judge to give him justice and law." The subjects are to give their lives for the king, as the king, because the safety of the king, as king, is the safety of the commonwealth. But the king, as offering unjust violence to his innocent subjects, is not king. Zoannet. (part 3, defens. n. 44,)—Transgrediens notorie officium suum judex, agit velut privatus aliquis, non ut magistratus (ff. de injur est bonus in simili in. l. qui fundum. sect. si. tutor ff. pro emptore). 3. If the politic body fight against this head in particular, not as head, but as an oppressor of the people, there is no fear of dissolution; if the body rise against all magistracy, as magistracy and laws, dissolution of all must follow. Parliaments and inferior judges are heads (Num. 1:16; 10:4; Deut 1:15; Josh. 22:21; Mic. 3:1, 9, 11; 1 Kings 8:1; 1 Chron. 5:25; 2 Chron. 5:2,) no less than the king; and it is unlawful to offer violence to them, though I shall rather think a private man is to suffer the king to kill him rather than he kill the king, because he is to prefer the life of a private man to the life of a public man.
5. 如果狗天生可以抵御狼，公牛可以抵御狮子，鸽子可以抵御鹰，那么人类在合法统治者不在场时，不应该抵御不公正的暴力，这将是上天对人类的巨大缺陷；但如果一个人可以组织天主教徒的军队，渴望流血，来摧毁无辜的人，那就太可怕了。他们反驳说：“当国王亲自在场时，他的入侵者也在场，所以虽然你可以杀死一个普通人而不是让自己被杀，但是因为谨慎决定了自卫的手段，你必须冒着生命危险为了国王的正义而奋斗，因此不能对国王的生命施以暴力；在任何自卫中，身体都不能对头部进行战斗，那将是整个身体的毁灭。”——答：1. 虽然国王在对无辜的臣民发动战争时作为一个不公正的入侵者是在场的，但作为国王、父亲和捍卫者，他是不在场的，同时也是一个不公正的征服者，因此当国王既不能也不愿意保护他们时，无辜的人可以自卫。"自然造就了一个人（法律如此说，Gener. c. de decur. l. 10, l. si alius sect. Bellissime ubique Gloss. in vers ex magn.） 不。每。髂骨文本。ff。因为力量或秘密。l.法官说。sect。如果我的债务人。ff。关于这些欺诈信任的事情，即使是一个私人，他自己是法官，法官和辩护人，当他没有法官给他正义和法律时。”主题是为了国王而献出自己的生命，因为国王的安全就是国家的安全。但是，国王对他无辜的臣民施加不公正的暴力，他就不是国王。Zoannet。（第 3 部分，defens。n.44，）-明显违背他的职责的法官，行事如同一个私人，而不是一个官员（ff。de injur est bonus in simili in。l. qui fundum。sect。si。tutor ff。pro emptore）。3.如果政治机构反对这个特定的头，不是作为头，而是作为人民的压迫者，那么就没有解散的恐惧；如果机构反对所有的政府，作为政府和法律，那么所有的解散都必须跟随。议会和下级法官是头目（民数记 1:16；10:4；申命记 1:15；约书亚记 22:21；弥迦书 3:1,9,11；列王纪上 8:1；历代志 5:25；历代志 5:2，不亚于国王；对他们施加暴力是非法的，尽管我更倾向于认为一个普通人应该让国王杀死他，而不是他杀死国王，因为他应该将一个普通人的生命置于公众人物的生命之上。

6. By the law of nature a ruler is appointed to defend the innocent. Now, by nature, an infant in the womb defendeth itself first, before the parents can defend it, then when parents and magistrates are not, (and violent invading magistrates are not in that magistrates,) nature hath commended every man to self-defence.
根据自然法则，统治者被任命来保护无辜者。现在，根据自然法则，胎儿在母体内首先保护自己，而父母还没有机会保护它，当父母和政府官员都不存在时，（而且那些侵略性的入侵者也不是合法的官员），自然赋予每个人自卫的权利。

7. The law of nature excepteth no violence, whether inflicted by a magistrate or any other. Unjust violence from a ruler is double injustice. 1. He doth unjustly as a man. 2. As a member of the commonwealth. 3. He committeth a special kind of sin of injustice against his office, but it is absurd to say we may lawfully defend ourselves from smaller injuries, by the law of nature, and not from the greater. "If the Pope, saith Fer. Vasquez (illust. quest. l. 1, c. 24, n. 24, 25) command to take away benefices from the just owner, those who are to. execute his commandment are not to obey, but to write back that that mandate came not from his holiness, but from the avarice of his officers; but if the Pope still continue and press the same unjust mandate, the same should be written again to him: and though there be none above the Pope, yet there is natural self-defence patent for all." "Defensio vitæ necessaria est, et a jure naturali profluit" (L. ut vim. ff. de just et jure 16,) "Nam quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure fecisse videatur," (C. jus naturale, 1 distinc. l. 1, ff. de vi et vi armata, l. injuriarum, ff. de injuria: C. significasti. 2, de hom. l. scientiam, sect. qui non aliter ff. ad leg. Aquil; C. si vero 1, de sent excom. et l. sed etsi ff. ad leg. Aquil.) "Etiamsi sequatur homicidium." Vasquez. (l. 1, C. 17, n. 5.)—"Etiam occidere licet ob defensionem rerum. Vim vi repellere omnia jura permittunt in C. significasti." Garcias Fortunius (comment. in l. 3)—"Defendere se est juris naturæ et gentium. A jure civili fuit additum moderamen inculpatæ tutelæ." Novel (defens. n. 101.)—"Occidens prinsipem vel alium tyrannidem exercentem, a pæna homicidii excusatur." Grotius (de jure belli et paeis, l. 2, c. 1, n. 3.)—"Si corpus impetatur vi presente, cum periculo vitæ non aliter vitabili, tunc bellum est licitum etiam cum interfectione periculum inferentis, ratio, natura quemque sibi commendat." Barclaius (advers. Monar. l. 3, c. 8.)—"Est jus cuilibet se tenendi adversus immanem sevitiam."
自然法不容忍任何暴力，无论是由执法者还是其他人施加的。统治者的不公正暴力是双重不公正。1. 作为一个人，他不公正。2. 作为一个公民的一员。3. 他犯了一种特殊的不公正罪，违背了他的职责，但说我们可以合法地通过自然法保护自己免受较小的伤害，却不能保护自己免受较大的伤害是荒谬的。"如果教皇命令从正当的所有者那里夺走福利，执行他的命令的人不应该服从，而应该回信说那个命令不是来自他的圣洁，而是来自他的官员的贪婪；但是如果教皇仍然坚持并推行同样的不公正命令，应该再次写信给他：虽然教皇之上没有人，但自然自卫权对所有人都是明显的。" "保护生命是必要的，是源于自然法"（L. ut vim. ff. de just et jure 16）"因为每个人为了保护自己的身体所做的事情，似乎是合法的"（C. jus naturale, 1 distinc. l. 1, ff. de vi et vi armata, l. injuriarum, ff. de injuria: C. significasti. 2, de hom. l. 科学，部分不同于阿奎尔法律；C.如果确实如此 1，关于放逐的判决和 l.但是即使如此 ff.至阿奎尔法律。）"即使是跟随谋杀。"瓦斯克斯。（l. 1，C. 17，n. 5。）-“甚至可以因为保护财产而杀人。你在 C.中指出，用武力击退一切法律都允许。”加西亚斯·福图尼乌斯（对 l. 3 的评论）-“自卫是自然法和国际法。民法增加了无罪保护的限制。”新法（辩护 n. 101。）-“杀害统治者或其他施行暴政的人，不受谋杀的惩罚。”格罗蒂乌斯（关于战争与和平法的法律，l. 2，c. 1，n. 3。）-“如果身体受到当前生命无法避免的危险，那么战争是合法的，即使有可能杀死对方，理性和自然都推荐每个人保护自己。”巴克莱（对抗君主的评论，l. 3，c. 8。）-“每个人都有权利抵抗残暴。”"

But what ground (saith the royalist) is there to take arms against the king? Jealousies and suspicions are not enough.
但是（皇室主义者说），有什么理由对国王采取武装行动呢？嫉妒和怀疑是不够的。

Ans.—1. The king sent first an army to Scotland, and blocked us up by sea, before we took arms. 2. Papists were armed in England. They have professed themselves in their religion of Trent to be so much the holier, that they root out protestants. 3. The king declared we had broken loyalty to him since the last parliament. 4. He declared both kingdoms rebels. 5. Attempted in his emissaries to destroy the parliament; 6. And to bring in a foreign enemy. And the law saith, "An imminent danger, which is a sufficient warrant to take up arms, is not strokes, but either the terror of arming or threatening." Glossator (in d. l. 1, C.)—"Unde vi. ait non esse verbera expectanda, sed vel terrorem armorum sufficere, vel minas, et hoc esse imminens periculum." L. sed et si quemcunque in princ. ff. ad leg. Aquil I. 3, quod qui armati ff. de vi et vi armata is qui aggressorem C. ad legem Corneli.
答案：1.国王先派遣一支军队去苏格兰，在我们拿起武器之前，他们通过海上封锁了我们。2.天主教徒在英格兰武装起来。他们在特伦特宗教会议上公开表示，他们比新教徒更加圣洁，要根除新教徒。3.国王宣布我们自上次议会以来对他的忠诚已经破裂。4.他宣布两个王国都是叛逆者。5.他试图通过他的密使摧毁议会。6.并引进外国敌人。法律说，“即将发生的危险足以证明采取武装行动是合理的，这种危险不是打击，而是武装或威胁的恐惧。”注释者（在 d. l. 1, C.中）-“因此，他说不必等待打击，而是武装的恐惧或威胁足以构成即将发生的危险。”L. sed et si quemcunque in princ. ff. ad leg. Aquil I. 3, quod qui armati ff. de vi et vi armata is qui aggressorem C. ad legem Corneli.

In most heinous sins, conatus, the endeavour and aim, etiamsi effectus non sequatur, puniri debet, is punishable. Bartol in l. "Si quis non dicam rapere."
在最严重的罪行中，conatus，即努力和目标，即使没有产生效果，也应受到惩罚。巴托尔在 l. "Si quis non dicam rapere."

The king hath aimed at the destruction of his subjects, through the power of wicked counsellors, and we are to consider not the intention of the workers, but the nature and intention of the work. Papists are in arms,—their religion, the conspiracy of Trent, their conscience, (if they have any,) their malice against the covenant of Scotland, which abjureth their religion to the full, their ceremonies, their prelates,—lead and necessitate them to root out the name of protestant religion, yea, and to stab a king who is a protestant. Nor is our king, remaining a protestant, and adhering to his oath made at the coronation in both kingdoms, lord of his own person, master of himself, nor able, as king, to be a king over protestant subjects, if the papists, now in arms under his standard, shall prevail. 重试    错误原因

The king hath been compelled to go against his own oath, and the laws which he did swear to maintain; the Pope sendeth to his popish armies both dispensations, bulls, mandates, and encouragements; the king hath made a cessation with the bloody Irish, and hath put arms in the hands of papists. Now, he being under the oath of God, tyed to maintain the protestant religion, he hath a metaphysically subtle, piercing faith of miracles, who believeth armed papists and prelates shall defend the religion of protestants; and those who have abjured prelates as the lawful sons of the Pope, that ο αντιχριστος and as the law saith, Quilibet in dubio præsumitur bonus. L. merito præsumi. L. non omnes, sect. a Barbaris de re milit. Charity believeth not ill; so charity is not a fool to believe all things. So saith the law, Semel malus, semper præsumitur malus, in eodem genere. C. semel malus de jure gentium in 6. Once wicked, is always wicked in that kind. Marius Salamonius, I. C. in L. ut vim atque injuriam ff. de just et jure. We are not to wait on strokes, the terror of armour, omnium consensu, by consent of all is sufficient (n. 3). "If I see (saith he) the enemy take an arrow out of the quiver, before he bend the bow, it is lawful to prevent him with a blow—cunctatio est periculosa." The king's coming with armed men into the House of Commons to demand the five members, is very symbolical, and war was printed on that fact, "he that runneth may read." His coming to Hull with an army, saith not he had no errand there, but to ask what it was in the clock. Novellus, that learned Venetian lawyer, in a treatise for defence, maketh continuatam rixam, a continued upbraiding, a sufficient ground of violent defence. He citeth Dr Comniter. in L. ut vim. ff. de just et jure. Yea, he saith, drunkenness, (defens. n. 44,) error, (n. 46,) madness, (n. 49, 50,) ignorance, (n, 51, 52,) impudence, (n. 54,) necessity, (n. 56,) laciviousness, (n. 58,) continual reproaches, (n. 59,) the fervour of anger, (n. 64,) threatening, (n. 66,) fear of imminent danger, (n. 67,) and just grief, do excuse a man from homicide, and that in these be ought to be more mildly punished, quia obnubilatum et mancum est consilium, reason in these being lame and clogged. (Ambros. 1. 1. offic.) Qui non repellit injuriam a socio, cum potest, tam est in vitio, quam ille qui facit. And as nature, so the law saith, "When the losses are such as can never be repaired, as death, mutilation, loss of chastity, quoniam facta infecta fieri nequeunt, things of that kind once done, can never be undone, we are to prevent the enemy" (l. Zonat. tract, defens. par. 3, l. in bello sect, factæ de capit. notat. Gloss, in l. si quis provocatione). If the king send an Irish rebel to cast me over a bridge, and drown me in a water, I am to do nothing, while the king's emissary first cast me over, and then in the next room I am to defend myself; but nature and the law of self-defence warranteth me (if I know certainly his aim,) to horse him first over the bridge, and then consult how to defend myself at my own leisure.
国王被迫违背自己的誓言和他发誓要维护的法律；教皇向他的天主教军队派遣豁免、教皇诏书、命令和鼓励；国王与血腥的爱尔兰人达成了停战协议，并将武器交给了天主教徒。现在，他作为上帝的誓约，被束缚着要维护新教信仰，他对奇迹有着形而上学上的敏锐、深入的信仰，相信武装的天主教徒和主教将保卫新教信仰；而那些宣誓放弃主教作为教皇合法儿子的人，被认为是反基督者，正如法律所说，任何人在怀疑中都被认为是好人。法律说，一次坏事，永远被认为是坏事，同类之中。我们不必等待打击，武器的恐怖，根据所有人的共识，足够了（第 3 条）。 “如果我看到敌人从箭袋中取出箭矢，还未拉弓，那么用一击来阻止他是合法的——犹豫是危险的。”国王带着武装人员进入下议院要求逮捕五名议员，这是非常象征性的，战争就印在这个事实上，“奔跑的人都能看到。”他带着军队来到赫尔，不是说他没有任务，而是要问一下现在几点了。那位学识渊博的威尼斯律师 Novellus 在一篇为自卫辩护的论文中，将持续的责骂视为暴力辩护的充分理由。他引用了康尼特博士的观点。他说，醉酒（辩护第 44 条），错误（第 46 条），疯狂（第 49、50 条），无知（第 51、52 条），厚颜无耻（第 54 条），必要性（第 56 条），淫荡（第 58 条），持续的责骂（第 59 条），愤怒的热情（第 64 条），威胁（第 66 条），即将到来的危险（第 67 条）和正当的悲伤，都可以为杀人辩护，并且在这些情况下应该更温和地惩罚，因为在这些情况下，理智是迟钝和阻塞的。（安布罗斯 1.1.职务）) 如果一个人不尽力阻止对伙伴的伤害，他与实施伤害的人一样有责任。正如自然界和法律所说的，“当损失是无法修复的，比如死亡、残废、失去贞操等，因为这些事情一旦发生就无法撤销，我们应该预防敌人”（l. Zonat. tract, defens. par. 3, l. in bello sect, factæ de capit. notat. Gloss, in l. si quis provocatione）。如果国王派遣一个爱尔兰叛乱分子把我推下桥，让我淹死在水里，我在国王的使者先把我推下桥之前不能采取任何行动，但是自然法和自卫法保证了我（如果我确切知道他的目的），可以先把他推下桥，然后再考虑如何在我自己的时间里保护自己。

Royalists object that David, in his defence, never invaded and persecuted Saul; yea, when he came upon Saul and his men sleeping, he would not kill any; but the Scottish and parliament's forces not only defend, but invade, offend, kill, and plunder; and this is clearly an offensive, not a defensive war.
王党派反对称，大卫在自卫时从未入侵或迫害扫罗；是的，当他发现扫罗和他的人们正在睡觉时，他不会杀任何人；但是苏格兰和议会军队不仅防御，而且入侵、冒犯、杀戮和掠夺；这显然是一场攻击性而非防御性的战争。

Ans. 1.—There is no defensive war different in specie and nature from an offensive war; if we speak physically, they differ only in the event and intention of the heart; and it is most clear that the affection and intention doth make one and the same action of taking away the life, either homicide, or no homicide. 1. If a man, out of hatred, deliberately take away his brother's life, he is a murderer eatenus, but if that same man had taken away that same brother's life, by the flying off of an axe-head off the staff, while he was hewing timber, he neither hating him before, nor intending to hurt his brother, he is no murderer, by God's express law, (Deut. 4:42; 19:4; Joshua 20:5.) 2. The cause between the king and the two parliaments, and between Saul and David, are so different in this, as it is much for us. Royalists say, David might, if he had seen offending to conduce for self-preservation, have invaded Saul's men, and, say they, the case was extraordinary, and bindeth not us to self-defence; and thus they must say—for offensive weapons, such as Goliath's sword, and an host of armed men, cannot by any rational man be assumed (and David had the wisdom of God) but to offend, if providence should so dispose; and so what was lawful to David, is lawful to us in self-defence; he might offend lawfully, and so may we.
答案 1. - 防御战与进攻战在种类和性质上没有区别；从物理上讲，它们只在心意和意图上有所不同；很明显，情感和意图决定了夺取生命的行为，无论是谋杀还是非谋杀。1. 如果一个人出于仇恨故意夺走他兄弟的生命，他是一个谋杀犯；但如果同样的人在砍伐木材时，斧头从柄上飞出，无意伤害他的兄弟，他不是谋杀犯，根据上帝的明确法律（申命记 4:42；19:4；约书亚记 20:5）。2. 国王与两个议会之间的原因，以及扫罗与大卫之间的原因，在这一点上有很大的不同，对我们来说很重要。 王党派说，如果大卫看到冒犯有助于自保，他可能会入侵扫罗的人，他们说，这种情况是特殊的，不要求我们进行自卫；因此他们必须这样说——像歌利亚的剑和一群武装人员这样的攻击性武器，任何理智的人都不会认为是为了其他目的（而大卫有上帝的智慧），除非上帝这样安排；所以对大卫来说是合法的，对我们来说也是合法的进行自卫；他可以合法地冒犯，我们也可以。

2. If Saul and the Philistines, aiming (as under an oath) to set up dagon in the land of Israel, should invade David, and the princes and elders of Israel who made him king; and if David, with an host of armed men, he and the princes of Israel, should come in that case upon Saul and the Philistines sleeping, if in that case David might not lawfully have cut off the Philistines, and as he defended in that case God's church and true religion, if he might not then have lawfully killed, I say, the Philistines, I remit to the conscience of the reader. Now to us, papists and prelates under the king's banner, are Philistines, introducing the idolatry of bread-worship and popery, as hateful to God as dagon-worship.
如果扫罗和非利士人，以誓言的方式，意图在以色列国建立大衮，侵犯了大卫和立他为王的以色列的首领和长老；如果大卫和以色列的首领，带着一支武装部队，在这种情况下袭击扫罗和正在睡觉的非利士人，如果在这种情况下大卫合法地杀死非利士人，因为他在那种情况下捍卫了上帝的教会和真正的宗教，我将把这个问题交给读者的良心。现在对于我们，天主教徒和主教在国王的旗帜下，非利士人就是那些引入崇拜面包和教皇制度的人，这与崇拜大衮一样令上帝憎恶。

3. Saul intended no arbitrary government, nor to make Israel a conquered people, nor yet to cut off all that professed the true worship of God; nor came Saul against these princes, elders and people, who made him king, only David's head would have made Saul lay down arms; but prelates, and papists, and malignants, under the king, intend to make the king's sole will a law, to destroy the court of parliament, which putteth laws in execution against their idolatry; and their aim is, that protestants be a conquered people; and their attempt hath been hitherto to blow up king and parliament, to cut off all protestants; and they are in arms, in divers parts of the kingdom, against the princes of the land, who are no less judges and deputies of the Lord than the king himself; and would kill, and do kill, plunder, and spoil us, if we kill not them. And the case is every way now between armies and armies, as between a single man unjustly invaded for his life, and an unjust invader. Neither in a natural action, such as is self-defence, is that of policy to be urged,—none can be judge in his own cause, when oppression is manifest: one may be both agent and patient, as the fire and water conflicting; there is no need of a judge, a community casts not off nature; when the judge is wanting, nature is judge, actor, accused, and all.
3. Saul intended no arbitrary government, nor to make Israel a conquered people, nor yet to cut off all that professed the true worship of God; nor came Saul against these princes, elders and people, who made him king, only David's head would have made Saul lay down arms; but prelates, and papists, and malignants, under the king, intend to make the king's sole will a law, to destroy the court of parliament, which putteth laws in execution against their idolatry; and their aim is, that protestants be a conquered people; and their attempt hath been hitherto to blow up king and parliament, to cut off all protestants; and they are in arms, in divers parts of the kingdom, against the princes of the land, who are no less judges and deputies of the Lord than the king himself; and would kill, and do kill, plunder, and spoil us, if we kill not them. And the case is every way now between armies and armies, as between a single man unjustly invaded for his life, and an unjust invader. 在自然行为中，比如自卫，也不应该提倡政策的作用 - 当压迫显而易见时，没有人可以在自己的案件中充当裁判：一个人可以既是行动者又是受害者，就像火与水的冲突一样；没有必要有一个裁判，一个社群不会背离本性；当裁判缺席时，本性就是裁判、行动者、被告和一切。

Lastly, no man is lord of the members of his own body, (m. I. liber homo ff. ad leg. Aqui.) nor lord of his own life, but is to be accountable to God for it.
最后，没有人是自己身体的主人，也没有人是自己生命的主人，而是要对上帝负责。

QUESTION XXXII
问题 XXXII

WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWFULNESS OF DEFENSIVE WARS HATH ITS WARRANT IN GOD'S WORD, FROM THE EXAMPLE OF DAVID, ELISHA, THE EIGHTY PRIESTS WHO RESISTED UZZIAH, &c.
无论防御战的合法性是否有上帝的话语作为依据，从大卫、以利沙、抵抗乌西雅的八十位祭司等人的例子来看。

David defended himself against king Saul, 1. By taking Goliath's sword with him. 2. By being captain to six hundred men; yea, it is more than clear, (1 Chron. 12:22–34,) that there came to David a host like the host of God, to help against Saul, exceeding four thousand. Now, that this host came warrantably to help him against Saul, I prove, 1. Because it is said, "Now these are they that came to David to Ziklag, while he kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Kish; and they were amongst the mighty men, helpers of the war;" and then so many mighty captains are reckoned out. "There came of the children of Benjamin and Judah to the hold of David." And there fell some of Manasseh to David,—"As he went to Ziklag there fell to him of Manasseh, Kenah and Jozahad, Jediel and Michael, and Jozabad and Elihu, and Zilthai, captains of the thousands that were of Manasseh." "And they helped David against the band of the rovers." "At that time, day by day, there came to David, until it was a great host, like the host of God." Now the same expression that is in the first verse, where it is said they came to help David against Saul, is repeated in ver. 16, 19–23. 2. That they warrantably came, is evident; because, (1.) The Spirit of God commendeth them for their valour and skill in war, (ver. 2 &c.), which the Spirit of God doth not in unlawful wars. (2.) Because Amassai, (ver. 18), the Spirit or the Lord coming on him, saith, "Thine are we, David, and on thy side, thou son of Jesse; peace, peace unto thee, and peace to thy helpers, for thy God helpeth thee." The Spirit of God inspireth no man to pray peace to those who are in an unlawful war. 3. That they came to David's side only to be sufferers, and to flee with David, and not to pursue and offend, is ridiculous. 1. It is said, (ver. 1,) "They came to David to Ziklag, while he kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Kish. And they were amongst the mighty men, helpers of the war." It is a scorn to say, that their might, and their helping in war, consisted in being mere patients with David, and such as fled from Saul, for they had been on Saul's side before; and to come with armour to flee, is a mocking of the word of God. 2. It is clear, the scope of the Spirit of God is to show how God helped his innocent servant David against his persecuting prince and master, king Saul, in moving so many mighty men of war to come in such multitudes, all in arms, to help him in war. Now to what end would the Lord commend them as fit for war, "men of might, fit to handle shield and buckler, whose feces are as the faces of lions, as swift as the roes on the mountains," (ver. 8,) and commend them as helpers of David, if it were unlawful for David, and all those mighty men, to carry arms to pursue Saul and his followers, and to do nothing with their armour but flee? Judge if the Spirit of God, in reason, could say, "All these men came armed with bows," (ver. 2,) and could "handle both the right hand and the left in flinging stones, and shooting of arrows," and that (ver. 22) all these "came to David, being mighty men of valour, and they came as captains over hundreds, and thousands, and they put to flight all them of the valleys, both toward the east and toward the west," (ver. 13, 15,) and that "David received them, and made them captains of the band," if they did not come in a posture of war, and for hostile invasion, if need were? For if they came only to suffer and to flee, not to pursue, bowmen, captains, and captains of bands made by David, and David's helpers in the war, came not to help David by flying, that was a hurt to David, not a help. It is true, Mr Symmons saith, (1 Sam. 22:2,) "Those that came out to David strengthened him, but he strengthened not them; and David might easily have revenged himself on the Ziphites, who did good will to betray him to the hands of Saul, if his conscience had served him.
大卫为自己辩护，反对扫罗王，1. 他带着歌利亚的剑。2. 他是六百人的队长；是的，（历代志上 12:22-34）很明显，有一支像神的军队来帮助大卫对抗扫罗，超过四千人。现在，我证明这支军队合法地来帮助他对抗扫罗，1. 因为有人说：“这些人来到大卫在洗革拉的时候，因为扫罗基士的儿子追逼他，他们都是勇士中的帮助者。”然后列举了这么多勇士队长。“便雅悯和犹大的人来到大卫的山寨。”还有一些玛拿西人投奔大卫，“当他去洗革拉的时候，玛拿西人中有些人投奔了他，有基拿和约扎拿、耶底蓝和米迦勒、约扎拔和以利户、西勒太，都是玛拿西千夫长。”“他们帮助大卫抵挡抢掠者的军队。”“那时，日复一日，人们来到大卫那里，直到成了一个像神的大军。”现在，在第一节中说他们来帮助大卫对抗扫罗的表达方式，在第 16 节、19-23 节中重复出现。2. 他们来的理由是合理的，这是显而易见的；因为，（1）上帝的灵赞美他们在战争中的勇气和技巧（第 2 节等），而上帝的灵不会在非法战争中这样做。（2）因为亚玛撒（第 18 节）被上帝的灵降临，说：“大卫啊，我们是归你的，耶西的儿子啊，我们是在你这一边的。愿你平安，愿帮助你的人也都平安，因为你的神帮助你。”上帝的灵不会激励人们为那些参与非法战争的人祈求和平。3. 他们只是来到大卫这边成为受苦者，并与大卫一起逃亡，而不是追击和攻击，这是荒谬的。1. 正如所说（第 1 节），“他们来到大卫所在的洗革拉，当时大卫因基士的儿子扫罗躲藏，他们是勇士中的帮助者。”说他们的力量和帮助在于成为大卫的患者，以及从扫罗那里逃离，这是对上帝的话语的嘲弄，因为他们之前曾站在扫罗一边；而带着武器来逃亡，更是对上帝的话语的嘲弄。2. 明显的，上帝的灵感表明，上帝如何帮助他无辜的仆人大卫对抗迫害他的王子和主人扫罗国王，使如此多的强大战士前来帮助他作战。现在，如果大卫和所有这些强大的战士追击扫罗和他的追随者，只是逃跑而不使用他们的武器，那么上主为什么会称赞他们适合作战，称赞他们是“勇士，善于使用盾牌和挡箭牌，他们的面孔像狮子的面孔，像山上的羚羊一样敏捷”（第 8 节）并称赞他们是大卫的帮手呢？请判断上帝的灵感是否合理地说：“所有这些人都带着弓箭”（第 2 节），并且能够“用右手和左手投掷石头和射箭”，并且（第 22 节）所有这些人“作为勇士来到大卫那里，他们成为百人和千人的队长，他们使东方和西方的所有山谷的人都溃败逃跑”（第 13、15）而且“大卫接纳他们，立他们为军长”，如果他们不是以战争的姿态来的，如果需要的话，是为了敌对入侵呢？因为如果他们只是来受苦和逃跑，而不是追击，那么大卫所任命的弓箭手、军长和军队的军长，以及大卫在战争中的帮手，他们来的目的不是通过逃跑来帮助大卫，那对大卫来说是一种伤害，而不是帮助。诚然，西蒙斯先生说过（撒母耳记上 22:2），“那些出来投奔大卫的人加强了他，但他没有加强他们；如果大卫的良心允许的话，他本可以轻易报复那些出卖他给扫罗的齐弗人。”

Ans. 1.—This would infer that these armed men came to help David against his conscience, and that David was a patient in the business. The contrary is in the text, (1 Sam. 26:2,) "David became a captain over them;" and (1 Chron. 12:17, 18,) "If ye come peaceably to help me, my heart shall be knit to you. Then David received them, and made them captains of the band." 2. David might have revenged himself upon the Ziphites, true; but that conscience hindered him cannot be proved. To pursue an enemy is an act of a council of war; and he saw it would create more enemies, not help his cause. 3. To David to kill Saul sleeping, and the people who, out of a mis-informed conscience came out, many of them to help their lawful prince against a traitor (as was supposed) seeking to kill their king, and to usurp the throne, had not been wisdom nor justice; because to kill the enemy in a just self-defence, must be, when the enemy actually doth invade, and the life of the defendant cannot be otherwise saved. A sleeping enemy is not in the act of unjust pursuit of the innocent; but if an army of papists, Philistines, were in the fields sleeping, pursuing not one single David only for a supposed personal wrong to the king, but lying in the fields and camp against the whole kingdom and religion, and labouring to introduce arbitrary government, popery, idolatry, and to destroy laws, and liberties, and parliaments, then David were obliged to kill these murderers in their sleep.
答案 1.——这意味着这些武装人员是违背大卫的意愿前来帮助他的，并且大卫在这件事上是一个被动的参与者。然而，正相反的是在经文中有所记载，（撒母耳记上 26:2）"大卫成为他们的首领"；还有（历代志上 12:17, 18）"如果你们和平地来帮助我，我的心就与你们联合。于是大卫接纳了他们，并任命他们为军队的首领。" 2. 大卫可能会报复齐弗人，这是事实；但不能证明他是因为良心的原因而阻止了他。追击敌人是一个军事会议的行动；他明白这样做只会制造更多的敌人，而不会帮助他的事业。 3. 对于大卫来说，在扫罗睡觉时杀死他，以及那些出于错误的良心而出来帮助他们合法的君主对抗一个被认为是谋杀他们国王并篡夺王位的叛徒（如所认为的），这既不明智也不公正；因为在正当的自卫中杀死敌人，必须是在敌人实际侵犯并且被告辩护人的生命无法以其他方式得救的情况下。 A sleeping enemy is not in the act of unjust pursuit of the innocent; but if an army of papists, Philistines, were in the fields sleeping, pursuing not one single David only for a supposed personal wrong to the king, but lying in the fields and camp against the whole kingdom and religion, and labouring to introduce arbitrary government, popery, idolatry, and to destroy laws, and liberties, and parliaments, then David were obliged to kill these murderers in their sleep.

If any say, The case is all one in a natural self-defence, whatever be the cause, and whoever be the enemy, because the self-defender is not to offend, except the unjust invader be in actual pursuit,—now armies in their sleep are not in actual pursuit.
如果有人说，无论原因是什么，无论敌人是谁，自卫就是一种自然的行为，因此情况都是一样的，因为自卫者只有在不公正的侵略者实际追击时才会进攻——现在，睡觉的军队并不在实际追击中。

Ans. 1.—When one man with a multitude invadeth one man, that one man may Pursue, as he seeth most conducible for self-defence. Now the law saith, "Threatenings and terror of armour maketh imminent danger," and the case of pursuit in self-defence lawful; if therefore an army of Irish rebels and Spaniards were sleeping in their camp, and our king in a deep sleep in the midst of them, and these rebels actually in the camp besieging the parliament, and the city of London, most unjustly to take away parliament, laws, and liberties of religion, it should follow that General Essex ought not to kill the king's majesty in his sleep, for he is the Lord's anointed; but will it follow that General Essex may not kill the Irish rebels sleeping about the king; and that he may not rescue the king's person out of the hands of the papists and rebels, ensnaring the king, and leading him on to popery, and to employ his authority to defend popery, and trample upon protestant parliaments and laws? Certainly from this example this cannot be concluded. For armies in actual pursuit of a whole parliament, kingdom, laws, and religion, (though sleeping in the camp,) because in actual pursuit, may be invaded, and killed, though sleeping. And David useth no argument, from conscience, why he might not kill Saul's army, (I conceive he had not arms to do that,) and should have created more enemies to himself, and hazard his own life, and the life of all his men, if he had of purpose killed so many sleeping men; yea, the inexpedience of that, for a private wrong to kill God's misled people, should have made all Israel enemies to David. But David useth an argument, from conscience only, to prove it was not lawful for him to stretch forth his hand against the king; and for my part, so long as he remaineth king, and is not dethroned by those who made him king at Hebron, to put hands on his person, I judge utterly unlawful. One man sleeping cannot be in actual pursuit of another man; so that the self-defender may lawfully kill him in his sleep; but the case is far otherwise in lawful wars; the Israelites might lawfully kill the Philistines encamping about Jerusalem to destroy it, and religion, and the church of God, though they were all sleeping; even though we suppose king Saul had brought them in by his authority, and though he were sleeping in the midst of the uncircumcised armies; and it is evident, that an host of armed enemies, though sleeping, by the law of self-defence, may be killed, lest they awake and kill us; whereas one single man, and that a king, cannot be killed. 2. I think, certainly, David had done unwisely, and hazarded his own life and all his men's, if he, and Abimelech, and Abishai, should have killed an host of their enemies sleeping: that had been a work as impossible to three, as hazardous to all his men.
答案 1. - 当一个人与众多人入侵一个人时，那个人可以根据自卫的需要进行追击。现在法律规定，“威胁和武装的恐怖造成了即将发生的危险”，并且自卫追击是合法的；因此，如果一个由爱尔兰叛乱分子和西班牙人组成的军队正在他们的营地里睡觉，而我们的国王正在他们中间沉睡，而这些叛乱分子实际上正在营地里围攻议会和伦敦市，非常不公正地剥夺议会、法律和宗教自由，那么埃塞克斯将军就不应该在国王沉睡时杀死国王陛下，因为他是上帝的受膏者；但这是否意味着埃塞克斯将军不能杀死围绕国王睡觉的爱尔兰叛乱分子；他不能救出国王脱离天主教徒和叛乱分子的手中，他们陷害国王，并引导他信奉天主教，并利用他的权威来捍卫天主教，并践踏新教议会和法律？当然，从这个例子中不能得出这样的结论。 对于正在追捕整个议会、王国、法律和宗教的军队（尽管他们在营地里睡觉），因为在实际追捕中，他们可能会被入侵和杀害，即使他们在睡觉。大卫没有从良心的角度提出任何理由，说明为什么他不能杀死扫罗的军队（我认为他没有武器来做到这一点），如果他故意杀死那么多睡着的人，他将为自己制造更多的敌人，冒着自己和所有士兵的生命危险；是的，出于对私人冤屈的考虑，杀死上帝误导的人民是不明智的，这将使以色列所有人都成为大卫的敌人。但大卫只是从良心的角度提出了一个论点，证明他伸手攻击国王是不合法的；就我而言，只要他仍然是国王，并且没有被在希伯伦立他为王的人废黜，我认为对他的人身进行干预是完全不合法的。 一个人在睡觉时无法实际追逐另一个人；因此，自卫者可以合法地在他睡觉时杀死他；但在合法的战争中情况大不相同；以色列人可以合法地杀死围绕耶路撒冷、要摧毁它、宗教和上帝的教堂的非利士人，即使他们都在睡觉；即使我们假设扫罗王以他的权威把他们带进来，即使他在未受割礼的军队中间睡觉；很明显，根据自卫法，即使敌人是武装的，睡觉的敌人也可以被杀死，以免他们醒来杀死我们；而一个单独的人，尤其是国王，是不能被杀死的。2. 我认为，如果大卫、亚比米勒和亚比筛杀死了一群正在睡觉的敌人，他们不仅不明智，而且还冒着自己和所有士兵的生命危险：这对三个人来说是不可能完成的任务，对所有士兵来说也是危险的。

Dr Ferne, as Arnisæus did before him, saith, "The example of David was extraordinary, because he was anointed and designed by God as successor to Saul, and so he must use an extraordinary way of guarding himself." Arnisæus (c. 2, n. 15) citeth Alberic. Gentilis, that David was now exempted from amongst the number of subjects.
弗恩博士，就像阿尼塞乌斯之前所说的那样，他说：“大卫的例子是非同寻常的，因为他被上帝膏选为扫罗的继任者，所以他必须采取非同寻常的方式来保护自己。”阿尼塞乌斯（第 2 章，第 15 节）引用了阿尔贝里克·真提利斯的观点，即大卫现在已经不再是臣民之一。

Ans.—1. There were not two kings in Israel now, both David and Saul. 1. David acknowledgeth his subjection in naming Saul the Lord's anointed, and his master, lord and king; and, therefore, David was yet a subject. 2. If David would have proved his title to the crown by extraordinary ways, he who killed Goliath extraordinarily might have killed Saul by a miracle; but David goeth a most ordinary way to work for self-defence, and his coming to the kingdom was through persecution, want, eating shew-bread in case of necessity, defending himself with Goliath's sword. 3. How was anything extraordinary and above a law, seeing David might have killed his enemy Saul, and, according to God's law, he spared him? and he argueth from a moral duty, He is the Lord's anointed, therefore I will not kill him. Was this extraordinary above a law? then, according to God's law, he might have killed him. Royalists cannot say so. What ground to say one of David's acts in his deportment towards Saul was extraordinary, and not all? Was it extraordinary that David fled? No; or that David consulted the oracle of God what to do when Saul was coming against him? 4. In an ordinary fact something may be extraordinary,—as the dead sleep from the Lord upon Saul and his men, (1 Sam. 26) and yet the fact, according to its substance, ordinary. 5. Nor is this extraordinary,—that a distressed man, being an excellent warrior, as David was, may use the help of six hundred men, who, by the law of charity, are to help to deliver the innocent from death; yea, all Israel were obliged to defend him who killed Goliath. 6. Royalists make David's act of not putting hands on the Lord's anointed an ordinary moral reason against resistance, but his putting on of armour they will have extraordinary; and this is, I confess, a short way to an adversary to cull out something that is for his cause and make it ordinary, and something that is against his cause must be extraordinary. 7. These men, by the law of nature, were obliged to join in arms with David; therefore, the non-helping of an oppressed man must be God's ordinary law,—a blasphemous tenet. 8. If David, by an extraordinary spirit, killed not king Saul, then the Jesuits' way of killing must be God's ordinary law.
答案：1.以色列现在没有两个国王，即大卫和扫罗。1.大卫承认自己的服从，称扫罗为上帝的受膏者、主人、主和国王；因此，大卫仍然是一个臣民。2.如果大卫想通过非凡的方式证明自己对王位的合法性，那么以非凡的方式杀死巨人歌利亚的他也可以通过奇迹杀死扫罗；但大卫采取了最普通的方式来自卫，他登上王位是通过迫害、贫困、在必要情况下吃陈设饼、用歌利亚的剑自卫。3.有什么是非凡的、超越法律的呢？既然大卫本可以杀死他的敌人扫罗，而且根据上帝的法律，他却饶恕了他？他从道义上辩论，他是上帝的受膏者，所以我不会杀他。这是非凡的、超越法律的吗？那么，根据上帝的法律，他本可以杀他。君主主义者不能这样说。有什么根据说大卫在对待扫罗的行为中有一些是非凡的，而其他的不是？大卫逃跑是非凡的吗？不是；或者大卫在扫罗来攻击他时咨询上帝的神谕是非凡的吗？4. 在一个普通的事实中，某些事情可能是非凡的，比如上帝对扫罗和他的人们的死亡睡眠（撒母耳记上 26 章），然而根据其实质来看，这个事实是普通的。5.这并不是非凡的，一个困扰的人，像大卫一样是一位出色的战士，可以利用六百个人的帮助，根据慈善法则，这些人应该帮助拯救无辜者免于死亡；是的，全以色列都有义务保护杀死歌利亚的人。6.保皇党人认为大卫不对上帝的受膏者动手是一种普通的道德理由来反对抵抗，但他穿上盔甲他们认为是非凡的；我承认，这是对敌人的一种简短的方式，挑选出对他的事业有利的东西并使其变得普通，而对他的事业不利的东西必须是非凡的。7.按照自然法则，这些人有义务与大卫一起参加战斗；因此，不帮助受压迫的人必须是上帝的普通法律，这是一种亵渎的信条。8.如果大卫不是凭借非凡的灵魂杀死了扫罗国王，那么耶稣会士的杀人方式必须是上帝的普通法律。

2. David certainly intended to keep Keilah against king Saul, for the Lord would not have answered David in an unlawful fact; for that were all one as if God should teach David how to play the traitor to his king; for if God had answered, They will not deliver thee up, but they shall save thee from the hand of Saul,—as David believed he might say this, as well as its contradicent, then David behoved to keep the city; for certainly David's question pre-supposeth he was to keep the city.
大卫确实打算抵抗扫罗王，因为上帝不会在不合法的事情上回答大卫；因为那就等于上帝教导大卫如何背叛他的国王；因为如果上帝回答说，他们不会出卖你，而是会拯救你脱离扫罗的手，正如大卫相信他可以说这样的话，那么大卫必须保住这座城市；因为大卫的问题明确暗示他要保住这座城市。

The example of Elisha the prophet is considerable, (2 Kings 6:32,) "But Elisha sat in his house, and the elders with him; and the king sent a man before him; but, ere the messengers came to him, he said to the elders, See now, the son of a murderer hath sent to take away mine head." 1. Here is unjust violence offered by king Joram to an innocent man. Elisha keepeth the house violently against the king's messenger, as we did keep castles against king Charles' unlawful messengers. "Look (saith he) when the messenger cometh,—shut the door." 2. There is violence also commanded, and resistance to be made, "Hold him fast at the door." In the Hebrew it is, כדלּת סגדוּ הדלּת ולחצתמ אתוּ Arias Montan.: Claudite ostium, et oppremetis eumin ostio, "Violently press him at the door." And so the Chaldee paraphrase, Nesinatis eum introire, Jerome. The LXX. Interpreters, ἐκθλίψατε αὐτὸν ἐν τῆ θύρα illidite eum in ostio, "Press him betwixt the door and the wall." It is a word of bodily violence, according to Vatablus; yea, Theodoret will have king Joram himself holden at the door. And, 3. It is no answer that Dr Ferne and other royalists give, that Elisha made no personal resistance to the king himself, but only to the king's cutthroat, sent to take away his head; yea, they say, it is lawful to resist the king's cutthroats. But the text is clear, that the violent resistance is made to the king himself also, for he addeth, "Is not the sound of his master's feet behind him?" And by this answer, it is lawful to keep towns with iron gates and bars, and violently to oppose the king's cut-throats coming to take away the heads of the parliaments of both kingdoms, and of protestants in the three kingdoms.
以先知以利沙为例，（列王记下 6:32）“以利沙正在他的房子里，有长老与他同在；王打发一个人去，但使者到了以利沙那里，他却对长老们说：‘你们看这凶手的儿子打发人来，要割我的头。’” 1. 这里是约兰王对一个无辜之人的不公正暴力。以利沙像我们对查尔斯国王的非法使者一样，强行守住了房子。“当使者来的时候，（他说）关上门。” 2. 这里也有命令使用暴力，并要进行抵抗，“在门口抓住他。”在希伯来文中是这样写的：כדלּת סגדוּ הדלּת ולחצתמ אתוּ（Arias Montan.：Claudite ostium, et oppremetis eumin ostio），意思是“在门口用力压制他。”所以，迦勒底的翻译是这样解释的：Nesinatis eum introire（Jerome）。七十士译本的解释是：ἐκθλίψατε αὐτὸν ἐν τῆ θύρα（illidite eum in ostio），意思是“在门和墙之间夹住他。”根据 Vatablus 的解释，这是一个身体上的暴力行为；甚至西奥多瑞特认为是约兰王自己被困在门口。而且，3. 弗恩博士和其他王党派的回答是没有意义的，他们说以利沙并没有对国王本人进行个人抵抗，而只是对国王派来夺取他的头颅的刺客进行了抵抗；是的，他们说，抵抗国王的刺客是合法的。但是，经文明确表明，这种暴力抵抗也是对国王本人的，因为他补充说：“他主人的脚步声不是在他身后吗？”根据这个回答，保持有铁门和栅栏的城镇，以及对来夺取议会和三个王国的新教徒的头颅的国王的刺客进行激烈抵抗是合法的。

Some royalists are so impudent as to say that there was no violence here, and that Elisha was an extraordinary man, and that it is not lawful for us to call a king the son of a murderer, as the prophet Elisha did; but Ferne, (sect. 2, p. 9,) forgetting himself, saith from hence, "It is lawful to resist the prince himself, thus far, as to ward his blows, and hold his hands." But let Ferne answer, if the violent binding of the prince's hand, that he shall not be able to kill, be a greater violence done to his royal person than David's cutting off the skirt of Saul's garment; for certainly the royal body of a prince is of more worth than his clothes. Now it was a sin, I judge, that smote David's conscience, that he being a subject, and not in the act of natural self-defence, did cut the garment of the Lord's anointed. Let Ferne see, then, how he will save his own principles; for certainly he yieldeth the cause for me. I judge that the person of the king, or any judge who is the Lord's deputy, as is the king, is sacred; and that remaining in that honourable case, no subject can, without guiltiness before God, put hands on his person, the case of natural self-defence being excepted; for, because the royal dignity doth not advance a king above the common condition of men, and the throne maketh him not leave off to be a man, and a man that can do wrong; and therefore as one that doth manifest violence to the life of a man, though his subject, he may be resisted with bodily resistance, in the case of unjust and violent invasion. It is a vain thing to say, "Who shall be judge between the king and his subjects? The subject cannot judge the king, because none can be judge in his own cause, and an inferior or equal cannot judge a superior or equal." But I answer, 1. This is the king's own cause also, and he doth unjust violence as a man, and not as a king, and so he cannot be judge more than the subject. 2. Every one that doth unjust violence, as he is such, is inferior to the innocent, and so ought to be judged by some. 3. There is no need of the formality of a judge in things evident to nature's eye, such as are manifestly unjust violences. Nature, in acts natural of self-defence, is judge, party, accuser, witness, and all; for it is supposed the judge is absent when the judge doth wrong. And for the plea of Elista's extraordinary spirit, it is nothing extraordinary to the prophet to call the king the son of a murderer, when he complaineth to the elders for justice of his oppression, no more than it is for a plaintiff to libel a true crime against a wicked person, and if Elisha's resistance came from an extraordinary spirit, then it is not natural for an oppressed man to close the door upon a murderer, then the taking away of the innocent prophet's head must be extraordinary, for this was but an ordinary and most natural remedy against this oppression; and though to name the king the son of a murderer be extraordinary, (and I should grant it without any hurt to this cause,) it followeth nowise that the self-defence was extraordinary. 4. (2 Chron. 26:17.) Four score of priests, with Azariah, are commended as valiant men. LXX. ὑιοι δυναμεως Heb. בני־היל Arius Montan. Filii virtutis, Men of courage and valour, for that they resisted Uzziah the king, who would take on him to burn incense to the Lord, against the law. Mr Symmons, (p. 34, sect. 10,) They withstood him not with swords and weapons, but only by speaking, and one but spake. I answer, 1. It was a bodily resistance; for beside that, Jerome turneth it, Viri fortissimi, most violent men. And it is a speech in the Scriptures taken for men valorous for war; as 1 Sam. 16:18; 2 Sam. 17:10; 1 Chron. 5:18; and so doth the phrase גכור הולּ Potent in valour; and the phrase, אוּש-הול 2 Sam 24:9; 11:16; 1 Sam. 31:2; and therefore all the eighty, not only by words, but violently, expelled the king out of the temple. 2. ויעמדוּ עלּ־עזוּהוּ Ar. Mont. Et steterunt contra Huzzi-Jahu; the LXX say, καὶ επεστενσαν they resisted the king. So Dan. 11:17, The armies of the south shall not stand, Dan. 8:25, it is a word of violence. 3. The text saith, (ver. 20,) and they thrust him out. ויכהילוחוּ Arias Mont. Et fecerunt eum festinare; Hieron. Festinato expulerunt eum. The LXX. say, The priest κατέσπασεν αὑτὸν ἐκεῖθεν; so Vatablus, They cast him out. 4. It is said, (ver. 21,) "He was cut off from the house of the Lord." Dr Ferne saith, (sect. 4, p. 50,) "They are valiant men who dare withstand a king in an evil way, by a home reproof, and by withdrawing the holy things from him, especially since, by the law, the leper was to be put out of the congregation."
一些皇室主义者如此厚颜无耻地说这里没有暴力，以及以利沙是一个非凡的人，我们不应该像先知以利沙那样称呼国王为谋杀者的儿子是不合法的；但是费恩（第 2 节，第 9 页）忘记了自己，从这里说，“抵抗王子本人是合法的，可以防御他的攻击，抓住他的手。”但是让费恩回答一下，如果暴力地束缚王子的手，使他无法杀人，是否对他的皇室人格造成的伤害比大卫剪下扫罗衣服的下摆更大；因为毫无疑问，王子的皇室身体比他的衣服更有价值。我认为，大卫剪下主的受膏者的衣服是一种罪过，因为他是一个臣民，不是在进行自然自卫的行为。让费恩看看他如何拯救自己的原则；因为毫无疑问，他为我提供了理由。 我认为国王或任何作为上帝代表的法官，如国王一样，是神圣的；在保持这种尊贵地位的情况下，没有人可以在上帝面前对他的人进行伤害，除非是自然的自卫情况；因为皇室的尊严并不使国王超越普通人的境地，王位也不能使他不再是一个人，一个可能犯错的人；因此，即使他是国王的臣民，如果他对一个人的生命进行明显的暴力行为，他可以在不公正和暴力入侵的情况下被身体上的抵抗所抵制。说“谁来判断国王和他的臣民之间的问题是徒劳的？臣民不能判断国王，因为没有人能在自己的事务中充当裁判，而一个下级或平级不能判断一个上级或平级。”但我回答说，1.这也是国王自己的事情，他作为一个人进行不公正的暴力行为，而不是作为国王，所以他不能比臣民更能判断。2.每个进行不公正暴力行为的人，作为这样的人，都是低于无辜者的，因此应该由某些人来判断。3. 在自然眼中显而易见的事情中，没有必要像法官那样拘泥于形式，比如明显不公正的暴力行为。在自卫的自然行为中，自然是法官、当事人、控告人、证人，一切都有；因为当法官做错事时，法官被认为是缺席的。至于埃利沙非凡的精神的辩解，对于先知来说，当他向长老们抱怨受压迫时，称国王为杀人犯的儿子并不是什么非凡之事，就像原告对一个邪恶的人提出真实的罪行诽谤一样。如果埃利沙的抵抗来自非凡的精神，那么一个受压迫的人关闭门对抗杀人犯就不是自然的行为，那么剥夺无辜先知的头颅就是非凡的，因为这只是对这种压迫的一种普通而最自然的解决办法；虽然称国王为杀人犯的儿子是非凡的（我应该毫不伤害地承认这一点），但这并不意味着自卫是非凡的。（历代志下 26:17）赞扬了八十个祭司和亚撒利雅作为勇士。LXX. ὑιοι δυναμεως Heb. בני־היל Arius Montan. 勇敢和勇猛的人们，因为他们抵抗乌西雅王，他试图在上帝面前烧香，违反了法律。西蒙斯先生（第 34 页，第 10 节）说，他们不是用剑和武器抵抗他，而是通过言语，只有一个人说了话。我回答说，1. 这是一种身体上的抵抗；因为除此之外，耶罗姆把它解释为“最暴力的人”。在圣经中，这是指勇于战斗的人；如撒母耳记上 16:18；撒母耳记下 17:10；历代志上 5:18；所以短语“勇猛的人”和短语“强壮的人”都是指战士；参见撒母耳记下 24:9；11:16；撒母耳记上 31:2；因此，所有的八十人不仅仅是通过言语，而是用暴力将国王赶出了圣殿。2. 希伯来文中说，“他们站在乌西雅背后”。希腊七十士译本说，“他们抵抗了国王”。但以理书 11:17 也是用来表示暴力的词语。3. 圣经文本说，“他们把他推出去”。希腊七十士译本说，祭司“把他从那里赶走”；瓦塔布鲁斯说，他们把他赶出去。4. 圣经还说（第 他被剥夺了进入主的殿宇的权利。费恩博士说，（第 4 节，第 50 页），“敢于以不正当的方式抵抗国王的勇敢人，通过家庭的谴责和将圣物从他身边带走，尤其是因为按照法律，麻风病人应该被排除在会众之外。”"

Ans. 1.—He contradicteth the text. It was not a resistance by words, for the text saith, "They withstood him, and they thrust him out violently." 2. He yieldeth the cause, for to withdraw the holy things of God by corporeal violence, and violently to pull the censer out of his hand, that he should not provoke God's wrath by offering incense to the Lord, is resistance; and the like violence may, by this example, be used when the king useth the sword and the militia to bring in an enemy to destroy the kingdom. It is no less injustice against the second table, that the king useth the sword to destroy the innocent than to usurp the censer against the first table. But Dr Ferne yieldeth, that the censer may be pulled out of his hand, lest he provoke God to wrath; therefore, by the same very reason, a fortiore, the sword, the castles, the sea-ports, the militia, may be violently pulled out of his hand; for if there was an express law that the leper should be put out of the congregation, and therefore the king also should be subject to his church-censor, then he subjecteth the king to a punishment to be inflicted by the subjects upon the king. 1. Therefore the king is obnoxious to the co-active power of the law. 2. Therefore subjects may judge him and punish him. 3. Therefore he is to be subject to all church-censors no less than the people. 4. There is an express law that the leper should be put out of the congregation. What then? Flattering court divines say, "The king is above all these laws;" for there is an express law of God as express as that ceremonial law on touching lepers, and a more binding law, that the murderer should die the death. Will royalists put no exception upon a ceremonial law of expelling the leper, and yet put an exception upon a divine moral law, concerning the punishing of murderers given before the law on Mount Sinai. (Gen. 6:9) They so declare that they accept the persons of men. 5. If a leper king could not actually sit upon the throne, but must be cut off from the house of the Lord, because of an express law of God, these being inconsistent, that a king remaining amongst God's people, ruling and reigning, should keep company with the church of God, and yet be a leper, who was to be cut off, by a divine law, from the church. Now, I persuade myself, that far less can he actually reign in the full use of the power of the sword, if he use the sword to cut off thousands of innocent people; because, murdering the innocent and the fatherless, and royal governing in righteousness and godliness, are more inconsistent by God's law, being morally opposite, than remaining a governor of the people, and the disease of leprosy, are incompatible. 6. I think not much that Barclay saith, (cont. Monar. l. 5, c. 11,) "Uzziah remained king, after he was removed from the congregation for leprosy." 1. Because that toucheth the question of dethroning kings, this is an argument brought for violent resisting of kings, and that the people did resume all power from Uzziah, and put it in the "hand of Jotham his son, who was over the king's house, judging the people of the land" (ver 21). And by this same reason the parliaments of both kingdoms may resume the power once given to the king, when he hath proved more unfit to govern morally than Uzziah was ceremonially, that he ought not to judge the people of the land in this case. 2. If the priests did execute a ceremonial law upon king Uzziah, far more may the three estates of Scotland, and the two houses of parliament of England, execute the moral law of God on their king.
答案 1.——他与原文相矛盾。原文并未指出是通过言辞抵抗，而是说，“他们反对他，强行把他赶出去。”2. 他承认了原因，因为通过肉体上的暴力夺取上帝的圣物，并强行从他手中夺走香炉，以免他通过向主献香引发上帝的愤怒，这就是抵抗；根据这个例子，当国王使用剑和军队引进敌人来摧毁王国时，也可以使用类似的暴力。国王使用剑来摧毁无辜者，与篡夺香炉违反第一诫的行为一样不公正。但费恩博士承认，香炉可以从他手中夺走，以免他激怒上帝；因此，按照同样的理由，更何况剑、城堡、海港、军队也可以被强行夺走；因为如果有明确的法律规定，麻风病人应该被赶出教会，因此国王也应该受到教会审查，那么他就将国王置于由臣民对国王实施的惩罚之下。1. 因此，国王对法律的强制力感到厌恶。2. 因此，臣民可以判断他并惩罚他。3. 因此，他应该受到所有教会的审查，不亚于普通人。4. 有一条明确的法律规定，应该将麻风病人排除在会众之外。那么呢？奉承的宫廷神职人员说，“国王高于所有这些法律；”因为有一条与那个关于触摸麻风病人的仪式法一样明确的上帝法律，而且是一条更具约束力的法律，即凶手应该受到死刑。皇室主义者对于将麻风病人驱逐的仪式法没有任何例外，却对于在西奈山上颁布的关于惩罚凶手的神圣道德法律提出了例外。(创 6:9)他们这样宣布他们接受人的外貌。5. 如果一个麻风病国王不能实际上坐在宝座上，而必须因为上帝的明确法律而被割离出主的殿宇，这是不一致的，因为一个留在上帝的子民中间，统治和执政的国王，应该与上帝的教会保持联系，但他却是一个麻风病人，根据神圣的法律，应该被割离出教会。 现在，我说服自己，如果他用剑杀害成千上万无辜的人，他实际上就无法完全行使剑的权力；因为，在上帝的律法中，杀害无辜和孤儿，以及以公义和敬虔统治，道德上是相反的，比起继续统治人民和麻风病一样不相容。6. 我认为巴克利所说的并不重要，（见《反对君主制》第 5 卷第 11 章）“乌西雅在被排除在会众之外因患麻风后仍然是国王。”1. 因为这涉及废黜国王的问题，这是为了暴力反抗国王而提出的一个论点，人民确实从乌西雅那里夺回了所有权力，并将其交给了“他的儿子约坦，他管理王宫，审判国家的人民”（第 21 节）。根据同样的理由，两个王国的议会可以在国王在道德上比乌西雅更不适合统治的情况下，夺回曾经给予国王的权力，他在这种情况下不应该审判国家的人民。2. 如果祭司们对乌西雅王执行了一项仪式法律，那么苏格兰的三个阶级和英格兰的两院议会更可以对他们的国王执行上帝的道德法律。

If the people may covenant by oath to rescue the innocent and unjustly-condemned from the sentence of death, notoriously known to be tyrannous and cruel, then may the people resist the king in his unlawful practices; but this the people did in the matter of Jonathan. Mr Symmons (p. 32) and Dr Ferne (sect. 9, 49) say, "That with no violence, but by prayers and tears, the people saved Jonathan; as Peter was rescued out of prison by the prayers of the church, king Saul might easily be entreated to break a rash vow to save the life of his eldest son."—Ans. 1. I say not the common people did it, but the people, including proceres regni, the princes of the land, and captains of thousands. 2. The text hath not one word or syllable of either prayers, supplications or tears; but by the contrary, they bound themselves by an oath, contrary to the oath of Saul, (1 Sam. 14:44, 45,) and swore, "God forbid: as the Lord liveth, there shall not one hair of his head fall to the ground. So the people rescued Jonathan;" The church prayed not to God for Peter's deliverance with an oath, that they must have Peter saved, whether God will or no. Though we read of no violence used by the people, yet an oath upon so reasonable a ground,—1. Without the king's consent. 2. Contrary to a standing law that they had agreed unto. (ver. 24.) 3. Contradictory to the king's sentence and unjust oath. 4. Spoken to the king in his face,—all these prove that the people meant, and that the oath ex conditione operis, tended to a violent resisting of the king in a manifestly unjust sentence. Chrysostom, hom. 14, ad Pop., Antioch accuseth Saul as a murderer in this sentence, and praiseth the people: so Junius, Peter Martyr (whom royalists impudently cite); so Cornelius à Lapide, Zanchius, Lyra, and Hugo Cardinalis say, "It was tyranny in Saul, and laudable that the people resisted Saul;" and the same is asserted by Josephus (l. 6, antiquit. c. 7; so Althusius, Polit. c. 38, n. 109).
如果人们可以宣誓立约，拯救那些被公开认为专横和残酷的无辜和不公正被判死刑的人，那么人们也可以抵抗国王的非法行为；但在约拿单的事情上，人们确实这样做了。西蒙斯先生（第 32 页）和费恩博士（第 9 节，第 49 段）说：“人们没有使用暴力，而是通过祈祷和眼泪拯救了约拿单；正如彼得因教会的祈祷而从监狱中被解救出来，扫罗王很容易被劝说打破一项轻率的誓言，拯救他长子的生命。”——回答：1. 我并不是说普通人民做到了这一点，而是人民，包括国家的贵族和千夫长。2. 文本中没有一句话或一个音节提到祈祷、恳求或眼泪；相反，他们通过誓言绑定了自己，违背了扫罗的誓言（撒母耳记上 14:44, 45），并发誓说：“万不可！我指着永生的耶和华起誓，他的一根头发也不至于落地。于是人民拯救了约拿单。”教会并没有用誓言向上帝祈求彼得的解救，他们必须拯救彼得，不管上帝是否愿意。 虽然我们没有读到人民使用暴力，但是基于如下合理的理由发誓：1.没有国王的同意。2.违反他们同意的常设法律（第 24 节）。3.与国王的判决和不公正的誓言相矛盾。4.当着国王的面对国王说出这些话，所有这些都证明人民的意图，而誓言的条件是对国王在明显不公正的判决中进行暴力抵抗。Chrysostom 在《对人民的第 14 篇讲道》中指责扫罗是一个谋杀犯，并赞扬人民；Junius、Peter Martyr（被王权主义者厚颜无耻地引用）、Cornelius à Lapide、Zanchius、Lyra 和 Hugo Cardinalis 也说：“扫罗是暴政，人民抵抗扫罗是可赞美的。”约瑟夫斯也提出了同样的观点（《古代史》第 6 卷第 7 章）；Althusius 在《政治学》第 38 章第 109 条中也提到了这一点。

We see also, (2 Chron. 21:10,) that Libnah revolted from under Jehoram, because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers. It hath no ground in the text that royalists say, that the defection of Libnah is not justified in the text, but the cause is from the demerit of wicked Jeboram, because he made defection from God. Libnah made defection from him, as the ten tribes revolted from Rehoboam for Solomon's idolatry, which, before the Lord, procured this defection, yet the ten tribes make defection for oppression. I answer, Where the literal meaning is simple and obvious, we are not to go from it. The text showeth what cause moved Libnah to revolt: it was a town of the Levites, and we know they were longer found in the truth than the ten tribes (2 Chron. 13:8–10; Hosea 11:12). Lavater saith, Jehoram hath pressed them to idolatry, and therefore they revolted. Zanchius and Cornelius à Lapide say, This was the cause that moved them to revolt, and it is clear, (ver. 13,) he caused Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem to go a whoring from God, and no doubt tempted Libnah to the like."
我们还看到，（历代志下 21:10）利比拿背叛了约兰，因为他离弃了他祖先的主耶和华。在文本中没有根据支持王党派的说法，即利比拿的叛变在文本中没有被证明，但原因是邪恶的约兰的罪过，因为他离弃了上帝。利比拿背叛了他，就像十个支派因所罗门的拜偶像而背叛了耶罗波安一样，这在耶和华面前引起了这种叛变，然而十个支派是因为受压迫而叛变。我回答说，当字面意义简单明了时，我们不应离开它。文本显示了利比拿叛变的原因：它是利未人的城镇，我们知道他们比十个支派更长时间地坚守真理（历代志下 13:8-10;何西阿书 11:12）。拉瓦特说，约兰迫使他们拜偶像，所以他们背叛了。詹基和拉皮德说，这是他们背叛的原因，而且很明显，（第 13 节）他使犹大和耶路撒冷的居民背离了上帝，毫无疑问也引诱了利比拿去行同样的淫乱。

Yea, the city of Abel (2 Sam. 20) did well to resist Joab, David's general, for he came to destroy a whole city for a traitor's sake, for Sheba; they resisted and defended themselves. The wise woman calleth the city a mother in Israel, and the inheritance of the Lord; (ver. 19;) and Joab professeth, (ver. 20,) far be it from him to swallow up and destroy Abel. The woman saith, (ver. 18,) "They said of old, they shall surely ask counsel at Abel; and so they ended the matter;" that is, the city of Abel was a place of prophets and oracles of old, where they asked responses of their doubts, and therefore peace should be first offered to the city before Joab should destroy it, as the law saith, Deut. 20:10. From all which it is evident, that the city, in defending itself, did nothing against peace, so they should deliver Sheba, the traitor, to Joab's hand, which they accordingly did; and Joab pursued them not as traitors for keeping the city against the king, but professeth in that they did no wrong.
是的，亚伯城（撒母耳记下 20 章）很明智地抵抗了大卫的将军约押，因为他来摧毁整个城市，为了一个叛徒希巴；他们抵抗并保卫了自己。智慧的妇人称这座城市为以色列的母亲和上主的产业；约押宣称远离他吞噬和摧毁亚伯。妇人说：“他们从前说，他们必定在亚伯求问；这样他们就了结了事。”也就是说，亚伯城是一个古老的先知和神谕之地，在那里他们询问他们的疑虑的答案，因此在约押摧毁之前，应该首先向城市提供和平，正如律法所说，申命记 20:10。从这一切可以明显看出，这座城市在保卫自己时并没有违背和平，所以他们应该把叛徒希巴交给约押，他们也确实这样做了；约押并没有追捕他们作为反对国王保卫城市的叛徒，而是宣称他们没有做错。

QUESTION XXXIII
问题 XXXIII

WHETHER OR NO THE PLACE, ROM. 13:1, PROVE THAT IN NO CASE IT IS LAWFUL TO RESIST THE KING
无论地方如何，罗马书 13:1 证明在任何情况下都不合法抵抗国王。

The special ground of royalists from Rom. 13, against the lawfulness of defensive wars, is to make Paul (Rom. 13) speak only of kings. Hugo Grotius (de jure belli et pac. l. 1, c. 4, n. 6), and Barclay (cont. Monar. l. 3, c. 9) say, "Though Ambrose expound the place, Rom. 13, de solis regibus, of kings only, (this is false of kings only, he doth not, but of kings principally,) yet it followeth not that all magistrates, by this place, are freed from all laws, because (saith he) there is no judge above a king on earth, and therefore he cannot be punished; but there is a judge above all inferior judges, and therefore they must be subject to laws." So Dr Ferne followeth him, (sect. 2, p. 10,) and our poor Prelate must be an accident to them, (Sacr. San. Maj. c. 2, p. 29,) for his learning cannot subsist per se.
罗马书 13 章的王党人士对于防御战的合法性的特殊立场是，他们试图让保罗（罗马书 13 章）只说到国王。格罗蒂乌斯（《战争与和平法》第 1 卷第 4 章第 6 条）和巴克莱（《反对君主制》第 3 卷第 9 章）说：“虽然安布罗斯将罗马书 13 章的这段解释为仅适用于国王（这是错误的，他并没有仅适用于国王，而是主要适用于国王），但这并不意味着所有政府官员都可以根据这段经文免除所有法律，因为（他说）地球上没有比国王更高的法官，所以他不能受到惩罚；但是有一个高于所有下级法官的法官，所以他们必须服从法律。”弗恩博士也是这样认为（第 2 节，第 10 页），我们可怜的主教对他们来说只是一个附带的人物（《神圣的圣所》第 2 章第 29 页），因为他的学识不能独立存在。

Assert. 1. In a free monarchy (such as Scotland is known to be) by the higher power (Rom. 13) is the king principally in respect of dignity understood, but not solely and only, as if inferior judges were not higher powers. 1. I say in a free monarchy; for no man can say, that where there is not a king, but only aristocracy, and government by states, as in Holland, that there the people are obliged to obey the king; and yet this text, I hope, can reach the consciences of all Holland, that there every soul must be subject to the higher powers, and yet not a subject in Holland is to be subject to any king: for non entis nulla sunt accidentia. 2. I said the king, in a free monarchy, is here principally understood in regard of dignity, but not in regard of the essence of a magistrate, because the essence of a magistrate doth equally belong to all inferior magistrates, as to the king, as is already proved; (let the Prelate answer if he can;) for though some judges be sent by the king, and have from him authority to judge, yet this doth no more prove that inferior judges are improperly judges, and only such by analogy, and not essentially, than it will prove a citizen is not essentially a citizen, nor a church-officer essentially a church-officer, nor a son not essentially a living creature, because the former have authority from the incorporation of citizens, and of church-officers, and the latter hath his life by generation from his father, as God's instrument. For though the citizen and the church-officers may be judged by their several incorporations that made them, yet are they also essentially citizens and church-officers, as those who made them such.
断言。1. 在一个自由君主制国家（如苏格兰所知）中，由更高的权力（罗马书 13 章）主要是指国王的尊严，但不仅仅如此，好像较低级的法官不是更高的权力。1. 我说的是在一个自由君主制国家；因为没有人能说，在那里没有国王，只有贵族统治和国家政府，如荷兰，人们就必须服从国王；然而，我希望这段经文能触动所有荷兰人的良心，即在那里每个人都必须服从更高的权力，但在荷兰没有一个公民需要服从任何国王：因为不存在的事物没有属性。2. 我说国王在自由君主制中，主要是指尊严，而不是指行政官的本质，因为行政官的本质同样属于所有下级行政官，就像国王一样，这已经被证明了（让主教回答如果他能回答的话）；因为虽然一些法官是由国王派遣的，并且从他那里获得了审判的权力，但这并不能证明下级法官不是合适的法官，只是类比地而不是本质上的，就像这不能证明一个公民不是本质上的公民，或者一个教会职员不是本质上的教会职员，或者一个儿子不是本质上的有生命的生物，因为前者是通过公民组织和教会职员组织的授权，后者是通过父亲的生殖作为上帝的工具而获得生命的。因为虽然公民和教会职员可以根据使他们成为这样的各自组织来进行评判，但他们也本质上是公民和教会职员，就像使他们成为这样的人一样。

Assert. 2.—There is no reason to restrain the higher powers to monarchs only, or yet principally, as if they only were essentially powers ordained of God, 1. Because he calleth them ἑξουσίαι ὑπερχούσαι higher powers. Now this will include all higher powers, as Piscator observeth on the place; and certainly Rom had never two or three kings to which every soul should be subject. If Paul had intended that they should have given obedience to one Nero, as the only essential judge, he would have designed him by the noun in the singular number. 2. All the reasons that the apostle bringeth to prove that subjection is due, agreeth to inferior judges as well as to emperors, for they are powers ordained of God, and they bear the sword, and we must obey them for conscience sake, and they are God's deputies, and their judgment is not the judgment of men, but of the Lord (2 Chron. 11:6, 7; Deut. 1:16; Numb. 11:16, 17). Tribute and wages be no less due to them, as ministers and servants, for their work, than to the king, &c. 3. The apostle could not omit obedience to the good civil laws enacted by the senate, nor could he omit to command subjection to rulers, if the Romans should change the government, and abolish monarchy, and erect their ancient form of government before they had kings. 4. This is canonical Scripture, and a clear exposition of the fifth commandment, and so must reach the consciences of all Christian republics, where there is no monarchy. 5. Parallel places of Scripture prove this. Paul (1 Tim. 2:1, 2) will have prayers made to God for kings, and for all that are in authority, and the intrinsical end of all is a godly, honest, and peaceable life. And (1 Pet. 2:13) "Submit to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake;" also, (Tit. 3:1,) it is true, subjection to Nero, of whom Tertullian said, (Apol. 5,) Nihil nisi grande bonum a Nerone damnatum, is commanded here, but to Nero as such a one as he is obliged, de jure, to be, (whether you speak of the office in abstracto, or of the emperor in concreto, in this notion, to me it is all one,) but that Paul commandeth subjection to Nero, and that principally and solely, as he was such a man, de facto, I shall then believe, when antichristian prelates turn Paul's bishops, (1 Tim. 2,) which is a miracle. 6. Inferior judges are not necessarily sent by the king, by any divine law, but chosen by the people, as the king is; and, de facto, is the practice of creating all magistrates of cities in both kingdoms. 7. Augustine, (expos. prop. 72 on epist. Rom.,) Irenæus, (l. 5, c. 24;) Chrysostom, (in Psal. 148, and on the place,) and Hieron. (epist. 53, advers. vigilant.) expound it of masters, magistrates; so do Calvin, Beza, Pareus, Piscator, Rollocus, Marloratus; so do popish writers, Aquinas, Lyra, Hugo Cardinalis, Carthusius, Pirerius, Toletus, Cornelius à Lapide, Salmeron, Estius, expound the place; and therefore there is no argument that royalists hence draw against resisting of the king by the parliaments, but they do strongly conclude against the cavaliers' unlawful wars against the parliaments and estates of two kingdoms. Here what the P. Prelate saith to the contrary. 1. They are called eminent powers; therefore, kings only.—Ans. It followeth not, for these can be no other than πάντες ὁι ἐν υπεροχῇ ὀντὲς, (1 Tim. 2:2). But these are not kings, but in the text contradivided from βασιλεῖς kings, and they can be no other than ἀρχαῖ καὶ ἐξουσίαι principalities and powers. 2. The reason of the apostle proveth clearly that ἐξουσίαι cannot mean king's only, for Paul addeth of that same ἐξουσία "For there is no power but of God." It must be there is no supereminent royal power, but it is of God, and the powers only (so he must mean) that be, are ordained of God. Now the latter is manifestly false, for inferior powers are of God. The powers of the Roman senate, of a master, of a father, are of God.
断言 2.——没有理由将高权力仅限于君主，或者主要是君主，好像只有他们才是上帝所命定的权力。1.因为他称他们为ἑξουσίαι ὑπερχούσαι高权力。现在这将包括所有的高权力，正如皮斯卡特在这个地方所观察到的那样；而且罗马从来没有两三个国王，每个灵魂都应该服从。如果保罗打算让他们只顺从一个尼禄，作为唯一的实质性的法官，他会用单数名词来指定他。2.使徒提出的所有理由，证明服从是应该的，同样适用于下级法官和皇帝，因为他们都是上帝所命定的权力，他们拿着剑，我们必须为了良心顺从他们，他们是上帝的代表，他们的判断不是人的判断，而是主的判断（历代志下 11:6,7；申命记 1:16；民数记 11:16,17）。对他们来说，作为仆人和仆役，像对国王等人一样，纳税和工资同样是应该的。3. 使徒不能忽视参议院制定的良好的民事法律，也不能不命令顺从统治者，如果罗马人改变政府，废除君主制，在他们建立国王之前恢复他们古老的政府形式。4. 这是正典圣经，对第五诫的明确阐述，因此必须触及所有基督教共和国的良心，其中没有君主制。5. 圣经中的类似经文证明了这一点。保罗（提摩太前书 2:1, 2）要求为君王和所有掌权者向上帝祈祷，而所有这些的内在目的都是虔诚、诚实和和平的生活。并且（彼得前书 2:13）“为主的缘故，要顺服人的一切制度”；此外，（提多书 3:1）确实是对尼禄的顺从，关于他，特尔图利安说过（辩护篇）。 5，) 在这里，命令的是尼禄所受到的伟大善行，但是对于尼禄本人来说，他是有义务的，无论是在抽象的职位上，还是在具体的皇帝身上，对我来说都是一样的。但是，当反基督的主教们变成保罗的主教时（提摩太前书 2 章），那时我才会相信保罗命令顺从尼禄，而且是主要和唯一的，因为他是这样一个人，事实上的。这是一个奇迹。 6. 下级法官并不是根据任何神圣法被国王派遣的，而是由人民选择的，就像国王一样；而且，事实上，在两个王国中，创造所有城市官员的做法都是如此。 7. 奥古斯丁（在罗马书注释第 72 条），伊雷内乌斯（第 5 卷，第 24 章）；克里索斯顿（在诗篇 148 和相关地方），还有希伦（第 53 封信，反对警惕者）。) 解释它是指统治者、官员；加尔文、贝扎、帕雷乌斯、皮斯卡特、罗洛库斯、马洛拉图斯都这样解释；天主教作家阿奎那、利拉、雨果·加尔丹纳尔、卡尔图修士、皮雷里乌斯、托莱图斯、拉皮德、萨尔梅隆、埃斯蒂乌斯都这样解释这个地方；因此，皇室主义者从这里得出的反对议会抵抗国王的论据是站不住脚的，但他们确实强烈地得出结论，反对骑士对两个王国的议会和财产进行非法战争。这里是大主教对此的反驳。1.他们被称为显赫的权力，因此只能是国王。-答：这并不意味着，因为这些人只能是πάντες ὁι ἐν υπεροχῇ ὀντὲς（提摩太前书 2:2）这些人不是国王，而是在文中与βασιλεῖς国王相对立，他们只能是ἀρχαῖ καὶ ἐξουσίαι首领和权力。2.使徒的理由清楚地证明了ἐξουσίαι不能仅指国王，因为保罗在同一句中补充说“因为没有权力不是出于神。”这里必须是没有超然的王权，但它是出于神，只有那些存在的权力（他必须是这个意思）是由神所命定的。现在后者显然是错误的，因为较低的权力也是出于神。 罗马参议院、主人和父亲的权力是来自上帝。

P. Prelate.—"Peter must expound Paul, and Paul's higher powers must be (1 Pet. 2) βασιλεῖς ὑπερεχοντες More reason that Paul expound Paul. Now (1 Tim. 2:2) πάντες ἐν ὑπεροχη ἐντες, All in authority are not kings. P. Prelate.—"Are of God," or "ordained of God," cannot so properly be understood of subordinate powers, for that is not by immediate derivation from God, but immediately from the higher power the king, and mediately from God.
P. Prelate. - "彼得必须解释保罗，保罗的更高权力必须是（彼得前书 2 章）βασιλεῖς ὑπερεχοντες 更有理由保罗解释保罗。现在（提摩太前书 2 章 2 节）πάντες ἐν ὑπεροχη ἐντες，所有的权威并不都是国王。P. Prelate. - "是出于上帝"或者"是上帝所命定"不能够适当地理解为下级权力，因为那不是直接来自上帝，而是直接来自更高的权力国王，间接地来自上帝。"

Ans. 1.—It is most false that king David is so immediately a king from God, as that he is not also by the mediation of the people, who made him king at Hebron. 2. The inferior magistrates are also immediate vicars and ministers of God as the king, for their throne and judgment is not the king's, but the Lord's (Deut. 1:16; 2 Chron. 21:6). 3. Though they were mediately from man, it followeth not that they are not so properly from God, for wisdom (Prov. 8) saith as properly, (ver. 16,) "By me princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth;" as, (ver. 15,) "By me kings reign;" and promotion is as properly from God, and not from the east and the west, (Psal. 75:6, 7,) though God promote Joseph by the thankful munificence of Pharaoh, and Mordecai by Ahasuerus, Daniel by Darius, as if he gave them power and honour immediately from heaven.
答案 1：大卫王并非仅仅是由上帝立即成为国王，而是通过人民的介入，在希伯仑被人民立为国王。2. 较低级的官员也是上帝的直接代理人和仆役，因为他们的宝座和审判不是国王的，而是主的（申命记 1:16；历代志下 21:6）。3. 虽然他们是通过人的介入，但这并不意味着他们不是真正由上帝所立，因为智慧（箴言 8 章）同样明确地说（第 16 节）：“凭我君王执政，首领和一切审判官也凭我统治。”就像（第 15 节）“凭我君王执政”一样，晋升也是来自上帝，而不是来自东方和西方（诗篇 75:6,7），尽管上帝通过法老的感激慷慨使约瑟得到晋升，通过亚哈随鲁使末底改得到晋升，通过大流士使但以理得到晋升，就好像他们直接从天上得到了权力和荣耀。

P. Prelate.—Learned interpreters expound it so.—Ans. It is an untruth, for none expound it only and principally of kings. Produce one Interpreter for that conceit. P. Prelate.—Paul wrote this when Nero was monarch.—Ans. 1. Then must the text be expounded of Nero only. 2. He wrote this when Nero played the tyrant and persecuted Christians, therefore we are not to obey Neroes now. 3. He wrote it when the senate of Rome had power to declare Nero an enemy, not a father, as they did. P. Prelate.—αἱ must be referred to the antecedent ἐξουσία ὑπερχουσα and this, "There is no power εἰ μὴ but of God," must undeniably infer there is no supreme power but of God; and so, sovereignty relates to God as his immediate author, so sectaries reason, Gal. 2:16, "Not justified by works, (ἐαν μὴ) but by faith only." Then εἰ μὴ απὸ τους θεοῦ must be a perfect exclusive, else their stronghold for justification is overthrown.—Ans. αἱ hath a nearer antecedent, which is ἐξσία, it is alone without ὑπέρχουσα. And this grammar is not so good as Beza's, which he rejected. 2. ἐαν μὴ, will refer to God alone as the only cause, in genere causa primæ. God alone giveth rain, but not for that immediately, but by the mediation of vapours and clouds. "God alone killeth and maketh alive," Deut. 32:39, that is, excluding all strange gods, but not immediately; for, by his people's fighting, he slew Og, king of Bashan, and cast out seven nations, yet they used bow and sword, as it is used in the book of Joshua; and, therefore, God killed not Og immediately. God hath an infinite, eminent, transcendent way of working, so that in his kind he only worketh his alone; Deus solus operatur solitudme primæ causæ, non solus solitudine omnis causæ, God only giveth learning and wisdom, yet not immediately always—often he doth it by teaching and industry. God only maketh rich, yet the prelates make themselves rich also with the fat of the flock; and God only maketh poor, yet the P. Prelate's courts, mediately also under God, made many men poor. 3. ἐαν μὴ is not such an exclusive particle when we ascribe it to God, as when we ascribe it to two created causes, works and faith; and the protestants' form of arguing (Gal. 2), to prove "we are justified by faith," he calleth our stronghold, therefore it is not his stronghold. In this point, then, he must be a papist, and so he refuses to own protestant strongholds for justification by faith alone.
教长：有学问的解释者这样解释它。答：这是不真实的，因为没有人只把它解释为国王。找一个解释者来证明这个观点。教长：保罗在尼禄当皇帝时写的这段话。答：1. 那么这段经文必须只解释为尼禄。2. 他在尼禄当暴君并迫害基督徒的时候写的，所以我们现在不需要服从像尼禄这样的人。3. 他在罗马参议院有权利宣布尼禄为敌人而不是父亲的时候写的。教长：αἱ必须指的是前面的ἐξουσία ὑπερχουσα，而且这句话“没有权力，除了神的权力”必然推断出只有神才有至高无上的权力；所以，主权与神作为其直接创造者有关，宗派们这样推理，加拉太书 2:16，“不是因为行为称义，而是因为信仰称义。”那么 εἰ μὴ απὸ τους θεοῦ 必须是一个完全排除的条件，否则他们对称义的依据就被推翻了。答：αἱ有一个更近的先行词，就是ἐξσία，它是独立的，没有ὑπέρχουσα。而且这个语法不如贝扎的好，他已经拒绝了这个解释。2. ἐαν μὴ，将只指神作为唯一的原因，作为第一原因的一般原因。 只有上帝赐予雨水，但不是立即的，而是通过水汽和云的中介。上帝独自杀死和使人复活，申命记 32:39，即排除所有陌生的神，但不是立即的；因为他的子民作战，他杀死了巴珊王俄各，并驱逐了七个国家，然而他们使用弓和剑，正如在约书亚书中所述；因此，上帝并没有立即杀死俄各。上帝有一种无限、卓越、超然的工作方式，所以在他的种类中，他只是独自工作；Deus solus operatur solitudme primæ causæ, non solus solitudine omnis causæ，上帝独自赋予学问和智慧，但并非总是立即的-他经常通过教导和勤奋来实现。上帝独自使人富有，但教长们也通过羊群的脂肪使自己富有；上帝独自使人贫穷，但教长的法庭，也在上帝的中介下，使许多人贫穷。3. 当我们将其归因于上帝时，“ἐαν μὴ”不是一种排他性的词汇，而当我们将其归因于两个被创造的原因，即工作和信仰时，它才是一种排他性的词汇；而新教徒的论证形式（加拉太书 2 章），为了证明“我们是因信称义”，他称之为我们的堡垒，因此它不是他的堡垒。 在这一点上，他必须是一个天主教徒，因此他拒绝承认唯信称义的新教堡垒。

Dr Ferne (sect. 2, p. 10).—As many as have souls must be subject to the higher Powers spoken of here; but all inferior judges have souls.
弗恩博士（第 2 节，第 10 页）- 所有有灵魂的人都必须服从这里所说的更高权力；但所有下级法官都有灵魂。

Ans.—1. If the word souls be thus pressed, none shall be understood by higher powers, but the king only. 2. Certainly he that commandeth as he commandeth must be excepted, except, because the king hath a soul, you must subject the king to himself and to his own commandments royal, and so to penal laws. 3. Inferior judges, as judges, by this text, must either be subject to themselves as judges, (and, by the same reason, the king must be subject to himself, as he is a judge,) or judges, as men, or as erring men are to be subject; which I would grant, but they are not subject as judges, no more than one, as he commandeth, can also obey as he commandeth. These are contradictory. I am not put off that opinion since I was at school, species subjicibilis qua subjicibilis non est prædicabilis. 4. If Nero make fathers rulers over their mothers and children, and command them, by this public sword of justice, to kill their own children and mothers,—if a senate of such fathers disobey, and if, with the sword, they defend their own children and mothers, which some other Doegs, as judges, are to kill, in the name and commandment of Nero, then they, resisting Nero's bastard commandment by this doctrine, resist the ordinance of God, and resist the minister of God. I have not a faith stretched out so far to the Prelate's court-divinity. Yet Ferne saith, "There was never more cause to resist higher powers, for their wicked Nero was emperor, when he now forbiddeth resistance, (Rom. 13) under the pain of damnation." I desire to be informed, whether to resist the king's servants, be to resist the king? Dr Ferne (p. 3, sect. 2, p. 10, and part 3, sect. 9, p. 59) allows us, in unavoidable assaults where death is imminent, personal defence without offending, as lawful, whether the king or his emissaries invade, without law or reason. Well, then, the resisting of the king's cut-throats, though they have a personal command of the king to kill the innocent, yet if they want a legal, is no resisting of the king, as king, for the servant hath no more than the master giveth; but the king, in lawless commandments, gave nothing royal to his cut-throats, and so nothing legal.
答案：1. 如果将“灵魂”一词这样解释，那么只有国王才会被高层权力理解。2. 当然，那些像他那样命令的人必须被排除在外，因为国王有灵魂，所以你必须使国王服从他自己和他自己的王室命令，以及刑法。3. 根据这段文字，次级法官作为法官，要么必须服从自己作为法官的身份（同样的道理，国王作为法官也必须服从自己），要么作为人，或者作为犯错的人必须服从；我愿意承认这一点，但他们并不是作为法官而服从，就像一个人在命令时也不能按照自己的命令服从一样。这是矛盾的。自从我上学以来，我就没有改变这个观点，即“可服从的种类是不可预言的”。4. 如果尼禄让父亲统治他们的母亲和孩子，并命令他们用公正的刀剑杀死自己的孩子和母亲，如果一个由这样的父亲组成的参议院不服从，并且用刀剑保护自己的孩子和母亲，而这些孩子和母亲将被其他一些多以格斯以法官的名义和尼禄的命令杀死，那么他们通过这个教义抵抗尼禄的非法命令，就是抵抗上帝的命令和上帝的仆人。我对主教法庭神学的信仰没有如此深入。然而，费恩说：“从来没有更多的理由抵抗更高的权力，因为当他现在禁止抵抗时，他们那邪恶的尼禄是皇帝。”我想知道，抵抗国王的仆人是否就是抵抗国王？费恩博士（第 3 页，第 2 节，第 10 页，第 3 部分，第 9 节，第 59 页）允许我们在不可避免的攻击中，在死亡迫在眉睫的情况下，进行个人防卫而不犯罪，无论是国王还是他的使者侵犯，无论是否有法律或理由。 好的，那么，抵抗国王的杀手，尽管他们有国王的个人命令去杀害无辜者，但如果他们想要合法性，那就不是对国王的抵抗，因为仆人只有主人给予的权力；但是国王在无法无天的命令中，并没有给他的杀手们任何皇家的东西，因此也没有合法性。

QUESTION XXXIV
问题 XXXIV

WHETHER ROYALISTS BY COGENT REASONS DO PROVE THE UNLAWFULNESS OF DEFENSIVE WARS
无论皇室支持者以有力的理由证明防御战争的非法性

What reasons have already been discussed, I touch not.
已经讨论过的原因，我不涉及。

Obj. 1.—Arnisæus (de authorit. princip. c. 2, n. 2). "If we are to obey our parents, not if they be good, but simply whether they be good or ill, (so Justin, saith of the king, Quamvis legum contemptor, quamvis impius, tamen pater, sect, si vero in ff. ves. 12,) then must we submit to wicked kings."
如果我们要顺从父母，不是因为他们是好人，而是无论他们是好是坏（正如贾斯汀对国王所说，尽管他蔑视法律，尽管他邪恶，但他是父亲，参见 ff. ves. 12），那么我们必须服从邪恶的国王。

Ans.—Valeat totum, we are to submit to wicked kings and wicked parents, because kings and parents; but when it cometh to actual submission, we are to submit to neither but in the Lord. The question is not touching subjection to a prince, let him be Nero, but if in acts of tyranny we may not deny subjection. There be great odds betwixt wicked rulers and rulers commanding or punishing unjustly.
答案：我们应该顺从邪恶的国王和邪恶的父母，因为他们是国王和父母；但是当涉及实际的顺从时，我们只能在主里顺从。问题不是关于对君主的顺从，无论他是尼禄，而是关于在暴政行为中我们是否可以拒绝顺从。邪恶的统治者和命令或惩罚不公正的统治者之间有很大的差别。

Obj. 2—Arnisæus (c. 3, n. 9). "We may resist an inferior magistrate, therefore we may resist the supreme. It followeth not; for an inferior judge hath a majesty in fiction only, not properly: treason is, or can only be committed against the king; the obligation to inferior judges is only for the prince, the person of none is sacred and inviolable but the king's.
我们可以抵抗一个下级官员，因此我们也可以抵抗最高权力者。这并不成立；因为下级法官只是虚构的威严，不是真正的；叛国罪只能针对国王；对下级法官的义务只是对王子的，没有人的人格是神圣和不可侵犯的，只有国王的人格是如此。

Ans.—We obey parents, masters, kings, upon this formal ground, because they are God's deputies, and set over us not by man, but by God; so that not only are we to obey them because what they command is good and just, (such a sort of obedience an equal owes to the counsel of either equal or inferior,) but also by virtue of the fifth commandment, because of their place of dignity. Now this majesty, which is the formal reason of subjection, is one and the same in specie and nature in king and constable, and only different gradually in the king and in other judges; and it is denied that there is any incommunicable sanctity in the king's person which is not in some degree in the inferior judge. All proceedeth from this false ground, that the king and inferior judges differ in nature, which is denied; and treason inferior may be committed against an inferior judge, and it is a fiction that the inferior judge doth not resemble God as the king doth; yea, there is a sacred majesty in all inferior judges, in the aged, in every superior, wherefore they deserve honour, fear, and reverence. Suppose there were no king on earth, as is clear in Scripture, (Exod. 20:12; Levit. 19:32; Esther. 1:20; Psal. 149:9; Prov. 3:16; Matt. 13:57; Heb. 5:4; Isa. 3:3; Lam. 5:12; Mal. 1:6; Psal. 8:5,) and this honour is but united in a special manner in the king, because of his high place.
答案：我们遵守父母、主人和国王的命令，是因为他们是上帝的代表，他们被上帝而不是人所任命；因此，我们不仅要遵守他们的命令是因为这些命令是善良和公正的（这种服从是平等者对等或下级者对等的建议所欠的），而且还要根据第五诫的原因，因为他们的地位是尊贵的。现在，这种威严，也就是服从的正当理由，在国王和警官身上是同一种类型和性质的，只是在国王和其他法官身上逐渐有所不同；而且否认国王的人格中有任何不可传达的神圣性，而在某种程度上不在下级法官身上。所有的一切都源于这个错误的观点，即国王和下级法官在性质上有所不同，这是被否认的；对下级法官可以犯下叛国罪，而下级法官不像国王那样类似上帝是一个虚构的观念；是的，在所有下级法官、年长者和每一个上级中都有一种神圣的威严，因此他们值得受到尊敬、敬畏和崇敬。假设地球上没有国王，正如圣经所清楚地表明的那样（出埃及记 20:12；利未记 19:32；以斯帖记）。 1:20; 诗篇 149:9; 箴言 3:16; 马太福音 13:57; 希伯来书 5:4; 以赛亚书 3:3; 耶利米哀歌 5:12; 玛拉基书 1:6; 诗篇 8:5。这个荣耀在国王身上以一种特殊的方式合二为一，因为他的地位高。

Obj. 3.—A king elected upon conditions may be resisted.
选举出来的带条件的国王可以被抵抗。

Ans.—He is as essentially a king as a hereditary, yea, as an absolute prince, and no less the Lord's anointed than another prince; if then one, also another may be resisted.
答案：他既然是一个世袭的国王，甚至是一个绝对的君主，与其他王子一样是上帝所拣选的受膏者，那么如果一个可以被抵抗，那么另一个也可以被抵抗。

Obj. 4.—The oath of God bindeth the subjects; therefore, they must obey, not resist.
上帝的誓约束缚着臣民，因此他们必须顺从，而不是抵抗。

Ans.—Obedience and resistance are very consistent. No doubt the people gave their oath to Athaliah, but to her as the only heir of the crown, they not knowing that Joash, the lawful heir, was living; so may conditional oaths (all of this kind are conditional) in which there is interpretative and virtual ignorance, be broken; as the people swear loyalty to such a man conceived to be a father, he, after that, turneth tyrant, may they not resist his tyranny? They may. Also, no doubt, Israel gave their oath of loyalty to Jabin, (for when Nebuchadnezzar subdued Judah, he took an oath of loyalty of their king,) yet many of Zebulun, Naphtali, and lssachar, Barak leading them, conspired against Jabin.
答案：服从和抵抗是非常一致的。毫无疑问，人们向阿塔利雅发誓效忠，但他们并不知道合法继承人乔阿斯还活着，所以这种有条件的誓言（所有这类誓言都是有条件的），在其中存在着解释性和虚拟性的无知，可以被打破；当人们向一个被认为是父亲的人发誓效忠，而他在那之后变成了暴君，他们可以不抵抗他的暴政吗？可以。同样，毫无疑问，以色列人向雅宾发誓效忠（因为尼布甲尼撒征服了犹大，他向他们的国王发誓效忠），然而许多来自西布伦、拿弗他利和以萨迦的人，由巴拉克带领，密谋反抗雅宾。

Obj. 5.—There is no law to take a king's life if he turn a Nero,—we never read that subjects did it.

Ans.—The treatise of unlimited prerogative saith, (p. 7,) "We read not that a father, killing his children, was killed by them, the fact being abominable." The law (Gen. 6:9; Levit. 24:16) excepteth none. See Deut. 13:6, the dearest that nature knoweth are not excepted.
答案：无限特权的论文说道（第 7 页），“我们没有读到一个杀害自己孩子的父亲被他们杀死的事情，这个行为是可憎的。”法律（创世记 6:9；利未记 24:16）没有例外。参见申命记 13:6，最亲爱的人也没有例外。

Obj. 6.—Vengeance pursued Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, who resisted Moses.
Obj. 6. - 对抗摩西的科拉、大坍和亚比兰受到了报复。

Ans.—From resisting of a lawful magistrate in a thing lawful, it followeth not it must be unlawful to resist kings in tyrannous acts.
答：从在合法事务中抵抗合法的执法官，不能推断抵抗暴君行为是非法的。

Obj. 7.—Exod. 22:28, "Thou shalt not revile the gods, nor curse the Ruler of the people." Exod. 10:20, "Curse not the king, no not in thy thought, nor the rich in thy bed-chamber."
出埃及记 22:28：“不可辱骂神，也不可咒诅百姓的官长。”出埃及记 10:20：“不可心里咒诅君王，也不可在你卧房中咒诅富户。”

Ans.—The word elohim signifieth all judges, and נּשיﬡ, nasi signifieth one lifted up above the people, saith Rivetus, (in loc.) whether a monarch, or many rulers. All cursing of any is unlawful, even of a private man, (Rom. 12:14,) therefore we may not resist a private man by this; the other text readeth, contemn not the king, במדעךּ in scientia tua. Aria Mon., or in thy conscience or thought; and it may prove resisting any rich man to be unlawful. Nothing in word or deed tending to the dishonour of the king may be done; now to resist him in self-defence, being a commandment of God in the law of nature, cannot fight with another commandment to honour the king, no more than the fifth commandment can fight with the sixth; for all resistance is against the judge, as a man exceeding the limits of his office, in that wherein he is resisted, not as a judge.
答案：以色列的神（Elohim）一词意味着所有的法官，而נּשיﬡ（nasi）一词意味着一个高于人民的人，如里维特斯所说（在此处），无论是君主还是许多统治者。任何人的诅咒都是不合法的，即使是一个普通人（罗马书 12:14），因此我们不能通过这种方式抵抗一个普通人；另一段经文说，不要轻视国王，在你的知识中（במדעךּ）。阿里亚·蒙（Aria Mon.）或者在你的良心或思想中；这可能证明抵抗任何富人都是不合法的。任何言行中有损国王荣誉的事情都不能做；现在，在自卫中抵抗国王是上帝自然法中的一项命令，它不能与尊重国王的另一项命令相抵触，就像第五诫与第六诫不能相抵触一样；因为所有的抵抗都是针对法官的，他是一个超出自己职权范围的人，在被抵抗的那个方面，而不是作为一个法官。

Obj. 8.—Eccles. 8:3, 4, "Where the word of a king is, there is power; and who may say to him, What dost thou?" therefore, the king cannot be resisted.
王的话语有权力，谁能对他说：“你在做什么？”因此，国王是无法抗拒的。

Ans.—Tremelius saith well, That "the scope is that a man go not from the king's lawful command in passion and rebellion;" Vatab.—"If thou go from the king in disgrace, strive to be reconciled to him quickly;" Cajetanus—"Use not kings too familiarly, by coming too quickly to them, or going too hastily from them;" Plutarch,—"Cum rege agendum ut cum rogo, neither too near this fire nor too far off." Those have smarted who have been too great in their favour,—Ahasuerus slew Haman, Alexander so served Clitus and Tiberius Sejaunus, and Nero Seneca. But the sense is clear, rebellion is forbidden, not resistance, so the Hebrew אל־תעמד כדכר רע stand not in an evil matter, or in a rebellion, and he dehorteth from rebellion against the king by an argument taken from his power, for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him. Where the word of a king is, there is power, and who may say unto him, what doest thou? The meaning is, in way of justice, he is armed with power that cannot be resisted; otherwise Samuel said to king Saul, (1 Sam. 13:13,) "Thou hast done foolishly." Elijah said more to Ahab then What hast thou done.? And the prophets were to rebuke sin in kings (2 Kings 3:14; Jer. 1:18; 22:3; Hosea 5:1, 2); and though Solomon here give them a power, he speaketh of kings as they are de facto; but, de jure, they are under a law (Deut. 17:18). If the meaning be, as royalists dream, he doth whatsoever he will or desireth, as a prince, by his royal, that is, his legal will, by which he is lex animata, a breathing law, we shall own that as truth, and it is nothing against us; but if the meaning be, that de jure, as king, he doth whatsoever he will, by the absolute supremacy of royal will, above all law and reason, then Joram should, by law, as king, take Elisha's head away; and Elisha resisted God in saying, What doth the king? and he sinned in commanding to deal roughly with the king's messenger, and hold him at the door; then the fourscore valiant priests, who said to king Uzziah, What dost thou? and resisted him, in burning incense, which he desired to do; sinned, then Pharaoh, who said, (Ezek. 29:3,) "The river Nilus is mine, I have made it for myself; and the king of Tyrus, (Ezek. 27:2,) "I am God, I sit in the seat of God," should not be controlled by the prophets; and no man should say to them, What sayest thou? Did Cyrus, as a king, with a royal power from God, and jure regio, be angry at the river Ganges, because it drowned one of his horses, and punish it by dividing it in one hundred and thirty channels? (Sen. l. 3, de ira, c. 21.) And did Xerxes, jure regio, by a royal power given of God, when Hellespontus had cast down his bridges, command that three hundred whips should be inflicted on that little sea, and that it should be cast in fetters? And our royalists will have these mad fools, doing these acts of blasphemous insolence against heaven, to be honoured as kings, and to act those acts by a regal power. But hear flatterers,—a royal power is the good gift of God, a lawful and just power. A king acting and speaking as a king, speaketh and acteth law and justice. A power to blaspheme is not a lawful power; they did and spake these things with a human and a sinful will; if, therefore, this be the royalists' meaning,—as kings, 1. They are absolute, and so the limited and elected king is no king. 2. The king, as king, is above God's law put on him by God, Deut. 17:3. His will is the measure of good and ill. 4. It were unlawful to say to the king of Cyrus, What sayest thou? thou art not God, according to this vain sense of royalists.
答案：特雷梅利乌斯说得好，“目的是不让人在激情和叛乱中违背国王的合法命令”；瓦塔布说，“如果你因国王而受辱，努力与他和解”；卡耶塔努斯说，“不要太亲近国王，不要太快地接近他们，也不要太快地离开他们”；普鲁塔克说，“与国王交往时，既不要离得太近，也不要离得太远”。那些过于得宠的人都受到了惩罚——亚哈随鲁杀了哈曼，亚历山大对待克利图斯和提比留斯，尼禄对待塞内加。但意思很明确，禁止叛乱，而不是抵抗，所以希伯来语中的“不要站在邪恶的事上”是指不要参与叛乱，他通过从国王的权力角度来劝阻反抗国王，因为国王可以随心所欲地行事。国王的话有权力，谁能对他说：“你在做什么？”这意味着，在公正的方式下，他拥有无法抵抗的权力；否则撒母耳对扫罗王说：“你行事愚昧。”以利亚对亚哈说的话比“你做了什么？”更多。先知们要责备国王的罪恶（列王纪下 3:14；耶利米书）。 1:18; 22:3; 何西阿书 5:1, 2); 虽然所罗门在这里给予他们权力，他说的是国王的实际情况; 但是，从法律上来说，他们是受法律约束的（申命记 17:18）。如果意思是，如同君主主义者所梦想的那样，他按照他的皇家，也就是他的合法意愿，做任何他想做的事情，作为一个王子，通过他的皇家意愿，他是有生命的法律，那么我们将承认这是真理，这对我们来说没有任何不利之处; 但是，如果意思是，作为国王，他按照绝对至高无上的皇家意愿，超越一切法律和理性，做任何他想做的事情，那么约兰应该按照法律，作为国王，夺走以利沙的头颅; 以利沙在对上帝说：“王要做什么？”时抵抗了上帝，并且在命令粗暴对待国王的使者，并将他拦在门外时犯了罪; 然后是那八十个勇敢的祭司，他们对乌西雅王说：“你要做什么？”并在他想要烧香时抵抗了他; 犯了罪，那么法老，他说（以西结书 29:3）：“尼罗河是我的，我为自己造了它。”和推罗王（以西结书 27:2）：“我是神，我坐在神的位上”，不应该受到先知们的控制; 没有人应该对他们说：“你说什么？” 作为一个国王，赛勒斯是否因为恒河淹死了他的一匹马而对其发怒，并通过将其分成一百三十个河道来惩罚它？（塞内加，愤怒论，第三卷，第 21 章。）泽克西斯是否也凭借上帝赋予的国王权力，当赫勒斯庞托斯摧毁了他的桥梁时，命令对这个小海施以三百鞭打，并将其束缚起来？我们的君主主义者将这些疯狂的愚人，对天堂进行亵渎的行为，视为国王的荣耀，并通过国王的权力来执行这些行为。但请听听谄媚者的话，国王的权力是上帝的美好赐予，是合法和公正的权力。作为国王，行动和言论都是合法和公正的。亵渎的权力不是合法的权力；他们这样做和说这些事情是出于人的罪恶意愿；因此，如果这是君主主义者的意思，1. 他们是绝对的国王，所以有限制和选举的国王不是国王。2. 国王作为国王，高于上帝赋予他的法律，申命记 17:3。他的意愿是衡量善恶的标准。4. 对赛勒斯国王说“你说什么”是不合法的。 你不是上帝，根据王权主义者的虚妄观念。

Obj. 9.—Elihu saith, (Job. 34:18,) "Is it fit to say to a king, Thou art wicked, and to princes, Ye are ungodly?" Therefore, you may not resist kings.
Obj. 9. — 以利户说（约伯记 34:18）：“对君王说你是邪恶的，对王子说你们是不虔诚的，这合适吗？”因此，你不应该抵抗君王。

Ans. 1.—This text no more proveth that kings should not be resisted than it proveth that rich men, or liberal men, or other judges inferior, should not be resisted, for נריבים signifieth all that, and it signifieth liberal, Isa. 32:5; and the same word is in ver. 8. 2. Deodatus and Calvin say, the meaning is, "Learn from the respect that is due to earthly princes the reverence due to the sovereign Lord," Mal. 1:8; for it is not convenient to reproach earthly kings, and to say to a prince, בליעלּ Beliel, a word of reproach, signifying extreme wickedness. And you may not say to a man of place, רשע an extremely wicked man; so are the words taken, as signifying most vile and wicked men, 1 Sam. 2:12; 10:27; 1 Sam. 25:6; Psal. 1:1, 6; 11:5; 12:8; Prov. 14:4; Psal. 146:9, and in infinite places. For בלּיעלּ is a word of extreme reproach, coming from בלי sine, non, and יעלּ profuit, (Jud. 19:22,) a most naughty and a lewd man, or from עיל jugum, a lawless man, who hath cast off all yokes of God's or man's laws. So then the meaning is, It is unlawful to reproach earthly princes and men of place, far more is it unlawful to reproach the Judge of the whole earth with injustice. And what then? We may not reproach the king, as Shimei cursed king David; therefore it is unlawful to resist the king in any tyrannous acts. I shall deny the consequence; nay, as Pineda observeth, if the royalist press the words literally, it shall not be lawful for prophets to reprove kings of their sins. Christ called Herod a fox, Elias Ahab, one that troubled Israel.
答案 1.——这段文字并不能证明国王不应该被抵抗，就像它也不能证明富人、慷慨的人或其他低级法官不应该被抵抗一样，因为“נריבים”意味着所有这些，它也意味着慷慨，以赛亚书 32:5；同样的词也出现在第 8 节。2. Deodatus 和 Calvin 说，这句话的意思是，“从对地上的君王应有的尊重中学习对至高主的敬畏”，玛拉基书 1:8；因为责备地上的君王并说一个带有责备意味的词“בליעלּ Beliel”，意思是极度邪恶，是不合适的。你也不能对一个有地位的人说“רשע”，意思是极度邪恶的人；所以这些话被理解为指最卑鄙和邪恶的人，撒母耳记上 2:12；10:27；撒母耳记上 25:6；诗篇 1:1, 6；11:5；12:8；箴言 14:4；诗篇 146:9，以及无数其他地方。因为“בלּיעלּ”是一个极度侮辱的词，来自“בלי”无、非，和“יעלּ”有益，（士师记 19:22，）一个极坏和淫乱的人，或者来自“עיל”轭，一个无法无天的人，他摆脱了上帝或人的法律的束缚。所以，意思是，责备地上的君王和有地位的人是不合法的，更不合法的是责备全地的审判者不公正。那又怎样呢？ 我们不能像示每咒骂大卫王那样责备国王；因此，在任何暴虐行为面前抵抗国王是不合法的。我将否认这个结论；不仅如此，正如皮内达所观察到的，如果皇家主义者按字面意义解释这些话，那么先知就不能指责国王的罪恶。基督称希律为狐狸，以利亚称亚哈为扰乱以色列的人。

Obj. 10.—Acts 23. Paul excuseth himself that he called Ananias, the high-priest, a whited wall.
Obj. 10. - 行动 23。保罗为自己称高祭司亚拿尼亚为白墙而辩解。

Ans.—Rivetus (Exod. 22) learnedly discussing the place, thinketh Paul, professing he knew him not to be the high-priest, speaketh ironically, that he could not acknowledge such a man for a judge. Piscator answereth, He could not then cite Scripture, "It is written," &c.—Ans. But they may well insist, in that act of smiting Paul unjustly, he might be reproached, otherwise it is not lawful to reproach him; and surely it is not like that Paul was ignorant that he was a judge; yea, it is certain he knew him to be a judge. 1. He appeared before him as a judge, to answer for himself. 2. Paul saith expressly he was a judge, (ver. 3,) "Sittest thou to judge me after the law," &c. And therefore the place is for us, for even according to the mind of all, the fault was (if there were any) in calling him a whited wall; and he resisted him in judgment, when he said, "Commandest thou me to be smitten against the law?" 3. Though royalists rather put a fault on the apostle Paul, (now in the act of prophesying judgment against Ananias, which after fell out,) than upon their god, the king, yet the consequence amounteth but to this, We may not revile the high-priest, therefore we may not resist the King in his illegal commandments. It followeth not; yea, it should prove, if a prelate come in open war to kill the innocent apostle Paul, the apostle might fly or hold his hands, but might not reoffend. Now the prelate is the high-priest's successor, and so his base person is as sacred as the person of the Lord's anointed, the king. Hence the cavaliers had in one of their colours, which was taken by the Scots at the battle of Marston, July 2, 1644, the crown and the Prelate's mitre, painted with these words, "Nolite tangere Christos meos," as if the antichristian mitre were as sacred as the lawful crown of the king of Britain.
答案：—Rivetus（出埃及记 22 章）学术地讨论了这个地方，保罗认为他不认识他是大祭司，讽刺地说他不能承认这样的人作为法官。Piscator 回答说，他当时不能引用经文，“经上记着说”等等。——答案。但他们可以坚持，因为不公正地打击保罗的行为，他可能受到了责备，否则是不合法的责备他；而且保罗肯定知道他是一个法官。1.他作为一个法官出现在他面前，为自己辩护。2.保罗明确说他是一个法官（第 3 节），“你按着律法审判我吗？”等等。因此，这个地方对我们有利，因为即使按照所有人的意愿，错误（如果有的话）在于称他为白墙；当他说“你吩咐我违法地被打吗？”时，他在审判中反抗了他。3. 尽管保皇派更倾向于将错误归咎于使徒保罗（现在正在预言对亚拿尼亚斯的审判，之后发生了这件事），而不是他们的神，国王，但结果只是这样：我们不能辱骂大祭司，因此我们不能反抗国王的非法命令。这并不是跟随的逻辑；是的，如果一个主教公然来杀害无辜的使徒保罗，使徒可以逃跑或保持手不动，但不能再犯罪。现在主教是大祭司的继任者，所以他的卑鄙人格和受膏者、国王的人格一样神圣。因此，骑士党人在他们的旗帜中有一个被苏格兰人在 1644 年 7 月 2 日马斯顿战役中夺取的颜色，上面画着皇冠和主教的教冠，并写着“Nolite tangere Christos meos”，好像反基督的教冠和英国国王的合法王冠一样神圣。

Obj. 11.—Ferne, (sect. 9, 56,) "If the senate and people of Rome, who a little before had the supreme government over the then emperors, that of subjects had made them lords, might not resist their emperors, much less can the people of England have power of resistance against the succession of this crown, descending from the conqueror, who by force of arms, but in justice, conquered the kingdom.
Obj. 11.——弗恩（第 9.56 节）：“如果罗马的参议院和人民，在不久之前对当时的皇帝拥有最高统治权，使他们成为臣民的主人，那么英格兰人民就更没有权力反抗这个王位的继承，这个王位是从征服者那里传承下来的，他通过武力征服了王国，但是是在正义的基础上。”

Ans. 1.—Though the Roman emperors were absolute, (of which I much doubt,) and though the senate had made them absolute, I deny that, therefore, they cannot be resisted. The unlawful resistance condemned by Paul (Rom. 13) is not upon the ground of absoluteness, which is in the court of God nothing, being never ordained of God, but upon reasons of conscience, because the powers are of God, and ordained of God. But some may say, Volenti non fit injuria, If a people totally resign their power, and swear non-resistance to a conqueror, by compact, they cannot resist. I answer, neither doth this follow, because it is an unlawful compact, and none is obliged to what is unlawful. For, (1.) It is no more lawful for me to resign to another my power of natural self-defence than I can resign my power to defend the innocent drawn to death, and the wives, children, and posterity that God had tyed me unto. (2.) The people can no more resign power of self-defence, which nature hath given them, than they can be guilty of self-murder, and be wanting in the lawful defence of kingdom and religion. (3.) Though you make one their king with absoluteness of power, yet when he use that transcendent power, not for the safety but for the destruction of the state, it is known they could not resign to another that power which neither God nor nature gave them, to wit, a power to destroy themselves. 2. I much doubt if the Roman emperor was absolute when Paul wrote this. Justinian saith so, (Digest. l. 2, tit. 2,) but he is partial in this cause. Bodine (de repub. l. 2, c. 5, p. 221,) proveth that the Roman emperors were but princes of the commonwealth, and that the sovereignty remained still in the senate and people. Marius Salamon. writeth six books (De Principatu) on the contrary. How could they make their emperors absolute? Livy saith, "The name of a king was contrary to a senate liberty." Florus, Nomen Regis invidiosum, They instituted a yearly feast, Feb. 23, called Regifugium. Cicero, as Augustine observeth, Regem Romæ post hæc nec Dii, nec homines esse patiantur. The emperors might do something de facto, but Lex Regia was not before Vespasian's time. Augustus took on him to be tribune of the people from ten years to ten. Suetonius and Tacitus say, "The succeeding kings encroached by degrees upon the people's liberty." For speedier execution of law, the kings in time of war were forced to do many things without the senate, and after the reign of emperors, though there were no Plebiscita, yet there were Senatus-consulta, and one great one is, that the senate declared Nero to be an enemy to the state. It is thought Julius Cæsar, in the war against Pompey, subdued the Romans and the senate, and they were subdued again in the battle of Octavius against Cassius and Brutus. But Tacitus saith that was de facto, not de jure, (Anal. I. 1, s. 2,) Romæ ruere in servitium, Consules, Patres, Eques. Caligula intended to assume diadema, the ensign of a king, but his friends dissuaded him. 3. England is obliged to Dr Ferne, who maketh them a subdued nation; the contrary of which is known to the world.
答案 1. - 虽然罗马皇帝是绝对的（我对此表示怀疑），虽然参议院使他们成为绝对的，但我否认因此他们不能被抵抗。保罗在罗马书 13 章所谴责的非法抵抗并不是基于绝对性的原因，在上帝的法庭中绝对性是无关紧要的，因为它从未被上帝所命令，而是基于良心的原因，因为权力来自上帝，并由上帝所命令。但有人可能会说，Volenti non fit injuria（自愿者不受伤害），如果一个民族完全放弃他们的权力，并且通过契约向征服者宣誓不抵抗，他们就不能抵抗。我回答说，这并不成立，因为这是一个非法的契约，没有人被迫遵守非法的事情。因为，（1.）我放弃我的自然自卫权力和放弃保护被带到死亡的无辜者以及上帝将我与之联系的妻子、孩子和后代的权力一样是不合法的。（2.）人民不能放弃自然赋予他们的自卫权力，就像他们不能犯自杀罪一样，不能在合法的国家和宗教防御中缺席。（3.）尽管你让一个人成为绝对权力的国王，但当他使用这种超然的权力，不是为了国家的安全而是为了国家的毁灭时，人们知道他们无法将这种既不是上帝也不是自然赋予他们的权力放弃给另一个人，也就是毁灭自己的权力。我非常怀疑保罗写这篇文章时罗马皇帝是否是绝对的。贾斯汀尼安这样说（《法典》第 2 卷第 2 章），但他在这个问题上是偏袒的。博丁（《国家论》第 2 卷第 5 章第 221 页）证明罗马皇帝只是共和国的君主，主权仍然掌握在参议院和人民手中。马里乌斯·萨拉蒙写了六本书（《关于统治》），持相反观点。他们怎么能让他们的皇帝绝对呢？利维亚斯说：“国王的名字与参议院的自由相悖。”弗洛鲁斯说，国王的名字令人讨厌。他们设立了一个每年一次的节日，2 月 23 日，叫做 Regifugium。正如奥古斯丁所观察到的，西塞罗说，此后罗马不允许有国王，无论是神还是人。皇帝们可能在事实上做一些事情，但《皇家法》在维斯帕先时代之前并不存在。奥古斯都从十年到十年担任人民的保护者。 苏埃托尼乌斯和塔西佗说：“后来的国王逐渐侵犯了人民的自由。”为了更快地执行法律，在战争时期，国王被迫在没有参议院的情况下做许多事情，而在帝王统治之后，虽然没有人民法令，但仍有参议院决议，其中一个重要的决议是参议院宣布尼禄为国家的敌人。据认为，朱利叶斯·凯撒在与庞培的战争中征服了罗马和参议院，而他们在奥克塔维乌斯对卡西乌斯和布鲁图斯的战斗中再次被征服。但塔西佗说这是事实，而不是法律（《分析》第一卷第一章第二节），罗马陷入奴役，领袖、元老院、骑士。卡利古拉打算戴上王冠，但他的朋友劝阻了他。3.英国要感谢费恩博士，他使他们成为被征服的民族；而世界上都知道相反的情况。

Symmons (sect. 6, p. 19).—God is not honoured by being resisted, no more is the king.
Symmons（第 6 节，第 19 页）。上帝不会因为被抵抗而受到尊敬，国王也是如此。

Ans.—1. I deny the consequence. Those who resist the king's personal will, and will not suffer him to ruin his crown and posterity in following papists, against his oath at the coronation, do honour him, and his throne and race, as a king, though for the time they displease him. 2. Uzziah was not dishonoured in that he was resisted. 3. Nor do we honour the king when we flee from him and his law; yet that resistance is lawful, according to the way of royalists, and in truth also.
答案：1. 我否认这个后果。那些抵抗国王个人意愿的人，并且不允许他在追随天主教徒的时候毁掉他的王冠和后代，他们尊重他，尊重他的王位和王室，尽管暂时让他不高兴。2. 乌西雅并没有因为被反抗而受到不尊重。3. 当我们逃离国王和他的法律时，我们并没有尊重国王；然而，根据君主主义者的方式，这种抵抗是合法的，事实上也是如此。

Obj. 12.—Supreme power is not to be resisted by subordinate powers, because they are inferior to the supreme.
上级权力不可被下级权力所抵抗，因为下级权力低于上级。

Ans.—1. The bloody Irish rebels, then, being inferior to the parliament, cannot resist the parliament. 2. Inferior judges, as judges, are immediately subordinate to God as the king, and must be guilty of blood before God if they use not the sword against bloody cavaliers and Irish cut-throats, except you say inferior judges are not obliged to execute judgment but at the king's commandment.
答案：1. 血腥的爱尔兰叛乱者，由于劣势无法抵抗议会。2. 作为法官，劣势的法官直接服从上帝作为国王，如果他们不使用剑对付血腥的骑士和爱尔兰刽子手，他们在上帝面前将会有罪，除非你说劣势的法官不必执行判决，除非得到国王的命令。

Obj.—As the Irish rebels are armed with the king's power, they are superior to the parliament.
由于爱尔兰叛军拥有国王的权力，他们比议会更强大。

Ans.—So an army of Turks and Spaniards, armed with the king's power, and coming against the two kingdoms at the king's commandment, though they be but lictors in a lawless cause, are superior to the highest courts of parliament in the two kingdoms. But the king and the law gave power to the parliament first to resist rebels, now he giveth power to rebels to resist the parliament. Here must be contradictory wills and contradictory powers in the king. Which of them is the king's will and his power? the former is legal and parliamentary; then, because law is not contrary to law, the latter cannot be legal also, nor can it be from God, and to resist it, then, is not to resist God.
答案：因此，一支由土耳其人和西班牙人组成的军队，凭借国王的权力，按照国王的命令来进攻这两个王国，尽管他们只是在一个无法无天的事业中充当执法者，却比这两个王国的最高议会更强大。但是国王和法律首先赋予了议会抵抗叛乱者的权力，现在他却赋予了叛乱者抵抗议会的权力。国王的意愿和权力之间必然存在矛盾。其中哪一个是国王的意愿和权力？前者是合法的和议会的；然后，因为法律不与法律相抵触，后者也不能合法，也不能来自上帝，因此，抵抗它并不是抵抗上帝。

Obj. 13.—If resistance be restrained to legal commandments, what shall we say to these arguments,—that Paul forbiddeth resistance under these tyrannous governors, and that from the end of their government, which is for good, and which their subjects did in some sort enjoy under them?
如果抵抗被限制在合法的命令上，对于这些论点，我们应该如何回答——保罗禁止在这些暴政统治者下进行抵抗，这是因为他们的统治目的是为了善良，并且他们的臣民在某种程度上享受了这种善良？

Ans.—This proveth nothing, but that we are to co-operate with these governors, though tyrannous, by subjecting to their laws, so far as they come up to this end, the moral good and peace of their government; but Paul nowhere commandeth absolute subjection to tyrannous governors in tyrannous acts, which is still the question.
答案：这并不能证明什么，只是我们应该与这些暴虐的统治者合作，通过服从他们的法律，尽可能地实现他们政府的道德善和和平。但保罗从未命令对暴虐的统治者在暴虐行为上绝对服从，这仍然是个问题。

Obj. 14.—He that hath the supreme trust next to God, should have the greatest security to his person and power; but if resistance be lawful, he hath a poor security.
如果合法抵抗是可能的，那么拥有至高无上的信任的人应该对自己的人身安全和权力拥有最大的保障；但如果合法抵抗是可能的，那么他的保障就很薄弱。

Ans.—1. He that hath the greatest trust should have the greatest security to his person and power in the keeping his power, and using it according to his trust for its own native end—for justice, peace, and godliness. God alloweth security to no man, nor that his angels shall guard them, but only when they are in their ways and the service of God; else, "there is no peace to the wicked." 2. It is denied that one man, having the greatest trust, should have the greatest security; the church and people of God, for whose safety he hath the trust, as a means for the end, should have a greater security; the city ought to have greater security than the watchers, the army than the leaders,—"The good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep." 3. A power to do ill, without resistance, is not security.
答案：1. 拥有最大信任的人应该对自己的人身和权力拥有最大的保障，以保持自己的权力，并根据信任的目的——公正、和平和敬虔来使用它。上帝不允许任何人拥有安全感，也不允许他的天使保护他们，除非他们在他们的道路上和为上帝服务；否则，“恶人没有平安。” 2. 否认一个人拥有最大信任就应该拥有最大安全保障；为了他们的安全，上帝的教会和子民应该拥有更大的安全保障；城市应该比守卫者拥有更大的安全保障，军队应该比领导者拥有更大的安全保障——“好牧人为羊舍命。” 3. 无阻力地做坏事并不是安全保障。

Obj. 15.—If God appoint ministers to preach, then the sheep cannot seek safety elsewhere.
如果上帝指派牧师去传道，那么羊群就不能在其他地方寻求安全。

Ans.—The wife is obliged to bed and board with her husband, but not if she fear he will kill her in the bed. The obedience of positive duties that subjects owe to princes cannot loose them from nature's law of self-preservation, nor from God's law of defending religion against papists in arms, nor are the sheep obliged to entrust themselves but to a saving shepherd.
答：妻子有义务与丈夫同床共食，但如果她担心丈夫会在床上杀死她，则不需要这样做。臣民对君主所负有的积极义务的服从不能使他们违背自我保护的自然法则，也不能使他们违背上帝保护宗教免受武装天主教徒侵害的法律，绵羊也只需要信任一个能拯救它们的牧羊人。

Obj. 16.—If self-defence, and that by taking up arms against the king, be an unlawful duty, how is it that you have no practice, no precept, no promise for it, in all the word of God? 1. You have no practice: Ahab sold himself to do evil,—he was an idolater,—and killed the prophets; and his queen, a bloody idolatress, stirred him up to great wickedness. Elias had as great power with the people as you have, yet he never stirred up the people to take arms against the king. Why did God at this time rather use extraordinary means of saving his church? Arnisæus, (de autho. princ. c. 8,)—"Elias only fled. Nebuchadnezzar, Ahab, Manasseh, and Julian, were tyrants and idolaters, yet the people never raised an army against them." Bishop Williams of Ossory, (Deut. 14,) "If brother, son, daughter, wife, or friend, entice thee to follow strange gods, kill them; not a word of the father. Children are to love their fathers, not to kill them." "Christ (saith John P. P.), in the cradle, taught by practice to flee from Herod; and all Christ's acts and sufferings are full of mysteries and our instructions. He might have had legions of angels to defend him, but would rather work a miracle, in curing Malchus' ear, as use the sword against Cæsar. If sectaries give us a new creed, it will concern them never with expunging Christ's descent into hell, and the communion of saints, to raze out this, He suffered under Pontius Pilate. My resolution is (for this sin of yours) to dissolve in tears and prayers, and, with my master, say, daily and hourly, Father, forgive them, &c. Christ thought it an uncouth spirit to call for fire from heaven to burn the Samaritans, because they refused him lodging. The prophets cried out against idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, &c., and all sins; never against the sin of neglect, and murderous omission to defend church and religion against a tyrannous king. No promise is made to such a rebellious insurrection in God's word."
目标 16.——如果自卫，即通过对国王使用武力，是一项不合法的义务，那么为什么在上帝的话语中你找不到任何实践、规定或承诺呢？1.你没有实践：亚哈卖身于邪恶，他是个拜偶像者，杀害了先知；而他的王后，一个血腥的拜偶像者，激励他犯下大恶。以利亚在人民中有着和你一样的权力，然而他从未激励人民对抗国王。为什么上帝在这个时候更倾向于使用非凡的手段来拯救他的教会呢？阿尔尼塞乌斯（de autho. princ. c. 8）说：“以利亚只是逃跑。尼布甲尼撒、亚哈、玛拿西和朱利安都是暴君和拜偶像者，然而人民从未对他们发动过战争。”奥索里主教（Deut. 14）说：“如果兄弟、儿子、女儿、妻子或朋友引诱你去追随陌生的神，杀死他们；没有提到父亲。孩子们应该爱他们的父亲，而不是杀死他们。”“基督（约翰 P.P.说）在摇篮中，通过逃离希律的迫害，以实践的方式教导我们；而基督的一切行为和受难都充满了奥秘和我们的教导。” 他或许可以拥有无数天使来保护他，但他宁愿施展奇迹，治愈马尔谷的耳朵，也不愿用剑对付凯撒。如果异端派给我们带来了新的信条，它们将永远不会涉及抹去基督下降地狱和圣徒的交通，以及抹去他在本丢彼拉多手下受难。对于你们的这个罪过，我的决心是以眼泪和祈祷来解散，并且与我的主一起，每天每时地说：“父啊，原谅他们，等等。”基督认为从天上呼唤火焰来烧毁撒玛利亚人是一种陌生的精神，因为他们拒绝给他提供住所。先知们呼喊反对偶像崇拜、亵渎、谋杀、通奸等等所有罪恶，从未呼喊反对忽视和犯下的罪过，即对抗暴君国王保护教会和宗教的罪过。在上帝的话语中，对这种叛乱起义没有给出任何承诺。"

Ans. It is a great non-consequence: this duty is not practised by any examples in God's word, therefore it is no duty. Practice in Scripture is a narrow rule of faith. Show a practice when a husband stoned his wife, because she enticed him to follow strange gods; yet it is commanded, (Deut. 13:6,) when a man lying with a beast is put to death; yet it is a law (Exod. 22:19). Infinite more laws are, the practice of which we find not in Scripture. 2. Jehu and the elders of Israel rooted out Ahab's posterity for their idolatry; and if Jehu, out of sincerity, and for the zeal of God, had done what God commanded, he should have been rewarded; for, say that it was extraordinary to Jehu that he should kill Ahab, yet there was an express law for it, that he that stirreth up others to idolatry should die the death (Deut. 13:6); and there is no exception of king or father in the law; and to except father or mother in God's matter, is expressly against the zeal of God (Deut. 32:9). And many grave divines think the people to be commended in making Jehu king, and in killing king Nabab, and smiting all the house of Jeroboam for his idolatry; they did that which was a part of their ordinary duty, according to God's express law (Deut. 13:6–9), though the facts of these men be extraordinary. 3. Ahab and Jezebel raised not an army of idolaters and malignants, such as are papists, prelates, and cavaliers, against the three estates, to destroy parliaments, laws, and religion—and the people conspired with Ahab in the persecution and idolatry, to forsake the covenant, throw down the altars of God, and slay his prophets—so as in the estimation of Elias, (1 King 19:9–11,) there was not one man, but they were malignant cavaliers; and hath any Elias now power with the cavaliers, to exhort them to rise in arms against themselves, and to show them it is their duty to make war against the king and themselves, in the defence of religion? When the prophets had much ado to convince the people that they sinned in joining with the king, what place was there to show them their sin, in not using their own lawful defence? And in reason, any may judge it unreasonable for Elias to exhort, of thousands of thousands in Israel, poor seven thousand (of which many no doubt were women, aged, weak, and young,) to rise in arms against Ahab and all Israel, except God had given a positive and extraordinary commandment, and with all miraculous courage and strength in war against the whole land. And God worketh not always by miracles to save his church, and therefore the natural mandate of self-preservation in that case doth no more oblige a few weak ones to lawful resistance than it obliged one martyr to rise against a persecuting Nero and all his forces. Arnisæus should remember we are not to tie our Lord to miracles.
答：这是一个非常重要的问题：这个责任在上帝的话语中没有任何实例，因此它不是一项责任。圣经中的实践是信仰的狭窄规则。展示一个丈夫因为妻子引诱他去追随外邦神而用石头砸死妻子的实践；然而这是被命令的（申命记 13:6）；当一个与兽交的人被处死时，这也是一条法律（出埃及记 22:19）。还有无数更多的法律，我们在圣经中找不到它们的实践。2.耶户和以色列的长老根除了亚哈的后裔，因为他们崇拜偶像；如果耶户出于真诚和对上帝的热忱而执行了上帝的命令，他应该得到奖赏；因为可以说，耶户杀死亚哈是非同寻常的，然而，这是有明确法律的，即那些煽动他人崇拜偶像的人应该被处死（申命记 13:6）；在这个法律中没有国王或父亲的例外；而在上帝的事上，排除父亲或母亲，明显违背了上帝的热忱（申命记 32:9）。 许多严肃的神学家认为，人民应该受到称赞，因为他们推举耶户为王，杀死了拿巴王，并击杀了耶罗波安全家族，因为他们的拜偶像行为；他们所做的是根据上帝明确的法律（申命记 13:6-9），尽管这些人的行为是非同寻常的。亚哈和耶洗别没有组织一支由偶像崇拜者和恶意分子组成的军队，例如天主教徒、主教和骑士，来对抗三个阶级，摧毁议会、法律和宗教——人民与亚哈共谋迫害和拜偶像，背弃盟约，推翻上帝的祭坛，杀害他的先知——所以在以利亚的估计中（列王纪上 19:9-11），没有一个人，除了那些恶意的骑士；现在有没有任何以利亚的力量能够劝说骑士们起来反对自己，并向他们展示，在捍卫宗教的过程中，他们有责任对抗国王和自己？当先知们费尽心思地说服人民他们在与国王联合时犯了罪时，有什么地方可以向他们展示，他们没有使用自己的合法防御手段是犯了罪的呢？ 在理性上，任何人都可以判断，以利亚斯劝告以色列数千人中的贫穷七千人（其中许多无疑是妇女、老年人、虚弱者和年轻人）起来反抗亚哈和整个以色列，除非上帝给出了明确而非凡的命令，并赋予他们在战争中的奇迹般的勇气和力量。上帝并不总是通过奇迹来拯救他的教会，因此在这种情况下，自我保护的自然命令对于一些虚弱者来说并没有更多的义务，就像它对一个殉道者来说并没有义务起来反抗迫害的尼禄和他的全部力量一样。阿尼塞乌斯应该记住，我们不能把我们的主束缚在奇迹中。

1. Elias did not only flee, but denounced wrath against the king and cavaliers who joined with them in idolatry; and when God gave opportunity, he showed himself, and stirred the people up to kill Baal's Jesuits and seducing idolators, when the idolatrous king refused to do it; and Elias with his own hand took them not, but all Israel being gathered together, (1 Kings 18:19,) the princes and judges did apprehend them, (ver. 40,) which is a warrant, when the king refuseth to draw the sword of justice against armed papists, that other judges are to do it. 2. For Jeremiah, from the Lord, expressly forbade to fight against Nebuchadnezzar, show us the like for not defending ourselves against bloody papists and Irish cut-throats; for that example may as well prove, (if it be a binding law to us,) that our king should not raise his subjects to fight against a Spanish armada and a foreign prince; for before ever Nebuchadnezzar subdued the kingdom of Judah, (Jer. 27:1,) in the beginning of the reign of Jehoiakim, (Jer. 36 and 37,) the king of Judah is from the Lord commanded not to draw a sword against the king of Babylon. I hope this will not tie us and our king not to fight against foreign princes, or against the great Turk, if they shall unjustly invade us and our king; and this example is against the king's resisting of a foreign prince unjustly invading him, as much as against us, for Nebuchadnezzar was a tyrannous invader, and the king of Judah the Lord's anointed. 3. The people also conspired with Manasseh, as with Ahab. (Jer. 15:4). 4. Of emperors persecuting Christians we shall hear anon. 5. Deut. 13, None are excepted, by a synecdoche, the dearest are expressed, "son, daughter, brother, the friend that is as thine own soul;" therefore fathers also; "and husbands are to love their wives" (Ephes. 5:25); yet to execute judgment on them without pity (Deut. 13:8, 9); the father is to love the son, yet if the son prophecy falsely in the name of the Lord, to kill him. (Zech. 13:3.) Hence love, fear, reverence toward the king, may be commanded, and defensive wars also. 6. Christ fled from Herod, and all his actions and sufferings are mysteries and instructions, saith the poor Prelate. Christ kissed the man that, to his knowledge, came to betray him; Christ fled not, but knowing where and when his enemy should apprehend him, came willingly to the place; therefore we should not flee. His actions are so mysterious that John P. P., in imitation of Christ's forty days' fast, will fast from flesh in Lent, and the Prelate must walk on the sea and work miracles, if all Christ's actions be our instructions. 7. He might, with more than twelve legions of angels, defend himself, but he would not, not because resistance was unlawful—no shadow for that in the text—but because it was God's will that he should drink the cup his Father gave him, and because to take the sword without God's warrant, subjecteth the usurper of God's place to perish with the sword. Peter had God's revealed will that Christ behoved to suffer, (Matt. 26:52, 53; 16:21–23,) and God's positive command, that Christ should die for sinners, (John 10:24,) may well restrain an act of lawful self-preservation, hic et nunc, and such an act as Christ lawfully used at another time. (Luke 4:29, 30; John 11:7, 8.) We give no new creed; but this apostate hath forsaken his old creed, and the religion of the Church of Scotland, in which he was baptized. Nor do we expunge out of the creed Christ's descension into hell and the communion of saints, as the apostate saith; but the popish local descension of Christ, and the popish advancing of the church's power above the Scriptures, and the intercession and prayers to the saints, or of the saints for us, we deny; and this Prelate, though he did swear the doctrine of the Church of Scotland, preached expressly all these, and many other points of popery, in the pulpits of Edinburgh. 10. We believe that Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate, but that Pilate had any legal power to condemn Christ—but only a power by a permissive decree, (Acts 4:27, 28,) such as devils had by God's permission, (Luke 22:53,)—we utterly deny. 11. The Prelate saith it is his resolution, for our sin of natural self-defence, to dissolve in tears; because his bishopric, I conceive, by which he was wont to dissolve in cups, (being drunk on the Lord's day, after he, with other prelates, had been at the Lord's supper, while the chamber, wherein they were, was dissolved in vomiting,) was taken from him. 12. The prophets cry against all sins, but never against the sin of non-resistance; and yet they had very tyrannous and idolatrous kings. This is but a weak argument. 1. The prophets cry not out against all sins—they cry not out against men-stealers, and killers of father and mother, in express terms, yet do they, by consequence, condemn all these sins; and so do they condemn non-resistance in wars, by consequence, when they cry out, (Jer. 5:31,) "The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so." And when they complain (Ezek. 22:26–28), "That the prophets and priests violate the law, her princes are like wolves ravening the prey, to shed blood, and the people use oppression, and exercise robbery, and vex the poor;" and when they say, (Jer. 22:2,) not to the king only, but also to his servants, and the people that enter in by the gates, "Execute judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor,"—I pray you, who are the oppressors? I answer, The murdering judges. (Isa. 1:21.) "As for my people, children are their oppressors, and women rule over them," (Isa. 3:12,) and, (ver. 14, 15,) "the ancients of the people grind the faces of the poor;" and when they are not valiant for the truth upon the earth; and (Prov. 24:11) the Lord shall render to these men according to their works, which forbear to help men that are drawn to death, and those that be ready to be slain; if they shift the business, and say, Behold, we know not, doth not he that pondereth the heart consider it? When, therefore, the Lord's prophets complain that the people execute not judgment, relieve not the oppressed, help not and rescue not those that are drawn to death unjustly by the king, or his murdering judges, they expressly cry out against the sin of non-resistance. 2. The prophets cannot expressly and formally cry out against the judges for non-resisting the king, when they join, as ravening wolves, with the king in these same acts of oppression, even as the judge cannot formally impannel twenty-four men, sent out to guard the travellers from an arch-robber, if these men join with the robber, and rob the travellers, and become cut-throats, as the arch-robber is, he cannot accuse them for their omission in not guarding the innocent travellers, but for a more heinous crime, that not only they omitted what was their duty, in that they did not rescue the oppressed out of the hands of the wicked, but because they did rob and murder; and so the lesser sin is swallowed up in the greater. The under-judges are watchmen, and a guard to the church of God; if the king turn a bosom robber, their part is, (Jer. 22:3,) "To deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor," to watch against domestic and foreign enemies, and to defend the flock from wolves; "To let the oppressed go free, and to break every yoke," (Isa. 58:6,) "To break the jaws of the wicked, and pluck the spoil out of his teeth," (Job. 29:17.) Now if these judges turn lions and ravening wolves, to prey upon the flock, and join with the king, as always they did when the king was an oppressor, "his princes made him glad with their lies," and joined with him, and the people with both, (Jer. 1:18; 5:1; 9:1; Mic. 7:1; Ezek. 22:24–31; Jer. 15:1–3,) it is no wonder if the prophets condemn and cry out against the hugest and most bloody crime of positive oppression, formally and expressly, and in that their negative murders, in not relieving the oppressed, must also be cried out against. 13. The whole land cannot formally be accused for non-resistance when the whole land are oppressors, for then they should be accused for not resisting themselves. 14. The king ought to resist the inferior judges in their oppression of the people, by the confession of royalists, then this argument cometh with the like force of strength on themselves. Let them show us practice, precept, or promise in the Word, where the king raised an army for defence of religion, against princes and people who were subverting religion, and we shall make use of that same place of Scripture to prove that the estates and people, who are above the king, (as I have proved,) and made the king, may, and ought to resist the king, with the like force of scriptural truth in the like case. 15. Royalists desire the like precedent of practice and precept for defensive wars; but, I answer, let them show us a practice where any king of Israel or Judah raised an army of malignants, of Philistines, Sidonians, or Ammonites, against the princes of Israel and Judah, convened in an assembly to take course for bringing home the captived ark of God, and vindicating the laws of the land, and raised an army contrary to the knowledge of the elders, princes, and judges, to set up Dagon, or tolerate the worship of the Sidonian gods; and yet princes, elders, judges, and the whole people, were obliged all to flee out of God's, land or then only to weep and request that the king would not destroy souls and bodies of them and their innocent posterities, because they could not, in conscience, embrace the worship of Dagon and the Sidonian gods. When the royalists can parallel this with a precedent, we can answer, There was as small apparency of precedency in Scripture, (except you flee to the law of nature,) that eighty priests, the subjects of king Uzziah, should put in execution a penal law against the Lord's anointed, and that the inferiors and subjects should resist the superior, and that these priests, with the princes of the land, should remove the king from actual government, all his days, and crown his son, at least make the father, their prince and superior, (as royalist say,) as good as a cypher? Is not this a punishment inflicted by inferiors upon a superior, according to the way of royalists? Now it is clear, a worshipping of bread and the mass commanded, and against law obtruded upon Scotland, by influence of the counsel of known papists, is to us, and in itself, as abominable as the worshipping of Dagon or the Sidonian gods; and when the kingdom of Scotland did but convene, supplicate, and protest against that obtruded idolatry, they were first declared rebels by the king, and then an army raised against them by prelates and malignants, inspired with the spirit of antichrist, to destroy the whole land, if they should not submit, soul and conscience, to that wicked service.
以利亚不仅逃离了，而且对与他们一起参与偶像崇拜的国王和骑士们发出了愤怒的谴责；当上帝给予机会时，他显现出来，激励人民杀死巴力的耶稣会士和引诱人们崇拜偶像的人，当偶像崇拜的国王拒绝这样做时；以利亚并没有亲自动手，而是以色列全体人民聚集在一起（列王记上 18:19），王子和法官们逮捕了他们（第 40 节），这是一种授权，当国王拒绝对武装的天主教徒采取正义之剑时，其他法官应该这样做。2. 耶利米明确禁止与尼布甲尼撒争斗，向我们展示了不对抗血腥的天主教徒和爱尔兰刺客的类似情况；因为如果这个例子对我们有约束力的话，那么我们的国王也不应该动员他的臣民对抗西班牙的无敌舰队和外国王子；因为在尼布甲尼撒征服犹大国之前（耶利米书 27:1），在约雅敬王统治的开始（耶利米书 36 和 37），犹大王从上帝那里得到命令，不要对巴比伦王动刀剑。 我希望这不会让我们和我们的国王不去对抗外国王子，或者对抗伟大的土耳其，如果他们不公正地侵略我们和我们的国王；这个例子是反对国王抵抗不公正侵略他的外国王子，也同样反对我们，因为尼布甲尼撒是一个暴虐的侵略者，犹大王是上主的受膏者。3.人民也与玛拿西同谋，就像与亚哈同谋一样。（耶 15:4）。4.关于皇帝迫害基督徒的事情，我们马上就会听到。5.申命记 13 章，没有人被排除在外，通过借代法，最亲近的人被表达出来，“儿子，女儿，兄弟，像你自己的灵魂一样的朋友”；因此也包括父亲；“丈夫要爱妻子”（以弗所书 5:25）；然而要无情地对待他们（申命记 13:8, 9）；父亲要爱儿子，但如果儿子以上主的名义假预言，要杀他。（撒迦利亚书 13:3）。因此，可以命令对国王的爱、敬畏、尊敬，以及防御性战争。6.基督逃离了希律，所有他的行动和受难都是奥秘和教导，贫穷的主教如此说。 基督亲吻了那个他知道要背叛他的人；基督没有逃跑，而是知道他的敌人何时何地将要逮捕他，自愿前往那个地方；因此我们不应该逃跑。他的行动是如此神秘，以至于约翰·P·P·为了效仿基督的四十天禁食，在四旬斋期间将戒绝肉食，主教必须在海上行走并行奇迹，如果基督的一切行动都是我们的指示。7.他本可以用超过十二军团的天使来保护自己，但他不愿意，不是因为抵抗是不合法的——在经文中没有这样的影子——而是因为这是上帝的旨意，他应该喝他父亲给他的杯子，并且拿起剑而没有上帝的许可，会使篡位者与剑一同灭亡。彼得知道上帝启示基督必须受苦（马太福音 26:52, 53; 16:21-23），上帝明确命令基督为罪人而死（约翰福音 10:24），这可以很好地限制合法的自我保护行为，即此时此刻，以及基督在另一个时候合法使用的行为。（路加福音 4:29, 30; 约翰福音 11:7, 8）。我们没有提出新的信条；但这个背教者已经抛弃了他的旧信条，以及他受洗时所属的苏格兰教会的宗教。我们也没有从信条中删除基督下降地狱和圣徒的交通，正如这个背教者所说的那样；但我们否认天主教关于基督的地狱下降、教会权力高于圣经、以及圣徒为我们代祷和祈祷的观点；而这位主教，尽管他曾宣誓信奉苏格兰教会的教义，却在爱丁堡的讲坛上明确宣讲了所有这些，以及许多其他天主教的观点。10. 我们相信基督在本丢彼拉多的统治下受难，但否认彼拉多有任何合法权力定罪基督——他只有一种准许性的权力，就像魔鬼在上帝的准许下拥有的权力一样——我们完全否认。11. 主教说，为了我们自然自卫的罪过，他决定以眼泪来解决；因为我认为他的主教职位，他过去常常以酒杯来解决（在主日喝醉后，他和其他主教参加主餐，而他们所在的房间里充满呕吐物），被夺走了。12. 先知们谴责一切罪恶，但从未谴责不抵抗的罪过；然而他们有非常暴虐和崇拜偶像的国王。这只是一个薄弱的论据。1. 先知们并没有对所有罪恶大声疾呼——他们并没有明确谴责拐卖人口和杀害父母的罪行，然而他们通过推论谴责了所有这些罪恶；当他们大声疾呼时，他们也通过推论谴责了战争中的不抵抗，（耶利米书 5:31）：“先知们说假预言，祭司们借此掌权，我的百姓喜爱这样。” 当他们抱怨（以西结书 22:26-28）：“先知和祭司违反律法，她的首领如同咆哮的狼，以流血为食，欺压人民，抢夺财物，欺负穷人。” 当他们说（耶利米书 22:2，不仅对国王，而且对他的仆人和进入城门的人说：“行公义，施行公平，救被抢夺的脱离欺压人的手。”我请问，谁是欺压者？我回答，是那些杀人的法官。（以赛亚书 1:21）“至于我的百姓，孩童欺压他们，妇女统治他们，”（以赛亚书 3:12）还有（第 14、15 节），“百姓的长者欺压穷人的面孔。”当他们在地上不为真理勇敢时；（箴言 24:11）主要按照他们的行为报应这些人，他们不帮助那些被拉到死亡边缘的人，那些即将被杀害的人；如果他们推卸责任，说：“看哪，我们不知道，那么权衡人心的不是他吗？”因此，当主的先知抱怨人民不行公义，不救助被压迫的人，不帮助和拯救那些被国王或杀人的法官不公正地拉到死亡边缘的人时，他们明确地对非抵抗的罪行大声疾呼。 先知们不能明确而正式地对法官因不抵抗国王而大声疾呼，因为他们与国王一起，如同贪婪的狼一样，参与了这些压迫行为，就像法官不能正式地组织二十四个人，派出去保护旅行者免受强盗的袭击，如果这些人与强盗结伙，抢劫旅行者，并像强盗一样成为杀人凶手，他不能指责他们因未能保护无辜的旅行者而犯下的过失，而是因为更严重的罪行，他们不仅忽略了他们的职责，没有拯救被恶人压迫的人，而且还抢劫和谋杀；因此，较小的罪被较大的罪吞噬了。副法官是看守者，是上帝的教会的保护者；如果国王变成了胸怀强盗，他们的任务是（耶 22:3）“救被抢夺的脱离压迫者的手”，对抗国内外的敌人，并保护羊群免受狼的伤害；“释放受压迫的人，打破每根轭”（以赛亚书 58:6），“打破恶人的颚骨，从他的牙齿中夺回所抢夺的”（约伯记 29:17）。现在，如果这些法官变成狮子和凶猛的狼，掠夺群羊，并与国王联合，就像国王是压迫者时他们总是这样做的，“他的王子们用谎言使他高兴”，与他一起，人民也与他们一起（耶 1:18；5:1；9:1；弥 7:1；结 22:24-31；耶 15:1-3），那么当先知们对最大和最血腥的积极压迫罪行进行谴责和呼喊时，也就不足为奇了，而且他们对那些不救助被压迫者的消极谋杀也必须加以谴责。13. 当整个土地都是压迫者时，就不能正式指责整个土地不抵抗，因为那样的话他们应该被指责为不抵抗自己。14. 国王应该抵制下级法官对人民的压迫，这是皇室主义者的承认，那么这个论点对他们自己也同样有力。 让他们在圣经中展示给我们实践、规范或承诺，国王为了捍卫宗教而组建军队，对抗颠覆宗教的王子和人民，我们将利用同样的经文来证明，那些高于国王的贵族和人民（正如我已经证明的），可以并且应该在类似情况下以同样的圣经真理的力量来抵抗国王。15. 王党派希望有类似的先例来支持防御战争的做法和规定；但是，我回答说，让他们向我们展示一个以色列或犹大的国王曾经组织过一个由恶棍、非利士人、西顿人或亚扪人组成的军队，对抗以色列和犹大的王子们，召集在一起商议如何将被掳走的上帝约柜带回家，并维护国家的法律，并且在长老、王子和法官的知情之外组建了一支军队，来崇拜大衮，或容忍西顿神的崇拜；然而，王子、长老、法官和全体人民都被迫逃离上帝的土地，或者只能哭泣并请求国王不要毁灭他们和他们无辜后代的灵魂和身体，因为他们无法在良心上接受崇拜大衮和西顿神。 当王党派能够将此与先例相提并论时，我们可以回答，圣经中几乎没有明显的先例（除非你诉诸自然法），即乌西雅王的臣民中的八十名祭司应该执行一项针对上帝的受膏者的惩罚法律，而下级和臣民应该抵抗上级，并且这些祭司与国家的王子们应该在他的一生中将国王从实际统治中罢免，并加冕他的儿子，至少使父亲，他们的王子和上级（正如王党派所说），成为一个零？这不就是下级按照王党派的方式对上级施加的惩罚吗？ Now it is clear, a worshipping of bread and the mass commanded, and against law obtruded upon Scotland, by influence of the counsel of known papists, is to us, and in itself, as abominable as the worshipping of Dagon or the Sidonian gods; and when the kingdom of Scotland did but convene, supplicate, and protest against that obtruded idolatry, they were first declared rebels by the king, and then an army raised against them by prelates and malignants, inspired with the spirit of antichrist, to destroy the whole land, if they should not submit, soul and conscience, to that wicked service.

QUESTION XXXV
问题 XXXV

WHETHER OR NO THE SUFFERINGS OF THE MARTYRS IN THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH MILITATE AGAINST THE LAWFULNESS OF DEFENSIVE WARS
无论原始教会的殉道者的苦难是否对防御战的合法性产生影响

Obj. 1.—Royalists think they burden our cause much with hatred, when they bring the fathers and ancient martyrs against us; so the P. Prelate (p. 74–76,) extracted out of other authors testimonies for this, and from I. Armagh, in a sermon on Rom. 13 (p. 20, 21); so the doctors of Aberdeen. The Prelate proveth from Clem. Alexand. (l. 7, c. 17) that the king is constituted by the Lord; so Ignatius.
目标 1：王党认为当他们拿父辈和古代殉道者来对付我们时，他们给我们的事业带来了很多仇恨；所以教区主教（第 74-76 页）从其他作者的证词中提取了这一点，并从亚美尼亚的伊格纳修斯在罗马书 13 章的讲道中（第 20-21 页）提取了这一点；亚伯丁的医生们也是如此。教区主教从克莱门特·亚历山大（第 7 卷，第 17 章）证明了国王是由主所任命的；伊格纳修斯也是如此。

Ans. 1.—Except he prove from these fathers that the king is from God only and immediately, he proveth nothing.
除非他能从这些父亲那里证明国王只是直接来自上帝，否则他证明不了任何事情。

Obj. 2.—Iren. (I. 5, adv. hær. c. 20).—proveth that God giveth kingdoms, and that the devil lied, Luke 4; and we make the people to make kings, and so to be the children of the devil.
Obj. 2. - 伊雷尼乌斯（I. 5, adv. hær. c. 20）证明上帝赐予王国，魔鬼撒谎，路加福音 4 章；我们使人民成为国王，从而成为魔鬼的子民。

Ans.—If we denied God to dispose of kingdoms, this man might allege the church of God in England and Scotland to be the sons of Satan; but God's word, in Deut. 17:18, and many other places, makes the people to make kings, and yet not devils. But to say that prelates should crown kings, and with their foul fingers anoint him, and that as the Pope's substitute, is to make him that is the son of perdition a donor of kingdoms; also to make a man, with his bloody sword, to ascend to a throne, is to deny God to be the disposer of kingdoms; and prelates teach both these.
答案：如果我们否认上帝支配王国的权力，这个人可能会声称英格兰和苏格兰的上帝教堂是撒旦的子民；但上帝的话语，在申命记 17:18 和其他许多地方，让人民来立王，但并非魔鬼。但说主教应该加冕国王，并用他们那肮脏的手指膏抹他，而且还是作为教皇的代理人，这就是让那个灭亡之子成为王国的赠予者；还有让一个人带着他血腥的剑登上王位，这就是否认上帝是王国的安排者；而主教教导这两者。

Obj. 3.—Tertul. (Apol. c. 30).—Inde est imperator, unde et homo, antequam imperator, inde potestas illi, unde et spiritus, God is no less the creator of sovereignty than of the soul of man.
神不仅是人的灵魂的创造者，也是统治权的创造者。

Ans.—God only maketh kings by his absolute sovereignty, as he only maketh high and low, and so only he maketh mayors, provosts, bailiffs, for there is no power but of him, (Rom 13,) therefore provosts and bailiffs are not from men. The reader shall not be troubled with the rest of the testimonies of this poor plagiary, for they prove what never man denied but prelates and royalists, to wit, that kings are not from God's approving and regulating will, which they oppose, when they say, Sole conquest is a just title to the crown.
答案：上帝仅凭他的绝对主权才能造就国王，就像他只能造就高低之人，也只有他才能造就市长、警长，因为除他以外没有其他权力（罗马书 13 章）。因此，市长和警长并非来自人类。读者不必为这个可怜的剽窃者的其他证词而烦恼，因为它们证明了没有人否认的事实，只有教长和皇室主义者才反对，即国王不是来自上帝的批准和调节意愿，而他们却说，唯一的征服是合法的王位。

But they deserve rather an answer which Grotius, Barclay, Arnisæus, and Spalato, allege, as,—
但他们更应该得到一个回答，格罗蒂乌斯、巴克利、阿尼塞乌斯和斯帕拉托提出的回答，如下所述，

Obj. 1—Cyprian (epist. 1).—Non est fas Christianis, armis, ac vi tueri se adversus impetum persecutorum, Christians cannot, by violence, defend themselves against persecutors.
基督徒不可以使用武力来抵御迫害者的攻击。

Ans.—If these words be pressed literally, it were not lawful to defend ourselves against murderers; but Cyprian is expressly condemning in that place the seditious tumults of people against the lawful magistrate.
答：如果这些话被字面理解，那么我们就不能合法地保护自己免受谋杀者的攻击；但是赛普里安在那个地方明确谴责了人民对合法政府的叛乱骚乱。

Obj. 2.—The ancients say he was justly punished who did rend and tear the edict of Dioclesian and Maximums (Euseb. I. 7, Hist. Eceles. c. 5).
古人说，那些撕毁和破坏了戴克里先和马克西姆斯的法令的人受到了应有的惩罚。

Ans.—To rend an edict is no act of natural self-defence, but a breach of a positive commandment of the emperor's, and could not be lawfully done, especially by a private man.
答：撕毁一道法令并不是自然自卫的行为，而是违反了皇帝的明确命令，尤其是由私人进行这样的行为是不合法的。

Obj. 3.—Cyprian (epist. 56) Incumbamus gemitibus assiduis et deprecationibus crebris, hæc enim sunt munimenta spiritualia et tela divina quæ protegunt; and Ruffinus, (l. 2, c. 6,) Ambrosius adversus reginæ (Justinæ Arinæ) furorem non se manu defensabat aut telo, sed jejuniis continuatisque vigiliis sub altari positus.
我们不断地用哀叹和频繁的祈祷来保护自己，因为这些是属灵的保护和神圣的武器；而安博罗修斯则不是用手或武器来抵御贵妃（贾斯汀娜·阿里娜）的狂怒，而是以持续的禁食和守夜来保护自己，他躺在祭坛下面。

Ans.—It is true, Cyprian reputed prayers his armour, but not his only armour. Though Ambrose, de facto, used no other against Justina, the places say nothing against the lawfulness of self-defence. Ambrose speaketh of that armour and these means of defence that are proper to pastors, and these are prayers and tears, not the sword; because pastors carry the ark, that is their charge, not the sword, that is the magistrate's place.
答案：是的，西普里安被认为是祈祷是他的盔甲，但不是他唯一的盔甲。虽然安布罗斯事实上在与朱斯蒂娜对抗时没有使用其他武器，但这些地方并没有对自卫的合法性提出异议。安布罗斯谈到的是牧师所特有的那种盔甲和防御手段，而这些手段是祈祷和眼泪，而不是剑；因为牧师承载的是方舟，那是他们的职责，而不是剑，那是执法者的职责。

Obj. 4.—Tertullian (apolog. c. 37) saith expressly, that the Christians might, for strength and number, have defended themselves against their persecutors, but thought it unlawful. Quando vel una nox pauculis faculis largitatem ultionis poss et operari, si malum malo dispungi penes nos liceret, sed absit ut igni humano vindicetur divina secta, aut doleat pati, in quo probetur. Si enim hostes extraneos, non tantum vindices occultos agere vellemus, deesset nobis vis numerorum et copiarum?
第四点。特尔图利安（辩护书第 37 章）明确表示，基督徒可以因为实力和人数而抵抗迫害者，但他们认为这是不合法的。当我们有足够的力量和人数来对抗敌人时，如果我们被允许用恶报恶，我们可以在一夜之间用火炬来进行报复，但绝不允许用人的火焰来惩罚神圣的信仰，或者为了证明我们能够忍受而感到痛苦。因为如果我们只是想对付外敌，而不是暗中寻求报复，我们就不会缺乏人数和力量了。

Ans.—I will not go about to say that Tertullian thought it lawful to raise arms against the emperor: I ingenuously confess Tertullian was in that error. But, 1. something of the man; 2. Of the Christians. 1. Of the man—Tertullian after this turned a Montanist. 2. Pamelius saith of him, in vit. Tertul. inter Apocrypha numeratur—excommunicatus. 3. It was Tertullian's error in a fact, not in a question, that he believed Christians were so numerous as that they might have fought with the emperors. 4. M. Pryn doth judiciously observe, (part 3, Sovereign Power of Parl. p. 139, 140,) he not only thought it unlawful to resist, but also to flee, and therefore wrote a book de fuga; and therefore as some men are excessive in doing for Christ, so also in suffering for Christ. Hence I infer, that Tertullian is neither ours nor theirs in this point; and we can cite Tertullian against them also, Jam sumus ergo pares; yea, Fox, in his Monum., saith, "Christians ran to the stakes to be burnt, when they were neither condemned nor cited." 5. What if we cite Theodoret, (fol. 98. De provid.) "Who, about that time, say that evil men reign ἀρχομένων ἀνανδρία, through the cowardliness of the subjects;" as the Prelate saith of Tertullian, I turn it, If Theodoret were now living he would go for a rebel. 1. About that time Christians sought help from Constantine the Great against Lycinius their emperor, and overthrew him in battle; and the Christians, being oppressed by the king of Persia their own King, sent to Theodosius to help them against him. 2. For the man, Tertullian, in the place cited, saith, "The Christians were strangers under the emperor," externi sumus, and therefore they had no laws of their own, but were under the civil laws of heathen till Constantine's time; and they had sworn to Julian, as his soldiers, and therefore might have, and no doubt had, scruples of conscience to resist the emperor. 3. It is known Julian had huge numbers of heathen in his army, and to resist had been great danger. 4. Wanting leaders and commanders, (many prime men doubting of the lawfulness thereof,) though they had been equal in number, yet number is not all in war, skill in valorous commanders is required. 5. What if all Christians were not of Tertullian's mind. 6. If I would go to human testimonies, which I judge not satisfactory to the conscience, I might cite many: the practice of France, of Holland, the divines in Luther's time, (Sleidan. 8, c. 8, 22,) resolved resistance to be lawful; Calvin, Beza, Pareus, the German divines, Buchanan, and an host might be produced.
答案：我不会说特尔图利安认为反抗皇帝是合法的：我坦率地承认特尔图利安在这一点上是错误的。但是，1.关于这个人；2.关于基督徒。1.关于这个人——特尔图利安后来成为了蒙太奇派。2.帕梅利乌斯在他的传记中说，特尔图利安被列为伪经之一——被逐出教会。3.特尔图利安的错误在于事实，而不是问题，他相信基督徒的人数如此之多，以至于他们可以与皇帝作战。4.普林先生明智地观察到（第三部分，议会的主权，第 139、140 页），他不仅认为抵抗是不合法的，逃跑也是不合法的，因此写了一本关于逃跑的书；因此，正如有些人在为基督而行事上过度一样，他们在为基督而受苦上也是如此。因此，我推断特尔图利安在这一点上既不是我们的，也不是他们的；我们也可以引用特尔图利安反对他们，正如福克斯在他的纪念碑中所说：“基督徒在没有被判决或传唤的情况下，跑到火刑柱前去被烧。”5.如果我们引用西奥多雷特（第 98 页，关于神的预知）。在那个时候，有人说邪恶的人通过臣民的懦弱统治，正如主教所说的关于特尔图利安的话，我改变了它，如果西奥多雷特现在还活着，他会成为一个叛徒。1. 在那个时候，基督徒向君士坦丁大帝寻求帮助，反对他们的皇帝利西尼乌斯，并在战斗中推翻了他；基督徒受到波斯国王的压迫，他们自己的国王，向西奥多修斯求助来对抗他。2. 特尔图利安在引用的地方说：“基督徒在皇帝统治下是外国人”，因此他们没有自己的法律，而是在君士坦丁时代之前受到异教徒的民法支配；他们曾向朱利安宣誓效忠，作为他的士兵，因此可能有，毫无疑问地有，抵抗皇帝的良心疑虑。3. 众所周知，朱利安的军队中有大量的异教徒，抵抗将带来巨大的危险。4. 缺乏领导者和指挥官（许多主要人物对此的合法性表示怀疑），即使他们在数量上相等，但在战争中，需要有勇敢指挥官的技能。5. 如果不是所有基督徒都同意特尔图利安的观点呢？6. 如果我要依赖人类的证词，我认为这对良心来说并不令人满意，我可以引用很多例子：法国和荷兰的做法，路德时代的神学家们（斯莱丹书 8，第 8 章，第 22 节）认为抵抗是合法的；加尔文、贝扎、帕鲁斯、德国的神学家们、布坎南等等，可以列举出一大批人。

QUESTION XXXVI
问题 XXXVI

WHETHER THE POWER OF WAR BE ONLY IN THE KING
战争的权力是否仅属于国王

It is not hard to determine this question. The sword in a constitute commonwealth is given to the judge supreme or subordinate; (Rom. 13:4;) "He beareth not the sword in vain" in the empire. The use of armour is restricted to the emperor by a positive law; so the law saith, Armorum officia nisi jussu principis sunt interdicta, (lib. de Cod. de Lege. 1.) Imperat Valentinian nulli, nobis inconsultis, usus armorum tribuatur, (ad 1. Jul. Mai. l. 3.) War is a species and a particular, the sword is a general.
这个问题并不难确定。在一个组成的共和国中，剑被赋予最高或次要的法官；（罗马书 13:4）“他不是徒然地拿着剑”在帝国中。使用盔甲是受到正面法律的限制，所以法律说，除非皇帝命令，否则禁止使用盔甲，（《法典》第一卷）瓦伦提尼安皇帝命令，未经我们同意，不得使用盔甲，（《朱利安·麦尔斯》第三卷）。战争是一种特殊的种类，剑是一种普遍的。

Assert.—1. The power of the sword, by God's law, is not proper and peculiar to the king only, but given by God to the inferior judges. 1. Because the inferior judge is essentially a judge no less than the king, as is proved, therefore he must bear the sword. (Rom. 13:4.) 2. Not Moses only, but the congregation of Israel, had power of life and death, and so of the sword; Num. 35:12, the man-slayer shall not die, "until he stand before the congregation in judgment;" ver. 24, "Then the congregation shall judge between the slayer and the avenger of blood;" Deut. 22:18, "The elders of the city shall take that man and chastise him;" ver. 21, "The men of the city shall stone her with stones;" Deut. 17:5; 19:12, 13, 5:18–21; 21:19, "Then shall his father and his mother bring him to the elders of his city;" ver. 21, "And the men of the city shall stone him with stones;" 1 Kings 21:11, The elders and nobles that were inhabitants in his city stoned Naboth. 3. Inferior judges are condemned as murderers, who have shed innocent blood, (Isa. 1:12; Psal. 94:5, 6; Jer. 22:3; Ezek. 22:12, 27; Hosea 6:8; Zeph. 3:1–3,) therefore, they must have the power of the sword, hence, upon the same grounds.
断言。一、上帝的法律赋予剑的权力不仅仅是国王的专有权力，而是赋予下级法官的权力。1. 因为下级法官与国王一样都是法官，这是被证明的，所以他们必须拿起剑。（罗马书 13:4）2. 不仅仅是摩西，以色列会众也有生死权，也就是剑的权力；民数记 35:12，“凡杀人的，总要等到他站在会众面前受审判。”；民数记 35:24，“会众要在杀人的和报血仇的人中间审判。”；申命记 22:18，“那城的长老就要拿住那人，责打他。”；申命记 22:21，“本城的人就要用石头打死她。”；申命记 17:5；申命记 19:12, 13, 5:18–21；申命记 21:19，“他的父母要把他带到本城的长老那里。”；申命记 21:21，“本城的人就要用石头打死他。”；列王记上 21:11，那城里的长老和贵胄就把拿伯投石打死。3. 那些流无辜血的下级法官被定为谋杀犯（以赛亚书 1:12；诗篇 94:5, 6；耶利米书 22:3；以西结书 22:12, 27；何西阿书 6:8；西番雅书 3:1–3），因此他们必须拥有剑的权力，基于同样的理由。

Assert. 2.—That the king only hath the power of war, and raising armies must be but a positive civil law. For, 1. By divine right, if the inferior judges have the sword given to them of God, then have they also power of war, and raising armies. 2. All power of war that the king hath is cumulative, not privative, and not destructive, but given for the safety of the kingdom; as therefore the king cannot take from one particular man the power of the sword for natural self-preservation, because it is the birthright of life, neither can the king take from a community and kingdom a power of rising in arms for their own defence. If an army of Turks shall suddenly invade the land, and the king's express consent cannot be had, (for it is essentially involved in the office or the king, as king, that all the power of the sword that he hath be for their safety,) or if the king should, as a man, refuse his consent, and interdict and discharge the land to rise in arms, yet they have his royal consent, though they want his personal consent, in respect that his office obligeth him to command them to rise in arms. 3. Because no king, no civil power can take away nature's birthright of self-defence from any man, or a community of men. 4. Because if a king should sell his kingdom, and invite a bloody conqueror to come in with an army of men to destroy his people, impose upon their conscience an idolatrous religion, they may lawfully rise against that army without the king's consent; for, though royalists say, they need not come in asinine patience, and offer their throats to cut-throats, but may flee, yet several things hindereth a flight. 1. They are obliged by virtue of the fifth commandment to remain, and, with their sword, defend the cities of the Lord and the king (2 Sam. 10:12; 1 Chron. 19:13); for if to defend our country and children, and the church of God, from unjust invaders and cut-throats, by the sword, be an act of charity that God and the law of nature requireth of a people, as is evident, (Prov. 24:11,) and if the fifth commandment oblige the land to defend their aged parents and young children from these invaders, and if the sixth commandment lay on us the like bond, all the land are to act works of mercy and charity, though the king unjustly command the contrary, except, royalists say, that we are not to perform the duties of the second table commanded by God, if an earthly king forbid us; and if we exercise not acts of mercy towards our brethren, when their life is in hazard, to save them, we are murderers; and so men may murder their neighbour if the king command them so to do; this is like the court-faith. 2. The king's power of wars is for the safety of his people; if he deny his consent to their raising of arms till they be destroyed, he playeth the tyrant, not the king, and the law of nature will necessitate them either to defend themselves, (seeing flight of all in that case is harder than death,) else they must be guilty of self-murder. Now, the king's commandment of not rising in arms, at best, is positive and against the nature of his office, and it floweth then from him as from a man, and so must be far inferior to the natural commandment of God, which commandeth self-preservation, if we would not be guilty of self-murder, and of obeying men rather than God; so Althusius (Polit. c. 25, n. 9), Halicarnas. (l. 4, Antiq. Rom.), Aristot. (Polit. l. 3, c. 3). 3. David took Goliath's sword and became a captain, a captain to an host of armed men in the battle, and fought the battles of the Lord, (1 Sam. 25:28,) and this Abigail by the spirit of prophecy, as I take it, saith, (ver. 29–31; 1 Sam. 22:2; 1 Chron. 12:1–3; 17:18, 21, 22,) not only without Saul's consent, but against king Saul, as he was a man, but not against him as he was king of Israel. 4. If there be no king, or the king be minor, or an usurper, as Athaliah, be on the throne, the kingdom may lawfully make war without the king, as (Judg. 20) the children of Israel,—four hundred thousand footmen that drew sword, went out to war against the children of Benjamin. Judah had the power of the sword when Josiah was but eight years old, in the beginning of his reign, (2 Kings 22:1, 2,) and before Jehoash was crowned king, and while he was minor, (2 Kings 11,) there were captains of hundreds in arms raised by. Jehoiada, and the people of Judah, to defend the young king. It cannot be said that this is more extraordinary than that it is extraordinary for kings to die, and in the interregnum, wars, in an ordinary providence, may fall out in these kingdoms, where kings go by election; and for kings to fall to be minors, captives, tyrannous. And I shall be of that opinion that Mr Symmons, who holdeth that royal birth is equivalent to divine unction, must also hold, that election is not equivalent to divine unction; for both election and birth cannot be of the same validity, the one being natural, the other a matter of free choice, which shall infer that kings by election are less properly, and analogically only, kings; and so Saul was not properly a king, for he was king by election; but I conceive that rather kings by birth must be less properly kings, because the first king by God's institution, being the mould of all the rest, was by election (Deut. 17:18–20).
断言 2：国王只有战争的权力，而且组建军队只能是一项明确的民法。因为，1.按照神圣权利，如果下级法官被上帝赋予了权力，那么他们也有战争和组建军队的权力。2.国王拥有的战争权力是累积的，而不是排他的，也不是破坏性的，而是为了王国的安全而赋予的；因此，国王不能剥夺一个特定人的自然自保的权力，因为这是生命的天赋权利，国王也不能剥夺一个社区和王国为自卫而组建军队的权力。如果突然有一支土耳其军队入侵这片土地，而国王的明确同意无法获得（因为作为国王，他的职责就是所有他拥有的战争权力都是为了他们的安全），或者如果国王作为一个人拒绝他的同意，并禁止这片土地组建军队，然而他们有他的皇家同意，尽管他们没有他的个人同意，因为他的职责要求他命令他们组建军队。3. 因为没有国王，没有民事权力可以剥夺任何人或一群人的自卫权，这是大自然赋予的权利。因为如果一个国王出售他的王国，并邀请一个血腥的征服者带领一支军队来摧毁他的人民，强迫他们接受偶像崇拜的宗教，他们可以合法地反抗那支军队，而不需要国王的同意；因为，尽管王党派说，他们不需要以愚蠢的耐心等待，把喉咙伸给刽子手，而可以逃跑，但有几件事情阻碍了逃跑。首先，根据第五诫的要求，他们有义务留下来，并用他们的剑保卫上帝和国王的城市（撒母耳记下 10:12；历代志上 19:13）；因为如果用剑保卫我们的国家、孩子和上帝的教会免受不公正的入侵者和刽子手的伤害是上帝和自然法律要求人民行善的行为，这是显而易见的（箴言）。 如果第五条诫命要求土地保护他们年迈的父母和年幼的孩子免受这些入侵者的伤害，如果第六条诫命也对我们有同样的义务，那么整个土地都应该行善行仁，即使国王不公正地下令相反，除非，王党派说，如果世俗国王禁止我们履行上帝所命令的第二表的职责，我们就不应该履行；如果我们在兄弟生命受到威胁时不行善行仁以拯救他们，我们就是凶手；所以如果国王命令他们这样做，人们也可以谋杀他们的邻居；这就像是宫廷信仰。2. 国王的战争权力是为了保护他的人民；如果他拒绝同意他们举起武器直到他们被摧毁，他是暴君，而不是国王，自然法则将迫使他们要么自卫（因为在那种情况下逃跑比死亡更困难），否则他们必须对自杀负责。 现在，国王的命令不兴起武装，最好是积极的，违背了他的职责的本质，它从他那里流出来，就像从一个人那里流出来一样，因此必然远远不及上帝的自然命令，这个命令是为了自我保护，如果我们不想犯自杀罪，不想顺从人而不是上帝；所以阿尔图修斯（Polit. c. 25, n. 9），哈利卡纳斯（l. 4, Antiq. Rom.），亚里士多德（Polit. l. 3, c. 3）都这样说。3. 大卫拿起歌利亚的剑，成为一个军队的队长，在战斗中与武装人员作战，为上帝争战（撒母耳记上 25:28），我认为这是亚比该凭借先知的灵感所说的（第 29-31 节；撒母耳记上 22:2；历代志上 12:1-3；17:18, 21, 22），不仅没有得到扫罗的同意，而且违背了他作为一个人的意愿，但并没有违背他作为以色列国王的意愿。4. 如果没有国王，或者国王是未成年人，或者是篡位者，如亚他利雅，坐在王位上，王国可以合法地在没有国王的情况下发动战争，就像以色列的子民（士师记 20）一样——四十万拿刀的步兵出征对抗便雅悯人。 当约西亚年仅八岁，在他执政初期，犹大拥有剑的力量（列王记下 22:1,2），在耶户亚施加冠为王之前，而他还是未成年（列王记下 11），犹大人民和耶何耶大举起了百人队长的武装，以保护年幼的国王。不能说这比国王去世更为特殊，而在这些国家中，国王通过选举产生，根据普通的神意，这些国家可能发生战争，国王可能成为未成年人、俘虏或暴君。 我认为，持有皇室出身等同于神圣膏抹的西蒙斯先生，也必须认为选举不等同于神圣膏抹；因为选举和出生不能具有相同的有效性，前者是自然的，后者是自由选择的事情，这将导致通过选举成为国王的人更不恰当，只能说是类似国王；所以扫罗并不是真正的国王，因为他是通过选举成为国王的；但我认为，通过出生成为国王的人更不恰当，因为上帝设立的第一位国王，作为其他所有国王的模范，是通过选举产生的（申命记 17:18-20）。

5. If the estates create the king, and make this man king, not that man, (as is clear from Deut. 17:18, and 2 Chron. 5:1–4,) they give to him the power of the sword, and the power of war, and the militia; and I shall judge it strange and reasonless, that the power given to the king, by the parliament or estates of a free kingdom, (such as Scotland is acknowledgeth by all to be,) should create, regulate, limit, abridge, yea, and annul that power that created itself. Hath God ordained a parliamentary power to create a royal power of the sword and war, to be placed in the king, the parliament's creature, for the safety of parliament and kingdom, which yet is destructive of itself? Dr Ferne saith that "the king summoneth a parliament, and giveth them power to be a parliament, and to advise and counsel him;" and, in the meantime, Scripture saith (Deut. 17:18–20; 1 Sam. 10:20–25; 2 Sam. 5:1–4) that the parliament createth the king. Here is admirable reciprocation of creation in policy! Shall God make the mother to destroy the daughter? The parliamentary power that giveth crown, militia, sword, and all to the king, must give power to the king to use sword and war for the destruction of the kingdom, and to annul all the power of parliaments, to make, unmake parliaments, and all parliamentary power, what more absurd?
如果贵族创造了国王，并选择了这个人作为国王，而不是那个人（正如《申命记》17:18 和《历代志》5:1-4 所清楚表明的），他们就赋予了他剑的权力、战争的权力和军队；我认为，国会或自由王国的贵族（正如众所周知的苏格兰）赋予国王的权力，创造、调节、限制、缩减甚至废除创造它自己的权力，这是奇怪而没有道理的。上帝是否命定了议会权力来创造国王的剑和战争的权力，放在国王身上，作为议会和王国的安全，然而这却是自我毁灭的？费恩博士说，“国王召集议会，并赋予他们成为议会的权力，并给予他们建议和劝告的权力”；与此同时，圣经却说（《申命记》17:18-20；撒母耳记上 10:20-25；撒母耳记下 5:1-4），是议会创造了国王。这里有一个令人惊叹的政策创造的相互作用！难道上帝会让母亲毁灭女儿吗？ 赋予国王王冠、民兵、剑和一切权力的议会权力，必须赋予国王使用剑和战争来摧毁王国的权力，并废除所有议会的权力，制定、废除议会和一切议会权力，还有什么更荒谬的呢？

Obj. 1.—(Symmons, p. 57). These phrases, (1 Sam. 9:1,) "When kings go forth to war," and (Luke 14:31) "What king going forth to war," speak to my conscience, that both offensive and defensive war are in the king's hand.
当国王出征时，无论是攻击性战争还是防御性战争，都掌握在国王手中。

Ans.—It is not much to other men what is spoken to any man's conscience by phrase and customs; for by this no states, where there be no kings, but government by the best, or the people, as in Holland, or in other nations, can have power of war; for what time of year shall kings go to war who are not kings? and because Christ saith, "A certain householder delivered talents to his servants," will this infer to any conscience, that none but a householder may take usury? And when he saith, "If the good man of the house knew at what hour the thief would come, he would watch;" shall it follow the son or servant may not watch the house, but only the good man?
答案：对其他人来说，通过言辞和习俗对任何人的良心说了什么并不重要；因为这样做并不能使没有国王的国家，如荷兰或其他国家，拥有战争的权力；因为没有国王的国家在什么时候会发动战争呢？而且，基督说：“有一个家主把银子交给他的仆人”，这是否意味着只有家主才能收取利息呢？当他说：“如果家主知道贼什么时候来，他就会守望”时，这是否意味着儿子或仆人不能守望家，只有好人才能守望呢？

Obj. 2.—(Ferne, p. 95.) The natural body cannot move but upon natural principles; and so neither can the politic body move in war, but upon politic reasons from the prince, which must direct by law.
目标 2. -（费尔恩，第 95 页）自然身体只能根据自然原则移动；因此，政治身体在战争中也只能根据君主的政治理由移动，君主必须依法指导。

Ans. 1.—This may well be retorted, the politic head cannot then move but upon politic reasons; and so the king cannot move to wars but by the law, and that is by consent of Parliament; and no law can principle the head to destroy the members. 2. If an army of cut-throats rise to destroy the kingdom, because the king is behind in his place in doing his duty, how can the other judges, the states and parliament, be accessory to murder committed by them in not raising armies to suppress such robbers? Shall the inferior judges be guilty of innocent blood because the king will not do his duty? 3. The politic body ceaseth no more to renounce the principles of sinless nature in self-defence, because it is a politic body, and subject to a king, than it can leave off to sleep, eat, and drink; and there is more need of politic principles to the one than the other. 4. The parliaments and estates of both kingdoms move in these wars by the king's laws, and are a formal politic body in themselves.
答案 1：这可以反驳说，政治头脑只能出于政治原因而行动；因此，国王只能通过法律而不是单方面行动发动战争，而法律是经过议会同意的；没有法律可以使国王毁灭成员。2. 如果一支刺客军队起来摧毁王国，因为国王没有履行他的职责，其他法官、国家和议会如何成为他们犯下的谋杀的共犯，因为他们没有组织军队来镇压这些强盗？难道下级法官要为无辜的血债负罪，因为国王不履行他的职责？3. 政治机构不因为是政治机构且受国王统治而放弃无罪本性的原则来自卫，就像它不能停止睡觉、吃饭和喝水一样；对于前者，比后者更需要政治原则。4. 两国的议会和贵族阶层在这些战争中按照国王的法律行动，它们本身就是一个正式的政治机构。

Obj. 2.—The ground of the present wars against the king, saith Dr Ferne, (sect. 4, p. 13,) is false, to wit, that the parliament is co-ordinate with the king; but so the king shall not be supreme, the parliament's consent is required to an act of supremacy, but not to a denial of that act. And there can no more (saith Arnisæus, de jure majestatis, c. 3; in quo consistat essen. majest. c. 3, n. 1; and an jur. majest. separ., &c. c. 2, n. 2) be two equal and co-ordinate supreme powers than there can be two supreme Gods; and multitudo deorum est nullitas deorum, many gods infer no gods.
目前对国王的战争的根据是错误的，即议会与国王是同等的；但是这样国王就不会是至高无上的，议会的同意是对至高无上行为的要求，但不是对否定该行为的要求。正如阿尼塞乌斯所说，没有两个平等和同等的至高无上权力，就像没有两个至高无上的神一样；众神的存在意味着没有神。

Ans. 1.—If we consider the fountain-power, the king is subordinate to the parliament, and not co-ordinate; for the constituent is above that which is constituted. If we regard the derived and executive power in parliamentary acts, they make but a total and complete sovereign power; yet so as the sovereign power of the parliament, being habitually and underived a prime and fountain-power, (for I do not here separate people and parliament,) is perfect without the king, for all parliamentary acts, as is clear, in that the parliament make kings, make laws, and raise armies, when either the king is minor, captived, tyrannous, or dead; but royal power parliamentary without the parliament, is null, because it is essentially but a part of the parliament, and can work nothing separated from the parliament, no more than a hand cut off from the body can write; and so here we see two supremes co-ordinate. Amongst infinite things there cannot be two, because it involveth a contradiction, that an infinite thing can be created, for then it should it be finite; but a royal power is essentially a derived and created power and supreme, secundum quid, only in relation to single men, but not in relation to the community; it is always a creature of the community, with leave of the royalist. 2. It is false, that to an act of parliamentary supremacy the consent of the king is required, for it is repugnant that there can be any parliamentary judicial act without the parliament, but there may be without the king. 3. More false it is, that the king hath a negative voice in parliament; then he shall be sole judge, and the parliament, the king's creator and constituent, shall be a cypher.
答案 1.——如果我们考虑到源泉权力，国王是从属于议会的，而不是并列的；因为组成者高于被组成者。如果我们考虑到议会行为中的派生和执行权力，它们构成了一个完整的主权力量；然而，议会的主权力量是习惯性和非派生的原始和源泉权力（因为我在这里没有分开人民和议会），对于所有的议会行为来说，它是完美的，就像明显的那样，议会制定国王，制定法律，组建军队，当国王是未成年、被俘、暴虐或死亡时；但是，没有议会的议会制度的王权是无效的，因为它本质上只是议会的一部分，与议会分离开来无法发挥任何作用，就像从身体上切断的手无法写字一样；所以在这里我们看到了两个并列的最高权力。 在无限的事物中，不可能有两个，因为这涉及到一个矛盾，即一个无限的事物可以被创造，因为那样它就应该是有限的；但是皇权本质上是一种派生和创造的权力，只在于个别人而非整个社群；它始终是社群的产物，在皇权者的许可下。2.声称议会至高无上需要国王的同意是错误的，因为议会的司法行为没有议会是不可能的，但没有国王是可能的。3.更加错误的是，国王在议会中有否决权；那样他将成为唯一的裁判，而议会，国王的创造者和组成部分，将成为一个零。

Obj. 3.—(Arnisæus, de jur. maj. de potest. armorum, c. 5, n. 4.) The people are mad and furious, therefore supreme majesty cannot be secured, and rebels suppressed, and public peace kept, if the power of armour be not in the king's hand only.

Ans. 1.—To denude the people of armour, because they may abuse the prince, is to expose them to violence and oppression, unjustly; for one king may more easily abuse armour than all the people; one man may more easily fail than a community. 2. The safety of the people is far to be preferred before the safety of one man, though he were two emperors, one in the east, another in the west, because the emperor is ordained of God for the good and safety of the people. (1 Tim. 2:2.) 3. There can be no inferior judges to bear the sword, as God requireth, (Rom. 13:4; Deut. 1:15, 16; 2 Chron. 19:6, 7,) and the king must be sole judge, if he only have the sword, and all armour monopolised to himself.
答案 1：剥夺人民的武装，因为他们可能滥用权力，是不公正地使他们暴露于暴力和压迫之中；因为一个国王比所有人更容易滥用武装；一个人比一个社区更容易失败。答案 2：人民的安全远比一个人的安全更重要，即使他是两个皇帝，一个在东方，一个在西方，因为皇帝是上帝为了人民的利益和安全而设立的。（提摩太前书 2:2）答案 3：如果只有国王拥有武器，而所有的武装都垄断在他手中，那么就无法有下级法官来执行上帝的要求（罗马书 13:4；申命记 1:15, 16；历代志下 19:6, 7），国王必须成为唯一的法官。

Obj. 4.—The causes of war, saith Mr Symmons, (sect. 4, p. 9,) should not be made known to the subjects, who are to look more to the lawful call to war from the prince than to the cause of the war.
第四点——西蒙斯先生说，战争的原因（第 4 节，第 9 页）不应该告诉臣民，他们应该更关注来自君主的合法战争召唤，而不是战争的原因。

Ans. 1.—The parliament and all the judges and nobles are subjects to royalists, if they should make war and shed blood upon blind obedience to the king, not inquiring either in causes of law or fact, they must resign their consciences to the king. 2. The king cannot make unlawful war to be lawful by any authority royal, except he could rase out the sixth commandment; therefore subjects must look more to the causes of war than to the authority of the king; and this were a fair way to make parliaments of both kingdoms set up popery by the sword, and root out the reformed religion upon the king's authority, as the lawful call to war, not looking to the causes of war.
答案 1：议会、所有法官和贵族都是皇室的臣民，如果他们出于对国王的盲从而发动战争并流血，不论是在法律还是事实上都不进行调查，他们必须将自己的良知交给国王。2. 国王不能通过任何皇家权威使非法战争合法，除非他能抹去第六戒命；因此，臣民必须更多地关注战争的原因，而不是国王的权威；这将是一个公正的方式，通过战争的合法召唤，使两个王国的议会建立起天主教，并根除改革宗教，而不是关注战争的原因。

QUESTION XXXVII
问题三十七

WHETHER OR NO IT BE LAWFUL THAT THE ESTATES OF SCOTLAND HELP THEIR OPPRESSED BRETHREN, THE PARLIAMENT AND PROTESTANTS IN ENGLAND, AGAINST PAPISTS AND PRELATES NOW IN ARMS AGAINST THEM, AND KILLING THEM, AND ENDEAVOURING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPERY, THOUGH THE KING OF SCOTLAND SHOULD INHIBIT THEM

1. Marianus saith, one is obliged to help his brother, non vinculo efficaci, not with any efficacious band; because in these, (saith he,) non est actio aut pæna, one may not have action of law against his brother, who refused to help him; yet, (saith he) as man he is obliged to man, nexu civilis societatis, by the bond of human society.
马里安努斯说，一个人有义务帮助他的兄弟，但不是通过任何有效的约束；因为在这种情况下，（他说）没有法律行动或惩罚，一个人不能对拒绝帮助他的兄弟提起诉讼；然而，（他说）作为人，他有义务帮助人类社会的成员，通过人类社会的纽带。

2. Others say, one nation may indirectly defend a neighbour nation against a common enemy, because it is a self-defence; and it is presumed that a foreign enemy, having overcome the neighbour nation, shall invade that nation itself who denieth help and succour to the neighbour nation. This is a self-opinion, and to me it looketh not like the spiritual law of God.
其他人说，一个国家可能会间接地为邻国对抗共同敌人进行自卫，因为这是自卫的行为；并且据推测，一个外国敌人在征服了邻国后，将会入侵那个拒绝帮助和援助邻国的国家。这是一种自我观点，对我来说，它看起来不像是上帝的精神法则。

3. Some say it is lawful, but not always expedient, in which opinion there is this much truth, that if the neighbour nation have an evil cause, neque licet, neque expedit, it is neither lawful nor expedient. But what is lawful in the case of necessity so extreme, as is the loss of a brother's life, or of a nation, must be expedient; because necessity of non-sinning maketh any lawful thing expedient. As to help my brother in fire or water, requiring my present and speedy help, though to the loss of my goods, must be as expedient as a negative commandment, Thou shalt not murder.
有人说这是合法的，但并非总是明智的，这种观点有一定的真实性，如果邻国有一个邪恶的原因，那么既不合法也不明智。但在极端的必要情况下，比如失去兄弟的生命或整个国家的生命，合法的事情必须是明智的；因为非犯罪的必要性使任何合法的事情都变得明智。比如在火灾或水中帮助我的兄弟，需要我立即和迅速的帮助，即使损失我的财物，也必须像一个否定的诫命一样明智，即“你不可杀人”。

4. Others think it lawful in the case that my brother seek my help only, otherwise I have no calling thereunto; to which opinion I cannot universally subscribe, it is held, both by reason and the soundest divines, that to rebuke my brother of sin is actus misericordiæ et charitatis, an act of mercy and charity to his soul; yet I hold I am obliged to rebuke him by God's law (Levit. 19:17,) otherwise I hate him. (Thes. 5:14; Col. 4:17; Math. 18:15.) Nor can I think in reason, that my duty of love to my brother doth not oblige me but upon dependency on his free consent; but as I am to help my neighbour's ox out of a ditch, though my neighbour know not, and so I have only his implicit and virtual consent, so is the case here. I so not farther in this case of conscience,—if a neighbour nation be jealous of our help, and in an hostile way should oppose us in helping, (which, blessed be the Lord, the honourable houses of the parliament of England hath not done, though malignant spirits tempted them to such a course,) what, in that case, we should owe to the afflicted members of Christ's body, is a case may be determined easily.
其他人认为，只有在我兄弟寻求我的帮助的情况下，我才有权利这样做，否则我没有召唤之力；对于这种观点，我不能普遍地认同，因为根据理性和最有见地的神学家的观点，责备我兄弟的罪是对他灵魂的怜悯和慈善的行为；然而，我认为我有义务按照上帝的律法责备他（利未记 19:17），否则我就恨他（帖撒罗尼迦前书 5:14；歌罗西书 4:17；马太福音 18:15）。我无法理解，为什么我对兄弟的爱的责任不是基于他的自由同意，而是基于依赖；但是，就像我要帮助邻居的牛从沟里出来一样，即使邻居不知道，我只有他的隐含和虚拟同意，这里也是一样的情况。在这个良心问题上，我不再深入讨论——如果一个邻国对我们的帮助感到嫉妒，并以敌对的方式阻止我们的帮助（感谢主，英国议会的尊贵机构没有这样做，尽管邪恶的灵魂试图引诱他们这样做），在那种情况下，我们应该对基督身体中受苦的肢体负有什么责任，这是一个可以轻松解决的问题。

5. The fifth and last opinion is of those who think, if the king command papists and prelates to rise against the parliament and our brethren in England in wars, that we are obliged in conscience, and by our oath and covenant, to help our native prince against them,—to which opinion, with hands and feet I should accord, if our king's cause were just and lawful; but from this it followeth, that we must thus far judge of the cause, as concerneth our consciences, in the matter of our necessary duty, leaving the judicial cognizance to the honourable parliament of England. But because I cannot return to all these opinions particularly, I see no reason but the civil law of a kingdom doth oblige any citizen to help an innocent man against a murdering robber, and that he may be judicially accused as a murderer, who faileth in his duty, and that Solon said well, Beatam remp. esse illam, in qua quisque injuriam alterius suam estimet, It is a blessed society in which every man is to repute an injury done against a brother, as an injury done against himself. As the Egyptians had a good law, by which he was accused upon his head who helped not one that suffered wrong; and if he was not able to help, he was held to accuse the injurer, if not, his punishment was whips or three days' hunger; it may be upon this ground it was that Moses slew the Egyptian. Ambrose commended him for so doing.
第五个也是最后一个观点是那些认为，如果国王命令天主教徒和主教们起来反对议会和我们在英格兰的兄弟们，那么我们在良心上、根据誓言和盟约的义务下，应该帮助我们的本国王子对抗他们。对于这个观点，如果我们国王的事业是公正合法的，我完全同意。但是从这个观点可以得出结论，我们必须在涉及我们必要职责的事情上，就事业做出这样的判断，将司法审判的权力留给尊贵的英国议会。但是因为我不能详细回答所有这些观点，我认为没有理由不认为一个国家的民法要求任何公民帮助一个无辜的人对抗一个杀人抢劫犯，并且那些未能履行自己职责的人可以被司法起诉为谋杀犯，而且索伦说得很好，一个人应该把对兄弟的伤害视为对自己的伤害，这是一个幸福的社会。 由于埃及人有一条良好的法律，根据这条法律，不帮助受到冤屈的人的人将受到指责；如果他无力帮助，他将被要求指控加害者，否则，他将受到鞭打或三天的饥饿惩罚；也许正是基于这个原因，摩西杀死了埃及人。安布罗斯赞扬了他这样做。

Assert.—We are obliged, by many bands, to expose our lives, goods, children, &c., in this cause of religion and of the unjust oppression of enemies, for the safety and defence of our dear brethren and true religion in England; 1 Prov. 24:11, 12, "If thou forbear to deliver them that are drawn to death, לּקחים לּמוּת (taken as captives to be killed,) and those that are ready to be slain. It thou sayest, Behold we knew it not, doth not he that pondereth the heart consider it? and he that keepeth thy soul, doth he not know it? and shall he not render to every man according to his work?" Mr Jermine is too narrow, who, commenting on the place, restricteth all to these two, that the priest should deliver by interceding for the innocent, and the king by pardoning only. But to deliver is a work of violence, as (1 Sam. 30:18) David by the sword rescued his wives; Hos. 5:14, "I will take away, and none shall rescue;" 1 Sam. 17:35, "I rescued the lambs out of his mouth," out of the lion's mouth, which behoved to be done with great violence; 2 Kings 18:34, "They have not delivered כי הצילו Samaria out of my hand." So Cornel, à Lapide, Charitas suadet, ut vi et armis eruamus injuste ductos ad mortem. Ambrose (lib. 1, offic. c. 36) citeth this same text, and commendeth Moses who killed the Egyptian in defending a Hebrew man. To deliver is an act of charity, and so to be done, though the judge forbid it, when the innocent is unjustly put to death.
断言。我们受到许多束缚，必须为了宗教和敌人的不公压迫而暴露我们的生命、财产、孩子等，为了保护和捍卫我们在英格兰亲爱的兄弟和真正的宗教；箴言 24:11,12，“你若不救被拉到死地的人，不保守将被杀的人，你说：‘这事我们未曾知道’，岂不衡量人心的主岂不明白吗？保守你命的岂不知道吗？他岂不按各人所行的报应吗？”杰尔米恩先生太狭隘了，他在评论这段经文时将所有事情都限制在这两点上，即祭司通过为无辜者代求而解救，国王只通过赦免来解救。但解救是一种暴力行为，就像大卫（撒母耳记上 30:18）用剑救出他的妻子一样；何西阿书 5:14，“我必将他们带去，无人能救”；撒母耳记上 17:35，“我从狮子口中救出羊羔”，这必须用很大的暴力来完成；列王记下 18:34，“他们没有救出撒玛利亚脱离我的手。”所以，Cornel, à Lapide, Charitas suadet, ut vi et armis eruamus injuste ductos ad mortem. Ambrose (lib. 1, offic. c. 36) 引用了同样的经文，并称赞摩西在保护一个希伯来人时杀死了埃及人。解救是一种慈善行为，因此，即使法官禁止，当无辜者被不公正地处死时，也应该这样做。

Obj.—But in so doing, private men may offer violence to the lawful magistrate when he unjustly putteth an innocent man to death, and rescue him out of the hands of the magistrate; and this were to bring in anarchy and confusion; for if it be an act of charity to deliver the innocent out of the hands of the magistrate, it is homicide to a private man not to do it; for our obedience to the law of nature tyeth us absolutely, though the magistrate forbid these acts; for it is known that I must obey God rather than men.
但是这样做的话，私人可能会对不公正地将无辜者处死的合法执法者施加暴力，并将其从执法者手中解救出来；这将导致无政府和混乱；因为如果将无辜者从执法者手中解救出来是一种慈善行为，那么私人不这样做就是杀人；因为我们对自然法的服从是绝对的，尽管执法者禁止这些行为；因为众所周知，我必须顺从上帝而不是人。

Ans.—1. The law of nature tyeth us to obedience in acts of charity, yet not to perform these acts after any way and manner in a mere natural way, impetu naturæ; but I am to perform acts of natural charity in a rational and prudent way, and in looking to God's law, else, if my brother or father were justly condemned to die, I might violently deliver him out of the magistrate's hand, but, by the contrary, my hand should be first on him, without natural compassion. As, if my brother or my wife have been a blasphemer of God, (Deut. 13:6–8,) therefore, I am to do acts natural, as a wise man observing (as Solomon saith, Eccles. 8:5) "both time and judgment." Now, it were no wisdom for one private man to hazard his own life by attempting to rescue an innocent brother, because he hath not strength to do it, and the law of nature obligeth me not to acts of charity when I, in all reason, see them impossible; but a multitude who had strength did well to rescue innocent Jonathan out of the hands of the king, that he should not be put to death; yet one man was not tyed by the law of nature to rescue Jonathan if the king and prince had condemned him, though unjustly.
答案：1. 自然法律要求我们在慈善行为上服从，但不是以纯粹的自然方式来执行这些行为，即不是凭借本能的冲动。我应该以理性和谨慎的方式进行自然慈善行为，并且要遵守上帝的法律，否则，如果我的兄弟或父亲被正当地判处死刑，我可能会强行将他从执法者手中解救出来，但相反，我应该首先对他动手，而没有任何自然的同情心。例如，如果我的兄弟或妻子亵渎上帝（申命记 13:6-8），因此，我应该像一个明智的人一样进行自然行为，观察（正如所罗门所说，传道书 8:5）"时机和判断"。现在，对于一个普通人来说，冒着生命危险试图解救一个无辜的兄弟是不明智的，因为他没有能力这样做，而且自然法律并没有要求我在合理的情况下进行慈善行为，当我看到这些行为是不可能的时候；但是，一个有力量的群体很好地解救了无辜的约拿单脱离国王的手，使他不被处死；然而，如果国王和王子判决他，即使是不公正的，根据自然法律，一个人也没有义务解救约拿单。

2. The host of men that helped David against king Saul (1 Sam. 22:2) entered in a lawful war, and (1 Chron. 12:18) Amasa, by the Spirit of the Lord, blesseth his helpers,—"Peace, peace be unto thee, and peace be to thy helpers, for thy God helpeth thee." Therefore, peace must be to the parliament of England, and to their helpers, their brethren of Scotland.
2. 帮助大卫对抗扫罗王的人群（撒母耳记上 22:2）参与了一场合法的战争，（历代志上 12:18）亚玛撒蒙上帝的灵祝福他的帮助者，说：“愿你平安，愿你的帮助者平安，因为你的神帮助你。”因此，和平必须降临到英国议会和他们的帮助者，他们的苏格兰兄弟。

3. Numb. 32:1–3, &c.; Josh. 1:12–14, the children of Gad, and of Reuben, and the half tribe of Manasseh, though their inheritance fell to be on this side of Jordan, yet they were to go over the river armed, to fight for their brethren, while they had also possession of the land, at the commandment of Moses and Joshua.

4. So Saul and Israel helped the men of Jabesh-Gilead conjoined in blood with them, against Nahash the Ammonite, and his unjust conditions in plucking out their right eyes, 1 Sam. 11.

5. Jephtha (Judg. 12:2) justly rebuketh the men of Ephraim because they would not help him and his people against the Ammonites.
耶弗他（士师记 12:2）公正地责备以法莲人，因为他们不愿意帮助他和他的人民对抗亚扪人。

6. If the communion of saints be any bond,—that England and we have "one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one head and Saviour, Jesus Christ," then are we obliged to help our bleeding sister-church against these same common enemies, papists and prelates; but the former is undeniably true, for we send help to the Rochelle, if there had not been a secret betraying of our brethren, we send help to the recovery of the palatinate, and the aid of the confederate princes against Babel's strength and power, and that lawfully, but we did it at great leisure and coldly. Queen Elizabeth helped Holland against the king of Spain; and, besides the union in religion, we sail in one ship together, being in one island, under one king; and now, by the mercy of God, have sworn one covenant, and so must stand or fall together.
如果圣徒的交往是一种纽带，即英格兰和我们有着“一个主，一个信仰，一个洗礼，一个头和救主耶稣基督”，那么我们有义务帮助我们受伤的姐妹教会对抗这些共同的敌人，天主教徒和主教；但前者是无可否认的真理，因为我们向罗谢尔提供帮助，如果没有秘密背叛我们的兄弟，我们向巴伐利亚恢复提供帮助，并帮助盟国的王子们对抗巴比伦的力量和权势，这是合法的，但我们做得很从容和冷淡。伊丽莎白女王帮助荷兰对抗西班牙国王；除了宗教上的联合外，我们还一起乘坐同一艘船，在同一个岛屿上，有同一个国王；现在，凭借上帝的怜悯，我们已经发誓立下一个盟约，所以必须共同站立或共同倒下。

7. We are obliged, by the union betwixt the kingdoms, concluded to be by the Convention of the Estates of Scotland, anno 1585, at the desire of the General Assembly, 1583, to join forces together at home, and enter in league with protestant princes and estates abroad, to maintain the protestant religion against the bloody confederacy of Trent; and, accordingly, this league between the two crowns was subscribed at Berwick, 1586, and the same renewed, 1587–8, as also the Confession of Faith subscribed, when the Spanish armada was on our coasts.
我们有义务根据苏格兰议会于 1585 年达成的联盟，根据 1583 年大会的要求，国内联合并与国外的新教君主和贵族结盟，以抵抗特伦特血腥联盟对新教的侵犯；相应地，这两个王国之间的联盟于 1586 年在伯里克签署，并于 1587-8 年进行了更新，同时在西班牙无敌舰队来袭时，也重新签署了信仰宣言。

8. The law of God, commanding that we love our neighbour as ourselves, and therefore to defend one another against unjust violence, (l. ut vim. ff. de just, et jur.,) obligeth us to the same, except we think God can be pleased with lip-love in word only, which the Spirit of God condemneth (1 John 2:9, 10; 3:16). And the sum of law and prophets is, that as we would not men should refuse to help us when we are unjustly oppressed, so neither would we so serve our afflicted brethren, (l. in facto ff. de cond. et demonstr. sect. Si uxor. Justit. de nupt.)
上帝的法律命令我们爱我们的邻居如同爱自己，并且要彼此保护免受不公正的暴力侵害（l. ut vim. ff. de just, et jur.）。除非我们认为上帝只满足于口头上的爱，而这种爱被上帝的灵所谴责（约翰一书 2:9, 10; 3:16）。法律和先知的总结是，正如我们不希望别人在我们受到不公正的压迫时拒绝帮助我们一样，我们也不应该这样对待我们受苦的弟兄姐妹（l. in facto ff. de cond. et demonstr. sect. Si uxor. Justit. de nupt.）。

9. Every man is a keeper of his brother's life. There is a voluntary homicide when a man refuseth food or physic necessary for his own life, and refuseth food to his dying brother; and men are not born for themselves; and when the king defendeth not subjects against their enemies, all fellow-subjects, by the law of nature, of nations, the civil and cannon law, have a natural privilege to defend one another, and are mutual magistrates to one another when there be no other magistrates. If an army of Turks or pagans would come upon Britain, if the king were dead, as he is civilly dead in this juncture of time, when he refuseth to help his subjects, one part of Britain would help another; as Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, did right in helping Ahab and Israel, so the Lord had approved of the war. If the left hand be wounded, and the left eye put out, nature teacheth that the whole burden of natural acts is devolved on the other hand and eye, and so are they obliged to help one another.
每个人都是他兄弟生命的守护者。当一个人拒绝为自己的生命提供必要的食物或药物，并拒绝为垂死的兄弟提供食物时，就会发生自愿杀人。人们不是为自己而生的；当国王不保护臣民免受敌人侵害时，根据自然法、国际法、民法和教会法，所有的同胞都有自然权利互相保护，当没有其他官员时，他们互为官员。如果一支土耳其或异教徒的军队要进攻不列颠，如果国王已经死亡，就像他在这个时刻在法律上已经死亡一样，当他拒绝帮助他的臣民时，不列颠的一部分将会帮助另一部分；正如犹大王约沙法在帮助亚哈和以色列时所做的正确之举，所以主已经批准了这场战争。如果左手受伤，左眼失明，自然会告诉我们所有的自然行为负担都转移到了另一只手和眼睛上，所以他们有义务互相帮助。

10. As we are to bear one another's burdens, and to help our enemies to compassionate strangers, so far more those who make one body of Christ with us.
我们要彼此分担重担，帮助我们的敌人和富有同情心的陌生人，更何况与我们一同成为基督的身体的人。

11. Meroz is under a curse, who helpeth not the Lord, so one part of a church another. A woe lieth on them that are at ease in Zion, and helpeth not afflicted Joseph so far as they are able.
11. Meroz 受到诅咒，不帮助主，所以教会的一部分互相对立。对于在锡安安逸的人们，以及不能尽力帮助受苦的约瑟夫的人们，他们将受到祸患。

12. The law of gratitude obligeth us to this. England sent an army to free both our souls and bodies from the bondage of popery and the fury of the French, upon which occasion a parliament at Leith (anno 1560) established peace and religion, and then after, they helped us against a faction of papists in our own bosom, for which we take God's name in a prayer, seeking grace never to forget that kindness.
12. 感恩之法使我们有此义务。英格兰派遣军队来解救我们的灵魂和身体，使我们摆脱罗马教权的束缚和法国的狂怒。在此情况下，利斯（1560 年）的议会确立了和平和宗教，然后他们帮助我们对抗我们内部的一派天主教徒，为此我们在祈祷中称颂上帝的名字，寻求恩典永远不忘记那份恩惠。

13. When papists in arms had undone England, (if God give them victory,) they should next fall on us, and it should not be in the king's power to resist them. When our enemies, within two days' journey, are in arms, and have the person of our king and his judgment, and so the breathing-law of the two kingdoms, under their power, we should but sleep to be killed in our nest, if we did not arise and fight for king, church, country, and brethren.

Obj. By these and the like grounds, when the king's royal person and life is in danger, he may use papists as subjects, not as papists, in his own natural self-defence.
当国王的皇家人格和生命受到威胁时，他可以将天主教徒作为他的臣民，而不是作为天主教徒，以自卫。

Ans. 1.—Hell and the devil cannot say that a thought was in any heart against the king's person. He slept in Scotland safe, and at Westminster in his own palace, when the estates of both kingdoms would not so much as take the water-pot from his bedside, and his spear; and Satan instilled this traitorous lie, first in prelates, then in papists. 2. The king professeth his maintenance of the true protestant religion in his declarations since he took arms, but if Saul had put arms in the hands of Baal's priests, and in an army of Sidonians, Philistines, Ammonites, professing their quarrel against Israel was not to defend the king, but their Dagon and false gods, clear it were, Saul's army should not stand in relation of helpers of the king's, but of advancers of their own religion. Now, Irish papists, and English, in arms, press the king to cancel all laws against popery, and make laws for the free liberty or mass, and the full power of papists, then the king must use papists, as papists, in these wars.
答案 1：地狱和魔鬼不能说有人心中对国王有任何不满的念头。当两国的议会连从他的床边拿水壶和长矛都不肯时，他在苏格兰安然入睡，在威斯敏斯特宫里，撒旦首先在主教中灌输了这个背叛的谎言，然后是天主教徒。2. 国王在自己的声明中宣称他坚持真正的新教信仰，但如果扫罗把武器交给巴力的祭司，以及一个由西顿人、非利士人、亚扪人组成的军队，他们声称自己的争斗不是为了保卫国王，而是为了保卫他们的达贡和假神，那么扫罗的军队就不是国王的帮手，而是他们自己宗教的推动者。现在，爱尔兰的天主教徒和英国的天主教徒武装起来，迫使国王取消所有反天主教的法律，并制定法律保障弥撒的自由和天主教徒的全部权力，那么国王必须把天主教徒视为天主教徒，在这场战争中使用他们。

QUESTION XXXVIII
问题 XXXVIII

WHETHER MONARCHY BE THE BEST OF GOVERNMENTS
无论君主制是否是最好的政府

Nothing more unwillingly do I write than one word of this question. It is a dark way; circumstances in fallen nature may make things best to be, hic et nunc, evil, though to me it is probable, that monarchy in itself, monarchy de jure, that is, lawful and limited monarchy is best, even now, in a kingdom, under the fall of sin, if other circumstances be considered.
我写下这个问题的一个字都是非常不情愿的。这是一条黑暗的道路；在堕落的自然环境中，情况可能使事物在此时此地变得恶劣，尽管对我来说，很可能君主制本身，合法且有限的君主制，在一个王国中，即使在罪恶的堕落下，考虑到其他情况，仍然是最好的选择。

But observe, I pray you, that Mr Symmons and this poor Prelate, do so extol monarchy, that there is not a government save monarchy only, all other governments are deviations; and therefore Mr Symmons saith, (p. 8,) "If I should affect another government than monarchy, I should neither fear God nor the king, but associate myself with the seditious;" and so the question of monarchy is,—1. Which is the choicest government in itself, or which is the choicest government in policy, and in the condition of man fallen in the state of sin? 2. Which is the best government, that is, the most profitable, or the most pleasant, or the most honest? For we know that there be these three kinds of good things,—things useful and profitable, bona utilia; things pleasant, jucunda; things honest, honesta; and the question may be of every one of the three. 3. The question may be, Which of these governments be most agreeable to nature? That is, either to nature in itself, as it agreeth communiter to all natures of elements, birds, beasts, angels, men, to lead them, as a governor, doth to their last end; or, Which government is most agreeable to men, to sinful men, to sinful men of this or that nation? For some nations are more ambitious, some more factious; some are better ruled by one, some better ruled by many, some by most and by the people. 4. The question may be in regard of the facility or difficulty of loving, fearing, obeying, and serving; and so it may be thought easier to love, fear, and obey one monarch than many rulers, in respect that our Lord saith, it is difficult to serve two masters, and possibly more difficult to serve twenty or an hundred. 5. The question may be in regard of the power of commanding, or of the justice and equity of commanding; hence from this last I shall set down the first thesis.
但请注意，我请求你注意，西蒙斯先生和这位可怜的主教如此赞扬君主制，以至于除了君主制之外，没有其他政府，其他政府都是偏离的；因此西蒙斯先生说（第 8 页）：“如果我喜欢的是另一种政府，而不是君主制，我既不敬畏上帝也不敬畏国王，而是与煽动者结合在一起。”因此，君主制的问题是：1. 它本身是最好的政府，还是在罪恶状态下的人的政策和条件中最好的政府？2. 哪种是最好的政府，即最有利可图的，或最愉快的，或最诚实的？因为我们知道有这三种好事-有用和有利的事物，bona utilia；愉快的事物，jucunda；诚实的事物，honesta；问题可能涉及这三种中的每一种。3. 问题可能是，哪种政府最符合自然？也就是说，要么符合自然本身，因为它与所有元素、鸟类、兽类、天使、人类的本质共同一致，将它们作为统治者引导到最后的目标；或者，哪种政府最符合人类，最符合有罪的人，最符合这个或那个国家的有罪的人？ 对于一些国家来说，它们更有野心，一些更好争议；一些更适合由一个人统治，一些更适合由多人统治，一些则适合由大多数人和人民统治。4. 这个问题可能涉及爱、敬畏、服从和服务的容易与困难；因此，可能认为爱、敬畏和服从一个君主比多个统治者更容易，因为我们的主说，事奉两个主是困难的，可能更困难的是事奉二十个或一百个主。5. 这个问题可能涉及命令的权力，或者命令的公正和公平；因此，从这个最后一个角度出发，我将陈述第一个论点。

Assert. 1.—An absolute and unlimited monarchy is not only not the best form of government, but it is the worst, and this is against our petty Prelate and all royalists. My reasons are these:—1. Because it is an unlawful ordinance, and God never ordained it; and I cannot ascribe the superlative degree to anything of which I deny the positive. Absolute government in a sinful and peaceable man is a wicked government, and not a power from God, for God never gave a power to sin. Plenitudo potestatis ad malum et injuriam non extenditur. Sozenus Junior (cons. 65) in causa occurrenti (l. 2). Ferdinand. Loazes in suo cons. pro March, de Velez. (p. 54, n. 65), and so that learned senator, Ferd. Vasquez (p. 1, l. 1, c. 5, n. 17). 2. It was better for the state that Epiminondas could not sleep than that he could sleep, when the people were dancing, because, said he, "I wake that you may have leave to sleep and be secure;" for he was upon deep cogitations how to do good to the commonwealth when the people were upon their pleasures; because all kings, since the fall of the father, king Adam, are inclined to sin and injustice, and so had need to be guided by a law, even because they are kings, so they remain men. Omnipotency in one that can sin is a cursed power. With reason all our divines say, the state of saving grace in the second Adam, where there is non posse deficere, they cannot fall away from God, is better than the state of the first Adam, where there was posse non deficere, a power not to fall away; and that our free will is better in our country in heaven, where we cannot sin, than in the way to our country, on earth, where we have a power to sin; and so God's people is in a better case, (Hosea. 2:6, 7,) "Where her power to overtake her lovers is closed up with an hedge of thorns that she cannot find her paths;" then the condition of Ephraim, of whom God saith, (Hosea. 4:17,) "Ephraim is joined to idols, let him alone." So cannot that be a good government when the supreme power is in a sinful man, as inclinable to injustice by nature as any man, and more inclinable to injustice by the condition of his place than any; and yet by office he is one that can do no injustice against his subjects; he is a king, and so may destroy Uriah, kill his subjects, but cannot sin; and this is, to flattering royalists, the best government in the world. As if an unchained lion were the best governor, because unchained, to all the beasts, sheep, and lambs, and all others, which with his teeth and paws he may reach, and that by virtue of an ordinance of God. 3. What is one man under no restraint, but made a god on earth, and so drunk with the grandeur of a sinning-god, here under the moon and clouds? who may hear good counsel from men of his own choosing, yet is under no restraint of law to follow it, being the supreme power absolute, high, mighty, and an impeccable god on earth. Certainly this man may more easily err, and break out in violent acts of injustice, than a number of rulers, grave, wise, under a law. One being a sinful man, shall sooner sin and turn a Nero (when he may go to hell, and lead thousands to hell with him gratis) than a multitude of sinful men, who have less power to do against law, and a tyrannous killing of innocents, and a subversion of laws, liberties, and religion, by one who may, by office, and without resistance of mortal men, do all ill, is more dangerous and hurtful than division and faction incident to aristocracy. 4. Cæsar is great, but law and reason are greater; by an absolute monarchy all things are ruled by will and pleasure above law; then this government cannot be so good as law and reason in a government by the best, or by many. 5. Under absolute monarchy, a free people is, actu primo, and in themselves enslaved, because though the monarch, so absolute, should kill all, he cannot be controlled; there is no more but flight, prayers, and tears remaining; and what greater power hath a tyrant? None at all, so may we say. An absolute monarch is, actu primo, a sleeping lion, and a tyrant is a waking and a devouring lion, and they differ in accidents only. 6. This is the papists' way. Bellarmine (de pontif., l. 1, c. 1), and Sanderus (de visibili Monorchia, l. 3, c. 3), Turrere (in sum de Eccles. l. 2, c. 2), prove that the government of the church is by an absolute monarch and pope, because that is the best government which yet is in question. So royalists prove commonwealths must be best governed by absolute monarchs, because that is the best government; but the law saith, it is contrary to nature, even though people should paction to make a king absolute: Conventio procuratoria ad dilapidandum et dissipandum juri naturali contraria nulla est, l. filius 15, de cond. Just. I. Nepos. procul 125, de verb. signif. l. 188, ubi. de jure Regni l. 85, d. tit.
断言。1. 绝对无限制的君主制不仅不是最好的政府形式，而且是最糟糕的，这与我们的小主教和所有君主主义者相悖。我的理由如下：1. 因为这是一种非法的制度，上帝从未规定过它；我不能将最高级别归因于我否认肯定的事物。在一个有罪而和平的人身上，绝对政府是一种邪恶的政府，而不是来自上帝的权力，因为上帝从未给予罪恶的权力。Plenitudo potestatis ad malum et injuriam non extenditur. Sozenus Junior (cons. 65) in causa occurrenti (l. 2). Ferdinand. Loazes in suo cons. pro March, de Velez. (p. 54, n. 65)，以及那位博学的参议员 Ferd. Vasquez (p. 1, l. 1, c. 5, n. 17)。2. 当人们跳舞时，埃皮米农达斯无法入睡对国家来说比他能入睡更好，因为他说：“我醒着，你们可以安心地睡觉；我醒着，你们可以安心地睡觉。”因为当人们享受快乐时，他正深思熟虑如何为共和国做好事；因为自从亚当国王堕落以来，所有的国王都倾向于犯罪和不公正，所以需要被法律引导，即因为他们是国王，所以他们仍然是人。一个能犯罪的人的全能是可诅咒的权力。有理由的是，我们所有的神学家都说，第二个亚当的救赎恩典状态，其中有不可能背离上帝的能力，比第一个亚当的状态更好，他们有不可能背离的能力；而我们的自由意志在我们的天国家园中，我们不能犯罪，比在通往我们国家的道路上，我们有犯罪的能力更好；所以上帝的子民处于更好的境地，（何西阿书 2:6,7），“她追赶她的情人的能力被荆棘篱笆封住，她找不到她的道路。”，而以法莲的处境则不同，上帝说（何西阿书。 4:17，“以法蓮結合偶像，讓他自己吧。”所以，當至高無上的權力掌握在一個有罪的人手中時，這能算是一個好的政府嗎？這個人天性上和其他人一樣容易偏向不公正，而且由於他的地位，他比其他人更容易偏向不公正；然而，根據他的職位，他不能對他的臣民做出不公正的行為；他是一個國王，所以他可以摧毀烏利亞，殺害他的臣民，但他不能犯罪；對那些奉承君主主義者來說，這是世界上最好的政府。就好像一頭沒有束縛的獅子是最好的統治者，因為他可以用他的牙齒和爪子攻擊所有的野獸、羊和羔羊，這是根據上帝的旨意。3. 一個沒有約束的人，成為地上的神，沉醉於犯罪之神的偉大中，這人可能聽從自己選擇的人的好建議，但他沒有法律的約束來遵從它，因為他是絕對的至高無上的權力，高大、強大，是地上無罪的神。毫無疑問，這個人比一群受法律約束的統治者更容易犯錯，並且表現出暴力的不公正行為。 一个罪人会更容易犯罪并变成一个尼禄（当他可能下地狱，并免费带领成千上万人一起下地狱）而不是一群罪人，他们对违法行为的能力较弱，对无辜者的暴行和法律、自由和宗教的颠覆，由一个可以通过职务而无需抵抗凡人的人来实施的恶行，比贵族制度中的分裂和派系更危险和有害。 4. 凯撒伟大，但法律和理性更伟大；在绝对君主制下，一切都由意愿和快乐来统治，超越法律；那么这种政府就不如最好或由众多人统治的政府那样好。 5. 在绝对君主制下，一个自由的人民在本质上是被奴役的，因为即使如此绝对的君主杀光所有人，他也无法受到控制；只剩下逃跑、祈祷和眼泪；一个暴君有什么更大的权力？根本没有，我们可以这样说。绝对君主实际上是一只沉睡的狮子，而暴君则是一只醒着的、吞噬人的狮子，它们只在偶然的事情上有所不同。 6. 这是天主教徒的方式。贝拉尔米（论教皇，第一卷，第一章）。 1）Sanderus（《de visibili Monorchia》第 3 卷第 3 章）和 Turrere（《in sum de Eccles.》第 2 卷第 2 章）证明教会的统治是由绝对君主和教皇来进行的，因为这是目前最好的政府形式。因此，君主主义者证明共和国必须由绝对君主来最好地治理，因为这是最好的政府形式；但是法律说，即使人们达成协议使国王成为绝对君主，这也是违背自然法的：Conventio procuratoria ad dilapidandum et dissipandum juri naturali contraria nulla est，l. filius 15, de cond. Just. I. Nepos. procul 125, de verb. signif. l. 188, ubi. de jure Regni l. 85, d. tit.

Assert. 2.—Monarchy in its latitude—as heaven, and earth, and all the host therein, are citizens—is the best government absolutely, because God's immediate government must be best; but that other governments are good or best so far as they come near to this, must prove that there is a monarchy in angels if there be a government and a monarchy amongst fishes, beasts, birds, &c.; and that, if Adam had never sinned, there should be one monarchy amongst all mankind. I profess I have no eye to see what government could be in that state, but paternal, or marital; and, by this reason, there should be one catholic emperor over all the kings of the earth; a position held by some papists and interpreters of the cannon law, which maketh all the princes of the earth to be usurpers, except those who acknowledge a catholic dominion of the whole earth in the emperor, to whom they submit themselves as vassals. If kings were gods and could not sin, and just, as Solomon in the the beginning of his reign, and as David, I could say, monarchy so limited must be better than aristocracy or democracy, 1. Because it is farthest from injustice, nearest to peace and godliness. (M. I. 3, sect. aparet. ff. de administrat. tutor. l. 2, sect. novissime, ff. de orig. jur. Aristot. pol. l. 8, c. 10, Bodin. de Rep. l. 6, c. 4.) 2. Because God ordained this government in his people. 3. By experience it is known to be less obnoxious to change, except that some think the Venetian commonwealth best; but, with reverence, I see small difference between a king and the Duke of Venice.
断言 2：君主制在其广度上——如同天地和其中所有的众生都是公民一样——绝对是最好的政府，因为上帝的直接统治必定是最好的；但其他政府只要接近这一点，就是好的或最好的，这必须证明如果有政府和君主制在天使中存在，那么在鱼类、兽类、鸟类等中也必定存在；而且，如果亚当从未犯罪，那么在全人类中也应该有一个君主制。我承认我没有眼睛看到在那种状态下可能存在的政府，除了父权制或夫权制；根据这个理由，全地上所有国王之上应该有一个普世皇帝；这是一些天主教徒和教会法解释者所持的观点，他们认为除了那些承认皇帝在全地上拥有普世统治的君主之外，地上的所有君主都是篡位者，他们向皇帝屈服，成为其臣民。如果国王是神而且不能犯罪，而且公正，就像所罗门在他的统治初期和大卫一样，我可以说，这种受限制的君主制一定比贵族制或民主制更好，1. 因为它离不义最远，最接近和平和敬神。（M. I. 3, sect. aparet. ff.） 行政导师法典第 2 卷，最新章节，关于法律起源的法典第 8 卷，第 10 章，亚里士多德政治学第 8 卷，第 10 章，博丁共和国法典第 6 卷，第 4 章。2. 因为上帝在他的子民中规定了这个政府。3. 根据经验，人们知道这种政府不太容易改变，尽管有些人认为威尼斯共和国最好，但是，恕我直言，我看不出国王和威尼斯公爵之间有什么区别。

Assert. 3.—Every government hath something wherein it is best; monarchy is honourable and glorious-like, before men; aristocracy, for counsel, is surest; democracy for liberty, and possibly for riches and gain, is best. Monarchy obtaineth its end with more conveniency, because the ship is easier brought to land when one sitteth at the helm, than when ten move the helm. We more easily fear, love, obey, and serve one than many. He can more easily execute the laws.
断言。第三条——每个政府都有其最优点；君主制在人们面前是尊贵和光荣的；贵族制度在提供咨询方面是最可靠的；民主制度在自由、可能也在财富和利益方面是最好的。君主制更方便地达到其目标，因为当一个人坐在舵轮上时，船更容易靠岸，而当十个人操纵舵轮时则不然。我们更容易害怕、爱、服从和侍奉一个人而不是许多人。他更容易执行法律。

Assert. 4.—A limited and mixed monarchy, such as is in Scotland and England, seems to me the best government, when parliaments, with the king, have the good of all the three. This government hath glory, order, unity, from a monarch; from the government of the most and wisest, it hath safety of counsel, stability, strength; from the influence of the commons, it hath liberty, privileges, promptitude of obedience.
断言。4. ——在苏格兰和英格兰这样的有限混合君主制似乎是最好的政府，当议会与国王共同为三者的利益着想时。这种政府从君主那里得到荣耀、秩序和统一；从最多最聪明的人的治理中得到谋士的安全、稳定和力量；从平民的影响中得到自由、特权和服从的迅速。

Obj. 1.—There is more power, terror, and love, in one than in many.
一个人比许多人更具有力量、恐惧和爱。

Ans.—Not more power; terror cometh from sin, and so to nature fallen in sin, in circumstances a monarchy is best.
答案：不是更多的权力；恐怖来自罪恶，所以对于堕入罪恶的自然状态来说，在某种情况下君主制是最好的。

Obj. 2.—It is more convenient to nature that one should be lord than many.
比起多个人，一个人成为主宰对于自然更加方便。

Ans.—To sinless nature, true, as in a father to many children.
答案：对于无罪的本性，真实的，就像一个父亲对待许多孩子一样。

Obj. 3.—Monarchy, for invention of counsels, execution, concealing of secrets, is above any other government.
目标 3：君主制在发明策略、执行任务和保守秘密方面，高于任何其他政府。

Ans.—That is in some particulars, because sin hath brought darkness on us; so are we all dull of invention, slow in execution, and by reason of the falseness of men, silence is needful; but this is the accidentary state of nature, and otherwise there is safely in a multitude of counsellors; one commanding all, without following counsel, trusteth in his own heart, and is a fool.
答案：这在某些方面是因为罪恶给我们带来了黑暗；所以我们都缺乏创造力，执行缓慢，由于人们的虚伪，沉默是必要的；但这是自然的偶然状态，否则在众多顾问中是安全的；一个不听从建议而单独指挥的人，信任自己的内心，是愚蠢的。

Obj. 4.—A monarch is above envy, because he hath no equal.
目标 4：君主不会受到嫉妒，因为他没有对手。

Ans.—Granted; in many things a monarchy is more excellent, but that is nothing to an absolute monarchy, for which royalists contend.
答案：同意；在许多方面，君主制更为优秀，但这与君主专制无关，这是君主派争论的内容。

Obj. 5.—In a multitude there be more fools than wise men, and a multitude of vices, and little virtue, is in many.
在众多人中，愚者比智者更多，而且许多人中有众多的恶习，但很少有美德。

Ans.—Mere multitude cannot govern in either democracy or aristocracy, for then all should be rulers, and none ruled, but many eyes see more than one,—by accident one may see more than hundreds, but accidents are not rules.
答案：仅仅人数众多无法在民主或贵族制度中进行治理，因为那样的话所有人都应该是统治者，没有人被统治，但是多个眼睛能看到的比一个眼睛更多，偶然情况下一个人可能看到比数百人还多，但偶然事件不是规律。

Obj. 6.—Monarchy is most perfect, because most opposite to anarchy and most agreeable to nature, as is evident in plants, birds, bees.
目标 6：君主制是最完美的，因为它与无政府状态最为相反，与自然最为一致，这一点在植物、鸟类和蜜蜂中是显而易见的。

Ans.—Government of sinless nature void of reason, as in birds and bees, is weak to conclude politic civil government amongst men in sin, and especially absolute government. A king-bee is not absolute, nor a king-eagle, if either destroy its fellows, by nature all rise and destroy their king. A king-bee doth not act by counsel borrowed from fellow-bees, as a king must do, and communication of counsels lesseneth absoluteness of a man. I see not how a monarchy is more opposite to anarchy and confusion than other governments. A monarch, as one, is more opposite to a multitude, as many, but there is no less order in aristocracy than in monarchy; for a government essentially includeth order of commanding and subjection. Now, one is not, for absoluteness, more contrary to anarchy than many; for that one now who can easily slip from a king to a tyrant, cannot have a negative voice in acts of justice, for then should he have a legal power to oppose justice, and so, for his absoluteness, he should be most contrary to order of justice; and a monarch, because absolute, should be a door-neighbour to disorder and confusion.
答案：没有罪恶本性的政府，如鸟类和蜜蜂，对于在罪恶中的人类之间的政治民主政府的结论是脆弱的，尤其是绝对政府。一个蜜蜂国王并不是绝对的，同样一个鹰国王也不是，如果它们中的任何一个摧毁了它的同伴，自然界中所有的生物都会起来摧毁它们的国王。一个蜜蜂国王不是通过向同伴借鉴的建议行动，而一个国王必须这样做，而且交流建议会减少一个人的绝对性。我不明白君主制比其他政府更与无政府主义和混乱相对立。一个君主作为一个人，与众多人相对立，但是在贵族政府中也有秩序，不亚于君主制；因为政府本质上包含了指挥和服从的秩序。现在，一个人对于无政府主义来说并不比众多人更相对立；因为那个现在可以轻易地从国王变成暴君的人，在正义行为中不能有否决权，因为那样他就有合法的权力来反对正义，所以，因为他的绝对性，他应该是最与正义秩序相对立的；而一个君主，因为绝对，应该是与混乱和混乱最为接近的邻居。

Obj.—But the parliament hath no power to deny their voices to things just, or to cross the law of God, more than the king.
但议会无权否认他们对公正事物的发言权，也无权违背上帝的法律，就像国王一样。

Ans.—It is true neither of them hath a negative voice against law and reason, but if the monarch, by his exorbitant power, may deny justice, he may, by that same legal power, do all injustice; and so there is no absoluteness in either.
答案：这是真实的，他们两个都没有反对法律和理性的否定声音，但如果君主凭借他过度的权力可以否认正义，他也可以凭借同样的合法权力做出所有的不公正行为；因此，两者都没有绝对性。

Obj.—Who should then punish and coerce the parliament in the case of exorbitance?
谁应该在议会过度行为的情况下惩罚和强制？

Ans.—Posterior parliaments.
后续议会。

Obj.—Posterior parliaments and people may both err.
后来的议会和人民都可能犯错。

Ans.—All is true; God must remedy that only.
答案：一切都是真实的；只有上帝能够解决这个问题。

QUESTION XXXIX
问题 XXXIX

WHETHER OR NO ANY PREROGATIVE AT ALL ABOVE THE LAW BE DUE TO THE KING, OR IF "JURA MAJESTATIS" BE ANY SUCH PREROGATIVE ROYAL
无论国王是否享有任何超越法律的特权，或者"JURA MAJESTATIS"是否是这样的皇家特权

I conceive kings are conceived to have a threefold supreme power. 1. Strictly absolute to do what they please, their will being simply a law. This is tyrannical. Some kings have it, de facto, ex consuetudine, but by a divine law none have it. I doubt if any have it by a human positive law, except the great Turk and the king of Spain, over his conquest without the borders of Europe, and some few other conquerors. 2. There is another power limited to God's law, the due proper right of kings. (Deut. 17:18–20.) 3. There is, a potestas intermedia, a middle power, not so vast as that which is absolute and tyrannical, which yet is some way human. This I take what jurists call jus regium, lex regia, jura regalia regis; Cicero, jura majestatis; Livius, jura imperii, and these royal privileges are such common and high dignities as no one particular magistrate can have, seeing they are common to all the kingdom, as that Cæsar only should coin money in his own name. Hence the penny given to Christ, because it had Cæsar's image and superscription, (Matt. 22:20, 21,) infers by way of argumentation, ἀποδοτὲ οὐν, &c., give therefore tribute to Cæsar as his due; so the magazine and armoury for the safety of the kingdom is in the king's hand. The king hath the like of these privileges, because he is the common, supreme, public officer and minister of God for the good of all the kingdom; and, amongst these royal privileges, I reckon that power that is given to the king, when he is made king, to do many things without warrant of the letter of the law, without the express consent of his council, which he cannot always carry about with him, as the law saith. The king shall not raise armies without consent of the parliament; but if an army of Irish, or Danes, or Spaniards, should suddenly land in Scotland, he hath a power, without a formally-convened parliament, to command them all to rise in arms against these invaders and defend themselves,—this power no inferior magistrate hath as he is, but such a magistrate. And in many such exigencies, when the necessity of justice or grace requireth an extemporal exposition of laws, pro re nata, for present necessary execution, some say only the emperor,—others, all kings have these pleasures. I am of the mind of Arnisæus, that these privileges are not rewards given to princes for their great pains; for the king is not obliged to govern the commonwealth because he receiveth these royal privileges as his reward, but because by office he is obliged to govern the commonwealth; therefore these privileges are given to him, and without them he could not so easily govern. But I am utterly against Arnisæus, who saith, "These are not essential to a king, because (saith he) he createth marquises, dukes, nobles, &c., and constituteth magistrates, not because of his royal dignity, but by reason of his aboslute power; for many princes have supreme power and cannot make nobles, and therefore to him they are jura majestatis, non jura potestatis.
我认为国王被认为拥有三种至高无上的权力。1. 绝对权力，可以随心所欲，他们的意愿就是法律。这是暴政。一些国王在事实上拥有这种权力，出于习惯，但根据神的法律，没有人拥有这种权力。我怀疑除了大土耳其和西班牙国王在欧洲以外的征服者之外，是否有人根据人类正面法拥有这种权力。2. 还有一种权力受限于上帝的法律，是国王的正当权利。（申命记 17:18-20）3. 还有一种中间的权力，不像绝对和暴政那样广泛，但在某种程度上是人为的。我认为这就是法学家所称的王权法、王权法律、国王特权；西塞罗称之为王权法、利维乌斯称之为帝国法，这些王室特权是如此普遍和崇高，以至于没有一个特定的官员可以拥有，因为它们是整个王国共有的，就像只有凯撒可以以自己的名义铸造货币一样。因此，给基督的一便士，因为上面有凯撒的形象和铭文，（马太福音 22:20, 21）通过推理推断出，应当归还给凯撒。因此，按照应有的方式向凯撒致敬；因此，王国的军械库和军械库都在国王手中，以确保王国的安全。国王拥有这些特权，因为他是上帝的公共官员和仆人，为了整个王国的利益而存在；在这些皇家特权中，我认为当国王成为国王时，他有权在没有法律书面授权和明确同意的情况下做许多事情，因为他不能总是随身携带他的顾问，正如法律所说。国王不得在没有议会同意的情况下组建军队；但是，如果爱尔兰人、丹麦人或西班牙人的军队突然登陆苏格兰，他有权在没有正式召开的议会的情况下命令他们全部起来武装抵抗这些入侵者并保护自己-这种权力不是作为下级官员而存在的，只有这样的官员才有。在许多这样的紧急情况下，当正义或恩典的需要要求对法律进行即席解释时，有人说只有皇帝-其他人说所有国王都有这些权力。 我同意 Arnisæus 的观点，这些特权并不是给予君主作为他们辛勤工作的奖励；因为国王并不是因为接受这些皇家特权作为奖励而被迫管理国家，而是因为他的职责要求他管理国家；因此，这些特权是给予他的，没有这些特权，他就不能如此轻松地管理。但我完全不同意 Arnisæus 的观点，他说：“这些对于国王来说并非必要，因为（他说）他创造侯爵、公爵、贵族等，并设立官员，不是因为他的皇家尊严，而是因为他的绝对权力；因为许多君主拥有至高无上的权力，却不能创造贵族，因此对于他们来说，这些是王权法，而不是权力法。”

Ans. 1.—The king, suppose a limited king, may and ought to make nobles, for he may confer honours as a reward of virtue; none can say Pharaoh, by his absolute authority, and not as a king, advanced Joseph to be a noble ruler, wife cannot say that, for there was merit and worth in him deserving that honour; and Darius, not by absolute authority, but on the ground of well-deserving, (the rule by which kings are obliged, in justice, to confer honours,) promoted Daniel to be the first president of all his kingdoms, because, (Dan. 6:3,) "an excellent spirit was in him;" and in justice the king could ennoble none rather than Daniel, except he should fail against the rule of conferring honours. It is acknowledgeth by all, that honos est præmium virtutis, honour is founded upon virtue; and therefore Darius did not this out of his absolute majesty, but as king.
答案 1：假设国王是有限制的国王，他可以并且应该封爵，因为他可以将荣誉作为对美德的奖励；没有人能说法老是凭借他的绝对权威而不是作为国王，提拔约瑟夫成为贵族统治者，妻子也不能这样说，因为他有值得荣誉的优点和价值；而大流士并不是凭借绝对权威，而是基于应当根据公正原则授予荣誉的原则，提拔但以理为他所有王国的首席总统，因为（但以理书 6:3）“他有卓越的灵性”；而且按照公正原则，国王除非违背授予荣誉的规则，否则不能比但以理更能封爵别人。众所周知，荣誉是建立在美德之上的；因此，大流士这样做并不是出于他的绝对权威，而是作为国王。

2. All kings as kings, and by a divine law of God, and so by no absoluteness of majesty, are to make men of wisdom, fearing God, hating covetousness, judges under them, Deut. 1:13; 2 Chron. 19:6, 7; Psal. 101:6–8.
所有的国王作为国王，按照上帝的神圣法律，而不是绝对的威严，应该任命敬畏上帝、憎恶贪婪的智者作为他们的法官，申命记 1:13；历代志下 19:6, 7；诗篇 101:6-8。

3. If we suppose a king to be limited, as God's king is, (Deut. 17:18–20,) yet is it his part to confer honours upon the worthiest. Now, if he have no absoluteness of majesty, he cannot confer honours out of a principle that is none at all, unum quodque sicut est, ita operatur; and if the people confer honours, then must royalists grant that there is an absolute majesty in the people, why then may they not derive majesty to a king? and why then do royalists talk to us of God's immediate creating of kings, without any intervening action of the people?
如果我们假设一个国王像上帝的国王一样受限制（申命记 17:18-20），那么他的职责就是给最有价值的人授予荣誉。现在，如果他没有绝对的威严，他就无法从一个根本不存在的原则中授予荣誉，每个事物都是按照其本质运作的；如果人民授予荣誉，那么君主主义者必须承认人民中存在着绝对的威严，那么他们为什么不能将威严传递给国王呢？为什么君主主义者对我们谈论上帝直接创造国王，没有任何人民的干预行动呢？

4. By this absoluteness of majesty, kings may play the tyrant, as Samuel (1 Sam. 8:9–14) foretelleth Saul would do. But I cannot believe that kings have the same very official absolute power, from whence they do both acts of grace, goodness, and justice, such as are to expone laws extemporally in extraordinary cases,—to confer honours upon good and excellent men of grace,—to pardon offenders upon good grounds, and also do acts of extreme tyranny: for out of the same fountain doth not proceed both sweet water and bitter. Then by this absoluteness kings cannot do acts of goodness, justice, and grace, and so they must do good as kings, and they must do acts of tyranny as men, not from absoluteness of majesty.
4. 由于这种威严的绝对性，国王可以像撒母耳（撒母耳记上 8:9-14）所预言的扫罗那样成为暴君。但我不相信国王拥有完全的官方绝对权力，从而可以同时行使恩典、善行和公正的行为，比如在特殊情况下即兴解释法律，向有恩典的优秀人士授予荣誉，基于正当理由赦免罪犯，以及进行极端暴政的行为：因为甜水和苦水不可能从同一个泉源涌出。因此，国王不能凭借这种绝对性行善、公正和恩典的行为，他们必须作为国王行善，作为人类行暴政，而不是凭借威严的绝对性。

5. Inferior magistrates, in whom there is no absoluteness of majesty, according to royalists, may expound laws also extemporally, and do acts of justice, without formalities of civil or municipal laws, so they keep the genuine intent of the law, as they may pardon one that goeth up to the wall of a city, and discovereth the approach of the enemy, when the watchmen are sleeping, though the law be, that any ascending to the wall of the city shall die. Also, the inferior judge may make judges and deputies under himself.
5. 根据王派的观点，没有绝对权威的下级官员也可以即兴解释法律，并且可以在没有民事或市政法律形式的情况下进行司法行为，只要他们保持法律的真实意图，就像他们可以原谅一个上城墙并揭示敌人接近的人，当守卫们正在睡觉时，尽管法律规定任何上城墙的人都会死。此外，下级法官可以任命自己的法官和副手。

6. This distinction is neither grounded upon reason or laws, nor on any word of God. Not the former, as is proved before, for there is no absolute power in a king to do above or against law; all the official power that a king hath, is a royal power to do good, for the safety and good of his subjects, and that according to law and reason, and there is no other power given to a king as a king; and for Scripture, Arnisæus allegeth, 1 Sam. 8 the manner or law of the king, ver. 9, 11, and he saith, It cannot be the custom and manner of the king, but must be the law of absolute majesty, 1. Because it was the manner of inferior judges, as Tiberius said of his judges, to flay the people, when they were commanded to shear them only. 2. Samuel's sons, who wrested judgment and perverted the law, had this manner and custom to oppress the people, as did the sons of Eli; and, therefore, without reason it is called the law of kings, jus regum, if it was the law of the judges; for if all this law be tyrannical, and but an abuse of kingly power, the same law may agree to all other magistrates, who, by the same unjust power, may abuse their power; but Samuel (as Brentius observeth, homi. 27, in 1 Sam. in princ.) doth mean here a greater license than kings can challenge, if at any time they would make use of their plentitude of absolute power; and therefore, nomine juris, by the word law here, he understandeth a power granted by law, jure, or right to the king, but pernicious to the people, which Gregory calleth jus regium tyrannorum, the royal law of tyrants.—So Seneca, 1 de clem. c. 11, hoc interest inter regem et tyrannum, species ipsa fortunes ac licentiæ par est, nisi quod tyranni ex voluntate sæviunt, reges non nisi ex causa et necessitate? quid ergo? non reges quoque occidere solent? sed quoties fieri publico, utilitas persuadet, tyrannis scevitia cordi est. A tyrant in this differeth from a king, Qui he ea quidem vult, quæ sibi licent, that a king will not do these things which are lawful; a tyrant doth qum libet, what he pleaseth to do.
这种区别既不基于理性或法律，也不基于上帝的话语。前者已经证明了，因为国王没有绝对的权力去超越或违背法律；国王所拥有的所有官方权力，都是为了对自己的臣民做好事，为了他们的安全和利益，而且必须依照法律和理性行事，国王作为国王没有其他的权力；至于圣经，阿尼塞乌斯引用了撒母耳记上 8 章国王的方式或法律，他说，这不可能是国王的习俗和方式，而必须是绝对权威的法律，1. 因为这是次要法官的方式，正如提比留所说的，当他们被命令只是剪羊毛时，他们却剥皮。2. 撒母耳的儿子们扭曲审判和歪曲法律，他们有这种压迫人民的方式和习俗，就像以利的儿子们一样；因此，如果这是法官的法律，那么毫无理由地称之为国王的法律，jus regum；因为如果所有这些法律都是暴虐的，只是对国王权力的滥用，那么同样的法律也可能适用于所有其他官员，他们也可以通过同样不公正的权力滥用他们的权力；但是撒母耳（正如布伦蒂乌斯所观察到的，homi. 27，在撒母耳记上 1 章中，这里所说的“法律”意味着比国王能够主张的更大的自由，如果他们随时想要利用他们绝对权力的充分性；因此，从法律的名义上，他理解这里的法律是指授予国王的、对人民有害的权力，格里高利称之为暴君的王权法。所以塞内加在《慈悲论》第一章第 11 节中说，国王和暴君之间的区别在于，他们的权力和自由的形式是相等的，除了暴君是根据自己的意愿行事，国王只有出于原因和必要才会这样做。那么，国王也常常杀人吗？但只要符合公共利益，国王杀人是有说服力的，而暴君的残忍是他们的本性。暴君与国王的区别在于，国王不会做违法之事，而暴君会做任何他想做的事情。

Ans. 1. Arnisæus betrayeth his ignorance in the Scriptures, for the word משפט signifieth a custom, and a wicked custom, as by many Scriptures I have proved already: his reasons are poor. It is the manner of inferior judges, as we see in the sons of Eli and Samuel, to pervert judgment, as well as king Saul did; but the king may more oppress, and his tyranny hath more colour, and is more catholic than the oppression of inferior judges. It is not Samuel's purpose thus to distinguish the judges of Israel and the kings, in that the judges had no power granted them of God to oppress, because the people might judge their judges and resist them; and there was power given of God to the king, so far to play the tyrant, that no man could resist him, or say, What dost thou? The text will not bear any such difference; for it was as unlawful to resist Moses, Joshua, Samuel, (as royalists prove from the judgment of God that came upon Korah, Dathan, and Abiram,) as to resist king Saul and king David: royalists doubt not to make Moses a king. It was also no less sin to resist Samuel's sons, or to do violence to their persons, as judging for the Lord, and sent by the supreme judge, their father Samuel, than it was sin to resist many inferior judges that were lions and even wolves under the kings of Israel and Judah, so they judged for the Lord, and as sent by the supreme magistrate. But the difference was in this, that judges were extraordinarily raised up of God out of any tribe he pleased, and were believers, (Heb. 11:32,) saved by faith, and so used not their power to oppress the people, though inferior judges, as the sons of Eli and Samuel, perverted judgment; and therefore in the time of the judges, God, who gave them saviours and judges, was their king; but kings were tyed to a certain tribe, especially the line of David, to the kingdom of Judah.
答案 1：Arnisæus 在圣经中表现出对经文的无知，因为“משפט”一词意味着一种习俗，一种邪恶的习俗，正如我已经通过许多经文证明的那样：他的理由很差。正如我们在以利和撒母耳的儿子们以及扫罗王所看到的，较低级的法官往往会歪曲判断，但国王可以更加压迫人民，他的暴政更具有合理性，也更具有普遍性，而不仅仅是较低级法官的压迫。撒母耳并不打算这样区分以色列的法官和国王，因为法官没有获得上帝授予的压迫权力，因为人民可以审判他们的法官并抵抗他们；而国王获得了上帝赋予的权力，以至于没有人能够抵抗他，或者说：“你在做什么？”这段经文不支持任何这样的区别；因为抵抗摩西、约书亚、撒母耳（正如保皇派从上帝对可拉、大坍和亚比兰的审判中证明的那样）与抵抗扫罗王和大卫王一样是不合法的；保皇派毫不怀疑地将摩西视为国王。 抵抗撒母耳的儿子，或对他们进行暴力，就像对待撒母耳这位最高法官派遣的、代表上帝行使审判权的判断一样，同样是罪过。在以色列和犹大的国王统治下，抵抗许多较低级的法官，他们也是上帝的判断者，被最高行政官派遣，同样是罪过。但不同之处在于，法官是上帝特别挑选出来的，可以来自任何支派，并且是信徒（希伯来书 11:32），凭借信仰得救，因此他们不会利用权力压迫人民，尽管像以利和撒母耳的儿子这样的较低级法官会歪曲判断。因此，在法官时代，上帝是他们的国王，他给他们拯救者和法官；而国王则与特定的支派有关，尤其是大卫的后裔与犹大王国有关。

2. They were hereditary, but judges are not so.
他们是世袭的，但法官不是这样的。

3. They were made and chosen by the people, (Deut. 17:14, 15; 1 Sam. 10:17–20; 2 Sam. 5:1–3,) as were the kings of the nations; and the first king, (though a king be the lawful ordinance of God,) was sought from God in a sinful imitation of the nations, (1 Sam. 8:19, 20,) and therefore were not of God's peculiar election, as the judges, and so they were wicked men, and many of them, yea, all for the most part, did evil in the sight of the Lord, and their law, משפט, their manner and custom, was to oppress the people, and so were their inferior judges little tyrants, and lesser lions, leopards, evening wolves. (Ezek. 22:27; Mic. 3:1–3; Isa. 3:14, 15.) And the kings and inferior judges are only distinguished, de facto, that the king was a more catholic oppressor, and the old lion, and so had more art and power to catch the prey than the inferior judges, who were but whelps, and had less power, but all were oppressors, (some few excepted, and Samuel speaketh of that which Saul was to be, de facto, not de jure, and the most part of the kings after him,) and this tyranny is well called jus regis, the manner of the king, and not the manner of the judges, because it had not been the practice, custom, and משפט, of the believing judges, before Saul's reign, and while God was his people's king, (1 Sam. 8:7,) to oppress. We grant that all other inferior judges, after the people cast off God's government, and, in imitation of the nations, would have a king, were also lesser tyrants, as the king was a greater tyrant, and that was a punishment of their rejecting God and Samuel to be their King and judge. How shall Arnisæus prove that this manner or משפט of the king was, potestas concessa, a power granted, I hope, granted of God, and not an abuse of kingly power; for then he and royalists must say, that all the acts of tyranny ascribed to king Saul, (1 Sam. 8:11–14,) by reason of which they did cry out, and complain to God because of their oppression, was no abuse of power given to Saul; therefore it was an use, and a lawful use of power given of God to their king, for there is no medium betwixt a lawful power used in moral acts, and a lawful power abused; and, indeed, Arnisæus so distinguished a king and a tyrant, that he maketh them all one in nature and specie. He saith, a tyrant doth, quod licet, that which by law he may do, and a king doth not these things, quæ licent, which by law he may do; but, so to me it is clear, a tyrant, acting as a tyrant, must act according to this משפט law of the king, and that which is lawful, and a king, acting as a king, and not doing these things that are lawful, must sin against his office, and the power that God hath given to him, which were to commend and praise the tyrant, and to condemn and dispraise the king. If this law of the king be a permissive law of God, which the king may, out of his absoluteness, put in execution to oppress the people, such as a law of a bill of divorcement, as Arnisæus, Barclay, and other royalists say, then must God have given a law to every king to play the tyrant, because of the hardness of the king's heart; but we would gladly see some word of God for this. The law of a bill of divorcement is a mere positive law, permitted in a particular exigent, when a husband, out of levity of heart and affection, cannot love his wife; therefore God by a law permitted him out of indulgence to put her away, that both might have a seed, (the want whereof, because of the blessed Seed to be born of woman, was a reproach in Israel,) and though this was an affliction to some particular women, yet the intent of the law, and the soul thereof, was a public benefit to the commonwealth of Israel, of which sort of laws I judge the hard usage permitted by God to his people—in the master toward the servant—and the people of God toward the stranger, of whom they might exact usury—though not toward their brethren. But that God should make a permissive law, that Jeroboam might press all Israel to sin and worship the golden calves; and that a king by law may kill, as a bloody Nero, all the people of God, by a divine permissive law, hath no warrant in God's word. Judge, reader, if royalists make God to confer a benefit on a land, when he giveth them a king, if by a law of God, such as the law for a bill of divorcement, the king may kill and devour, as a lawful absolute lion, six kingdoms of nations that profess Christ and believe in his name. For if the king have a divine law to kill an innocent Jonathan, so as it be unlawful to resist him, he may, by that same law, turn bloodier than either Nero, Julian, or any that ever sucked the paps of a lioness, or of whom it may be said, and he shall be given as a plague of God, ex conditione doni, to the people, and the people, inasmuch as they are gifted of God with a king, to feed them in a peaceable and godly life, must be made slaves; now, it wanteth reason, that God will have a permissive law of murdering the church of Christ, a law so contrary to the public good and intrinsical intention of a king, and to the immutable and eternal law of nature, that one man, because of his power, may, by God's permissive law, murder millions of innocents. Some may say, "It is against the duty of love, that by nature and God's law the husband owes to the wife, (Ephes. 5:25,) that the husband should put away his wife; for God hateth putting away, and yet God made a law, that a husband might give his wife a bill of divorce, and so put her away; and by the same reason, God may make a law, though against nature, that a king should kill and murder, without all resistance." 重试    错误原因

Ans.—1. The question is not, if God may make permissive laws to oppress the innocent; I grant he may do it, as he may command Abraham to kill his son Isaac; and Abraham by law is obliged to kill him, except God retract his commandment, and whether God retract it or not, he may intend to kill his son, which is an act of love and obedience to God; but this were more than a permissive law. 2. We have a clear Scripture for a permissive law of divorce, and it was not a law tending to the universal destruction of a whole kingdom, or many kingdoms, but only to the grievance of some particular wives; but the law of divorce gave not power to all husbands to put away their wives, but only to the husband who could not command his affection to love his wife. But this law of the king is a catholic law to all kings, (for royalists will have all kings so absolute, as it is sin and disobedience to God to resist any,) that all kings have a divine law to kill all their subjects; surely, then, it were better for the church to want such nurse-fathers, as have absolute power to suck their blood; and for such a perpetual permissive law continuing to the end of the world, there is no word of God. Nor can we think that the hardness of one prince's heart can be a ground for God to make a law, so destructive to his church and all mankind; such a permissive law, being a positive law of God, must have a word of Christ for it, else we are not to receive it. Arnisæus, (cap. 4. distru. Tyran. et princ. n. 16,) thinketh a tyrant, in exercito, becoming a notorious tyrant, when there is no other remedy, may be removed from government, sine magno scelere, without great sin. But, I ask, how men can annul any divine law of God, though but a permissive law. For if God's permissive law warrant a tyrant to kill two innocent men, it is tyranny more or less, and the law distinguisheth not. 3. This permissive law is expressly contrary to God's law, limiting all kings. (Deut. 17:16–18.) How then are we to believe that God would make an universal law contrary to the law that he established before Israel had a king? 4. What Brentius saith is much for us, for he calleth this משפט law a licence, and so to use it, must be licentiousness. 5. Arnisæus desireth that kings may use sparingly the plenitude of their power for public good; there must be, saith he, necessity to make it lawful to use the plenitude of their power justly; therefore Ahab sinned, in that he unjustly possessed Naboth's vineyard, though he sinned specially in this, that he came to the possession by murder, and it was peculiar to the Jews that they could not transfer their possessions from one tribe to another. But if it be so, then this power of absoluteness is not given by permissive law, by which God permitted putting away of wives, for the object of a permissive law is sin; but this plenitude of power may be justly put forth in act, saith he, if the public good may be regarded. I would know what public good can legitimate tyranny and killing of the innocent,—the intentions of men can make nothing intrinsically evil to become good. 6. How can that be a permissive law of God, and not his approving law, by which kings create inferior judges? for this is done by God's approving will. 7. It is evident that Arnisæus' mind is, that kings may take their subjects' vineyards and their goods, so they err not in the manner and way of the act; so be like, if there had not been a peculiar law that Naboth should not sell his vineyard, and if the king had had any public use for it, he might have taken Naboth's vineyard from him; but he specially sinned, saith he, in eo maxime culpatur, &c., that he took away the man's vineyard by murdering of him; therefore, saith Arnisæus, (c. 1. de potest, maj. in bona privato. 2,) that by the king's law, (1 Sam. 8,) "There is given to the king, a dominion over the people's sons, daughters, fields, vineyards, olive-yards, servants, and flocks." So he citeth that, that Daniel putteth all places, the rocks of the mountains, the birds of the heaven, (Dan. 2,) under the king's power. So all is the king's in dominion, and the subjects in use only.
答案：1.问题不在于上帝是否可以制定允许性法律来压迫无辜者；我承认他可以这样做，就像他可以命令亚伯拉罕杀死他的儿子以撒一样；根据法律，亚伯拉罕有义务杀死他，除非上帝撤回他的命令，而无论上帝是否撤回命令，他都可能打算杀死他的儿子，这是对上帝的爱和顺从的行为；但这不仅仅是一项允许性法律。2.我们有明确的经文证明了允许性离婚法律，并且这不是一项导致整个王国或许多王国普遍毁灭的法律，而只是对一些特定妻子的不满；但离婚法律并没有赋予所有丈夫抛弃他们的妻子的权力，而只是给那些无法控制自己的感情去爱妻子的丈夫。但这个国王的法律是适用于所有国王的普遍法律（因为王党派认为所有国王都应该如此绝对，抵抗任何国王都是罪恶和对上帝的不顺从），即所有国王都有上帝的法律可以杀死他们的臣民；所以，对于教会来说，没有这样的养育父母也许更好，他们有绝对的权力吸取他们的血液；至于这样一项持续到世界末日的永久允许性法律，上帝的话语中没有提到。 我们也不能认为一个君王心硬可以成为上帝制定如此破坏教会和全人类的法律的依据；这样一条允许性的上帝法律，必须有基督的话语支持，否则我们不应接受它。阿尼塞乌斯（第 4 章，对暴君和君主的破坏，第 16 条）认为，当军队中的暴君成为众所周知的暴君时，如果没有其他办法，可以在不犯大罪的情况下罢免他的统治。但是，我问，人们如何废除上帝的任何神圣法律，即使只是一条允许性的法律。因为如果上帝的允许性法律允许暴君杀害两个无辜的人，那就是多多少少的暴政，而法律并不区分。3.这条允许性法律明确违背了上帝的法律，限制了所有的君王。（申命记 17:16-18）那么我们怎么能相信上帝会制定一条与他在以色列有君王之前建立的法律相违背的普遍法律呢？4.布伦提乌斯所说的对我们非常有利，因为他将这条"法律"称为一种许可证，因此使用它必须是放纵。5. 阿尼西乌斯希望君王们能节制使用他们的权力，以造福公众；他说，必须有必要使使用权力合法；因此，亚哈犯了罪，因为他不正当地占有了拿伯的葡萄园，尽管他特别在于通过谋杀来占有，而犹太人特有的是他们不能将财产从一个部落转移到另一个部落。但如果是这样的话，那么这种绝对权力并不是通过许可法赋予的，上帝允许休妻的目的是犯罪；但是，如果可以考虑到公共利益，这种权力的充分发挥可能是合理的。我想知道，什么公共利益可以使暴政和无辜者的杀害合法化，人的意图不能使本质上邪恶的事情变得善良。6. 通过哪个许可法，而不是他的赞成法，君王们创造下级法官呢？因为这是上帝赞成的意愿。7. 显然，阿尼塞乌斯的观点是，国王可以夺取臣民的葡萄园和财物，只要在行为方式和方式上没有错误；所以，如果没有一条特殊的法律规定拿伯的葡萄园不能出售，如果国王有任何公共用途，他可以夺取拿伯的葡萄园；但他特别犯了罪，他说，他最大的罪过在于通过谋杀夺取了这个人的葡萄园；因此，阿尼塞乌斯说，根据国王的法律（撒母耳记上 8），"国王有权统治人民的儿子、女儿、田地、葡萄园、橄榄园、仆人和牲畜"。所以他引用了但以理把所有地方、山上的岩石、天上的鸟（但以理书 2）都归于国王的权力。所以所有的都是国王的统治，臣民只能使用。

But 1. This law of the king, then, can be no ground for the king's absoluteness above law, and there can be no permissive law of God here; for that which asserteth the king's royal dominion over persons and things, that must be the law of God's approving, not his permitting evil; but this is such a law as Arnisæus saith.
但是，这个国王的法律不能成为国王在法律之上的绝对权力的依据，这里也不能有上帝的许可法律；因为那些主张国王对人和事物的王权统治的法律，必须是上帝认可的法律，而不是他容忍邪恶的法律；但这是阿尼塞乌斯所说的这样一条法律。

2. The text speaketh of no law or lawful power, or of any absoluteness of king Saul, but of his wicked custom, and his rapine and tyranny, "He will take your sons, your daughters, your fields, and your vineyards from you." Saul took not these through any power of dominion by law, but by mere tyranny.
这段文字没有提到任何法律或合法权力，也没有提到扫罗国王的绝对权力，而是指他邪恶的习惯，以及他的掠夺和暴政：“他会从你们那里夺取你们的儿子、女儿、田地和葡萄园。”扫罗并非通过法律的统治权力来夺取这些，而是纯粹的暴政。

3. I have before cleared that the subjects have a propriety, and an use also, else how could we be obliged, by virtue of the fifth commandment, to pay tribute to the king, (Rom. 13:7,) for that which we pay was as much the king's before we paid as when we have paid it.
我之前已经明确过，主题具有适当性和用途，否则我们怎么会根据第五诫命被迫向国王纳税呢？（罗马书 13:7）我们所支付的东西在我们支付之前就已经是国王的了，就像我们支付之后一样。

4. Arnisæus saith, all are the king's, in respect of the universal jurisdiction that the king hath in governing and ordering all to the universal end, the good of the commonwealth; for as universal nature careth for the conservation of the specie and kind, so doth particular nature care for the conservation of individuals, so do men care for their private goods, and the king is to refer every man's private goods to the good of the public. But the truth is, this taketh not away propriety of goods from private men, retaining only the use to private men, and giving the dominion to the king, because this power that the king hath of men's goods is not power of dominion, that the king hath over the goods of men, as if the king were dominus, lord and owner of the fields and monies of the private subject; but it is a power to regulate the goods for a public use, and supposeth the abuse of goods, when they are monopolised to and for private ends. The power that the king hath over my bread is not a power of dominion, so as he may eat my bread as if it were his own bread, and he be lord of my bread as I was sometime myself, before I abused it, but it is a dominion improperly and abusively so called, and is a mere fiduciary and dispensatory power, because he is set over my bread not to eat it, nor over my houses to dwell in them, but only with a ministerial power, as a public though honourable servant and watchman, appointed by the community as a mean for an end, to regulate my bread, houses, monies and fields, for the good of the public. Dominion is defined "a faculty to use a thing as you please, except you be hindered by force or by law;" (Justin, tit. c. de legibus in I. digna vox, &c.;) so have I a dominion over my own garments, house, money, to use them for uses not forbidden by the law of God and man, but I may not lay my corn-field waste, that it shall neither bear grass nor corn,—the king may hinder that, because it is a hurt to the public; but the king, as lord and sovereign, hath no such dominion over Naboth's vineyard. How the king is lord of all goods, ratione jurisdictionis, et tuitionis se. Anton, de paudrill. in l.; Altius. n. 5, c. de servit; Hottom. illust, quest, q. 1, ad fin., conc. 2; Lod. Molin. de just, et jur. dis. 25; Soto. de justitia et jur. l. 4, q. 4, art. 1.
阿尼斯斯说，所有的东西都属于国王，这是因为国王在统治和管理所有事物以达到普遍目标——国家的利益方面拥有普遍的管辖权；因为就像普遍的自然关心物种和种类的保存一样，个别的自然关心个体的保存，人们关心自己的私人财产，国王应该将每个人的私人财产与公共利益联系起来。但事实上，这并不剥夺私人财产的所有权，只保留给私人使用，将所有权交给国王，因为国王对人们财产的权力并不是主权的权力，国王并不是私人主体的领主和所有者，而是一种调节财产为公共利益服务的权力，并假设当财产被垄断用于私人目的时存在滥用。 国王对我的面包拥有的权力并非统治权力，因此他不能像对待自己的面包那样吃我的面包，也不能像我之前滥用时那样成为我的面包的主人，而是一种不正确和滥用称之为的统治权力，是一种纯粹的信托和分配权力，因为他被任命为社区的一种手段，以调节我的面包、房屋、金钱和田地，为公众利益而服务，而不是为了吃掉我的面包或住在我的房子里。统治权力被定义为“可以随心所欲使用一件事物的能力，除非被武力或法律阻止”（贾斯汀，《法律书》第 c 章第 I 条，digna vox 等）；因此，我对自己的衣服、房屋、金钱拥有统治权力，可以将它们用于上帝和人的法律未禁止的用途，但我不能毁坏我的农田，使其既不长草也不结谷物——国王可以阻止这样做，因为这对公众有害；但国王作为主人和君主，并没有对拿伯的葡萄园拥有这样的统治权力。关于国王如何成为所有财产的主人，ratione jurisdictionis, et tuitionis se. 安东尼奥，de paudrill. 在 l.；Altius。n. 5，c. de servit；Hottom。illust，quest，q. 1，ad fin.，conc. 2；Lod. Molin. de just，et jur. dis. 25；Soto。de justitia et jur. l. 4，q. 4，art. 1。

QUESTION XL
问题 XL

WHETHER OR NO THE PEOPLE HAVE ANY POWER OVER THE KING, EITHER BY HIS OATH, COVENANT, OR ANY OTHER WAY
无论人民是否对国王拥有任何权力，无论是通过他的誓言、契约还是其他任何方式

Aristotle saith, (Ethic. 8, c. 12,) Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τυράννος τὸ ἐαυτοῦ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασελεῦς τὸ τῶν ἀρχεμενῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἐστι βασελεῦς, ὁ μὴ αὐταρκης και πασι τοῖς ἀγαιθοῖς ὑπερέχων, "A tyrant seeketh his own, a king the good of the subjects; for he is no king who is not content and excelleth in goodness." The former part of these words distinguish essentially the king by his office from the tyrant. Now, every office requireth essentially a duty to be performed by him that is in office; and, where there is a duty required, there is some obligation;—if it be a politic duty, it is a politic obligation. 1. Now, amongst politic duties betwixt equal and equal, superior and inferior, that is not, de facto, required co-action for the performance thereof, but, de jure, there is; for two neighbour kings and two neighbour nations, both being equal and independent the one toward the the other, the one owes a duty to the other; and if the Ammonites do a wrong to David and Israel, as they are equal, de facto, the one cannot punish the other, though the Ammonites do a disgrace to David's messengers, yet, de jure, David and Israel may compel them to politic duties of politic consociation, (for betwixt independent kingdoms there must be some politic government, and some politic and civil laws, for two or three making a society cannot dwell together without some policy,) and David and Israel, as by the law of nature they may repel violence with violence; so, if the laws of neighbourhood and nations be broken, the one may punish the other, though there be no relation of superiority and inferiority betwixt them. 2. Wherever there is a covenant and oath betwixt equals, yea, or superiors and inferiors, the one hath some co-active power over the other; if the father give his bond to pay to his son ten thousand pounds, as his patrimony to him, though before the giving of the bond the father was not obliged but only by the law of nature to give a patrimony to his son; yet now, by a politic obligation of promise, covenant, and writ, he is obliged so to his son to pay ten thousand pounds, that, by the law of nations and the civil law, the son hath now a co-active power by law to compel his father, though his superior, to pay him no less than ten thousand pounds of patrimony. Though, therefore, the king should stand simply superior to his kingdom and estates, (which I shall never grant,) yet if the king come under covenant with his kingdom, as I have proved at length, (c. 13,) he must, by that same, come under some co-active power to fulfil his covenant; for omne promissum (saith the law) cadit in debitum, what any doth promise falleth under debt. If the covenant be politic and civil, as is the covenant between king David and all Israel, (2 Sam. 5:1–3,) and between king Jehoash and the people, (2 Kings 11:17, 18,) then the king must come under a civil obligation to perform the covenant; and, though there be none superior to king and the people on earth, to compel them both to perform what they have promised, yet, de jure, by the law of nations, each may compel the other to mutual performance. This is evident,—
亚里士多德说（《伦理学》第 8 章第 12 节）：“暴君追求自己的利益，而国王追求被统治者的利益；因为不满足于自给自足并在善行上超越一切的人不是国王。”这些话的前半部分从本质上区分了国王和暴君的职责。现在，每个职位本质上都要求在职者履行一项职责；而在有职责要求的地方，就存在着某种义务——如果是一项政治职责，就是一种政治义务。1. 现在，在平等和平等之间的政治职责中，实际上并不需要共同行动来履行这些职责，但从法律上讲是需要的；对于两个邻国的国王和两个邻国，彼此之间既平等又独立，彼此之间有义务；如果亚扪人对大卫和以色列做了错事，因为他们是平等的，实际上一个不能惩罚另一个，尽管亚扪人对大卫的使者做了侮辱，但从法律上讲，大卫和以色列可以强迫他们履行政治共同体的政治职责（因为在独立的王国之间必须有一些政治管理和一些政治和民事法律，因为两个或三个人组成的社会不能没有一些政策而生活在一起），大卫和以色列，根据自然法则，他们可以以暴力回击暴力；因此，如果邻里和国家的法律被破坏，一个可以惩罚另一个，尽管他们之间没有上下级关系。 无论在平等者之间，还是在上下级之间，只要存在契约和誓言，一方就对另一方有一定的强制力量；如果父亲向儿子发出债券，承诺支付给他一万英镑作为他的遗产，尽管在发出债券之前，父亲只有按照自然法律的规定给予儿子遗产的义务，但现在，通过政治承诺、契约和法律文件的义务，他有义务向儿子支付一万英镑，根据国际法和民法的规定，儿子现在有法律上的强制力量，可以迫使他的父亲支付不少于一万英镑的遗产。因此，即使国王对他的王国和财产简单地处于上位地位（我永远不会同意这一点），但如果国王与他的王国达成契约，正如我在第 13 章中详细证明的那样，他必须通过同样的方式承担一定的强制力量来履行他的契约；因为法律规定，任何承诺都会变成债务。如果契约是政治和民事的，就像大卫王与以色列全体人民之间的契约一样（撒母耳记下 2 章）。 5:1-3)和国王约阿施与人民之间的约定(列王纪下 11:17,18)，那么国王必须承担民事义务来履行这个约定；虽然在地球上没有人比国王和人民更高，可以强迫他们履行承诺，但根据国际法，双方都可以强迫对方履行互相的承诺。这是显而易见的，

1. By the law of nations, if one nation break covenant to another, though both be independent, yet hath the wronged nation a co-active power, de jure, (by accident, because they are weaker they want strength to compel, yet they have right to compel them,) to force the other to keep covenant, or then to punish them, because nature teacheth to repel violence by violence, so it be done without desire of revenge and malice.
根据国际法，即使两个国家都是独立的，如果其中一个国家违反了与另一个国家的契约，被冒犯的国家仍然有权力（法律上的权力，因为他们较弱，没有强大的力量来强迫对方，但他们有权力强迫对方）强迫对方遵守契约，或者惩罚他们，因为自然法则教导我们用暴力来抵御暴力，只要这样做不是出于报复和恶意的欲望。

2. This is proved from the nature of a promise or covenant, for Solomon saith, (Prov. 6:1, 2,) "My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou hast stricken thy hand with a stranger, thou art snared with the words of thy mouth, and art taken with the words of thy mouth." But whence is it that a man free is now snared as a beast in a gin or trap? Certainly Solomon saith it is by a word and striking of hands, by a word of promise and covenant. Now, the creditor hath co-active power, though he be an equal or an inferior to the man who is surety, even by law to force him to pay, and the judge is obliged to give his co-active power to the creditor, that he may force the surety to pay. Hence it is clear, that a covenant maketh a free man under the co-active power of law to an equal or a weaker, and the stronger is by the law of fraternity to help the weaker with his co-active power, to cause the superior fulfil his covenant. If, then, the king (giving, and not granting, he were superior to his whole kingdom) come under a covenant to them to seek their good, not his own, to defend true protestant religion, they have power to compel him to keep his covenant, and Scotland (if the king be stronger than England, and break his covenant to them) is obliged, by God's law, (Prov. 24:11,) to add their forces and co-active power to help their brethren of England.
这是从承诺或契约的本质得出的结论，所罗门说（箴言 6:1,2）：“我儿，你若为朋友作保，替外人击掌，你就被口中的话语所缠住，被嘴里的言语所捉住。”但是，为什么一个自由的人现在会像兽类一样被陷入陷阱中呢？确实，所罗门说，这是因为一句话和击掌，因为一句承诺和契约。现在，债权人有强制力量，即使他与作为担保人的人是平等的或者是弱者，根据法律他也可以强迫他支付，法官有义务将他的强制力量交给债权人，以便他可以强迫担保人支付。因此，很明显，契约使一个自由的人在法律的强制力下成为一个平等的或者是较弱者，而更强大的人根据兄弟关系的法律义务，应该用他的强制力量帮助较弱者，使上级履行他的契约。 如果国王（假设他比整个王国都更强大）与他们达成一个契约，以寻求他们的利益而非自己的利益，以捍卫真正的新教宗教，他们有权力强迫他遵守契约。如果国王比英格兰更强大，并违背了与苏格兰的契约，苏格兰有义务根据上帝的法律（箴言 24:11）加入他们的力量和协同力量来帮助他们在英格兰的兄弟。

3. The law shall warrant to loose the vassal from the lord when the lord hath broken his covenant, Hippolitus in I., Si quis viduam col. 5, et dixit de quest. I. Si quis major. 41 et 161. Bartol. n. 41. The Magdeburgens. in libel, de offic. magistrat. Imperatores et reges esse primarios vassallos imperii, et regni, et proinde si feloniam contra imperium aut regnum committant, feudo privari, proinde ut alios vasallos.
法律应保证当领主违反契约时，解除臣民与领主的关系，希波利图斯在 I.中，如果有人寡妇，第 5 列，并在问题 I.中说。如果有人更大，第 41 和 161。巴托尔。第 41 号。马格德堡人。在关于官员职责的小册子中，皇帝和国王是帝国和王国的首要臣民，因此如果他们违反了帝国或王国的罪行，应该被剥夺封地，就像其他臣民一样。

Arnisæus (q. 6. An princeps qui jurat subditis, etc. n. 2) saith, "This occasioneth confusion and sedition." "The Egyptians cast off Ptolemæus because he affected too much the name of a king of the Romans, his own friend," Dion. (1. 9.) "The States punished Archidanius because he married a wife of a low stature," Plutarch, (in Ages. in pris.) "The ancient Burgundians thought it cause enough to expel their king, if matters went not well in the state," Marcel. (1. 27.) "The Goths in Spain gave no other cause of expelling their king, nisi quod sibi displiceret, because he displeased them," Aimon. (l. 2, c. 20, l. 4, c. 35.)
阿尼西乌斯（第 6 题，宣誓效忠的君主等等，第 2 题）说：“这引起了混乱和叛乱。”“埃及人抛弃了托勒密，因为他过于追求罗马国王的名号，他自己的朋友，”狄奥尼修斯（第 1 题，第 9 题）。“国家惩罚阿基达尼乌斯，因为他娶了一个身材矮小的妻子，”普鲁塔克（在《阿基达尼乌斯》中，第一题）。“古代的勃艮第人认为，如果国家事务不顺利，这已经足够理由驱逐他们的国王，”马塞尔（第 27 题）。“西班牙的哥特人驱逐他们的国王没有其他原因，只是因为他让他们不满意，”艾蒙（第 2 题，第 20 题，第 4 题，第 35 题）。

Ans.—All these are not to be excused in people, but neither every abuse of power in a king dethroneth a king, nor every abuse in people can make null their power.
答案：这些都不能为人们所原谅，但并非每个国王滥用权力都会使其丧失王位，也并非人们的每个滥用行为都能使他们的权力无效。

Arnisæus maketh three kinds of oaths: The first is, when the king sweareth to defend true religion and the Pope; and he denieth that this is an oath of fidelity, or by paction or covenant made to the Pope or clergy, he saith it is only on oath of protection, nor doth the king receive the crown from the Pope or clergy.
Arnisæus 制定了三种誓言：第一种是国王发誓捍卫真正的宗教和教皇；他否认这是对教皇或神职人员的忠诚誓言，也不是与教皇或神职人员达成的契约或协议，他说这只是一种保护誓言，国王也不是从教皇或神职人员那里接受王冠。

Ans. 1.—Arnisæus divideth oaths that are to be conjoined. We do not read that kings swear to defend religion in one oath, and to administer judgment and justice in another; for David made not two covenants, but only one, with all Israel. 2. The king was not king while he did swear this oath, and therefore is must be a pactional oath between him and the kingdom, and it is true the king receiveth not a crown from the church; yet David received a crown from the church, for this end, "to feed the Lord's people," and so conditionally. Papir. Masse (I. 3, Chron. Gal.) saith, the king was not a king before the oath, and that he swore to be a keeper not only of the first, but also of the second table of the law. Ego N. Dei gratia, mox futurus rex Francorum, in die ordinationis meæ coram Deo, et Sanctis ejus polliceor, quod servabo privilegia canonica, justitiamque et jus unicuique Prælato debitum, vosque defendam, Deo juvante, quantum potero, quemadmodum rex ex officio in suo regno defendere debet, unumquemque episcopum ac ecclesiam, et administrabo populo justitiam et leges, uti jus postulat. And so it is ordained in the council of Toledo: Quisquis deinceps regni sortitus fuerit apicem, non ante conscendat regiam sedem, quam inter reliquas conditiones sacramento policitus fuerit, quod non sinet in regno suo degere eum qui non sit catholicus. All these by Scripture are oaths of covenant, Deut. 17:17, 18; 2 Sam. 5:1–4; 2 Kings 11:17, 18.
答案 1. - 阿尼斯乌斯将要结合的誓言分开。我们没有看到国王在一次誓言中宣誓捍卫宗教，另一次宣誓行使审判和正义；因为大卫只与以色列立下了一个约，而不是两个。2. 国王在宣誓这个誓言时还不是国王，因此这必须是他与王国之间的契约誓言，而且确实国王并不是从教会那里得到王冠；然而大卫从教会那里得到了王冠，目的是为了“喂养主的子民”，因此是有条件的。帕皮尔·马斯（I. 3，Chron. Gal.）说，国王在宣誓之前不是国王，并且他宣誓要成为不仅守护第一条，还守护第二条律法的人。我，N. 神的恩典，即将成为法兰克人的国王，在我受命之日，在上帝和他的圣徒面前，我发誓，我将遵守教会的特权，公正和每位主教应得的权利，并在上帝的帮助下，尽我所能保护你们，正如国王在他的王国中应该保护每一位主教和教堂，并为人民行使正义和法律，正如法律所要求的那样。 在托莱多议会中，这样规定：凡是接任王位的人，在登上王座之前，必须在其他条件之间发誓，承诺不允许非天主教徒在他的王国居住。这些都是根据圣经的盟约誓言，申命记 17:17, 18; 撒母耳记下 5:1–4; 列王纪下 11:17, 18。

Arnisæus maketh a second oath of absolute kings, who swear they shall reign according to equity and justice; and he saith, "There is no need of this oath, a promise is enough; for an oath increaseth not the obligation, (L. fin, de non num. pec.,) only it addeth the bound of religion; for there is no use of an oath where there is no paction of law against him that sweareth; if he violate the oath, there followeth only the punishment of perjury. And the word of a prince is as good as his oath, only he condescendeth to swear to please the people, out of indulgence, not out of necessity. And the king doth not therefore swear because he is made king, but because he is made king he sweareth. And he is not king because he is crowned, but he is crowned because he is king. Where the crown goeth by succession, the king never dieth; and he is king by nature before he be crowned."
阿尼斯乌斯制定了绝对君主的第二个誓言，他们发誓将按照公平和正义来统治；他说：“这个誓言是没有必要的，承诺就足够了；因为誓言并不增加义务（L. fin, de non num. pec.），只是增加了宗教的约束；在没有违反誓言的法律约束的情况下，誓言是没有用处的；如果他违反誓言，只会受到伪证的惩罚。君王的话和他的誓言一样可靠，只是他愿意发誓来取悦人民，出于宽容，而不是出于必要。君王发誓不是因为他成为了国王，而是因为他成为了国王，他才发誓。他不是因为加冕而成为国王，而是因为他是国王才加冕。当王位通过继承传递时，国王永远不会死亡；在加冕之前，他就是天生的国王。”

Ans. 1.—This oath is the very first oath spoken of before, included in the covenant that the king maketh with the people; (2 Sam. 5:2–4;) for absolute powers, by Arnisæus' grant, doth swear to do the duties of a king, as Bodinus maketh the oath of France, (de Rep. l. 1. c. 8,) Juro ego, per deum, ac promitto me juste regnaturum judicium, equitatem, ac misericordiam facturum; and Papir. Masse (1. 3, Chron.) hath the same expressly in the particulars. And by this a king sweareth he shall not be absolute; and if he swear this oath, he bindeth himself not to govern by the law of the king, whereby he may play the tyrant, as Saul did, (1 Sam. 8:9–12, &c.,) as all royalists expound the place. 2. It is but a poor evasion to distinguish betwixt the king's promise and his oath; for the promise and covenant of any man, and so of the king, doth no less bring him under a civil obligation and politic co-action to keep his promise than an oath; for he that becometh surety for his friend doth by no civil law swear he shall be good for the son, or perform in lieu and place of the friend; what he is to perform he doth only covenant and promise, and in law and politic obligation he is taken and snared by that promise, no less than if he had sworn. Reuben offered to be caution to bring Benjamin safe home to his old father, (Gen. 42:37,) and Judah also, (Gen. 43:9,) but they do not swear any oath; and it is true that an oath addeth nothing to a contract and promise, but only it lays on a religious tie before God, yet so as consequently, if the contractor violate both promise and oath, he cometh under the guilt of perjury, which a law of men may punish. Now, that a covenant bringeth the King under a politic obligation as well as an oath, is already proved, and farther confirmed by Gal. 3:15, "Though it be a man's testament or covenant, no man disannuleth and addeth thereunto." No man, even by man's law, can annul a confirmed covenant; and therefore the man that made the covenant bringeth himself under law to fulfil his own covenant, and so must the king put himself under men's law, by a covenant at his coronation; yea, and David is reputed by royalists an absolute prince, yet he cometh under a covenant before he be made a king. 3. It is but a weak reason to say that an oath is needless, where no action of law can be against the king who sweareth, if it have any strength of reason. I retort it; a legal and solemn promise then is needless also, for there is no action of law against a king (as royalists teach) if he violate his promise. So then king David needlessly made a covenant with the people at his coronation; for though David should turn as bloody an enemy to the church as Nero or Julian, the people have no law-action against David; and why then did Jeremiah seek an oath of the king of Judah, that he would not kill him nor deliver him into the hands of his enemies? and why did David seek an oath of Jonathan? It is not like Jeremiah and David could have law-action against a king and a king's son, if they should violate the oath of God; and farther, it is a begging of the question to say that the states can have no action against the king if he should violate his oath. Hugo Grotius putteth seven cases in which the people may have real action against the king to accuse and punish. (1.) They may punish the king to death, for matters capital, if so it be agreed on betwixt the king and the people, as in Lacedæmonia. (2.) He may be punished as a private man. (3.) If the king make away a kingdom given to him by succession, his act is null, and he may be resisted, because the kingdom is a life-rent only to him; yea, saith Barclay, he loseth the crown. (4.) He loseth his kingdom, if, with a hostile mind, he seek the destruction of the kingdom. (5.) If such a clause be put in, that if he commit felony, or do such oppressions, the subjects shall be loosed from the bonds of subjection; then the king, failing thus, turneth a private man. (6.) If the king have the one-half or part of the kingdom, and the people or senate the other half; if the king prey upon that half which is not his own, he may violently be resisted, for in so far he hath not the empire. (7.) If, when the crown was given, this be declared, that in some cases he may be resisted, then some natural liberty is free from the king's power, and reserved in the people's hand. 4. It is then reason that the king swear an oath, 1. That the king's oath is but a ceremony to please the people, and that because he is king, and king by birth, therefore he sweareth, and is crowned, is in question, and denied. No man is born a king, as no man is born a subject; and because the people maketh him king, therefore he is to swear. The council of Toledo saith, non antea conscendat regiam sedem quam juret. 2. An oath is a religious obligation, no arbitrary ceremony. 3. He may swear in his cabinet-chamber, not covenanting with the people, as David and Jehoash did. 4. So he maketh promises that he may be king, not because he is king; it were ridiculous he should promise or swear to be a just king, because he is a just king; and by the same reason the estates swear the oath of loyalty to the new king, not that they may be loyal in all time coming, but because they are loyal subjects already; for if the one-half of the covenant on the king's part be a ceremony of indulgence, not of necessity, by the same reason the other half of the covenant must be a ceremony of indulgence also to the people.
答案 1. - 这个誓言是在之前提到的誓言中的第一个，包括国王与人民所达成的契约中；（撒母耳记下 5:2-4；）因为绝对权力，根据阿尼塞乌斯的授权，发誓要履行国王的职责，正如博丁纳斯在法国的誓言中所说的那样，（de Rep. l. 1. c. 8，）我发誓，我将以公正的方式统治，行使审判，公正和仁慈；而帕皮尔·马斯（1. 3, Chron.）在具体事项上明确提到了同样的内容。通过这个誓言，国王发誓他不会是绝对的；如果他发誓了这个誓言，他就不会按照国王的法律来统治，从而可能成为暴君，正如扫罗所做的那样，（撒母耳记上 8:9-12 等，）正如所有君主主义者解释这个地方的意思。 2. 这只是一个差劲的回避，区分国王的承诺和他的誓言；因为任何人的承诺和契约，包括国王的，都同样使他承担民事义务和政治约束来履行承诺，就像誓言一样；因为为朋友担保的人并没有根据民法发誓他会为儿子做好，或者代替朋友履行义务；他只是约定和承诺要履行的事情，在法律和政治义务上，他被这个承诺所束缚，就像他发过誓一样。流便主动提出担保将便雅悯安全带回老父亲那里（创世记 42:37），犹大也是如此（创世记 43:9），但他们并没有发誓；而且确实，誓言对合同和承诺没有任何增加，只是在上帝面前加上了宗教的约束，但是如果承诺者违背了承诺和誓言，他就会陷入伪证的罪责，这是人类法律可以惩罚的。现在，一个契约使国王承担政治义务，就像誓言一样，这已经得到证明，并且在加拉太书 3:15 中得到了进一步的证实：“尽管是人的遗嘱或契约，没有人能废除或增加其中的条款。”没有人，即使是按照人的法律，也不能废除一个确认的契约；因此，订立契约的人必须遵守自己的契约，这样国王就必须通过加冕时的契约接受人们的法律约束；是的，而且保皇派认为大卫是一个绝对的君主，然而他在成为国王之前也要订立契约。3. 如果有任何合理的理由，说宣誓是不必要的，因为对于发誓的国王来说，法律无法对他采取任何行动。我反驳说，法律上的庄重承诺也是不必要的，因为（正如保皇派所教导的）如果国王违背了自己的承诺，法律也无法对他采取行动。所以，大卫国王在加冕时不必要地与人民订立契约；因为即使大卫变成像尼禄或朱利安那样对教会充满敌意的敌人，人民也无法通过法律对大卫采取行动；那么为什么耶利米要求犹大国王发誓，不杀他，也不将他交给敌人？大卫为什么要求约拿单发誓呢？ 不像耶利米和大卫可以对国王和国王的儿子采取法律行动，如果他们违反了上帝的誓言；而且，如果国王违反了他的誓言，说国家不能对国王采取行动是个问题。雨果·格罗蒂乌斯列举了七种情况，人民可以对国王提起真正的诉讼来控告和惩罚。（1.）如果国王和人民都同意，他们可以处死国王，因为这是在拉克达蒙尼亚的情况。（2.）他可以像一个普通人一样受到惩罚。（3.）如果国王废除了通过继承给予他的王国，他的行为是无效的，人们可以反抗他，因为王国只是他的终身租赁权；巴克利说，他失去了王冠。（4.）如果他怀有敌意，寻求摧毁王国，他将失去王国。（5.）如果有这样的条款，即如果他犯下重罪或施加压迫，臣民将被解除从属关系的束缚；那么，国王在这种情况下就成为一个普通人。（6.）如果国王拥有王国的一半或部分，而人民或参议院拥有另一半；如果国王掠夺不属于他自己的那一半，他可能会遭到强烈的抵抗，因为在这方面他没有帝国。（7）如果在授予王冠时宣布，在某些情况下可以抵抗国王，那么一些自然的自由就摆脱了国王的权力，并保留在人民手中。4. 因此，国王宣誓是合理的，1. 国王的誓言只是为了取悦人民的仪式，因为他是国王，而且是出生的国王，所以他宣誓并加冕，这是有争议的并被否认的。没有人生来就是国王，就像没有人生来就是臣民一样；因为人民让他成为国王，所以他必须宣誓。托莱多的议会说，非在宣誓之前不得登上王位。2. 宣誓是一种宗教义务，而不是任意的仪式。3. 他可以在内阁室宣誓，而不是与人民缔结契约，就像大卫和约阿施所做的那样。4. 所以他承诺成为国王，不是因为他已经是国王；他承诺或发誓成为公正的国王是荒谬的，因为他已经是公正的国王；同样的道理，贵族们宣誓效忠新国王，并不是为了将来永远忠诚，而是因为他们已经是忠诚的臣民；因为如果国王在契约的一半上是一种仪式性的宽容，而不是必要的，那么契约的另一半也必须是对人民的宽容的仪式。

Obj.—Arnisæus saith, A contract cannot be dissolved in law, but by consent of two parties contracting, because both are obliged; (I. ab emptione 58, in pr. de pact. l. 3, de rescind, vend. l. 80, de solu;) therefore, if the subjects go from the covenant that they have made to be loyal to the king, they ought to be punished.
Obj. - 阿尼塞乌斯说，合同不能在法律上解除，除非两个缔约方同意，因为双方都有义务；（I. ab emptione 58, in pr. de pact. l. 3, de rescind, vend. l. 80, de solu;) 因此，如果主体们违背了他们对国王忠诚的契约，他们应该受到惩罚。

Ans.—A contract, the conditions whereof are violated by neither side, cannot be dissolved but by the joint consent of both; and in buying and selling, and in all contracts unviolated, the sole will of neither side can violate the contract: of this speaketh the law. But I ask the royalists, if the contract betwixt the spies sent to view Jericho, and Rahab the harlot, had not been null, and the spies free from any obligation, if Rahab had neglected to keep within doors when Jericho was taken, though Rahab and the spies had never consented expressly to break the covenant? We hold that the law saith with us, that vassals loss their farm if they pay not what is due. Now, what are kings but vassals to the state, who, if they turn tyrants, fall from their right?
答案：合同的条件没有被任何一方违反，只能通过双方共同同意解除；在买卖和所有未被违反的合同中，任何一方的意愿都不能违反合同：法律就是这样说的。但我问皇室主义者，如果派去侦察耶利哥的间谍与妓女喇合的合同不是无效的，间谍也没有任何义务，如果喇合在耶利哥被攻占时没有留在屋内，即使喇合和间谍从未明确同意违反契约，这个合同不是也会失效吗？我们认为法律与我们一样说，臣民如果不支付应付的款项，就会失去他们的土地。那么，国王不就是国家的臣民吗？如果他们变成暴君，就会失去他们的权利。

Arnisæus saith in the council of Toledo, (4. c. 47,) the subjects ask from the king, that kings would be meek and just, not upon the ground of a voluntary contract and paction, but because God shall rejoice in king and people by so doing.
阿尼西乌斯在托莱多会议上说道，（第 4 章第 47 节），臣民要求国王温和公正，不是基于自愿的契约和协议，而是因为上帝会因此而喜悦于国王和人民。

Ans.—These two do no more fight with one another than that two merchants should keep faith one to another, both because God hath said he shall dwell in God's mountain who sweareth and covenanteth, and standeth to his oath and covenant, though to his loss and hurt, (Psal. 15) and also because they made their covenant and contract thus and thus.
答：这两个人之间的争斗并不比两个商人之间的信守更多，这是因为上帝说过，发誓并守约的人将居住在上帝的山上，即使这样做会损失和受伤（诗篇 15），而且他们按照这样和那样的方式达成了他们的契约和合同。

Arnisæus.—Every prince is subject to God, but not as a vassal; for a master may commit felony, and lose the propriety of his farm. Can God do so? The master cannot take the farm from the vassal without an express cause legally deduced; but cannot God take what he hath given but by a law process? A vassal can entitle to himself a farm against the master's will, as some jurists say, but can a prince entitle a kingdom to himself against the God of heaven's will? Though we grant the comparison, yet the subjects have no law over the kings, because the coercive power of the vassal is in the lord of the manor, the punishing of kings belongeth to God.
阿尼斯斯。每个王子都服从上帝，但不是作为一个臣子；因为主人可能犯罪，失去他的农场的所有权。上帝能做到这一点吗？主人不能没有明确的法律依据就从臣子那里夺取农场；但上帝能否通过法律程序夺取他所给予的东西？一些法学家说，臣子可以违背主人的意愿获得农场，但一个王子能否违背天上的上帝的意愿获得一个王国？虽然我们承认这种比较，但臣民对国王没有法律权力，因为臣子的强制权力在庄园的主人手中，惩罚国王属于上帝。

Ans. 1.—We compare not the lord of a manor and the Lord of heaven together; all these dissimilitudes we grant, but as the king is God's vassal, so is he a noble and princely vassal to the estates of a kingdom because they make him. 2. They make him rather than another their noble servant. 3. They make him for themselves and their own godly, quiet, and honest life. 4. They, in their first election, limit him to such a way, to govern by law, and give to him so much power for their good, no more; in these four actst hey are above the prince, and so have a coercive power over him.
答案 1.——我们不将领主和天堂的主相比较；我们承认所有这些不同之处，但是正如国王是上帝的封臣一样，他也是王国的贵族和王子般的封臣，因为他们造就了他。2. 他们选择他而不是其他人作为他们的贵族仆人。3. 他们为了自己和他们自己的虔诚、宁静和诚实的生活而造就他。4. 他们在最初的选举中将他限制在这样一种方式下，即按照法律来治理，并为了他们的利益给予他这么多的权力，没有更多；在这四个行动中，他们高于王子，因此对他有一种强制力量。

Arnisæus.—It is to make the prince's fidelity doubtful to put him to an oath. Lawyers say there is no need of an oath, when a person is of approved fidelity.
Arnisæus.——让王子的忠诚成为可疑的是为了让他发誓。律师们说，当一个人的忠诚得到认可时，就不需要发誓。

Ans. 1.—Then we are not to seek an oath of an inferior magistrate, of a commander in wars, of a pastor, it is presumed these are of approved fidelity, and it maketh their integrity obnoxious to slander to put them on an oath. 2. David was of more approved fidelity than any king now a-days, and to put him to a covenant seemed to call his fidelity in question; Jonathan sought an oath of David to deal kindly with his seed when he came to the throne; Jeremiah sought an oath of the king of Judah. Did they put any note of falsehood on them therefore?
答案 1：那么我们不需要寻求下级官员、战争指挥官、牧师的誓言，因为人们认为他们的忠诚已经得到认可，让他们宣誓会使他们的诚信受到诽谤的威胁。答案 2：大卫的忠诚比现今任何国王都更加可靠，让他宣誓似乎是在质疑他的忠诚；约拿单要求大卫宣誓在他登基后善待他的后代；耶利米要求犹大王宣誓。难道他们因此被贴上了虚假的标签吗？

Arnisæus.—You cannot prove that ever any king gave an oath to his subjects in Scripture.
阿尼西乌斯。你无法证明在圣经中有任何国王向他的臣民宣誓的记录。

Ans. 1.—What more unbeseeming kings is it to swear to do their duty, than to promise covenant-wise to do the same? And a covenant you cannot deny. 2. In a covenant for religious duties there was always an oath, (2 Chron. 15:12–14,) hence the rite of cutting a calf, and swearing in a covenant (Jer. 34:18). 3. There is an oath that the people giveth to the king to obey him, (Eccles. 8:2,) and a covenant (2 Sam. 5:1–3) mutual between the king and people; I leave it to the judicious, if the people swear to the king obedience in a covenant mutual, and he swear not to them.
答案 1：对于国王来说，发誓履行职责比承诺以契约方式履行职责更不合适。而且你不能否认一个契约。2. 在宗教职责的契约中，总是有一个誓言（《历代志下》15:12-14），因此有割小牛和在契约中宣誓的仪式（《耶利米书》34:18）。3. 人民向国王发誓服从他（《传道书》8:2），并且国王与人民之间有一个相互的契约（《撒母耳记下》5:1-3）；我把这个问题留给明智的人，如果人民在相互的契约中向国王发誓服从，而他没有向他们发誓，他们会怎么想。

Arnisæus showeth to us a third sort of oath that limited princes do swear. This oath in Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, is sworn by the kings, who may do nothing without consent of the senate, and according to order of law; this is but the other two oaths specified, and a prince cannot contravene his own contract; the law saith, in that the prince is but as a private man (in I. digna vox C. de ll. Rom. cons. 426, n. 17); and it is known that the emperor is constituted and created by the prince's electors, subject to them, and by law may be dethroned by them.
阿尼斯乌斯向我们展示了统治者所宣誓的第三种誓言。这种誓言在丹麦、瑞典、波兰和匈牙利等国家由国王宣誓，国王不能不经参议院同意和法律规定而做任何事情；这只是其他两种特定誓言的补充，统治者不能违背自己的合同；法律规定，统治者只是一个普通人（在 I. digna vox C. de ll. Rom. cons. 426, n. 17 中）；众所周知，皇帝是由选举人选出并受其支配，法律规定他们有权废黜皇帝。

The Bishop of Rochester (de potest, p. l. 2, c. 20) saith from Barclay, "None can denude a king of his power, but he that gave him the power, or hath an express commandment so to do, from him that gave the power. But God only, and the people, gave the king his power; therefore God, with the people, having an express commandment from God, must denude the king of power.
罗切斯特主教（来自巴克利）说：“除非是给予国王权力的那个人，或者是得到明确命令的人，否则没有人可以剥夺国王的权力。但只有上帝和人民给予国王权力；因此，上帝和人民必须根据上帝的明确命令剥夺国王的权力。”

Ans. 1.—This shall prove that God only, by an immediate action, or some having an express commandment from him, can deprive a preacher for scandals; Christ only, or those who have an express commandment from him, can excommunicate; God only, or the magistrate with him, can take away the life of man (Numb. 11:14–16); and no inferior magistrates, who also have their power from God immediately, (Rom. 13:1,) if we speak of the immediation of the office, can denude inferior judges of their power. God only, by the husbandman's pains, maketh a fruitful vineyard, therefore, the husbandman cannot make his vineyard grow over with nettles and briers. 2. The argument must run thus, else the assumption shall be false. God only by the action of the people as his instrument, and by no other action, makes a lawful king; God only by the action of the people, as his instrument, can make a king; God only by the action of the people, as his instrument, can dethrone a king; for as the people, making a king, are in that doing what God doth before them, and what God doth by them in that very act, so the people unmaking a king, doth that which God doth before the people; both the one and the other according to God's rule obligeth. (Deut, 17:14–20.)
答案 1：这将证明只有上帝，通过直接行动或一些得到他明确命令的人，才能因为丑闻而剥夺传教士的地位；只有基督或那些得到他明确命令的人才能逐出教会；只有上帝或与他同在的执法者才能夺取人的生命（民数记 11:14-16）；如果我们谈论职位的直接性，那么没有下级执法者，他们也是直接从上帝得到权力的（罗马书 13:1），不能剥夺下级法官的权力。只有上帝通过农夫的辛勤劳动才能使葡萄园多产，因此，农夫不能让他的葡萄园长满荨麻和荆棘。2.论证必须这样进行，否则假设就是错误的。 上帝只通过人民的行动作为他的工具，而不是其他行动，才能使一个合法的国王产生；上帝只通过人民的行动作为他的工具，才能使一个国王产生；上帝只通过人民的行动作为他的工具，才能废黜一个国王；因为人民在选择国王时，是在做上帝在他们之前所做的事情，也是在上帝通过他们在那个行动中所做的事情；同样，人民废黜一个国王，也是在做上帝在人民之前所做的事情；无论是选择还是废黜国王，都是按照上帝的规定来行事的。（申命记 17:14-20）)

The prelate, whose tribe seldom saith truth, addeth,—"As a fatherly power, by God and nature's law, over a family, was in the father of a family before the children could either transfer their power, or consent to the translation of that power to him, so a kingly power (which succeedeth to a paternal or fatherly power) to govern many families, yea, and a kingdom, was in that same father, in relation to many families, before these many families can transfer their power. The kingly power floweth immediately from God, and the people doth not transfer that power, but doth only consent to the person of the king, or doth only choose his person at some time. And though this power were principally given to the people, it is not so given to the people as if it were the people's power, and not God's, for it is God's power; neither is it any otherwise given to the people, but as to a stream, a beam, and an instrument which may confer it to another." M. Antonius (de domini. l. 6, c. 2, n. 22, 23) doth more subtlely illustrate the matter: "If the king should confer honour on a subject, by the hand of a servant who had not power or freedom to confer that honour, or not to confer it, but by necessity of the king's commandment must confer it, nothing should hinder us to say, that such a subject had his honour immediately from the king: so the earth is immediately illuminated by the sun, although light be received on the earth, but by the intervening mediation of many inferior bodies and elements, because by no other thing but by the sun only, is the light as an efficient cause in a nearest capacity to give light; so the royal power in whomsoever it be, is immediately from God only, though it be applied by men to this or that person, because from God only, and from no other the kingly power is formally and effectively that which it is, and worketh that which it worketh; and if you ask by what cause is the tree immediately turned into fire, none sound in reason would say, it is made fire, not by the fire, but by him that laid the tree on the fire." John P. P. would have stolen this argument also, if he had been capable thereof.
那位教长，他的部落很少说真话，补充道：“作为一个父亲般的权力，根据上帝和自然法则，在孩子们能够转让他们的权力或同意将权力转移给他之前，这种权力在一个家庭的父亲身上存在。因此，一个国王的权力（继承了父权或父亲般的权力）来统治许多家庭，甚至一个王国，在这个父亲与许多家庭的关系中，这个权力早已存在，而这些许多家庭在转让他们的权力之前。国王的权力直接来自上帝，人民并没有转让这个权力，而只是同意国王的人选，或者只是在某个时候选择他的人选。虽然这个权力主要是给予人民的，但它并不是给予人民的权力，而是上帝的权力；它也不是以任何其他方式给予人民，而是像一条河流、一束光线和一个工具，可以将它转交给另一个人。” M.安东尼乌斯（de domini. l. 6, c. 2, n. 22, 23) 更加巧妙地阐明了这个问题：“如果国王通过一个没有权力或自由来授予荣誉的仆人的手来授予一个臣民荣誉，或者只能通过国王的命令来授予荣誉，那么我们毫不犹豫地说，这个臣民的荣誉是直接来自国王的：同样，尽管光是通过许多次要的物体和元素的中介而被地球接收，但地球仍然是直接被太阳照亮的，因为只有太阳作为一个有效的原因，才能在最近的能力上提供光；同样，无论是在任何人身上，皇权都是直接来自上帝的，尽管人们将皇权应用于这个或那个人，因为皇权只有来自上帝，而没有其他任何东西，皇权才是形式上和实质上的，它产生了它所产生的效果；如果你问树是如何立即变成火的，没有理智的人会说，树不是被火而是被将树放在火上的人变成了火。”如果约翰·P·P·有能力的话，他也会偷走这个论点。

Ans. 1.—A fatherly power is in a father, not before he hath a child, but indeed before his children by an act of their free-will consent that he be their father; yea, and whether the children consent or no, from a physical act of generation, he must be the father; and let the father be the most wicked man, and let him be made by no moral requisite, yet is he made a father, nor can he ever leave off physically to be a father: he may leave off morally to do the duty of a father, and so be non pater officio, but he cannot but be pater naturce generantis vi. So there never is, nor can be, any need that children's free consent intervene to make Kish the father of Saul, because he is by nature a father. To make Saul a king and a moral father by analogy and improperly,—a father by ruling, governing, guiding, defending Israel by good laws, in peace and godliness, I hope there is some act of the people's free-will required even by Spalato's way; the people must approve him to be king, yea, they must king him, or constitute him lung, say we. No such act is required of natural sons to make a physical father, and so here is a great halt in the comparison, and it is most false that there is a Kingly power to govern many families in the same father, before these many families can transfer their power to make him king. Put royalists to their logic, they have not found out a medium to make good that there is a formal kingly power whereby Saul is king and father morally over all Israel before Israel chose him and made him, as Kish was Saul's father formally, and had a fatherly power to be his father, before Saul had the use of free-will to consent that he should be his father. Royalists are here at a stand. The man may have royal gifts before the people make him king, but this is not regia potestas, a royal power, by which the man is formally king. Many have more royal gifts than the man that beareth the crown, yet are never kings, nor is there formally regia potestas, kingly power, in them. In this meaning Petrarch said, Plures sunt reges quam regna. 2. He saith, "The people doth not confer royal power, but only consent to the person of the man, or choice of his person." This is nonsense, for the people's choosing of David at Hebron to be king, and their refusing of Saul's seed to be king, what was it but an act of God, by the free suffrages of the people, conferring royal power on David, and making him king? Whereas in former times, David even anointed by Samuel at Bethlehem, (1 Sam. 16,) was only a private man, the subject of king Saul, and never termed by the Spirit of God a king; nor was he king till God, by the people's consent made him king at Hebron; for Samuel neither honoured him as king, nor bowed to him as king, nor did the people say, God save king David; but after this David acknowledgeth Saul as his master and king, Let royalists show us any act of God making David king, save this act of the people making him formally king at Hebron, and therefore the people, as God's instrument, transferred the power, and God by them in the same act transferred the power, and in the same they chose the person; the royalists affirm these to be different actions, affirmanti incumbit probatio. 3. This power is the people's radically, naturally, as the bees (as some think) have a power natural to choose a king-bee, so hath a community a power naturally to defend and protect themselves; and God hath revealed in Deut. 7:14, 15, the way of regulating the act of choosing governors and kings, which is a special mean of defending and protecting themselves; and the people is as principally the subject and fountain of royal power, as a fountain is of water. I shall not contend, if you call a fountain God's instrument to give water, as all creatures are his instruments. 4. For Spalato's comparison, he is far out, for the people choosing one of ten to be their king, have free will to choose any, and are under a law (Deut. 17:14, 15) in the manner of their choosing, and though they err and make a sinful choice, yet the man is king, and God's king, whom they make king; but, if the king command a servant to make A. B. a knight, if the servant make C. D. a knight, I shall not think C. D. is a valid knight at all; and indeed the honour is immediately here from the king, because the king's servant by no innate power maketh the knight, but nations by a radical, natural, and innate power, maketh this man a king, not that man; and I conceive the man chosen by the people oweth thanks and grateful service to the people, who rejected others, that they had power to choose, and made him king. 5. The light immediately and formally is light from the sun, and so is the office of a king immediately instituted of God, Deut. 17:14. Whether the institution be natural or positive, it is no matter. 2. The man is not king, because of royal endowments, though we should say these were immediately from God, to which instruction and education may also confer not a little; but he is formally king, ratione ἐξοίσιας βασιλίκης in regard of the formal essence of a king, not immediately from God, as the light is from the sun, but by the mediation of the free consent of the people; (2 Sam. 5:1–3;) nor is the people in making a king, as the man who only casteth wood in the fire; the wood is not made fire formally, but by the fire, not by the approach of fire to wood, or of wood to fire; tor the people do not apply the royalty, which is immediately in and from God to the person. Explicate such an application; for to me it is a fiction inconceivable, because the people hath the royalty radically in themselves, as in the fountain and cause, and conferreth it on the man who is made king; yea, the people, by making David king, confer the royal power on the king. This is so true, that royalists, forgetting themselves, inculcate frequently in asserting their absolute monarch from Ulpian, but misunderstood that the people have resigned all their power, liberty, right of life, death, goods, chastity, a potency of rapine, homicides, unjust wars, &c., upon a crearture called an absolute prince; even, saith Grotius, as a man may make himself a slave, by selling his liberty to a master. Now, if the people make away this power to the king, and this be nothing but the transcendent absoluteness of a king, certainly this power was in the people; for how can they give to a king that which they have not themselves? As a man cannot make away his liberty to a master, by becoming a slave to him, if his liberty were immediately in God, as royalists say, sovereignty is immediately in God, and people can exercise no act about sovereignty, to make it over to one man rather than to another. People only have an after-approbation, that this man to whom God hath given it immediately, shall have it. Furthermore, they say, people in making a king may make such conditions, as in seven cases a king may be dethroned, at least resisted, saith Hugo Grotius: therefore people may give more or less, half or whole, limited or absolute royal power to the prince; but if this power were immediately in God and from God, how could the people have the husbanding of it, at their need to expend it out in ounce weights, or pound weights, as they please? And that the people may be purveyors of it to sell or give it, is taught y Grotius (de jur. bel et pae. l. 1, c. 4); Barclay (advers. monarch. l. 4, c. 6); Arnisæus (c. 6, de majest. an princeps qui jurat subditis, &c. n. 10, n. se Aventium Anal l. 3); Chytreus (l. 23, Z. 28); Saxon Sleidan (lib. 1, in fi); yet Arnisæus is not ashamed to cite Aristot. (polit. c. 12, I. 3), that he is not a true and absolute king who ruleth by laws. The point blank contrary of which Aristotle saith.
答案 1：父亲的权力存在于他成为孩子的父亲之后，而不是在他拥有孩子之前，实际上是通过他们自愿同意他成为他们的父亲的行为来成为父亲；是的，无论孩子们是否同意，从生育的生理行为来看，他必须是父亲；即使父亲是最邪恶的人，即使他没有任何道德要求，他也成为了父亲，而且他永远无法在生理上停止成为父亲：他可以在道义上停止履行父亲的职责，因此成为非父亲（non pater officio），但他无法不成为生物学上的父亲（pater naturce generantis vi）。因此，没有必要要求孩子的自愿同意来使基士成为扫罗的父亲，因为他天生就是父亲。至于使扫罗成为国王和道义上的父亲，通过类比和不正确的方式，即通过统治、管理、引导、保护以善法在和平与虔诚中引导以色列，我希望即使按照斯帕拉托的方式，也需要人民的自愿行为；人民必须批准他成为国王，是的，他们必须封他为王，或者说我们要他成为国王。 没有必要让自然的儿子成为一个生理上的父亲，所以在比较中有一个巨大的停顿，而且说有一个国王的权力在许多家庭中统治，这是最错误的，因为在这些许多家庭能够转移他们的权力使他成为国王之前，以色列全体人民都选择了才使他成为国王。按照君主主义者的逻辑，他们没有找到一个中间地带来证明在以色列人选择扫罗并使他成为国王之前，扫罗在道义上是以色列全体人民的国王和父亲，就像基士在道义上是扫罗的父亲一样，并且在扫罗有自由意志同意他成为他的父亲之前，基士就有了作为他的父亲的父亲的权力。君主主义者在这里陷入了困境。这个人在人民使他成为国王之前可能有皇家的才能，但这不是 regia potestas，即正式的国王权力，通过这个权力，这个人正式成为国王。许多人比戴着王冠的人拥有更多的皇家才能，但他们从来不是国王，他们身上也没有正式的 regia potestas，即国王权力。在这个意义上，彼得拉克说，Plures sunt reges quam regna。他说，“人民并没有授予国王权力，而只是同意这个人的人格或选择他的人格。”这是胡说八道，人民在希伯伦选择大卫为国王，拒绝扫罗的后裔成为国王，这不就是上帝的行动吗？人民自由投票，将王权赋予大卫，使他成为国王。而在过去，大卫即使在伯利恒被撒母耳膏立为王（撒母耳记上 16 章），也只是一个普通人，是扫罗国王的臣民，并没有被上帝的灵称为国王；直到上帝经过人民的同意在希伯伦立他为国王，他才成为国王。因为撒母耳既不尊重他为国王，也不向他臣服，人民也没有说“上帝保佑国王大卫”；但在此之后，大卫承认扫罗是他的主人和国王。保皇派应该向我们展示上帝使大卫成为国王的任何行动，除了人民在希伯伦正式立他为国王的行动之外，因此人民作为上帝的工具转移了权力，上帝也在同一行动中通过他们转移了权力，并在同一行动中选择了这个人；保皇派声称这些是不同的行动，那么他们有责任提供证据。 这种权力是人民的根本，自然的，就像蜜蜂（有些人认为）有天然选择一只王蜂的权力一样，社区也有天然的权力来保护和保卫自己；上帝在申命记 7:14, 15 中揭示了调节选择统治者和国王的行为的方式，这是保护和保卫自己的特殊手段；人民是皇权的主体和源泉，就像泉水是水的源泉一样。如果你称泉水是上帝给予水的工具，我不会争辩，因为所有的生物都是他的工具。至于斯帕拉托的比较，他大错特错，因为人民选择十分之一的人作为他们的国王，他们有自由选择任何人，并且在选择方式上受到法律的约束（申命记 17:14, 15），尽管他们犯错并做出罪恶的选择，但那个人是国王，是他们选择的国王；但是，如果国王命令仆人让 A. B.成为骑士，如果仆人让 C. D.成为骑士，我不会认为 C. D. 是一个合法的骑士; 事实上，荣誉立即来自国王，因为国王的仆人并非凭借先天的力量成为骑士，而是国家凭借根本的、自然的和先天的力量，使这个人成为国王，而不是那个人; 我认为被人民选中的人应该向人民致以感谢和感激的服务，因为他们拒绝了其他人，他们有权选择，并使他成为国王。5. 光明立即和正式地来自太阳，国王的职位也是由上帝立即设立的，申命记 17:14。无论这个制度是自然的还是积极的，都无关紧要。2. 这个人不是国王，因为他具有王室的天赋，尽管我们可以说这些天赋是直接来自上帝，教育和培养也可以起到一定的作用; 但他在形式上是国王，因为他具有国王的形式本质，不是直接来自上帝，就像光明来自太阳一样，而是通过人民的自由同意的中介;（撒上 5:1–3;) 人民在选举国王时，并不像只是把木头投入火中的人；木头并不是通过形式上的火而成为火，而是通过火本身，而不是火接近木头，或者木头接近火；因为人民并没有将直接来自上帝的王权应用于个人。解释一下这样的应用；对我来说，这是一个难以想象的虚构，因为人民在根本上拥有王权，就像是源泉和原因一样，并将其授予成为国王的人；是的，人民通过选举大卫为国王，将王权授予了国王。这是如此真实，以至于君主主义者忘记了自己，在坚称他们的绝对君主权力时，引用乌尔皮安的话，但误解了人民已经放弃了他们的权力、自由、生死权、财产、贞操、掠夺、杀人、不正义的战争等等，交给了一个被称为绝对君主的人；正如格罗蒂乌斯所说，一个人可以通过将自己的自由卖给主人而成为奴隶。 现在，如果人民将这种权力交给国王，而这只是国王的绝对权力，那么这种权力肯定是在人民手中；因为他们怎么能把自己没有的东西给国王呢？正如一个人不能通过成为奴隶将他的自由让给主人一样，如果他的自由立即在上帝那里，正如君主主义者所说的那样，主权立即在上帝那里，人民就不能对主权进行任何行动，将其转交给某个人而不是另一个人。人民只能事后批准，上帝立即赋予这个人拥有主权。此外，他们说，人民在选择国王时可以制定一些条件，比如在七种情况下可以废黜国王，至少可以抵抗，雨果·格罗提乌斯说：因此，人民可以给予王子更多或更少的权力，半权或全权，有限或绝对的王权；但是，如果这种权力立即来自上帝，人民如何能够在需要时掌握它，按照他们的意愿以盎司或磅的重量来支配它？格罗提乌斯（de jur. bel et pae. l. 1, c. 4）和巴克利（advers. monarch. l.）都教导我们，人民可以成为它的供应商，出售或赠送它。 4，c. 6）; Arnisæus（c. 6，de majest. an princeps qui jurat subditis, &c. n. 10, n. se Aventium Anal l. 3）; Chytreus（l. 23, Z. 28）; Saxon Sleidan（lib. 1, in fi）; 然而 Arnisæus 却不惭愧地引用亚里士多德（polit. c. 12, I. 3）的话，说通过法律统治的人不是真正的和绝对的国王。而亚里士多德正好相反地说。

QUESTION XLI
问题 XLI

WHETHER DOTH THE P. PRELATE UPON GOOD GROUNDS ASCRIBE TO US THE DOCTRINE OF JESUITS IN THESE QUESTIONS OF LAWFUL DEFENSIVE WARS
无论教皇代表是否有充分的理由将耶稣会士的教义归因于我们在这些合法防御战的问题上。

The P. Prelate, without all ground, will have us all Jesuits in this point, but if we make good that this truth was in Scripture before a Jesuit was in the earth, he falleth from his cause.
普雷拉特主教毫无根据地要求我们所有的耶稣会士在这一点上一致，但如果我们能证明在地球上有耶稣会士之前，这个真理已经存在于圣经中，他就会失败。

P. Prelate (c. 1, p. 1, 2).—The Begardi saith, There was no government, no law given to the just. It feareth me this age fancieth to itself some such thing, and have learned of Korah, Dathan, &c.
P. Prelate（第 1 章，第 1 页，第 2 行）。——Begardi 说，公义者没有被赋予任何政府，任何法律。我担心这个时代会自以为有这样的东西，并且从可拉、大坍等人那里学到了一些东西。

Ans.—This calumniator, in the next words, belieth himself when he saith, We presuppose that those with whom we are to enter in lists, do willingly grant that government is not only lawful and just, but necessary both for church and commonwealth: then we fancy no such thing as he imputeth to us.
答：这个诽谤者在接下来的话中自相矛盾，他说我们假设我们要与之交锋的人自愿承认政府不仅合法和公正，而且对教会和公共利益都是必要的：然后我们并没有想象他所归咎于我们的那种情况。

P. Prelate.—Some said that the right of dominion is founded on grace, whether the Waldenses and Huss held any such tenet, I cannot now insist to prove or disprove. Gerson and others held that there must be a new title and right to what men possess. Too many too confidently hold these or the like.
P. Prelate. - 有人说统治权是建立在恩典之上的，无论瓦尔登斯派和胡斯派是否持有这样的信条，我现在不能坚持证明或否定。格尔松和其他人认为，人们所拥有的东西必须有一个新的称号和权利。太多人过于自信地持有这些或类似的观点。

Ans.—1. That dominion is founded upon grace as its essential pillar, so as wicked men be no magistrates, because they are in mortal sin, was falsly imputed to ancient I protestants, the Waldenses, Wicliff, and Huss, by papists; and this day by Jesuits, Suarez, Bellarmine, Becanus. The P. Prelate will leave them under this calumny, that he may offend papists and Jesuits as little as he can, but he would lay it on us; but if the P. Prelate think that dominion is not founded on grace, de jure, that rulers should have that spirit that God put on the seventy elders for their calling, and that they ought not to be "men fearing God and hating covetousness," as Gerson and others did, he belieth the Scripture. 2. It is no error of Gerson that believers have a sipritual right to their civil possessions, but by Scripture, 1 Cor. 4:21; Rev. 21:7.
答案：1.那个统治是建立在恩典之上的，作为其基本支柱，所以邪恶的人不能成为统治者，因为他们犯了致命的罪，这是被天主教徒错误地归咎于古代的新教徒、瓦尔登斯派、威克里夫和胡斯；而今天，这种指责又来自耶稣会士、苏亚雷斯、贝拉尔米诺和贝卡努斯。主教会把这些诽谤留给他们，以尽量不冒犯天主教徒和耶稣会士，但他却想把责任推给我们；但如果主教会认为统治不是建立在恩典之上的，按照法律，统治者应该拥有上帝赋予七十位长老的灵，他们不应该像格尔松和其他人那样是“敬畏上帝、憎恶贪婪”的人，那么他就是在说谎经文。2. 根据经文，格尔松没有错误地认为信徒对他们的财产有一种属灵的权利，这在哥林多前书 4:21 和启示录 21:7 中有所体现。

P. Prelate.—The Jesuits are ashamed of the error of casuists, who hold that, directum imperium, the direct and primary power, supreme, civil, and ecclesiastical, is in the Pope; and, therefore, they give an indirect directive and coercive power to him over kings and states, in ordine ad spiritualia, so may he king and unking princes at his pleasure. Our presbyterians, if they run not fully this way, are very near to it.
普雷拉特。耶稣会对于犯错的伦理学家感到羞愧，他们认为直接的、首要的权力，即至高无上的、民事和教会的权力，属于教皇；因此，他们赋予他对国王和国家的间接指导和强制权力，以便在属灵的秩序中，他可以随意使国王成为国王或非国王。我们的长老会，如果他们没有完全走这条路，也非常接近这种观点。

Ans.—1. The windy man would seem versed in schoolmen. He should have named some casuists, who hold any like thing. 2. The presbyterians must be popes, because they subject kings to the gospel, and Christ's sceptre in church censures, and think Christian kings may be rebuked for blasphemy, bloodshed, &c, whereas prelates, in ordine ad diabolica, murder souls of kings. 3. Prelates do king princes. A popish archprelate, when our king was crowned, put the crown on king Charles' head, the sword and sceptre in his hand, anointed him in his hands, crown, shoulders, arms, with sacred oil. The king must kiss the archbishop and bishops. Is not this to king princes in ordine ad spiritualia? And those that kingeth may unking, and judge what relation the popish archbishop Spotswood had, when he proffered to the king the oath that the popish kings sweareth to maintain the professed religion, (not one word of the true protestant religion,) and will carefully root out all heretics and enemies (that is protestants as they expone it.) to the true worship of God, that shall be convicted by the church of God of the foresaid crimes. And when the prelates professed they held not their prelacies of the king, but of the Pope indeed: who are then nearest to the Pope's power, in ordine ad spiritualia? 4. How will this black-mouthed calumniator make presbyterians to dethrone kings? He hath written a pamphlet of the inconsistency of monarchy and presbyterian government, consisting of lies, invented calumnies of his church in which he was baptized. But the truth is, all his arguments prove the inconsistency of monarchs and parliaments, and transform any king into a most absolute tyrant; for which treason he deserveth to suffer as a traitor.
答案：1. 这个风趣的人似乎很熟悉学者们的观点。他应该提到一些持有类似观点的伦理学家。2. 长老会必须成为教皇，因为他们将国王置于福音之下，并认为基督的权杖在教会的惩罚中，基督教国王可以因亵渎、流血等行为受到斥责，而主教则在属于魔鬼的秩序中谋杀国王的灵魂。3. 主教们给国王加冕。当我们的国王加冕时，一个天主教的大主教给查尔斯国王戴上了王冠，把剑和权杖放在他手中，用神圣的油膏他的手、冠冕、肩膀和手臂。国王必须亲吻大主教和主教们。这难道不是在属于属灵事务的秩序中给国王加冕吗？而那些加冕的人也可以废除国王的王位，并判断天主教的大主教斯波茨伍德在向国王提供天主教国王宣誓时的关系（没有提到真正的新教宗教），并将小心翼翼地根除所有被上帝教会指控犯有上述罪行的异端和敌人（即他们所解释的新教徒）对真正的上帝崇拜的影响。 当主教们宣称他们的主教职位不是来自国王，而是来自教皇的时候，他们离教皇的权力最近，按照属于属灵的顺序来说。这个满嘴黑言诽谤者如何让长老会推翻国王？他写了一本关于君主制和长老会政府不一致性的小册子，里面充满了谎言，对他受洗的教会进行了捏造的诽谤。但事实是，他的所有论点都证明了君主和议会的不一致性，并将任何国王变成了最绝对的暴君；对于这种叛国行为，他应该像叛徒一样受到惩罚。

P. Prelate (q. 1, c. 1). The puritan saith that all power civil is radically and originally seated in the community; he here joineth hands with the Jesuit.
P. Prelate（问题 1，章 1）。清教徒说，所有的公权力根本上和最初都属于社区；他在这里与耶稣会士握手。

Ans.—In six pages he repeateth the same things, 1. Is this such an heresy, that a colony cast into America by the tyranny of popish prelates, have power to choose their own government? All Israel was heretical in this; for David could not be their king, though designed and anointed by God, (1 Sam. 16,) till the people (2 Sam. 5.) put forth in act this power, and made David king in Hebron. 2. Let the Prelate make a syllogism, it is but ex utraque affirmante in secunda figura, logic like the bellies of the court, in which men of their own way is disgraced and cast out of grace and court; because in this controversy of the king with his two parliaments, they are like Erasmus in God's matters, who said, Lutherum nec accuso, nec defendo. He is discourted, whoever he be, who is in shape like a puritan, and not fire and sword against religion and his country, and oath and covenant with God; and so it is this: The Jesuit teacheth that power of government is in the community originally. The puritan teacheth, that power of government is in the community originally; therefore, the puritan is a Jesuit. But so the puritan is a Jesuit, because he and the Jesuit teacheth that there is one God and three persons. And if the Prelate like this reasoning, we shall make himself and the prelates, and court-divines, Jesuits upon surer grounds.
答案：在六页中，他重复了同样的事情，1. 这是一个异端吗？一个被天主教主教的暴政投入美洲的殖民地有权选择自己的政府吗？以色列全体在这方面都是异端的；因为大卫虽然被上帝指定和膏抹为他们的国王（撒母耳记上 16 章），但直到人民（撒母耳记下 5 章）行使了这种权力，并在希伯仑立大卫为王。2. 让主教做一个三段论，这只是在第二形式中的 ex utraque affirmante，逻辑上类似于法庭的肚子，其中他们自己的方式被羞辱和驱逐出宫廷和宠爱；因为在国王与他的两个议会的争议中，他们就像在上帝的事务中的伊拉斯谟一样，他说：“我既不控告路德，也不为他辩护。”无论是谁，只要他长得像清教徒，而不是用火和剑反对宗教和他的国家，并且与上帝立誓和盟约，他就会被赶出宫廷；所以问题是：耶稣会士教导说，政府的权力最初在社区中。清教徒教导说，政府的权力最初在社区中；因此，清教徒就是耶稣会士。 但是清教徒和耶稣会士都教导只有一个上帝和三个位格，所以清教徒就是耶稣会士。如果主教喜欢这种推理，我们可以更确切地说，他自己和其他主教、宫廷神职人员也是耶稣会士。

1. Jesuits teach, (1.) The Pope is not the antichrist. (2.) Christ locally descended to hell to free some out of that prison. (3.) It was sin to separate from Babylonish Rome. (4.) We are justified by works. (5.) The merit of fasting is not to be condemned. (6.) The mass is no idolatry. (7.) The Church is the judge of controversies. (8.) All the Arminian points are safer to be believed, than the contrary; yea, and all the substantiatis of popery are true, and catholic doctrine to be preached and printed. 2. The prelates and court-divines, and this Prelate, conspireth in all these with the Jesuits, as is learnedly and invincibly proved in the treatise, called ἀυτοκατακρίσις, the Canterburian self-conviction; to which no man of the prelatical and Romish faction durst ever make answer for their hearts; and see then who are Jesuits. 3. This doctrine was taught by lawyers, protestants, yielded to by papists, before any Jesuit was whelped in rerum natura. Never learned man wrote of policy, till of late, but he held power of government, by the light of nature, must be radically and originally in a community. The P. Prelate saith, Jesuits are not the fathers of this opinion (c. 1, p. 12). How then can the liar say, that the puritan conspireth with the Jesuit? Suarez, the Jesuit, (de primat. sum. pontifi. l. 3, c. 2, n. 10,) Non est novum, aut a Cardinali Bellarmino inventum. The Jesuit Tannerus, will not have their family the mother of this opinion, (tom 2, disp. 5, de leg, q. 5, in 12, q. 95, 96; Dubi. 1, n. 7). Sine dubio communis omnium Theologorum et Jurisperitorum sententia, &c. The Jesuit Tolet, (in Rom. 13,) taketh it for a ground, that the civil powers are from God, by the natural mediation of men, and civil societies. 4. Jesuits teach that there is no lawful Christian society, truly politic, that hath a near and formal power to choose and ordain their own magistrates, but that which acknowledgeth subjection, and the due regulation of their creating of magistrates, to be due and proper to the Pope of Rome. We acknowledge nowise the bishop of Rome, for a lawful bishop and pastor at all. But this popish Prelate doth acknowledge him, for he hath these words, (c. 5, p. 58,) "It is high presumption in the Pope to challenge to himself the title or right of Christ's universal vicar on earth, by divine right. The Pope, the bishop of Rome, hath no more by divine right, (what he may have by positive ecclesiastical right is not pertinent for us now to examine and discuss,) no higher privilege, (except it be in extent,) than the meanest bishop of the world in his diocese." And amongst all proofs, he passing by Scriptures, which should prove, or improve a divine right, he will content himself with one proof of Cyprian, (de unitat. Eccles.,) and endeth with these words,—"Would God, both sides in this, and other controversies, would submit to the judgment of the holy fathers."
1. 耶稣会教导：（1）教皇不是敌基督。（2）基督曾亲自下到地狱，解救了一些人。（3）与巴比伦罗马分离是罪恶的。（4）我们因行为而被称义。（5）禁食的功德不应被谴责。（6）弥撒不是偶像崇拜。（7）教会是争议的裁判者。（8）相较而言，所有亚米尼洛主义的观点都比相反的观点更安全；是的，所有天主教的实质都是真实的，应该被传教和印刷。 2. 主教和宫廷神学家，以及这位主教，在所有这些问题上与耶稣会教士密谋，正如在那篇名为《自我定罪》的论文中所学术地和无可辩驳地证明的那样；在这篇论文中，没有一位主教和罗马派系的人敢对他们的内心做出回答；看看谁是耶稣会教士。 3. 在任何耶稣会教士出现之前，这个教义就已经被律师和新教徒教导，并被天主教徒接受。直到最近，没有一位学者写过关于政治的著作，而他不认为政府的权力必须根本上和最初地属于一个社群，这是自然之光所赋予的。主教说，耶稣会教士不是这个观点的创始人（第 1 章，第 12 页）。 那么，撒谎者怎么能说清教徒与耶稣会共谋呢？耶稣会士苏亚雷斯（《总主教的首位》第 3 卷第 2 章第 10 节）说：“这不是新的，也不是贝拉尔米诺枢机发明的。”耶稣会士坦纳鲁斯认为他们的家族不是这种观点的创始者（《法律问题》第 2 卷第 5 篇第 5 题第 12 题第 95、96 题；疑问 1 第 7 节）。毫无疑问，这是所有神学家和法学家的共同观点，等等。耶稣会士托莱特（在罗马书 13 章）认为，民事权力是通过人的自然中介和民事社团来自上帝的。4. 耶稣会士教导说，没有合法的基督教社团，真正具有选择和任命自己的治理者的权力，除了承认对罗马教皇的服从和对他们创建治理者的适当规范的社团。我们根本不承认罗马主教是合法的主教和牧师。但是这位教皇教士承认他，因为他有这样的话（第 5 章第 58 页）：“教皇自命为基督在地上的普世代理人，这是极度傲慢的，是以神的权利。” 教皇，即罗马主教，没有更多的神圣权利（他可能有正面教会权利对我们现在来说并不重要），除了在范围上可能比世界上最低级的主教更高的特权之外。在所有的证据中，他忽略了经文，这些经文应该证明或改进神圣权利，他将满足于西比里亚的一种证据（关于教会的统一），并以这些话结束：“但愿上帝，无论在这个问题上还是其他争议中，双方都能服从圣父的判断。”"

1. Hence the P. Prelate, in his fourth article, (the other two I shall touch anon,) maketh puritans grosser than Jesuits, in dethroning kings; because if the king be deficient, the people may resume their power, and govern for him, and so dethrone the king. But Bellarmine (l. 3, q. de laic.) holdeth the people cannot dethrone the king, but, in certis easibus, in some cases, that is, (as Suarez saith,) si Rex sua potestate in manifestam, (Civitatis ceu Regni,) perniciem abutatur. But I will demonstrate, that if papists hold that the Pope may dethrone kings, this Prelate is of their mind; for, 1. The words I cited make good that he is for the Pope's supremacy; (now it is a joint or part of his supremacy, to king and unking princes.) 2. They make good that he is a papist; for, 1. It is presumption in the Pope to challenge to himself that he is Christ's universal vicar on earth, by divine right. Why saith he not, by no right at all, but only he is not Christ's vicar by divine right; for it is evident, that papists make him Christ's vicar only by ecclesiastical right; for they profess succession of popes to this day cannot be proved but by tradition, not by Scripture.
因此，教长在他的第四篇文章中（其他两篇我稍后会提及），认为清教徒在废黜国王方面比耶稣会士更加极端，因为如果国王有缺陷，人民可以恢复他们的权力，并代表他统治，从而废黜国王。但贝拉明（第三卷，第 laic 问题）认为人民不能废黜国王，只有在某些情况下，也就是说，如果国王滥用他的权力对城市或国家造成明显的危害。但我将证明，如果天主教徒认为教皇可以废黜国王，那么这位教长是持有这种观点的；因为，1.我引用的话证明了他支持教皇的至高无上权力（现在对国王和非国王的统治都是他至高无上权力的一部分）。2.他们证明了他是一个天主教徒；因为，1.教皇自命为基督在地上的普世代理人，这是傲慢的。为什么他不说，他根本没有权利，只是他不是基督的代理人，是明显的，天主教徒只认为他是教会的代理人，因为他们声称迄今为止的教皇继任只能通过传统而不是圣经来证明。

2. The Pope's supremacy, by papists, is expressly reckoned amongst unwritten traditions, and so there is no necessity that the right of it be proved from Scripture.
教皇的至高无上地位，在天主教徒中被明确列为口传传统之一，因此没有必要从圣经中证明其权利。

3. The Prelate expressly saith, "He will not discuss the ecclesiastical right that the Pope hath to be Christ's vicar;" and by that he clearly insinuateth that he hath a right to be Christ's vicar, besides a scriptural and divine right; only, for offending papists, he will not discuss it.
教长明确表示：“他不会讨论教皇作为基督代理的教会权利。”由此可以清楚地暗示他除了圣经和神圣权利之外，还有权利成为基督的代理；只是为了不冒犯天主教徒，他不会讨论这个问题。

4. He hath no higher privilege, saith he, than other bishops, except in extent, by divine right. Now other bishops, as officers, in nature different from presbyters, (for of such the P. Prelate must speak in his own dialect,) have their office by divine right; and this the Prelate's word must include, else he saith nonsense to the matter in hand. And, in extent, the Pope hath, by divine right, more than other bishops have. Now what is the Pope of Rome's extent? All know it is the whole catholic visible church on earth. If then, all bishops be particular ambassadors in Christ's stead, (2 Cor. 5:20,) and so legates and deputies of Christ, he who by divine right is a bishop in extent over the whole world, is as like one that calleth himself the universal vicar of Christ, as one egg is like another. The doctrine taught by this Prelate, so popish, and hints, yea, are more than evidences, of gross popery in this book, and his other pamphlet against presbyteries. And his desire that the controversy, concerning the Pope's supremacy and others, were determined with submission to the judgment of the fathers, do cry that he is but a rotten papist. For why will he submit all other controversies to the judgment of the fathers? Why not to the prophets and apostles? Can fathers decide controversies better than the Word of God? A reason cannot be dreamed of why the fathers should be judges, and not the Scriptures, except that the Scriptures are obscure. Their authority and light cannot determine and judge controversies, except in so far as they have authority from fathers and the church; and we know this to be proprium quarto modo, proper to Jesuits and papists, to cry, Fathers, fathers, in all controversies, though the fathers be more for us than for them, except two things:—1. What fathers speak for us, are corrupted by them. 2. What were but errors in fathers, when children add contumacy to error, becomes the heresies of the sons.
他说，除了范围之外，他没有比其他主教更高的特权，这是神圣权利。现在其他主教作为官员，与长老在本质上不同（因为长老主教必须用自己的方言说话），他们的职位是神圣的权利；这是主教的话必须包括的，否则他对手头的问题说的是胡话。在范围上，罗马教皇比其他主教拥有更多的神圣权利。那么，罗马教皇的范围是什么？众所周知，他是地球上整个天主教可见教会。如果所有的主教都是基督的特使（哥林多后书 5:20），所以是基督的使者和代表，那么按照神圣的权利，一个在整个世界范围内都是主教的人，就像一个自称是基督的普世代理人的人一样，就像一个鸡蛋和另一个鸡蛋一样。这位主教所教导的教义如此教皇式，而且这本书中的暗示，甚至是更多的证据，表明他对长老会有严重的教皇式倾向。他希望关于教皇的至高无上和其他问题的争议能够以对父辈的判断为依归，这表明他只是一个腐朽的天主教徒。 为什么他要将所有其他争议提交给教父的判断？为什么不提交给先知和使徒？教父能比上帝的话语更好地解决争议吗？除了圣经难以理解之外，我们无法想象为什么教父应该成为判断者，而不是圣经。他们的权威和光明不能决定和判断争议，除非他们从教父和教会那里获得权威；我们知道这是耶稣会士和天主教徒的特点，他们在所有争议中都喊着“教父，教父”，尽管教父对我们来说比对他们更有利，除非有两个事实：1.支持我们的教父被他们腐化了。2.当子女们在错误中加入蔑视时，教父的错误变成了子女们的异端。

And it is most false that we join with Jesuits. 1. We teach no more against tyrants, in exercitio, than Grotius, Barclay, and Winzetus, in the matter of deposing kings; and in this, royalists conspire with Jesuits. 2. We deny that the Pope may loose subjects from the oath of fidelity when a king turneth heretical. 3. That people, at the Pope's commandment, are to dethrone kings for heresy; so do the prelates, and their fellows, the papists, teach; so Gregory VII, practised; so Aquinas taught, (22 q. 12. ar. 2.) Antonin, (sum. par. 3. t. 22, c. 3, sect. 7,) "Thou hast put all things under the Pope's feet," oves, id est, Christianos; boves. Juæos et hereticos; pecora, Paganos; so Navar. (l. 1, c. 13,) Pagans have no jurisdiction. Jaco. Symanca, (de Catho. Instit. tit. 45, n. 25,) "Catholica uxor heretico viro debitum reddere non tenetur." Item, Constat, hæreticum privatum esse omni dominio, naturali, civili, politico, naturali quod habet in filios, nam propter hæresin patris efficiuntur filii sui juris, civili, quod habet in servos, ab eo enim servi liberantur, politico, quod rerum domini habent in subditos, ita Bannes, (22. q. 12, art, 10.) Gregor. (de valent. 22. dis. 1, q, 12, p. 2, lod. Mol. to. 1, de just. et jur. tract. 2, dis. 29, v. 3.) Papists hold that generatio clerici est corruptio subditi, churchmen are not subjects under the king's law. It is a canonical privilege of the clergy, that they are not subject to the king's civil laws. Now this Prelate and his fellows made the king swear, at his coronation, to maintain all canonical privileges of the prelatical clergy, the very oath and words sworn by all the popish kings.
我们与耶稣会并无关联，这是最错误的说法。1. 在“推翻国王”的问题上，我们的教义并不比格罗蒂乌斯、巴克利和温泽图斯更加反对暴君，而在这一点上，君主主义者与耶稣会一致。2. 我们否认教皇可以在国王变为异端时解除臣民的效忠誓约。3. 教皇命令人民因为异端而废黜国王，主教和他们的同僚天主教徒也是这样教导的；格雷戈里七世就是这样实践的；阿奎那斯也是这样教导的（22 q. 12. ar. 2.）；安东宁（sum. par. 3. t. 22, c. 3, sect. 7）：“你已经把一切都交给了教皇的脚下”，羊，即基督徒；牛，犹太人和异端者；牲畜，异教徒；纳瓦拉（l. 1, c. 13）：“异教徒没有管辖权。”雅各·西曼卡（de Catho. Instit. tit. 45, n. 25）：“天主教徒妻子不必向异端丈夫履行义务。”同样，众所周知，异端者在所有领域都被剥夺了权力，包括自然、公民、政治和对子女的权力，因为由于父亲的异端，子女们成为了自己的主人，公民权力，他们对奴隶的权力，因为奴隶们从他那里得到了解放，政治权力，他们对臣民的权力，如班尼斯（22. q. 12, art, 10.）和格雷戈里（de valent. 22. dis. 1, q, 12, p. 2，lod. Mol. to. 1，de just. et jur. tract. 2，dis. 29，v. 3。）天主教徒认为 generatio clerici est corruptio subditi，教士不受国王法律的约束。这是教士的教规特权，他们不受国王的民事法律约束。现在，这位主教和他的同僚让国王在加冕时发誓要维护主教教士的所有教规特权，这是所有天主教国王所宣誓的誓言和言辞。

P. Prelate.—Power is given by the multitude to the king immediately, and by God mediately, not so much by collation, as by approbation, how the Jesuit and puritan walk all along in equal pace. See Bellarmine, I. 1. de liac. c. 6. Suarez cont. sect. Angl. I. 2. c. 3.
普雷拉特（P. Prelate）——权力是由众多人直接赋予国王的，由上帝间接赋予，不仅仅是通过授予，而是通过认可，耶稣会士和清教徒一直以相同的步伐前进。参见贝拉尔米诺（Bellarmine），第一卷，第一章，第六节。苏亚雷斯（Suarez）继续讨论英国问题，第二卷，第三章。

Ans.—It is a calumny that we teach that the power of the king is from God mediately, by mere approbation; indeed, a fellow of his, a papist, writing against the king's supremacy, Anthony Capell saith, Saul was made king, and others also, by God's permission, and Deo invito et irato, God being angry, that is not our doctrine; but with what real efficiency God hath made men and communities rational and social men with the same hath he made them by instinct of nature, by the mediation of reason, to create a king; and Bellarmine and Suarez say not God maketh kings by approbation only.
答案：我们教导国王的权力是由上帝通过纯粹的认可间接赋予的，这是一种诽谤；事实上，一个与他同伴的天主教徒，安东尼·卡佩尔反对国王至高无上的著作中说，扫罗和其他人都是在上帝的许可下成为国王的，上帝生气了，这不是我们的教义；但上帝以何种真实的效力使人和社群成为理性和社会化的人，他们也是通过本能和理性的中介来创造国王的；贝拉尔米和苏亚雷斯说，上帝不仅仅通过认可来立国王。

P. Prelate.—The people may change monarchy into aristocracy or democracy, or aristocracy into monarchy; for aught I know, they differ not in this neither.
教长：人民可以将君主制变为贵族制或民主制，或将贵族制变为君主制；就我所知，它们在这方面并没有区别。

Ans. 1.—The P. Prelate knoweth not all things—the two Jesuits, Bellarmine and Suarez are produced only, as if they were all Jesuits; and Suarez saith, (De prim. po. l. 3, n. 4,) "Donationem absotutam semel valide factam revocari non posse, neque in totum, neque ex parce, maxime quando onerosa fuit," If the people once give their power to the king, they cannot resume it without cause; and laying down the grounds of Suarez and other Jesuits, that our religion is heresy, they do soundly collect this consequence, "That no king can he lord of the consciences of their subjects, to compel them to an heretical religion." We teach that the king of Spain hath no power over the consciences of protestant subjects to force them to idolatry, and that their souls are not his subjects, but only their persons, and in the Lord. 2. It is no great crime, that if a king degenerate in a tyranny, or if the royal line fail, that we think the people have liberty to change monarchy into aristocracy, aut contra. Jesuits deny that the people can make this change without the Pope's consent. We judge neither the great bishop, the Pope, nor the little popes, ought to have hand in making kings.
答案 1：大主教并不知道所有事情——贝拉明和苏亚雷斯这两个耶稣会士只是被提出来，好像他们就是所有耶稣会士；苏亚雷斯说（《政治原理》第 3 卷第 4 条），“一旦有效地进行了绝对的捐赠，就不能撤销，无论是全部撤销还是部分撤销，尤其是当它是有负担的时候。”如果人民一旦将他们的权力交给国王，就不能没有原因地收回，根据苏亚雷斯和其他耶稣会士的观点，我们的宗教是异端，他们确实得出这样的结论：“没有国王可以成为他们臣民的良心的主宰，迫使他们接受异端宗教。”我们教导西班牙国王对新教徒臣民的良心没有权力，不能强迫他们崇拜偶像，他们的灵魂不是他的臣民，只是他们的人，而且是在主里面。2. 如果国王堕落为暴政，或者王室血统断绝，我们认为人民有权利将君主制转变为贵族制，反之亦然，这并不是什么大罪。耶稣会士否认人民可以在没有教皇同意的情况下进行这种改变。我们认为既不应该让大主教教皇，也不应该让小教皇参与制定国王。

P. Prelate.—They say the power is derived to the king from the people, comulative or communicative, non privative, by way of communication, not by way of privation, so as the people denude not themselves of this sovereignty. As the king maketh a lieutenant in Ireland, not to denude himself of his royal power, but to put him in trust for his service. If this be their mind, the king is in a poor case. The principal authority is in the delegate, and so the people is still judge, and the king their deputy.
教长：他们说国王的权力是从人民那里获得的，是通过沟通的方式，而不是通过剥夺的方式，因此人民不会剥夺自己的主权。就像国王在爱尔兰任命一位代理人，不是为了剥夺自己的王权，而是为了让他代表自己服务。如果这是他们的意思，国王的处境就很糟糕。主要的权力在代表手中，所以人民仍然是法官，国王是他们的代表。

Ans.—The P. Prelate taketh on him to write, he knoweth not what, this is not our opinion. The king is king, and hath the people's power, not as their deputy.
答：教长承担起写作的责任，但他不知道写些什么，这不是我们的观点。国王是国王，拥有人民的权力，而不是作为他们的代表。

1. Because the people is not principal judge, and the king subordinate. The king, in the executive power of laws, is really a sovereign above the people; a deputy is not so.
因为人民不是首席法官，国王是下级。国王在法律的执行权上，真正是人民之上的主权；而代理人则不是。

2. The people have irrevocably made over to the king their power of governing, defending, and protecting themselves, I except the power of sell-preservation, which people can no more make away, it being sinless nature's birthright, than the liberty of eating, drinking, sleeping; and this the people cannot resume, except in case of the king's tyranny; there is no power by the king so irrevocably resigned to his servant or deputy, but he may use it himself.
人民已经无可撤销地将他们的统治、防御和保护权力交给了国王，我除外的是自我保护的权力，人民无法放弃它，因为它是无罪的自然权利，就像吃饭、喝水、睡觉的自由一样；人民只有在国王暴政的情况下才能夺回这个权力；没有任何权力被国王如此无可撤销地交给他的仆人或代理人，他可以自己使用。

3. A delegate is accountable for all he doth to those that put him in trust, whether he do ill or well. The king, in acts of justice, is not accountable to any; for if his acts be not liable to high suspicions of tyranny, no man may say to him, What dost thou? only in acts of injustice; and those so tyrannous, that they be inconsistent with the habitual fiduciary repose and trust put on him, he is to render accounts to the parliament, which representeth the people.
3. 代表对那些委托他的人负责，无论他做得好还是坏。国王在公正行为中不需要对任何人负责；因为如果他的行为不容易引起对暴政的高度怀疑，没有人可以对他说：“你在做什么？”只有在不公正的行为中，而且这些行为是如此暴虐，以至于与对他的习惯性信任和依赖不一致时，他需要向代表人民的议会交代。

4. A delegate in esse, in fieri, both that he may be a delegate, and that he may continue a delegate, whether he do ill or well, dependeth on his pleasure who delegateth him; but though a King depend in fieri, in regard of his call to the crown, upon the suffrages of his people, yet that he may be continued king, he dependeth not on the people simply, but only in case of tyrannical administration, and in this sense Suarez and Bellarmine spake with no more honesty than we do, but with more than prelates do, for they profess any emissary of hell may stab a protestant king. We know the prelates profess the contrary, but their judgment is the same with Jesuits in all points; and since they will have the Pope Christ's vicar, by such a divine right as they themselves are bishops, and have the king under oath to maintain the clergy, bishops, and all their canonical privileges, (amongst which the bishops of Rome's indirect power in ordine ad spiritualia, and to dethrone kings who turn heretics, is one principal right,) I see not how prelates are not as deep in treason against kings as the Pope himself, and therefore, P. Prelate, take the beam out of your own eye.
4. 一个代表在存在中，正在进行中，无论他表现好坏，都取决于委派他的人的意愿；虽然一个国王在进行中，就他被选为王冠的呼声而言，依赖于人民的选票，但他能够继续做国王，并不完全依赖于人民，而只是在暴政的情况下才依赖于人民。在这个意义上，苏亚雷斯和贝拉尔米诺说话的诚实程度不比我们低，但比主教们高，因为他们宣称地狱的任何使者都可以刺杀一个新教国王。我们知道主教们宣称相反，但他们在所有问题上与耶稣会士的判断是一致的；既然他们认为教皇是基督的代理人，拥有与他们自己作为主教一样的神圣权利，并且国王宣誓要维护教士、主教和所有他们的教会特权（其中罗马主教在属灵事务上的间接权力和废黜转为异端的国王的权力是其中一个主要权利），我看不出主教们对国王的背叛不比教皇本人更深，因此，主教先生，请先从自己的眼中取出木屑。

The P. Prelate taketh unlearned pains to prove that Gerson, Occam, Jac. de Almaine, and the Parisian doctors, maintained these same grounds anent the people's power over kings in the case of tyranny, and that before Luther and Calvin were in the world; and this is to give himself the lie, that Luther, Calvin, and we, have not this doctrine from Jesuits; and what is Calvin's mind is evident, (Instit. l. 4, c. 4,) all that the estates may coerce, and reduce in order a tyrant, else they are deficient in their trust that God hath given them over the commonwealth and church; and this is the doctrine for which royalists cry out against Knox of blessed memory, Buchanan, Junius Brutus, Bouchier, Rossæus, and Althusius, Luther, in scripto ad pastorem, (tom. 7, German, fol. 386,) bringeth two examples for resistance; the people resisted Saul, when he was willing to kill Jonathan his son, and Ahikam and other princes rescued Jeremiah out of the hands of the king of Judah; and Gerardus citeth many divines who second Luther in this, as Bugenliagius, Justus Jonas, Nicholas Ambsderffius, George Spalatinus, Justus Menius, Christopher Hofmanus. It is known what is the mind of protestant divines, as Beza, Parous, Melancthon, Bucanus, Polanus, Chamer, and all the divines of France, of Germany, and of Holland. No wonder than prelates were upon the plot of betraying the city of Rochelle, and of the protestant church there, when they then will have the protestants of France, for their defensive wars, to be rebels, and siders with Jesuits, when, in these wars, Jesuits sought their blood and ruin.
普雷拉特主教费尽心思证明，格尔松、奥卡姆、雅克·德·阿尔曼和巴黎医生在暴政时代坚持人民对国王的权力，而且这是在路德和加尔文出现之前；这就是给自己撒谎，即路德、加尔文和我们并非从耶稣会士那里得到这个教义；加尔文的意思是明显的（《基督教要义》第 4 卷第 4 章），所有的贵族都可以强制和整顿暴君，否则他们就不履行上帝赋予他们的对公共事务和教会的责任；这就是保皇派对着受祝福的诺克斯、布坎南、尤尼乌斯·布鲁图斯、布希尔、罗斯斯和阿尔图修斯大喊大叫的教义；路德在《给牧师的书信》（第 7 卷，德文，第 386 页）中举了两个反抗的例子；人民反抗扫罗，当他想杀死他的儿子约拿单，阿希干和其他王子救出耶利米脱离犹大王的手；格拉鲁德引用了许多支持路德的神学家，如布根利亚吉乌斯、尤斯图斯·约纳斯、尼古拉斯·安布斯德菲乌斯、乔治·斯帕拉蒂努斯、尤斯图斯·梅尼乌斯、克里斯托弗·霍夫曼。 众所周知，新教神学家如贝扎、帕鲁斯、梅兰希顿、布卡努斯、波兰努斯、查梅尔以及法国、德国和荷兰的所有神学家的心思。因此，当主教们密谋背叛罗谢尔市和那里的新教教堂时，他们将法国的新教徒视为叛乱分子，并与耶稣会一起行动，这一点就不足为奇了。在这场战争中，耶稣会寻求他们的鲜血和毁灭。

The P. Prelate having shown his mind concerning the deposing of Childerick by the Pope, (of which I say nothing, but the Pope was an antichristian usurper, and the poor man never fit to bear a crown,) he goeth on to set down an opinion of some mute authors; he might devise a thousand opinions that way, to make men believe he had been in a world of learned men's secrets, and that never man saw the bottom of the controversy, while he, seeing the escapes of many pens, (as supercilious Bubo praiseth,) was forced to appear a star new risen in the firmament of pursuivants, and reveal all dreams, and teach all the new statists, the Gamaliels, Buchanan, Junius Brutus, and a world who were all sleeping, while this Lucifer, the son of the night, did appear, this new way of laws, divinity, and casuists' theology.
普雷拉特主教对教皇废黜查尔德里克的意见表示了他的看法（我对此不发表任何评论，但教皇是一个反基督的篡夺者，这个可怜的人从来不适合戴王冠），他继续陈述了一些无声作者的观点；他可以设计出无数观点，让人们相信他曾经接触过许多学者的秘密，而且从未有人真正了解争议的底细，而他，看到许多笔者的错误（正如傲慢的布波所称赞的），被迫出现在追随者的天空中，揭示所有的梦想，并教导所有新的政治家、加玛列、布坦、朱尼乌斯·布鲁图斯和一大批在这位夜之子出现时都在沉睡的人们，这是一种新的法律、神学和伦理学的方式。

P. Prelate.—They hold sovereign power is primarily and naturally in the multitude, from it derived to the king, immediately from God. The reason of which order is, because we cannot reap the fruits of government unless by compact we submit to some possible and accidental inconveniences.
P. Prelate. - 他们认为主权权力首先和自然地属于众多人民，从中派生给国王，直接来自上帝。这种秩序的原因是，因为我们只有通过契约才能享受到政府的成果，而契约可能会带来一些可能的和偶然的不便之处。

Ans. 1.—Who saith so the P. Prelate cannot name,—That sovereign power is primarily and naturally in the multitude. Virtually (it may be) sovereignty is in the multitude, but primarily and naturally, as heat is in the fire, light in the sun, I think the P. Prelate dreamed it; no man said it but himself; for what attribute is naturally in a subject, I conceive may directly and naturally be predicated thereof. Now the P. Prelate hath taught us this very natural predication. "Our dreadful and sovereign lord, the multitude, commandeth this and that."
答案 1：谁说主教不能说出来，主权力首先和自然地属于大众。虽然实质上主权可能属于大众，但首先和自然地，就像热在火中，光在太阳中一样，我认为主教是在做梦；除了他自己，没有人说过这样的话；因为什么属性自然地属于一个主体，我认为就可以直接和自然地预言它。现在主教教导我们这种非常自然的预言。“我们可怕而至高无上的主宰，大众，命令这个和那个。”

2. This is no more reason for a monarchy than for a democracy, for we can reap the fruits of no government except we submit to it.
这并不是支持君主制的理由，也不是支持民主制的理由，因为我们只有顺从政府才能享受到其带来的好处。

3. We must submit in monarchy (saith he) to some possible and accidental inconveniences. Here be soft words, but is subversion of religion, laws, and liberties of church and state. Introducing of popery, Arminianism, of idolatry, altar-worship, the mass, (proved by a learned treatise, "the Canterburian self-conviction," printed 1641, third ed., never answered, couched under the name of inconveniency,) the pardoning of the innocent blood of hundreds of thousand protestants in Ireland, the killing of many thousand nobles, barons, commons, by the hands of papists in arms against the law of the land, the making of England a field of blood, the obtruding of an idolatrous service-book, with armies of men, by sea and land, to block up the kingdom of Scotland, are all these inconveniences only?
3. 我们必须在君主制下忍受一些可能的和偶发的不便。这里有柔和的言辞，但却是对宗教、法律和教会与国家自由的颠覆。引入天主教、阿米纳尼主义、偶像崇拜、祭坛崇拜、弥撒（在一本名为《坎特伯雷自我认罪》的学术著作中得到证明，该书于 1641 年出版，第三版，从未得到回应，以不便之名隐藏），赦免爱尔兰数十万新教徒的无辜血案，杀害许多贵族、男爵和平民，这些都是天主教徒违反国家法律的行为，使英格兰成为一片血腥的战场，强迫推行偶像崇拜的礼拜书，以陆海军的力量封锁苏格兰王国，这些只是不便吗？

4. Are they only possible and accidental? But make a monarch absolute, as the P. Prelate doth, and tyranny is as necessary and as much intended by a sinful man, inclined to make a god of himself, as it is natural to men to sin, when they are tempted, and to be drunken and giddy with honour and greatness. Witness the kings of Israel and Judah, though de jure they were not absolute. Is it accidental to Nero, Julian, to the ten horns that grew out of the woman's head, who sat upon the scarlet coloured beast, to make war against the Lamb and his followers, especially the spirit of Satan being in them?
他们只是可能的和偶然的吗？但是，如果像 P. Prelate 那样使君主绝对，那么暴政对于一个倾向于把自己当作上帝的罪人来说，就像对人类来说犯罪是自然的一样，当他们受到诱惑时，他们会沉迷于荣誉和伟大。以色列和犹大的国王就是明证，尽管从法律上讲他们并不是绝对的。对于尼禄、朱利安以及从坐在朱红色兽身上的女人头上长出的十个角，他们与羔羊及其追随者作战，尤其是在他们身上有撒旦的灵的情况下，这是偶然的吗？

P. Prelate.—They infer, 1. They cannot, without violation of a divine ordinance and breach of faith, resume the authority they have placed in the king. 2. It were high sin to rob authority of its essentials. 3. This ordinance is not ἀλογος but ἐυδοκια and hath urgent reasons.
教长。他们推断出，1. 他们不能违背神的命令和背信弃义地夺回他们授予国王的权力。2. 剥夺权力的本质是极大的罪恶。3. 这个命令不是无理的，而是出于善意，并有紧迫的理由。

Ans. 1.—These nameless authors cannot infer that an oath is broken which is made conditionally; all authority given by the people to the king is conditional, that he use it for the safety of the people; if it be used for their destruction, they break no faith to resume it, for they never made faith to give up their power to the king upon such terms, and so they cannot be said to resume what they never gave.
答案 1：这些无名的作者不能推断出一个有条件的誓言被违背了；人民赋予国王的所有权力都是有条件的，即他必须将其用于人民的安全；如果他将其用于人民的毁灭，他们并没有违背信仰来收回权力，因为他们从未在这样的条件下放弃过权力，所以他们不能说是收回了他们从未给予过的东西。

2. So the P. Prelate maketh power to act all the former mischiefs, the essentials of a king. Balaam is not worthy his wages for prophesying thus, that the king's essentials is a power of blood, and destructive to people, law, religion, and liberties of church and state, for otherwise we teach not, that people may resume from the king authority and power to disarm papists, to root out the bloody Irish, and in justice serve them as they have served us.
所以，教皇代表行使了所有以前的恶行，这是一个国王的本质。巴兰并不值得因为这样的预言而得到报酬，即国王的本质是一种血腥的权力，对人民、法律、宗教和教会和国家的自由具有破坏性，否则我们不会教导人民可以从国王那里夺回权威和权力，来解除天主教徒的武装，根除血腥的爱尔兰人，并以正义对待他们，就像他们对待我们一样。

3. This ordinance of the people, giving lawful power to a king for the governing of the people in peace and godliness, is God's good pleasure, and hath just reasons and causes. But that the people make over a power to one man, to act all the inconveniences above named, I mean the bloody and destructive inconveniences, hath nothing of God or reason in it.
这个人民的法令，赋予国王合法的权力来治理人民的和平与虔诚，是上帝的喜悦，并且有正当的理由和原因。但是，人民将权力转交给一个人，来承担上述所提到的所有不便，我指的是血腥和破坏性的不便，其中没有上帝或理性的成分。

P. Prelate.—The reasons of this opinion are:—1. If power sovereign were not in one, he could not have strength enough to act all necessary parts and acts of government. 2. Nor to prevent divisions which attend multitudes, or many endowed with equal power; and the authors say, they must part with their native right entirely for a greater good, and to prevent greater evils. 3. To I resume any part of this power, of which the people have totally divested themselves, or to limit it, is to disable sovereignty from government, loose the sinews of all society, &c.
P. Prelate. - 这个观点的原因是：1. 如果统治权不集中在一个人手中，他就没有足够的力量来执行政府的所有必要职能和行为。2. 也无法防止伴随着众多人或许多拥有相等权力的人的分裂；作者们说，他们必须完全放弃他们的本来权利，以换取更大的利益，以防止更大的灾祸。3. 要重新获得人民完全放弃的这部分权力，或者对其进行限制，就是使主权无法进行治理，削弱了社会的纽带等等。

Ans. 1.—I know none for this opinion, but the P. Prelate himself. The first reason may be made rhyme, but never reason: for though there be not absolute power to good and ill, there may be strength of limited power in abundance in the king, and sufficient for all acts of just government, and the adequate end of government, which is, salus populi, the safety of the people. But the royalist will have strength to be a tyrant, and act all the tyrannical and bloody inconveniences of which we spake, an essential part of the power of a king; as if weakness were essential to strength, and a king could not be powerful as a king, to do good, and save and protect, except he had power also as a tyrant to do evil, and to destroy and waste his people. This power is weakness, and no part of the image of the greatness of the King of kings, whom a king represented.
答案 1. - 除了教区主教本人，我不知道有谁支持这个观点。第一个理由可以用韵脚来表达，但不能用理性来解释：虽然没有绝对的善恶权力，但国王可能拥有充足的有限权力，足以进行公正的治理行为，并实现政府的充分目标，即人民的安全。但皇室主义者认为，国王应该拥有成为暴君的力量，并扮演我们所说的所有暴虐和血腥的不便之一，作为国王权力的一个重要组成部分；好像弱点是力量的本质，国王只有在作为暴君的同时才能作为国王强大，才能行善，拯救和保护人民，否则就无法做到。这种权力是弱点，不是国王的伟大形象的一部分，国王代表了至高无上的上帝之王。

2. The second reason condemneth democracy and aristocracy as unlawful, and maketh monarchy the only physic to cure these; as if there were no government an ordinance of God save only absolute monarchy, which indeed is no ordinance of God at all, but contrary to the nature of a lawful king. (Deut. 17:3.)
第二个理由谴责民主和贵族制度为非法，并将君主制视为唯一的治愈之法；仿佛除了绝对君主制之外，没有其他的政府是上帝的命令，然而实际上绝对君主制并不是上帝的命令，而是与合法国王的本质相悖。（申命记 17:3）

3. That people must part with their native right totally to make an absolute monarch, is as if the whole members of the body would part with their whole nutritive power, to cause the milt to swell, which would be the destruction of the body.

4. The people cannot divest themselves of power of defensive wars more than they can part with nature, and put themselves in a condition inferior to a slave, who, if his master, who hath power to sell him, invade him unjustly, to take away his life, may oppose violence to unjust violence. And the other consequences are null.
人们不能剥夺自己进行防御战的权力，就像他们不能剥夺自然的力量一样，也不能使自己处于比奴隶还要低下的境地。如果奴隶的主人有权力出售他，并且不公正地侵犯他，夺走他的生命，他可以对不公正的暴力进行反抗。其他后果都是无效的。

QUESTION XLII
问题 XLII

WHETHER ALL CHRISTIAN KINGS ARE DEPENDENT FROM CHRIST, AND MAY BE CALLED HIS VICEGERENTS
是否所有基督教国王都依赖基督，并可称为他的代理人

The P. Prelate taketh on him to prove the truth of this; but the question is not pertinent, it belongeth to another head, to the king's power in church matters. I therefore only examine what he saith, and follow him.
普雷拉特主教试图证明这个问题的真实性；但这个问题并不相关，它属于另一个方面，即国王在教会事务中的权力。因此，我只是检查他所说的，并跟随他的观点。

P. Prelate.—Sectaries have found a query of late, that kings are God's, not Christ's lieutenants on earth. Romanists and puritans erect two sovereigns in every state,—the Jesuit in the Pope, the puritan in the presbytery.
P. Prelate. - 近来，异端分子提出了一个问题，即国王是上帝的，而不是基督在地上的代理人。罗马教徒和清教徒在每个国家中建立了两个君主，即耶稣会士在教皇中，清教徒在长老会中。

Ans. 1.—We give a reason why God hath a lieutenant, as God; because kings are gods, bearing the sword of vengeance against seditious and bloody prelates, and other ill doers. But Christ, God-man, the Mediator and head of the body—the church, hath neither pope nor king to be head under him. The sword is communicable to men; but the headship of Christ is communicable to no king, nor to any created shoulders. 2. The Jesuit maketh the Pope a king; and so this P. Prelate maketh him, in extent, the bishop of bishops, and so king, as I have proved. But we place no sovereignty in presbyteries, but a mere ministerial power of servants, who do not take on them to make laws and religious ceremonies, as prelates do, who indeed make themselves kings and lawgivers in God's house.
答案 1：我们给出一个理由，为什么上帝有一个代理人，作为上帝；因为国王是上帝，手持复仇之剑，对叛乱和血腥的主教和其他恶人进行惩罚。但是基督，上帝与人合一的中保和教会的头，既没有教皇也没有国王作为他的头。剑可以传给人，但基督的领导地位不能传给任何国王，也不能传给任何被创造的肩膀。答案 2：耶稣会士使教皇成为国王；所以这位主教使他成为主教之王，正如我已经证明的那样。但我们不把主权放在长老会中，而只是把它看作是仆人的纯粹的事奉权力，他们不像主教那样制定法律和宗教仪式，实际上他们把自己当作上帝的家中的国王和立法者。

P. Prelate.—We speak of Christ as head of the church. Some think that Christ was king by his resurrection, jure acquisito, by a new title, right of merit. I think he was a king from his conception.
普雷拉特主教-我们称基督为教会的头。有人认为基督通过他的复活成为了国王，通过一种新的称号，即功绩的权利。我认为他从受孕开始就是国王。

Ans.—1. You declare hereby, that the king is a ministerial head of the church, under the head Christ. All our divines, disputing against the Pope's headship, say, No mortal man hath shoulders for so glorious a head. You give the king such shoulders. But why are not the kings, even Nero, Julian, Nebuchadnezzar, and Belshazzar, vicegerents of Christ, as mediator, as priest, as redeemer, as prophet, as advocate, presenting our prayers to God his father? What action, I pray you, have Christian kings, by office, under Christ, in dying and rising from the dead for us, in sending down the Holy Ghost, preparing mansions for us? Now, it is as proper and incommunicably reciprocal with the mediator to be the only head of the body, the church, (Col. 1:18,) as to be the only redeemer and advocate of his church.
答案：1. 你在此宣称，国王是教会的部长，位于基督之下。我们所有反对教皇领导地位的神学家都说，没有凡人有如此光荣的头。你给予国王这样的肩膀。但是，为什么连尼禄、朱利安、尼布甲尼撒和伯沙撒这样的国王，也不是基督的代理人，作为中保、祭司、救赎主、先知、辩护人，向上帝父亲呈递我们的祈祷？请问，基督教国王在职责上，在基督的领导下，为我们死而复生，降下圣灵，为我们预备住处，有什么行动？现在，作为中保，成为教会的唯一头（歌罗西书 1:18）与成为教会的唯一救赎主和辩护人一样，是合适且独特的互相关系。

2. That Christ was king from his conception, as man born of the Virgin Mary, suiteth well with papists, who will have Christ, as man, the visible head of the church; that so as Christ-man is now in heaven, he may have a visible pope to be head in all ecclesiastical matters. And that is the reason why this P. Prelate maketh him head of the church by an ecclesiastical right, as we heard; and so he followeth Becanus the Jesuit in this, and others of his fellows.
基督从受孕开始就是国王，作为由童贞玛利亚所生的人，这与天主教徒的观点相符，他们认为基督作为人是教会的可见头领；这样，基督作为人现在在天堂，他可以有一个可见的教皇在所有教会事务上担任头领。这就是为什么这位 P.主教以教会法的权威使他成为教会的头领，正如我们所听到的；所以他在这一点上追随了耶稣会士贝卡努斯和其他同僚的观点。

P. Prelate.—1. Proof. If kings reign by בי per, in and through Christ, as the wisdom of God and the mediator, then are kings the vicegerents of Christ as mediator; but the former is said, Prov. 8:15, 16; so Dr Andrews, of blessed memory.
P. Prelate. - 1. 证据。如果君王通过基督作为上帝的智慧和调解者来统治，那么君王就是基督作为调解者的代理人；但前者在箴言书 8:15, 16 中有所提及；如同已故的安德鲁斯博士所说。

Ans. 1.—I deny the major. All believers living the life of God, engrafted in Christ as branches in the tree, (John 15:1, 2,) should, by the same reason, be vicegerents of the Mediator; so should the angels to whom Christ is a head, (Col. 2:10,) be his vicegerents; and all the judges and constables on earth should be under-mediators, for they live and act in Christ; yea, all the creatures, in the Mediator, are made new, (Rev. 21:5; Rom. 8:20–22.) 2. Dr Andrew's name is a curse on the earth, his writings prove him to be a popish apostate.
答案 1：我否认主要观点。所有活在神的生命中、被嫁接在基督里的信徒（约翰福音 15:1,2）应该按照同样的理由成为调停者的代理人；同样，基督是天使的头（歌罗西书 2:10），他们也应该成为他的代理人；地上的所有法官和警察也应该成为次级调停者，因为他们活在基督里并且行动；是的，所有的受造物在调停者里都是新造的（启示录 21:5；罗马书 8:20-22）。答案 2：安德鲁博士的名字在地上是一个诅咒，他的著作证明他是一个背弃天主教的叛徒。

P. Prelate.—2. Christ is not only king of his church, but in order to his church, King over the kings and kingdoms of the earth. (Psal. 2:5, 8.) 3. Matt. 21:18, "To him is given all power in heaven and earth;" therefore, all sovereignty over kings.
教长。2.基督不仅是他的教会的国王，而且为了他的教会，也是地上君王和王国的国王。（诗篇 2:5, 8）3.马太福音 21:18，“天上地下的一切权柄都赐给了他”；因此，他拥有对君王的所有主权。

Ans. 1.—If all these be Christ's vicegerents, over whom he hath obtained power, then, because the Father hath given him power over all flesh, to give them life eternal, (John 17:1, 2,) then are all believers his vicegerents, yea, and all the damned men and devils, and death and hell, are his vicegerents; for Christ, as mediator, hath all power given to him as king of the church, and so power kingly over all his enemies, "to reign until he make them his footstool," (Psal. 110:1, 2,) "to break them with a rod of iron." (Psal. 2:9; 1 Cor. 15:24–27; Rev. 1:18, 20; 5:10–14.) And, by that same reason, the P. Prelate's fourth and fifth arguments fall to the ground, He is heir of all things; therefore, all things are his vicegerents. What more vain? He is Prince of the kings of the earth, and King of Ogs, of kings, of his enemies; therefore, sea and land are his vicegerents.
答案 1. - 如果所有这些都是基督的代理人，他已经获得了权力，那么因为父亲已经赋予他权力，使他能够赐予所有人永生，（约翰福音 17:1, 2），那么所有信徒都是他的代理人，是的，所有被诅咒的人和魔鬼，死亡和地狱，都是他的代理人；因为作为调解者的基督，作为教会的国王，他被赋予了所有的权力，因此对他的所有敌人有国王般的权力，“直到他使他们成为他的脚凳”，（诗篇 110:1, 2），“用铁杖打碎他们。”（诗篇 2:9；哥林多前书 15:24-27；启示录 1:18, 20；5:10-14）。同样的道理，P. Prelate 的第四和第五个论点也站不住脚，他是万有的继承人；因此，万物都是他的代理人。还有什么更荒谬的呢？他是地上君王的君王，是敌人的王，因此，海洋和陆地都是他的代理人。

P. Prelate (p. 58).—Kings are nurse-fathers of the church, therefore they hold their crowns of Christ. Divines say, that by men in sacred orders Christ doth rule his church mediately in those things which primely concern salvation, and that by kings' sceptres and power he doth protect his church, and what concerneth external pomp, order, and decency. Then, in this latter sense, kings are no less the immediate vicegerents of Christ than bishops, priests, and deacons, in the former.
P. Prelate（第 58 页）。——国王是教会的养育之父，因此他们的王冠是基督所赐予的。神学家说，基督通过圣职人员在那些与救赎最为关键的事情上间接地统治着他的教会，而通过国王的权杖和权力，他保护着他的教会，以及与外部的华丽、秩序和庄重有关的事物。因此，在后一种意义上，国王与主教、牧师和执事一样，都是基督的直接代理人。

Ans. 1.—Because kings hold their crowns of Christ as mediator and redeemer, it followeth, by as good consequence, kings are sub-mediators, and under-priests, and redeemers, as vicegerents. Christ, as king, hath no visible royal vicegerents under him.
因为君王将他们的王冠视为基督的调解者和救赎者，所以很自然地，君王也是副调解者、副祭司和副救赎者，作为代理人。基督作为君王，在他之下没有可见的王权代理人。

2. Men in holy orders, sprinkled with one of the papists' five blessed sacraments, such as antichristian prelates, unwashed priests to offer sacrifices, and popish deacons, are no more admitted by Christ to enter into his sanctuary as governors, than the leper into the camp of old, and the Moabite and Ammonite Were to enter into the congregation of the Lord (Deut. 23:3); therefore, we have excommunicated this P. Prelate and such Moabites out of the Lord's house. What be the things that do not primely concern salvation, the P. Prelate knoweth, to wit, images in the church, altar worship, antichristian ceremonies, which primely concern damnation.
2. 神圣的职位中的男性，受到天主教徒五个祝福圣礼之一的洗礼，例如反基督的主教、未洗净的祭司和天主教的执事，与古时的麻风病人进入营地和摩押人、亚扪人进入主的会众一样，基督不允许他们作为统治者进入他的圣所；因此，我们已经将这位 P.主教和这些摩押人逐出了主的家。P.主教知道哪些事情不是首要关乎救恩的，即教堂中的偶像、祭坛崇拜、反基督的仪式，这些事情首要关乎永世的刑罚。

3. I understand not what the P. Prelate meaneth, That the king preserveth external government in order and decency. In Scotland, in our parliament, 1633, he prescribed the surplice, and he commanded the service-book, and the mass-worship. The Prelate degradeth the king here, to make him only keep or preserve the prelates' mass-clothes; they intended, indeed, to make the king but the Pope's servant, for all they say and do for him now.
我不明白普雷拉特主教的意思，即国王保持外部治理的秩序和庄重。在苏格兰，我们的议会上，他规定了法衣，他命令使用礼拜书和弥撒崇拜。主教在这里贬低了国王，只让他保留或保护主教的弥撒服装；他们的意图实际上是让国王成为教皇的仆人，尽管他们现在为他说和做的一切。

4. If the king be vicegerent of Christ in prescribing laws for the external ordering of the worship, and all their decent symbolical ceremonies, what more doth the Pope and the prelate in that kind? He may, with as good warrant, preach and administer the sacraments.
如果国王是基督的代理人，在规定崇拜的外部秩序和所有合适的象征仪式方面，教皇和主教还能做什么？他们同样有权讲道和施行圣礼。

P. Prelate.—Kings have the sign of the cross on their crowns.
教长。国王的皇冠上有十字架的标志。

Ans.—Therefore, baculus est in angulo, prelates have put a cross in the king's heart, and crossed crown and throne too. Some knights, some ships, some cities and boroughs do carry a cross; are they made Christ's vicegerents of late? By what antiquity doth the cross signify Christ? Of old it was a badge of Christians, no religious ceremony. And is this all; the king is the vicegerent of Christians. The prelates, we know, adore the cross with religious worship; so must they adore the crown.
因此，baculus est in angulo，教长们在国王的心中放了一个十字架，也把王冠和王座十字交叉了。一些骑士、一些船只、一些城市和市镇都带着十字架；他们最近成为了基督的代理人吗？十字架从何时开始象征基督？古时候它只是基督徒的标志，没有宗教仪式。这就是全部吗？国王是基督徒的代理人。我们知道，教长们以宗教崇拜的方式崇拜十字架；他们也必须崇拜王冠。

P. Prelate.—Grant that the Pope were the vicar of Christ in spiritual things, it followeth not—therefore, kings' crowns are subject to the Pope; for papists teach that all power that was in Christ, as man, as power to work miracles, to institute sacraments, was not transmitted to Peter and his successors.
普雷拉特（Prelate）——即使承认教皇在属灵事务上是基督的代理人，也不能得出结论——因此，国王的王冠受教皇支配；因为天主教徒教导，基督作为人所拥有的一切权力，如行奇迹、设立圣礼，都没有传给彼得和他的继任者。

Ans.—This is a base consequence; make the Pope head of the church, the king, if he be a mixed person, that is, half a churchman and Christ's vicegerent, both he and prelates must be members of the head. Papists teach that all in Christ, as man, cannot be transmitted to Peter; but a ministerial catholic headship (say Bucanus and his fellows) was transmitted from Christ, as man and visible head, to Peter and the Pope.
答案：这是一个基本的结果；让教皇成为教会的首领，如果国王是一个混合人物，即既是教士又是基督的代理人，那么他和主教都必须是首领的成员。天主教徒教导说，作为人的基督的一切不能传给彼得；但是，作为人和可见的首领，基督的部分普世首领地位（比如布卡纳斯和他的同僚）被传给了彼得和教皇。

P. Prelate.—I wish the Pope, who claimeth so near alliance with Christ, would learn of him to be meek and humble in heart, so should he find rest to his own soul, to church and state.
教长：我希望教皇，他声称与基督有如此亲近的关系，能向他学习谦和和谦卑的心，这样他将为自己的灵魂、教会和国家找到安宁。

Ans. 1.—The same wag the wish of Gerson, Occam, the doctors of Paris, the fathers of the councils of Constance and Basil, yet all make him head of the church.
答案 1：格尔森、奥卡姆、巴黎医生、康斯坦斯和巴塞尔会议的父亲们都希望他成为教会的领袖。

2. The excommunicate Prelate is turned chaplain to preach to the Pope; the soulrest that protestants wish to the Pope is, "That the Lord would destroy him by the Spirit of his mouth." (2 Thes. 2:8,) But to popish prelates this wish is a reformation of accidents, with the safety of the subject, the Pope, and is as good as a wish, that the devil, remaining a devil, may find rest for his soul: all we are to pray for as having place in the church, are supposed members of the church. The Prelate would not pray so for the presbytery by which he was ordained a pastor, (1 Tim. 4:14,) though he be now an apostate; it is gratitude to pray for his lucky father, the Pope. Whatever the Prelate wish, we pray for and believe that desolation shall be his soul-rest, and that the vengeance of the Lord and of his temple shall fall upon him and the prelates, his sons.
被逐出教会的主教成为牧师，向教皇传道；新教徒对教皇的祈求是：“愿主以他口中的灵毁灭他。”（帖撒罗尼迦后书 2:8）但对于天主教的主教来说，这个祈求是对事故的改革，同时保护了教皇这个对象，和祈求魔鬼仍然是魔鬼，能够找到灵魂的安息一样好：我们所祈求的，是教会中被认为是教会成员的人。主教不会为他被任命为牧师的长老团祈祷（提摩太前书 4:14），尽管他现在是一个背教者；为他幸运的父亲教皇祈祷是出于感激之情。无论主教希望什么，我们祈祷并相信荒凉将是他的灵魂安息之地，主的复仇和他的殿堂的惩罚将降临在他和他的儿子们身上。

P. Prelate.—That which they purpose, by denying kings to be Christ's vicegerents, is to set up a sovereignty ecclesiastical in presbyteries, to constrain kings, repeal his laws, correct his statutes, reverse his judgments, to cite, convent, and censure kings; and, if there be not power to execute what presbyteries decree, they may call and command the help of the people, in whom is the underived majesty, and promise, and swear, and covenant to defend their fancies against all mortal men, with their goods, lands, fortunes, to admit no derisive motion; and this sovereign association maketh every private man an armed magistrate.
主教。他们否认国王是基督的代理人，目的是在长老会中建立一个教会主权，强迫国王，废除他的法律，纠正他的法令，推翻他的判决，传唤、召集和审判国王；如果长老会的决议无法执行，他们可以召集并命令人民的帮助，人民拥有无可争议的威权，承诺、宣誓和契约保护他们的幻想不受任何凡人的侵犯，用他们的财产、土地和命运，不接受任何嘲笑的建议；这个主权联盟使每个普通人成为一名武装的官员。

Ans.—You see the excommunicate apostate strives against the presbytery of a reformed church, from which he had his baptism, faith, and ministry.
答：你看到这个被逐出教会的背教者与他接受洗礼、信仰和事奉的改革教会长老会对抗。

1. We deny the king to be the head of the church.
我们否认国王是教会的首领。

2. We assert, that in the pastors, doctors, and elders of the church, there is a ministerial power, as servants under Christ, in his authority and name to rebuke and censure kings; that there is revenge in the gospel against all disobedience (2 Cor. 2:6; 10:6);—the rod of God (1 Cor. 4:21); the rod of Christ's lips (Isa. 11:4); the sceptre and sword of Christ (Rev. 1:16; 19:15); the keys of his kingom, to bind and loose, open and shut (Matt. 18:17, 18; 16:19; 1 Cor. 5:1–3; 2 Thess. 3:14, 15; 1 Tim. 1:19; 5:22; 5:17); and that this power is committed to the officers of Christ's house, call them as you will.
我们断言，在教会的牧师、医生和长老中，有一种事奉的权力，作为基督的仆人，以他的权柄和名义来责备和谴责君王；福音中对一切不顺从的行为有报复（哥林多后书 2:6；10:6）；上帝的杖（哥林多前书 4:21）；基督嘴唇的杖（以赛亚书 11:4）；基督的权杖和剑（启示录 1:16；19:15）；他的国度的钥匙，可以捆绑和释放，开启和关闭（马太福音 18:17, 18；16:19；哥林多前书 5:1-3；帖撒罗尼迦后书 3:14, 15；提摩太前书 1:19；5:22；5:17）；而这种权力是委托给基督家的官员，无论你如何称呼他们。

3. For reversing of laws made for the establishing of popery, we think the church of Christ did well to declare all these unjust, grievous decrees, and that woe is due to the judges, even the queen, if they should not repent. (Isa. 10:1.) And this Prelate must show his teeth in this against our reformation in Scotland, which he once commended in pulpit as a glorious work of God's right arm; and the Assembly of Glasgow, 1638, declared, That bishops, though established by acts of parliament, procured by prelates only, commissioners and agents for the church, who betrayed their trust, were unlawful; and did supplicate that the ensuing parliament would annul these wicked acts. They think God privilegeth neither king nor others from church-censures. The popish prelates imprisoned and silenced the ministers of Christ, who preached against the public sins, the blood, oppressions, injustice, open swearing, and blasphemy of the holy name of God, the countenancing of idolaters, &c., in king and court.
3. 对于为建立天主教而制定的法律的逆转，我们认为基督教会很好地宣布了所有这些不公正、令人痛苦的法令，并且如果法官，甚至女王不悔改，他们应该受到诅咒。（以赛亚书 10:1）这位主教必须在这方面表现出他的牙齿，反对我们在苏格兰的改革，他曾经在讲坛上称赞这是上帝的伟大工作；而格拉斯哥大会在 1638 年宣布，虽然主教是由议会法案确立的，但这些法案是由主教们自己、教会的委员和代理人所获得的，他们背叛了自己的信任，因此是非法的；并且请求即将召开的议会废除这些邪恶的法案。他们认为上帝不会使国王或其他人免受教会的惩罚。天主教的主教们监禁和禁止了基督的传道人，他们反对公众的罪恶、流血、压迫、不公正、公然的咒骂和亵渎上帝的圣名，以及在国王和宫廷中支持偶像崇拜等行为。

4. They never sought the help of the people against the most unjust standing law of authority.
他们从未寻求人民对最不公正的权威法律的帮助。

5. They did never swear and covenant to defend their own fancies; for the confession and covenant of the protestant religion, translated in Latin to all the protestants in Europe and America, being termed a fancy, is a clear evidence that this P. Prelate was justly excommunicated for popery.
他们从未发誓并立约捍卫自己的幻想；因为把新教信仰的告白和盟约翻译成拉丁文传给欧洲和美洲的所有新教徒，而将其称为幻想，清楚地证明这位 P.主教因为信奉天主教而被正当地逐出教会。

6. This covenant was sworn by king James and his house, by the whole land, by the prelates themselves; and to this fancy this P. Prelate, by the law of our land, was obliged to swear when he received degrees in the university.
这个契约是由詹姆斯国王及其家族、整个土地和主教们亲自宣誓的；根据我们国家的法律，这位 P.主教在获得大学学位时也必须宣誓遵守这个契约。

7. There is reason our covenant should provide against divisive motions. The prelates moved the king to command all the land to swear our covenant, in the prelatical sense, against the intent thereof, and only to divide and so command. Judge what religion prelates are of, who will have the name of God profaned by a whole nation, by swearing fancies.
有理由让我们的契约防止分裂的动议。主教们说服国王命令全国人民按照主教的意思宣誓我们的契约，违背了契约的本意，只是为了分裂和统治。你们来判断一下主教们信仰的是什么宗教，他们竟然要让整个国家亵渎上帝的名字，宣誓一些幻想。

8. Of making private men magistrates in defending themselves against cut-throats, enough already. Let the P. Prelate answer if he can.
对于私人成为治安官来自卫抵御刺客的问题，已经足够了。让主教回答吧，如果他能的话。

P. Prelate.—Let no man imagine me to privilege a king from the direction and just power of the church, or that, like Uzziah, he should intrude upon sacred actions, ex vi ordinis, in foro interno conscientiæ, to preach or administrate sacraments, &c.
教长：不要让任何人认为我会让国王享有教会的指导和公正权力，也不要让他像乌西雅那样，擅自干涉神圣的行为，以行使讲道或施行圣礼等权力。

Ans.—Uzziah did not burn incense, ex vi ordinis, as if he had been a priest, but because he was a king and God's anointed. Prelates sit not in council and parliament, ex vi ordinis, as temporal lords. The pope is no temporal monarch, ex vi ordinis, yet all are intruders. So the P. Prelate will license kings to administer sacraments, so they do it not ex vi ordinis.
安斯：乌西雅不是作为一名祭司而烧香，而是因为他是国王和上帝的受膏者。教长们不是作为世俗领主而参加议会和会议。教皇不是世俗君主，但所有人都是侵入者。因此，教长将允许国王施行圣礼，但不是按照规定。

P. Prelate.—Men in sacred orders, in things intrinsically spiritual, have immediately a directive and authoritative power, in order, to all whatsoever, although ministerial only as related to Christ; but that giveth them no coercive civil power over the prince, per se, or per accidens, directly or indirectly, that either the one way or the other, any or many in sacred order, pope or presbytery, can cite and censure kings, associate, covenant or swear to resist him, and force him to submit to the sceptre of Christ. This power over man God Almighty useth not, much less hath he given it to man. (Psal. 110) His people are a willing people. Suadenda non cogenda religio.
普雷拉特（Prelate）- 在事物本质上属于属灵的事务中，神圣职位的人们立即拥有指导和权威的力量，以便对所有事物进行秩序安排，尽管这种力量只是作为与基督相关的仆役；但这并不赋予他们对君主的强制性民事权力，无论是直接还是间接地，无论是通过一种方式还是另一种方式，无论是通过一个或多个神圣职位的人，教皇或长老会，都不能传唤和指责国王，结盟，契约或发誓抵抗他，并迫使他屈服于基督的权杖。全能的上帝不使用这种对人的权力，更不用说将其赋予人了。（诗篇 110）他的子民是自愿的。宗教应该是劝导而不是强迫。

Ans. 1.—Pastors have a ministerial power (saith he) in spiritual things, but in order to Christ; therefore, in order to others it is not ministerial, but lordly. So here a lordly power pastors have over kings, by the P. Prelate's way. We teach it is ministerial in relation to all, because ministers can make no laws as kings can do, but only, as heralds, declare Christ's laws.
牧师在属灵事务上有一种职权（他说），但是这种职权是为了基督；因此，在其他方面，它不是职权，而是统治权。所以，按照主教的方式，牧师在君王身上有一种统治权。我们教导的是，它在与所有人的关系中是职权，因为牧师不能像君王那样制定法律，而只能像传令员一样宣布基督的法律。

2. None of us give any coercive civil power to the church over either kings or any other—it is ecclesiastical; a power to rebuke and censure was never civil.
我们中没有人将任何强制性的公民权力交给教会，无论是对国王还是其他人，这是教会的权力；责备和谴责的权力从来都不是民事的。

3. A religious covenant to swear to resist, that is, to defend ourselves, is one thing, and a lawful oath, as is clear in those of Israel that did swear Asa's covenant, without the authority of their own king, (2 Chron. 15:9–12,) and to swear to force the king to submit to Christ's sceptre, is another thing. The presbytery never did swear or covenant any such thing; nor do we take sacrament upon it, to force the king. Prelates have made the king swear, and take his sacrament upon it, that he shall root out puritans, that is, protestants, whereas, he did swear at his coronation to root out heretics, that is, (if prelates were not traitorous in administering the oath,) Arminians and papists, such as this P. Prelate is known to be; but I hold that the estates of Scotland have power to punish the king, if he labour to subvert religion and laws.
3. 宗教契约是为了发誓抵抗，即保护自己，这是一回事；而合法的誓言，正如以色列人在没有自己国王的授权下发誓阿撒的契约一样清楚，发誓迫使国王顺从基督的权杖，是另一回事。长老会从未发誓或契约过这样的事情；我们也不会因此而领圣餐来迫使国王。主教们让国王发誓，并在领圣餐时让他发誓要铲除清教徒，也就是新教徒，然而，他在加冕时发誓要铲除异端，也就是（如果主教们在行使誓言时没有背叛）阿米纳派和天主教徒，而这位 P 主教众所周知就是这样的人；但我认为苏格兰的各个阶层有权惩罚国王，如果他试图颠覆宗教和法律。

4. If this argument, that religion is to be persuaded, not forced, which the P. Prelate useth, be good, it will make much against the king; for the king, then, can force no man to the external profession and use of the ordinances of God, and not only kings, but all the people should be willing.
如果这个论点，即宗教应该通过说服而不是强迫，正如主教所说，是正确的，那么这将对国王不利；因为国王不能强迫任何人对上帝的仪式进行外部宣称和使用，不仅仅是国王，所有人都应该自愿。

P. Prelate.—Though the king may not preach, &c. yet the exercise of these things freely within his kingdom, what concerneth the decent and orderly doing of all, and the external man, in the external government of the church, in appointing things arbitrary and indifferent, and what else is of this strain, are so due to the prerogative of the crown, as that the priests, without highest rebellion, may not usurp upon him; a king in the state and church is a mixed person, not simply civil, but sacred too. They are not only professors of truth, that they have in the capacity of Christians, but they are defenders of the faith as kings; they are not sons only, but nurse-fathers; they serve God, as Augustine saith, as men, and as kings also.
主教。尽管国王可能不会传道等等，但在他的王国内自由行使这些事情，关乎所有事物的得体和有序进行，以及外在的教会管理中的外在人，任命任意和无关紧要的事物，以及其他与此类似的事物，都是属于王权的特权，以至于祭司们在不犯最高叛乱的情况下不能篡夺他的权力；国王在国家和教会中是一个混合的人，不仅仅是民事的，也是神圣的。他们不仅仅是作为基督徒的信仰者，而且作为国王也是信仰的捍卫者；他们不仅仅是儿子，而且是养父；正如奥古斯丁所说，他们作为人和国王都事奉上帝。

Ans. 1.—If ye give the king power of the exercises of word and sacraments in his kingdom, this is deprivation of ministers in his kingdom, (for he sure cannot hinder them in another kingdom,) you may make him to give a ministerial calling, if he may take it away. By what word of God can the king close the mouth of the man of God, whom Christ hath commanded to speak in his name? 2. If the king may externally govern the church, why may he not excommunicate; for this is one of the special acts of church government, especially seeing he is a mixed person, that is, half a churchman, and if he may prescribe arbitrary-teaching ceremonies, and instruct men in the duties of holiness required of pastors, I see not but he may teach the Word. 3. Dr Ferne, and other royalists, deny arbitrary government to the king in the state, and with reason, because it is tyranny over the people; but prelates are not ashamed of commanding a thing arbitrary and indifferent in God's worship; shall not arbitrary government in the church be tyranny over the conscience? But, say they, "Churchmen teacheth the king what is decent and orderly in God's worship, and he commandeth it."
答案 1：如果你让国王在他的王国里行使言语和圣礼的权力，这就剥夺了他王国内的牧师们的权力（因为他肯定不能在另一个王国里阻止他们），你可以让他给予一个牧师的职责，如果他可以随时收回。按照上帝的话语，国王怎么能够关闭那些基督命令代表他说话的人的嘴巴呢？答案 2：如果国王可以外部管理教会，为什么他不能进行逐出教会的行为呢？因为这是教会管理的特殊行为之一，尤其是考虑到他是一个混合人物，也就是说，他是半个教会人，如果他可以规定任意的教仪和教导人们牧师所要求的圣洁的职责，我看不出他为什么不能教导上帝的话语。答案 3：弗恩博士和其他王党派否认国王在国家中的任意政府，并且有理由这样做，因为这是对人民的暴政；但是主教们却不以在上帝的敬拜中命令任意和无关紧要的事情为耻，难道在教会中的任意政府不是对良心的暴政吗？但是，他们说：“教会人教导国王在上帝的敬拜中什么是合适和有秩序的，然后他命令这样做。”

Ans.—1. Solomon by no teaching of churchmen deposed Abiathar; David by no teaching of churchmen appointed the form of the temple. 2. Hath God given a prerogative royal to kings, whereby they may govern the church, and as kings, they shall not know how to use it, but in so far as they are taught by churchmen? 3. Certainly, we shall once be informed by God's word, what is this prerogative, if according to it, all the external worship of God may be ordered. Lawyers and royalists teach, that it is an absoluteness of power to do above or against a law, as they say from 1 Sam. 8:9–11, and whereby the king may oppress, and no man may say, What dost thou? Now, good P. Prelate, if, by a plenitude of tyranny, the king prescribe what he will in the external worship and government of God's house, who can rebuke the king though he command all the antichristian ceremonies of Rome, and of Turkey, yea, and the sacrificing of children to Molech? (for absoluteness royal will amount to shedding of innocent blood,) for, if any oppose the king, or say, Sir, what do you? he opposeth the prerogative royal, and that is highest rebellion, saith our P. Prelate. 4. I see not how the king is a mixed person, because he is defender of the faith, as the Pope named the king of England, Henry VIII.; he defendeth it by his sword, as he is a nurse-father, not by the sword that cometh out of his mouth. 5. I would know how Julian, Nebuchadnezzar, Og, and Sihon, were mixed persons, and did all in the external government of the church, and that by their office, as they were kings. 6. All the instances that Augustine bringeth to prove that the king is a mixed person, proveth nothing but civil acts in kings; as Hezekiah cast down the high places, the king of Nineveh compelled to obey the prophet Jonah, Darius cast Daniel's enemies to the lions.
答案：1. 所罗门没有因为教会人员的教导而废黜亚比亚他；大卫也没有因为教会人员的教导而指定圣殿的形式。2. 上帝赋予君王一项皇家特权，使他们可以管理教会，但作为君王，他们只能按照教会人员的教导来使用这项特权吗？3. 当然，我们将通过上帝的话语得知这项特权是什么，如果根据这项特权，所有关于上帝的外部崇拜都可以被规定。律师和皇权主义者教导说，这是一种超越或违背法律的绝对权力，正如他们从撒母耳记上 8:9-11 中所说的那样，君王可以压迫，没有人可以说：“你在做什么？”现在，好的主教先生，如果君王通过专制的方式规定上帝的殿堂的外部崇拜和管理，谁能责备君王，即使他命令所有罗马和土耳其的反基督仪式，甚至献祭给摩洛，有谁能责备君王呢？（因为皇家的绝对权力将导致无辜血液的流淌），因为如果有人反对君王，或者说：“先生，你在做什么？”他就是反对皇家特权，这是最高的叛乱，我们的主教先生这样说。4. 我不明白国王如何是一个混合的人，因为他是信仰的捍卫者，正如教皇称英国国王亨利八世为国王；他用剑来捍卫它，就像他是一个养育之父，而不是通过口中的剑。5.我想知道朱利安、尼布甲尼撒、敖格和西宏是如何成为混合人物，并在教会的外部管理中做出一切行动，而且是根据他们的职责，因为他们是国王。6.奥古斯丁提出的所有例子都证明国王是一个混合的人，但只证明了国王的民事行为；就像希西家推翻了高处，尼尼微的国王被迫听从先知约拿，大流士把但以理的敌人扔给了狮子。

P. Prelate.—If you make two sovereigns and two independents, there is no more peace in the state, than in Rebecca's womb, while Jacob and Esau strove for the prerogative.
P. Prelate.——如果你制造出两个君主和两个独立者，那么国家就不再和平，就像丽贝卡的子宫里，雅各和以扫争夺特权一样。

Ans. 1.—What need Israel strive, when Moses and Aaron are two independents? If Aaron make a golden calf, may not Moses punish him? It Moses turn an Ahab, and sell himself to do wickedly, ought not eighty valiant priests and Aarons both rebuke, censure, and resist?
答案 1：以色列何必努力，当摩西和亚伦都是独立的呢？如果亚伦制造了金牛犊，摩西难道不能惩罚他吗？如果摩西变成了亚哈，卖身去作恶，难道不应该有八十位勇敢的祭司和亚伦一起责备、指责和抵抗吗？

2. The P. Prelate said, (p. 65,) "Let no man imagine we privilege the king from the direction and power of the church, so he be no intruding Uzziah." I ask, P. Prelate, what is this church power? Is it not supreme in its kind of church power? or is it subordinate to the king? If it be supreme, see how P. Prelate maketh two supremes, and two sovereigns. If it be subordinate to the king, as he is a mixed person, the king is privileged from this power, and he may intrude as Uzziah; and by his prerogative, as a mixed person, he may say mass, and offer a sacrifice, if there be no power above his prerogative to curb him. If there be none, the P. Prelate's imagination is real; the king is privileged from all church power. Let the P. Prelate see to it. I see no inconvenience for reciprocations of subjections in two supremes; and that they may mutually censure and judge one another.
主教说道：“让没有人以为我们特权国王不受教会的指导和权力，只要他不是侵犯的乌西雅。”我问，主教先生，这个教会的权力是什么？它不是在其教会权力中至高无上吗？还是它从属于国王？如果它是至高无上的，看看主教先生是如何制造两个至高无上者和两个君主的。如果它从属于国王，因为他是一个混合人物，国王就特权免受这个权力的约束，他可以像乌西雅一样侵犯；并且凭借他的特权，作为一个混合人物，他可以说弥撒，献祭，只要没有权力超过他的特权来制约他。如果没有，主教先生的想象是真实的；国王就特权免受所有教会权力的约束。让主教先生自己看看吧。我看不出两个至高无上者相互服从会有什么不方便；他们可以相互批评和审判。

Obj.—Not in the same cause, that is impossible. If the king say mass, shall the church judge and censure the king for intrusion? and because the king is also sovereign and supreme in his kind, he may judge and punish the church for their act of judging and censuring the king; it being an intrusion on his prerogative, that any should judge the highest judge.
不在同一事务中，这是不可能的。如果国王说弥撒，教会会因为他的干涉而判断和指责国王吗？因为国王也是至高无上的统治者，他可以对教会的判断和指责进行审判和惩罚；这是对他的特权的干涉，任何人都不应该对最高法官进行评判。

Ans.—The one is not subject to the other, but in the case of mat-administration; the innocent, as innocent, is subject to no higher punishing; he may be subject to a higher, as accusing, citing, &c. Now, the royalist must give instance in the same cause, where the church faileth against the king and his civil law; and the king, in the same cause, faileth against the church canon; and then it shall be easy to answer.
答案：一个不受另一个的支配，但在管理垫上；无辜者，作为无辜者，不受更高的惩罚；他可能受到更高的指控、传唤等。现在，保皇派必须在同一案件中举出例子，证明教会对国王及其民法的失败；而国王在同一案件中对教会的教规的失败；然后回答将会很容易。

P. Prelate.—Religion is the bottom of all happiness, if you make the king only to execute what a presbytery commandeth, he is in a hard case, and you take from him the chiefest in government. Ecclesiastical power hath the soul in subjection; the civil sovereignty holdeth a dead dominion over the body. Then the Pope and presbytery shall be in a better condition than the king. Cic. in ver. omnes religione moventur: superstition is furious, and maddeneth people, that they spare neither crown nor mitre.
P. Prelate. - 宗教是所有幸福的基础，如果你让国王只执行长老会的命令，他将处于困境，你夺走了他在政府中的最重要的地位。教会权力使灵魂屈服；民事主权对身体拥有死亡的统治。那么教皇和长老会将比国王处于更好的状态。西塞罗在《论宗教》中说：所有人都受到宗教的影响；迷信是狂暴的，使人发狂，他们不顾王冠和教士帽。

Ans.—Cold and dry is the P. Prelate when he spendeth four pages in declamation for the excellency of religon: the madness of superstition is nothing to the purpose.
答：当 P. Prelate 在四页演讲中强调宗教的卓越性时，他是冷漠而干燥的；迷信的疯狂与此无关。

1. The king hath a chief hand in church affairs, when he is a nurse-father, and beareth the royal sword to defend both the tables of the law, though he do not spin and weave surplices, and other base mass-clothes to prelates, and such priests of Baal: they dishonour his majesty, who bring his prerogative so low.
国王在教会事务中拥有主要的权力，当他是一个养育之父，并且持有王权之剑来保护法律的两个表，尽管他不会纺织法衣和其他低贱的大量衣物给主教和巴力的祭司们：那些将他的特权贬低到如此地步的人是在侮辱他的威严。

2. The king doth not execute with blind obedience, with us, what the Pope commandeth, and the prelates, but with light of knowledge what synods discern; and he is no more made the servant of the church by this, than the king of Judah and Nebuchadnezzar are servants to Jeremiah and Daniel, because they are to obey the word of the Lord in their mouth. Let them show a reason of this, why they are servants in executing God's will in discipline, and in punishing what the Holy Ghost, by his apostles and elders, decree, when any contemn the decree concerning the abstinence from blood, things strangled, &c. (Acts 15,) rather than when they punish murder, idolatry, blasphemy, which are condemned in the Word, preached by pastors of Christ; and farther, this objection would have some more colour, (in reality it hath not,) if kings were only to execute what the church ministerially, in Christ's name, commandeth to be done in synods; but kings may, and do command synods to convene, and do their duty, and command many duties, never synodically decreed; as they are to cast out of their court apostate prelates, sleeping many years in the devil's arms, and are to command trencher-divines, neglecting their flock, and lying at court attending the falling of a dead bishop, as ravens do an old dying horse, to go and attend the flock, and not the court, as this P. Prelate did.
2. 国王不是盲目服从教皇和教士们的命令，而是根据教会会议的认知来执行；他并不因此而成为教会的仆人，就像犹大王和尼布甲尼撒王不是因为要听从耶利米和但以理口中的上帝的话语而成为他们的仆人一样。让他们解释一下，为什么他们在执行上帝的意愿和纪律时是仆人，为什么他们要惩罚那些蔑视关于戒血、勒死等事项的教令的人，这些教令是圣灵通过使徒和长老们所颁布的。 （使徒行传 15 章）与其惩罚谋杀、偶像崇拜、亵渎等在基督牧师传道中被谴责的罪行，国王们更应该遵循的是圣经中所宣讲的话语。此外，如果国王们只是按照教会以基督的名义在会议中命令的事情来执行的话，这个反对意见可能会有一些道理（实际上并没有），但国王们可以并且确实命令召开会议，并履行他们的职责，并命令执行许多从未在会议上决定的职责；例如，他们可以将背叛的主教赶出法庭，这些主教已经在魔鬼的怀抱中沉睡多年，并命令那些忽视自己羊群、整天在法庭上等待一个已故主教去世的饭桌神学家去照顾羊群，而不是法庭，就像这位 P. Prelate 所做的那样。

3. A king hath greater outward glory, and may do much more service to Christ, in respect of extension, and is more excellent than the pastor, who yet, in regard of intention, is busied about nobler things, to wit, the soul, the gospel, and eternity, than the king.
一个国王拥有更大的外在荣耀，可以为基督做更多的服务，从扩展的角度来看，他比牧师更卓越。然而，就意图而言，牧师忙于更崇高的事情，即灵魂、福音和永恒，比国王更高尚。

4. Superstition maddeneth men; but it followeth not that true religion may not set them on work to defend soul and body against tyranny of the crown, and antichristian mitres.
迷信使人发狂；但这并不意味着真正的宗教不能激励他们为了保护灵魂和身体免受王权和反基督教的压迫而奋斗。

P. Prelate.—The kingdom had peace and plenty in the prelates' time.
教长。在教长的时代，王国享有和平与丰裕。

Ans.—1. A belly-argument. We had plenty, when we sacrificed to the queen of heaven. If the traveller contend to have his purse again, shall the robber say, Robbery was blessed with peace? The rest, to the end, are lies, and answered already. Only his invectives against ruling elders, falsely called lay-elders, are not to purpose. Parliament-priests, and lay and court-pastors, are lay-prophets.
答案：1. 一个肚子的争论。当我们向天后祭祀时，我们有很多。如果旅行者坚持要拿回他的钱包，强盗会说，抢劫是和平的祝福吗？其余的直到最后都是谎言，已经回答过了。只有他对所谓的世俗长老的谩骂是没有意义的。议会牧师，世俗和宫廷牧师都是世俗的先知。

2. That presbyteries meddle with civil business, is a slander. They meddle with public scandals that offendeth in Christ's kingdom. But the prelates, by office, were more in two elements, in church and state, than any frogs, even in the king's leaven-tubs, ordinarily.
2. 那些长老会干涉民事是诽谤。他们只干涉在基督的国度中冒犯公众的丑闻。但是按照职责，主教在教会和国家两个领域的涉足比青蛙在国王的发酵桶中还要多。

3. Something he saith of popes usurping over kings, but only of one of his fathers, a great unclean spirit, Gregory the Great. But if he had refuted him by God's word, he should have thrown stones at his own tribe; for prelates, like him, do ex officio trample upon the neck of kings.
他说教皇篡夺国王的事情，但只是指他的一个祖先，一个伟大的不洁灵魂，即格里高利大帝。但如果他用上帝的话语驳斥他，他应该对自己的同族投石；因为像他这样的教长，按职责来说，是践踏国王的颈项。

4. His testimonies of one council and one father for all antiquity proveth nothing. Athanasius said, "God hath given David's throne to kings." What, to be head of the church? No; to be minister of God, without ἐξω to tutor the church. And, because "Kings reign by Christ," as the council of Armin saith; therefore, it may follow, a bailie is also head of the church. It is taken from Prov. 8, and answered.
他关于古代的一个议会和一个父亲的证词毫无意义。阿他那修斯说：“上帝把大卫的宝座给了君王。”什么，是教会的头吗？不，是作为上帝的仆役，不需要教导教会。而且，正如阿尔明议会所说，“君王是基督的统治者”，因此，可以推断出，一个法官也是教会的头。这是从箴言 8 章引用的，并得到了回答。

5. That presbyteries have usurped over kings more than popes, since Hildebrand, is a lie. All stories are full of the usurpation of prelates, his own tribe. The Pope is but a swelled fat prelate; and what he saith of popes, he saith of his own house.
5. 自从希尔德布兰德以来，长老会比教皇更多地篡夺了国王的权力，这是个谎言。所有的故事都充满了教长们的篡夺行为，他自己的同类。教皇只不过是一个肥胖的教长而已；他所说的关于教皇的话，也适用于他自己的家族。

6. The ministers of Christ in Scotland had never a contest with king James but for his sins, and his conniving with papists, and his introducing bishops, the ushers of the Pope.
基督教的苏格兰部长们与詹姆斯国王从未因他的罪恶以及与天主教徒的勾结和引进教皇的主教而发生争执。

QUESTION XLIII
问题 XLIII

WHETHER THE KING OF SCOTLAND BE AN ABSOLUTE PRINCE, HAVING PREROGATIVES ABOVE PARLIAMENT AND LAWS: THE NEGATIVE IS ASSERTED BY THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, THE KING'S OATH OF CORONATION, THE CONFESSION OF FAITH, &c.
无论苏格兰国王是否是绝对君主，拥有超过议会和法律的特权：否定由苏格兰法律、国王加冕誓言、信仰告白等所断言。

The negative part of this I hold in these assertions.
我对这些断言中的负面部分持保留态度。

Assert. 1.—The kings of Scotland have not any prerogative distinct from supremacy above the laws. If the people must be governed by no laws but by the king's own laws, that is, the laws and statutes of the realm, acted in parliament under pain of disobedience, then must the king govern by no other laws, and so by no prerogative above law. But the former is an evident truth by our acts of parliament; therefore, so is the latter. The proposition is confirmed, 1. Because whatever law enjoineth passive obedience no way but by laws, that must enjoin also the king actively to command no other way but by law; for to be governed by law essentially includeth to be governed by the supreme governor only by law. 2. An act of regal governing is an act of law, and essentially an act of law; an act of absolute prerogative is no act of law, but an act above law, or of pleasure loosed from law; and so they are opposed as acts of Law, and non-acts of law. If the subjects, by command of the king and parliament, cannot be governed but by law, how can the king but be under his own and the parliament's law, to govern only by law? I prove the assumption from Parl. 3, of king James I, act 48, which ordains "That all and sundry the king's lieges be governed under the king's laws and statutes of the realm allenarly, and under no particular laws or special privileges, nor by any laws of other countries or realms." Privileges do exclude laws. Absolute pleasure of the king as a man, and the law of the king as king, are opposed by way of contradiction; and so in Parl. VI, James IV. act 79, ratified Parl. 8, James VI. act 131.
断言。1.苏格兰国王没有与法律至上权不同的特权。如果人民必须受国王自己的法律，即国家的法律和法令，在违抗的情况下在议会中执行，那么国王就不能依据其他法律来统治，也就是说不能享有超越法律的特权。但前者在我们的议会法案中是明显的事实；因此，后者也是如此。这个命题得到了证实，1.因为任何法律只通过法律来规定被动服从，那么也必须通过法律来规定国王主动命令，因为被法律统治本质上包括只通过最高统治者的法律来统治。2.君主统治的行为是法律行为，本质上是法律行为；绝对特权的行为不是法律行为，而是超越法律或不受法律约束的行为；因此，它们作为法律行为和非法律行为相对立。如果根据国王和议会的命令，臣民只能受法律统治，那么国王怎么能不受自己和议会的法律约束，只依法统治呢？我从议会证明了这个假设。 詹姆斯一世国王的第 3 条法令第 48 条规定：“所有国王的臣民都必须仅受国王的法律和领土法规的统治，不受任何特定法律或特权的约束，也不受其他国家或领土的法律的约束。”特权排除法律。国王作为一个人的绝对权力和国王作为国王的法律是相互矛盾的；因此，在议会第六届詹姆斯四世第 79 条法令中，确认了议会第八届詹姆斯六世第 131 条法令。

2. The king, at his coronation, (Parl. 1, James VI. act 8,) sweareth "to maintain the true kirk of God, and religion now presently professed, in purity, and to rule the people according to the laws and constitutions received in the realm, causing justice and equity to be ministered without partiality." This did king Charles swear at his coronation, and was ratified, Parl. 7, James VI. act 99. Hence he who, by the oath of God, is limited to govern by law, can have no prerogative above the law. If, then, the king change the religion and confession of faith, authorised by many parliaments, (especially by Parl. 1, Charles, 1633,) he goeth against his oath. The king's royal prerogative, or rather supremacy, (enacted Parl. 8, James VI. act 129; Parl. 18, act 1; Parl. 21, act 1, James; and Parl. 1, Charles, act 3,) cannot be contrary to the oath that king Charles did swear at his coronation, which bringeth down the prerogative to governing according to the standing laws of the realm." It cannot be contrary to these former parliaments and acts, declaring that "the lieges are to be governed by the laws of the realm, and by no particular laws and special privileges;" (but absolute prerogative is a special privilege above, or without law;) which acts stand unrepealed to this day; and these acts of parliaments stand ratified by Parl. 1, Charles, 1633.
2. 国王在加冕时（议会 1，詹姆斯六世第 8 法案）宣誓“维护真正的上帝教会和目前纯洁的宗教信仰，并根据国内接受的法律和章程来统治人民，使公正和公平得到无偏见的执行。”查尔斯国王在加冕时也宣誓了这一点，并在詹姆斯六世第 7 法案第 99 条中得到了确认。因此，凭借上帝的誓言限制其依法治国的国王，不能拥有超越法律的特权。因此，如果国王改变了由许多议会（特别是查尔斯国王 1633 年的第 1 次议会）授权的宗教和信仰告白，他就违背了自己的誓言。国王的皇家特权，或者更确切地说是至高无上的权力（詹姆斯六世第 8 法案第 129 条；第 18 法案第 1 条；詹姆斯第 21 法案第 1 条；查尔斯第 1 法案第 3 条），不能与查尔斯国王在加冕时所宣誓的誓言相抵触，该誓言将特权限制为根据国内现行法律来统治。这不能与先前的议会和法令相违背，这些议会和法令宣布“臣民应受国家法律的统治，而不受任何特定法律和特权的约束”（但绝对特权是一种超越或无需法律的特权）；这些法令至今未被废除；这些议会法令已由 1633 年查尔斯一世议会批准。

3. Parl. 8, James VI. in the first three acts thereof, the king's supremacy, and the power and authority of parliaments are equally ratified under the same pain:—"Their jurisdictions, power, and judgments in spiritual or temporal causes, not ratified by his Majesty, and the three estates convened in parliament, are discharged." But the absolute prerogative of the king above law, equity, and justice, was never ratified in any parliament of Scotland to this day.
3. 在詹姆斯六世的第一至第三个法案中，国王的至高无上权力和议会的权力和权威同样受到了同样的确认和制裁：“他们在精神或世俗事务中的司法管辖权、权力和判决，如果没有国王陛下和三个阶级在议会中的批准，将被解除。”但是，国王在法律、公平和正义之上的绝对特权从未在苏格兰的任何一届议会中得到确认，直到今天。

4. By Parl. 12, James VI. act 114, all former acts in favour of the true church and religion being ratified, their power of making constitutions concerning τὸ πρέπον, order and decency, the privileges that God hath given to spiritual office-bearers, as well of doctrine and dicipline, in matters of heresy, excommunication, collation, deprivation, and such like, warranted by the word of God, and also to assemblies and presbyteries, are ratified. Now in that parliament, in acts so contiguous, we are not to think that the king and three estates would make acts for establishing the church's power in all the former heads of government, in which royalists say, "the soul of the king's absolute prerogative doth consist;" and therefore it must be the true intent of our parliament to give the king a supremacy and a prerogative royal, (which we also give,) but without any absoluteness of boundless and transcendent power above law, and not to obtrude a service-book, and all the superstitious rites of the church of Rome, without God's word, upon us.
4. 根据詹姆斯六世议会第 12 号法案第 114 条，所有早期支持真正教会和宗教的法案被确认，他们有权制定关于“适当性、秩序和庄重”的宪法，以及上帝赋予属灵职事者的特权，包括在异端、逐出教会、任命、剥夺等事项上的教义和纪律，这些都是根据上帝的话语所授权的，也包括对会议和长老会的授权。现在，在那个议会中，通过如此接近的法案，我们不应该认为国王和三个阶级会制定法案来确立教会在所有以前的政府领域中的权力，而王党派则说：“国王绝对特权的灵魂就在于此。”因此，我们议会的真正意图是给予国王至高无上的权力和王室特权（我们也给予），但没有超越法律的无限和超然的权力，并且不强加一本礼拜书和罗马教会的所有迷信仪式给我们，而这些都没有上帝的话语支持。

5. The former act of parliament ratifieth the true religion, according to the word of God, then could it never have been the intent of our parliament to ratify an absolute supremacy, according to which a king might govern his people, as a tyrannous lion, contrary to Deut. 17:18–20: And it is true, Parl. 18, James VI. acts 1 and 2, upon personal qualifications, giveth a royal prerogative to king James over all causes, persons, and estates within his Majesty's dominion, whom they humbly acknowledge to be "sovereign monarch, absolute prince, judge and governor over all estates, persons, and causes."
前议会法案根据上帝的话语确认了真正的宗教，那么我们的议会决不可能意图确认一种绝对的至高无上，根据这种至高无上，国王可以像暴虐的狮子一样统治他的人民，违背了《申命记》17:18-20 的规定。而且，确实如此，詹姆斯六世议会在个人资格上，赋予詹姆斯国王在他陛下领土内所有事务、人员和财产上的王权特权，他们谦卑地承认他是“至高无上的君主、绝对的君主、所有事务、人员和原因的法官和统治者”。

These two acts, for my part I acknowledge, are spoken rather in court expressions than in law terms.
这两个行为，就我而言，我承认，更多地是用法庭的措辞而不是法律术语来表达。

1. Because personal virtues cannot advance a limited prince (such as the kings of Scotland, post hominum memoriam, ever were) to be an absolute prince. Personal graces make not David absolutely supreme judge over all persons and causes; nor can king James, advanced to be king of England, be for that made more king of Scotland, and more supreme judge, than he was while he was only king of Scotland. A wicked prince is as essentially supreme judge as a godly king.
因为个人的美德无法使一个有限的君主（例如苏格兰的国王，自人类记忆以来）成为绝对的君主。个人的魅力并不能使大卫成为对所有人和事情拥有绝对权威的最高法官；同样，詹姆斯国王晋升为英格兰国王后，并不能使他成为苏格兰国王和更高的最高法官，因为他只是苏格兰国王时已经是如此了。一个邪恶的君主和一个虔诚的国王一样都是本质上的最高法官。

2. If this parliamentary figure of speech, which is to be imputed to the times, exalted king James to be absolute in Scotland, for his personal endowments, there was no ground to put the same on king Charles. Personal virtues are not always hereditary, though to me the present king be the best.
如果这种议会修辞，归因于时代，使詹姆斯国王因其个人才能在苏格兰成为绝对君主，那么没有理由将同样的情况归咎于查尔斯国王。个人美德并不总是世袭的，尽管对我来说现任国王是最好的。

3. There is not any absoluteness above law in act 1,—the parliament must be more absolute in themselves. King James VI. had been divers years, before this 18th parliament, king of Scotland; then, if they gave him by law an absoluteness, which he had not before, then they were more absolute. Those who can add absoluteness must have it in themselves, Nemo dat quod non habet. If it be said king James had that before the act; the parliament legally declared it to be his power, which, before the declaration, was his power, I answer, all he had before this declaration was, to govern the people according to law and conscience, and no more; and if they declare no other prerogative royal to be due to him, there is an end,—we grant all. But, then, this which they call prerogative royal, is no more than a power to govern according to law, and so you had nothing to add to king James upon the ground of his personal virtues, only you make an oration to his praise in the acts of parliament.
在第一幕中，法律没有任何绝对性，议会必须更加绝对。詹姆斯六世在这第 18 届议会之前已经多年担任苏格兰国王；如果他们通过法律给予他绝对权力，那么他们就更加绝对。能够增加绝对性的人必须自己拥有绝对性，Nemo dat quod non habet。如果有人说詹姆斯国王在法案之前就已经拥有这个权力，议会在法律上宣布这是他的权力，那么在宣布之前，这就是他的权力，我回答说，他在这个宣布之前所拥有的只是按照法律和良心来治理人民的权力，没有其他；如果他们没有宣布给予他其他皇家特权，那就结束了，我们承认一切。但是，他们所谓的皇家特权，不过是按照法律来治理的权力，所以你们在议会法案中对他的赞美只是对他个人美德的演讲而已。

4. If this absoluteness of prerogative be given to the king, the subjects, swearing obedience, swear that he hath power from themselves to destroy themselves: this is neither a lawful oath, nor though they should swear it, doth it oblige them.
如果将这种绝对的特权赋予国王，臣民们宣誓服从，就等于宣誓他们自己授予他毁灭自己的权力：这既不是合法的誓言，即使他们宣誓了，也不会对他们产生约束力。

5. A supreme judge is a supreme father of all his children and all their causes; and to be a supreme father cannot be contrary to a supreme judge; but contrary it must be, if this supremacy make over to the prince a power of devouring as a lion, and that by a regal privilege, and by office, whereas he should be a father to save; or if a judge kill an evil-doer, though that be an act destructive to one man, yet is it an act of a father to the commonwealth. An act of supreme and absolute royalty is often an act of destruction to one particular man, and to the whole commonwealth. For example, when the king, out of his absolute prerogative, pardoneth a murderer, and he killeth another innocent man, and out of the same ground the king pardoneth him again, and so till he kill twenty, (for by what reason the prerogative giveth one pardon, he may give twenty, there is a like reason above law for all,) this act of absolute royalty is such an act of murder, as if a shepherd would keep a wolf in the fold with the sheep, he were guilty of the loss of these sheep. Now an act of destroying cannot be an act of judging, far less of a supreme judge, but of a supreme murderer.
5. 一个至高无上的法官是所有子民和他们的事业的至高无上的父亲；成为一个至高无上的父亲不可能与成为一个至高无上的法官相矛盾；但如果这种至高无上使君主拥有像狮子一样吞噬的权力，并且这是通过王权特权和职务来实现的，而他应该是一个拯救者而不是一个吞噬者；或者如果一个法官杀死一个作恶者，尽管这是对一个人的毁灭性行为，但它是对整个国家的父亲的行为。至高无上和绝对的王权行为往往是对一个特定人和整个国家的毁灭性行为。例如，当国王凭借他的绝对特权赦免一个杀人犯，而他又杀死了另一个无辜的人，然后国王再次凭借同样的理由赦免他，直到他杀死二十个人（因为赦免一个人的理由，他可以赦免二十个人，这是法律之上的同样理由），这种绝对王权的行为就是一种谋杀行为，就像一个牧羊人把一只狼和羊群放在一起一样，他就对这些羊的损失负有责任。现在，一种毁灭性的行为不能是一种审判行为，更不用说是至高无上的法官的行为，而是至高无上的凶手的行为。

6. Whereas he is called "absolute prince and supreme judge, in all causes, ecclesiastical and civil," it is to be considered, 1. That the estates profess not in these acts to give any new prerogative, but only to continue the old power, and that only with that amplitude and freedom which the king and his predecessors did enjoy and exercise before: the extent whereof is best known from the acts of parliament, histories of the time, and the oaths of the kings of Scotland. 2. That he is called absolute prince, not in any relation of freedom from law, or prerogative above law, whereunto, as unto the norma regula ac mensura potestatis suæ, ac subjectionis meæ, he is tyed by the fundamental law and his own oath, but in opposition to all foreign jurisdiction or principality above him, as is evident by the oath of supremacy set down for acknowledging of his power in the first act of parliament 21, king James 6:3. They are but the same expression, giving only the same power before acknowledgeth in the 129th act, Parl. 8, king James VI., and that only over persons or estates, considered separatim, and over causes; but neither at all over the laws nor over the estates, taken conjunctim, and as convened in parliament, as is clear, both by the two immediately subsequent acts of that parliament, 8, James VI., establishing the authority of parliaments equally with the kings, and discharging all jurisdictions (albeit granted by the king) without their warrant, as also by the narrative depositive words, and certification of the act itself; otherwise the estates convened in parliament might, by virtue of that act, be summoned before and censured by the king's majesty or his council, a judicatory substitute, be subordinate to, and censured by themselves, which were contrary to sense and reason. 4. The very terms of supreme judge, and in all causes, according to the nature of correlates, presupposeth courts and judicial proceedings and laws, as the ground-work and rule of all, not a freedom from them. 5. Act 6, Parl. 20, James VI. clearly interpreteth what is meant by the king's jurisdiction in all spiritual and ecclesiastical causes; to wit, to be only in the consistorial causes of matrimony, testaments, bastardy, adulteries, abusively called spiritual causes, because handled in commissary courts, wherein the king appoints the commissary, his deputies, and makes the lords of the session his great consistory in all ecclesiastical causes, with reservation of his supremacy and prerogative therein.
虽然他被称为“绝对的王子和最高法官，在所有教会和民事案件中”，但需要考虑以下几点：1. 在这些法令中，贵族们并未宣称要赋予任何新的特权，而只是继续保持国王及其前任所享有和行使的旧权力，只是在幅度和自由度上有所增加。这种幅度最好从议会法令、当时的历史记录和苏格兰国王的宣誓中了解。2. 他被称为绝对的王子，并不意味着他与法律无关或拥有超越法律的特权，他受到基本法和自己的宣誓所约束，作为他权力的准则和限度，以及我对他的服从。而是与他之上的任何外国管辖权或领地相对立，这一点在国会第 21 号法令、詹姆斯六世国王的第一号法令中所规定的至高无上的宣誓中是明确的。这只是相同的表达方式，仅仅是在第 129 号法令中承认的相同权力。，并且仅限于个人或财产，分别考虑，并且仅限于案件；但是对于法律或作为议会召集的财产，既不完全适用，也不适用，这一点在该议会的两个紧随其后的法案中是清楚的，即詹姆斯六世的第八号法案，该法案与国王的权威一样，解除了所有（尽管由国王授予）没有他们的许可的司法管辖权，以及法案本身的叙述性词语和认证；否则，根据该法案，议会召集的财产可能会被国王陛下或他的议会召集，一个次要的审判机构召集并受到他们自己的审判，这与感性和理性相悖。4.至高无上的法官的术语，以及根据相关性的性质在所有案件中，预设了法院和司法程序和法律，作为所有的基础和规则，而不是对它们的自由。5.詹姆斯六世的第 20 号法案第 6 号法案。 明确解释了国王在所有精神和教会事务中的管辖权，即仅限于婚姻、遗嘱、私生子、通奸等被误称为精神事务的教会法庭案件，其中国王任命法庭代理人和副手，并将大法庭的法官视为他在所有教会事务中的最高法庭，但国王对此保留其至高无上的权威和特权。

7. Supreme judge in all causes, cannot be taken quoad actus elicitos, as if the king were to judge between two seamen, or two husbandmen, or two tradesmen, in that which is proper to their art; or between two painters. Certainly the king is not to judge which of the two draweth the fairest picture, but which of the two wasteth most gold on his picture, and so doth interest most of the commonwealth. So the king cannot judge in all ecclesiastical causes, that is, he cannot, quoad actos elicitos, prescribe this worship, for example, the mass, not the sacrament of the Lord's supper. Therefore the king hath but actus imperatos, some royal political acts about the worship of God, to command God to be worshipped according to his word, to punish the superstitions or neglectors of divine worship; therefore, cannot the king be sole judge in matters that belong to the college of judges by the laws of Scotland, the lords of session only may judge these matters, (Parl. 2, James I, act 45; Parl. 8, James III., act 62; Parl. 4, James III, act 105; Parl. 6, James I., act 83; Parl. 6, James I., act 86; Parl. 7, James V., act 104,) and that only according to law, without any remedy of appellation to king or the parliament (Parl. 14, James II, act 62 and 63). And the king is by act of parliament inhibited to send any private letter to stay the acts of justice; or if any such letter be procured, the judges are not to acknowledge it as the king's will, for they are to proceed impartially according to justice, and are to make the law, which is the king and parliament's public revealed will, their rule (Parl. 5, James V., act 68; Parl. 8, James VI., act 139; Parl. 6, James 6, act 92). Nor may the lords suspend the course of justice, or the sentence or execution of decrees upon the king's private letter (Parl. 11, James VI., act 79, and Parl. 11, James VI., act 47). And so, if the king's will or desire, as he is a man, be opposite to his law and his will as king, it is not to be regarded. This is a strong argument, that the parliaments never made the king supreme judge, quoad actus elicitos, in all causes, may not if the king have a cause of his own that concerneth lands of the crown, far less can the king have a will of prerogative above the law by our laws of Scotland. And, therefore, when in Parl. 8, James VI., the king's royal power is established in the first act, the very next act immediately subjoined thereunto declareth the authority of the supreme court of parliament continued past all memory of man unto this day, and constitute of the free voices of the three estates of this ancient kingdom, which, in the parliament 1606, is called, "the ancient and fundamental policy of this kingdom;" and so fundamental, as if it should be innovated, such confusion would ensue, as it could no more be a free monarchy, as is expressed in the parliament's printed commission, 1604, by whom the same, under God, hath been upholden, rebellious and traitorous subjects punished, the good and faithful preserved and maintained, and the laws and acts of parliament (by which all men are governed) made and established, and appointeth the honour, authority, and dignity of the estates of parliament to stand in their own integrity, according to the ancient and laudable custom by-past, without alteration or diminution, and therefore dischargeth any to presume or take in hand, "to impugn the dignity and the authority of the said estates, or to seek or procure the innovation or diminution of their power or authority, under the pain of treason:" and, therefore, in the next act, they discharge all jurisdictions, or judicatories, (albeit appointed by the king's majesty, as the high commission was,) without their warrant and approbation; and that, as contrary to the fundamental laws above titled, (Parl. 3, James I., act 48 and Parl. 6, James IV., act 79,) whereby the lieges should only be ruled by laws or acts passed in the parliament of this kingdom. Now, what was the ancient dignity, authority, and power of the parliaments of Scotland, which is to stand without diminution, that will be easily and best known from the subsequent passages, or historians, which can also be very easily verified by the old registers, whensoever they should be produced. In the meantime, remember that in parliament and by act of Parl James VI., for observing the due order of parliament, promiseth, never to do or command any thing which may directly or indirectly prejudge the liberty of free reasoning or voting of parliament (Parl. 11, James VI., act 40). And withal, to evidence the freedom of the parliament of Scotland, from that absolute unlimited prerogative of the prince, and their liberty to resist his breaking of covenant with them, or treaties with foreign nations, ye shall consider—1. That the kings of Scotland are obliged, before they be inaugurated, to swear and make their faithful covenant to the true kirk of God, that they shall maintain, defend, and set forward the true religion confessed and established within this realm; even as they are obliged and restricted by the law of God, as well in Deuteronomy as in 2 Kings 11, and as they crave obedience of their subjects. So that the bond and contract shall be mutual and reciprocal, in all time coming, between the prince and the people, according to the word of God, as is fully expressed in the register of the convention of estates, July 1567. 2. That important acts and sentences at home, (whereof one is printed, Parl. 14, James III., act 112,) and in treaties with foreign princes, the estates of parliament did append their several seals with the king's great seal, (which to Grotius, Barclaius, and Arnisæus, is an undeniable argument of a limited prince, as well as the style of our parliament, that the estates, with the king, ordain, ratify, rescind, &c.) as also they were obliged, in case of the king's breaking these treaties, to resist him therein, even by arms, and that without any breach of their allegiance, or of his prerogative, as is yet extant in the records of our old treaties with England and France, &c. But to go on, and leave some high mysteries unto a rejoinder.
7. 在所有案件中担任至高无上的法官，不能就行为本身而被采纳，就像国王在两个海员、两个农夫、两个商人之间进行判断，这是与他们的艺术有关的；或者在两个画家之间进行判断。当然，国王不应该判断哪个画出了最美的画，而是哪个在画上浪费了最多的金子，从而对国家利益产生了最大的影响。因此，国王不能在所有教会事务中进行判断，也就是说，他不能就行为本身而规定这种崇拜，例如弥撒，而不是主餐的圣餐。因此，国王只有一些关于上帝崇拜的皇家政治行为，可以命令按照他的话语崇拜上帝，惩罚迷信或忽视神圣崇拜的人；因此，国王不能成为苏格兰法律规定的法官团体中属于法官团体的事务的唯一裁判，只有上诉庭的法官才能判断这些事务。（议会第 2 号，詹姆斯一世第 45 号法案；议会第 8 号，詹姆斯三世第 62 号法案；议会第 4 号，詹姆斯三世第 105 号法案；议会第 6 号，詹姆斯一世第 83 号法案；议会第 6 号，詹姆斯一世第 86 号法案；议会第 7 号，詹姆斯五世第根据法律，只能依法行事，没有上诉的救济措施，无论是向国王还是议会（议会第 14 号，詹姆斯二世第 62 和 63 号法案）。国王被议会法案禁止发私人信件以阻止司法行为；如果有这样的信件被获得，法官不得将其视为国王的意愿，因为他们必须按照公正进行审判，并以法律为准则，法律是国王和议会公开表达的意愿（议会第 5 号，詹姆斯五世第 68 号法案；议会第 8 号，詹姆斯六世第 139 号法案；议会第 6 号，詹姆斯六世第 92 号法案）。贵族也不能暂停司法程序，或者根据国王的私人信件暂停判决或执行法令（议会第 11 号，詹姆斯六世第 79 号法案和议会第 11 号，詹姆斯六世第 47 号法案）。因此，如果国王作为一个人的意愿与他作为国王的法律和意愿相冲突，就不应予以考虑。这是一个有力的论据，证明议会从未使国王成为所有案件的最高法官，更不用说如果国王有自己关于王冠土地的案件，国王就不可能拥有超越法律的特权意愿，根据我们苏格兰的法律。因此，当在议会中讨论时。 8，詹姆斯六世。国王的皇家权力在第一幕中确立，紧接着的下一幕立即宣布议会最高法院的权威延续至今，由这个古老王国的三个阶级的自由声音组成，在 1606 年的议会中被称为“这个王国的古老和基本政策”；如若改变这一基本政策，将会导致混乱，无法再成为一个自由君主制，正如 1604 年议会的印刷委员会所表达的那样，上帝之下，这一政策得以维持，叛逆和叛国的罪犯受到惩罚，善良和忠诚的人得到保护和维护，议会的法律和法案（所有人都受其统治）得以制定和确立，并确定议会的尊荣、权威和尊严保持其完整性，按照古老而可赞美的过去的习俗，不加改变或减少，并因此禁止任何人妄图或试图“贬低上述阶级的尊严和权威，或寻求或促使他们的权力或权威的改变或减少”y，在叛国的痛苦下：“因此，在下一幕中，他们解除了所有的司法权力，或者法院（尽管由国王陛下任命，如高级委员会），没有他们的授权和批准；这与上述的基本法律（议会 3，詹姆斯一世，第 48 号法案和议会 6，詹姆斯四世，第 79 号法案）相违背，根据这些法律，臣民只应受到在这个王国的议会通过的法律或法案的统治。现在，苏格兰议会的古老尊严、权威和权力是什么，这将很容易从后来的经过或历史学家中了解，这也可以通过旧的注册表很容易地验证，无论何时它们被提出。与此同时，记住，在议会中，并根据詹姆斯六世的议会法案，为了遵守议会的正当秩序，他承诺永远不会做或命令任何可能直接或间接损害议会自由思考或投票自由的事情（议会 11，詹姆斯六世，第 40 号法案）。 为了证明苏格兰议会的自由，以及他们抵抗国王违背与他们的契约或与外国签订的条约的自由，你们应该考虑以下几点：1. 在加冕之前，苏格兰国王必须宣誓并与上帝的真正教会订立忠诚的契约，承诺维护、捍卫和推进在这个王国内承认和建立的真正宗教；他们受到上帝的律法的约束，正如申命记和列王记第 11 章所规定的，他们也要求臣民服从。因此，这个契约将是互惠互利的，将在未来的所有时间里，根据上帝的话语，成为王子和人民之间的约束，这在 1567 年 7 月的国家会议记录中得到了充分的表达。2. 在国内，重要的法令和判决（其中之一已经印刷出来，议会第 14 号，詹姆斯三世。，行动 112 号），以及与外国王子签订的条约中，议会的贵族们用国王的大印盖上了各自的印章，（对于格罗蒂乌斯、巴克莱乌斯和阿尼塞乌斯来说，这是一个不可否认的有限君主的证据，以及我们议会的风格，即贵族与国王一起制定、批准、废除等等。）而且，如果国王违反这些条约，他们有义务抵抗他，甚至动用武力，而这并不违背他们的忠诚，也不违背他的特权，这在我们与英国和法国等国的旧条约记录中仍然存在。但是，继续下去，留下一些高深的奥秘给对方的回应。

And to the end I may make good, 1. That nothing is here taught in this treatise but the very doctrine of the Church of Scotland, I desire that the reader may take notice of the larger Confession of the Church of Scotland, printed with the body of the confessions at Geneva, anno 1612, and authorised by James VI. and the three estates in parliament, and printed in our acts of parliament (Parl. 15, James VI., anno 1567). Amongst good works of the second table, saith our Confession, (art. 14,) are these:—To honour father, mother, princes, rulers, and superior powers. To love them, to support them, yea, to obey their charge, (not repugning to the commandment of God,) to save the lives of innocents, to repress tyranny, to defend the oppressed, to keep our bodies clean and holy, &c. The contrary whereof is, to disobey or resist any that God hath placed in authority, (while they pass not over the bounds of their office,) to murder, or to consent thereunto, to bear hatred, or to let innocent blood be shed, if we may withstand it, &c. Now the Confession citeth in the margin, Eph. 1:1, 7 and Ezek. 22:1–4, &c., where it is evident, by the name of father and mother, all inferior judges as well as the king, and especially the princes, rulers, and lords of parliament are understood. 2. The bloody city is to be judged, because they relieved not the oppressed out of the hand of the bloody princes, (5:6,) who every one of them did to their power shed innocent blood (Ezek. 22:6). 3. To resist superior powers, and so the estates of parliament, as the cavaliers of Scotland do, is resistance forbidden (Rom. 13:1). The place is also cited in the Confession, and the Confession exponeth the place (Rom. 13.) according to the interpretation of all sound expositors, as is evident in these words, art. 24, "And therefore we confess and avouch, that such as resist the supreme power, doing that thing which appertaineth to his charge, do resist God's ordinance, and therefore cannot be guiltless. And farther, we affirm, that whosoever denieth unto them aid, their counsel and support, while as the princes and rulers vigilantly travel in execution of their office, that the same men deny their help, support, and counsel to God, who, by the presence of his lieutenant, craves it of them." From which words we have clear:—
为了达到最终目的，我要做好以下事情：1. 在这篇论文中所教授的只是苏格兰教会的真正教义，我希望读者注意苏格兰教会的更大信仰告白，该告白于 1612 年与其他告白一起在日内瓦印刷，并由詹姆斯六世和议会的三个阶层授权，并在我们的议会法案中印刷（詹姆斯六世第 15 届议会，1567 年）。在我们的信仰告白中，关于第二表的善行（第 14 条）包括：尊敬父亲、母亲、君主、统治者和上级权力。爱他们，支持他们，甚至服从他们的命令（不违背上帝的诫命），拯救无辜者的生命，镇压暴政，保护受压迫者，保持我们的身体洁净和圣洁等等。相反的行为是不服从或抵抗上帝所任命的任何权威（只要他们不超越自己的职权范围），谋杀或同意谋杀，怀有仇恨，或者让无辜的血流淌，如果我们可以阻止的话等等。现在，信仰告白在边注中引用了以弗所书 1:1、7 和以西结书 22:1-4 等经文。在这里，通过父亲和母亲的名字，所有下级法官以及国王，尤其是议会的王子、统治者和领主都被理解。2. 血腥的城市将受到审判，因为他们没有解救被血腥的王子压迫的人们（5:6），他们每个人都尽力流了无辜的血（以西结书 22:6）。3. 抵抗上级权力，如苏格兰的骑士们所做的那样，是被禁止的（罗马书 13:1）。该地方也在信仰告白中被引用，并且信仰告白根据所有合理的解释者的解释解释了该地方（罗马书 13 章），正如在第 24 条中明显所示：“因此，我们承认并宣称，那些抵抗至高无上的权力，做与他的职责相关的事情的人，是抵抗上帝的命令，因此不能无罪。此外，我们断言，那些在王子和统治者勤勉地履行职责时否认他们援助、建议和支持的人，也否认了上帝的帮助、支持和建议，因为上帝通过他的代理人的存在向他们请求。”从这些词语中，我们可以清楚地看出：

1. That to resist the king or parliament, is to resist them while as they are doing the thing that appertaineth to their charge, and while they vigilantly travel in the execution of their office. But while king and Parliament do acts of tyranny against God's law, and all good laws of men, they do not the things that appertain to their charge and the execution of their office; therefore, by our Confession, to resist them in tyrannical acts is not to resist the ordinance of God.
抵抗国王或议会，就是在他们履行职责和认真执行职务时抵抗他们。但是，当国王和议会违背上帝的法律和所有良好的人类法律时，他们并没有履行职责和执行职务的事情；因此，根据我们的信仰，抵抗他们的暴政行为并不是抵抗上帝的命令。

2. To resist princes and rulers, and so inferior judges, and to deny them counsel and comfort, is to deny help, counsel, and comfort to God. Let then cavaliers, and such as refuse to help the princes of the land against papists, prelates and malignants, know, that they resist God's ordinance, which rebellion they unjustly impute to us.
抵抗王子和统治者，以及次要的法官，拒绝给予他们建议和安慰，就是拒绝给予上帝帮助、建议和安慰。那些拒绝帮助国家的王子对抗天主教徒、主教和恶意分子的骑士们应该知道，他们抵抗的是上帝的命令，而他们不公正地将反抗归咎于我们。

3. Whereas it is added in our Confession, that God, by the presence of his lieutenant, craveth support and counsel of the people, it is not so to be taken, as if then only we are to aid and help inferior judges and parliaments, when the king personally requireth it, and not otherways. 1. Because the king requireth help, when, by his office, he is obliged to require our help and counsel against papists and malignants, though as misled, he should command the contrary: so if the law require our help, the king requireth it ex officio. 2. This should expressly contradict our Confession, if none were obliged to give help and counsel to the parliaments and estates, except the king in his own person should require it, because (art. 14) it is expressly said, That to save the lives of innocents, or repress tyranny, to defend the oppressed,—not to suffer innocent blood to be shed, are works pleasing to God, which he rewardeth. Now we are not to think in reason, if the king shall be induced by wicked counsel to do tyrannical works, and to raise papists in arms against protestants, that God doth by him, as by his lieutenant, require our help, comfort, and counsel in assisting the king in acts of tyranny, and in oppression, and in shedding innocent blood; yea, our Confession tyeth us to deny help and comfort to the king in these wicked acts, and therefore our help must be in the things that pertaineth to his royal office and duty only, otherwise we are to repress all tyranny (art. 14).
既然在我们的信仰告白中提到，上帝通过他的代理人的存在，寻求人民的支持和建议，这并不意味着只有在国王亲自要求时，我们才应该帮助和支持下级法官和议会，而其他情况则不需要。1. 因为国王在履行职责时，有义务要求我们对抗天主教徒和恶意分子提供帮助和建议，即使他被误导，他也应该下令相反：所以如果法律要求我们提供帮助，国王也要求我们提供帮助。2. 如果只有国王亲自要求时，才有义务向议会和各方提供帮助和建议，那将明显与我们的信仰告白相矛盾，因为（第 14 条）明确指出，拯救无辜者的生命，制止暴政，保护受压迫者，不容许无辜的鲜血被流，这些都是上帝喜悦的工作，他会予以回报。 Now we are not to think in reason, if the king shall be induced by wicked counsel to do tyrannical works, and to raise papists in arms against protestants, that God doth by him, as by his lieutenant, require our help, comfort, and counsel in assisting the king in acts of tyranny, and in oppression, and in shedding innocent blood; yea, our Confession tyeth us to deny help and comfort to the king in these wicked acts, and therefore our help must be in the things that pertaineth to his royal office and duty only, otherwise we are to repress all tyranny (art. 14).

4. To save the lives of innocents, to repress tyranny, to defend the oppressed, are, by our Confession, good works, well pleasing to God, and so is this a good work, not to suffer innocent blood to be shed, if we may withstand it. Hence it is clear as the sun, that our Confession, according to the word of God, to which king Charles did swear at his coronation, doth oblige and tie us in the presence of God and his holy angels, to rise in arms to save the innocent, to repress tyranny, to defend the oppressed. When the king, by ill counsel, sent armies by sea and land to kill and destroy the whole kingdom who should refuse such a service-book as they could not in conscience receive, except they would disobey God, renounce the Confession of Faith, which the king and they had sworn unto, and prove perfidious apostates to Christ and his church, what could we do, and that the same Confession, considering our bonds to our dear brethren in England, layeth bonds on us to this, as a good work also, not to suffer their innocent blood to be shed, but to defend them, when they, against all law of God, of men, of state, of nations, are destroyed and killed. For my part, I judge it had been a guiltiness of blood upon Scotland, if we had not helped them, and risen in arms to defend ourselves and our innocent brethren against bloody cavaliers. Add to this what is in the 24th article of the same Confession:—"We confess, whosoever goeth about to take away, or to confound the whole state of civil polity, now long established, we affirm the same men not only to be enemies to mankind, but also wickedly to fight against God's will." But those who have taken arms against the estates of Scotland, and the princes and rulers of the land, have laboured to take away parliaments, and the fundamental laws of this kingdom, therefore, the Confession addeth, (art. 16,) "We farther confess and acknowledge, that such persons as are placed in authority are to be loved, honoured, feared, and holden in most reverent estimation, because that they are lieutenants of God, in whose sessions God himself doth sit and judge; yea, even the judges and princes themselves, to whom, by God, is given the sword, to the praise and defence of good men, and to revenge and punish all open malefactors." Therefore, the parliament, and princes, and rulers of the land, are God's lieutenants on earth no less than the king, by our Confession of Faith; and those who resist them, resist the ordinance of God. Royalists say, they are but the deputies of the king, and when they do contrary to his royal will, they may be resisted, yea, and be killed, for in so far they are private men, though they are to be honoured as judges when they act according to the king's will, whose deputies they are. But, I answer:—
为了拯救无辜的生命，压制暴政，保护受压迫者，根据我们的信仰，这些都是善行，是上帝所喜悦的。因此，如果我们有能力阻止无辜的鲜血被流，那么这也是一项善行。因此，很明显，根据上帝的话语，我们的信仰要求我们在上帝和他的圣天使面前，起来武装保护无辜者，压制暴政，保护受压迫者。当国王查尔斯因为不良的建议，派遣海陆军队来杀戮和摧毁整个王国，那些拒绝接受他们无法在良心上接受的礼拜仪式的人，除非他们违背上帝的旨意，背弃他们和国王所宣誓的信仰告白，并对基督和他的教会证明是背信弃义的叛教者，我们能做什么呢？而且，考虑到我们与英格兰亲爱的弟兄的羁绊，同样的信仰也将我们束缚在这个善行上，即不容许他们无辜的鲜血被流，而是要保护他们，当他们在违背上帝、人类、国家和国际法的情况下被摧毁和杀害时。 就我而言，如果我们没有帮助他们，并且起来武装保护自己和我们无辜的兄弟姐妹免受血腥的骑士的侵害，那么我认为这对苏格兰来说是一种血债。再加上同一信仰告白的第 24 条中所述：“我们承认，任何试图剥夺或混淆现已长期建立的民事政治整体状态的人，我们断言这些人不仅是人类的敌人，而且还邪恶地违背了上帝的旨意。”但那些对苏格兰的国家机构、王子和统治者采取武装行动的人，他们努力剥夺议会和这个王国的基本法律，因此，信仰告白补充道（第 16 条）：“我们进一步承认和承认，被任命为当权者的人应该被爱戴、尊敬、敬畏，并被最尊敬地评估，因为他们是上帝的代理人，在他们的座位上，上帝自己坐着审判；是的，甚至是法官和统治者自己，他们获得了上帝赐予的剑，以赞美和保护善良的人，并惩罚和惩治所有公开的罪犯。”因此，根据我们的信仰告白，议会、王子和土地统治者与国王一样，都是上帝在地上的代表；而那些反抗他们的人，就是反抗上帝的命令。皇室主义者说，他们只是国王的代理人，当他们违背国王的意愿时，可以被反抗，甚至可以被杀害，因为在这种情况下，他们只是普通人，尽管当他们按照国王的意愿行事时，应该被尊重为法官，因为他们是国王的代理人。但是，我回答：—

1. It is a wonder that inferior judges should be formally judges, in so far as they act conform to the will of a mortal king, and not in so far as they act conform to the will of the King of kings, seeing the judgment they execute is the King of kings', and not the judgment of a mortal king. (2 Chron. 19:6.)
低劣的法官竟然能被正式任命为法官，只要他们按照凡人国王的意愿行事，而不是按照至高无上的上帝的意愿行事，这真是奇怪。因为他们所执行的判决是至高无上的上帝的判决，而不是凡人国王的判决。（《历代志下》19:6）

2. Royalists cannot endure the former distinction as it is applied to the king, but they receive it with both hands as it is applied to inferior judges; and yet, certain it is, that it is as ordinary for a king, being a sinful man, to act sometimes as the lieutenant of God, and sometimes as an erring and misinformed man, no less than the inferior judge acteth sometimes according to the king's will and law, and sometimes according to his own private way; and if we are to obey the inferior judge as the deputy of the king, what shall become of his person, when cavaliers may kill him at some Edgehill? for so they mock this distinction, as applied to the king in regard of his person and of his royal office; and for this point our Confession citeth in the margin Rom. 13:7; 1 Pet. 2:17; Psal. 82:1, which places do clearly prove that inferior magistrates are, 1. God's ordinances; 2. Gods on earth, (Psal. 82:6); 3. Such as bear the Lord's sword; 4. "That they are not only (as the Confession saith) appointed for civil policy, but also for maintenance of true religion, and for suppressing of idolatry and superstition." Then, it is evident, to resist inferior magistrates is to resist God himself, and to labour to throw the sword out of God's hand. 5. Our Confession useth the same Scriptures cited by Junius Brutus, to wit, Ezek. 22:1–7; Jer. 22:3, where we are, no less than the Jews, commanded to "execute judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hands of the oppressor;" for both the law of God and the civil law saith, Quinon impedit homicidium quum, potest, is homicidii reus est. I will cast in a word of other Confessions, lest we seem to be Jesuits alone.
王党派无法忍受将前述区别应用于国王，但他们却毫不犹豫地接受将其应用于下级法官；然而，可以肯定的是，国王作为一个有罪之人，有时会像上帝的代理人一样行事，有时会像一个错误和被误导的人一样行事，就像下级法官有时会根据国王的意愿和法律行事，有时会根据自己的私人方式行事一样；如果我们要服从下级法官作为国王的代理人，那么当骑士们可能在某个埃奇希尔杀死他时，他的人怎么办呢？因此，他们嘲笑这种将其应用于国王的区别，关于他的人和他的王室职务；至于这一点，我们的信仰告白在罗马书 13:7、彼得前书 2:17 和诗篇 82:1 的旁注中引用了这些经文，这些经文明确证明了下级官员是：1. 上帝的命令；2. 上帝在地上的代表（诗篇 82:6）；3. 手握主的剑；4. "他们不仅（如信仰告白所说）被任命为民政，而且还被任命为维护真正的宗教，压制偶像崇拜和迷信。然后，很明显，抵抗下级官员就是抵抗上帝自己，努力夺取上帝手中的权力。我们的信仰使用了与朱尼乌斯·布鲁图斯引用的同样经文，即以西结书 22:1-7；耶利米书 22:3，我们被命令像犹太人一样“行公义，施行公平，救被抢夺的脱离欺压人的手”。因为上帝的律法和民法都说，不阻止他人被杀，而有能力阻止的人就是杀人的罪犯。我会提到其他信仰，以免我们看起来像是耶稣会士独自一人。

The Confession of Helvetia saith, (c. 30,) de Magistratu. Viduas, pu pillos, afflictos asserat, every magistrate is to defend the widow, the orphan, and the oppressed. The French Confession saith, (art. 40,) Affirmamus ergo parendumesse legibus et statutis, solvenda tributa, subjectionis denique jugum voluntarie tolerandum, etiamsi infideles fuerint magistratus, dummodo Deisummum imperium integrum et illibatum maneat. So clear it is that all active obedience is due to all magistrates, and that that yoke of passive obedience is to be tolerated but conditionally, with a dummodo, so as the magistrate violate not the supreme commandment of the King of kings; and we know, accordingly, protestants of that church have taken defensive arms against their king. But our P. Prelate can say, the Confessions of Scotland, Helvetia, France, and all the reformed churches, are Jesuitical, when as it was the doctrine of the Waldenses, the protestants, Luther, Calvin, and others, while as there was no Jesuit on earth.
瑞士的告白书说（第 30 章），关于政府。它声称，每个官员都应该保护寡妇、孤儿和受压迫者。法国的告白书说（第 40 条），我们肯定要遵守法律和法规，支付税款，自愿忍受服从的压力，即使官员是不信教的，只要至高无上的权力保持完整和无损。因此，很明显，所有官员都应该得到积极的服从，而被动服从的枷锁只有在特定条件下才能容忍，即只要官员不违反至高无上的上帝的命令；我们知道，相应地，该教会的新教徒曾经对抗他们的国王。但是我们的主教可以说，苏格兰、瑞士、法国和所有改革派教会的告白书都是耶稣会的，而当时地球上根本没有耶稣会士。

The thirty-seventh article of the Church of England's Confession is so far from erecting an absolute power in the king, that they expressly bring down the royal prerogative from the high seat and transcendent superlative power above the law, and expone the prerogative to be nothing but mere law-power. "We only (say they) ascribe that prerogative to the king which the Scripture doth ascribe to all godly princes; that is, that they cause all committed to their trust, whether ecclesiastical or civil persons, to do their duty, and punish with the civil sword all disobedient offenders." In syntag. Confess. "And this they say in answer to some who believed the Church of England made the king the head of the church." The Prelates' Convocation must be Jesuits to this P. Prelate also.
英国教会信条的第三十七条远非将绝对权力赋予国王，而是明确将王权从高位和超越法律的至高无上的权力降低，并将王权解释为纯粹的法律权力。他们说：“我们只将那种特权归于国王，正如圣经归于所有虔诚的君主一样；也就是说，他们要求所有委托给他们的人，无论是教会的还是民事的，都要尽责，并用民事刑罚惩罚所有不服从的罪犯。”在《信条》的语境中，“他们这样说是回应了一些人认为英国教会将国王视为教会的首领。”主教会议对这位主教也必须是耶稣会士。

So the thirty-sixth article of the Belgic Confession saith of all magistrates, no less than of a king, (we know, for tyranny of soul and body, they justly revolted from their king,) Idcirco magistratus ipsos gladio armavit, ut malos quidem plectant pænis, probos vero tueantur. Horum porro est, non modo de civili politia conservanda esse solicitos, verum etiam dare operam ut sacrum ministerium conservetur, omnis idololatria et adulterinus Dei cultus e medio tollatur, regnum antichristi diruatur, &c. Then, all magistrates, though inferior, must do their duty that the low of God hath laid on them, though the king forbid them; but, by the Belgic Confession and the Scripture, it is their duty to relieve the oppressed, to use the sword against murdering papists and Irish rebels and destroying cavaliers; for, shall it be a good plea in the day of Christ to say, "Lord Jesus, we would have used thy sword against bloody murderers if thy anointed, the king, had not commanded us to obey a mortal king rather than the King of ages, and to execute no judgment for the oppressed, because he judged them faithful catholic subjects." Let all Oxford and cavalier doctors in the three kingdoms satisfy the consciences of men in this, that inferior judges are to obey a divine law, with a proviso that the king command them so to do, and otherwise they are to obey men rather than God. This is evidently holden forth in the Argentine Confession, exhibited by four cities to the emperor Charles V., 1530, in the very same cause of innocent defence that we are now in in the three kingdoms of Scotland, England, and Ireland.
所以比利时信条的第 36 条关于所有的官员，不仅仅是国王，说道（我们知道，出于灵魂和身体的暴政，他们正当地背叛了他们的国王），因此官员们被武装起来，以惩罚邪恶者，保护善良者。他们的责任不仅仅是关心公民政治的维护，而且还要努力保护神圣的事工，消除一切偶像崇拜和异端的神的崇拜，摧毁敌基督的王国等等。然后，所有的官员，尽管地位较低，也必须履行上帝赋予他们的责任，即使国王禁止他们；但是，根据比利时信条和圣经，他们有责任帮助受压迫者，用剑对付杀人的天主教徒、爱尔兰叛乱分子和摧毁骑士；因为，在基督的日子里，能够说“主耶稣，如果你的受膏者国王没有命令我们服从一个凡人的国王而不是万世之王，并且不为受压迫者行公义，因为他认为他们是忠诚的天主教信徒，我们本来会使用你的剑对付血腥的凶手”这将是一个好的辩词吗？让所有牛津和骑士派的医生在三个王国中满足人们的良心，即次要的法官应该遵守神的法律，但前提是国王命令他们这样做，否则他们应该服从人而不是神。这在 1530 年由四个城市向查理五世皇帝展示的阿根廷信仰告白中明显表达出来，正是我们现在在苏格兰、英格兰和爱尔兰三个王国中所面临的无辜防卫的原因。

The Saxon Confession, exhibited to the Council of Trent, (1551, art. 23,) maketh the magistrate's office essentially to consist in keeping of the two tables of God's law; and so, what can follow hence, but in so far as he defendeth murderers,—or, if he be a king, and shall with the sword or arms impede inferior magistrates (for the Confession speaketh of all) to defend God's law and true religion against papists, murderers, and bloody cavaliers, and hinder them to execute the judgment of the Lord against evil doers,—he is not, in that, a magistrate; and the denying of obedience, active or passive, to him in that, is no resistance to the ordinance of God; but, by the contrary, the king himself must resist the ordinance of God.
撒克逊信仰告诉特伦特会议（1551 年，第 23 条）, 执政官的职责本质上在于遵守上帝的两个戒律；因此，从这里可以得出什么结论呢？除非他保护杀人犯，或者如果他是国王，并且用剑或武器阻碍下级执政官（因为信仰涉及所有人）保护上帝的法律和真正的宗教，抵抗教皇派、杀人犯和血腥骑士，并阻止他们对作恶者执行上帝的审判，否则他在这方面就不是一个执政官；对他在这方面的服从或不服从，不是对上帝的命令的抵抗；相反，国王自己必须抵抗上帝的命令。

The Confession of Bohemia is clear, (art. 16,) Qui publico munere magistratuquefunguntur, quemcunque, gradum teneant, se non suum, sed Dei opus agere sciant. Hence, all inferior or the supreme magistrate, whatever be their place, they do not their own work, nor the work of the king, but the work of God, in the use of the sword; therefore, they are to use the sword against bloody cavaliers, as doing God's work-suppose the king should forbid them to do God's work; and it saith of all magistrates, Sunt autem magistratuum partes ac munus, omnibus ex æquo jus dicere, in communem omnium usum, sine personarum acceptatione, pacem ac tranquilitatem publicam tueri ac procurare de malis ac facinorosis hanc inter turbantibus pænas sumere, aliosque, omnes ab eorum vi et injuria vindicare. Now, this confession was the faith of the barons and nobles of Bohemia who were magistrates, and exhibited to the emperor, anno 1535, in the cause not unlike unto ours now, and the emperor was their sovereign; yet they profess they are obliged, in conscience, to defend all under them from all violence and injuries, that the emperor, or any other, could bring on them; and that this is their office before God, which they are obliged to perform as a work of God, and the Christian magistrate is not to do that work which is not his own but God's, upon condition that the king shall not inhibit him. What if the king shall inhibit parliaments, princes, and rulers, to relieve the oppressed, to defend the orphan, the widow, the stranger, from unjust violence? Shall they obey man rather than God?
波希米亚的告白是明确的（第 16 条），任何担任公职和官职的人，无论他们的地位如何，都应该知道他们所做的不是自己的工作，也不是国王的工作，而是上帝的工作，使用剑的权力；因此，他们应该使用剑来对付血腥的骑士，因为这是在做上帝的工作——假设国王禁止他们做上帝的工作；并且对于所有的官员，它说：官员的职责和任务是公正地裁决，为了公众的利益，不偏袒任何人，维护和促进公共的和平与安宁，对那些扰乱秩序的恶人和罪犯进行惩罚，保护所有人免受他们的暴力和伤害。 现在，这个忏悔是波希米亚的男爵和贵族的信仰，他们是法官，于 1535 年向皇帝展示，原因与我们现在的情况类似，而皇帝是他们的君主；然而他们宣称，他们有责任在良心上保护他们统治下的所有人免受任何暴力和伤害，无论是皇帝还是其他人可能对他们施加的；而这是他们在上帝面前的职责，他们有义务将其视为上帝的工作来完成，而基督教的统治者不应该做不属于他自己而是属于上帝的工作，前提是国王不会禁止他。如果国王禁止议会、王子和统治者来援助受压迫者，保护孤儿、寡妇和陌生人免受不公正的暴力，那又如何呢？他们应该听从人还是听从上帝？

To say no more of this: prelates in Scotland did what they could, 1. To hinder his Majesty to indict a parliament. 2. When it was indicted, to have its freedom destroyed by prelimitations. 3. When it was sitting, their care was to divide, impede, and annul the course of justice. 4. All in the P. Prelate's book tendeth to abolish parliaments, and to enervate their power. 5. There were many ways used to break up parliaments in England; and to command judges not to judge at all, but to interrupt the course of justice, is all one as to command unrighteous judgment (Jer. 22:3). 6. Many ways have been used by cavaliers to cut off parliaments, and the present parliament in England.
不再多说：苏格兰的主教们尽力阻止陛下召开议会。当议会召开时，他们试图通过预先限制来破坏其自由。当议会开会时，他们的关注点是分裂、阻碍和废除司法程序。主教的书中的一切都旨在废除议会，并削弱其权力。在英格兰有许多方法用来解散议会；命令法官不审判，而是中断司法程序，与命令不公正的判决（耶利米书 22:3）无异。骑士们曾用许多方法来废除议会，包括英格兰现在的议会。

The paper found in William Laud's study, touching fears and hopes of the parliament of England, evidenceth that cavaliers hate the supreme seat of justice, and would it were not in the world; which is the highest rebellion and resistance made against superior powers.
在威廉·劳德的书房里发现的文件，涉及英国议会的恐惧和希望，证明骑士们憎恨最高司法机构，希望它不复存在；这是对上级权力最高的叛乱和抵抗。

1. He feareth this parliament shall begin where the last left.
他担心这个议会将从上一个议会停下的地方开始。

Ans.—Whatever ungrateful courtier had hand in the death of king James deserved to come under trial.
无论是哪个忘恩负义的朝臣与詹姆斯国王的死有关，都应该接受审判。

2. He feareth they sacrifice some man.
他害怕他们会牺牲某个人。

Ans.—1. If parliaments have not power to cut off rebels, and corrupt judges, the root of their being is undone. 2. If they be lawful courts, none need fear them, but the guilty.
答案：1. 如果议会没有权力剪除叛乱分子和腐败的法官，它们的存在根基就被破坏了。2. 如果它们是合法的法庭，只有有罪者才需要害怕它们。

3. He feareth their consultations be long, and the supply must be present.
他担心他们的讨论会很长，而且必须立即提供补给。

Ans.—1. Then cavaliers intend parliaments for subsidies to the king, to foment and promote the war against Scotland, not for justice. 2. He that feareth long and serious consultations, to rip up and lance the wounds of church and state, is afraid that the wounds be cured.
答案：1. 骑士们打算通过议会向国王征收赋税，以煽动和推动对苏格兰的战争，而不是为了正义。2. 那些害怕长时间而严肃的磋商，揭开和治愈教会和国家的伤口的人，是害怕伤口被治愈。

4. He feareth they deny subsidies, which are due by the law of God, nature, and nations, whereas parliaments have but their deliberation and consent for the manner of giving, otherwise this is to sell subsidies, not to give them.
他担心他们否认应根据上帝的法律、自然法和国际法应得的补贴，而议会只有权决定和同意给予的方式，否则这就是出售补贴，而不是给予补贴。

Ans.—Tribute, and the standing revenues of the king, are due by the law of God and nations; but subsidies are occasional rents given upon occasion of war, or some extraordinary necessity; and they are not given to the king as tribute and standing revenues, which the king may bestow for his house, family, and royal honour, but they are given by the kingdom, rather to the kingdom than to the king, for the present war, or some other necessity of the kingdom, and therefore are not due to the king as king, by any law of nature or nations, and so should not be given but by deliberation and judicial sentence of the states; and they are not sold to the king, but given out by the kingdom by statute of parliament, to be bestowed on the kingdom, and the king should sell no acts of justice for subsidies.
答案：贡品和国王的固定收入是根据上帝和国际法的规定应当支付的；而赋税是在战争或某种特殊需要的情况下给予的临时租金；它们并不是作为贡品和国王的固定收入给予国王的，国王可以将其用于自己的住宅、家庭和皇家荣誉；而是由王国给予的，更多是给予王国而不是国王，用于当前的战争或王国的其他需要；因此，它们不是根据任何自然法或国际法应当归国王的，因此只能通过国家的审议和司法判决来给予；它们不是卖给国王的，而是由议会的法令由王国分配给王国使用；国王不应该以赋税的名义出售任何正义行为。

5. He dare not speak of the consequences, if the king grant bills of grace, and part with the flowrets of the crown.
他不敢谈论后果，如果国王批准宽大法案，并放弃王冠上的花朵。

Ans.—He dare not say, the people shall vindicate their liberty by selling subsidies to buy branches of the prerogative royal, and diminishing the king's fancied absoluteness; so would prelates have the king absolute, that they may ride over the souls, purses, persons, estates, and religion of men, upon the horse of pretended absoluteness.
他不敢说，人民将通过出售补贴来购买王权的分支，以维护他们的自由，并减少国王所幻想的绝对权力；主教们希望国王绝对统治，以便他们可以乘着假装的绝对权力之马，踏过人们的灵魂、钱袋、人身、财产和宗教。

6. He feareth the parliament fall upon church business; but, 1. The church is too weak already; if it had more power, the king might have more both of obedience and service. 2. The houses can be no competent judges in point of doctrine. 3. For the king, clergy, and convocation are judges in all causes ecclesiastical.
他担心议会会干涉教会事务；但是，1. 教会已经太弱了；如果它有更多的权力，国王可能会得到更多的服从和服务。2. 两院在教义问题上不能成为合适的裁判。3. 因为国王、神职人员和教会会议是所有教会事务的裁判。

Ans. 1.—This striketh at the root of all parliamentary power. 1. The P. Prelate giveth them but a poor deliberative power in subsidies; and that is, to make the king's will a law, in taking all the subjects' goods from them, to foment war against the subjects. 2. He taketh all jurisdiction from them over persons, though they were as black traitors as breathe. 3. And spoileth them of all power in church matters; to make all judges, yea, and the king himself yield blind obedience to the Pope and Prelate, and their illuminated clergy. Sure I am, P. Maxwell imputeth this, but most unjustly, to presbyteries. What essential and fundamental privileges are left to parliaments? David and the parliament of Israel are impertinent judges in the matter of bringing home the ark of God. And for the church's weakness, that is, the weakness of the damned prelates, shall this be the king's weakness? Yes; the P. Prelate must make it true, no bishop, no king.
答案 1. 这直接打击了议会权力的根基。1. 主教只给予他们在补贴方面一个很差的决策权；也就是说，将国王的意愿变成法律，从他们那里拿走所有的臣民财产，用来煽动对臣民的战争。2. 他剥夺了他们对个人的所有司法权力，即使他们是如同呼吸的黑暗叛徒一样。3. 并且剥夺了他们在教会事务中的所有权力；使所有的法官，甚至国王自己都要盲目服从教皇、主教和他们受启发的神职人员。我确信，P. Maxwell 将这一切都归咎于长老会，但是非常不公正。议会还剩下哪些基本和重要的特权？大卫和以色列议会在带回上帝的约柜的事情上是无关紧要的裁判者。至于教会的软弱，也就是该死的主教的软弱，这就是国王的软弱吗？是的；主教必须让它成为真理，没有主教就没有国王。

7. He feareth factious spirits will take heart to themselves, if the king yield to them without any submission of theirs.
他担心如果国王在没有他们的任何屈服的情况下向他们让步，那些党派精神会得到鼓舞。

Ans.—The princes and judges of the land are a company of factious men, and so no parliament, no court, but at best some good advisers of a king to break up the parliament, because they refuse subsidies, that he may, by a lawless way, extort subsidies.
答案：国家的王子和法官是一群党派人士，所以没有议会，也没有法庭，最多只有一些好的顾问来解散议会，因为他们拒绝提供补贴，这样国王可以通过非法手段勒索补贴。

8. He desireth the parliament may sit a short time, that they may not well understand one another.
他希望议会能短暂开会，这样他们就无法很好地相互理解。

Ans.—He loveth short or no justice from the parliament; he feareth they reform God's house, and execute justice on men like himself. But I return to the Scottish parliament.
他不喜欢议会提供简短或没有正义；他担心他们会改革上帝的殿堂，并对像他一样的人执行正义。但我回到苏格兰议会。

Assert. 2.—The parliament is to regulate the power of the king. The heritable sheriffs complain that the king granteth commissions to others in cases pertaining to their office; whereupon the estates (Parl. 6, James VI., act 82) dischargeth all such commissions, as also appointeth that all murderers be judged by the justice general only. And in several acts the king is inhibited to grant pardons to malefactors, Parl. 11, James VI. act 75.
断言。2. ——议会负责调整国王的权力。世袭的郡长抱怨国王在与他们职责相关的案件中授予他人委任状；因此，议会（第 6 届詹姆斯六世议会，第 82 号法案）解除了所有此类委任状，并且还指定所有凶手只能由总法官判决。在几个法案中，国王被禁止对罪犯赦免，詹姆斯六世议会第 11 号法案，第 75 条。

It is to be considered that king James, in his Basilikon Doron, layeth down an unsound ground, that Fergus the first, father of one hundred and seven kings of Scotland, conquered this kingdom. The contrary whereof is asserted by Fordome, Major, Boethius, Buchanan, Hollanshed, who run all upon this principle, that the estates of the Kingdom did, 1. Choose a monarchy, and freely, and no other government. 2. That they freely elected Fergus to be their king. 3. King Fergus frequently convened the parliament called Insulanorum duces, tribuum rectores, majorum consessus, conventus ordinum, conventus statuum, communitatum regni, phylarchi, primores, principes, patres; and, as Hollanshed saith, they made Fergus king, therefore a parliament must be before the king; yea, and after the death of king Fergus, philarchi coeunt concione advocata, the estates convened without any king, and made that fundamental law regnielective, that when the king's children were minors, any of the Fergusian race might be chosen to reign, and this endured to the days of Kenneth; and Redotha, the seventh king, resigned and maketh over the government into the hands of the parliament, and Philarchi Tribuum Gubernatores ordained Thereus the eighth king. Buchanan, (l. 4, rer. Scot.) calleth him Reutha, and said he did this, populo egre permittente, then the royal power recurred to the fountain. Thereus, the eighth king, a wicked man, filled the kingdom with robbers, and fearing the parliament should punish him, fled to the Britons, and thereupon the parliament choose Connanus to be prorex and protector of the kingdom.
应该考虑到，詹姆斯国王在他的《Basilikon Doron》中提出了一个不可靠的观点，即苏格兰的第一位国王弗格斯征服了这个王国，而这一观点被福多姆、梅杰、博伊修斯、布坎南和霍兰斯海德所否认。他们都坚持以下原则：1. 王国的各个阶层自由选择了君主制而不是其他政府形式。2. 他们自由地选举弗格斯为国王。3. 国王费尔格斯经常召集被称为 Insulanorum duces, tribuum rectores, majorum consessus, conventus ordinum, conventus statuum, communitatum regni, phylarchi, primores, principes, patres 的议会；正如 Hollanshed 所说，他们选举费尔格斯为国王，因此国王必须在议会之前；是的，在费尔格斯国王去世后，philarchi coeunt concione advocata，各个阶层的代表在没有国王的情况下召集，制定了国王选举的基本法，即当国王的子女未成年时，可以选择费尔格斯家族的任何人来统治，这一制度一直持续到肯尼斯时代；第七位国王 Redotha 辞职并将政权移交给议会，Philarchi Tribuum Gubernatores 任命 Thereus 为第八位国王。布坎南（l. 4, rer. Scot.）称他为 Reutha，并说他是在人民的要求下这样做的，于是皇权回归到源头。第八位国王 Thereus 是一个邪恶的人，他让王国充满了强盗，担心议会会惩罚他，他逃到了不列颠，因此议会选择康纳纳斯成为王国的代理人和保护者。

Finnanus, the tenth king, decreed,—Ne quid reges, quod majoris esset momenti, nisi de publici consilii authoritate juberent, et he domestico consilio remp. administrarent, regia publicaque negotia non sine patrum consultatione ductuque tractarentur, nec bellum pacem aut fædera reges per se patrum, tribuumve, rectorum injussu facerent, demerentue; then it is clear that parliaments were consortes imperii, and had the authority with and above the king. When a law is made that the kings should do nothing injussu rectorum tribuum, without commandment of the parliament, a cabinet-council was not lawful to the kings of Scotland. So Durstus, the eleventh king, sweareth to the parliament, "Se nihil nisi de primorum consilio acturum," that he shall do nothing but by counsel of the rulers and heads of the kingdom.
费南努斯，第十位国王，颁布法令：除非经过公共议会的授权，国王不得做出任何重大决策，国家事务必须在国内顾问的指导下进行，国王不能在没有父老们的咨询和引导下单独处理战争、和平或条约事宜；由此可见，议会是帝国的合作伙伴，并且拥有与国王同等甚至更高的权威。当有法律规定国王不能在没有议会命令的情况下做任何事情时，苏格兰国王就不能组建内阁委员会。因此，第十一位国王杜斯特向议会宣誓：“除非经过王国统治者和领袖的咨询，我将不做任何事情。”

The parliament, rejecting the lawful son of Corbredus, the nineteenth king, because he was young, created Dardanus, the nephew of Metellanus, king, which is a great argument of the power of the Scottish parliament of old for elective rather than hereditary kings.
议会拒绝接受科布雷德斯的合法儿子作为第 19 位国王，因为他年幼，而选择了梅特拉努斯的侄子达尔达努斯作为国王，这充分证明了古代苏格兰议会对选举而非世袭国王的强大支持。

Corbredus II., called Galdus, the twentyfirst king, at his coronation, renouncing all negative voices, did swear, Se majorum consiliis acquieturnm, that he should be ruled by the parliament; and it is said, Leges quasdam tollere non potuit, adversante multitudine.
科布雷德二世，又名加尔都斯，第二十一位国王，在加冕仪式上，放弃了所有负面声音，并发誓要受议会的统治；据说，他无法废除某些法律，因为人民反对。

Luctatus, the twenty-second king, is censured by a parliament, "Quod spreto majorum consilio," he appointed base men to public offices.
卢克塔图斯，第二十二位国王，被议会指责：“因蔑视前辈的建议”，他任命了卑劣的人担任公职。

Mogaldus, the twenty-third king, "Ad consilia seniorum omnia ex prisco more revocavit," did all by the parliament, as the ancient custom was.
莫加尔德斯，第二十三位国王，“按照古老的习俗，通过议会做出了所有决策。”

Conarus, the twenty-fourth king, was cast into prison by the parliament, "Quod non expectato decreto patrum, quod summæ erat potestatis, privatis consiliis administrasset," because he did these weightiest business that concerned the kingdom, by private advice, without the judicial ordinance of parliament, that was of greatest authority. Where is the negative voice of the king here?
康纳鲁斯，第二十四位国王，因为他在处理涉及王国的重大事务时，未经议会的司法法令，只凭私人建议行事，被议会投入监狱。“Quod non expectato decreto patrum, quod summæ erat potestatis, privatis consiliis administrasset。”在这里，国王的否定之声在哪里？

Ethodius II. (son of Ethodius I.) the twenty-eighth king, (the parliament passing him by on account of his age, and electing Satrael, his father's brother, king before him,) was a simple ignorant man, yet for reverence to the race of Fergus, kept the name of a king, but the estates appointed tutors to him.
伊索迪乌斯二世（伊索迪乌斯一世之子），第二十八位国王，（因为年龄太小，议会绕过他，选择了他父亲的兄弟萨特拉尔先做国王），他是一个简单无知的人，但出于对费尔格斯家族的尊重，保留了国王的名号，但贵族们为他指定了导师。

Nathalocus, the thirtieth king, corrupting the nobles with buds and fair promises, obtained the crown.
纳塔洛库斯，第三十位国王，以花苞和美好的承诺腐化贵族，获得了王冠。

Romachus, Fethelmachus, and Angusianus, or as Buchanan calleth him, æneanus, contended for the crown, the parliament convened to judge the matter was dissolved by tumult, and Romachus chosen king, doing all, non adhibito, de more, consilio majorum, was censured by the parliament.
罗马库斯、费特尔马库斯和安古斯尼斯，或者如布坎南所称的埃尼阿努斯，争夺王位，议会召开以裁决此事，但因骚乱而解散，罗马库斯被选为国王，他在未征求前辈的意见下做出了一切决策，因此受到了议会的指责。

Fergus II. was created king by the states, de more.
费尔格斯二世由国家任命为国王，更多的是。

Constantine, the forty-third king, a most wicked man, was punished by the states.
康斯坦丁，第四十三位国王，一个极其邪恶的人，被国家惩罚。

Aidanus, the forty-ninth king, by the counsel of St Columba, governed all in peace, by three parliaments every year.
艾达努斯，第四十九位国王，在圣哥伦巴的建议下，每年通过三次议会来统治并维持和平。

Ferchard I., the fifty-second king, and Ferchard II., the fifty-fourth king, were both censured by parliaments.
费尔查德一世，第五十二位国王，和费尔查德二世，第五十四位国王，都受到了议会的谴责。

Eugenius VII., the fifty-ninth king, was judicially accused, and absolved by the states, of killing his wife Spondana.
尤金尼乌斯七世，第五十九位国王，被司法指控杀害妻子斯邦达娜，并被国家宣告无罪。

Eugenius VIII., the sixty-second king, a wicked prince, was put to death by the parliament, omnibus in ejus exitium, consentientibus.

Donaldus, the seventieth king, is censured by a parliament, which convened, pro salute reipublicæ, for the good of the land. So Ethus, the seventy-second king, Ne unius culpa, regnum periret.
唐纳德斯，第七十位国王，受到了一个为了国家的利益而召开的议会的谴责。因此，以塞斯，第七十二位国王，不让一个人的过错毁掉王国。

Gregory, the seventy-third king, sweareth to maintain kirk and state in their liberties; the oath is ordained to be sworn by all kings at their coronation.
格雷戈里，第 73 位国王，发誓要维护教堂和国家的自由；这个誓言被规定在所有国王加冕时宣誓。

The estates complain of Duff, the seventy-eighth king, because contemning the counsel of the nobles, Sacrificulorum consiliis abduceretur, and that either the nobility must depart the kingdom, or another king must be made.
庄园抱怨第 78 位国王达夫，因为他蔑视贵族的建议，Sacrificulorum consiliis abduceretur，并且要么贵族必须离开王国，要么必须选出另一位国王。

Culen, the seventy-ninth king, was summoned before the estates, so before him, Constantine III., the seventy-fifth king, did, by oath, resign the kingdom to the states, and entered in a monastery at St Andrews.
库伦，第七十九位国王，在召集众议院之前，第七十五位国王康斯坦丁三世，通过宣誓将王国让给国家，并进入圣安德鲁斯修道院。

Kenneth III., the eightieth king, procured almost, per vim, saith Buchanan, that the parliament should change the elective kings into hereditary; observe the power of parliaments.
肯尼斯三世，第 80 位国王，几乎通过武力，如布坎南所说，使议会将选举国王改为世袭国王；请注意议会的权力。

After this Grim, and then Macbeth, the eighty-fifth king, is rebuked for governing by private counsel; in his time, the king is ordained by the states to swear to maintain the community of the kingdom.
在这之后，格林接替麦克白成为第 85 位国王，因为他以私人谋士来治理而受到责备；在他的时代，国王被国家指定宣誓维护王国的共同体。

When Malcolm IV., the ninety-second king, would have admitted a treaty to the hurt of the kingdom, the nobles said, Non jus esse regi, the king had no right to take anything from the kingdom, Nisi omnibus ordinibus consentientibus. In the time of Alexander, the ninty-fourth king, is ordained, Acta regis oporteri confirmari decreto ordinum regni, quia ordinibus regni non consultis, aut adversantibus, nihil guod ad totius regni statum attinet, regiagere liceret; so all our historians observe; by which it is clear, that the parliament, not the king, hath a negative voice.
当第 92 位国王马尔科姆四世试图接受对王国有害的条约时，贵族们说，国王没有权力从王国中拿走任何东西，除非得到所有阶层的同意。在第 94 位国王亚历山大的时代，规定了国王的行为必须得到王国各阶层的决议确认，因为如果不征求或者遭到反对，对整个王国的状态没有任何影响，国王就可以行使权力。我们所有的历史学家都注意到这一点，由此可以清楚地看出，议会而不是国王拥有否决权。

The states' answer to king Edward's legates, concerning Balzee's conditions in his contest with Bruce is, that these conditions were made a solo rege, by the king only, without the estates of the kingdom, and therefore they did not oblige the kingdom.
关于巴尔兹与布鲁斯的争议，各州对爱德华国王的使节的回答是，这些条件是由国王独自制定的，没有经过王国的各个领地的同意，因此它们对王国没有约束力。

In Robert the Bruce's reign, the ninty-seventh king, the succession to the crown is appointed by act of parliament, and twice changed; and in the league with France, Quod quando de successuro rege ambigeretur apud Scotos, ea controversia ab ordinum de creto decideretur.
在罗伯特·布鲁斯的统治时期，第 97 位国王，王位继承由议会法案任命，并且两次改变；在与法国的联盟中，当在苏格兰人中对于继任国王的问题存在争议时，该争议将由议会决议解决。

Robert, the hundredth king, in a parliament at Scoon, moved the states to appoint the earl of Carrick, his eldest son of the second marriage, to the crown, passing his children of the first marriage; and when he would have made a treaty, he was told, that he could not inducias facere nisi ex sententia conventus publici, he could not make truces but with the consent of the estates of parliament.
罗伯特，第一百位国王，在斯昆的议会上，要求国家任命卡里克伯爵，他第二次婚姻的长子，为王位继承人，而不是他第一次婚姻的子女；当他想要达成一项条约时，有人告诉他，他只能在议会的同意下达成停战协议。

James I. could not do anything in his oath in England. The parliament's approbation of the battle at Stirling against king James III. is set down in the printed acts, because he had not the consent of the states.
詹姆斯一世在英格兰的誓言中无法做任何事情。议会对斯特灵战役对詹姆斯三世的支持被记录在印刷的法令中，因为他没有得到各国的同意。

To come to our first reformation, the queen regent, breaking her promise to the states, said, "Faith of promise should not be sought from princes;" the states answered, that they then were not obliged to obey, and suspended her government as inconsistent with the duty of princes, by the articles of pacification at Leith, June 16, 1560. No peace or war can be without the states.
来到我们的第一次改革，女王摄政王违背了对国家的承诺，说：“不应该从王公身上寻求信守承诺的信仰。”国家回答说，他们当时没有义务服从，并暂停了她的统治，因为根据 1560 年 6 月 16 日在利斯的和平协议，这与王公的职责不一致。没有国家就没有和平或战争。

In the parliament thereafter, (1560,) the nobility say frequently to the queen, Regum Scotorum limitatum esse imperium, nec unquam ad unius libidinem, sed ad legum præscriptum et nobilitatis consensum regi solitum.
在随后的议会中（1560 年），贵族们经常对女王说，Regum Scotorum limitatum esse imperium, nec unquam ad unius libidinem, sed ad legum præscriptum et nobilitatis consensum regi solitum.

So it is declared, parliament at Stirling, 1578, and parl. 1567, concerning queen Mary, I need not insist here. James VI. July 21, 1567, was crowned, the earl of Morton and Hume, jurarunt pro eo, et ejus nomine, in leges, eum doctrinam et ritus religionis, quæ turn docebantur, publice quoad posset, servaturum, et contrarios oppugnaturum. (Buch. Rer. Scot. Hist. 1.18.) The three estates revoke all alienations made by the king without consent of the parliament. Parl. 2, James VI. c. 2, 4, 5, 6.
因此，宣布于 1578 年在斯特灵的议会和 1567 年的议会关于玛丽女王的事情，我在这里不需要坚持。詹姆斯六世于 1567 年 7 月 21 日加冕，莫顿伯爵和休姆宣誓支持他，并代表他遵守当时教导的法律、教义和宗教仪式，尽可能公开地保护并反对反对者。（Buch. Rer. Scot. Hist. 1.18.）三个阶级撤销了国王未经议会同意进行的所有转让。詹姆斯六世议会第 2、第 2、第 4、第 5、第 6 章。

Three parliaments of James II. are held without any mention of the king, as 1437, 1438, and 1440, and act 5 and 6 of Parl. 1440, the estates ordain the king to do such and such things, to ride through the country for doing of justice; and Parl. 1, James I. act 23, the estates ordained the king to mend his money; but show any parliament where ever the king doth prescribe laws to the states, or censure the states.
詹姆斯二世的三个议会在没有提及国王的情况下进行，分别是 1437 年、1438 年和 1440 年，1440 年议会的第 5 和第 6 法案中，国会决定国王要做某些事情，要骑马穿越国家以实施司法；詹姆斯一世的第 1 议会第 23 法案中，国会决定国王要改善货币；但是没有任何一个议会显示国王规定法律给国家，或者审查国家。

In Parl. 1, James VI., the Confession of Faith being ratified, in acts made by the three estates, that the kings must swear at their coronation, "In the presence of the eternal God, that they shall maintain the true religion, right preaching, and administration of the sacraments now received and preached within this realm, and shall abolish and gain-stand all false religions contrary to the same, and shall rule the people committed to their charge, according to the will of God, laudable laws, and constitutions of the realm," &c.
在议会第一次会议上，詹姆斯六世，信仰告白被三个阶级通过的法案批准，规定国王必须在加冕时宣誓：“在永恒上帝的面前，他们将维护真正的宗教，正确的传教和在这个领土上接受和传扬的圣礼，并将废除和抵制所有与之相悖的假宗教，并按照上帝的旨意、可赞美的法律和领土的宪法来统治托付给他们的人民”，等等。

The Parl. 1, James VI., 1567, approveth the acts of parliament 1560, conceived only in name of the states, without the king and queen, who had deserted the same; so saith the act 2, 4, 5, 20, 28. And so this parliament, wanting the king and queen's authority, is confirmed, Parl. 1572, act 51, king James VI.; Parl. 1581, act 1; and Parl. 1581, act 115, in which it is declared, "That they have been common laws from their first date," and are all ratified, Parl. 1587, and 1592, act 1; and stand ratified to this day by king Charles' parliament, 1633. The act of the Assembly, 1566, commendeth that parliament, 1560, as the "most lawful and free parliament that ever was in the kingdom."
议会 1 号，詹姆斯六世，1567 年，批准了 1560 年议会的法案，这些法案只是以国家的名义提出的，没有国王和女王的参与，正如第 2、4、5、20 和 28 号法案所述。因此，这个没有国王和女王授权的议会在 1572 年得到了确认，詹姆斯六世的第 51 号法案；1581 年的第 1 号法案；以及 1581 年的第 115 号法案，其中宣布“它们从第一天起就是普通法”，并且在 1587 年和 1592 年的第 1 号法案中得到了确认，并且到今天仍然由查尔斯国王的议会于 1633 年得到了确认。1566 年的大会法案称赞 1560 年的议会为“王国中最合法和自由的议会”。

Yea, even Parl. 1641, king Charles himself being present, an act was passed upon the occasion of the king's illegal imprisoning of the laird of Langton: that the king hath no power to imprison any member of the parliament without consent of the parliament. Which act, to the great prejudice of the liberty of the subject, should not have been left unprinted; for, by what law the king may imprison one member of the parliament, by that same reason he may imprison two, twenty, and a hundred; and so may he clap up the whole free estates, and where shall then the highest court of the kingdom be?
是的，甚至在 1641 年议会上，查尔斯国王亲自在场时，针对国王非法监禁兰顿庄园主的事件通过了一项法案：国王没有权力在没有议会同意的情况下监禁议会的任何成员。这项法案对公民自由造成了极大的损害，不应该被遗漏未印刷出来；因为按照国王监禁议会成员的法律，他同样可以监禁两个、二十个、一百个成员；这样他就可以关押所有自由的贵族，那么王国最高法院将在哪里呢？

All politicians say, the king is a limited prince, not absolute; where the king giveth out laws, not in his own name, but in the name of himself and the estates judicially convened.
所有政治家都说，国王是一个有限的王子，不是绝对的；国王颁布法律，不是以自己的名义，而是以自己和司法机构召集的代表的名义。

In p. 33 of the old acts of parliament, members are summoned to treat and conclude.
在旧议会法案的第 33 页中，成员被召集来进行讨论和达成结论。

The duty of parliaments, and their power, according to the laws of Scotland, may be seen in the history of Knox, now printed at London (an. 1643), in the nobles' proceeding with the queen, who killed her husband and married Bothwell, and was arraigned in parliament, and by a great part condemned to death; by many, to perpetual imprisonment.
根据苏格兰法律，议会的职责和权力可以从诺克斯的历史中看出来，该历史现在在伦敦印刷（1643 年），其中记载了贵族对杀害丈夫并与博斯韦尔结婚的女王的处理，女王在议会中受审，并被大部分人判处死刑，也有人判处终身监禁。

King Charles received not crown, sword, and sceptre, until first he did swear the oath that king James his father did swear. He was not crowned, till one of every one of the three estates came and offered to him the crown, with an express condition of his duty, before he be crowned.
查尔斯国王在未宣誓效忠前，没有接受王冠、剑和权杖。他直到来自三个阶层的代表之一前来向他献上王冠，并明确规定了他的责任，才受到加冕。

After king Charles said, "I will by God's assistance bestow my life for your defence, wishing to live no longer than that I may see this kingdom flourish in happiness," thereafter, the king showing himself on a stage to the people, the popish archbishop said; "Sirs, I do present unto you king Charles, the right descended inheritor,—the crown and dignity of this realm, appointed by the peers of the kingdom. And are you willing to have him for your king, and become subject to him?" The king turning himself on the stage, to be seen of the peope, they declared willingness, by crying, God save king Charles! Let the king live!
查尔斯国王说：“在上帝的帮助下，我将为你们的防御而献出我的生命，我希望能看到这个王国在幸福中繁荣发展。”之后，国王在舞台上向人民展示自己，天主教大主教说：“先生们，我向你们介绍查尔斯国王，这个王国的合法继承人，由王国的贵族任命为这个王国的国王和统治者。你们愿意接受他为你们的国王并成为他的臣民吗？”国王转身面向舞台，让人们看到他，他们通过呼喊“上帝保佑查尔斯国王！让国王长命！”来表示愿意。

QUESTION XLIV
问题 XLIV

GENERAL RESULTS OF THE FORMER DOCTRINE, IN SOME FEW COROLLARIES, OR STRAYING QUESTIONS, FALLEN OFF THE ROADWAY, ANSWERED BRIEFLY
前述学说的一般结果，在一些少数推论或离题的问题中，偏离了正道，简要回答了

Quest. 1.—Whether all governments be but broken governments and deviations from monarchy.
问题 1：是否所有政府都只是破碎的政府和偏离君主制的形式。

Ans.—1. It is denied: there is no less somewhat of God's authority in government by many, or some of the choicest of the people, than in monarchy; nor can we judge any ordinance of man unlawful, for we are to be subject to all for the Lord's sake. (1 Pet. 2:13; Tit. 3:1; 1 Tim. 2:1–3.) 2. Though monarchy should seem the rule of all other governments, in regard of resemblance of the Supreme Monarch of all, yet it is not the moral rule from which, if other governments shall err, they are to be judged sinful deviations.
答案：1. 否认：在由许多人或一些最优秀的人统治的政府中，上帝的权威并不比君主制少；我们不能判断任何人的法令是否非法，因为我们要为主的缘故顺服于所有的人。（彼得前书 2:13；提多书 3:1；提摩太前书 2:1-3）2. 尽管君主制似乎是所有其他政府的规则，因为它与至高无上的君主的相似性，但它不是道德规则，如果其他政府犯错，它们就会被判断为罪恶的偏离。

Quest. 2.—Whether royalty is an immediate issue and spring of nature.
问题 2：皇权是否是自然的直接问题和源泉。

Ans.—No; for a man, fallen in sin, knowing naturally he hath need of a law and a government, could have, by reason, devised governors, one or more; and the supervenient institution of God, coming upon this ordinance, doth more fully assure us, that God, for man's good, hath appointed governors; but, if we consult with nature, many judges and governors, to fallen nature, seem nearer of blood to nature than one only; for two, because of man's weakness, are better than one. Now, nature seemeth to me not to teach that only one sinful man should be the sole and only ruler of a whole kingdom; God, in his word, ever joined with the supreme ruler many rulers, who, as touching the essence of a judge, (which is, to rule for God,) were all equally judges: some reserved acts, or a longer cubit of power in regard of extent, being due to the king.
答案：不；对于一个堕落在罪恶中的人来说，他自然而然地知道自己需要法律和政府，他可以凭借理性设计出一个或多个统治者；而上帝的附加制度更加确保了上帝为了人类的利益而指定了统治者；但是，如果我们从自然的角度来看，对于堕落的人性来说，许多法官和统治者似乎比一个人更接近人性；因为出于人类的脆弱，两个人比一个人更好。现在，对我来说，自然似乎并不教导只有一个有罪的人应该成为整个王国的唯一统治者；上帝在他的话语中，总是将最高统治者与许多统治者结合在一起，他们在作为一个法官的本质上（即为上帝而统治）都是平等的法官：一些保留的行为，或者更长的权力范围，是应该归于国王的。

Quest. 3.—Whether magistrates, as magistrates, be natural.
问题 3：作为执法官，执法官是否是天然的。

Ans.—Nature is considered as whole and sinless, or as fallen and broken. In the former consideration, that man should stand in need of some one to compel him with the sword to do his duty, and not oppress, was no more natural to man than to stand in need of lictors and hangmen, or physicians for the body, which in this state was not in a capacity of sickness or death; and so government by parents and husbands was only natural in the latter consideration. Magistrates, as magistrates, are two ways considered,—1. According to the knowledge of such an ordinance; 2. According to the actual erection of the practice of the office of magistrates. In the former notion, I humbly conceive, that by nature's light, man now fallen and broken, even under all the fractions of the powers and faculties of the soul, doth know, that promises of reward, fear of punishment, and the co-active power of the sword, as Plato said, are natural means to move us, and wings to promote obedience and to do our duty; and that government by magistrates is natural. But, in the second relation, it is hard to determine that kings, rather than other governors, are more natural.
答案：自然被认为是完整和无罪的，或者是堕落和破碎的。在前一种考虑中，人们需要某人用剑强迫他履行职责，不压迫他，这对人类来说并不比需要执法官和刽子手，或者身体需要医生更自然，因为在这种状态下，身体不会生病或死亡；因此，父母和丈夫的统治只在后一种考虑中是自然的。作为统治者，官员有两种考虑方式：1.根据这样一种法令的认识；2.根据官员职务实际设立的实践。在前一种观念中，我谦卑地认为，根据自然的光明，现在堕落和破碎的人，即使在灵魂的各种力量和能力的分裂下，也知道，奖励的承诺、惩罚的恐惧和剑的强制力量，正如柏拉图所说，是促使我们行动、促进服从和履行职责的自然手段；而且，通过官员的统治是自然的。但是，在第二种关系中，很难确定国王比其他统治者更自然。

Quest. 4.—Whether nature hath determined that there should be one supreme ruler, a king, or many rulers, in a free community.
问题 4：自然是否决定在一个自由社区中应该有一个至高无上的统治者，即国王，还是多个统治者。

Ans.—It is denied.
否认。

Quest. 6.—Whether every free commonwealth hath not in it a supremacy of majesty, which it may formally place in one or many.
问题 6：是否每个自由共和国都具有一种至高无上的权威，它可以正式地集中在一个或多个人身上。

Ans.—It is affirmed.
肯定的。

Quest 6.—Whether absolute and unlimited power of royalty be a ray and beam of divine majesty immediately derived from God?
第六个问题——君主的绝对无限权力是否是直接来自上帝的神圣威严的一束光芒？

Ans.—Not at all. Such a creature is not in the world of God's creation. Royalists and flatterers of kings are parents to this prodigious birth. There is no shadow of power to do ill in God. An absolute power is essentially a power to do without or above law, and a power to do ill, to destroy; and so it cannot come from God as a moral power by institution, though it come from God by a flux of permissive providence; but so things unlawful and sinful come from God.
答案：绝对不是。这样的生物并不存在于上帝创造的世界中。君主主义者和谄媚君王的人是这个怪物的父母。在上帝那里没有任何恶意的影子。绝对权力本质上是一种可以无视或超越法律的权力，也是一种可以做恶、毁灭的权力；因此，它不能作为一种道德权力由上帝设立，尽管它可能是通过上帝的允许性安排而来；但是不合法和罪恶的事物也是从上帝那里来的。

Quest. 7.—Whether the king may in his actions intend his own prerogative and absoluteness.
问题 7：国王在他的行动中是否可以追求自己的特权和绝对权力。

Ans.—He can neither intend it as his nearest end, nor as his remote end. Not the former, for if he fight and destroy his people for a prerogative, he destroyeth his people that he may have a power to destroy them, which must be mere tyranny, nor can it be his remote end; for, granting that his supposed absolute prerogative were lawful, he is to refer all lawful power and all his actions to a more noble end, to wit, to the safety and good of the people.
答案：他既不能将其视为最近的目标，也不能将其视为远期目标。前者不行，因为如果他为了特权而战斗并摧毁自己的人民，那么他摧毁人民只是为了获得摧毁他们的权力，这必然是纯粹的暴政；而后者也不行，因为即使假设他所谓的绝对特权是合法的，他也应该将所有合法权力和行动归结于更高尚的目标，即人民的安全和福祉。

Quest. 8.—Do not they that resist the parliament's power, resist the parliament; and they that resist the king's power, resist the king; God hath joined king and power, who dare separate them?
问题 8：那些抵抗议会权力的人，是不是在抵抗议会；那些抵抗国王权力的人，是不是在抵抗国王；上帝将国王和权力结合在一起，谁敢分离他们？

Ans.—1. If the parliament abuse their power, we may resist their abused power, and not their power parliamentary. Mr Bridges doth well distinguish (in his Annotations on the "Loyal Convert") betwixt the king's power, and the king's will. 2. The resisters do not separate king and power, but the king himself doth separate his lawful power from his will, if he work and act tyranny out of this principle, will, passion, lust; not out of the royal principle of kingly power. So far we may resist the one, and not the other.
答案：1. 如果议会滥用权力，我们可以抵制他们滥用的权力，而不是议会的权力。布里奇斯先生在他对《忠诚的转变者》的注释中很好地区分了国王的权力和国王的意愿。2. 抵抗者并没有将国王和权力分开，而是国王自己将他的合法权力与他的意愿分开，如果他出于意愿、激情、欲望而行使暴政，而不是出于国王权力的皇家原则。在这一点上，我们可以抵制前者，而不是后者。

Quest. 9.—Why, if God might work a miracle in the three children's resistance active, why doth he evidence omnipotence in the passive obedience of these witnesses? The kingdom of Judah was Christ's birthright, as man and David's son. Why did he not, by legions of men and angels, rather vindicate his own flesh and blood, than triumph by non-resistance, and the omnipotence of glory to shine in his mere suffering?
问题 9：为什么上帝可以在三个孩子的积极抵抗中行奇迹，却选择在这些见证人的被动顺从中展示全能？犹太王国是基督作为人和大卫的儿子的合法继承权。为什么他不选择通过大军和天使来维护自己的血脉，而是选择通过不抵抗和光荣的全能来彰显自己的苦难？

Ans.—Who art thou that disputest with God? He that killeth with the jaw-bone of an ass, thousands, and he that destroyed the numberless Midianites by only three hundred, should no more put the three children to an unlawful act in the one, if they had by three men killed Nebuchadnezzar and all his subjects, than in the other. But nothing is said against us in a sophism a non causa pro causa; except it be proved, God would neither deliver his three children, nor Christ from death, and the Jews from bondage, by miraculous resistance, because resistance is unlawful. And if patient suffering is lawful, therefore, is resistance unlawful? It is a poor consequent, and a begging of the question: both must be lawful to us; and so we hold, of ten lawful means, fit to compass God's blessed end, he may choose one and let go nine. Shall any infer, therefore, these other nine means are unlawful, because God chose a mean different from those nine, and refused them? So may I answer by retortion. The three hundred sinned in resisting Midian, and defeating them. Why? Because it should be more honour to God, if they had, by suffering patiently the sword of Midian, glorified God in martyrdom. So Christ and the apostles, who could have wrought miracles, might have wrought reformation by the sword, and destroyed kings and emperors, the opposers of the Lamb; and they did reform by suffering; therefore, the sword is unlawful in reformation. It followeth not. The mean Christ used, is lawful; therefore, all other means that he used not, are unlawful. It is vain logic.
答案——你是谁，竟敢与上帝争论？用驴下颚骨杀死成千上万人的人，用仅三百人摧毁无数的米甸人的人，如果他们用三个人杀死尼布甲尼撒和他的所有臣民，就不应该在一个场合中让这三个孩子做出非法的行为，就像在另一个场合中一样。但是，在一个非因果关系的诡辩中，没有对我们提出任何指责；除非能够证明，上帝既不会通过奇迹般的抵抗来拯救他的三个孩子、基督和犹太人摆脱死亡和奴役，因为抵抗是非法的。如果耐心忍受是合法的，那么抵抗为什么是非法的呢？这是一个荒谬的推论，也是一个问题的假设：对我们来说，两者都是合法的；因此，我们认为，有十种合法的方法可以实现上帝祝福的目标，他可以选择其中一种，而放弃其他九种。难道有人会推断，因为上帝选择了与这九种不同的方法，并拒绝了它们，所以这其他九种方法都是非法的吗？我可以用反驳的方式回答。三百人在抵抗米甸人并击败他们时犯了罪。为什么？因为如果他们能够忍受米甸人的刀剑，在殉道中荣耀上帝，那将更加荣耀上帝。 所以基督和使徒们本可以通过剑来进行奇迹般的改革，摧毁那些反对羔羊的国王和皇帝，但他们选择了通过受苦来进行改革；因此，在改革中使用剑是不合法的。这并不成立。基督所使用的方法是合法的；因此，他没有使用的其他方法都是不合法的。这是徒劳的逻辑。

Quest. 10.—Whether the coronation of a king is any other thing but a ceremony.
问题 10：国王的加冕仪式是否只是一种仪式？

Ans.—In the coronation there is, and may be, the ceremony of a shout and an acclamation, and the placing of a sceptre in his right hand who is made king, and the like; but the coronation, in concreto, according to the substance of the act, is no ceremony, nor any accidental ingredient in the constitution of a king. 1. Because Israel should have performed a mere ceremonial action on Saul when they made him king, which we cannot say; for as the people's act of coronation is distinctive, so is it constitutive: it distinguished Saul from all Israel, and did constitute him in a new relation, that he was changed from no king to be a king. 2. The people cannot, by a ceremony, make a king; they must really put some honour on him, that was not put on him before. Now this ceremony, which royalists do fancy coronation to be, is only symbolical and declarative, not really dative. It placeth nothing in the king.
答案：在加冕仪式中，可能会有欢呼和喝彩的仪式，以及将权杖放在被封为国王的人的右手上等等；但是，从实际行为的实质来看，加冕仪式并不是一种仪式，也不是国王身份的任何偶然成分。1. 因为以色列人在封立扫罗为王时只是进行了一种纯粹的仪式行动，这一点我们不能说；因为正如人民的加冕行为是有区别的，它也是构成性的：它将扫罗与以色列众人区分开来，并使他在一种新的关系中被构成为国王，从一个非国王变成了国王。2. 人民不能仅凭仪式来封立国王；他们必须真正给予他一些之前没有得到的荣誉。现在，这种被君主主义者认为是加冕仪式的仪式只是象征性和宣示性的，而不是真正的赋予性的。它并没有给国王带来任何东西。

Quest. 11.—Whether subjects may limit the power that they gave not to the king, it being the immediate result (without intervening of law or any act of man) issuing from God only.
问题 11：是否主体可以限制他们未授予国王的权力，这是直接来自上帝的结果（没有法律或任何人为行为的干预）？

Ans.—1. Though we should allow (which in reason we cannot grant) that royal power were a result of the immediate bounty of God, without any act of man, yet it may be limited by men, that it over-swell not its banks. Though God immediately make Peter an apostle, without any act of men, yet Paul, by a sharp rebuke, (Gal. 2) curbeth and limiteth his power, that he abuse it not to Judaising. Royalists deny not, but they teach, that the eighty priests that restrained Uzziah's power "from burning incense to the Lord," gave no royal power to Uzziah. Do not subjects, by flight, lay restraint upon a king's power, that he kill not the subjects without cause? yet they teach that subjects gave no power to the king. Certainly this is a proof of the immediate power of the King of kings, that none can fly from his pursuing hand, (Psal. 139:1–3; Amos 9:1–4,) whereas men may fly from earthly kings. Nebuchadnezzar, as royalists teach, might justly conquer some kingdoms, for conquest is a just title to the crown, say they. Now, the conqueror then justly not only limiteth the royal power of the conquered king, but wholly removeth his royalty and unkingeth him; yet, we know, the conqueror gave no royal power to the conquered king. Joshua and David took away royal power which they never gave, and therefore this is no good reason,—the people gave not to the king royal power, therefore they could not lawfully limit it and take it away. 2. We cannot admit that God giveth royal power immediately, without the intervention of any act of law; for it is an act of law, that (Deut. 17) the people chooseth such a king, not such a king; that the people, by a legal covenant, make Saul, David, and Joash, kings, and that God exerciseth any political action of making a king over such subjects, upon such a condition, is absurd and inconceivable; for how can God make Saul and David kings of Israel upon this political and legal condition, that they rule in justice and judgment, but there must intervene a political action? and so they are not made kings immediately. If God feed Moses by bread and manna, the Lord's act of feeding is mediate, by the mediation of second causes; if he feed Moses forty days without eating any thing, the act of feeding is immediate; if God made David king, as he made him a prophet, I should think God immediately made him king; for God asked consent of no man, of no people, no, not of David himself, before he infused in him the spirit of prophecy; but he made him formally king, by the political and legal covenant betwixt him and the people. I shall not think that a covenant and oath of God is a ceremony, especially a law-covenant, or a political paction between David and the people, the contents whereof behoved to be de materia gravi et onerosa, concerning a great part of obedience to the fifth commandment of God's moral law, the duties moral concerning religion, and mercy, and justice, to be performed reciprocally between king and people. Oaths, I hope, are more than ceremonies.
答案：1. 虽然我们应该承认（尽管在理性上我们无法接受）皇权是上帝直接赐予的结果，没有任何人的行为，但它可以被人类限制，以免过度膨胀。虽然上帝直接使彼得成为使徒，没有任何人的行为，但保罗通过严厉的责备（加拉太书 2 章）限制了他的权力，以免他滥用权力使人归信犹太教。皇权主义者并不否认，但他们教导，那些限制乌西雅权力“不得向耶和华烧香”的八十位祭司并没有给乌西雅王权力。难道臣民不是通过逃跑来限制国王的权力，以免他无故杀害臣民吗？然而他们教导，臣民并没有给国王权力。毫无疑问，这是对万王之王的直接权力的证明，没有人能逃脱他追捕的手（诗篇 139:1-3；阿摩司书 9:1-4），而人们可以逃离世俗的君王。正如皇权主义者所教导的，尼布甲尼撒可能正当地征服一些王国，因为征服是合法的王冠称号，他们说。 现在，征服者不仅合理地限制了被征服国王的王权，而且完全剥夺了他的王位；然而，我们知道，征服者并没有给予被征服国王王权。约书亚和大卫夺走了他们从未给予的王权，因此这不是一个好的理由——人民没有给予国王王权，因此他们不能合法地限制和剥夺它。2. 我们不能接受上帝立即赋予王权，而不需要任何法律行为的干预；因为这是法律的行为，人民选择这样的国王，而不是那样的国王（申命记 17 章）；人民通过合法的契约使扫罗、大卫和约阿施成为国王；上帝对这样的条件下的这样的臣民行使任何政治行动，是荒谬和难以理解的；因为上帝如何能够在这个政治和法律条件下使扫罗和大卫成为以色列的国王，即他们必须以公正和公正来统治，但必须有一个政治行动的干预？所以他们不是立即成为国王的。 如果上帝用面包和吗哪喂养摩西，那么上帝的喂养行为是通过第二因素的中介来实现的；如果他在四十天内让摩西不吃任何东西，那么喂养的行为是直接的；如果上帝像使他成为先知一样使大卫成为国王，我认为上帝直接使他成为国王；因为上帝在将先知之灵注入他之前，没有征求任何人的同意，包括大卫本人在内；但他通过大卫与人民之间的政治和法律契约正式使他成为国王。我不认为上帝的契约和誓言是一种仪式，尤其是一种法律契约，或者是大卫与人民之间的政治协议，其内容必须涉及对上帝道德法第五诫的大部分服从的重要事项，以及关于宗教、仁慈和正义的道德责任，这些责任在国王和人民之间应该相互履行。誓言，我希望，不仅仅是仪式。

Quest. 12.—Whether or no the commonwealth is not ever a pupil, never growing to age, as a minor under nonage doth come not to need a tutor, but the commonwealth being still in need of a tutor, a governor, or king, must always be a tutor, and so the kingdom can never come to that condition as to accuse the king, it always being minor.
问题 12：无论是否，国家是否永远是一个学生，永远不会成长为成年人，就像未成年人不需要导师一样，但国家仍然需要导师、统治者或国王，必须始终成为导师，因此王国永远无法达到指责国王的状态，因为它始终是未成年人。

Ans.—1. Then can they never accuse inferior judges, for a kingdom is perpetually in such a nonage, as it cannot want them, when sometimes it wanteth a king. 2. Can the commonwealth, under democracy and aristocracy, being perpetually under nonage, ever then quarrel at these governments and never seek a king? By this reason they cannot. 3. The king, in all respects, is not a tutor—every comparison in something beareth a leg; for the commonwealth, in their own persons, do choose a king, complain of a king, and resist an Uzziah, and tie their elective prince to a law. A pupil cannot choose his tutor, either his dying father, or the living law doth that service for him; he cannot resist his tutor, he cannot tie his tutor to a law, nor limit him, when first he chooseth him. Pupillo non licet postulare tutorem suspecti, quamdiu sub tutela est, et manetlimpubes. (l. Pietatis 6, in sin. C. de susp. Tutor. l. impuberem. 7, and sect. impuberes. Just. eod).
答案：1.那么他们永远不能指责下级法官，因为一个王国永远处于这样的未成年状态，当它有时缺少国王时，它就不会缺少他们。2.在民主和贵族制下，共和国永远处于未成年状态，难道它会对这些政府发生争执，却从不寻求国王吗？根据这个理由，他们不能这样做。3.在各个方面，国王并不是一个导师——每个比较都有一条腿；因为共和国在自己的人民中选择国王，抱怨国王，并抵抗乌西雅，将他们选举的王子束缚在法律之下。一个学生不能选择他的导师，无论是他已故的父亲还是活着的法律都会为他提供这种服务；他不能抵抗他的导师，他不能将他的导师束缚在法律之下，也不能在他首次选择他时对他进行限制。Pupillo non licet postulare tutorem suspecti, quamdiu sub tutela est, et manetlimpubes. (l. Pietatis 6, in sin. C. de susp. Tutor. l. impuberem. 7, and sect. impuberes. Just. eod).

Quest. 13.—Whether or no subjects are more obnoxious to a king than clients to patrons, and servants to masters, because the patron cannot be the client's judge, but some superior magistrate must judge both, and the slave had no refuge against his master, but only flight; and the king doth confer infinite greater benefits on the subjects, than the master doth on the slave, because he exposeth his life, pleasure, ease, credit, and all for the safety of his subjects.
问题 13：是否主题对国王比客户对赞助人、仆人对主人更令人讨厌，因为赞助人不能成为客户的法官，而必须由某个上级法官来裁决双方，而奴隶对主人没有避难所，只能逃跑；国王对主题所提供的好处比主人对奴隶所提供的好处更多，因为国王为了主题的安全而牺牲了自己的生命、快乐、舒适、信誉等等。

Ans.—1. It is denied, for to draw the case to fathers and lords, in respect of children and vassals, the reason why sons, clients, vassals, can neither formally judge, nor judicially punish, fathers, patrons, lords, and masters, though never so tyrannous, is a moral impotency, or a political incongruity, because these relations of patron and client, fathers and children, are supposed to be in a community, in which are rulers and judges above the father and son, the patron and the client; but there is no physical incongruity that the politic inferior punish the superior, if we suppose there were no judges on the earth, and no relation but patron and client; and, because, for the father to destroy the children, is a troubling of the harmony of nature, and the highest degree of violence, therefore one violence of self-defence, and that most just, though contrary to nature, must be a remedy against another violence; but in a kingdom there is no political ruler above both king and people, and therefore, though nature have not formally appointed the political relation of a king rather than many governors and subjects, yet hath nature appointed a court and tribunal of necessity, in which the people may, by innocent violence, repress the unjust violence of an injuring prince, so as the people injured in the matter of self-defence may be their own judge. 2. I wonder that any should teach, That oppressed slaves had of old no refuge against the tyranny of masters, but only flight; for, (1.) The law expressly saith that they might not only fly but also change masters, which we all know was a great damage to the master, to whom the servant was as good as money in the purse. (2.) I have demonstrated before, by the law of nature, and out of divers learned jurists, that all inferiors may defend themselves by opposing violence against unjust violence; to say nothing that unanswerably I have proved that the kingdom is superior to the king. 3. It is true, Qui plus dat, plus obligat, as the Scripture saith, (Luke 7,) He that giveth a greater benefit layeth a foundation of a greater obligation. But, 1. If benefit be compared with benefit, it is disputable if a king give a greater benefit than an earthly father, to whom, under God, the son is debtor for life and being, if we regard the compensation of eminency of honour and riches, that the people putteth upon the king; but I utterly deny that a power to act tyrannous acts, is any benefit or obligation, that the people in reason can lay upon their prince, as a compensation or hire for his great pains he taketh in his royal watch-tower. I judge it no benefit, but a great hurt, damage, and an ill of nature, both to king and people, that the people should give to their prince any power to destroy themselves, and therefore that people do reverence and honour the prince most, who lay strongest chains and iron fetters on him, that he cannot tyrannise.
答案：1.对于将案件引向父亲和领主，涉及子女和臣民的原因，即使儿子、客户和臣民再暴虐，也不能正式审判或司法惩罚父亲、赞助人、领主和主人，这是一种道德无能或政治不协调，因为赞助人和客户、父亲和子女的这些关系被认为是在一个社区中，其中有高于父亲和儿子、赞助人和客户的统治者和法官；但如果我们假设地球上没有法官，也没有除赞助人和客户之外的关系，那么政治下级惩罚上级并没有物理上的不协调；而且，因为父亲毁灭子女是对自然和最高程度的暴力的干扰，所以自卫的暴力，尽管违背自然，却是对另一种暴力的补救；但在一个王国中，没有政治统治者同时高于国王和人民，因此，尽管自然没有正式指定国王而不是许多统治者和臣民的政治关系，但自然已经指定了一个必要的法庭和裁判所，在这个法庭中，人民可以对国王进行审判人们可以通过无辜的暴力来制止一个伤害人民的君主的不公正暴力，以至于在自卫的问题上受到伤害的人民可以成为自己的法官。2. 我惊讶于有人教导，被压迫的奴隶在过去对待主人的暴政时没有避难所，只能逃跑；因为，（1）法律明确规定他们不仅可以逃跑，还可以更换主人，我们都知道这对主人来说是一大损失，因为仆人对他们来说就像钱包里的钱一样重要。（2）我之前已经通过自然法和多位学者的论述证明，所有下级都可以通过反对不公正的暴力来保护自己；更不用说我已经无可辩驳地证明了王国高于国王。3. 的确，正如圣经所说，“给得越多，责任越大”（路加福音 7 章），给予更大的恩惠会带来更大的责任。但是，1. 如果将利益与利益相比较，一个国王是否能给予比世俗父亲更大的利益是有争议的，因为在上帝的眼中，儿子对于生命和存在都是欠父亲的，如果我们考虑到人民赋予国王的尊荣和财富的补偿。但我完全否认，行使暴政行为的权力是人民在理性上可以对他们的君主提出的任何利益或义务，作为对他在皇家瞭望塔中所付出的巨大辛劳的补偿或报酬。我认为这不是一种利益，而是一种巨大的伤害、损失和自然的不幸，对于国王和人民来说，人民给予他们的君主任何毁灭自己的权力，因此，那些给予君主最强大的束缚和铁链的人民最尊敬和崇敬君主。

Quest. 14.—But are not subjects more subject to their prince, (seeing the subjection is natural, as we see bees and cranes,) to obey him, than servants to their Lord? (C. in Apib. 7, 9, 1, ex Hiero. 4, ad Rustic. Monach. Plin. n. 17.) For jurists teach, that servitude is beside dr against nature, (I. 5, de stat. homi. sect. 2, just. et jur. pers. c. 3, sect, et sicut Nov. 89, quib. med. nat. eff. sui.)
问题 14：但是，主题不是更加服从于他们的君主吗？（因为我们看到蜜蜂和鹤都是自然而然地服从于他们的君主。）而仆人对他们的主人的服从呢？因为法学家教导我们，奴役是违背自然的（I. 5, de stat. homi. sect. 2, just. et jur. pers. c. 3, sect, et sicut Nov. 89, quib. med. nat. eff. sui.）

Ans.—There is no question, in active subjection to princes and fathers commanding in the Lord, we shall grant as high a measure as you desire. But the question is, if either active subjection to ill and unjust mandates, or passive subjection to penal inflictions of tyranny and abused power, be natural or most natural; or if subjects do renounce natural subjection to their prince, when they oppose violence to unjust violence. This is to beg the question. And for the commonwealth of bees and cranes, and crown and sceptre amongst them, give me leave to doubt of it. To be subject to kings, is a divine moral law of God; but not properly natural to be subject to coaction of the sword. Government and subjection to parents, is natural; but that a king is juris naturce strictim, I must crave leave to doubt. I hold him to be a divine moral ordinance, to which, in conscience, we are to submit in the Lord.
答案——毫无疑问，在主内服从君王和父亲的命令下，我们将给予您所需的最高程度。但问题是，无论是对不公正和不公正的命令的积极服从，还是对暴政和滥用权力的惩罚性施加的被动服从，哪种是自然或最自然的；或者当臣民对不公正的暴力采取反对暴力的行动时，他们是否放弃了对君王的自然服从。这是在回避问题。至于蜜蜂和鹤的共和国，以及其中的王冠和权杖，让我对此表示怀疑。服从国王是上帝的神圣道德法律；但是，对剑的强制服从并不是真正的自然。政府和对父母的服从是自然的；但是，我必须请教是否国王是严格的自然法律。我认为他是上帝的神圣道德法令，我们应该在主内顺服。

Quest. 15.—Whether king Uzziah was dethroned by the people?
问题 15：乌西雅王是否被人民废黜？

Ans.—Though we should say he was not formally unkinged and dethroned, yet if the royal power consist in an indivisible point, as some royalists say, and if Uzziah was removed to a private house, and could not reign, being a leper; certainly much royal power was taken from. It is true, Arnisæus saith, he neither could be compelled to resign his power, nor was he compelled to resign his royal authority; but he willingly resigned actual government, and remained king, as tutors and curators are put upon kings that are mad or stupid, and children, who yet govern all by the authority of lawful kings. But that Uzziah did not denude himself of the royal power voluntarily, is clear. The reason (2 Chron. 26:21) why he dwelt in a house apart, and did not actually reign, is, because he was a leper; for, "He was cut off (saith the text) from the house of the Lord; and Jotham, his son, was over the king's house, judging the people of the land." Whereby it is clear, by the express law of God, he being a leper, and so not by law to enter into the congregation, he was cut off from the house of the Lord; and he being passive, is said to be cut off from the Lord's house. Whether, then, Uzziah turned necessity to a virtue, I know not: it is evident, that God's law removed the actual exercise of his power. If we obtain this, which God's word doth give us, we have enough for our purpose, though Uzziah kept the naked title of a king, as indeed he took but up room in the catalogue of kings. Now, if by law he was cut off from actual governing, whether he was willing or not willing to denude himself of reigning, is all one. And to say, that furious men, idiots, stupid men, and children, who must do all royal acts by curators and tutors, are kings jure, with correction, is petitio principii; for then hath God infused immediately from heaven (as royalists teach us) a royal power to govern a kingdom, on those who are as capable of royalty as blocks. I conceive that the Lord (Deut. 17:14–17) commandeth the people to make no blocks kings; and that the Lord hath not done that himself in a binding law to us, which we have no commandment from him to do. I conceive that God made Josiah and Joash kings typical, and in destination, for his promise sake to David, while they were children, as well as he made them kings; but not actu completo ratione officii, to be a rule to us now, to make a child of six years of age a king by office. I conceive children are to us only kings in destination and appointment; and for idiots and fools, I shall not believe (let royalists break their faith upon so rocky and stony a point, at their pleasure) that God hath made them governors of others, by royal office, who can scarce number their own fingers; or that God tyeth a people to acknowledge stupid blocks for royal governors of a kingdom, who cannot govern themselves. But far be it from me to argue with Bellarmine, (de pænit. l. 3, c. 2,) from Uzziah's bodily leprosy to infer that any prince who is spiritually leprous and turned heretical, is presently to be dethroned. Nothing can dethrone a king but such tyranny as is inconsistent with his royal office. Nor durst I infer that kings, now a-days, may be removed from actual government for one single transgression. It is true, eighty priests, and the whole kingdom, so serving king Uzziah (their motives, I know, were divine) proveth well that the subjects may punish the transgression of God's express law in the kins, in some cases even to remove him from the throne; but as from God's commanding to stone the man that gathered sticks on the Sabbath-day, we cannot infer that Sabbath-breakers are now to be punished with death; yet we may well argue, Sabbath-breakers may be punished, and Sabbath-breakers are not unpunishable, and above all law; so may we argue here, Uzziah, though a king, was punished; therefore kings are punishable by subjects.
答案：虽然我们应该说他没有正式被废黜和废位，但如果皇权是一个不可分割的点，正如一些皇室主义者所说，如果乌西雅被送到一个私人住宅，不能统治，因为他是一个麻风病人；那么肯定剥夺了很多皇权。阿尼塞乌斯说得对，他既不能被强迫辞去权力，也没有被强迫辞去皇权；但他自愿辞去了实际的统治，仍然是国王，就像疯狂或愚蠢的国王和孩子们被指定为国王的监护人一样，他们通过合法国王的权威来统治一切。但乌西雅并不是自愿放弃皇权的，这是明确的。《历代志下》26:21 的原因是，他住在一个独立的房子里，没有实际统治，是因为他是一个麻风病人；因为“他被割断（经文说）离开耶和华的殿；约坦，他的儿子，管理王宫，审判国家的人民。”由此可见，根据上帝的明确法律，他是一个麻风病人，因此不能按照法律进入会众，他被割断离开耶和华的殿；他是被动的，被称为被割断离开主的殿。 乌西雅是否将必要性转化为美德，我不知道：显然，上帝的法律取消了他实际行使权力的机会。如果我们获得了上帝的话语给予我们的东西，那就足够了，尽管乌西雅仍然保留着国王的虚名，实际上他只是在国王名单中占了个位置。现在，如果按照法律，他被剥夺了实际统治的权力，无论他是否愿意放弃统治，都是一样的。而说狂暴的人、白痴、愚蠢的人和孩子们，必须通过监护人和导师来执行所有国王的行为，是先验的；因为上帝（正如君主主义者所教导我们的）已经直接从天上赋予了统治王国的权力，给那些和木块一样有资格担任国王的人。我认为，主（申命记 17:14-17）命令人民不要让木块成为国王；而主自己并没有通过一项对我们有约束力的法律来做到这一点，我们也没有他的命令来这样做。 我认为上帝使约西亚和约阿施成为典型的国王，并且出于对大卫的应许，他们在孩童时期就被任命为国王，但并非完全按照职责的实际完成来说，现在我们不能按照职务让一个六岁的孩子成为国王。我认为对我们来说，孩子只是在命运和任命上成为国王；至于白痴和傻瓜，我不会相信（让君主派在这个岩石般坚硬的观点上背弃他们的信仰），上帝已经通过王室职务使他们成为他人的统治者，他们自己都几乎数不清自己的手指；或者上帝会让一个国家承认愚蠢的木头为王国的统治者，他们连自己都无法管理。但我绝不会与贝拉明（de pænit. l. 3, c. 2）争论，从乌西雅的身体麻风病推断出任何在精神上患有麻风病并转变为异端的王子应立即被废黜。只有与王室职务不相容的暴政才能废黜国王。我也不敢推断现在的国王可能因为一次过失而被撤职。 这是真的，八十位祭司和整个王国都侍奉乌西雅王（我知道他们的动机是神圣的），这充分证明臣民可以惩罚国王违反上帝明文法律的行为，有时甚至可以将其废黜；但就像上帝命令用石头砸死在安息日采集柴火的人一样，我们不能推断现在安息日破坏者应该受到死刑惩罚；然而我们可以合理地推论，安息日破坏者可以受到惩罚，他们并不是不可惩罚的，也不是超越法律之上的；因此我们可以得出这样的论断，乌西雅虽然是国王，却受到了惩罚；因此国王是可以被臣民惩罚的。

Quest 16.—Whether or no, as the denial of active obedience in things unlawful is not dishonourable to the king, as king, he being obliged to command in the Lord only, so the denial of passive subjection to the king using unjust violence, be also no dishonouring of the king.
问题 16.——无论如何，既然在不合法的事情上拒绝主动服从对国王来说并不是对他作为国王的不敬，因为他只有在主的命令下才有义务发号施令，那么对使用不公正的暴力的国王拒绝被动服从也不是对国王的不敬。

Ans.—As the king is under God's law both in commanding and in exacting active obedience, so is he under the same regulating law of God, in punishing or demanding of us passive subjection, and as he may not command what he will, but what the King of kings warranteth him to command, so may he not punish as he will, but by warrant also of the Supreme Judge of all the earth; and therefore it is not dishonourable to the majesty of the ruler, that we deny passive subjection to him when he punisheth beside his warrant, more than it is against his majesty and honour that we deny active obedience when he commandeth illegally; else I see not how it is lawful to fly from a tyrannous king, as Elias, Christ, and other of the witnesses of our Lord have done; and, therefore, what royalists say here is a great untruth, namely, that in things lawful we must be subject actively,—in things unlawful, passively. For as we are in things lawful to be subject actively, so there is no duty in point of conscience, laying on us to be subject passively, because I may lawfully fly, and so lawfully deny passive subjection to the king's will, punishing unjustly.
答案：正如国王在命令和要求积极服从方面受到上帝的法律约束，他在惩罚或要求我们被动服从方面也受到上帝的同样调节法律的约束。他不能随心所欲地命令，而是必须得到万王之王的授权，同样，他也不能随心所欲地惩罚，而是需要得到全地的至高审判者的授权。因此，当国王在超出授权范围惩罚时，我们拒绝被动服从并不是对统治者威严的不敬，就像当他非法命令时我们拒绝积极服从一样。否则，我不明白为什么逃离暴君国王是合法的，正如以利亚、基督和其他主的见证人所做的那样。因此，王党主义者在这里所说的是一个巨大的谎言，即在合法的事情上我们必须积极服从，在非法的事情上我们必须被动服从。因为正如我们在合法的事情上应该积极服从一样，在道德上并没有责任要求我们被动服从，因为我可以合法地逃离，并且合法地拒绝对国王不公正的惩罚被动服从。

Quest. 17.—Whether the prince may make away any part of his dominions, as an island, or a kingdom, for the safety of the whole kingdoms he hath; as if goods be like to sink an over-burthened ship, the seamen cast away a part of the goods in the sea, to save the lives of the whole passengers; and if three thousand passengers being in one ship, and the ship in a storm like to be lost, it would seem that a thousand may be cast over board, to save the lives of the whole passengers.
问题 17：国王是否可以为了整个王国的安全而放弃其领土的一部分，比如一个岛屿或一个王国，就像货物可能会使超载的船沉没，水手们会把一部分货物扔进海里，以拯救所有乘客的生命一样；如果一艘船上有三千名乘客，而船在一场即将沉没的风暴中，似乎可以扔下一千人，以拯救所有乘客的生命。

Ans.—The kingdom being not the king's proper heritage, it would seem he cannot make away any part of his kingdom to save the whole, without the express consent of that part, though they be made away to save the whole. In things of this find, men are not as the commodities of merchants, nor is the case alike; as when one thousand, of three thousand, are to be cast into the sea to save all the rest, and that either by common consent, or by lots, or some other way; for it is one thing, when destruction is evidently inevitable, as in the casting so many men into the sea to save the whole and many passengers, and when a king for peace, or for help from another king, maketh away part of his dominion. The Lord is here to be waited on in his good providence, and events are to be committed to him; but far less, can it be imaginably lawful for a king to make away a part of his dominions without their consent, that he may have help from a foreign prince to destroy the rest: this were to make merchandise of the lives of men.
答案：由于王国不是国王的私产，所以似乎他不能在没有该部分明确同意的情况下，将王国的任何部分转让以保全整个王国，即使这样做是为了保全整个王国。在这种情况下，人们不像商人的商品那样，情况也不一样；比如当有三千人中的一千人需要被投入海中以保全其余的人，无论是通过共识、抽签还是其他方式，这是一回事；因为当毁灭显然是不可避免的时候，比如为了保全整个王国和许多乘客而将这么多人投入海中，或者当国王为了和平或从另一个国王那里得到帮助而放弃他的部分领土时，情况就不同了。在这里，应该等待上帝的善意安排，事件应该交托给他；但是，国王想要在没有他们的同意的情况下放弃他的部分领土，以便从外国王子那里得到帮助来摧毁其余的部分，这是不可想象的合法的；这将是将人的生命当作商品来交易。

Quest. 18.—Whether or no the convening of the subjects, without the king's will, be unlawful.
问题 18：是否非法在没有国王意愿的情况下召集臣民？

Ans.—The convention of men, of itself, is an indifferent thing, and taketh its specification from its causes, and manner of convening, though some convention of the subjects without the king, be forbidden; yet ratio legis est anima legis, the reason and intent of the law, is the soul of the law. Convention of the subjects, in a tumultuary way, for a seditious end, to make war without warrant of law, is forbidden; but not when religion, laws, liberties, invasion of foreign enemies, necessitated the subjects to convene, though the king and ordinary judicatures, going a corrupt way to pervert judgment, shall refuse to consent to their conventions. Upon which ground, no convention of tables at Edinburgh, or any other place, (an. 1637, 1638, 1639,) can be judged there unlawful; for if these be unlawful, because they are conventions of the leagues, without express act of parliament, then the convention of the leagues to quench a house on fire, and the convention of a country to pursue a wolf entered in the land to destroy women and children, which are warranted by the law of nature, should be lawless, or against acts of parliament.
答案——男人的约定本身是一件中立的事情，它的具体规定取决于其原因和召集方式，尽管一些没有国王参与的主体约定是被禁止的；但是法律的理由和意图是法律的灵魂。主体的骚乱约定，为了叛乱的目的，没有法律授权就发动战争是被禁止的；但是当宗教、法律、自由、外国敌人的入侵迫使主体召集时，这是允许的，尽管国王和普通法院走上了腐败的道路来扭曲判断，拒绝同意他们的约定。基于这个理由，爱丁堡或其他地方的桌子约定（1637 年，1638 年，1639 年）不能被认为是非法的；因为如果这些是非法的，因为它们是没有明确的议会法案的联盟约定，那么灭火的联盟约定和追捕进入土地破坏妇女和儿童的狼的国家约定，这些都是被自然法律所保证的，应该是违法的，或者违反了议会法案。

Quest. 19.—Whether the subjects be obliged to pay the debts of the king.
问题 19：是否要求臣民偿还国王的债务。

Ans.—These debts which the king contracteth as king, in throno regali, the people are to pay. For the law of nature and the divine law doth prove, that to every servant and minister wages is due. (Rom. 13:5, 6, compared with verse 4, and 1 Cor. 9:9–12; 1 Tim. 5:18.) If the prince be taken in a war, for the defence of the people, it is just that he be redeemed by them: so the law saith, (tit. F. et C. de negotiis gestis, et F. et C. Manda.) But, Ferdinandus Vasquez (illust quest. I. 1, c. 7, n. 6, Vicesimo tertio apparet, &c.) saith, if the prince was not doing the business of the public, and did make war without advice and consent of the people, then are they not to redeem him. Now certain it is, when the king raiseth war, and saith, "God do so to me and mine, if I intend any thing but peace," yet maketh war not only against his oath, but also without consent of the parliament, and a parliament at that time convocated by his own royal writ, and not raised, and dissolved at all, but still sitting formally a parliament; if he borrow money from his own subjects, and from foreign princes, to raise war against his subjects and parliament, then the people are not obliged to pay his debts, 1. Because they are obliged to the king only as a king, and not as an enemy; but in so raising war he cannot he considered as a king. 2. Though if the people agree with him, and still acknowledge him king; it is impossible, physice, he can be their king, and they not pay his debts; yet they sin not, but may, ex decentia, non ex debito legali, pay his debts, yet are they not obliged by any law of God or man to pay his debts. But though it be true, by all law the king is obliged to pay his debt, (except we say, that all the people's goods are the king's: a compendious way, I confess, to pay aff that any voluptuous Heliogabolus shall contract,) yet it may easily be proved, that what his subjects and foreign princes lent him to the raising of an unjust war are not properly debts, but expenses unjustly given out under the reduplication of formal enemies to the country, and so not payable by the subjects; and this is evident by law, because one may give most unjustly monies to his neighbour, under the notion of loan, which yet hath nothing of the essence of loan and debt, but is mere delapidation, and cannot properly be debt by God's law; for the law regulateth a man in borrowing and lending, as in other politic actions. If I, out of desire of revenge, should lend monies to a robber to buy powder and fuel to burn an innocent city, or to buy armour to kill innocent men, I deny that that is legally debt. I dispute not whether A. B., borrowing money formally, that thereby he may waste it on debauchery, shall be obliged to repay it to C. D. under the reduplication of debt; or if the borrower be obliged to pay what the lender hath unjustly lent. I dare not pray to God that all our king's debts may be paid; I have scarce faith so to do.
答案：这些债务是国王作为国王所负担的，人民应该支付。因为自然法和神法证明，每个仆人和仆役都应该得到工资。（罗马书 13:5, 6 与第 4 节以及哥林多前书 9:9-12; 提摩太前书 5:18 进行比较。）如果王子在保卫人民的战争中被俘，人民有责任赎回他：法律如此规定。（tit. F. et C. de negotiis gestis, et F. et C. Manda.）但是，费迪南多·瓦斯克斯（illust quest. I. 1, c. 7, n. 6, Vicesimo tertio apparet, &c.）说，如果王子没有为公众办事，并且在未经人民同意和咨询的情况下发动战争，那么他们就不需要赎回他。 现在可以确定的是，当国王发动战争并说：“上帝对我和我的人民如此，如果我没有别的意图，只是为了和平”，然而他不仅违背了誓言，而且没有经过议会同意，而是在他自己的皇家令状下召集的议会，并且没有解散，而是继续正式地开会；如果他向自己的臣民和外国君主借钱，以对抗他的臣民和议会，那么人民没有义务偿还他的债务，1. 因为他们只对国王作为国王有义务，而不是作为敌人；但是，如果他们同意并继续承认他为国王；从物理上讲，他不可能是他们的国王，而他们不支付他的债务；然而，他们并不犯罪，但可以出于礼貌而非法律义务地偿还他的债务，然而，他们没有任何上帝或人的法律义务来偿还他的债务。 但尽管按照所有法律，国王有义务偿还债务（除非我们说，所有人民的财产都属于国王：我承认这是一种简便的方式，用来偿还任何放荡的赫利奥加拉布斯所积累的债务），但很容易证明，他的臣民和外国王子借给他用于发动不正义战争的款项并不是真正的债务，而是在国家正式敌人的重复下不正当地支出的费用，因此不应由臣民偿还；这在法律上是明显的，因为一个人可以极不公正地向他的邻居借钱，以借款的名义，但这并不具备借贷和债务的本质，而是纯粹的挥霍，在上帝的法律中不能被视为债务；因为法律在借贷和贷款等政治行为中对人进行规范。如果我出于复仇的欲望，借钱给一个强盗买火药和燃料来烧毁一个无辜的城市，或者买武器来杀害无辜的人，我否认那是合法的债务。我不争论 A.B.是否正式借钱，以便可以在放荡上浪费，是否有义务偿还给 C.D. 在债务的重复下；或者如果借款人被迫偿还借款人不正当借出的款项。我不敢向上帝祈祷，希望我们国王的所有债务都能偿还；我几乎没有这样的信心。

Quest. 20.—Whether subsidies be due to the king as king.
问题 20：是否应该向国王作为国王支付补贴。

Ans.—There is a twofold subsidy; one debitum, of debt; another, charitativum, by way of charity. A subsidy of debt is rather the kingdom's due for their necessity than the king's due, as a part of his rent. We read of customs due to the king as king, and for conscience sake, (Rom. 13:5, 6,) never of a subsidy or taxation to the kings of Israel and Judah, at any convention of the states. Augustus Cæsar's taxing of all the world (Luke 2) for the maintenance of wars, cannot be the proper rent of Augustus, as emperor, but the rent of the Roman empire; and it is but the act of a man. Charitative subsidies to the king, of indulgence, because, through bad husbanding of the king's rents, he hath contracted debts, I judge no better than royal and princely begging. Yet lawful they are, as I owe charity to my brother, so to my father, so to my politic father the king. See Ferd. Vasq. (illust, quest. I. 1, c. 8) who desireth that superiors, under the name of charity, hide not rapine, and citeth Cicero, gravely saying, (offic. l. 1,) "Nulla generi humano et justitiæ major pestis est, quam eorum, qui dum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut boni viri esse videantur," &c.
答案：有两种补贴；一种是债务补贴，另一种是慈善补贴。债务补贴更多是王国因为需要而应得的，而不是国王应得的，作为他的租金的一部分。我们读到过应归国王为国王的关税，也为了良心的缘故（罗马书 13:5,6），但从未听说过以色列和犹大的国王在任何国家会议上征收补贴或税款。奥古斯都·凯撒对全世界征税（路加福音 2 章）是为了维持战争，这不可能是奥古斯都作为皇帝的合理租金，而是罗马帝国的租金；这只是一个人的行为。对国王的慈善补贴是出于宽容，因为由于国王租金的不善管理，他积累了债务，我认为这不过是国王和王子的乞讨。然而，它们是合法的，因为我对我的兄弟、对我的父亲、对我的政治父亲国王都有责任慈善。参见费尔迪南德·瓦斯克（illust, quest. I. 1, c. 8），他希望上级不要以慈善的名义掩盖掠夺，并引用西塞罗的话，庄重地说（offic. l. 1）：“对人类和正义来说，没有比那些在最欺骗人的时候却努力显得善良的人更大的祸害。”

Quest. 21.—Whether the seas, floods, roadways, castles, ports, public magazine, militia, armour, forts, and strongholds be the king's.
问题 21：海洋、洪水、道路、城堡、港口、公共仓库、民兵、盔甲、堡垒和要塞是否属于国王。

Ans.—All these may be understood to be the king's in divers notions. 1. They are the king's, quoad custodiam, et publicam possessionem, as a pawn is the man's in whose hand the pawn is laid down. 2. They are the king's, quoad jurisdictionem cumulativam, non privativam. The king is to direct, and royally to command, that the castles, forts, ports, strongholds, armour, magazine, militia, be employed for the safety of the kingdom. All the ways, bridges, and public roadways, are the king's, in so far as he, as a public and royal watchman, is to secure the subject from robbers, and to cognosce of unknown murders, by himself and the inferior judges; yet may not the king employ any of these against the kingdom. 3. They are the kings, as he is king, quoad officialem, et regalem, et publicam proprietatem; for he hath a royal and princely propriety to all these, as his own, in so far as he useth them according to law. 4. And thus they are the king's also, quoad usum, in regard of official use. But, 1. They are the kingdom's, quoad fructum, in regard of the effect and fruit. 2. They are the kingdom's, finaliter, being destinated for the safety and security of the kingdom. 3. They are the kingdom's, quoad proprie-tatem propriam, et legalem stricte sumptam, according to the proper and legal propriety; and are not the king's proper heritage as he is a man: 1. Because he may not sell these forts, strongholds, ports, magazine, bridges, &c. to a stranger, or a foreign prince. 2. When the king is dead, and his heirs and royal line interrupted, these all remain proper to the kingdom; yet so as the state cannot, as they are men, make them away, or sell them, more than the king; for no public persons, yea the multitude cannot make away the security, safety, and that which necessarily conduceth to the security of the posterity. "The Lord build his own Zion, and appoint salvation for walls and bulwarks!"
答案-所有这些可以理解为国王在不同意义上的所有物。1. 从监护和公共占有的角度来看，它们是国王的，就像当一个典当品被放在某人手中时，它就是那个人的一样。2. 从累积的而不是排他的管辖权来看，它们是国王的。国王有权指挥和命令，要求城堡、堡垒、港口、要塞、武器库和民兵用于保护王国的安全。所有的道路、桥梁和公共道路都是国王的，因为他作为一个公共和皇家的守卫，要保护公民免受强盗的侵害，并通过自己和下级法官来审理未知的谋杀案件；然而国王不能利用这些来对付王国。3. 从国王作为国王的角度来看，它们也是国王的，作为他的官方、皇家和公共财产；因为他对所有这些都有皇家和王子般的所有权，只要他按照法律使用它们。4. 从官方使用的角度来看，它们也是国王的。但是，1. 从效果和结果的角度来看，它们是王国的。2. 从最终目的来看，它们是王国的，被指定为王国的安全和保障。3. 他们属于王国，按照适当和合法的所有权，而不是作为国王作为一个人的合法继承物：1. 因为他不能将这些堡垒、要塞、港口、仓库、桥梁等出售给陌生人或外国王子。2. 当国王去世，他的继承人和王室血统中断时，这些都仍然属于王国；然而，国家不能像他们是人一样将它们处理掉或出售，因为没有公共人物，甚至是大众，能够放弃后代的安全、安全性以及必要的安全措施。"主啊，求你建立你自己的锡安，为城墙和保障指定救恩！""

THE END.

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